Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 26th October 2016
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-II(b) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (26 Oct 2016)
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to make a statutory provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response to serious flooding.
Part 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 sets out the statutory core functions of fire and rescue authorities: fire safety, firefighting, and rescuing people and protecting them from harm in the event of road traffic accidents. The 2004 Act also gives the Secretary of State the power to give fire and rescue authorities functions relating to other emergencies, including outside the fire and rescue authority’s area. This is an order-making power and does not require primary legislation.
There is thus no statutory duty on the fire and rescue services for emergencies arising from flooding, yet flooding is on the increase. Government figures show that in 2007 there were 14,000 flooding calls; in 2011-12 there were 16,000; and in 2013-14 there were 18,000. I also sense that the extent of flooding is becoming more serious. The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service said that on Boxing Day last year it deployed two-thirds of its available resources on flood response. The 2008 Pitt review into the 2007 floods said that a statutory duty would be beneficial and recommended that the Government should urgently put in place a fully funded national capability for flood rescue, with fire and rescue authorities playing a leading role underpinned as necessary by a statutory duty.
The case for a statutory duty on the fire and rescue services is now stronger than it was in 2008, with more and more flood calls but fewer staff, less equipment and fewer fire stations. In parts of the United Kingdom there is already a statutory duty on flooding, namely in Scotland since April 2013 and Northern Ireland since January 2012. A statutory duty would assist in adding to the resilience of fire and rescue services when faced with flooding, assist with strategic planning between fire and rescue services and local resilience forums, and underscore the need to resource fire and rescue services specifically for flooding.
The Government’s approach to date appears to be that there is no need for a statutory duty because the fire and rescue services will turn up as necessary anyway even though it is not a statutory core function. On the basis of that argument one might as well remove all the existing statutory core functions of the fire and rescue services on the basis that they will turn up anyway. The reality is that additions are made to statutory functions to reflect changing circumstances.
The fire service has been rescuing people from road traffic crashes for decades, but it was felt that a statutory duty was needed and the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 addressed that. The fire service had been providing fire protection for centuries, but a statutory duty was introduced in 1947. Now is surely the time to introduce a statutory duty on flooding to reflect and recognise the vastly increased role of the fire and rescue services in this area of emergency provision. The Government talk about the need to reform our emergency services and bring them up to date. Perhaps the Government need to do the same for the statutory functions of the fire and rescue services. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, while I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on a statutory core function or a statutory duty on flooding for the fire and rescue service, we are a little concerned about the wording of his amendment which reads:
“The Secretary of State shall make provision for the fire and rescue services in England to lead and co-ordinate the emergency service response”.
It is accepted practice among all the emergency services that the police co-ordinate during the emergency phase of any emergency, whether flooding or anything else, partly because there is a duty on the police to investigate. For example, one can imagine a scenario where flooding is caused by a criminal act. It is generally accepted practice and has been for many years that the police service should lead and co-ordinate in every emergency situation. That is slightly different from what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is saying in terms of the fire and rescue services having a statutory core function or duty but we do not believe that that should be to lead and co-ordinate in the case of flooding.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, if I say this at the beginning of the afternoon, I hope I will not have to repeat it, but I declare an interest as having been a member of the police service for 30 years. In moving Amendment 124, I will also speak to the other amendment in this group, Amendment 127.
Clause 12 allows a police and crime commissioner—or the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime in relation to the Metropolitan Police district, or the Common Council in relation to the City of London police area—to choose to take on direct responsibility for receiving and recording complaints against the police and keeping the complainant informed of progress.
The problem here is that this may further confuse the public about who they should complain to. People are already unsure whether they should complain to a local police station, to the IPCC or to a third party. This change will inevitably mean that in some parts of the country, the complaint needs to be made to the police and crime commissioner—the local policing authority, to use a generic term—who will then deal with the complaint and keep the complainant informed. In other cases, it will be the police service itself, depending on whether the local policing authority takes up the offer provided by the legislation to take on the handling of complaints.
The idea of giving local policing authorities responsibility for complaints against the police, as opposed to the chief officer, is a good one. It will introduce a further element of independence into the police complaints system, but allowing local policing authorities simply the option—and indeed allowing local policing authorities to be persuaded by their chief constable not to take responsibility away from her or him—appears to me to be a fudge. Indeed, the more a chief constable tries to persuade his or her PCC not to take away the responsibility, the more the PCC should resist such pressure, in my opinion. This amendment would require the local policing authority to take over these statutory responsibilities, to ensure independence and clarity for the public.
I turn to Amendment 127. Clause 22 inserts into Section 23 of the Police Reform Act 2002, titled “Regulations”, a new paragraph which gives local policing authorities the power,
“to delegate the exercise or performance of powers and duties conferred or imposed on them”,
in relation to the handling of complaints against police. In a subsequent subsection, which inserts new paragraphs into the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, the expression used is to “arrange” for another person,
“to exercise a function that the police and crime commissioner has”.
Although the Explanatory Notes give reassurance that liability remains at the top, Amendment 127 is intended to probe why there is a difference in the wording between the two different subsections and to ensure that the delegation of powers and duties does not include delegation of responsibility. I beg to move Amendment 124.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a police and crime commissioner, for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I will say a few words about this very interesting amendment, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, neither to praise it nor to condemn it, but just to tell the Committee something that it is probably aware of anyway. I suspect I speak for other police and crime commissioners as well when I say that as we speak here, we are considering which way to go, given the possibilities that the Bill opens up for us in terms of complaints. It is very interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggests that we should not have that option but should be compelled, as it were, to take all complaints at a low level and consider them. I am not so sure he is right—I do not know. I think there may in the end be a tendency among a number of police and crime commissioners, once the Bill is an Act and this legislation is law, to not take full responsibility for all complaints. I am not quite sure what the Government would like in this case: it may be that they really do not have a preference, and it would be interesting to hear from the Minister whether they do or not.
I have to tell the noble Lord that the chief constable in my patch has done absolutely nothing up until now to try and persuade me not to take the full gamut, but it may be different elsewhere. It is an interesting debate and I look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say. I suspect, if the Bill remains as it does up until it becomes an Act, then police and crime commissioners around the country will be doing different things.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will correct this if I am wrong. While I am not guessing, I am assuming that, particularly where you have the model with a mayoral PCC as well, the mayoral precept will enable some of those mayoral functions. On the additional resources, I would like to write to the noble Lord before Report as I would not want to say something to the Committee now that simply was not true.
Amendment 127 to Clause 22 relates to the ability of PCCs to delegate their complaints-related function. The amendment seeks to clarify the difference in language in the subsections of the clause, and I am happy to do that.
The reason for the difference in language between the subsections is that it aims to replicate the language already used in the corresponding Acts. Although subsection (1) uses different language to that in subsections (2) to (4), the policy intention and result is the same. Local policing authorities should and will be able to delegate their complaints-related functions. Regardless of whether any complaints-related functions have been delegated, the local policing body will retain ultimate responsibility for the complaints performance in its area. This follows the same model as chief constables delegating their complaints responsibilities to more junior ranks, where the chief constable is still ultimately responsible for the outcome.
I hope that those comments have reassured noble Lords and that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation on Amendment 127, which is a probing amendment. I am not as enthusiastic about her response to Amendment 124, and I am grateful that we have the noble Lord, Lord Bach, here as a living, breathing police and crime commissioner who can bring his experience to this. I have to say that, bringing my experience as a police officer, I believe that there would be great benefit if there was one system that members of the public knew and could rely on. For example, it would be of great benefit to the public if the decision on whether complaints were investigated was taken out of the hands of the police.
The Minister said that the purpose of the new provision was to restore trust. If the purpose is to restore trust and a PCC decides not to take up the offer, what are the constituents in a PCC’s area to think about that? However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I fear it will be like this for the rest of the afternoon. Amendment 124A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I shall speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 124B.
Clause 14 amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 in relation to keeping complainants—people who have complained about the police—informed of the progress of the investigation of their complaint. Subsection (3) substitutes the matters contained within it for those matters that subsection (3) of the 2002 Act required the complainant to be kept informed about. Basically, subsection (3) sets out what the complainant needs to be kept abreast of. One of the matters in the 2002 Act was to keep the complainant informed of,
“any provisional findings of the person carrying out the investigation”.
This requirement is no longer listed in the new subsection (3), and the amendment is to probe why it is no longer a requirement. Amendment 124B relates to the substitution of subsection (9) in Section 21 of the 2002 Act made by Clause 14(7), which again omits “any provisional findings” from the requirements in the 2002 Act. I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I understand absolutely the objective of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I have a lot of sympathy with what he is trying to get at. However, perhaps there is also need to look at the extent to which the public who have been victims of crime are also kept informed of the progress of investigations into those crimes. In exactly the same principles that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has outlined in terms of complaints against police officers, ought they perhaps also be applied to people who have been victims of crime?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contribution to this short debate. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton. It could be that giving “provisional findings”, which are not the ultimate findings, could create a false sense of expectation in the complainant and so forth. However, the question was around not whether that should be there but the reason for it being there. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said, there may be a sensible reason for taking it out in the new legislation, but I failed to hear a sensible reason for why it was formerly in primary legislation but will no longer be. Perhaps between now and Report we may be able to unearth that reason. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
“(aa) the complainant (who must be questioned as to whether he wishes the complaint to be recorded) does not indicate a wish that it not be recorded, or”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 125 is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to Amendment 126. In Schedule 5, Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2000 is amended after sub–paragraph (6) by inserting a new sub-paragraph (6A) in relation to when a complaint against police must be recorded. It states that a complaint must be recorded if,
“at any time the complainant indicates a wish for the complaint to be recorded”.
Our amendment adds a requirement that the complainant must be asked whether he wishes the complaint to be recorded and states that unless he positively indicates that he does not wish the complaint to be recorded, it must be recorded.
From a wealth of personal experience in this area, I know that it is very easy for a complainant to be misled, albeit unintentionally, about whether his complaint will be formally recorded or even to be dissuaded from having a legitimate complaint recorded. The current wording gives the police or the local policing body, if it takes over responsibility, the ability not to record a complaint unless the complainant specifically asks that it be recorded. If the police inspector at the front counter tells the complainant not to worry but to leave it to him as he will have a word with the officer concerned and there is no specific request that the complaint be recorded, it could result in a complaint not being recorded when the complainant believes that it has been. This amendment is designed to reduce the chance of that happening.
Amendment 126 relates to a different issue: the conduct of chief officers of police. Part 3 of Schedule 5 is intended to require the referral of all complaints and matters concerning the conduct of chief officers to the Independent Police Complaints Commission by inserting new paragraphs into Part 3 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. They provide new powers to enable the Secretary of State to specify in regulations that the IPCC must independently investigate all complaints, recordable conduct matters, and deaths and serious injury matters which relate to the conduct of a chief officer or the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
Assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police wear the same badge of rank as, and are considered to be at least the equivalent of, chief constables or chief officers. In fact, they are paid at the highest rate of chief officer, with the exception of the commissioner and deputy commissioner of the Met, a salary equivalent to that of the chief constables of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Scotland, the West Midlands Police and Greater Manchester Police. The assistant commissioner of the City of London Police wears the insignia of, and is considered equivalent to, a deputy chief officer and is outside the scope of this provision and the amendment. Will the Minister explain why assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police are not included with the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police as officers complaints about whom must be referred to the IPCC? Our amendments would add assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to the list of compulsory referrals. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the purpose of the two amendments. The handling of complaints about the police must be customer-focused, simple to understand and transparent throughout. It is widely accepted that the current system is confusing, complicated and, in many cases, unclear. Through the reforms made in the Bill, we are ensuring that cases are dealt with quickly and effectively, for the benefit not just of the public but of officers who have done nothing wrong. Many forces already currently operate customer service teams through which all complaints about the force are filtered and whereby they try to resolve quality-of-service issues as soon as possible. The reforms in the Bill explicitly provide for that sort of model and try to make it as bureaucracy free and straightforward as appropriate.
The evidence is that this approach works. In Derbyshire in 2014-15, for example, 47% of issues raised about the force were handled outside of the formal complaints system. In Northumbria, where the triage team sits in the office of the police and crime commissioner, 36% of issues raised about the force in the first six months of 2014 were handled in this manner, with 92% of complainants happy with how their issue was handled—and this is increasing. The Government want to encourage forces and local policing bodies such as PCCs to adopt this more customer-focused approach and to resolve as many complaints as possible quickly, simply and to the complainant’s satisfaction through this route. Amendment 125 would require complainants explicitly to confirm that they were content for the force or PCC to seek a customer service solution to their issue outside of the formal complaints system. I put it to the noble Lord that this approach risks limiting what forces can achieve through informal resolution.
The Government believe that this confirmation process would lead to fewer issues being dealt with in this way and, contrary to the policy intent, increase the number dealt with in the formal system. We think it right that, unless the complainant has offered an alternative view or the complaint falls into one of the categories outlined in the legislation for why this form of resolution is inappropriate—I shall discuss the safeguards shortly—the force or PCC should first have the opportunity to draw on their experience to seek to resolve the matter through its own customer service processes. I reassure the noble Lord that the Bill includes extensive provisions to ensure the complainant is in control in this process and that forces can resolve issues outside of the complaints system only when it is appropriate to do so.
There is a clear expectation on PCCs, with their new explicit responsibility for oversight of the complaints system locally, as provided for in Clause 21, to ensure clear communication is provided to complainants about their rights when they make a complaint and how the process will work. This includes explaining that, if at any point a complainant wants his or her complaint to be recorded, it will be recorded. If the force pursues a customer service solution that falls short of the complainant’s view on what constitutes a satisfactory resolution, they can request that the complaint be recorded and handled formally. There is a statutory duty at the outset of a complaint to contact the complainant to understand how the complaint might be best resolved. Statutory guidance will also make clear that, 10 days after receipt of a complaint, it should be formally recorded, even if a customer service approach may have been proportionate. This is to ensure that this form of resolution is limited to only those issues that can be resolved quickly. Beyond that, if there is any indication that the complaint might result in disciplinary or criminal proceedings, or might meet the criteria for mandatory referral to the IPCC, it must be recorded.
Finally, there will also be a requirement on forces, to be detailed in regulations or secondary legislation, to keep some information on the issues they resolve outside of the formal complaints system—the name of the complainant, the issue, and how it was resolved. This will allow PCCs locally to scrutinise those data and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary to inspect the robustness of the decision-making of forces in deciding what is suitable for an informal resolution. Given these safeguards, we are satisfied that there is no need for an explicit requirement that the complainant must agree at the outset to an issue being resolved informally. Ultimately, the priority for most complainants is that their complaint is dealt with to their satisfaction and as quickly as possible.
I turn to Amendment 126. The complaints and discipline system is designed on the premise that, unless matters are of exceptional seriousness and sensitivity and are therefore referred to the IPCC, they should be dealt with—in accordance with the legislation—within the force’s chain of command. The exception is where there is no ultimate senior officer, such as would arise where a complaint is made against a chief constable. In these cases, most complaints are investigated by the IPCC but some may end up being investigated by chief constables of other forces. In his independent review of the police disciplinary system in England and Wales, Chip Chapman recommended that all such investigations should be undertaken by an independent body. The Government agree with this recommendation and that is why the Bill introduces a new regulation-making power that will require complaints regarding the conduct of chief officers to be referred to the IPCC to determine whether it should conduct an independent investigation or direct an investigation. However, although the rank of Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service is one of the highest ranks in England and Wales, there is no need to include it in the proposed measure because it can be reasonably expected that the commissioner or deputy commissioner will oversee any investigation. I hope that this clarifies the matter and that, on the basis of my explanation, the noble Lord will feel free to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. As far as Amendment 125 is concerned, I have no issue with a complainant being offered the option of informal resolution or a “customer service solution”—I never heard of that when I was in the police service; it shows how things have moved on—or a formal complaint. The problem we keep encountering in this House is the Government saying, “Well, it’s going to be be in statutory guidance and of course, in practice, if it’s a serious complaint or something that should be recorded, it will be recorded”. Unfortunately, the real world is not quite as ideal as the Minister makes out.
As far as Amendment 126 is concerned, I was with the noble Baroness until she said that matters needed to be referred to the IPCC where there was no ultimate senior officer. Quite clearly, in the case of the Deputy Commissioner of the Met, which is a specific rank for which any complaints have to be referred to the IPCC, there clearly is an ultimate senior officer: the Commissioner of the Met. Unfortunately, the explanation given by the noble Baroness does not help me to understand why the Deputy Commissioner of the Met is specifically mentioned.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I can explain a bit further. While new paragraph 5(1)(a) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill, does cover the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, this is because, in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, the deputy commissioner is treated in the same way as the commissioner. The Secretary of State is responsible for appointing the investigator of any conduct matter relating to both the commissioner and deputy commissioner. There is no mechanism to allow investigations into the deputy commissioner to be conducted internally. I hope that I have not confused the noble Lord further; I am just seeking to clarify the position.
Lord Swinfen (Con)
Will my noble friend look at the practicality of the matter, which has been so well explained?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate and to the Minister. As regards the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, my reading of this is that it concerns complaints against the commissioner himself rather than vicarious liability responsibility—which, of course, the commissioner carries for all his officers. The clue lies in the fact that the legislation goes on to talk about “death or serious injury” matters—not that the commissioner is known for using physical violence against people.
Lord Bach
I am so sorry to interrupt again. I wonder whether there is a proper distinction between a complaint per se and a complaint that may be laid vicariously at the commissioner’s or chief constable’s door. Who will make that distinction when the complaint comes in? It will add to the existing bureaucracy and is another reason for listening very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, suggested a minute or two ago.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and I will leave it to the Government to respond. The deputy commissioner of the Met was, at least at one stage, considered to be a first among equals among assistant commissioners. I will have to read the second part of the Minister’s explanation on that issue. As regards the other matter, again, I will want to read carefully what the Minister said—but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 126A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to Amendment 165A in this group.
Clause 18 deals with sensitive information received by the IPCC and restrictions on disclosing that information. It amends Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 by inserting new Clause 21A, subsection (3) of which defines sensitive information as including,
“information obtained from a government department which, at the time it is provided to the Commission or the paragraph 18 investigator, is identified by the department as information the disclosure of which may, in the opinion of the relevant authority … cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”.
When this House recently considered the Investigatory Powers Bill, where matters were considered to be related to the economic interests of the United Kingdom it was made explicit that these were only where the economic interests were directly linked to national security. Amendment 126A would insert the wording,
“so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”,
to make it explicit in this Bill as well as in the Investigatory Powers Bill. Amendment 165A makes a similar change to the term “economic interests” in Clause 35, which amends Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996 in relation to the restriction on disclosure of sensitive information acquired by Her Majesty’s inspectors of constabulary. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 18 increases the protections afforded to any sensitive information that is obtained by the Independent Police Complaints Commission in the course of its investigations or by a police or National Crime Agency investigator conducting an investigation under the direction of the IPCC. Clause 18 ensures that where the IPCC or investigator receives “sensitive information” it must not disclose that information without the consent of the “relevant authority”, as defined in the clause. To assist the IPCC or investigator in fulfilling this requirement, Clause 18 places a duty on the person providing the information to make the IPCC or investigator aware that the information is sensitive and to provide enough detail to permit the identification of the appropriate “relevant authority”. Clause 35 does likewise in respect of sensitive information received by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.
“Sensitive information” in this context means: first, that provided by or that which relates to the security and intelligence services; secondly, information derived from interception; and thirdly, information provided by a government department which may, if disclosed, cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the country or any part of it. In such instances, the government department must identify it as such when it provides the information to the IPCC or investigator. Amendments 126A and 165A seek to narrow the third part of this definition by carving out information which may cause damage to the economic interests of the UK or part of the UK, unless there is a national security link. In effect, this would mean that the IPCC, investigator or HMIC would not need the relevant authority’s consent to disclose certain economically sensitive information that could, if disclosed or handled inappropriately, have a negative economic impact on the country. The drafting approach taken in the Bill in relation to the definition of “sensitive information” is not new. The drafting simply replicates the existing definition in paragraph 19ZD of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, which these provisions replace.
I stress that the primary purpose of Clauses 18 and 35 is not to prevent sensitive information being provided for legitimate reasons, such as to the CPS in the event of criminal proceedings, but, rather, to protect that information and ensure that it is handled appropriately. Simply because a piece of information falls under the definition of “sensitive information” in Clauses 18 or 35, the relevant authority cannot unreasonably withhold its consent to its disclosure; it is a matter of public law that decisions made by the relevant authorities must be both reasonable and rational. The Government are simply closing a gap to provide additional certainty and reassurance around the handling of sensitive information, not to prevent any greater disclosure than is absolutely necessary.
I hope that that has clarified the matter for the noble Lord and that he is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for that lengthy explanation, but it does not answer the question that I asked. The drafting may not be new but my understanding is that it is inconsistent with the Investigatory Powers Bill. We sought clarification and the Government agreed to put it on the face of the Bill that economic interests meant economic interests that are likely to impact on national security. It may be consistent with previous legislation but my understanding is that it is not consistent with the most recent legislation. That is the question that I hoped she would answer. I understand and accept everything that she has said; it is what is missing that is key.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Perhaps I can provide further clarification, although I am not sure that it will clarify matters much better. Clause 18 talks about,
“the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”.
Clause 62 of the Investigatory Powers Bill says,
“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.
There is a variation in the drafting of the two Bills because the provisions serve entirely different purposes. It is right that where authority is being sought to obtain communications data or to issue warrants for the purpose of the economic well-being of the UK, it should be done only where it is also relevant to the interests of national security. In Clause 18 of this Bill, the definition of “sensitive information” is intended to provide a safeguard to ensure that, whenever the IPCC handles particular types of information that originate from the security services or from government departments, it checks with the relevant authority before disclosing that information. The noble Lord does not look convinced but I hope that that has provided further clarification.
Lord Paddick
I need to improve my poker face skills. I am very grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I will read it to see whether I can get the answer to my question from what she has said, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 128 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee I will speak also to the other amendments in the group—Amendments 129 and 130. These are probing amendments that relate to which bodies can be designated as being eligible to bring super-complaints against the police.
Bodies are to be designated by the Secretary of State through regulations. Clause 25 inserts a new Section 29B into Part 2A of the Police Reform Act 2002. Subsection (5) of new Section 29B states:
“The Secretary of State must, before making regulations under subsection (3) or (4), consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
However, it does not require the Secretary of State to consult on subsection (1). Adding in reference to subsection (1) means that the Secretary of State would have to consult before making the regulations that designate which bodies should be capable of bringing super-complaints. Those regulations presumably will set out the criteria referred to in subsections (3) and (4). That means that there will be consultation on those as well.
Amendment 129 lists the three bodies—the Law Society of England and Wales, the National Council of Voluntary Organisations, and Citizens Advice—that, along with others as specified by the Secretary of State, would be made “authorised” persons for the purposes of subsection (2)(d). That gives them a role in designation, as they are likely to know the territory and issues involved, know their members and know which the good non-governmental organisations are, and so on.
Amendment 130 is intended to ensure that the first regulations made under subsections (1), (3) and (4) of new Section 29B are subject to the affirmative resolution process. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, this section of the Bill gives the power to designated bodies to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. The complaints can be made where, in the opinion of those bodies, a feature of policing is harming the public and needs to be looked at.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, listed three organisations to make these super-complaints to be put on the face of the Bill. I have some sympathy with the amendments that have been put forward, but I understand that they are probing amendments. I hope that when the noble Baroness replies she can give us some indication of the organisations likely to be designated to make these complaints under the regulations. It is important that, when creating these new powers, we have some idea of what the organisations are likely to be. Are those listed in the amendment likely candidates to be designated when this comes into force, or are there others?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I do not have a timescale. I do not want to give the noble Lord false information, so it is only fair that I write to him.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, and for the response given by the Minister. I have a confession to make: I did not write the amendments. I am glad to see that everyone fell into the same trap I did. The intention of Amendment 128, whether or not it would be the effect, is for there to be consultation on the regulations, not each time an organisation is designated. It could be that it is a mistake in the drafting—I can say that because I did not draft them.
The organisations listed in Amendment 129 are suggestions as to who authorised persons should be under the Act, not who the designated bodies should be. The authorised persons are those who can make representations to the Secretary of State to have a particular body designated or removed from the list of designated bodies. That is what I believe I explained when I introduced the amendment. The list that includes the Law Society and so forth is not a list of bodies that we think should be designated, but a list of people who should be authorised persons who can then ask the Secretary of State to add or remove people from the list of designated bodies.
I will read again the view of the Delegated Powers Committee so far as Amendment 130 is concerned, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 128.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The second stage of Leveson is a very important stage of the investigation into the conduct of the police and the media. It is essential that it is carried out as soon as possible, bearing in mind that there may be outstanding criminal cases that need to be dealt with first.
It is understandable that a slightly one-sided picture has been given of the relationship between police and press. There are many entirely appropriate relationships between the media and press which are beneficial to the public interest. For example, appeals for witnesses to a serious crime can receive the wide publicity sometimes required only with the co-operation of the media and local press. There are searches for missing persons, where an appeal needs to be made nationally to try to identify where a vulnerable person might be. Clearly, there are examples of the opposite. Hillsborough is one. Another rather common example is where, sadly, the police brief the media casting doubt on the character of those who died at the hands of the police.
I am not saying that it is entirely a positive relationship but it is necessary for the police to have a relationship with the media. It is important to differentiate between positive and appropriate relationships and negative and entirely inappropriate ones, particularly, as happened with the phone hacking case, where there was at least the opportunity for critics of the police to suggest that their lack of enthusiasm initially to investigate phone hacking by the media might have had something to do with that too-close relationship. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Rosser. I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I very much support the police. They do a fantastic job for us and put their lives on the line every day to keep us safe.
The noble Lord is right when he talks about the need for an appropriate relationship between the media and the police, and how important that is. Equally, as my noble friend Lord Rosser said, there are obviously times when things go wrong. Clearly what happened at Hillsborough was an absolute tragedy. Can you imagine losing a loved one on that day and then having to endure the abuse in the media which has clearly now been shown not to be true? We should pay tribute to the steely determination of the Hillsborough families to get justice for their loved ones. They not only lost them but saw their names dragged through the mud.
It is important that we get to the point where the Government can clarify that they will proceed with the second stage of Leveson. There are some nuances between the statement we had from the previous Prime Minister and what we had from this Dispatch Box more recently. That difference might just be a few words which mean nothing at all, but we need to be clear that this should go ahead and that the Government are determined that any prosecution dealing with this will proceed.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 132 I will speak also to our Amendments 135, 136 and 137 in this group and in support of Amendments 133 and 134, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Clause 27 relates to investigations by the IPCC of concerns raised by whistleblowers and inserts a new Part 2B into the Police Reform Act 2002. If we were asking for this clause to not stand part of the Bill, it would be a case of 2B or not 2B—but that is not what we are asking for. I am just checking to see whether noble Lords are awake. New Section 29D of the 2002 Act defines a whistleblower as a person who,
“raises a concern … about a police force or a person serving with the police”,
and who is,
“under the direction and control of a chief officer of police”,
at the time. However, it does not cover cases where the whistleblower is currently under the direction and control of a chief officer. One potential scenario is where the whistleblower is a witness to an incident that happened before he or she joined the police service, and wishes to draw the matter to the attention of the IPCC. Our Amendment 132 would legislate for that scenario.
I move on to Amendments 135, 136 and 137. New Section 29I of the 2002 Act allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to set out the circumstances where the identity of the whistleblower may have to be disclosed. This may be done only for permitted disclosure purposes, one of which is,
“the institution or conduct of criminal proceedings”.
Our concern is that a whistleblower may not realise that his or her identity may be revealed if the investigation turns into a criminal one, and that the whistleblower should be informed at the outset that this might be the case, so that they can withdraw the concern if they are worried by that prospect. Amendment 135 addresses that issue.
New Section 29E of the 2002 Act sets out the actions of the IPCC if it chooses not to investigate, including making recommendations in the light of the concern. Subsections (4) and (5) allow the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to such a scenario, including, in (5)(a), to,
“describe the kinds of recommendations that the Commission may make”.
Our Amendment 136 is aimed at ensuring that the IPCC is not restricted as to what recommendations it can make by adding that the Secretary of State,
“may not specify an exclusive list of recommendations”.
In new Section 29L of the 2002 Act, the Secretary of State is required to consult various bodies before making regulations about whistleblowers. We believe that organisations representing police officers and staff should be included in the list of groups who must be consulted. Our Amendment 137 makes this change. We also support, as I mentioned, Amendments 133 and 134, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I beg to move Amendment 132.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this section of the Bill deals with whistleblowing and investigations by the IPCC. It provides a new power for the IPCC to investigate matters raised by a police whistleblower without the matter having to be raised with the police force concerned, and provides further powers to protect the identity of the individual or individuals concerned. All the amendments in this group are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with the exception of Amendments 133 and 134 in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser.
Amendment 132 seeks to provide as much clarity as possible and allows for the eventuality that the person making a complaint could still be under the direction and control of a chief officer of police. This amendment raises an interesting point, which was highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when he presented his scenario to the House a few moments ago. I hope that when the Government respond they will be as clear possible in their reasoning if they do not think the amendment is necessary.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend seek to add clarity to this section of the Bill by making clear that these provisions cannot be used if the matter is subject to an ongoing investigation. Amendment 134 would allow for whistleblowing protections to be applied to police witnesses. These are good amendments that would strengthen what is proposed by the Government.
When reading and thinking about Amendment 135, I was not completely convinced that it was either necessary or should in fact be there. Having said that, I listened to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I think that he persuaded me on those.
I am not sure what Amendment 136 adds to the Bill as it would not put in the Bill an exclusive or exhaustive list. Amendment 137 is completely correct: organisations representing police officers and staff must be consulted before regulations are made concerning this section of the Bill. It is not good enough to rely on the subsection that talks about other organisations that are deemed appropriate. Those organisations deserve to be in the Bill when it leaves this House.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanation and for admitting the concern of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary that support for whistleblowers at present is patchy. We welcome the changes that the legislation brings in terms of reassurance to whistleblowers. I am grateful that the noble Baroness has undertaken to take away our Amendment 132 to see whether anything can be done.
I am not sure that whistleblowers will be reassured by the noble Baroness’s response to Amendment 135, that the IPCC will do its best to keep their identity secret. Again, we are discussing whether something should be in the Bill or in statutory guidance, and if in statutory guidance it will be adhered to in the real world.
On Amendment 136, we understand that it is not the intention to restrict the recommendations that the IPCC can make in response to an issue of concern raised by a whistleblower that is not investigated by the IPCC. However, perhaps the Minister might consider putting in statutory guidance the fact that it is not the intention of the legislation to restrict the number or type of recommendations that the IPCC can make. I will reflect on what she said about Amendment 137, which appears to be a reasonable explanation. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 132.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the important amendments in this group relate to the circumstances in which disciplinary action may be taken against former police officers and former special constables.
Clause 28 will allow for the extension of the disciplinary regime to former officers where an allegation arose before they resigned or retired, or arose within a period of time following their resignation or retirement. The relevant period will be specified in regulations and we have made it clear that we intend to specify 12 months. On Report in the Commons, the then Policing Minister undertook to bring forward amendments which would set aside the 12-month time limit in exceptional circumstances. The government amendments in this group make good on that commitment.
I start by recognising, as the whole House does, that the vast majority of police officers and special constables conduct themselves with absolute integrity. They serve our communities with distinction and loyalty throughout their careers and, in doing so, demonstrate the values set out in the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics on standards of professional behaviour. Nevertheless, and regrettably, a small minority do not meet the high standards of professionalism that the public rightly expect. The public also expect those suspected of serious misconduct to be subject to formal disciplinary proceedings and that, where officers are in the wrong, they are held to account for their actions. Indeed, that is what both the public, and the majority of decent, dedicated and hard-working police officers in this country deserve.
The Bill already contains significant reforms to increase the accountability of former police officers. As I have indicated, the provisions in Clause 28, and the accompanying regulations, will ensure that where an allegation that could have led to dismissal had the officer still been serving comes to the attention of a force within 12 months of an officer’s resignation or retirement, or where an individual resigns while an investigation is ongoing, this can be investigated or continue to be investigated and that, where appropriate, disciplinary action can be taken to hold the officer to account for serious wrongdoing. Where a case is proven, the new police barred list will ensure that the individual concerned is prevented from future service in policing.
These are important steps, but we need to go further, particularly in the wake of high-profile cases where there is a perception that retired officers suspected of committing the most serious acts of gross misconduct have not been held to account where such acts cause serious harm to public trust and confidence in policing. In these cases, which can emerge long after individuals have left policing, there is more to be done to prevent the perception that officers who have left policing are able to evade accountability. We recognise the strength of feeling in relation to such cases and, in particular, the public concern that police officers who commit the most serious acts of wrongdoing should be held to account for their actions. The Government also recognise the importance of ensuring that the measures introduced are proportionate for policing as a whole and fair for individual officers.
The amendments that stand in my name achieve this important principle of accountability and do so in a way that is robust, fair and proportionate. In effect, these create the new exceptional circumstances test, which will be applied by the IPCC and, in due course, by the director general of the Office for Police Conduct, following the reforms to the IPCC. In our view it is right that the decision as to whether the exceptional circumstances test is met is taken by an organisation independent of government and free from any politicised decision-making. The IPCC carries out its role and functions in a way that is well established within the sector as the independent watchdog for policing.
It would be only in those cases where this test is met and the IPCC has determined that it would be reasonable and proportionate to do so that disciplinary proceedings could be instigated. In deciding whether the exceptional circumstances test is met, the IPCC will have to have regard to the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness, the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police and the public interest. We will set out in regulations the matters to be taken into account by the IPCC in making such a determination.
This will mean that disciplinary proceedings can be brought in relation to the most serious matters which are considered of an exceptional nature where serious and lasting harm has been caused to public confidence in policing as a result of the wrongdoing. As with the original provisions set out in Clause 28, the exceptional circumstances test will not operate retrospectively. As such, these provisions will apply only to those officers who are serving on or after the date that they come into force. Where there is a finding that the former officer would have been dismissed at a subsequent misconduct hearing, the individual will be barred from future service in police and other law-enforcement agencies.
Amendment 138 gives effect to these changes in respect of former police officers, Amendment 140 in respect of former special constables and Amendment 144 in respect of former MoD police officers. Amendments 139, 141 and 145 clarify that, in cases where the investigation or disciplinary proceedings concerning the former officer, special constable or member of the Ministry of Defence Police arise from a decision to reinvestigate a matter previously closed, this can lead to disciplinary proceedings only in cases which either meet the exceptional circumstances test or where the reinvestigation commences within the specified time limit. Amendments 160, 161 and 162 are consequential on the main amendments and the changes to the governance of the IPCC. They provide that, in future, these determinations will be made by the director general of the Office for Police Conduct.
Amendments 149, 150 and 151 clarify the operation of the police advisory list. The amendment makes it clear that the duty on chief officers and others to report officers to the College of Policing applies only in the case of officers who at the time of leaving the force are under active investigation. The amendments will mean that in circumstances where an officer was previously under investigation while serving but the investigation concluded with no disciplinary proceedings being brought and subsequently the officer leaves the force, the duty to report the officer to the college shall not apply. This eliminates potential ambiguity in the legislation and makes it clear that reports are required only when an individual is subject to an ongoing investigation.
Amendments 142 and 143, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, are directed at the same end as the key government amendments in this group. I hope that, having heard my explanation of the government amendments, the noble Lord is satisfied that they deliver a similar outcome. I commend the government amendments to the Committee and I beg to move Amendment 138.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, we broadly welcome the government amendments in this group and, subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, has to say on the Labour amendments, they seem to cover similar ground.
I have some questions, but I agree with the Minister that the overwhelming majority of police officers are honest, decent people who want only to do their best to protect and serve the public. However, if an officer has left the service and, within 12 months, an investigation takes place which, if the officer was still serving, could have resulted in that officer being sacked, what sanctions would be available against such an officer, other than their name being added to the banned list?
I understand that “exceptional circumstances”, in terms of the most serious acts of wrongdoing, needs to be defined by an independent body. We will come later on in our considerations to talk about the Independent Police Complaints Commission and whether it is truly independent. It is slightly concerning that one criterion that the IPCC would have to look at, in deciding what action to take, is the impact on public trust and confidence in the police, because it could take the decision that the impact of exposing serious misconduct through an investigation would have such a detrimental impact on that trust and confidence that it would use it as a reason not to investigate rather than an obligation to do so. So we have to be very careful about the grounds on which the IPCC should or should not consider something to be exceptional wrongdoing.
Clearly, many members of the public will be very concerned, or disappointed, that the legislation will not be retrospective, particularly with regard to those involved in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster. The concern is not with the rank and file officers in that case; the concern is with what happened in the aftermath, and the leadership exercised at Hillsborough. However, as I say, we are generally supportive of the government amendments.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, first, I associate myself with the comments made by the Minister and by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in paying tribute to the police and how they conduct themselves. They are a fantastic group of people, who protect us every day, and we are very lucky to have them looking after us.
As we have heard, this section of the Bill concerns disciplinary proceedings against former police officers and former special constables, and the amendments in this group are to both the relevant clauses and schedules. Generally, I am content with the government amendments, and supportive of them. My noble friend Lord Rosser tabled Amendments 142 and 143 before the Government tabled their amendments, and we are very happy with what the Government have proposed.
I accept entirely the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about “exceptional circumstances” being defined by an appropriate body. Could the Minister give us some idea what the Government’s thinking is on that matter? Having said that, I support the government amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have responded to both the government amendments and the other amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about the ultimate sanction for someone who had retired. The ultimate sanction is that the officer is found to have committed gross misconduct at a public misconduct hearing, with the panel finding that the officer would have been dismissed, and, therefore, as a consequence, should be added to the police barred list. Inclusion on the police barred list would see the officer banned from any future service in policing and added to the published list for a period of five years. Perhaps the noble Lord was referring to a police officer in this situation who had retired anyway and had no intention of going back into the police. However, if I had served 40 years in an organisation, such a judgment would be a pretty awful outcome for my career. Therefore, although there would be no actual effect on the person’s life, the ultimate judgment of misconduct in public office would fulfil that purpose.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way but my understanding is that, in the past at least, it has been possible in exceptional circumstances for a disciplinary authority to reduce the pension, for example, of somebody who is dismissed or forced to resign from the police service. Will the noble Baroness write to me explaining whether that sort of sanction might be available?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I will certainly write to the noble Lord. I can envisage such a situation where somebody was sanctioned before they retired. In fact, I have the answer—the cavalry arrived in the nick of time. The measure will not directly impact an officer’s pension. However, if criminal activity is identified following an investigation and the officer is convicted, it will be open to the force, as now, to apply for some of the officer’s pension to be forfeited.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, was disappointed that the measure was not retrospective in circumstances such as Hillsborough. I think that most noble Lords would share that disappointment. However, we make laws in line with established principles. It is in line with established principles that new laws generally should not be retrospective. They will apply only to officers who are serving when the relevant provisions are commenced. These matters do not in any way affect criminal investigations and prosecutions which, as now, can be pursued at any stage. So, yes, it is disappointing, but it is in line with established practice.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the exceptional circumstances. I repeat that the IPCC will have regard to the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the inefficiency or the ineffectiveness, the impact of the allegation on public confidence in the police and the public interest. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Condon, for making the very important point about the necessity and proportionality of these measures.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 147A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our other amendments in this group, Amendments 147B, 150A and 151A.
Schedule 8, which is to be inserted as part of Part 4A of the Police Act 1996, outlines the procedures with regard to the police barred list and a duty to report dismissals to the College of Policing, which is responsible for maintaining the list. Amendment 147A removes the requirement to report cases where a civilian police employee has been dismissed for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness. The amendment probes whether the barred list should be confined to wrongdoing such as dishonesty or the inappropriate use of violence rather than a person being deemed to be inefficient or ineffective.
Amendment 147B has a similar effect on the provisions in new Section 88A(6), which defines “dismissed”. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, just said, someone’s employment prospects could be fundamentally affected by being placed on the police barred list. Does she not think it slightly disproportionate to include people who are considered to be inefficient or ineffective on the barred list and thereby affect their employment prospects so fundamentally?
Amendment 150A has a similar effect on the requirement to report resignations and retirements in the face of an allegation of inefficiency or ineffectiveness. Amendment 151A allows someone reported as having resigned or retired in the face of an allegation to be able to appeal against the decision to report his resignation or retirement. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for these amendments. The Government are clear that the provisions on the police barred and advisory lists should apply to police officers and civilian staff equally where individuals have been dismissed or face allegations that could lead to their dismissal for reasons of serious misconduct, incompetence or unsatisfactory performance.
The provisions for civilian staff use the language of “conduct, efficiency or effectiveness” to mirror the language in Sections 50 and 51 of the Police Act 1996, under which regulations concerning discipline for police officers are made. This is a catch-all term to encompass all circumstances that could lead to a dismissal, through the processes related to performance and conduct. The barred list provisions are designed to protect against those who have been dismissed from policing being recruited to another force or policing body having been found to have fallen so far below the standards expected of those working in policing that they have been dismissed.
Amendments 147A and 150A would remove grounds of effectiveness from the relevant categories of dismissal that could lead to a civilian member of staff being added to the barred list. It is my view that “efficiency and effectiveness” are inextricably linked; therefore, to remove one of these factors would seriously undermine the ability of these mechanisms to capture individuals who have been dismissed or who are under ongoing investigation for matters of competence or performance.
Dismissal in these cases would arise only following a prescribed and lengthy process to establish that the individual’s performance or competency has fallen well below the standards expected on a consistent basis or relate to a matter so severe that dismissal is justified. For example, the Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 define gross incompetence for officers as,
“a serious inability or serious failure”,
to perform the duties to a satisfactory standard or level.
As drafted, these amendments would create a disparity in the way that civilian staff are treated compared to their counterparts holding the office of constable with regard to what would be captured by, and the effect of, these provisions. In the Government’s view it would not be desirable to make such a distinction and create such a different approach to the information and individuals that would be captured by the barred and advisory lists for civilian staff versus police officers.
Amendments 147B and 151A seek to create a new right of appeal, specifically with regard to inclusion on either the police advisory or barred list. This is neither necessary nor desirable. Our approach is clear: if an individual has been dismissed from policing, they should be added to the barred list to prevent them rejoining another force or policing body at a later stage. It is important to note that new Sections 88F and 88L of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Schedule 8, already provide for removal from the barred list and the advisory list. There is an existing route for appeal against dismissal via the Police Appeal Tribunal or employment tribunal. As a result, in the circumstances that a decision to dismiss an individual is overturned, this will result in the individual being removed from the barred list. This is explicitly provided for by Schedule 8.
As we see greater flexibility in roles, functions and powers exercised by civilian staff, as designated under the powers set out in Clause 37, it is important that the police barred list provisions adequately capture individuals who have been dismissed from the police service. This flexibility and application of policing powers must, in the view of the Government, be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, protections and accountability.
The police advisory list provisions are in place to ensure that adequate information is captured where an individual leaves a force while investigatory or disciplinary proceedings are ongoing. This list does not represent a statutory bar but creates a framework for capturing this information for future policing employers to take into account as part of the vetting process. To add an appeal route to this process would therefore undermine the ability of police forces and policing organisations to adequately subject incoming candidates to vetting procedures and take account of the fact that a candidate may be subject to an ongoing investigation or disciplinary process.
As with the barred list, the advisory list provisions contain safeguards so that an individual will remain on this list only while proceedings are ongoing. Where it is determined that no disciplinary proceedings will be brought or are withdrawn, or where disciplinary proceedings conclude without there being a finding that the individual would have been dismissed, the individual’s name and details must be removed from the advisory list.
Ultimately, the right of appeal against inclusion on the advisory list exists within a misconduct hearing, where it will be determined whether the individual should be dismissed and so be added to the barred list. Where dismissal is not the outcome, they will be removed when the process concludes.
Given that explanation, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her lengthy explanation of what the barred list and the advisory list are about. However, that is not what the amendments seek; the intention behind them is to suggest that it is disproportionate to include on the lists those who are accused of being inefficient or ineffective.
Although I accept some of the points that the noble Baroness has made, it just spurs us on to look at whether the amendments we have tabled for Committee need to be refined. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, bearing in mind what the Minister said about the impact that this provision might have on employment prospects—presumably generally and not re-employment in a police service—we question whether the inclusion of “efficiency or effectiveness” is over the top.
I understand the parallel with gross incompetency for police officers. I would be interested to hear whether, since its introduction, that provision has yet broken its duck in terms of a person having been dismissed for gross incompetency. More research is to be done and no doubt we will return to this issue at later stages of the Bill. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 147A.
Earl Attlee
The noble Lord makes a very good point. I hope that the Minister will also remind us why we are changing the name at all. Legislation could be used to change the function, composition or governance of the body, but I would like to be reminded why we are changing the name at all. The general public are used to the term “IPCC” and they know what it does —and now we are changing it.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I added my name to the three amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Condon, and say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the IPCC has an uphill task because, necessarily, it has to rely to a large extent on former police officers as investigators. It does not do itself any favours by appointing, as it has done at least at some point in its history, a former staff officer to a Commissioner of the Met as its head of investigations—that hardly inspires confidence in those looking at it subjectively from the outside or conveys the message that it is completely independent.
Cynics might say that removing “Independent” from the title of the organisation is an outbreak of honesty in the Government. But that is not the direction that we should be moving in. This should not be seen simply as a cosmetic change; it needs to have some substance behind it. To call it the Office for Police Conduct, without “Independent” in there, is manna from heaven to those who want to criticise the new body as not being independent at all. For those reasons, I strongly support these amendments.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I will not detain the House long on this small but very important amendment. This is the first time I have spoken on the Bill. The interest is relatively niche and relates to the three service police forces and the 160,000 men and women who serve in our Armed Forces.
The aim of the amendment is to insert a clause that extends the remit of the IPCC to the service police forces. I am not alone in this desire. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary recommended that oversight of service police should be brought within the competence of the IPCC. In a report last year on the Royal Military Police, the Army’s investigative and policing branch, stated:
“There was insufficient public scrutiny of RMP investigations. The RMP does not report to the public, and investigations into RMP wrongdoing are carried out by an internal Professional Standards Department or the Provost Marshal of another service police force”
It added:
“The Provost Marshal acknowledged to HMIC that a strategic risk to the RMP is inadequate independent oversight of its own independence.”
Only last week, the RMP finally admitted to failings in a rape case in 2009, that of Anne-Marie Ellement, a member of the Royal Military Police, who claimed that two of her colleagues raped her. She took her own life in 2011. The MoD said, seven years after the rape case, that it was clear that mistakes were made and apologised to the family.
Had the IPPC’s remit covered service police forces there would have been another avenue to take the concern. This is a terrible case and I am sure the service police forces have taken a long hard look at themselves, but it is not the only case where they have been found wanting. Had there been the opportunity, an independent complaints commissioner could have intervened.
I feel sure that the Minister will refer to the chain of command—this is important to military discipline—and the fact that there is a Service Complaints Commissioner. There is, but the system was ineffective in this case. Our servicemen and women have rights and those rights are best upheld if this amendment is accepted.
I remind the Minister that in 2014, the Defence Select Committee called for a timescale to be set out to bring the service police under the auspices of the IPCC. Has such a timetable been agreed? If the answer is no, in the light of this week’s announcements, how much more likely it is that the MoD would review the situation?
Lack of accountability of the service police undermines the rule of law and makes it harder for them to undertake their function of policing by consent. This amendment gives the opportunity to bring the three police services into the same independent system of oversight as applies to the rest of us. If the Minister is not able to help this afternoon, will she agree to meet me to look at it further? I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Jolly and myself. My noble friend has made a very strong case, not just because it was Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s recommendation that the three service police forces should come under the remit of the IPCC. Those responsible for the Royal Military Police have accepted that the organisation is at a strategic risk because it does not come under the remit of the IPCC. If the Government are not prepared to accept the amendment, it would be very interesting to hear from the Minister why not.
Lord Rosser
I will just add briefly to the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at the end of his speech. If the Government do not feel inclined to accept the amendment, there is a need—I am sure it will happen when the Government respond—to hear precisely what their reasons are for not going down that road. It has been said that no comparable body to the IPCC exists to deal with complaints about service police forces. A significant number of forces and agencies do fall within the jurisdiction of the IPCC, including, I understand, the Ministry of Defence Police. If the Government do not accept the amendment, like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I wait to listen with interest to their reasons why not.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 164A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I will also speak to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 164B. Clause 35 addresses the powers of inspectors—that is, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary—to obtain information, to secure access to police premises, and other matters by substituting paragraphs 6A and 6B in Schedule 4A to the Police Act 1996. New paragraph 6B talks about the powers of inspectors to obtain access to police premises and paragraph 6B(1)(a)(iii) talks about who can be served with a notice requiring them to allow access to premises, including,
“a person providing services, in pursuance of contractual arrangements (but without being employed by a chief officer of police of the police force or its local policing body)”.
The amendment deletes “but” and replaces it with “with or”, so it would cover a person who is employed by the police, as well as someone who is not. Amendment 164B makes a similar change to who can appeal against such a notice. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the amendment presumably aims to ensure that inspectors have comprehensive access to premises used for policing purposes, and that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is able to inspect the totality of policing in a landscape where functions are increasingly delivered by multiple agencies. The noble Lord nods; I thought that was probably the aim. The Government wholeheartedly agree with that aim, which is the purpose of this Bill’s inspection provisions.
The amendment does not actually further that aim. The current wording already ensures that inspectors have access to any premises used in the delivery of policing functions, whether they are occupied by the force itself, the local policing body, another emergency service acting in collaboration with the force or a private company carrying out the activities of a force under a contract. I put it to the noble Lord that these amendments would not, in practice, extend the categories of premises to which an inspector had access. Any premises occupied for the purposes of a police force by persons employed under contract by the chief officer are already captured in these provisions. That being the case, I think the noble Lord would agree that the amendments were unnecessary. I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. Clearly the amendment is not designed to extend the category of premises that HMIC would be able to access. It is about extending the category of person upon which a notice could be served. It appears to us that the wording in the Bill is restrictive and needs to be broadened. We are trying to broaden the category of person on which the notice can be served.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It might be helpful to the noble Lord to hear that this is covered by government Amendment 166, which ensures that any other person who is,
“by virtue of any enactment … carrying out the activities of”,
a police force is subject to inspection.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful for that second explanation and will consider it carefully. In the interim, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
I support the amendment tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and again express my concerns about this move to give police volunteers considerable powers, including authorising them to use incapacitant sprays. I share the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, expressed in terms of public confidence in volunteers being given these weapons.
If somebody wants to volunteer to get involved in the use of force in the exercise of police powers, as would be the case in using incapacitant sprays, there is an avenue open to them: volunteer to become a special constable. They then have all the powers of a regular police officer, undergo extensive training and wear uniform almost indistinguishable from a regular police officer. As a consequence, there is no need for this Bill to give other volunteers the powers in this clause. If they want to help the police service by volunteering for other activities that do not involve the use of force, then of course it is open to them to do so, but in that case they would not need the powers that this clause would give volunteers.
Again, this adds complexity to what is already a complex policing family. There is already confusion among some members of the public about the different powers available to police community support officers compared with police constables; for example, at the scenes of road traffic accidents, where police community support officers have to stand at the side of the road and wait for a police officer to turn up to take control of any resulting traffic congestion because they do not have the power to direct traffic. Having volunteer community support officers would add a further level of complexity and confusion in the eyes of the public. Not only do we consider this clause unnecessary, but we feel that it could add to confusion and further undermine what the police service is trying to achieve in very difficult circumstances in the face of significant cuts to its budget.
Baroness Redfern (Con)
My Lords, I support the powers of police civilian staff and police volunteers, who deliver extra support and complement our police officers. In Lincolnshire two years ago the first VPCSOs were recruited as an extra uniformed visible presence in local communities, supporting the work of regular PCSOs in providing reassurance and support to local people. The word “extra” is important as these officers were designed not to replace existing provision but to supplement it.
The VPCSO role is varied but includes: giving advice and reassurance to victims and witnesses of crime; supporting policing operations by providing reassurance to members of the community; working with police officers, PCSOs and other police staff on policing priorities; and working within the local policing team on minor incidents, crime inquiries and anti-social behaviour, with a commitment to at least four hours a week on patrol in their local area.
The force has developed a role profile for VPCSOs with eligibility requirements that are the same as for PCSOs, such as minimum age, residency, skills and qualities, health, and vetting. Applicants undertake a selection process that includes an interview to test that their personal qualities meet those required in the role profile. Induction and initial training is undertaken over five weekends, followed by a further two weekends’ consolidation a few weeks later once they have gained some experience.
From a pilot stage to a valued part of visible policing in Lincolnshire, this has been pioneered and funded entirely by the PCC and chief constable and has offered an innovative way to supplement local policing while enhancing the range of opportunities available to local residents who wish to volunteer and contribute to their community. It is also a possible route to becoming a regular officer. The important changes in the Policing and Crime Bill to allow VPSCOs to have powers will improve the flexibility and efficacy of the role. Most importantly, these officers offer an extra uniformed, visible presence, thus addressing many, many residents’ requests and supporting our valued police officers.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is of course very difficult not to stray into other amendments when talking about something in the round. I thank my noble friend Lady Redfern for laying out her experience of using volunteer police officers in Lincolnshire. It must be one of the first areas in the country to do that, so it was very useful to have that information in the round. In thinking about my noble friend Lord Deben’s point about the importance of the public knowing the difference between a volunteer and a special police constable, or indeed a fully trained officer, I asked myself whether I wondered, when my children were at school, what the difference was between the teaching assistant and the fully trained teacher. In fact, as long as they both contributed to my child’s education, I was not that much bothered—but it may be an issue for some people and I recognise the point that my noble friend makes.
Amendment 167 returns to an issue that was debated at length in the House of Commons: namely, whether it is ever right for designated members of police staff, or the new category of designated volunteers, to carry these particular sprays for defensive purposes. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has also given notice that he intends to oppose the question that Clause 38 should stand part of the Bill.
I hope that I can assist the Committee by first explaining what Clause 38 seeks to achieve. It makes necessary consequential amendments to the Firearms Act 1968 to ensure that police volunteers come within the definition of “civilian officers” for the purposes of that Act. The effect of this is that they do not then need a firearms certificate or authorisation under either Section 1 or Section 5 of the 1968 Act in order to carry a defensive spray. The clause simply puts community support volunteers and policing support volunteers in the same position in relation to defensive sprays that police officers and police civilian staff are currently in.
Clause 37(6) makes it clear that police staff and volunteers cannot use other weapons within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 unless the Secretary of State makes regulations under new Section 38(9B)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002. Any such regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Lord Paddick
To clarify what the noble Baroness has just said, could the Secretary of State, by regulations, authorise police volunteers to carry guns, if they were so minded?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I will repeat that Clause 37(6) makes it clear that police staff and volunteers cannot use other weapons within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 unless the Secretary of State makes regulations under new Section 38(9B)(b). Yes, it does read like that—but, as the law currently covers this, it is only trained police officers within London who can be armed.
Lord Paddick
Yes, but I think the Minister has just agreed with me that, through regulations, the Secretary of State could allow police volunteers to be given guns without the need for a firearms certificate. That is slightly worrying.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am pretty much as certain as I ever can be about anything that it is not the intention of the Bill to allow volunteers to carry guns—but I suspect that I need to provide some further clarification, and hopefully I will do that.
Lord Condon
Before the Minister finally sits down, I ask her to acknowledge and perhaps clarify this point. We are considering this very important crossover point from special constables being given these powers to volunteers having them in the context of what the Bill is also doing. It is enhancing the role of police and crime commissioners by giving them the ability to consider taking on the responsibility for fire and rescue services, and giving them the power to appoint the fire chief as the overall chief officer for policing and for fire. The Bill will create a model whereby, for example, a relatively young 32 year-old police and crime commissioner in an area can choose to appoint the fire chief as the overall chief officer of policing and fire in that area—admittedly, with the approval of the Secretary of State—and in that context a young, relatively inexperienced PCC with a chief officer who may not have a police background could take decisions on what volunteers could and could not do. The notion of them being given potentially lethal force is quite a big issue. I look forward to the Minister, as I am sure she will, giving us some reassurance about the notion of volunteers being able to have pepper sprays that in theory can kill people.
Lord Paddick
I do not want to prolong the agony, but another aspect of this is that members of the public should be reasonably sure about what level of force they are going to encounter from whom. As I say, special constables now are virtually indistinguishable from regular police officers; if a special constable decides to use a defensive spray, that will not come as a shock to the member of the public. In terms of the way that the member of the public interacts with a police officer or special constable, they may or may not use force against that individual on the basis of what they anticipate the reaction of that person to be, or the ability of the person to respond to it. When it comes to a volunteer police community support officer, who does all the wonderful things that the Minister said earlier, I think it is going to be a bit of a shock, and an unreasonable one, to expect such a volunteer to respond with an incapacitant spray.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, may I perhaps make a bit of progress on what I was already outlining? Much of what I am going to say answers the questions that noble Lords are asking.
The argument has been put forward that issuing PCSOs with defensive equipment is somehow incompatible with those officers’ primary role, which is to engage with members of the public in their communities. If we examine the way in which different forces equip their PCSOs, we can see that there are different approaches. Some forces equip their PCSOs with body armour and some do not, and the same is true of handcuffs, yet all forces use their PCSOs as the key point of engagement with their local communities. I was one of the people who was very sceptical about PCSOs, but they now have a lot of respect in communities across the country. If the prevailing security situation were such that a particular chief officer considered it necessary to issue their PCSOs with defensive sprays—I emphasise to noble Lords that none has to date—the Government consider that they should be able to, subject of course to the test of suitability, capability and training already set out in the Police Reform Act 2002.
It has also been argued that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of defensive sprays, to which our response has two limbs. First, if an officer or volunteer has not been properly trained in the use of any power, the law simply does not allow a chief officer to designate that officer or volunteer with the power in question. Section 38(4) of the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by Clause 37 of the Bill, already states that a chief officer cannot designate the person with a power unless they are satisfied that they are both suitable and capable of exercising the power and that they have received adequate training in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties to be conferred.
However, we do not consider that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of defensive sprays. On 31 March this year, there were over 16,000 special constables in the 43 police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport Police, all of whom have the full powers of a police officer, performed on a volunteer basis for at least 12 hours per month.
I was grateful to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at Second Reading, on his strong support for members of the special constabulary, with whom he will definitely have worked during his career policing. As he said, special constables receive extensive training and have all the powers of a regular constable. Many of those specials patrol on a regular basis with their full-time colleagues and they carry identical equipment, including body armour, batons and defensive sprays—again, in exactly the way as their full-time colleagues. It is therefore patently not the case that it is impractical to train volunteers in the use of such equipment. Any volunteer who did not want to carry such a spray, could not undertake the training or was not suitable would not be designated by their chief to carry and use it, even if others in their force were so designated.
Lord Paddick
On a very similar point, the Minister just said that while chief constables have the power to issue incapacitant spray to PCSOs, no chief constable has done so to date. Why do the Government now feel it necessary to give chief constables the power to give incapacitant spray to volunteer community support officers?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
It is simply to give chief officers the flexibility to use their workforce and their volunteer force to the best end in fighting crime and reassuring communities. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asks why, for example, a volunteer cannot simply become a special constable. There are many reasons why you might want to be a volunteer rather than a special constable. We are focused today on the deployment of PAVA and CS spray, but actually a volunteer could be a police volunteer. They could be a retired accountant, for example, or a retired lawyer, and may want to bring their skills to the police but may not want to volunteer for any more than that, or indeed become a special constable.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 26th October 2016
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-II(b) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (26 Oct 2016)
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
My Lords, I have not read the speeches of the two noble Baronesses. I am about to make a speech on an amendment that I am about to move. I can only say that it completely dovetails with what has just been said. I am not entirely certain that the superintendent is the most important rank in the police service, but I probably have a special interest in some of that. However, I absolutely subscribe to the point of view that superintendents are the workhorses of governance and practice and I support this amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support to an extent the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond and the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. Clearly, superintendents, as my noble friend articulated at length, play an essential role, which is recognised extensively in legislation.
Also in this group, I and my noble friend Lady Hamwee intend to oppose the proposition that Clause 46 stand part of the Bill. Clause 46 allows the Secretary of State by regulations to specify the ranks that may be held by members of police forces other than chief officers of police. A great deal of concern has been expressed in the public domain recently about the cost of, and the perks given to, chief officers of police. One would have thought that if the Government were going to legislate, that is an area that they might have turned their attention to. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, mentioned, we have been here before with the Sheehy report the last time that the Conservative Party was alone in government.
From memory, it was a decision of the Sheehy report and the Government to abolish the rank of chief inspector. At some stage before that was fully implemented, the decision was rescinded. The police service paid off a lot of chief inspectors to get them to retire because it had been told that the rank was going to be abolished, but it never was. That led to the mass recruitment of chief inspectors to fill the gap that had been left because the police service had pensioned off early a lot of the chief inspectors that it then needed.
My point, which the Minister has made continually over the issue of volunteers, is that it should be left to individual chief officers to decide. In the case of police volunteers, the flexibility should be available to chief officers to use them however they want and to give them whatever powers they wish. Surely exactly the same argument applies here: it should be left to individual chief constables to promote officers to particular ranks—or not—depending on local need.
While I accept that, especially in legislation, the superintendent has a particular and pivotal role, similar arguments could be made for police sergeants as custody officers and so forth, or for police inspectors who are often operational team leaders. One could go through and make a case—perhaps not as compelling as that put forward on behalf of the superintendent—for each and every particular rank to continue to exist, given different scenarios in different police forces.
I appreciate that the legislation simply gives the power to the Secretary of State through regulations to specify the ranks but I would argue, for the reasons I set out, both that that is unnecessary and that it limits the flexibility of chief officers in designing a police rank structure that suits their local needs.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
Amendment 174, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, and my noble friend Lady Henig, is in the clause dealing with police ranks. It amends Clause 46 to require the rank of superintendent as well as that of constable to be retained. We heard from both the noble Baroness and my noble friend who put their names to the amendment about the important role that the officers holding this rank play. That was confirmed by the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Paddick, in their contributions.
I very much agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, when she spoke about the holders of these ranks being senior officers taking senior operational roles. They are held by people with the ability to undertake those important strategic roles and it is accepted that they have departmental and functional responsibilities.
My noble friend Lady Henig also spoke about the importance of the role these officers play across the piece in all departments. I also recall the Sheehy report, and the abolition of chief superintendents being very controversial at the time. As my noble friend said, they were then quietly brought back a few years later. We have heard from a number of speakers who are former serving officers as well as Members of this House who served as chairs of police organisations, and know much more than I do about police operations. They have all reached the same conclusion, so I suggest that the Minister should reflect on what has been said. I hope that she will give a very warm response.
Lord Rogan (UUP)
My Lords, the PSNI has a requirement that before potential chief constables are appointed, they have to serve—I think for one or two years—in a force other than one in Northern Ireland. Perhaps that requirement could be introduced in the rest of the UK.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I shall try to be brief. I am getting wind-up signals already. As regards Amendments 176, 177 and 178, the opportunities for international police experience are very limited. Therefore, to mandate it would be to disadvantage many able candidates for promotion. Something desperately needs to be done to stop people being promoted just from within the most senior ranks within the force because the police and crime commissioner knows the candidates and does not know candidates from outside forces. As the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and others have said, it used to be a rule that, if you wanted to be the chief constable, you could not have been the assistant chief constable and the deputy chief constable in that same force. That rule needs to be brought back.
I say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the difference between leadership and management is that management is about getting people to do what you want them to do and leadership is about getting them to want to do what you want them to do. The latter approach is essential in policing because in most circumstances you are not with the officer when the officer is in contact with the public.
As regards what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, said, the three-day extended interview, the strategic command course and the strategic leadership course were good models and produced good candidates. Something needs to be done to rectify that situation.
I was slightly disappointed that the first I knew of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, was when I saw it in the Marshalled List. If he had sought our help, we would have supported his amendment. I hope that we can work together on it between now and the next stage of the Bill. The noble Lord may recall that when we had discussions about direct entry at superintendent level, I went further than him and the noble Lord, Lord Condon, in terms of the need for police experience.
The Minister can learn from the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, as commissioner. Within weeks of him becoming commissioner, the bombing on the London Underground and on the bus in Russell Square happened. Do the Government want to put somebody who has no experience of policing, or even somebody who has had experience in another country and who does not know the capacity and the powers of the British police service or the laws that apply in this country, in a situation where within weeks they could face that sort of disaster?
Lord Wasserman (Con)
My Lords, I very much welcome the amendment. It deals with an issue I raised in the Second Reading debate on the Bill in your Lordships’ House. As I said at that time, and repeat for the sake of maintaining the highest standards of conduct and transparency, I was, until a few months ago, an unpaid adviser to the Police Federation of England and Wales and had been acting in that capacity for the best part of the previous three years.
I hope that I also made clear in that debate that the line I was about to take in respect of Clause 48 had not been prompted by the Police Federation. Indeed, it was not even supported by the leadership of that organisation. That position has not changed. My views on Clause 48 and, in particular, on the four words which this amendment seeks to omit, remain as they were in July—that is, mine and mine alone. Indeed, it is a cause of some regret that not even my noble friends on the Front Bench are likely to agree with me.
I say that this is a cause of some regret because my views stem directly from my experience as an official in the Home Office—an official doing very much the same job as those who prepared the Bill. The rule in the Home Office at that time was that, when preparing legislation, every effort had to be made to avoid giving hostages to fortune, or making rods for one’s own back—or any number of similar clichés. In practice, this meant that one’s seniors and betters were constantly on the lookout for words which they could strike out of draft legislation because they were not absolutely necessary. Every word in every Bill, we were taught, could be used by clever, rapacious lawyers as a stick with which to beat the Government—or at least a stick to beat other clever and rapacious lawyers. For this reason, every word in a piece of draft legislation, particularly primary legislation, had to be justified as being absolutely necessary and not amenable to misinterpretation or exploitation for purposes other than those directly related to the main purpose of the legislation in question.
I regard the words “protect the public interest” in Clause 48, as the noble Baronesses who spoke before me said, as precisely the kind of words that are amenable to misinterpretation and exploitation. They certainly are not necessary to achieve the purposes of this particular part of the Bill. I therefore regard them as prime candidates for omission.
The same problems do not arise with the words in the other two paragraphs. I believe that it is very sensible to place a duty on the federation to maintain high standards of conduct and transparency. Everyone understands what those words mean. More importantly, I believe that they are quite sufficient by themselves to achieve the Government’s aims for the federation. In fact, they are probably more than enough.
All of us who take an interest in policing know very well why the previous Home Secretary felt moved to introduce these words into the Bill. I for one strongly supported her doing so. But the words “protect the public interest” are quite different. The federation is at bottom a staff association and its job is to represent its members. It is clearly in the public interest that it should do so effectively—that is why it was established. And it is clearly in its own interest that it should act, as Sir David Normington said, to maintain exemplary standards of conduct, integrity and professionalism and to retain public confidence.
To require the federation to act to “protect the public interest” is quite another matter. I fear that these words are tantamount to giving the federation a licence to interfere in policing matters well beyond its expertise. For example, I see the federation deciding that it is in the public interest that it should monitor and make recommendations on the type of equipment and systems which police forces purchase and deploy; on the leadership qualities of candidates for chief constable rank and other operational matters; or on issues of police governance such as the size and composition of police and crime panels.
Of course, individual members of the federation will have views on all these matters and on many more besides. But what we would be doing by including the words “support the public interest” in this Bill is to give the leaders of the federation grounds for spending their money on studying these matters and publicly advocating for changes in them. Indeed, I believe that these words would permit the federation to extend its remit almost indefinitely and to employ clever, rapacious lawyers to justify this on the grounds that it has a statutory duty to protect the public interest.
The federation has more than enough on its plate in carrying out its core mission. Placing on the federation a duty to “support the public interest” may sound good, as the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, said, but it does not pass the test of being essential to the purposes of the Bill. In fact, I believe that it falls squarely into the category of words which could come back to bite the Government in very unpleasant ways.
That is why I strongly support this amendment and urge the Minister to agree with me that omitting these four words would in no way weaken the motivation of the federation to operate in the public interest but would minimise the opportunity for it to make trouble for itself and others in due course.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have given notice of our intention to oppose the proposition that Clause 48 stand part. The reason is that all officers of the federation hold public office. They are therefore all subject to the Nolan principles—the seven principles of public life. Can the Minister explain what is to be added by the clause, over and above the Nolan principles?
Lord Rosser
I will briefly make two points. I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendment that has been moved by my noble friend Lady Henig. I do not necessarily share the interpretation of the words “protect the public interest” that the noble Lord, Lord Wasserman, attached to them. I think that probably, under some of its other responsibilities to its members, the Police Federation would be entitled to pursue at least some of the issues to which he made reference.
Do the Government interpret this wording of “protect the public interest” to mean that the federation must put the interests of the public before the interests of the members of the police forces it is there to represent? Secondly, does this wording mean that legal proceedings or some other action can be taken against the Police Federation by someone who believes that it has not protected the public interest? If so, who can take such legal proceedings or such other action?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for her explanation of this amendment to Clause 48, which amends the 1996 Act to require the Police Federation, in fulfilling its core purpose, to protect the public interest and maintain high standards of conduct and of transparency —as the noble Baroness said. There was a discussion the other day about what the public interest is. I understood that, in a different context, it was not what the public were interested in but something quite different.
In the spring of 2013, the Police Federation commissioned a review to consider whether any changes were required to its operation or structure to ensure that it continued to promote the public good as well as the interests and welfare of its members. The panel’s final report, Police Federation Independent Review, known widely as the Normington review, was published in January 2014 and made 36 recommendations to improve trust, accountability, professionalism and member services. Recommendation 1 was the adoption of a revised core purpose that reflects the Police Federation’s commitment to act in the public interest. The Police Federation accepted the review’s recommendations in their entirety and has already publicly adopted a revised core purpose on a non-statutory basis. The Normington review was clear that a reformed federation would act in the interests of both its members and the public.
Clause 48 focuses on how the Police Federation discharges its representative role—namely by considering the public interest in its actions, in the same way that the police uphold the public interest in all their actions, whether that is fighting crime on the front line or representing colleagues as a member of the federation. The clause does not conflict with the Police Federation’s representative purpose and will not, for example, require it to act against the interests of its members. The ambition here is to ensure that the federation does not operate against the public interest. Indeed, the Police Federation itself, acting in line with the recommendations of Sir David Normington and his review, asked the Government to enshrine its revised core purposes in legislation. That is exactly what this clause achieves.
Sadly, as the Normington review highlighted, a culture of “narrow self-interest” has permeated the federation in recent years—one of “distrust and division”, as he described it. The Government wish to support the federation in proving that it can serve its members and respect the public interest in providing a representative voice for police officers, with professionalism and integrity.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made a point about changing the purpose of the Police Federation as set out in the Police Act 1996. Clause 48, as worded, is clear that the federation must protect the public interest and maintain high standards of conduct and transparency in fulfilling that purpose. The Police Act 1996 sets out what the federation should do and Clause 48 sets out how it must deliver that.
The noble Lord also asked what happens when the public interest and the interests of the police diverge. The Normington review was clear that a reformed federation would act in the interests of both its members and the public. Section 59 of the Police Act 1996 provides that the purpose of the Police Federation is to represent members of the police forces in England and Wales in all matters affecting their welfare and efficiency.
Could the federation be challenged in the courts? It could, on the basis that it was not fulfilling its purpose as set out in Section 9(1) of the Police Act 1996 in a way that protected the public interest, but it may already be challenged on the basis that it was not fulfilling its existing purpose.
I hope I have provided some explanation and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Paddick
I do not think the Minister answered my question about what the clause adds over and above what is within the Nolan principles.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The Nolan principles underpin every single aspect of involvement in public life. Obviously, this is specific to the police in a certain context, but I think the two should go hand in hand. Obviously, there are different aspects to the police compared with other public professions, but anyone who is in public office needs to sign up to the Nolan principles. This is an aspect that applies to the police.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 2nd November 2016
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
Lord Dear (CB)
My Lords, I support what both noble Lords have said, the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, in particular. I am sure I am right in saying that there is a growing sense of disquiet throughout society, which has swung away from the rampant interest that one saw in recent years in pursuing sex offenders, in particular—the Jimmy Savile case comes to mind immediately—towards beginning to say, “Wait a minute, it has gone too far”. I believe that it has gone too far. We live in a world where reputations can be traduced almost within seconds, given the spread of social media—I think the phrase now used is “going viral”. That can happen and, worldwide, a reputation is in tatters in a way that was not at risk of happening before.
One has only to look at Members of this House, never mind anyone outside—and outside is in many ways more important than our own membership of your Lordships’ House. Lord Bramall comes to mind. The son of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey, has recently been in the newspapers for reasons I found totally disquieting. So have Sir Cliff Richard, Lord Brittan, Sir Edward Heath and Bishop Bell, who has been the subject of many of our debates recently. I will not take up your Lordships’ time except to say that I support what is being said. Whether we should do it by advice, as has recently been said, I do not know, but the Government should take note of this growing tide of disquiet at what is going on. I hesitate to say, and I am sad to say, that the police are front runners in causing this situation. Something should be done and this amendment is a step in that direction. I support it.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. I might go a little further than the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and say that “lack of evidence” is probably exactly the phrase that should be used and it should be made compulsory. Saying that there is a lack of evidence could quite easily mean a complete lack of credible evidence, whereas “insufficient evidence” could imply that there was some credible evidence in cases where there was none. “Lack of evidence” is exactly the right phrase and I look forward to the Minister’s response as to how this can be made compulsory.
Baroness Boothroyd (CB)
My Lords, I support this very splendid amendment that has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, and spoken to by your Lordships warmly and welcomingly. In many cases, the people we are speaking about here—and I say this in front of many people here who have given great service to the police—have been harassed by the police. On many occasions, they have been pilloried by the press. We were just talking about the press in an earlier debate. Often they do not spoil a good story with the facts. The relations of persons who have been questioned under caution with their immediate relationships have been spoiled and bruised. Their relationships with friends have been harmed. At the end of the day they deserve to be more precisely dealt with. We need precise wording here and more direction—they deserve nothing less. I like the wording of “lack of evidence” and I ask the Minister to either accept this or look at it again, and I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, that if he puts this to the House for a decision I shall be in the Lobby in support of him.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 183, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond, I will speak to the other amendments in the group, Amendments 186 and 187. My noble friend is unable to be in her place this afternoon.
Amendment 183 seeks to make the initial period beyond which police bail under Section 30A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 must then be authorised by a superintendent 56 days instead of 28, as proposed in the Bill. The impact assessment published by the Government on 26 May 2016 alongside the Bill indicates that the 28-day limit is a reasonable one and that the impact on police resources would not be arduous. However, academic research carried out by Professor Anthea Hucklesby of the School of Law at the University of Leeds suggests that an initial limit of 60 days would be necessary to avoid considerable adverse impact on the police service.
That research forms the basis of an article by Professor Michael Zander, the acknowledged expert on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, in vol. 180 of Criminal Law and Justice Weekly entitled, “Not a Good Idea to Ignore the Evidence”. I have spoken to Professor Zander about this issue. In the article, he agrees with Professor Hucklesby’s conclusion that:
“A time-limit of 60 days would be proportionate for both suspects and the police. This would allow cases involving routine forensic analysis, which officers in my study consistently reported took an average of six weeks, to be completed”.
Professor Zander goes on to say that the Home Office has had this research for “over a year” and that the findings,
“have now been confirmed by the College of Policing’s bail report, Pre-charge Bail—an Exploratory Study, September 2016”.
My noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond tells me that the Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales believes that the 28-day limit could have a considerable detrimental effect on the impact of impending changes on inspectors, superintendents and magistrates’ courts.
I do not wish to detain the Committee with the detailed reasoning behind the conclusions of the academics, the College of Policing and the Police Superintendents’ Association. Suffice to say, we have no doubt excellent number-crunchers in the Home Office on the one hand saying the 28-day limit is doable, and the rest of the world on the other hand claiming that it is not. Of course we support limits on police bail, and we generally welcome the provisions in the Bill in this respect, for the reasons the Minister outlined in response to the first group of amendments. But can the Minister explain how the academics and the practitioners are lined up against the Government on the initial time limit? Amendments 186 and 187 are consequential on the main amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 183, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, would delete “28” and insert “56”, which would increase the period of pre-trial bail from 28 to 56 days. I think we all agree that bail at any point should be as short as possible, although the point that the noble Lord made needs to be considered carefully by your Lordships’ Committee. There seems little point in bringing people back to the police station, only for them to be rebailed because other work has not actually happened. People may be waiting for forensics or other things to be done, so the noble Lord has a good point. If Professor Zander and other academics suggest that this will not be effective, I hope that when the Minister responds she can answer that point. It seems pointless to bring people back just to be sent away again, given the cost of the bureaucracy for the police, the solicitors and the suspect. If she can respond to the points made, that would be very helpful.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the comments that I made about the presumption against pre-charge bail, which I think is compelling in the Government’s attempt to reform the system. There will be presumption in favour of release without bail—in other words, do not bail someone unless there is a good reason to put them on bail, which in many ways would free up the system. Bail should be used only where it is both necessary and proportionate. The fact that almost one-third of people are released within 28 days anyway is, I think, compelling evidence for the arguments that the Government are making.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, on this matter. As he just said, there is agreement on all sides that we need to protect the human rights of those people arrested and bailed by the police. But there needs to be a balance between the protection of human rights and the practical impact on the police, particularly in the light of the significant cuts in police numbers, the even greater cuts in the number of detectives, who would be mainly involved in investigating these matters—and trying to do so within a 28-day limit—and the reduction in the number of police superintendents, who would have to authorise a further extension. The noble Baroness said that 28 days was not arrived at by chance and that people should not be on bail for years. The amendment suggests 56 days, not years. It is just a proportionate increase to the maximum limit proposed in the Bill.
It is unfortunate that the noble Baroness appears to be trying to argue this on party lines, talking about what the Liberal Democrats did in coalition. Unlike other political parties, the Liberal Democrats like to base their decisions and legislation on the evidence. The evidence from academics that I put forward, which the noble Baroness has not addressed, points in the opposite direction to the Home Office impact assessment. The noble Baroness failed to answer when I asked why there was a difference between the Government’s view and the findings of academic research and representations from the Superintendents’ Association. She quoted from a 2013 College of Policing report. I quoted from a 2016 College of Policing report, which Professor Zander said backs up Professor Hucklesby’s conclusion that 60 days is a far more appropriate period and strikes the right balance between the human rights of those bailed and the practical issues facing the police. Clearly, we will return to this at other stages on the Bill but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
I was trained in how to deal with these sorts of situations before Tasers were invented. Batons and firearms are not the only alternatives. Using shields, either those specially produced in order to deal with these situations or even NATO-type shields, particularly in the confined space you find on a mental health ward, is an alternative to the batons and guns which the noble Lord seems to suggest are the only alternatives to a Taser.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I, of course, defer to the extensive knowledge of the noble Lord, who was born many decades before the Taser was invented. He is right that of course there are alternative methods, but pinning somebody against a wall and pushing them hard and repeatedly with a NATO shield is also a fairly violent response. We are not talking about nice situations; we are talking about a situation where something major in terms of an intervention is needed to save somebody’s life. Under those circumstances, I think a blanket proscription which says you must not use a Taser is a mistake.
There are also questions about why this amendment refers simply to mental health wards. There are violent incidents every night in accident and emergency departments. Are we saying that we would permit the use of a Taser in an incident in an accident and emergency department, but if exactly the same incident occurred in a mental health ward that would not be the case? The noble Baroness may actually be saying that Tasers should not be used at all. That is fine—it is a perfectly legitimate argument, and there is a debate to be had, but it seems a strange anomaly to make a distinction between one type of hospital ward and another.
The issue that has to be addressed is why so many incidents get out of hand in mental health wards. If that can be resolved—and I suspect it will mean staffing and may mean improved training and a lot of de-escalation—concern about the sheer number of times the police are called out to incidents of this sort would be diminished. The fact is that that is the problem, and that is the problem that must be addressed. A blanket ban on Tasers does not solve that problem; it just creates other problems, which is unsatisfactory.
The noble Baroness also referred to the overuse of Tasers elsewhere in the community, the probable discrimination and the fact that black people are more likely to be tasered than others. That is a real concern. I am aware that in London, at least, the mayor’s office requires that on every single occasion that a Taser is drawn, an individual is red-dotted when a Taser is pointed at them or a Taser is discharged, the circumstances are recorded and it is reported to the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime. I assume that the Minister has those figures to hand. It would be very interesting to know—it is quite a substantial number of cases. It is also interesting that often the mere act of red-dotting an individual—pointing the Taser at them—is enough to de-escalate the situation without discharge. It would be interesting to know whether those statistics tell us in how many instances Tasers were used in a mental health ward. I assume that the detail that is collected would enable that; I hope it does. It is certainly important that whenever a Taser or any other force is used, it should be properly recorded together with the circumstances and the ethnicity of the person against whom it was used. I understand that that is included in guidelines which are emerging from the College of Policing. I strongly welcome them because that will enable us to have a baseline to be able to see what is happening and to deal with issues where there is discrimination or overuse of force under whatever circumstances. By “overuse of force”, I do not mean just Tasers; I mean all forms of force.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, although I have sympathy for everything that has been said in this debate, I support those noble Lords who oppose Amendment 194. We need to consider the position of a police officer who has to deal with an exceptionally violent situation. If this amendment were agreed, the police officer would have to get much closer to someone who is extremely violent. We have technology that we can use and strict controls on how it is used, and we should not deny the police the ability to use Tasers in these circumstances.
Lord Paddick
In her response, could the noble Baroness tell the Committee whether there is any information on the effectiveness of the Tasers used in those situations? Anecdotally and from my own experience, the mental state of some people means that Tasers have no impact. Perhaps she may be able to help the Committee on that point as well.
Baroness Walmsley
The amendment is intended to ensure that children who have been abused or sexually exploited are made known to mental health services in their area. It is beyond the scope of the Bill to mandate what happens next, but it is inconceivable that services to which the child is referred should not provide the necessary assessment and therapeutic services.
However, we know that many thousands of children who have been abused sexually and otherwise have not received any help, despite the fact that up to 90% of children who have been sexually abused develop mental health problems before they are 18. Recent NSPCC and Children’s Society research has highlighted that abused children are not routinely getting access to the mental health and therapeutic support they need. They found that traumatic experience of abuse on its own rarely triggers therapeutic support, with abused children reaching high clinical thresholds for services only when they have severe mental health issues and are at crisis point.
Evidence from the Children’s Society report, Access Denied, said that despite abuse being a major risk factor for mental health issues, less than half of mental health trusts identify children who have experienced sexual exploitation in referral and initial assessment forms, and only 11% of trusts fast-track access to CAMHS for this group. Only 14% of local transformation plans for children’s mental health contained an adequate needs assessment for children who have been abused or neglected, and one-third of plans do not mention services to meet the needs of such children at all. Identifying young people who experience sexual exploitation and their needs in the first place can be a particular challenge.
Since I entered your Lordships’ House 16 years ago, I have attended many presentations and seminars, but one sticks in my mind from my very first months here. It was with the NSPCC, highlighting the lack of therapeutic help for abused children. Here we are, 16 years later, talking about the same thing, despite all the efforts of my right honourable friend Norman Lamb MP to get more funding for CAMHS.
This morning, I attended the 30th birthday party of ChildLine, and I was discussing the amendment with Esther Rantzen. She, of course, supports it, but she made another relevant point, which was that although ChildLine often refers children to the police—with their permission—it is rarely the other way round. The point is that if the police are having difficulty getting a child to disclose to them about suspected sexual abuse, they should put them in touch with ChildLine, which will not only help them to disclose safely, in the way they should, but will support them through the proceedings that may follow.
The phone number of ChildLine should be on the wall of every police station: 0800 1111. Perhaps this would also remind police to refer children to their local mental health services for an assessment. They know they should, but they do not always do it. That was admitted this morning on Radio 4’s “Today” programme, when Sarah Champion MP, a great champion for abused children, and a senior police officer, discussed this very thing. Although it was accepted that the police’s attitude to abused children has improved enormously, it was admitted that there is still some way to go.
There is an opportunity through the Bill to pursue the recommendations set out in Future in Mind: that sexually abused or exploited children receive a comprehensive specialist initial assessment and a referral to appropriate services, which can provide evidence-based interventions according to their need. Where victims of child sexual exploitation come into contact with the police or a local authority, the Bill provides an ideal opportunity to state in law that the police must refer them for a psychological assessment, and then we must rely on providers to give them the support they need to recover.
These children are going to cost the NHS a great deal of money unless we act promptly. A report from Public Health Wales this week found that people who have been abused in childhood are three times as likely to contract a serious illness later in life. The Government must see the amendment as prevention of a great deal of expenditure later, and accept it tonight. I call on them to do so and beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise very briefly to support my noble friend Lady Walmsley’s amendment, to which I have added my name. It seems absolute common sense that, if the police are investigating an allegation that a child has been sexually exploited, the needs of the child should be paramount and that referral to appropriate support for the child should be compulsory in those circumstances. I feel that I really need say no more than that.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 2nd November 2016
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I rise notionally to support my noble friend Lord Rosser and his amendment, but first I record that I have recently completed for the Mayor of London a review of London’s preparedness to withstand a major terrorist incident. As part of that review I looked at the policing of the River Thames. I became aware of a lacuna—or at least what I understood to be a lacuna—that appeared to exist in the legislation, which these clauses fill and deal with by making it possible for police to stop and search boats on the River Thames. I was therefore delighted to see it. My recommendations on that were couched in those terms.
However, it appears that it is possible for anyone to sail up the River Thames without having any licence or even permit, which seems an extraordinary gap. While we were tidying up some of these matters, I would have thought it useful to tidy up precisely that one. Given that one is expected to have a licence to drive a car, with the car being required to be of a certain standard, it is surprising that there is no such requirement for sending a boat up the Thames.
I come to the specific question that I wanted to ask the Minister—she can answer the first one if she wishes. An hour and three-quarters ago, I received an email from Nigel—I suppose that I am taking a leaf out of the book of my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition here. Nigel said:
“I’m an old retired police officer”—
so he must have been there with Brian—
“and I may be out of date but back in 1967 when I joined The Met, one bit of legislation they kept drumming into us was Sec 66 of The Metropolitan Police Act and it read police may stop, search and detain any vehicle, vessel, boat, cart or carriage in or upon which anything stolen or unlawfully may be found”.
At what point in the various reorganisations of London government and policing legislation was Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act repealed or changed? It may still be there, in which case what does this provision add to it? The Minister may not have that information immediately available in her brief, so I would be quite happy to receive a note at a later stage.
Lord Paddick
Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act was repealed on the basis of the powers to stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The earlier powers were superseded, so it was decided that Section 66 was no longer necessary.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Well, my Lords, it just shows how marvellous this House is. We have experts who can always answer the questions for us, which is an enormous help.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, Amendments 196A and 200A relate to the power, by regulations, to add to the list of law enforcement officers who may exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4 of the Bill. Clause 82(3) defines “law enforcement officers” in England and Wales for the purpose of exercising the maritime powers. This includes provision for the Secretary of State to specify in regulations other categories of person who may be allowed to exercise these powers. Clause 94(3) makes equivalent provision for Scotland. The proposed amendments would require the Secretary of State to consult prior to making such regulations.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned foreign ports. Ports in foreign countries are included. Maritime powers can be exercised in international and foreign waters all over the globe. It is a practical and operational necessity that those exercising such powers should be able lawfully to divert a ship to a port and detain it there where the operation in question takes place hundreds or thousands of miles away from England and Wales. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—
Lord Paddick
“Exercise of maritime enforcement powers
(1) The maritime enforcement powers may be exercised only in the event that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed which is—
(a) an indictable offence under the law of England and Wales; and(b) included in a list of offences specified by the Secretary of State in regulations made by statutory instrument.(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 196B is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have just been discussing, Chapter 5 of the Bill gives extensive powers to law enforcement officers in relation to maritime enforcement—not just in British territorial waters and not just British vessels but far more extensively—including the power in Clause 86(1) to stop, board, divert and detain the ship,
“if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that … an offence under the law of England and Wales is being, or has been, committed”.
The amendment seeks to probe whether the powers are intended to apply if a law enforcement officer suspects that any offence whatever has been committed. For example, if two crew members are involved in a fight, could these powers then be used,
“to stop, board, divert and detain”,
the ship? That would appear rather disproportionate. While two crew members having a fight might not be considered a good example, stranger things have happened at sea, apparently. The amendment works on the basis that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. It takes its wording from proposed new Section 137B by restricting enforcement powers to “indictable” offences only, and only those offences specified in regulations by the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained, Amendment 196B seeks to limit the exercise of the new maritime enforcement powers by the police to suspected offences which are “indictable” and specified in the regulations made by the Secretary of State. He indicated that the intention is to limit the use of these powers to serious crimes, so as to ensure a proportionate response to crime that takes place in the maritime context. I do not believe it necessary to limit these powers in this way.
In other contexts the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has argued that we should put our trust in the operational judgment of chief officers. This is one such area where we should adopt that principle. We should trust in the operational judgment of the police to determine when it is appropriate to commit resources to investigate an offence on a vessel at sea. It is perhaps highly unlikely that resources would be committed to interdicting a vessel for the purposes of investigating a minor summary-only offence, but we should not rule out the possibility that the police would want to exercise these powers in relation to an either-way offence. We do not impose restrictions on the categories of offences that the police can investigate where they take place on other modes of transportation, so I am unclear why we should treat maritime vessels any differently. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister. The reason why this should apply in the case of these maritime powers is that the potential impact of diverting a cargo vessel in the English Channel, for example, is quite significant. While I may have suggested in other contexts that the number of ranks in each police force should be left to the judgment of chief officers, I do not think that the chief constable of whichever force it is will be making the decision as to whether to divert a ship; it will be an officer of relatively junior rank. The Minister also says that the Government should not be restricting the powers to particular offences, in which case I would ask her to explain why proposed new Section 137B does exactly that. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
Briefly, I agree with my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey, that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has raised an important issue. However, it needs careful consideration for the reasons that my noble friend outlined. I therefore hope that the Minister will agree that the Government will take this away and have a look at this issue. We all want to make sure that the police have the appropriate power, but equally, of course, we should ensure that the proper safeguards are built in so that unintended consequences, which no one would want to occur, do not cause problems as well.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I did not intend to speak on this matter but the issues the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, raised, particularly around religious dress, need to be considered very carefully. I bear in mind the scenario that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, presented us with where constables on the street, faced with individuals who they interpret as deliberately trying to conceal their identity, are radioing an inspector for authority who is not at the scene and cannot make that assessment himself or herself. That is potentially difficult. I am not a lawyer and I may have misread it, but my reading of the existing legislation was that it allows for a scenario where written authority could be given contemporaneously with the actions of the officers on the ground. Can the Minister therefore help the House by saying whether the Government think that the amendment is necessary? However, I absolutely accept that flash mobs and spontaneous public disorder are becoming an increasing problem, as we saw in the riots in London only a few years ago, which were driven by social media.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that the permission in writing can be given after the event, but we now find that that is not an ideal situation. On what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, proposes, both national policing leads and others would welcome a clarification on this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, answered the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for me, but I will repeat it, as it is important. With regard to removing face coverings for religious reasons, for example, the Act states that when an authorisation is in place, a constable can require a person to remove a face covering only if the constable reasonably believes that the person is wearing the item,
“wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his”,
or her “identity”. Of course, it is for individuals to ensure the fair and proportionate use of their powers.
If the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment—it sounds as though he is—I will give the matter further sympathetic consideration in advance of Report.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, this amendment and its associated new clause seek to establish the principle of parity of legal funding for bereaved families at inquests involving the police, the lack of which and the associated injustice was highlighted by the sorry saga of the Hillsborough hearings and the extent to which the scales were weighted against the families of those who had lost their lives. But Hillsborough was not a one-off—it was simply that the proceedings received a lot of publicity. Many bereaved families can and do face a similar situation when they go to an inquest and find themselves in an adversarial and aggressive environment where they are not in a position to match the spending of the police or other parts of the public sector in what they spend on their own legal representation. At times, the families feel that they are being made to look like the perpetrators responsible for what happened, rather than the victims.
The public sector is in a position to spend taxpayers’ money on hiring the best lawyers to defend its reputation. Bereaved families have to find their own money, sometimes even to the extent of remortgaging their house, to have any sort of legal representation to mount a challenge. Public money should pay to establish the truth, and that surely means parity of arms. If the argument is that an inquest will get at the truth anyway, irrespective of the extent and quality of legal representation, why do the police and the public sector turn up at such inquests with their own array of lawyers?
Margaret Aspinall, who was the chair of the Hillsborough Family Support Group, has told of the lengths to which she and other members of the group had to go to raise money for the legal fund. It is surely not right, and surely not justice, when bereaved families trying to find out the truth, and who have not done anything wrong, find that taxpayers’ money is being used by the other side to paint a very different picture of events in a bid to destroy their credibility.
It might also help if we had inquisitorial rather than adversarial inquests. In the case of Hillsborough, the Lord Chief Justice made a specific ruling when he quashed the original inquest: he hoped that, given that the police had tainted the evidence, the new inquest would not degenerate into an adversarial battle. However, that is precisely what happened, and the lies and innuendo about Liverpool supporters at the match were repeated by a lawyer being financed at public expense and presumably acting under instructions from the public body involved.
I hope that the Government will be able to respond in a more helpful way than they did when this matter was debated during the Bill’s passage through the Commons. If there is to continue to be an adversarial battle at inquests involving the police, we should at least ensure that bereaved families have the same ability as the public sector to get their points and questions across and, in the light of what can currently happen, to defend themselves and the loved ones they have lost from attack, and, if necessary, to challenge the very way proceedings are being conducted. This is a bigger issue than simply Hillsborough: it relates to the situation that all too often happens to too many families, but without the same publicity as Hillsborough. We surely need to act now to change a process and procedure that appears at times to be geared more to trying to grind down bereaved families than to enabling them to get at the truth and obtain justice. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment to which I have added my name. I declare an interest: I gave evidence for the de Menezes family at the inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, whom noble Lords will remember was shot by accident by the police, suspecting him to be a suicide bomber. Sadly, I experienced the adversarial nature of inquests at first hand. Indeed, during the lunch break on the day that I gave evidence, the coroner had to warn the legal team for the Metropolitan Police and basically tell them to “cool it”.
A very adversarial system operates at the moment, whereas it should be an inquiry after the truth. Having experienced it first hand, I can say that it is absolutely necessary for the families of the bereaved to be as well represented as the police where there has been a death at the hands of the police, or a death in police custody, to use the technical term. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I speak to my amendment in this group, which is similar except in terms of who ends up paying. I tabled this amendment very much for the reasons mentioned by my noble friend Lord Rosser and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—the nature of inquests and the importance of creating a level playing field to enable the coroner to get to the truth of what has happened in cases of tragic death. The cases that I have been involved with relate to deaths in custody. For a number of years, I was chair of the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody, which was concerned with not only police custody and deaths following police contact, but with deaths in prison and in secure mental hospitals. On a number of occasions, I spent time with the families of those who had died, as far as they were concerned, at the hands of the state.
I remember one family very movingly describing the experience of the inquest. They wanted to know what had happened to their loved one. They were not necessarily looking to apportion blame or for someone’s head on a platter. They just wanted to know the facts. They were confronted with a complicated legal system, with everybody else being fully represented—at public expense. They were having to fight for legal representation through the legal aid system.
I do not know how many noble Lords have been in a coroner’s court when such matters have been discussed. They are not always the easiest of environments. I remember one person describing that there was one small area for everyone to wait—counsel, witnesses and the bereaved families themselves. There were not sufficient chairs in the waiting room for everyone concerned. They described walking down the corridor and hearing behind them the trundle of wheeled suitcases filled with legal papers being dragged by highly paid legal officials, employed by the state to argue and create confusion around what had happened to their loved one. For that reason, we should consider the proper operation of the inquest to enable the truth to be obtained.
What concerns me about the present system is that when this issue was raised in the past, we were told that families were eligible for legal aid. But it is not as simple as that because there are strict criteria on the income that people can have in order to obtain legal aid. Of course, when a case relates to a family, it is not related to an individual, so before eligibility for legal aid can be established, the financial means of every single member of the family has to be assessed, whether or not they are actively engaged in the process. That can be long and drawn-out, extremely intrusive and not helpful. The reality is that the legal aid pot is tiny, and it becomes increasingly difficult to deal with cases humanely.
The purpose of my amendment is slightly different from that of my noble friend Lord Rosser. Yes, there should be parity of funding, but rather than an off-the-top call on the legal aid fund—therefore diminishing the amount of aid available to people who need it for criminal cases, for example—the agency that had custody of the individual at the time of their death should provide the funding. The agency will almost certainly be paying a substantial number of legal costs. In the case of a death in a police custody suite, it is probable that several police officers were involved, all of whom may be legally represented separately at the expense of the state. The police force itself may be represented separately, and at the expense of the state. Then there is the bereaved family, who may be quite traumatised by what has happened and facing extreme difficulties because they do not know what to do. If it were not for charities like INQUEST, with which I have worked over the years, which provides support for such families and has a panel of lawyers to assist them, many families would essentially go unrepresented at inquests. Yet it is important that those families have the right to challenge the evidence being presented to make sure that they are satisfied that as far as possible, the truth has been obtained at the inquest.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 9th November 2016
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 263KB) - (7 Nov 2016)
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have added our names. My argument is quite simple: when we were discussing the Immigration Act, the Government proposed a philosophy of full cost recovery for visa applications and the Immigration Service generally. On 18 March this year, they increased the fees for visa applications, in some cases by 25%. Family and spouse visas are now £1,195, adult dependent relative visas are £2,676, and settlement applications have increased to £1,875. British citizen naturalisation certificates are now £1,156 for adults and £936 for children.
There is currently a government consultation on immigration appeal fees, which proposes an even greater increase to ensure full cost recovery. The consultation suggests a fee for an appeal on the papers to the First-tier Tribunal should increase from £80 to £490, and from £140 to £800 for an oral hearing. If the Minister is not going to agree with these amendments to ensure full cost recovery for the issuing of firearms certificates, will she explain why a different approach is being taken to the principle of full cost recovery when it comes to immigration? In particular, can she refute the obvious allegation that the Government are discriminating against foreign nationals as set against those who go hunting with guns for sport?
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I have some sympathy for the position articulated by noble Lords opposite. However, it needs to be remembered that shooters have to buy their guns, ammunition and facilities and that they pay value added tax at 20%. There is actually huge government revenue from the shooting fraternity, as 20% of everything they spend on shooting comes back to the Government. I can see the noble Lord, Lord Harris, getting very excited. It must be a very powerful argument. I have expressed sympathy for the noble Lords’ position but I give a note of caution: we should not forget the tax revenues from shooting.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Government agree that fees for firearms licences should be set on a cost-recovery basis. We have already increased the fees for civilian firearms and shotgun certificates issued by the police in line with this objective. Clause 115 addresses firearms licences issued by the Home Office and the Scottish Government. They therefore concern fees for licences to possess non-civilian prohibited weapons, and for shooting clubs and museums. Currently, most of these types of licence do not attract a fee. Where a fee is charged, it is set at a level well below the cost of administering an application.
Amendments 204 to 206 would require the Government to set all fees at a level that would achieve full cost recovery. The administration of these licences, including assistance from the police, costs the taxpayer an estimated £700,000 a year. The Government agree that licence holders, not the taxpayer, should pay for this service. Clause 115 therefore provides a power for the Home Secretary to set fees for these licences. As the then policing Minister, Mike Penning, explained when similar amendments were debated in the House of Commons, we intend that the fees should be set at a level that will achieve full cost recovery. We will then set out the proposed fees in a public consultation, which we intend to publish shortly.
The consultation will invite views on the implementation of these measures and we welcome responses. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked when the Section 5 fees are planned to be introduced. It will be in April 2017, subject to the planned consultation. I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation. However, there might be good reasons not to set fees at full cost recovery levels, either for a transitional period or for certain categories of licence holder. We will consider the responses to the consultation on these matters before deciding on the level that should be set. In doing so, we will be guided by the principle to which I referred above: that the costs of licensing should fall to the licence holder rather than to the taxpayer.
Amendment 207 relates to the fees charged by the police for shotgun and civilian firearms certificates and for registered firearms dealer licences. In 2015, we increased fees for those certificates substantially. This was the first increase in the licence fee since 2001. The increase reflected the fact that the cost of the licences had fallen far below the cost to the police of their administration. Fees increased between 23% and 76%, depending on the type of certificate.
When we consulted on the fee levels for certificates issued by the police, we were clear that the cost of licences should reflect the full cost of licensing once a new online licensing system was in place. Work is under way to secure that system. In the meantime we are committed to undertaking an annual review of the fees. There will be a comprehensive review of police licensing fees in five years’ time. I hope that the noble Lord will be reassured that it is indeed this Government’s intention that firearms fees should reflect the full cost of licensing and that on this basis he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, what consultation was there before the Government implemented full cost recovery for immigration visas with those groups that represent immigrants or those who might be applying for visas?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
May I write to the noble Lord on that? I do not have the answer on timing to hand. I apologise.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, this amendment in my name raises the issue of people who, through negligence, have allowed their firearm to be lost or stolen. This seems to me something that should be taken much more seriously than it is at present. I do not want to bore the House with too many statistics, but roughly half of all recent terrorist plots that have been disrupted have involved situations in which those alleged to be the perpetrators have sought to obtain firearms.
In an average year, 800 registered firearms are lost or stolen. That means there is a seepage of firearms, most likely into the illegal economy. Whether those firearms are obtained by criminals or terrorists seems almost irrelevant. These are firearms that in many instances could kill or harm people, and certainly terrify them. In those circumstances, if an owner has negligently allowed their firearm to be lost or stolen, it seems there should be significant consequences. That is why this amendment proposes not only that they should they have all firearms certificates in their name revoked but that they should be banned from holding a firearms certificate for the rest of their life.
Those who might argue that that is a draconian penalty just need to think about what an unlicensed, stolen firearm in the hands of a criminal or a terrorist might do to somebody else’s life. This seems a punishment that fits the crime. I hope the Minister will accept that this is a serious matter and agree to take this away and tidy up whatever inadequacies there are in my drafting of the amendment, because it seems a no-brainer that we should take firm action against those who, through their negligence, allow dangerous firearms to get into the illegal economy. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, although perhaps not quite in the terms he suggested. This is a very serious problem. Any firearm that is lost or stolen will almost inevitably find its way into the hands of criminals, whether terrorists or not. It is an extremely serious problem. Because we have world-class controls on firearms, stealing firearms is one of the few ways in which criminals or terrorists can arm themselves. Clearly, there would have to be some investigation to establish whether negligence was involved or not. I understand that, at the moment, when a firearms licence is up for renewal the police will consider what the security arrangements are to store firearms and, indeed, whether any firearms have been lost or stolen by that certificate holder. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that this is not taken seriously enough at the moment, that there are very serious potential consequences and that this definitely needs further consideration.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, while I am grateful to the noble Lord for moving this amendment, I am curious about what he means by “negligence”. He talked about the problem of firearms being stolen. If a gun owner has properly kept his firearms in the storage facilities that have already been approved by the police and a burglar comes in and successfully and quite quickly gets into the gun cabinet and steals the firearms, has the firearms owner been negligent or not?
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)
My Lords, I beg to move that the clause do not stand part of the Bill and, in short, that it be deleted. If carried, the clause means that the definition of alcohol will be extended to cover all forms in which it might be presented. Specifically, it will cover powdered alcohol and vaporised alcohol, and it follows that they will then become regulated for sale in the UK under the Licensing Act 2003.
Yesterday we had a short debate on the action the Government are taking to address reports of increasing violence in prisons. The Minister replying referred to the White Paper, Prison Safety and Reform, in which there is a section on reducing the supply of and demand for illicit items. If I had been able to get into the debate yesterday, I would have asked the Minister to explain to the House how permitting for the first time in the UK the sale of powdered and vaporised alcohol will help to reduce the problems in prisons. I would be grateful if the Minister endeavoured to respond to that point. How can this change be justified against the background of the Government’s announcement last week that no-fly zones are to be imposed over jails in England and Wales to stop drones being used to smuggle drugs into prison grounds? It is against a background of numerous initiatives costing £1.3 billion that we are trying to tackle rising violence, drug use and other problems in prisons.
The Home Office may have consulted the drinks industry on this change, but did it consult its own Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for prisons, and the health authorities on how they view the proposals? I have tabled a whole range of Written Questions asking the Government about this topic and they have answered a fair number recently. I particularly asked if they would define the benefits of this change to the public. I have had no reply, so I should be grateful if the Minister told the House today what benefit the Government see from authorising the sale of powdered and vaporised alcohol.
Powdered alcohol has been around in some countries for quite a while—not vaping alcohol, which is a new development to which I will come back shortly. The production and marketing of powdered alcohol started to take off in the USA about two years ago—March 2015—when its sale was authorised by the federal bureau on drugs and drinks. This has been controversial in the States. Powdered alcohol can be consumed with fruit juices, water and other soft drinks. It can be mixed with other alcoholic drinks to double or treble their strength. It can be taken to and consumed in places where ordinary liquid alcoholic drinks cannot because they are prohibited, such as sporting and musical events, public places and on public transport. Powdered alcohol can be taken there because it cannot be detected. It can be baked, put into ice cream, and so on. A whole range of things can be done with it.
There has been an outcry in the States about the attempt to market and sell it. Opposition has grown over the months, and I understand that 27 states have banned its sale. The opposition has been such that there have been disputes about its legality, and the main producer of the main powdered alcohol—Palcohol—is having to take a different stance entirely to the one it adopted previously. It is interesting to note, too, that this year, Russia is banning the sale of powdered alcohol. Yet here we are in the UK contemplating legitimising its sale. It is true that it is not yet on sale here but as I pointed out to the Home Office, websites are already set up waiting to sell it online as soon as it is legalised for sale.
As the Home Office has conceded, alcohol in vaping form is already here. It is true that it is being presented as a novelty item, but how long will it remain as such? Indeed, is it being used as a novelty item? I do not think it will stay like that for long. The cigarette manufacturers are already moving big time into vaping. The CEO of Philip Morris, which has the big selling brand, Marlboro, and commands 30% of the market outside the USA, selling 847 billion cigarettes last year alone, said that he is on a mission to get millions more people vaping. He says he can see the day when Philip Morris stops selling cigarettes entirely, and will be totally into vaping.
So a big change is taking place—we will have a vaping future. Of course, it will not just be nicotine. Last week, I went to one of my local vaping shops in Battersea, which has 50 different vaping items on sale. As yet, they do not have alcohol, but when I talked to them about the possibility, they said, “Yes please, could you tell us when we can get our hands on it?”. The items they are already selling come from all different parts of the world, in all different concoctions. There must be a question from a health point of view about what people will be vaping and the effect over time on their health—even from what is currently available for sale.
Make no mistake: when we look at the future of vaping, what we are seeing is just the start of a major development and we should be aware of it—if indeed the Government intend to proceed with this measure. I hope they are prepared to think again. The truth is that powdered ethyl alcohol and vaping alcohol are mind and mood-altering substances little different to class C prohibited drugs, while those classified in the recently passed Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 will in due course cause the same kind of problems as the substances which have been previously been banned, if not more, particularly if vaping takes off on a big scale.
The Government should withdraw Clause 117 and to help them, I oppose its standing part of the Bill. To help them clarify the legal position—which is ostensibly their concern and why they are taking this action—I suggest they have a look at class C prohibited drugs and the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 to see whether these substances should be so classified. If not, they should simply and straightforwardly be banned.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise to pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, and his persistent campaign against powdered alcohol and vaping. I accept what he says about these things being mind-altering substances, but surely that is because they contain alcohol, which is an accepted mind-altering substance—no more, no less than that. I understand the concern about the way you take the alcohol. Vaping, I understand, gives a very instant hit, unlike drinking alcohol, where you get a delayed reaction. However, have we not learned lessons from the past about prohibition and, in particular, prohibition of alcohol, not being an effective way of dealing with these issues? On these Benches, we would say it is far better to regulate, license and control the use of these new substances, rather than trying to ban them.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, my name is on this amendment and we are coming on to a whole series of amendments relating to alcohol. With all due respect, I do not agree that alcohol in these alternative forms should be looked at in the same way as alcoholic drinks consumed in a social context.
The great difficulty for us and the country already is the size of the problem. In 2014 there were 8,697 alcohol-related deaths. That was an increase on the previous year and alcohol-related harms are already estimated to cost the country £21 billion a year. We know that around 9% of adult men and 4% of adult women are not taking alcohol for social consumption, but because they have alcohol dependence. Sadly, only around 7% of them are accessing any kind of treatment, so we have a huge problem. When we look at the amount of alcohol-fuelled crime and at what victims have said, over half of all victims of violence felt that the offender was under the influence of alcohol, and that is without ways of boosting the potency of the alcohol that they might be taking.
When we look at young people in particular and alcohol-related harms among those aged under 25 from 2002 to 2010, alcohol-related hospital admissions increased by 57% in young men and by 76% in girls and young women. We have a massive, looming problem of alcohol addiction and harms. The consequences of that may be handed down to the next generation, given that we know that among 15 and 16 year-olds, 11% had sex under the influence of alcohol and almost one in 10 boys and one in eight girls had unsafe sex while under the influence of alcohol. Of course, unsafe sex leads to pregnancy.
It is also important to look at children who were excluded from school, because almost half of those were regular drinkers. This is nothing to do with people’s freedom to consume alcohol socially. This is pure alcohol harm. I do not see how a school will be able to differentiate powdered alcohol from sugar or any other substance, such as sherbet that a child has in their pocket. I do not see how prison services or others will be able to differentiate alcohol vaping devices from the other types of nicotine-related vaping devices or how they will be able to have any control over the consumption of these. I have a real concern, and the reason I put my name to this amendment is that these kinds of products fuel alcohol addiction and do nothing to enhance social interaction within our society; they specifically fuel dependence and all the harms that go along with dependence. I have yet to be convinced of any benefit whatever, given that other countries that have major problems with alcohol consumption have decided that these products are too dangerous. I suggest that we should follow their lead and not risk taking these substances which we will be unable to detect or police. By allowing them for sale, they can be used to spike drinks and increase the cost to the country of alcohol-induced harms.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Cabinet Office
Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 9th November 2016
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 263KB) - (7 Nov 2016)
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I shall take a slightly different approach from that of the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and just say—I am sorry, I meant the noble Lord, Lord James of Blackheath; I am reading the wrong name on the annunciator. I do apologise. I do not know how the Minister can sit here hour after hour and hear the overwhelming evidence of the damage that these machines are causing and not do anything about it. This is an opportunity to do something about it. The Minister should grab it with both hands.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness. Any alcohol whatever will to some extent cause a reduction in driving capability and increase the risk of having an accident. I am saying that we need to be careful and take advantage of a full range of statistics from the Scottish experience. I was disappointed with the Department for Transport because it could not tell me at what point it thought it would get useful statistics from Scotland.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am generally supportive of the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. From my recollection of what she said, there was evidence of people involved in accidents who were not above the current legal limit but were above the proposed limit, and therefore there was some evidence that reducing the drink-driving limit would be beneficial. Am I wrong?
Baroness Berridge
If I remember correctly from the statistics provided by the Minister at the meeting, 3% of the fatalities are occurring within the 50 to 80 milligram limit. So there will be fewer deaths and correspondingly fewer injuries if we reduce the limit. There is then the added effect—and thus, one hopes, an exponential benefit—of changing everybody’s behaviour in relation to alcohol.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that explanation. To some extent, although it does not provide evidence of the Scottish experience, it shows that reducing the limit could have an effect by reducing the number of accidents that cause fatalities.
There are a couple of things that I am concerned about. One is the extent to which a change in the law would have a deterrent effect in the absence of increased enforcement by officers involved in roads policing. We know how much police forces have had to reduce their budgets and reduce the number of officers. My experience is certainly that roads policing is one of the first areas on the list when it comes to reductions. Does the Minister have any information about the deterrent effect of roads policing in relation to drink-driving that we need to consider in addition to the reduction in the drink-driving limit?
The other thing that I am concerned about is the increasing amount of drug-driving—that is, people who drive under the influence of illegal drugs—with a potentially even worse impact on their ability to drive than if they had taken a drink. I wonder whether a lower alcohol limit would cause people to move to taking drugs rather than alcohol for fear of being detected as being above the new alcohol limit, with such a change therefore having a negative impact or an unintended consequence. I would be very grateful if the Minister had any information on whether that has been the effect in Scotland.
Lord Paddick
“Vagrancy Act 1824
In section 8 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (abolition of offence of loitering etc with intent) at end insert—“(2) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under those provisions is pardoned for the offence.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) it is irrelevant whether the person has died before subsection (2) comes into force.(4) A pardon under this section does not give rise to any right, entitlement or liability.””
Lord Paddick
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I cannot let the opportunity go past without congratulating my noble friend Lord Sharkey on what is a phenomenal achievement. I am very grateful to the Government for the support that they have finally given to his amendment.
I turn to another contentious issue. Amendment 214Q stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have just discussed, with government support my noble friend Lord Sharkey has moved amendments—and we have just passed those amendments—to grant pardons to those convicted of offences that only gay men could commit and that are no longer on the statute book because they were considered discriminatory. These offences are symbolic to the gay community and it is striving to ensure equality in law and in society as a whole.
There is another offence that is symbolic to another minority, which is no longer an offence on the statute book and is considered by many to be another example of what amounts to an historic injustice. Parliament repealed the offence because it was accepted that it was being used in a discriminatory manner by the police; it is the offence of being a suspected person loitering with the intent to commit what was originally an indictable, and later, an arrestable offence. Although the term “sus” has recently been more widely used to describe the use of police “stop and search” powers, it was originally confined to the criminal offence of being a suspected person under Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. The offence required the evidence of two witnesses, usually two police officers patrolling together. The usual evidence was of a suspected person being seen to try three car door handles, in an attempt to steal the car or from it, or the suspect putting his shoulder to the doors of three homes, with the intention of committing burglary.
The difficulty with the offence was the absence in almost every case of any corroboration, either from witnesses other than police officers, or any physical or forensic evidence. Both the police officers and, usually, young black men, who were almost exclusively the target under sus, knew that it was the word of two police officers against a young black man with no other witnesses or evidence or any other corroboration. This allowed unscrupulous police officers to invent evidence against those who had, at least on that occasion, done nothing wrong.
Of course, some will say that a miscarriage of justice did not occur on every occasion of someone being convicted of being a suspected person and, of course, I cannot say that that was the case. However, I can say—I hope that Members of this House agree with this—that thousands of innocent young black men were convicted, which caused huge pain and distress, destroying the trust and confidence between the community and the police.
I was a police officer—a bobby on the beat, a patrol officer—at the height of the use of that aspect of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act. In 1975 and 1976, the year I joined the Metropolitan Police, more than 40% of those arrested for sus were black people, when at the time black people accounted for only 2% of the population. It was because by the end of the 1970s you were 15 times more likely to be arrested for sus if you were black than if you were white, far more than the disproportionality in stop and search, that in 1980 the Home Affairs Select Committee recommended the repeal of the legislation. It also threatened to introduce a Private Member’s Bill if the Government did not take action, but the Government did.
There was a great deal of concern, even among police officers at the time—me included—over the use of the offence, in that we knew about the claims of the black community that it was used as a tool to oppress black people. If there was evidence of another offence—for example, attempted theft of or from a motor vehicle or attempted burglary—not only were these offences less likely to be open to question but the penalties were more severe. In other words, if there had been substantive evidence, physical or forensic evidence, which in those days would have been simply fingerprints, then the much safer, more acceptable and far less contentious route was to arrest and charge for the substantive offence rather than sus.
My second comment is anecdotal. I was at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court with someone I had arrested. The stipendiary magistrate, Toby Springer, would want to hear from the arresting officer in every case except for those of being drunk and incapable. The case just before me was an arrest made by a colleague for whom I had respect for his honesty and professionalism. He had arrested someone for sus, and the young black man who had been arrested pleaded guilty to the offence and was fined. Downstairs in the cells, where the young man had to pay his fine before being released, I spoke to my colleague, and I remember this very distinctly. I said to him that he had restored my faith in sus because here was a trusted colleague with someone who had pleaded guilty in court to the offence, so the criticisms made by the black community, at least in some cases of sus, were clearly unjustified. He told me what had happened. He and a colleague had turned a street corner and the person he had arrested looked at the police officers and ran away. The officers ran after the youth and caught him. The youth was given the ultimatum, “Do you want attempted burglary or sus?”. The youth said, “Sus”. Presumably realising that the odds were stacked against him, he then went through the whole process admitting to something that he had never done.
Sus is another example of an offence that should never have been on the statute book, or at least an offence that was designed to deal with soldiers coming home from the Napoleonic wars and making a nuisance of themselves should not still have been on the statute book 150 years later. Not every part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 was repealed by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, but those other offences are, and should be, a debate for another time.
Bearing in mind how long it has taken my noble friend Lord Sharkey to achieve what he has achieved for the gay community through his long campaign for justice, and in the absence of the equivalent of an Alan Turing figure regularly to hand in the case of sus, I am not expecting instant agreement from the Government. However, I ask the Minister to think carefully about what has been a symbolic offence for the black community. It has created huge pain and distress for decades. To pardon those convicted under this legislation—repealed because of its acknowledged discriminatory application and potential for misuse—would be of immeasurable importance to the black community.
Not only did sus damage relations between the black community and the police, it damaged relationships between the generations in the black community. The first generation of migrants from the Caribbean had great faith in the police and when their sons were arrested they did not believe their tales of the police acting improperly in inventing evidence against them. It drove divisions between generations as well as between police and the subsequent generations. Granting pardons to those convicted of being suspected persons loitering with intent to commit an indictable or arrestable offence would be a huge step forward in healing the pain caused and the damage done to the trust and confidence the black community as a whole had in the police. It would also be a much-needed catalyst to dramatically improve those damaged relations as we work to create safer communities for all. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I have one question for the Minister when she responds to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Does she have any idea of the number of people affected by this?
Lord Paddick
My Lords, from the Minister’s response I do not think she has quite grasped the essence of what this amendment is about or the misuse that has been made of this legislation. The Home Affairs Select Committee put pressure on the Government to repeal that particular part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act. It is a very wide piece of legislation, criminalising all sorts of activity, much of which is still on the statute book. This is specifically about being a person suspected of loitering with intent to commit an indictable offence, the evidence of which I described when I moved the amendment.
I will of course look very carefully at what the Minister has said but I do not believe that it will give me sufficient grounds not to return to this matter on Report. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 16th November 2016
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 129KB) - (14 Nov 2016)
Lord Paddick
“Pre-charge anonymity
(1) After a person is accused of a sexual offence, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify them as the person against whom the accusation is made shall either be published in England and Wales in a written publication available to the public, or be broadcast in England and Wales, up until that person is charged with the offence, except where a judge is satisfied that it is in the public interest to remove the restriction in respect of that person.(2) In subsection (1), “matter” includes but is not limited to—(a) a still or moving picture or image of that person; or(b) the name and address of that person.(3) In subsection (2)(a), “picture” includes a likeness however produced.”
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 219A is tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. This amendment is designed simply to protect the identity of those accused of sexual offences in a similar way that the identities of the alleged victims of sexual offences are currently protected. The significant difference here is that the identity of the accused would be protected only until the point of charge, and if the police believe that the public interest demands it, the police can apply to a court to have that ban lifted so that the identity of the accused can be put into the public domain before charge. There needs to be a balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victims of sexual offences. This amendment is designed to allow us to establish where that balance should be.
We will all be acutely aware of the impact that sexual offences can have on the victims or survivors, but until recently the voice of those who have been falsely accused of such offences has not been heard. Some noble Lords will have heard about the impact that such accusations have had on the widow of Lord Brittan, Sir Cliff Richard and Paul Gambaccini when they came to speak to Members of the House about their experiences. I introduced that event but did not hear their personal accounts. Since then I have been contacted by others—the families of those whom none of us has ever heard of—who have been similarly devastated by allegations of a sexual nature being made, those allegations being made public, and then the police realising that there was no credible evidence to support the allegations. The emotional first-hand accounts of the pain and suffering of those falsely accused are powerful, but I have tried to stand aside from such emotions and to deal with this matter objectively.
It is important that I declare a number of interests in terms of my experiences over the years. During my professional career of more than 30 years as a police officer, I have dealt with, supported and campaigned for justice for those who have been the victims of male violence in general and of sexual offences in particular. I was one of the most senior police officers at New Scotland Yard when the incoming commissioner, Sir Ian, now the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, asked me to carry out a review of how the victims of rape were dealt with by the Metropolitan Police. Having been the co-author of a book that significantly changed the way the police investigated rape offences for the better, the commissioner wanted to ensure that the Metropolitan Police was among the best in the world at dealing with rape allegations. I carried out an in-depth review with academics and survivor groups, and produced hard-hitting recommendations on how the police should improve the way they support victims of rape. I worked together with the then assistant commissioner, Tim Godwin, to establish further Havens, places in the National Health Service where the survivors of sexual offences could go to receive the physical and psychological support they needed, where forensic samples could be preserved, and where they could be put in contact with the police if they wanted to pursue the case through the criminal justice system.
One of the first engagements I had with a group from outside the House following my introduction three years ago was with representatives of the End Violence Against Women Coalition, a UK-wide coalition of more than 70 women’s organisations and others working to end violence against women and girls in all its forms. The point I want to make is that I am passionate about working to end violence against women and girls, ensuring that the survivors of male violence are supported and the perpetrators brought to justice if the survivor wants to pursue the matter.
I know from personal experience about male violence and no one is more committed to ensuring that the criminal justice system does more to protect and support survivors, as well as ensuring that the perpetrators are successfully brought to justice in a way that respects survivors and encourages them to come forward. But this cannot be justice for victims at any cost. The protection of the rights of survivors cannot be at the unnecessary and unreasonable denial of the rights of the accused.
Many sexual offences are different in nature from other criminal offences. In most cases of criminal wrongdoing, there is objective and physical evidence of that wrongdoing. If someone is accused of murder, there is almost always a body. If someone is accused of child cruelty, there is a child who has been harmed. In many sexual offences cases, particularly where the offence is historical, very often there is no objective, independent physical evidence. The allegation can be made and the complainant can be credible, but the complainant may be mistaken or, albeit rarely, malicious. One has only to look at those parts of the report produced for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police by Sir Richard Henriques, which was made public last week, to realise how the police can be taken in. The police must treat every allegation made to them seriously, but they must believe the person making the allegation as far as the initial investigation and care and support for that person are concerned. They must treat the allegations as true as far as their interaction with that individual is concerned, unless and until they establish that there is no credible evidence to support the allegation. However, until they do establish that there is credible evidence that they can put before a court, they should not do anything to identify the accused, unless there are exceptional circumstances. That is what this amendment seeks to achieve.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for supporting this amendment.
I have to make it clear to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that this amendment is not an attack on the Metropolitan Police. It operates in what some might find a very strange way but there are reasons the commissioner is distanced from the operational decisions made by his officers, although I will not go into them now. The police have always had the problem that when things go wrong they are held back from apologising by their own lawyers, for reasons which will be apparent to the lawyers in the Chamber.
On what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, I agree with my noble friends that these are drafting issues. I said that the reason for this amendment was to allow a debate. The wording is actually a copy and paste of the protections provided to the victims of sexual offences; no doubt many of the noble Lord’s criticisms could therefore be directed at the current legislation. I will not go over what he said as criticisms have been made by other noble Lords and I do not want to carry on in that vein.
I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for saying that, in principle, he felt this was correct. It is interesting that he said that the unauthorised disclosure of information by police officers should be addressed, particularly in light of the fact that the Government want to put a stop to part two of the Leveson inquiry, which is supposed to look at the relationship between the police and the press. The Government seem determined not to allow it to go ahead so maybe we should sidestep it and include this issue in the amendment, which we will no doubt return to on Report.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I gave an exact example of an exceptional circumstance where such an exemption might take place and I do not want to detain the Committee by repeating it. However, perhaps “in the interests of justice” might be a better phrase to use than “in the public interest”.
Lord Faulks
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Perhaps he could help the Committee with this: the amendment would change the moment when anonymity is lost from arrest to charge. As the decision an officer takes about whether to charge is a very difficult one, does the noble Lord not think that there might be a temptation on the part of the police to charge rather earlier than they should—or at all—because then anonymity would be lost and they might be able to get more evidence? That would be a distortion of proper police practice.
Lord Paddick
I am quite surprised that that argument is being put forward. The noble Lord will know that in serious cases such as sexual offences the police cannot charge on their own account but have to have the agreement of the Crown Prosecution Service. I am sure that the noble Lord is not suggesting that the Crown Prosecution Service would be tempted to charge somebody in the absence of available evidence—the police would argue that the contrary is the case.
I take my life in my hands in addressing the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. In answer to his question, yes, it is important, and my noble friend Lord Marks has come up with the solution of including in the amendment the proposal that the identity of the accused should not be put into the public domain without his consent. That would cover the example that the noble and learned Lord gave of alibi witnesses being sought.
We are not saying that sexual offences are more serious than murder or terrorism. We are saying that there are many sexual offences and that particularly when it comes to historic offences there are questions of consent—perhaps—or there is no evidence at all and it is one person’s word against the other. That is not the case with murder or terrorism. Even when there is conspiracy to commit a terrorist act, evidence is gathered, whether, for example, from emails or through security services bugging rooms in which these people are operating. For those offences, there is some tangible evidence and that is what makes sexual offences different in a real sense. That is not to say that they are more serious—they might be so in terms of the reputational damage done to the individuals concerned but not in terms of the offence.
As a police officer who exercised the power of arrest on hundreds of occasions, I am not as confident that the level of reasonable cause to suspect that leads the police to arrest somebody is as high as the noble and learned Lord suggested. Yes, liberty is taken away, and somebody should not be deprived of their liberty without anybody knowing about it. However, if we put it into the amendment that the identity of the person should not be released without their consent, that issue would be addressed. Presumably it could also be given by the lawyer in particular circumstances.
I am very interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, said about the presumption of innocence and what he referred to as a cultural shift away from it. Everybody agrees that the presumption of innocence is at the heart of our criminal justice system, but, in practice, it is not being reflected in the minds of the public or the editors of certain newspapers. We have to deal with that reality and not some theoretical construct, and regrettably that is where we are going as far as the presumption of innocence is concerned in the minds of many members of the public.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, cited Stuart Hall as an example of a case in which more people came forward as a result of an arrest, but Stuart Hall was arrested and charged on the same day. In the case of Jimmy Savile, people did come forward to the police and were not believed; that was not because he was given anonymity but because there was something fundamentally wrong with the culture of the police at the time and they did not believe vulnerable victims. That is the issue that needs to be addressed.
We also have to ask ourselves about publicising cases which inevitably collapse. What impact does that have on victims of sexual offences who may be afraid that their genuine concerns will also result in a collapsed case? That is no doubt what is happening at the moment with the man who made these allegations and is known only as Nick. I am sure there are tabloid newspapers trying to identify that individual in order to give him negative publicity.
In response to the Minister, this is a difficult and sensitive issue. It is a question of balance and we have heard from noble Lords who have spoken in the debate that the majority feel that it is not right at the present time. The noble Baroness said that legislation is not the way forward at this time, but times have changed, as the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, said. People’s attitude towards those accused of sexual offences has changed so we need to look at this again, which is why I have brought forward the amendment and why we are having this discussion.
As I said in my opening remarks, everything needs to be done to encourage any victim of a sexual offence to come forward and report it to the police. Systems need to be in place within policing so that if allegations are made in different parts of the country against a long-distance lorry driver, for example, they are then matched up in order to reinforce the situation. But in saying that the College of Policing is doing a review when guidance is already in place which says that the presumption should be against identifying the accused, how on earth does that square, for example, with the way Sir Cliff Richard was treated by South Yorkshire Police? How does that follow College of Policing guidance, and how is a review of that guidance going to change police practice in the future?
On guidance to editors or the code of practice for the press, I have to question whether the noble Baroness reads the press and the attitude taken by its members and how a coach and horses is driven through the guidance to editors on an almost daily basis. This is why guidance is proven not to work. In marginal cases there may be some loss in terms of people not coming forward after someone has been arrested if no publicity is given, but people come forward predominantly when someone is charged and there is some certainty that a court case will happen, not at the point of arrest. That is why we will return to this on Report, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 30th November 2016
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-I(Rev)(a) Amendments for Report, supplementary to the revised marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (30 Nov 2016)
Lord Paddick
“( ) Section 2 does not require a police body to enter into a collaboration agreement with a fire and rescue body unless—(a) the relevant emergency services are services for the same area, or(b) the police area is the same as the area of more than one fire and rescue authority taken together.”
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Clause 3 covers specific restrictions that apply to collaboration agreements between police, fire and ambulance services—the emergency services—and we welcome government Amendment 2, which adds having an adverse effect on public safety to the existing restriction, if collaboration would result in an adverse effect on efficiency and effectiveness. While I am in a generous mood—it will not last—we also welcome the Government responding to the issues raised in Committee by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, around variations in existing agreements and replacement of those agreements with a new agreement, which is government Amendment 3.
We of course support innovative arrangements that are appropriate to the area and develop organically; there are examples across the country where this is happening. However, this is not unqualified support. In Yeovil, Somerset, for example, it has just been announced that the four-storey police station with cells is to be closed and police operations moved to the fire station, which is about a quarter of the size and has very limited parking. Whether the police vehicles or the fire appliances will have to use the nearby public car park is yet to be seen.
Amendment 1 places an additional restriction on collaboration agreements where the emergency service areas are not coterminous or where the boundaries of the police area do not coincide with the area covered by one or more fire and rescue service. The degree of complexity involved, were this not the case, would make such collaboration extremely difficult. On the first day of Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, gave a good example of the issues:
“In Wiltshire, we would have loved to have joined both fire and police under our PCC. That would be the best use of public resources, not just financial, but people and assets as well. But we cannot do that now, because Wiltshire fire and rescue, earlier this year, joined with Dorset fire and rescue. Dorset police work with Cornwall and Devon. Wiltshire police work in collaboration on major crimes with Avon and Somerset and Gloucester. There are two PCCs—the whole thing is a muddle. The barrier is that there is no coterminosity between different public service authorities and this is, I think, probably getting worse”.—[Official Report, 14/9/16; col. 1469.]
For there to be effective collaboration to the degree envisaged by the Government, there needs to be coterminosity. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to limit the duty to collaborate so that police bodies would be required to collaborate with fire and rescue services only where they share coterminous boundaries. I see no reason why collaboration should be limited by geographical borders. The Government require there to be coterminous boundaries where a change of governance for fire is proposed, as the core approach of those provisions is to introduce greater democratic accountability by giving a directly elected individual responsibility for both services, with a clear mandate from the electorate in their area. However, collaboration between two bodies does not invoke such issues. Further, the duty, as currently drafted, would ensure that areas where the services are not coterminous, such as Devon and Cornwall, can still maximise the benefits outside a governance change if there is no appetite to adjust boundaries locally.
As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, existing examples of collaborative working between police forces show the benefits that closer working can provide, regardless of geographical proximity. For instance, Cheshire Police collaborates with Northamptonshire and Nottingham police forces on back-office functions, including payroll, accounting, purchasing and HR, via the Multi-Force Shared Service. West Midlands Police led the largest ever police and emergency service collaborative procurement exercise, which includes 26 territorial forces, two non-territorial forces and five fire and rescue services. Together, the services will buy 3,000 vehicles over the next two years, with forecasted savings of up to £7 million over the period of the contracts.
Government Amendments 2 and 3 respond to points raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in respect of collaboration agreements. Amendment 2 explicitly provides that no relevant emergency service will be required to enter into a collaboration agreement where it would have an adverse effect on public safety. This has been the Government’s policy intention since conception of the Bill. Indeed, as I set out in Committee, the Government believe that the impact on public safety will be assessed by an emergency service whenever considering the effect of a proposed collaboration on its efficiency or effectiveness. None the less, for the avoidance of any doubt, this amendment makes it explicit in the Bill that no relevant emergency service will be required to enter into a collaboration agreement that would negatively impact public safety.
Amendment 3 clarifies the process for varying a collaboration agreement. We agree that parties to an agreement should also be able to straightforwardly vary terms of an existing agreement, where all parties are in agreement. Parties will also still be able to replace an existing agreement with a new agreement, again with the consent of the parties concerned.
I hope that, having heard my explanation, the noble Lord will be content to support the government amendments in this group and withdraw Amendment 1.
Lord Paddick
In my opening remarks, I welcomed the government amendments and suggested that we would support them. The examples that the noble Baroness gave of collaboration between police forces were to do with requisition and back-office functions. The real issues arise where there is collaboration on operational issues—for example, the sharing of buildings, and particularly where the Government want to encourage police and crime commissioners to take over the running of fire and rescue authorities, as we will hear later this afternoon. That is where the coterminosity issue is most stark. Therefore, while I accept that for requisition and back-office functions the forces do not need to be geographically co-located, real problems can arise on the operational front in these circumstances, and if the PCC has to take over. However, I will consider carefully what the noble Baroness has said and, at this stage, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The government amendments in this group do not go far enough—for example, in publishing the results of any consultation in full and on the process of the consultation itself, which we believe simply cannot be left in the hands of a police and crime commissioner. We also oppose in principle that police and crime commissioners should be allowed to take over fire and rescue authorities, for many of the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, gave this afternoon and in Committee, particularly, as we dealt with in Amendment 1, the issue around coterminosity. We also share the concerns about the employment implications of merging police services and fire and rescue services in a single employer model under a police and crime commissioner.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 19 in this group. The amendment would require that the Secretary of State cannot make an order to provide for the police and crime commissioner to be the fire and rescue authority under new Section 4A unless this has been agreed by all relevant local authorities. This amendment is supported by the Local Government Association.
In Committee, the Minister seemed to want to have her cake and eat it—to use a topical phrase. When these issues were discussed, she said at one point that,
“the Government are not mandating the transfer of fire and rescue authorities to police and crime commissioners. These provisions are locally enabling and acknowledge that local leaders are best placed to assess what would work … in their areas”.
But then later she said:
“Where there is clear merit in a transfer taking place that could benefit local communities, it would be wrong to allow vested local interests to stand in the way”.—[Official Report, 14/9/16; col. 1520.]
Local authority councillors are democratically elected to represent local people. One of their responsibilities is the fire and rescue service. Police and crime commissioners have been democratically elected to oversee policing, based on a manifesto that covers only policing. I believe that the Minister was right to say that local leaders are best placed to assess what would work best in their areas, and wrong to describe as “vested local interests” the democratically elected local authority councillors who do not agree with their police and crime commissioner about the PCC taking over local fire and rescue services. Our amendment is in line with the Minister’s initial comment in Committee, rather than her later comment.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, the Government came into office with a clear manifesto commitment to enable fire and police services to work more closely together and to develop the role of our elected and accountable police and crime commissioners. The provisions in Part 1 of the Bill, including those in Clause 6, give legislative effect to that commitment.
It is clear that better joint working can strengthen our emergency services, deliver significant savings to taxpayers and, most importantly, enable the emergency services to better protect the public. While there are many excellent examples of collaboration between the emergency services across the country—I draw noble Lords’ attention to the excellent overview of such collaboration recently published by the Emergency Services Collaboration Working Group—the picture of collaboration remains patchy and more needs to be done to make collaborative working the norm. The directly accountable leadership of PCCs can play a critical role in this by securing better commissioning and delivery of emergency services at a local level. This is not about a merger or a police takeover; nor is it an erosion of the brand identity of the fire service. By overseeing both services, PCCs can strengthen the services by maximising the opportunities for innovative collaboration between policing and fire, and ensure that best practice is shared.
It has been said many times before, but I should stress again, that the provisions in Clause 6 providing for PCCs to take on responsibility for fire and rescue are totally locally enabling. A one-size-fits-all approach would clearly be inappropriate and it should be up to local communities to have a say in how their services are provided. PCCs will be able to take on responsibility for fire and rescue only where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy or effectiveness, on the one hand, or public safety, on the other, and where they have consulted the relevant local authorities and the public. Removing the provisions from the Bill that enable PCCs to take on governance of fire and rescue denies PCCs the opportunity to drive forward local reform. In a number of areas—for example, Essex, Northamptonshire and Hertfordshire—we know that PCCs are already working closely with their fire and rescue authorities to consider the local case.
Requiring there to be local agreement before a transfer of governance can take place, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would introduce unnecessary and unjustifiable barriers that serve to inhibit positive collaboration taking place at a local level. If there are valid reasons for a local authority’s opposition to a PCC’s proposal, these will be identified in the independent assessment process and the Home Secretary will approve a transfer only where a case has been made that it is in the interests of local communities. It would not be right to let parochial local interests—to take up what the noble Lord said—get in the way of reform where there is a clear benefit to the public.
In Committee, I was clear that the Government’s intention is for the process by which a PCC brings forward a business case for the transfer of responsibility for fire to be as robust and transparent as possible. It is important that this process commands the confidence of all parties and that local views are properly taken into account. To provide even greater assurances on this point, the Government have put forward a number of amendments which strengthen the consultation and transparency duties on PCCs. These amendments respond to a number of helpful and important points raised by noble Lords during the earlier stages of the Bill.
First, Amendment 9 will replace the existing duty on PCCs to seek the views of people in their police area with a duty that requires them to consult them. This strengthening of the duty makes explicit the Government’s expectation that PCCs will take local views into account when developing their business case and responds to concerns that the existing duty to seek views is not strong enough. In addition, Amendment 10 places an explicit duty on PCCs to consult with persons representing the views of employees and of members of the police force who may be affected by their proposal. I would expect this to include trade unions and staff associations such as the FBU, Unison and the Police Federation.
Amendment 16 will additionally require the PCC to submit a summary of the responses to such consultation to the Home Secretary to inform her decision on the proposal where the PCC does not have local agreement. It remains appropriate that it is for the PCC to determine the manner in which they should consult local authorities, the public and employee representatives, and Amendment 13 makes that clear. In the interests of transparency, Amendments 11, 15 and 17 will also require the PCC to publish the outcomes of their local consultation and the Secretary of State to publish the independent assessment that she secures of a PCC’s business case, where they do not have the agreement of the relevant local councils.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, tabled further amendments to these provisions, which seek to further prescribe the process by which a PCC consults on his or her proposal and the requirements on the Home Secretary to publish an independent assessment. As I have already set out, I am very keen, like the noble Lord, to make sure that the process by which a PCC seeks to take on the responsibilities of a fire and rescue authority is as robust and transparent as possible. However, I hope the noble Lord would agree that many of the points that he has raised are properly a matter for guidance rather than for primary legislation. The circumstances of each local consultation will be different, so we should not unduly fetter local flexibility to put in place proportionate arrangements that recognise the nature of each local business case. The amendments, while well intentioned, risk cutting across the local accountability of PCCs and risk Whitehall dictating matters that should rightly be left to local leaders.
In response to the noble Lord’s important concerns, however, I can be very clear about the Government’s expectation that the PCC’s consultation will be undertaken in an appropriate manner and be of an appropriate duration to allow local people to express their views and for the PCC to have them taken into account. Further, we would expect the PCC’s response to the consultation to cover the matters that the noble Lord has listed in Amendment 12. The Home Office will work closely with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Association of Police and Crime Chief Executives to ensure that their guidance on the development of PCC business cases incorporates these points. However, I should stress again that it is for the PCC to determine locally how to achieve such outcomes based on the nature of the case, its complexity and its understanding of the best ways to engage with local communities.
Furthermore, government Amendment 17 will ensure that the independent assessment is published as soon as is practicable after the Home Secretary has made a determination. In practice, this will ensure that all parties have sufficient time to consider the findings before an order is made. Adding in what amounts to a statutory one-month pause in the process in every case again strikes me as unduly complicating the procedure for making these orders and risks increasing local uncertainty as the process is drawn out. I might add that having received the independent assessment, there is no assumption that the Home Secretary would necessarily approve a PCC’s proposal. She will base her decision on the evidence presented. I hope that noble Lords will agree that the government amendments set out a clear expectation that there should be a comprehensive consultation, that the process will be transparent, and that local views will be properly taken into account.
I also indicated in Committee that I would give further consideration to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, regarding public safety. As I set out during that debate, public safety is a core function of the emergency services and we consider that any assessment of the impact of a proposed transfer of governance on effectiveness would include an assessment of its impact on public safety. None the less, I am content to make provision on the face of the Bill that puts this matter beyond any doubt. Government Amendments 5, 6 and 35 explicitly provide that the Secretary of State may not make an order transferring responsibility for fire and rescue to a PCC or implementing the single employer model under either a PCC or a combined authority mayor where it would adversely affect public safety.
I shall deal with the other government amendments in this group. As the Bill is currently drafted, when a PCC implements the single employer model and so delegates fire functions to a single chief officer, schemes that may be made by the Secretary of State transferring property, rights and liabilities from an FRA or the PCC-style FRA to that chief officer are one way only. On the terms and conditions for police and fire and rescue personnel, when staff are transferred from an FRA to the PCC, and under the single employer model from the PCC to the chief officer, they would be covered by the principles of the Cabinet Office code of practice entitled Statement of Practice of Staff Transfers in the Public Sector, taking into account the considerations associated with bringing two workforces closer together. For example, we propose that under the single employer model, complaints, conduct and death and serious injury matters for both the police and the fire service are treated on a consistent basis. PCCs will need to consider how to best reflect a more closely aligned workforce locally when preparing their business case, including consultation with the relevant unions where necessary, as I said previously.
On the question whether the proposals will take firefighters, emergency fire control staff and fire support staff out of national pay and conditions, pensions and other arrangements, the terms and conditions of firefighters and control staff are negotiated on a UK-wide basis via the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services. The NJC has no statutory basis and it is for PCC FRAs to decide whether to remain members. PCC-style FRAs will also have the same ability as FRAs to negotiate changes to terms and conditions at local level, while remaining members of the NJC, but PCCs would need to approach the NJC if they wished to become members.
Lord Paddick
Before the Minister sits down, could she clarify something? She described the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as unnecessary interference in what should be a locally determined matter—the nature of the consultation process. However, when it comes to deciding whether the police and crime commissioner should take over the fire and rescue authority, against the wishes of the democratically elected local councillors, that is not seen as an unnecessary interference in local decisions.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I hope I have outlined clearly that the Home Secretary would take a view on this issue and on all representations that have been received when making her decision.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I shall also speak to the other amendments in this group. These amendments, taken together, are designed to allow police and crime commissioners to attend and speak at committees or sub-committees appointed by local authorities wholly or partly for the purposes of discharging the functions of a fire and rescue authority but not to allow police and crime commissioners to vote at those meetings.
Local authority councillors are democratically elected to represent local people on a range of issues, including fire and rescue services. Police and crime commissioners have been democratically elected to represent local people in overseeing the police force for which they are responsible. They have no democratic mandate to vote on issues relating to fire and rescue services, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said so persuasively in Committee, at col. 1489. If the police and crime commissioner has persuasive points, the committee that he is present and speaking at will be persuaded, and if his points are not persuasive, he should not be allowed to use a vote to push those views through. The “real influence” that the Minister referred to in Committee, at col. 1544, should come from the strength of the police and crime commissioner’s arguments, not from having a vote to back them up. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Clause 7 enables police and crime commissioners to request to be represented on fire and rescue authorities within their police areas where they do not take responsibility for the governance of the fire and rescue service. This is what we have described as the representation model. Where a fire and rescue authority accepts such a request, we have set out that PCCs will be treated as if they were a member of the authority for the purposes of bringing agenda items, receiving papers and so on, and have full voting rights to ensure that they can take part in the business of the fire and rescue authority in a meaningful and effective way.
The noble Lord’s amendments seek to remove these provisions, which would be a great shame, as we want the PCC’s representation to be meaningful and on an equal footing with existing members of the FRA. To deny PCCs the ability to vote would reduce their scope for influence and I fear that opportunities for fostering greater collaboration would be missed. As my noble friend Lady Williams explained in Committee, in response to a group of similar amendments, we want police and crime commissioners and fire and rescue authorities to consider the representation model as a viable option for promoting greater collaboration between the two services. These amendments would hinder that.
The amendments would also remove the necessity for a fire and rescue authority to publish its decision and reasoning in considering the PCC’s request for membership. I am concerned that to do so would remove transparency and accountability from the process. These provisions enable PCCs to seek representation where they wish to do so, while respecting local fire governance arrangements. The final decision on representation rests with the fire and rescue authority, although we fully expect that in the majority of instances the fire and rescue authority would accept the PCC’s request and, if it did not, its reasons should be made clear to both the PCC and the public. This ensures that the process is fully transparent and open to effective scrutiny.
The provisions in the Bill allow for the representation model to be considered as an opportunity to foster greater collaboration outside of pursuing other governance models. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord of the merits of the approach taken in the Bill and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister. I am still struggling to understand why a police and crime commissioner, who is elected on the basis of a manifesto to do with policing, should have full voting rights on a fire and rescue authority. I am not sure that “It would be a great shame” is a particularly powerful argument against my proposal. The Minister said that the police and crime commissioner should be on an equal footing with other members of the fire and rescue authority but did not actually say why. Yes, the final decision rests with the fire and rescue authority but, given the fact that this is in legislation, it would be difficult, certainly following the Minister’s remarks, for fire and rescue authorities to resist a move by a police and crime commissioner to take those voting rights. Greater collaboration surely does not necessarily depend on the police and crime commissioner having a vote on the fire and rescue authority. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I hope it is not going to be another letter because, from my dim and distant memory of local government officers’ political restrictions, I recall that up to a certain level of officer, you are free to canvass and engage in political activity. You are also free to stand for elected office in an authority other than your own. I think I may have to write, now that the noble Lord is heading for the door, on the matter of elected office for local authority officials because that will be looked at in the regulations.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I thank the Minister for listening to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and to the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. She cannot be in her place today, but she has asked me to pass on her thanks for the amendments that the Government have brought forward in this group.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 46 I will speak also to the other amendment in the group, Amendment 47. Both are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This is a straight rerun of the amendments we had in Committee in relation to police super-complaints, which bodies can make them and the authorised persons who can ask the Secretary of State to add or remove bodies from the list of bodies that can make them. In Committee, we argued that the Secretary of State should be required to consult on the regulations that designate which bodies can make super-complaints. These regulations will contain the criteria that will be applied to decide which bodies can bring police super-complaints. New Section 29B, inserted by Clause 25, requires the Secretary of State to consult when she makes or revokes a designation but does not require her to consult on the criteria that she applies in deciding whether to make or revoke a designation. That is the intended effect of Amendment 46.
Amendment 47 relates to the “authorised persons” who can ask the Secretary of State to make or revoke a designation under new Section 29B(2)(b) of the Police Reform Act 2002. Contrary to what the Minister took as our intention in Committee, Amendment 47 sets out a list of bodies that the Secretary of State should specify as authorised persons who can ask the Secretary of State to make or revoke a designated body under new subsection (2)(a), not a list of designated bodies that can make police super-complaints.
Just to be clear, there will be two lists of bodies in relation to police super-complaints. There are authorised persons, who are bodies who can ask the Secretary of State to designate or remove a body from the list of those able to make police super-complaints, and there are bodies that are designated as being able to bring police super-complaints. We believe that the list of authorised persons should include the Law Society, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and Citizens Advice, and others that should be listed in the Bill. I beg to move Amendment 46.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, these matters were discussed in Committee. I am very supportive of Amendments 46 and 47. As we have heard, designated bodies will get the power to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, and these complaints can be made where, in the opinion of the designated body, a feature of policing may be harming the public and needs looking at. It is based on a system that works in the private sector and this is the first time it will be used in the public sector. Only designated bodies will be able to make super-complaints, and the process for designating these bodies will be set out in regulations.
When the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, responds to this debate, it would be helpful if she said something about the timescale for the consultation processes, and when she expects these regulations to be laid before Parliament and come into force. I should also say that I am happy for the negative procedure to be used in respect of the regulations; perhaps the noble Baroness could bring that fact to the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hyde of Ashton, who is of the opinion that I would never agree to the negative procedure being used for regulations in this House.
The proposals in this section of the Bill are a welcome move and will be a positive benefit to organisations and individuals that have legitimate concerns to raise. We are supportive of them and of these amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the opportunity to address the misunderstanding over Amendment 47, which was previously tabled in Committee. However, I am again going to have to disappoint the noble Lord as the Government cannot support either of these amendments. The Bill provides for the delegation of the ability to authorise those who can be designated bodies for the purposes of the new super-complaints system.
I welcome the noble Lord’s suggestions of who should perform this function but I do not agree that this task can be performed by bodies that might themselves want to raise super-complaints, or by multiple agencies. For the system to have legitimacy, we need to avoid a conflict of interest in this role. That is why the Bill creates this distinct role, as we do not consider it appropriate that HM Inspectorate of Constabulary designates the bodies that can come to it with super-complaints.
All three bodies put forward by the noble Lord could potentially add significant value as designated bodies, should they wish to apply. It would be a shame if, for example, Citizens Advice were precluded from raising issues through the super-complaints system. In the interests of a smooth and speedy process, I suggest that this role should be undertaken by an individual or single body, not by a committee.
The critical point here is that the criteria for designation are clear and unambiguous so that authorisation is a simple and objective process. That is why we will consult widely on the criteria in due course, and I encourage all those who have an interest to feed in their views. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about timing: it will be in the coming months.
Having consulted to establish clear criteria, we believe it is unnecessary to subsequently consult on any list of bodies deemed to have met the criteria, as required by the noble Lord’s Amendment 46. This risks slowing the whole system down, delaying designation and further delaying the point at which bodies can submit super-complaints to HMIC.
I reiterate the Government’s commitment to consulting widely on the criteria. As part of that process, we would welcome the input of noble Lords on bodies or organisations that may be suitable for designation or for the role as the authorised person. I hope the noble Lord, having considered the Government’s arguments, will feel free to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his support for these amendments and for the explanation given by the Minister. Obviously I am disappointed that she felt she could not support them. Clearly there would have to be a distinction between the role of authorised persons and the role of designated bodies. The suggestions we made were on the basis that these organisations had vast knowledge of the voluntary bodies and third party organisations that work in their areas. There would have to be a distinction if they were appointed as authorised persons, and they would not be able to be designated bodies themselves, but that is something that the Government could make a decision on.
I am grateful for the reassurance around the consultation that will take place over the criteria that will be used in order to decide which bodies should be designated. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. I should declare three interests. First, I was a police officer for more than 30 years, retiring with an exemplary record in 2007 as a deputy assistant commissioner, the equivalent of a deputy chief constable outside London. Secondly, I was a victim of phone hacking. Thirdly, I was party to a judicial review of the Metropolitan Police Service in 2011. This review concluded that the police had failed in their duty to protect my and others’ Article 8 rights to a private and family life under the Human Rights Act, because they had failed to tell us that we were the targets of phone hacking by the press. I was a senior police officer in the Metropolitan Police at the time of the phone hacking. The noble Lord, Lord Prescott, another party to the judicial review, was the Deputy Prime Minister at the time his phone was hacked.
To take up the point of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I accept the question of proportionality but the difference here is that the Government promised the victims of phone hacking that Leveson 2 would take place. The former Prime Minister promised that this inquiry would take place and that, I am afraid, rather trumps the noble Viscount’s arguments around proportionality. The inquiry was set up to explore and resolve a number of areas but, in the interests of brevity, as no doubt these points will be covered by other noble Lords, I will focus on just one element.
I discovered that I had been the subject of interest to the private detective employed by News International to carry out phone hacking, Glen Mulcaire, when I was told through my solicitors by the Guardian in 2011. My solicitors contacted the Metropolitan Police, who said that there was no record of my having been the victim of phone hacking. The Guardian sources insisted that I was and the Metropolitan Police eventually admitted that I had been involved as a target. They subsequently disclosed pages from Mulcaire’s notebook which had my name, details of my then partner, our home address and phone numbers and other personal details and that these documents were in their possession and had been in their possession since before 2006. The police also subsequently disclosed an internal memo which indicated that “Commander Paddick” was a target of phone hacking. I was a commander from 2000 to 2003, when I was promoted.
My point is that the Metropolitan Police knew that there was widespread phone hacking and did nothing to investigate it or to warn the victims that their phones were being hacked, even when one of those victims was the Deputy Prime Minister and another was one of its own senior police officers, who was working in the same building as the detectives who had uncovered the scandal. At around the same time, it appears that members of the press whose phones were being hacked by rival newspapers were warned that their phones were being hacked.
There has been no satisfactory explanation of why the police behaved in this way—we need to know why. Leveson 2 should be initiated to find that out. I say that there has been no satisfactory explanation of the police conduct because it has been suggested that the initial investigation, where the Royal Family had been among the victims and which had been carried out by the Counter Terrorism Command as a result, had other priorities. We can imagine that the counterterrorism branch did have other priorities. If that was the reason for not taking the matter further, there was no reason why the police could not have informed other victims to take precautions against using their mobile phones and that no further action would be taken. Indeed, that was the conclusion reached by the judge who heard the judicial review.
Once the royal connection had been dealt with, the case could, and should, have been transferred to the Specialist Crime Directorate of the Metropolitan Police, the most appropriate department at Scotland Yard to investigate such matters, where a scandal of such proportions could have been given the resources required to investigate matters properly. Instead, it was only after the Guardian discovered the extent of the scandal that the Metropolitan Police acknowledged that an investigation was needed and applied the resources required. We have not got to the bottom of the relationship between the Metropolitan Police and the media at that time. That is why we need the inquiry proposed by this amendment.
If a public inquiry is needed and the Government have promised one, it should take place. The sudden deployment of a wholly unnecessary consultation is, or appears to be, a device to give cover to the Government reneging yet again on a promise made regarding the phone hacking issue. If I am wrong and the Government decide after all to recommit to Leveson 2, I am sure this House will simply agree to the later removal of the amendment. In the meantime, it is our insurance policy against the Government letting us down again, and we on these Benches will support it if the noble Baroness divides the House.
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lords who tabled this amendment. I listened to the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the chronology of which I understand, but which may be difficult for others to understand. I totally accept the passion with which he spoke on that issue. I support the amendment but make it clear that I am one of the few Members of the House who gave evidence to Leveson in person and on oath. I support the amendment precisely because it fulfils the previous government commitment. As I was the commissioner at the time the first phone hacking case appeared to arise, which concerned the royal household and to which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred, it would not be appropriate for me to say in this House that I do not accept any further scrutiny of the Metropolitan Police or other police forces over this matter. Therefore, I very much support the idea that Leveson 2, in whatever form, or whether it is through this amendment, should be introduced.
However, given that I gave evidence to the inquiry, I need to make it clear that I shall be very surprised—at this point, I move towards the position adopted by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—if a new inquiry uncovers anything involving major corruption in recent years. To that end, I ask the House’s indulgence to allow me to read one paragraph—paragraph 49—of my statement to Leveson, which I made in 2012, which set out my position on the question. It refers to the Met and only to events post-2000. Therefore, it does not refer to Morgan or Hillsborough as that was the question I was being asked: what had I done since I had been the deputy commissioner and the commissioner? It was submitted in spring 2012 and says:
“Whilst I therefore accept that current enquiries may reveal that a small number of relatively junior officers took bribes from the press, I do not believe that corruption in monetary terms lies at the heart of any major problem in the relationship between the”,
Metropolitan Police Service and the press. We can now say that a number of junior police officers were convicted, and rightly so. I continued:
“I believe that where that problem may have become significant is that a very small number of relatively senior officers … became too close to journalists, not I believe for financial gain but for the enhancement of their reputation and for the sheer enjoyment of being in a position to share and divulge confidences. It is a siren song. I also believe that they based this behaviour on how they saw politicians”,
behaving with the press,
“and that they lost sight of their professional obligations. The MPS did not have adequate defences against this behaviour and in previous decades would probably not have needed it”.
In short, what will be revealed by such an inquiry, which I still say is necessary, is behaviour that was wrong, reprehensible and unprofessional, but largely not criminal.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the Government are committed to ensuring that those working for the police have the confidence to come forward to report concerns of malpractice and misconduct within the service. Clause 27 inserts new Part 2B and new Schedule 3A into the Police Reform Act 2002. This will provide the Independent Police Complaints Commission with a new power to carry out independent whistleblowing investigations. It gives police officers and staff a new route to raise their concerns directly with the IPCC. As a result, it will give police officers and staff a greater level of assurance around discretion and objectivity by strengthening the protections for whistleblowers, including anonymity.
Amendments 49 and 50 respond to points raised in Committee by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy. The amendments will provide greater clarity about when a whistleblowing investigation can be considered by the IPCC. The amendments modify the definition of a whistleblower in two ways. The first modification is to enable whistleblowers to raise concerns about matters which occurred before they joined the police. The second modification will remove the need for the IPCC to consider whether to start a new whistleblowing investigation where it is already conducting an investigation under Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, or where there is an ongoing whistleblowing investigation.
There will also be no requirement for the IPCC to consider whether to open a new investigation when the concern raised is already being dealt with as a super-complaint. These modifications will provide further clarity on the definition of a whistleblower, ensuring that the new Part 2B provisions will not interfere with the progress of these existing investigations. This will also support the IPCC to effectively implement its duties under the new provisions.
Amendments 51, 55, 63, 64 and 69 are technical amendments to ensure that, as with concerns which involve conduct matters, where the IPCC identifies a concern as relating to a “death or serious injury” matter as defined in Part 2 of the 2002 Act, the matter must be handled under that part. In such circumstances, the whistleblower’s identity will continue to be protected by modifications to Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act specified in regulations. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to the Government for listening to the concerns we raised around whistleblowing in Committee. We certainly support the government amendments in this group.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, there was a very useful debate in Committee on whistleblowing. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I raised a number of issues; we are very grateful that the Government have listened and tabled these amendments and we are very supportive of them.
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 59 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I, too, thank the Government for the change that they have made regarding the word “Independent”. This amendment tries to ensure that that is not simply a cosmetic change and that the new body will be even more independent.
The amendment would change the current position where a member of the Independent Police Complaints Commission cannot be someone who holds or who has held office as a constable in any part of the United Kingdom or someone who has worked under the direction or control of a chief officer or equivalent office in Scotland or Northern Ireland. The current legislation specifically excludes anyone making decisions on casework or investigations, for obvious reasons. The public are not reassured about the independence of the police complaints investigation body if those making such decisions are either former police officers or those who have worked for the police.
The amendment would prevent other members of the new body being serving or former police officers or those who formerly worked for the police. In Committee the Minister said:
“We do not think that there should be statutory restrictions on those who are members of the office—in effect, the board of the reformed organisation. The core functions of the office are set out clearly in the Bill and include ensuring the good governance and financial management of the organisation. These functions are quite distinct from the functions of the director-general. The director-general, as the single executive head, will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, not the board. It is not right that a suitably qualified individual could not be appointed to a corporate governance role as a member of the board simply because he or she once worked as a police civilian, perhaps for just a short period many years previously”.—[Official Report, 26/10/16; col. 258.]
There is very little trust or confidence in the IPCC among many who bring complaints against the police and many others, including me, because we do not believe it is independent enough. How will having members of the board of the new body—the rebranded body—who are former employees of the police service improve that trust and confidence? It certainly does not do it for me. Although the Minister says that the director-general will be solely accountable for all casework and investigation decisions, in practice he will not be making all those decisions—unless he works 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Even if the board members are there to ensure good governance and financial management, their decisions could be crucial to the effective investigation of serious complaints by deciding the way the rebranded organisation operates, its structure and so forth, and the way resources are apportioned.
The Government keep saying how important it is to bring people with different skills and experience into the police service. If the police service is in such desperate need of new blood, because the Government believe it does not have enough talent of its own, why are the Government so keen for those from the police service to be part of the new body that will be investigating the most serious complaints against the police? Barring those previously employed by the police service from holding crucial positions within the rebranded Office for Police Conduct—with or without “Independent” stuck on the front of it—would be a small price to pay for providing reassurance that it is truly independent. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will have a vital role in securing and maintaining public confidence in the reformed police complaints system. That is why the Bill provides for an absolute bar on the new single executive head of the organisation—the director-general —ever having worked for the police. The Government do not believe it is appropriate for the Bill to impose further statutory restrictions on membership of the office beyond the post of director-general.
The corporate structure of the IOPC is radically different from the existing commission model. The new board—the office—will have a majority of independent non-executive members, and its functions are set out clearly in the Bill. These include ensuring good corporate governance and financial management. Importantly, the board’s functions do not include responsibility for investigations and casework decisions, for which the director-general alone will be accountable. This is in contrast to the current position, where commissioners undertake such investigative functions.
If a highly suitable individual applies for a non-executive role, perhaps as a finance expert, it would be wrong to reject them automatically simply because many years previously they worked for a short period as a police civilian, perhaps in a relatively junior role. To ensure that the organisation can deliver high-quality and timely investigations—the predominant driver of confidence—the director-general will wish to ensure that the organisation has a diverse mix of people. As part of this, the director-general may wish to employ a number of people who have valuable policing experience, as the IPCC does now.
Under the new model, investigations and casework decisions will be undertaken by employees, all of whom will be working in a single line management chain reporting to the director-general. The Government fully expect the director-general to decide that certain employee roles, including some senior operational and public-facing positions, should not be filled by those with a police background, but those decisions should be a matter for the director-general.
We recognise that confidence is also driven by the perception of the organisation as impartial and independent from the police. That is why the Bill provides the director-general with an explicit power to determine the functions and roles that are not open to former police officers. This means that the director- general can go further than the current legislation, which requires only that a minimum of six people cannot have worked for the police—namely, the chair and a minimum of five other members of the commission. The Bill also strengthens existing arrangements in relation to transparency by setting out a requirement on the director-general to publish a statement of policy on the exercise of these particular powers of recruitment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I of course acknowledge the Government’s intention in drafting the legislation as they have. If we were starting with a completely new body with no previous track record, I would be more willing to agree with the Minister. However, this is all about public confidence and perception, and the fact is that under the previous legislation the Independent Police Complaints Commission had six commissioners, all of whom were barred by law from having been employed by the police or having held the office of constable, and now there will be only one. In theory, the rest of the new body could be formed of previous police officers. Now, I understand that that is not likely, but there is the potential for those critics of the police complaints system to point out that there has been a reduction in the number of people statutorily barred from serving on the new body—it has gone down to one.
I accept that there is an explicit power for the director-general to designate certain posts that should not be open to former police officers, but, as I say, this is all about perception. While we are grateful that “Independent” has been shunted on to the front of the description of the new body, we feel that this change—reducing the number of people who are barred statutorily from holding positions in the body—will undermine public confidence in that independence. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I am sorry that I missed the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, opening this discussion, but I was somewhere else and I came here as soon as I could. My concern over this is with the concept of volunteers. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, there is a range of defensive systems here, including the truncheon itself, but I am concerned about giving volunteers Tasers. If you give a volunteer a Taser, all the volunteer has to do once it has gone off is to say that they do not want to be a volunteer anymore and disappear into the distance. Then you have nothing unless you have a criminal inquiry into what happened. My sense is that this set of clauses needs a lot more specificity.
My view is that the police could bring in some designated persons as firearms officers: they could recruit people from the Army and deploy them only to be firearms officers, which would be a logical and a budget-saving thing to do. The idea that we have to have fully trained constables standing outside embassies has always struck me as odd when we could recruit them much more cheaply. But with all those cases, you have a financial arrangement between the chief constable and that person, and they can therefore be disciplined and so on. Obviously if you shoot somebody, you have a criminal inquiry, but that is not the point here. We need to take this piece of the Bill and look at it again, to make sure we have the different types of defensive and offensive weapons, and the people who can use them, categorised. At the moment it feels that we will be opening a door we might find very difficult to close subsequently.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I start by agreeing wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that this seems too broad in what it could allow. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, it could result in volunteers being equipped with revolvers. I also have the same concerns that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has about a self-defence weapon being used in an aggressive as opposed to a defensive way.
We support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 107 in the group, which says that Clause 38 should not stand part of the Bill and seeks to achieve the same end as Amendment 106, which is to prevent police community support officer volunteers from being provided with CS spray or any other firearm that the Secretary of State might authorise by regulation in the future. My understanding, contrary to that of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is that special constables can be equipped with CS spray at the moment, and will continue to be, so I do not think that the changes in the Bill will have the effect he suggests.
The only remarks that I would add to those already made by noble Lords are that police volunteers carry out excellent work and are a valuable addition to the police family. However, with reservations already being expressed about whether paid police community support officers should be using force, and in the absence of any paid PCSO having been authorised to use CS spray by any chief constable anywhere in the United Kingdom—if I remember the debate in Committee correctly—changing the law to allow chief constables to give CS spray to volunteer PCSOs seems both unnecessary and unreasonable.
Secondly, as alluded to by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, if chief constables need additional volunteers who can exercise the use of force, including with CS spray, because they do not have the resources any more to pay full-time police officers, whatever the rights and wrongs of that, there is a route open to them, which is to recruit more special constables, who have all the powers of a regular police officer and who are paid only expenses. We on these Benches will support the Labour amendment on this issue.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, these amendments return us to an issue that was debated at length in both the other place and in Committee in this House, namely whether it is ever right for designated members of police staff, or the new category of designated volunteers, to carry CS or PAVA sprays for defensive purposes—I stress the point that this is for defensive purposes.
I should point out to the House that, although most of our debates have been about whether it is right for volunteers to carry defensive sprays, Amendment 106 as drafted would also prevent chief officers equipping their existing paid staff, such as PCSOs, with such sprays. I assume this is not intention of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, but it would be helpful if he could clarify this when winding up.
When we debated this issue in Committee, a number of noble Lords expressed the view that the use of force is somehow incompatible with the PCSO role, and even more so for volunteers. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that the appropriate route for an individual who wishes,
“to volunteer to get involved in the use of force in the exercise of police powers”,
is,
“to become a special constable”.—[Official Report, 26/10/16; col. 267.]
I think he said that again today. However, it is important to put on record that, given the long-standing tradition of policing by consent, I would hope that no one who wishes to help with the policing of their community, as a police officer or a member of staff, whether paid or as a volunteer, does so with a view to using force against their fellow citizens. There are of course myriad roles which police officers, staff and volunteers perform regularly that do not involve the use of force.
Indeed, as we have discussed, the primary role of a PCSO across England and Wales is to engage with members of the public and to carry out low-level interventions such as dealing with anti-social behaviour. However, as was discussed in the House of Commons earlier this month, it is a sad fact of life that both police officers and PCSOs are assaulted and injured on duty. For example, in 2015-16, 270 assaults were reported by PCSOs in England and Wales, and those figures do not include the British Transport Police. It should be noted that this figure includes only assaults that officers report to their health and safety or human resource teams. In some cases, officers will choose not to report cases, as it is usually not compulsory to do so. Therefore, in reality, this figure is likely to be much higher.
We must therefore ensure that chief police officers are able to use their operational experience to make judgments as to the necessary level of defensive equipment and self-defence training that they make available to their officers and PCSOs. The only other option for chief police officers would be to withdraw their PCSOs from areas where there was a threat to their safety, potentially making disorder more likely if members of the community were unable to engage with a familiar face in uniform.
The situation is in essence no different from that of special constables, who are themselves volunteers. They have all the powers of a police officer, and a significant number are trained in the use of defensive sprays. I also point out that a small proportion of specials are trained in the use of public order tactics, so the use of force by appropriately trained police volunteers is not a new idea.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has tabled Amendment 107, which would remove Clause 38 from the Bill. The change to Section 54 of the Firearms Act 1968 made by Clause 38(2) is consequential on the provisions in Clause 37 enabling designated volunteers to be given access to defensive sprays. It therefore follows that if Amendment 106 were agreed to, Clause 38(2) would be unnecessary. However, Clause 38(3) deals with a separate point, making it explicit that special constables are members of a police force for the purposes of the Firearms Act 1968 and therefore do not require a certificate or authorisation under the 1968 Act when equipped with a defensive spray. Accordingly, the amendment goes wider than I believe the noble Lord intends.
A question was asked about the most appropriate route for an individual who wishes to perform front-line policing to join the specials. I think I have already addressed that point but I add that there might be reasons why an individual who wants to volunteer to help to make his or her community safer chooses not to join the specials. These reforms will enable those who wish to help to keep their communities safe to do so even where they are unable to meet the requirements for being a special—the time commitment, for example, or they may be in an occupation where they are prevented from being a special, such as being a Border Force officer, but still have skills or experience that could be of value.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham asked about the order-making power in Clause 37(6) enabling the Home Secretary to make regulations that would allow police staff and volunteers to use a firearm. The power is primarily intended as a form of future-proofing. Should, for example, a new form of defensive spray that uses substances other than CS come on to the market—
Lord Paddick
Lord Paddick
My Lords, the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee asks that Clause 46 not stand part of the Bill. Clause 46 gives power to the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify the ranks that may be held by police officers other than chief officers of police.
We have been here before—in 1993—with the Sheehy review into police responsibilities and rewards. Among other recommendations of that review was the abolition of the ranks of chief inspector and chief superintendent. After an expensive process of offering chief inspectors early retirement, that decision was reversed, leaving the police service with a deficit of suitably qualified and experienced chief inspectors. One consequence was that overnight—or, perhaps I should say, over the weekend—I went from being a uniformed chief inspector with no experience as a detective to being a detective chief inspector in charge of CID at Notting Hill.
Another recommendation of that report was to abolish the rank of chief superintendent. Instead, in the Metropolitan Police, we had grade 1 and grade 2 superintendents, one in charge and the other a deputy. They were both called “superintendent”, they both wore the same badge of rank, but one was more senior than the other. Such nonsense did not last long, and the rank of chief superintendent was subsequently reinstated. More recently, some police forces have decided significantly to reduce or not appoint officers to particular ranks, as suits the local circumstances of each force.
History has shown us, and present practice continues to demonstrate, that we do not need the Secretary of State to designate which ranks may be held by members of police forces; it is far better to allow chief constables to decide for themselves which ranks they need and which they do not. By all means let the Secretary of State or the College of Policing issue guidance to chief officers as to factors they should take into account when deciding which ranks to have. But, please, let us not make the same, very expensive—in terms of both money and loss of experience—mistake again. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, policing needs a greater say in how it structures its own organisations. It was the College of Policing’s leadership review that initially recommended a review of rank structure. It recognised that the rank structure as set out in the Police Act 1996 and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 was not serving the needs of all forces. To support this police-led reform, Clause 46 will give the college the power to recommend regulations setting out what the rank structure should be. Chief Constable Francis Habgood, who is leading the review of the rank structure, is working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to develop proposals that will work across all forces.
Having some commonality across forces is essential. The public have the right to expect the same high standards of service from every force and there needs to be clarity for the public around the exercise of significant police powers that can impact on civil liberties. Indeed, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and other legislation, expressly requires certain decisions to be taken by an officer of a specified minimum rank, very often an inspector or superintendent. I note that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on pre-charge anonymity specified that an application to a court to waive anonymity has to be made by an officer of at least the rank of inspector. Such key protections for the citizen cannot operate meaningfully without a national rank structure. Furthermore, the Government are committed to a national pay framework for police officers, where again there must be consistency across forces. A consistent rank structure also makes interforce collaboration easier, which is a critical consideration given the many complex challenges facing modern policing that require forces to work together.
This is not to say that every force must have officers of every rank. The Metropolitan Police has, for example, recently announced that it is to do away with the rank of chief inspector and it is open to other forces to follow suit. As I said in Committee, the Government make no presumption about the rank structure that may be proposed by the College of Policing in future. I believe that we should let the work of Chief Constable Francis Habgood continue and not constrain police leaders in how forces should be organised. Parliament will have the opportunity to examine the proposals for changes to the rank structure once the College of Policing has made its recommendations, as these will need to be set out in regulations which will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I agree that decisions are best taken locally wherever possible, but there are circumstances where we need a clear national framework. This is one such case, albeit one where the reforms provided for in Clause 46 will afford chief officers a measure of local flexibility. With those words, I hope that the noble Lord feels content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that explanation which, unless I have got completely the wrong end of the stick, seems to me to be completely contradictory. The noble Baroness says that there needs to be commonality across police forces, yet then gives the example of how the Metropolitan police service is not going to appoint anybody to the rank of chief inspector.
The noble Baroness says that it is necessary to have a clear national framework—we have a clear national framework in existing legislation, which specifies the ranks. So I really do not see why we need the Secretary of State to be given the power to make regulations about what ranks there should and should not be. For example, were the Secretary of State, by regulation, to say that there must be officers of the rank of chief inspector, where would that leave the Metropolitan Police if it has decided not to have any chief inspectors, as it apparently has?
The noble Baroness also talked about how it was important for the public for there to be commonality across all forces. If the Commissioner of the Met can decide not to appoint somebody to a rank that the Home Secretary has, in regulations, said that there should be, there will not be commonality across the country. I accept what the noble Baroness says in terms of the need for a national structure—which currently exists. What does not need to be done is for that system to be changed; what is needed is for chief constables to be given guidance as to which ranks they need, which will vary from force to force. The Metropolitan Police, in its chief officer ranks, for example, has a completely different rank structure to other forces. Yet, the Government do not seem to want to change that. Commanders do not exist anywhere other than in the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police. Deputy assistant commissioners do not exist in any other force. So there is not commonality now and there is no move by the Government to enforce commonality across the country when it comes to chief officer ranks.
I find the Minister’s explanation incomprehensible. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Blair of Boughton
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond—including the one that she did not put forward. My name is attached to some of them but they came in quite a hurry in the last 24 hours and I think I missed some of them as they went through. I am sure that neither the noble Baroness nor I will press an amendment at this stage of the evening. However, I hope that I may be able to persuade the Minister to table an amendment at Third Reading.
I accept that the use of police bail has hitherto been seriously underregulated. I further accept that it has been used far too frequently and without the supervision of more senior officers. I agree with the tenor of this set of proposals. I also accept that in a number of cases police bail has been used in a sloppy, unthinking and unfortunate way. However, it is a well-known dictum that hard cases make bad law—and what is being proposed here is simply bad law. The argument put forward by those supporting this proposal is that the number of police bail cases will reduce. I absolutely agree; they will reduce. But police bail will be used in the most difficult cases because, without it, you cannot impose conditions on the suspect you are releasing. There are times when you need to require that the defendant does not approach the alleged victim—including children. There are times when you will want to impose residential or reporting requirements or the surrender of passports. These are the cases in which police bail will be used.
A drop in the overall number of police bail cases will not reduce this number of serious cases. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, suggested, these serious cases are the very cases that require, for example, forensic examination or the interrogation of computer databases. This will be done by third parties outside the police service. When all that has been done, these cases will require detailed consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service, which is also outside the police service. These bodies will handle only these sorts of cases, so they will already have a heavy workload to set against limited resources.
These cases will be investigated specifically by experienced detectives, who will deal only with these kinds of cases and will themselves have a high case load, in which each case will have a police bail clock ticking. We are talking about putting a huge amount of pressure on a system without the resources that would be necessary to complete these cases in 28 days. These cases—79% of the total—just will not be completed in 28 days, which will necessitate a return to the police station for a review by a superintendent, which will be a bureaucratic and unnecessary procedure for a suspect and his or her legal advisers. Furthermore, the 28-day limit will set up false hopes for victims—who will be told about it—that their case will be resolved within 28 days. Those hopes will be dashed.
It is fair to say that the noble Baroness and I have scarcely had time to confer over this matter, although I used the same joke in my speech about the fact that some people do not like experts. However, I know from my own correspondence and from a letter I have seen from the Minister to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which has already been discussed, that the Minister herself knows that all the police professional bodies— the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Police Superintendents’ Association and the Police Federation—have advised in the strongest terms that the provisions may simply be unworkable. So has the College of Policing, which the Minister praised for its work during the debate on the last amendment. If the College of Policing is saying that this is unworkable, why are we proceeding with it? I just suggest that, if possible, the Minister might listen to this and table a government amendment at Third Reading to raise the provision to 56 days. Even if that does not happen—that is the main thing we want to happen—the idea that the inspector’s police bail can only be 28 days, not 27 or seven, is simply absurd. It is simple: what if the 28th day is Christmas Day? The Government should bring forward that amendment: in the inspector’s bail there should be the same phrase of “up to 28 days”, not “28 days”, as that will cause major mayhem.
My first point is: why not listen to the people who really know how the system will work in serious cases? There are many serious cases where it is simply impossible to persuade the forensic companies and the people who understand the nature of digital records to provide this information in time for 28 days, and for it to have been discussed by the Crown Prosecution Service. This is bad legislation, and I urge that it be reconsidered at Third Reading.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and my noble friend have said on this subject. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 115 in this group; I will not say that it is a compromise, but it is another option.
As my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond said today and as I raised in Committee, academics, practitioners and the College of Policing all claim that an initial 28-day limit on police bail is impractical, and a government impact assessment, which allegedly takes into account the academic research, says that a 28-day initial limit is workable. I say “allegedly” because, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, just said, the academic research and the impact assessment come to different conclusions about the workability of an initial 28-day limit. Our amendment effectively suggests that the Government give the new 28-day limit a trial period of two years and then allow Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to assess whether the new provision is working effectively or not; that is, whether the academics, the practitioners and the College of Policing are right, or the Home Office civil servants are right. Of course, we support much stricter limits on police bail, but they must not impede police effectiveness.
Lord Blair of Boughton
I point out that Amendment 115 would work if it was 56 days as well. In other words, you could have a two-year experiment with 56 days as well as a two-year experiment with 28 days.
Lord Bach
My Lords, I declare my interest as the police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland and say in passing what a pleasure it was to host the Minister in Leicestershire the other day. I know that this matter was briefly raised with her, but neither I nor the chief constable talked about it for long. It was a great pleasure to have her there, and her visit went down very well.
There is a need to reform the present system of pre-charge bail. We all know of cases—of course, none in Leicestershire that I know of—where individuals, to put it mildly, have been carelessly treated by the present system. I personally know of one recent case where the delay has been truly shocking. However, the more the principle is right, the more vital it is that the practical way of putting it into effect is correct too. It is important that the change should work, without causing serious difficulties—the kind of difficulties that both the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Blair, mentioned—and unnecessary disruption for the police.
Lord Paddick
Before the Minister sits down—and with the leave of the House, as one would normally intervene to seek clarification from the Minister—I wish to correct what she said about people on these Benches accepting the 28-day limit. That is not the case.
Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 7th December 2016
(7 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-II(Rev) Revised second marshalled list for Report (PDF, 324KB) - (6 Dec 2016)
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Section 32 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 limits police jurisdiction throughout Northern Ireland and its adjacent UK waters within the seaward limits of the territorial sea in the same manner as Section 30 of the Police Act 1996 applies in England and Wales. However, within these limits, the police do not have powers suitable for the maritime context.
The new clauses proposed in this group comprise a new Chapter 6A of Part 4 of the Bill, making provision for the police and other law enforcement in Northern Ireland to have powers corresponding to those conferred on law enforcement in England and Wales and in Scotland by virtue of Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4. In particular, new Chapter 6A provides Northern Ireland law enforcement with maritime-specific powers, such as to stop, board, detain and divert ships for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating an offence under the law of Northern Ireland. Unlike the provisions in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4, and at the request of the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, the powers are, however, limited to ships in the territorial waters of Northern Ireland and do not extend to international or foreign waters.
There are particular policing accountability and oversight arrangements in Northern Ireland, and it has not been possible for the Department of Justice to secure the necessary agreement with relevant stakeholders within the time available for the exercise of powers by law enforcement officers from England, Wales or Scotland in Northern Ireland waters in hot-pursuit situations. Again at the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland, these amendments would remove the hot-pursuit provisions that relate to law enforcement officers from outside Northern Ireland entering Northern Ireland waters. The Northern Ireland Assembly agreed the necessary legislative consent Motion in respect of these provisions on 28 November.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has an amendment in this group and I propose to respond to it when winding up. For now, I beg to move.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, as the Minister has just said, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 122A in this group. It concerns Chapter 5, which is headed “Police Powers: Maritime Enforcement in Connection with English and Welsh Offences”.
The Bill gives extensive powers to the police in connection with preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting offences under the law of England and Wales in relation to a UK ship in England and Wales waters or international waters, a ship without nationality in England and Wales waters or international waters, a foreign ship in England and Wales waters or international waters, or a ship registered under the law of a relevant territory in England and Wales waters or international waters. That seems to me to cover any ship anywhere in the world, although there are restrictions if the UK ship is in foreign waters or if it is a foreign ship in England and Wales waters, when either the Secretary of State’s permission or, in some cases, that of the foreign state to which the ship is registered is required. In one place the Bill talks about “England and Wales waters” and in another it uses the words,
“within the territorial sea adjacent to England and Wales”.
I am not sure why there is different wording in different parts. Perhaps the Minister can explain.
The powers are to stop, board, divert and detain, to search and obtain information, and to arrest and seize. Officers who can exercise these powers include special constables, port constables, customs officials and anyone else the Secretary of State specifies in regulations, subject only to the negative procedure. This gives extensive powers to a whole range of law enforcement officers without restriction in relation to the exercise of the powers relating to a UK ship in England and Wales waters on the basis that the law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect—the same low level of suspicion required to make an arrest or to carry out a stop and search in the street—that an offence under the law of England and Wales is being or has been committed, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship itself is being used in the commission of an offence.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has again argued for the maritime enforcement powers in the Bill to be restricted to the enforcement of serious offences. As I indicated in Committee, we do not believe it is necessary to limit these powers in this way. The Government believe that we should trust the operational judgment of the police to determine when it is appropriate and proportionate to exercise their powers at sea. For example, we do not believe that the police would commit resources to interdict a vessel in international waters where there had been a theft of an item of, say, confectionery from a gift shop—which, incidentally, would be an indictable offence.
However, a police officer on, let us say, a UK-registered ferry should be able to act when the vessel is in international waters where a person commits a common assault on another person, or where a person exhibits threatening or abusive behaviour. In both cases, we are talking about summary-only offences and in both cases the noble Lord’s amendment would prevent the police acting, even though the law of the land applied and the actions of those individuals might none the less be triable in the courts of England and Wales. We do not impose restrictions on the categories of offences the police can investigate where they take place on other modes of transportation, so, again, I am unclear why we should treat maritime vessels any differently.
Lord Paddick
Can the Minister explain what happens at the moment if a summary-only offence is committed, for example, on a cross-channel ferry? How would that offence be dealt with?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I think that I will have to get back to the noble Lord on that point.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am glad that I brought back this amendment, if only to hear the noble Lord, Lord Blair, call me utterly reasonable. As for the Minister’s faith in the ability of an off-duty police officer who becomes involved in a brawl on a cruise ship to make completely the right operational decision not to divert the vessel into port, that goes beyond my own experience and that of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, of the way in which it would be natural for some off-duty police officers to behave in such circumstances. Clearly, I am not going to press this to a Division, but I think the House recognises the considerable discomfort that both the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I have over the legislation as proposed.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, many years ago the “Marchioness” inquiry had to have a second coroner’s inquest. The parents of the people who had sadly lost their lives came to me and asked for legal aid, because there was no legal aid generally speaking in that situation. It was possible for me to authorise a fixed payment. In other words, I would decide how long their matter should last. Having had regard to the submissions made, I was able to fix an amount that defrayed the cost of the second inquest for the parents, which was extremely satisfactory.
A police force may be an interested party without being represented, but where it is represented, money should be available to the people affected on the other side. I agree that a judicial officer should decide that. The obvious judicial officer in this case is the coroner, who is already fixed with the ideas and matters likely to be litigated in the inquest. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was to go for the coroner instead of the elected police commissioner, that would be worth putting on the statute book now, subject to any argument we may yet hear from the Government. It is true that a considerable inquiry is already initiated, but it is primarily related to what happened at Hillsborough, which was a very special case. This is a much more general proposition. There is a good deal to be said for it. If the police want to save public money they should reduce their representation.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, taking into account the contributions that have subsequently been made. I will reinforce some of the points I made in Committee and some of the points the noble Lord made.
Hillsborough was not unique. A more recent case I was a participant in was the inquest of Jean Charles de Menezes. Noble Lords will remember that Jean Charles de Menezes was accidentally killed by armed officers in 2005, having wrongly been identified as one of the suspects who had attempted to carry out a suicide bombing. I gave evidence for the family. I experienced first-hand the tactics deployed by some police counsel at inquests—a search for the truth turns into a bruising adversarial encounter. As I said in Committee, the coroner had to warn the police counsel over the aggressive tactics he was using in cross-examination.
As far as the family of the deceased is concerned, I do not believe there can be any argument. It cannot be right that the police can employ as large and as eminent a legal team as their considerable budgets will allow to represent them while the families of those who die at the hands of the police struggle to raise the funds to be represented at all, nor should it fall to public interest lawyers to have to provide pro bono representation. If the Government are looking for a low-cost or no-cost option, perhaps the police could be forced to divide whatever budget they decide to deploy at an inquest equally with the family of the deceased. Any death at the hands of the police is a tragedy, and it is as important for the police as it is for the family to ensure that the true facts emerge in order to reassure the public that the police have acted fairly and reasonably and to enable the police to counter those with a political agenda, who often accuse them of a cover-up and of having given a misleading account of what happened. Spending public money on establishing beyond doubt what happened when someone died at the hands of the police is worth every penny, and I believe the police themselves should fund both legal teams to the same extent.
I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about the issues with this amendment, and I accept what the noble Lords, Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Dear, have said on this issue. Having served in your Lordships’ House for only three years, I do not know whether I should dare say that my understanding is that, as we are on Report, it is only the Government who could bring forward an alternative amendment at Third Reading. If we are, as we should be, trying to establish the principle of equality of arms in an inquest situation, if this is the only amendment we can divide on and if the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, decides to divide the House, we will support him.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
I think that if the Government agree that the matter can be reconsidered at Third Reading, it does not need to be a government amendment.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I would like to make a declaration of interest, in that I hold a shotgun certificate and a firearm certificate, and to that extent I may be supposed to have a personal interest. Moreover, I have a declaration of personal responsibility to make too, in that after the Hungerford shooting way back at the end of the 1980s I was the Minister in the Home Office—subject, of course, to Douglas Hurd, now Lord Hurd of Westwell—responsible for the carriage of the firearms Act in 1988. I also have a long-standing interest in the law relating to firearms.
I am broadly in favour of Amendment 169A. Indeed, it is a response to my former Parliamentary Private Secretary, Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown—and all credit to him for tabling it in the House of Commons. However, I have one reservation about proposed new subsection (1)(b) in the amendment, which states,
“in the case of a rifle, the borrower is aged 17 or over”.
Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, I think that that threshold is far too high. I look back to my youth when I used to use a .22 carbine, shooting on the lawn under the very close supervision of my father, who was, I think, a fairly respectable Member of this House. We felt that there was nothing improper about that so long as the supervision was close. I think that the age 17 threshold is too high. Personally, I would rather see a lower one—14 or something close to it. I agree that there should be supervision but I do not agree with the threshold.
I am very much against Amendment 169B, which concerns the full recovery of costs. I think we need to keep in mind the basic proposition that if you give powers to officials, on occasion they will be abused. That is one of the great rules of politics. Therefore, one needs to watch very carefully the powers you give officials.
In Lincolnshire, the chief officer pursues a sensible firearms policy. However, I am conscious that there are forces not too distant from Lincolnshire in which the firearms officers are fairly aggressive, driving up the cost. You should have a restriction of the reasonable cost, not the full cost, because it is possible for chief officers and firearms officers, through an overaggressive use of their investigatory and inspection powers, to drive the cost up, either because they want to deter firearms use or simply because they have a fairly aggressive approach. Therefore, my strong preference is that the limit be confined to a reasonable cost and not the full cost.
In acknowledging my own failings in 1987, I will go a little wider. There are three areas relating to the possession of firearms to which I hope my noble friend will give consideration in the future—or perhaps even in this Bill. First, what happens when your guest leaves by accident his or her gun in your house? This has happened to me. One of my guests, a Member of your Lordships’ House, was shooting with me in Scotland and he managed to leave his shotgun accidently when he went a long way south, 200 or 300 miles away. The gun was in the gun cabinet and perfectly locked up, but the estate owner was not certificated to hold it. I asked myself whether I should take it down to him. I was not certificated to transport it. What does one do? I am not going to tell you what I did for obvious enforcement reasons, but it is a dilemma. What is the law where a gun is accidently left behind but is secure in a gun case? We need to have provision to cover such a situation.
Secondly, and rather similarly, if you go shooting some distance from your home you take your gun in the car. You travel along the motorway—no doubt with your wife or your partner—and when you stop at a service station, for obvious reasons, you leave your gun, generally speaking, in the car, with your wife in the car looking after it. However, in the normal run of events, she is not certificated. In my case I have taken precautions in that regard, but your wife or partner in the car is in possession of a gun for which she is not certificated. That is potentially an offence.
My final point—I am sorry to trespass on your Lordships’ patience—relates to the keys of gun cases. Some of your Lordships may know of the unfortunate case where a lady admitted to a police officer that she knew where the keys to the gun case were, and she was done for being in possession of the gun. That is a complete nonsense. I did not tackle these problems when I was the Minister in charge of this issue, but I like to think that my noble friend will be more sensible than I was.
In the old days, enforcement of gun laws was fairly relaxed. The chief officer would know that so and so was a reliable citizen. However, that is not the case now—probably rightly—and what I have described can give rise to serious sanctions and penalties. That alarms me. I like to think that my noble friend on the Front Bench will reflect on my shortcomings as the Minister responsible for the 1987 Act and perhaps remedy the deficiencies.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I support Amendment 169B in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark.
I accept the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about reasonable cost as opposed to full cost recovery—or, at least, I could accept it if it was an approach the Government took across the board. However, in Committee I drew a parallel with the Immigration Act, where the Government proposed a philosophy of full cost recovery for visa applications and for the Immigration Service generally. I asked the Minister then, if she was not going to agree with amendments tabled to ensure full cost recovery for the issuing of firearm certificates, to explain why a different approach is being taken to the principle of full cost recovery when it comes to immigration. In particular, I asked her to refute the obvious allegation that the Government are discriminating against foreign nationals as against those who go hunting with guns for sport. I cannot recall the Minister specifically responding to that question; perhaps she could address it today.
Having apparently agreed in Committee to the principle of full cost recovery for firearms certificates, the Minister went on to say that there was a public consultation on these issues and that,
“there might be good reasons not to set fees at full cost recovery levels, either for a transitional period or for certain categories of licence holder”.—[Official Report, 9/11/16; col. 1163.]
There are very good reasons why visa applications and the like should not be set at full cost recovery levels, yet the Government appear determined that they should be, without any public consultation or a transitional period. Can the Minister explain why foreign nationals are being treated differently from those who possess firearms?
I asked the Minister in Committee what consultation there had been with groups that represent immigrants or those who might apply for visas before the Government implemented full cost recovery for immigration visas. Can the Minister please answer that question for the record, as she was unable to do so in Committee?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, perhaps I may first deal with some of the questions that have arisen out of Amendment 169A. Both the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham asked about the age threshold of 17—the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, probably thought that it was too low and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, thought it too high. The age of 17 or over for borrowing rifles reflects the current position under Section 16 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988—which the noble Viscount may have taken through Parliament himself.
The noble Viscount asked about firearms accidentally left in someone’s house. I understood that if you held a firearms licence yourself, it was okay for someone to leave something in your house, but I am not certain on that point so I will write to him.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the provisions were new. The answer is both yes and no, because they amend current legislation. After careful consideration, we have decided to clarify and align the existing provisions for the borrowing of a rifle or shotgun to practise the hunting of animals and the shooting of game or vermin on private land. He also asked whether individuals with a qualifying criminal record are prohibited from possessing a firearm under Section 21 of the 1968 Act. It is for the lender to satisfy himself or herself that a borrower does not have a relevant criminal record when he or she is lending them a firearm.
The lender would have to be present. If the borrower needed to go to the toilet, for example, they would have to leave the certificate-holder with the weapon while they went to the loo.
I will just respond to Amendment 169B from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The Government agreed that fees for firearm certificates should be set on a cost recovery basis. I am happy to confirm, as I did in my letter to the noble Lord, that the cost of these certificates is expected to reflect the full cost of licensing once a new, more cost-effective online licensing system is in place. We already increased the fees for civilian firearm certificates in line with this objective, and Clause 117 allows us to set fees for licences issued by the Home Office and the Scottish Government. As I think I said in Committee, this will save the taxpayer around £700,000 a year.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I oppose these amendments. I attended the meeting yesterday with my noble friend Lady Berridge and other noble Lords. We all agree that any alcohol in the blood will adversely affect someone’s driving. There is no doubt about that. As regards Amendment 175 about young drivers, this is not a matter for my noble friend the Minister in the Home Office but I was very disappointed that the Government wimped out on graduated driving licences, but of course that is another matter.
I am far from convinced that the experiment of lowering the blood alcohol level in Scotland will have the desired effect. I worry that it may even have a negative effect. We will have to wait and see. Next year we will get the statistics from Scotland and have them analysed carefully and we will know for certain which side of this debate is right and which is wrong. If I am wrong, I will be perfectly happy to say, “I was wrong”. The wise course of action will be to wait and see and get those results from Scotland and, if necessary, put pressure on the Government to make sure that those results are analysed skilfully and quickly.
I will say a word about the rural economy. If this change is the right change in terms of road safety, we should do it. In this ongoing debate, I have not heard any new arguments in the past few years. If the Opposition want to support these amendments, they will have to explain what has changed. The party opposite, when in government, had at least two excellent Ministers for Road Safety and the very same arguments that have been presented today were presented to those Ministers but they did not make the change. If the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, supports the amendment, I would love to know what has made his party change its position.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in response to similar amendments in Committee, the Minister pointed out that reduced drink-drive limits in other countries did not necessarily result in fewer drink-drive-related deaths. She went on to highlight the importance of penalties, which are harsh in the UK: enforcement, although this is likely to be less with the cuts in recent years to roads policing in the light of cuts to police budgets generally; and hard-hitting campaigns that have successfully made drink-driving socially unacceptable in a way that it is not in other countries. But these are not alternatives to a reduction in the drink-drive limit; they would still apply.
Reducing the opportunities to evade prosecution and carrying out medical tests to ensure that offenders are not dependent on alcohol before they get their licences back are also very good steps. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, made some very powerful points. She said that the number of drink-drive-related deaths had been static over recent years. My understanding is that the overall number of deaths on the roads has been reducing over the years because of improved safety. If it is true that the number of drink-drive related deaths is not reducing in line with that, it is an increasing problem, not a static one.
A wide range of organisations—motoring organisations, the police and others—supports a reduction in drink-drive limits. Although I found the arguments around the different limits in Scotland and in England and Wales a little complex—rather like a whodunit—clearly there is an anomaly there. The plain and simple issue is that current drink-drive limits enable people to take the risk of having a drink and driving. The proposed limits would deter people from drinking anything before they got into a car. Surely that would be safer. On balance, and having discussed this with our transport spokesperson, we support the amendments.
Viscount Simon (Lab)
My Lords, I will mention just a couple of things. First, in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act all those years ago I got an amendment through on the evidence on roadside breath-testing, which will get the readings there and then, rather than two hours or so later at the police station. I would love to see this kit eventually approved by the Home Office. It has not been approved yet. Secondly, we are talking about having a glass of wine or whatever. I am teetotal so I would not have the slightest idea but I have been told that the glasses of wine in most restaurants and pubs have got bigger. Therefore, the chance of going above the limit has also increased.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsMonday 12th December 2016
(7 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-III(a) Amendment for Report, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 54KB) - (9 Dec 2016)
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, briefly, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Cashman, for introducing the amendments, and the noble Baroness for supporting them, and ask that she consider the matters still outstanding, to which the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, referred, concerning the Armed Forces. I am very grateful that the Government are also considering other offences mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, as a consequence of his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, I very much support all the amendments in this group. We have made tremendous progress in recent years in seeking to redress the effects of homophobic legislation. Terrible injustices were suffered, and previous changes to the law and the amendments are intended to go some way to correct that and make amends. They have my full support and that of my party.
Of course, we need to go further in Northern Ireland, but this is an important step. I want to see the day when LGBT people living in Northern Ireland have exactly the same rights, protections and freedoms as LGBT people living in England, Scotland and Wales. We are a United Kingdom, albeit with devolved institutions, but LGBT people should have the right to get married in Northern Ireland; that must be urgently addressed by the Northern Ireland Assembly and the ministerial team led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Stormont. It is wrong to keep using the petition of concern procedure to block progress in this matter. The UK Government must play their role in championing the rights of LGBT people in Northern Ireland by raising this issue at ministerial and official level. It is not enough for the Government to say that it is a matter for the devolved institution.
During Committee on the Bill on 9 November, I made clear my support for a range of amendments proposed by several Lords. I was clear that welcome progress was being made, but that the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Cashman were in my view the best ones before your Lordships’ House. They were not accepted by the Government, but discussions have taken place outside the Chamber, and the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, are very welcome. I thank the noble Baroness very much for listening and working with my noble friend on them.
I pay warm tribute to my noble friend Lord Cashman. We have been friends for many years. It is his tireless campaigning with others, including the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, that has got us to this point today, and we should be very grateful to them all.
Although it is not on the subject of the amendments, I will make one final point on equality in Northern Ireland in respect of women’s equality. The Northern Ireland Assembly, Ministers, led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and the political parties must get together to deliver equality for women living in Northern Ireland, so that they enjoy the same rights as women living in England, Scotland and Wales. Again, the UK Government have to play their role by raising that at ministerial level. Although that is a matter for another day, it is an important issue to which we must return. In conclusion, I confirm my full support for the amendments.
Lord Paddick
“Vagrancy Act 1824
In section 8 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (abolition of offence of loitering etc with intent) at end insert—“(2) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under those provisions is pardoned for the offence. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2) it is irrelevant whether the person has died before subsection (2) comes into force.(4) A pardon under this section does not give rise to any right, entitlement or liability.””
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 181M is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I tried to make it clear in Committee that the specific offence of being a suspected person loitering with intent to commit an indictable and later an arrestable offence under that specific part of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 and how it was used against the black community is seen by the black community—and by many others, myself included—as as much of a clear historical wrong as the offences that we have just debated.
In Committee, the Minister suggested that, without looking at the facts of individual cases, it is impossible to know whether the conduct in question would still be an offence today. In Committee, I described exactly how, in circumstances where a person behaved in a way that would have amounted to an offence today, they would have been charged with a substantive offence—for example, attempted theft of or from a motor vehicle, or attempted burglary. I suggested that it was only when behaviour did not amount to an offence under other legislation that individuals would have been charged with an offence of being a suspected person under Section 4.
These offences are important and symbolic to the black community and how they have in the past been, and continue to be, discriminated against in the criminal justice system. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was debated in Committee. It is fair to say that it did not get a warm welcome from the Minister in responding to the debate. I was surprised to learn that the Government had no data at all on the number of people affected by the law before it was abolished. Clearly, the amendment is not going to be accepted by the Government tonight, but the noble Lord is right to keep raising the issue and I hope that it will keep being raised. It is only by doing so that we can explore what options are available to us, what happened in the past and whether it was right and whether, with hindsight, the offence should have been removed from the statute books many years before it actually was, as it was used in a way that discriminated against black people.
I hope that, when the Minister responds to this short debate, she can focus particularly on the amendment. In her response in Committee, the focus was as much on the previous debate, so I hope that it can focus particularly on the points voiced before us here today.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister, who perhaps lulled me into a false sense of hope and optimism by saying that the Government are not “currently” minded to agree to this. We clearly do not want to go back more than 200 years—I think the law was aimed at dealing with soldiers returning from the Napoleonic wars and begging in the streets—but where it is a question of discrimination against the black community perhaps we can do some work and target any future consideration more accurately. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for his support, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marlesford (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 182 on anonymity before charge, I refer to an earlier amendment which I moved in Committee on 2 November. It proposed substituting “lack of evidence” for “insufficient evidence” when police communicate a decision not to charge. Eight noble Lords spoke in support and I have now had the Minister’s letter of 1 December saying that the Government agree to replace the phrase “insufficient evidence” with revised wording which will be incorporated in fresh guidance, to take effect by next spring. However I am afraid that their suggestion of the words,
“the case failed to reach the evidential test”,
does not quite hit the spot. Frankly, “no case to answer”, would be better but that is probably a discussion for another day.
I am glad that the Government listened to the Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for using her influence on the Home Office. I hope she will do so again, after this debate. The matter is really very simple. There have, particularly in recent years, been a number of instances when the police have released the names of suspects or publicly identified them at a very early stage in their investigations into allegations and complaints, particularly of sexual impropriety. A most notorious example was on 14 August 2014 when the Yorkshire police arranged for the BBC to film and broadcast their entry into the house of the pop star Sir Cliff Richard. Sir Cliff must have gone through hell before it was eventually accepted that he had no case to answer.
There are many other examples. We may remember the wholly inappropriate way in which, on 3 August 2015, a superintendent of the Wiltshire police posed for television cameras in front of Sir Edward Heath’s final residence in Salisbury, encouraging people to claim that the former Prime Minister had misbehaved with children. The superintendent was launching an investigation on which the Wiltshire police have now spent over £700,000 of taxpayers’ money, with the chief constable of Wiltshire apparently determined to continue his fishing expedition indefinitely.
The method of fishing adopted by Wiltshire police seems to vary between the utterly naive and the patently absurd. I have been told by a former member of the Downing Street staff that they were contacted by one of the investigating officers, who asked, first, whether they had noticed any untoward incidents at any time in the behaviour of the then Prime Minister and secondly, whether they had noticed any young men slipping in and out of No. 10 Downing Street. Surely the Wiltshire police and crime commissioner has a role in pointing out the opportunity-cost of this farce and guiding the chief constable on priorities in the use of limited police resources.
In Committee a number of noble Lords raised this issue of the police being free to name suspects and the Minister is on record as saying that,
“it is absolutely right and proper for the police to have operational independence in deciding whether to name a suspect”.—[Official Report, 16/11/16; col. 1466.]
My response to that is simple. Searching a house is an operational matter, on which the police must make a judgment. However, to search a house they have to obtain a magistrate’s warrant before they do so. Indeed, the centuries-old requirement for a search warrant forms part of the fundamental protection of our liberties, under both statute and convention, which has its roots in Magna Carta.
The impact of modern social media means that naming suspects is a powerful weapon; indeed, sometimes even a lethal one. I am not saying that it is never sensible for suspects to be named, sometimes even at a very early stage in an investigation. In sexual cases, or cases of fraud, for example, it may be necessary for there to be publicity that will encourage other victims of the alleged offenders to come forward. Indeed, the media have always had an important role in exposing allegations in the pursuit of justice. However, the media have to follow court directions restricting reporting—and they do so.
Hitherto it has been left to the police to make a judgment on whether to name a suspect. However, it has now been shown that all too often the police cannot be relied on to make the right judgment. In their recent decisions on naming suspects they have aroused much public resentment and indignation. This has resulted not only in often irreparable damage to the reputation of innocent persons but undermined confidence in, and therefore support for, the police.
History teaches us the need for vigilance in the defence of liberty. In September 1793, at the height of the reign of terror during the French Revolution, the so-called Committee of Public Safety passed the Law of Suspects, which meant that suspects, once named, could be put under the guillotine without any trial. This continued until July 1794, when Robespierre himself was guillotined. We are a million miles from that. But the road is the same and we must not take a single step along it. It is to halt and, indeed, remedy an unacceptable situation that I am advocating the urgent need for a check on the exercise of unsupervised police powers to publish the names of suspects. That is why in Amendment 182 I propose that the police should be required to obtain a magistrates’ warrant before publishing the name of a suspect who has not been charged. I realise that my amendment as drafted may not be the full answer, but I am anxious that the Government should address what has become a serious problem. I look forward to hearing the views of other noble Lords and, of course, of the Minister. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, we have Amendment 187 in this group but, before I address that amendment, I would like to speak briefly to Amendment 182. In Committee, some noble Lords asked why sexual offences should be a special case when it comes to pre-charge anonymity. Amendment 182 addresses that question by including all offences. However, there are three reasons why we cannot support this amendment. As I will set out shortly, not only do we believe that sexual offences are a special case, but the law acknowledges that they are a special case in which the normal principles of free speech and open justice are restricted. We believe that these are important principles that should be restricted only in those cases where there are specific reasons for doing so. In sexual offences cases alone, the identity of the complainant or victim is protected. For similar reasons, we believe that the identity of the accused should be protected up until the point of charge.
Secondly, in Committee, we also heard compelling reasons why the accused should be able to lift the ban on publicising his identity, if he wishes. The accused may wish to complain at the injustice of his case or appeal for alibi witnesses to come forward, for example. Amendment 182, as drafted, would not allow that.
The third reason is that we do not believe the magistrates’ court is the right place for such a decision to be made. We believe that such an important decision should be considered by a judge of a higher court.
Amendment 187 is substantially different from the amendment we moved in Committee in a number of respects. First, it is as close as possible to the wording of the legislation that currently protects complainants or victims in sexual offences cases. Secondly, it allows the accused to lift pre-charge anonymity at any stage if he wishes to do so. Thirdly, as well as specifying the minimum rank of police officer who can make an application, and the Crown Court as the appropriate court for hearing an initial application from the police for the ban to be lifted, it would specifically require the judge to have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences committed by the accused. We believe that such cases will be rare and such applications will be exceptional, as I will explain.
We had a long debate on this issue in Committee, and I do not want to make my case again as it is a matter of record. However, I want to address the remarks made by other noble Lords in that debate, having had an opportunity to reflect on what they said. I will address head on, and at an early stage, the shocking picture that is emerging of allegations of historic child abuse at football clubs. Most of the initial allegations that attracted so much publicity, and gave rise to the unprecedented number of further allegations being made across the length and breadth of the country, involved the former football coach Barry Bennell. Bennell was convicted of sexual abuse offences in the United States in 1994, and convicted of further sexual offences in the United Kingdom in 1998, and again in 2015, for which he served terms of imprisonment. These are not cases where pre-charge anonymity would have had any adverse effect. Indeed, I suggest that these cases point to a change in culture where victims of sexual abuse are more willing to come forward. Therefore, they undermine to some extent an argument against pre-charge anonymity on the grounds that victims need to be given confidence to name people who have been accused but not yet charged.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made this point in Committee—that publicity can lead others to come forward with supporting evidence that helps to make the case against a person who is rightly accused. But what if somebody is not rightly accused? What if somebody like Nick comes forward and makes highly damaging and groundless allegations against individuals? Is it right that these allegations and the identity of the accused are put into the public domain? How do we safeguard against others coming forward with similarly damaging and groundless allegations, particularly when the details of the allegations are made public? There is a view that the law on similar fact evidence has gone too far and that this can result in convictions based on multiple uncorroborated allegations, all of which could be false. I am not legally qualified to comment, but surely a balance needs to be struck between shoring up uncorroborated allegations by trawling for others and protecting the reputation of the accused.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I am trying to illustrate that alleged victims’ willingness to come forward is now more common because they feel that they can come forward and they are more likely to be believed. There are not huge numbers of convictions in sexual abuse trials, and to go back to the position where anonymity was granted would be a retrograde step.
Lord Paddick
Can the Minister clarify that? I think she just said that there is a low conviction rate in trials involving sexual offences. That is not accurate. In rape cases, for example, the conviction rate at trial is more or less over 50% and more or less in line with the conviction rate in other offences.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Many cases do not come to trial. I was trying to illustrate the reluctance of people to come forward. People are still reluctant to do so, and the Government do not want to create an environment in which we go back to the practices of times gone by, which is why we have so many allegations of historic sex offences.
Noble Lords asked about safeguards, and of course, as my noble friend Lord Faulks said, we have the magistrates’ court and the High Court. We have College of Policing guidance, which states that the police should not routinely release information about suspects before charge. However, it also makes clear that there are limited circumstances in which the release of such information can be justified.
Lord Paddick
“Pre-charge anonymity
(1) The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1 insert—“1A Anonymity of suspects prior to charge(1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed by a person but the person has not been charged with that offence, neither the name nor address, and no still or moving picture of that person, nor any other matter shall (without that person's consent) during that person’s lifetime—(a) be published in England and Wales in a written publication available to the public; or(b) be included in a relevant programme for reception in England and Wales,if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person by whom the offence is alleged to have been committed.(2) Subsection (1) is subject to any direction given under section 3.”(3) In section 3—(a) in subsection (1) for “to which this Act applies” substitute “to which section 1 of this Act applies”;(b) after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) A police officer of the rank of inspector or above may apply to a judge of the Crown Court for a direction under this subsection and if the judge is satified that it is in the interests of justice to remove or vary a restriction provided for in section 1A, the judge shall direct that the restriction shall be lifted or shall be limited to such extent and on such terms as the judge considers the interests of justice require.(4B) In considering an application under subsection (1), the judge shall have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences allegedly committed by the person.”(4) In section 5—(a) in subsection (1) after “section 1” insert “or section 1A”;(b) in subsection (2) after “committed” insert “or the person by whom an offence is alleged to have been committed and to whom section 1A applies”.”
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in the absence of any credible alternative, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I recognise the point that the noble Viscount has made about the general increase in the level of sentencing, which has caused me considerable concern for quite some time. However, there is force in the point that the noble Baroness made about repeat offences. The people who commit this kind of offence tend to be victims of an obsession. There must be a risk that a number of these perpetrators will do it again, and if the first sentence is ineffective as a deterrent a judge is really inhibited in visiting the appropriate penalty on a repeat offender, particularly if it is even a further repetition, if he is restricted to the levels that presently exist. For that reason, among the others that the noble Baroness mentioned, I would be inclined to support her amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. While I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about overcrowding, we need to differentiate between many offences that do not deserve a custodial sentence, and in fact would be more effectively dealt with by a non-custodial sentence, and those that really need long custodial sentences, for the very reasons that the noble and learned Lord has just articulated. These are offences where, particularly in the case of repeat offences, a longer custodial sentence is needed. That is why we will support the noble Baroness should she decide to divide the House.
Lord Rosser
I will be brief. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, if, having heard the Government’s reply, my noble friend Lady Royall decides to test the opinion of the House, we too shall be supporting her amendment in the Division Lobby.
I will not go through all her points but my noble friend has referred, as have others, to the issue of repeat offences. She referred to why the maximum sentence is five years at present. She referred to the level of cross-party support that there has been on this issue, and to the relationship of the maximum sentence for this offence with other offences that have a maximum of 10 years. She also made reference to the stalking orders and the Government’s announcement there, which was welcome, but of course it does not address the issue of what the appropriate maximum length of the sentence is. My noble friend also stressed that stalking costs lives in certain circumstances, and causes psychological harm. I think she has made an extremely powerful case. As I said, if she decides, having heard the Government’s response, to test the opinion of the House, we shall be with her in the Division Lobby.
Lord Paddick
“( ) section (Inquiry into complaints alleging corrupt relationships between police and newspaper organisations);”
Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsMonday 19th December 2016
(7 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
I shall be very brief, but I take this opportunity to thank the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, for the courteous and open way in which they have listened to and sought to address, within government policy constraints, the issues raised during the passage of the Bill. I seem to have received a deluge of letters, for which I am genuinely very grateful, but it rather tests the statement that somebody, somewhere is waiting for a letter—that may no longer be the case in this instance. Actually, the number of letters that we have received in the light of the debates that have taken place is a reflection that the issues have been raised, considered and responded to, and I am very grateful for that. I thank the members of the Bill team for their help. I also thank all my noble friends, especially my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark, and other Members of this House who have contributed to the debates. We too wish the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, a very successful time, presumably on the Back Benches, from where I am sure she will continue to make her views known.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I too thank the noble Baronesses—the Ministers—for the way in which they have conducted proceedings on the Bill, and the members of the Bill team for the help and co-operation that we have received from them. My next offer of thanks is rather controversial and probably not in accordance with protocol but I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, for the way in which we have discussed matters, which has helped the Bill’s passage
Lord Paddick
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Policing and Crime Bill
Lord Paddick ExcerptsWednesday 18th January 2017
(7 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I support the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. If anybody is in any doubt about the need for Leveson 2, which was intended to be an inquiry into the potential for corrupt practice between the police and the press, let me say that, with the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, the then leader of the Opposition, Ed Miliband, and the former Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, I met with the family of Milly Dowler. The Sunday before that series of meetings took place, Mr Dowler received a phone call from Surrey Police to tell him that the News of the World had told Surrey Police at the time of Milly Dowler’s disappearance that it had hacked into Milly Dowler’s voicemail and retrieved information from it. Surrey Police did nothing at all to prosecute the News of the World over that issue, and it was only the day before that series of meetings that Surrey Police told Mr Dowler that it had known all along that the News of the World had hacked into Milly Dowler’s voicemail. This is the sort of matter that we have not got to the bottom of yet, and Leveson 2 should be held in order to establish what happened.
On financial privilege, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. Parliament has already committed to the expenditure for Leveson 2; the amendment simply says that it is Parliament itself that should decide that that money should not be spent. The amendment would not involve additional money which has not previously been committed.
However, there is an issue with the wording of the amendment. Our reading of the amendment, if correct, suggests that as the chair of the inquiry, Lord Justice Leveson could override the view of both Houses of Parliament, in that if both Houses voted not to hold Leveson 2 but Lord Justice Leveson himself disagreed with that, the inquiry would still go ahead. We feel that that is a defect in the amendment. Clearly, there will be an opportunity for that to be corrected if we support the amendment today and it goes to the other end, but I hope that the noble Baroness will consider that carefully in considering whether we are on firm enough ground to divide the House on the amendment.
I cannot stress strongly enough from our side how important we think Leveson 2 is and how it needs to take place. We will take every opportunity we are offered to ensure that the Government hold the Leveson 2 inquiry.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
Like, I imagine, many other Members of this House, I have received an email from Margaret Aspinall in her capacity as chairwoman of the Hillsborough Family Support Group, asking me to support this amendment. I will not repeat the terms of the email, which I believe has been widely circulated, but it is an indication of the widespread and heartfelt concern that Leveson part 2 might not proceed.
The Leveson inquiry was set up with cross-party agreement and firm commitments from the then Conservative Prime Minister that Leveson part 2 would take place. Let us be clear: Leveson part 2 was in the agreed terms of reference of the Leveson inquiry. The words in the terms of reference for part 2 conclude with:
“In the light of these inquiries, to consider the implications for the relationships between newspaper organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities, and relevant regulatory bodies—and to recommend what actions, if any, should be taken”.
When the Lords amendment on Leveson part 2 was considered in the Commons last week, the Government said that,
“given the extent of the criminal investigations into phone hacking and other illegal practices by the press that have taken place since the Leveson inquiry was established, and given the implementation of the recommendations following part 1, including reforms within the police and the press, the Government must consider whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry is appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/1/17; col. 247.]
Those are words with which we are uncomfortable. They sound like the words of a Government who have already decided they do not wish to proceed with part 2 and are looking for their public consultation, which has now concluded, to give them a cloak of respectability for going back on previous firm pledges that part 2 of Leveson would take place.
The inquiries under the terms of reference of Leveson part 2 have not taken place, and thus neither have we had, nor, I would suggest, if this Government think they can get away with it, will we have the considered implications, in the light of those inquiries, for the relationships between newspaper organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities and relevant regulatory bodies with recommendations on what actions, if any, should be taken, called for and provided for under the terms of reference of Leveson part 2.
The Government appear in effect to have decided that they already know what would emerge from the Leveson part 2 inquiries and, likewise, what the recommendations would be without those inquiries taking place and recommendations being made. Frankly, it begins to look as though some powerful individuals and organisations behind the scenes know that they have something to hide and are determined to stop Leveson part 2 and, with it, the prospect of it all coming out into the open.
When the Lords amendment on Leveson part 2 was considered in the Commons, the Speaker certified it as engaging financial privilege, and that is the reason the Commons has given for disagreeing with it. Whether the amendment before us today would likewise be deemed as engaging financial privilege is not something on which I have any standing. However the amendment, which I saw for the first time only at a very late stage, does say that Leveson part 2 proceeds unless both Houses of Parliament and the chairman of the inquiry agree that it should not.
We are thus in a situation where, if both Houses decided that Leveson part 2 should not proceed—I sincerely hope they would not so decide—that decision would mean nothing if the chairman of the inquiry was not of the same view. I think that however strongly we may feel that Leveson part 2 should proceed, we are in difficult territory if basically we say that the view of the chairman of an inquiry that Leveson part 2 should proceed can override a decision by both Houses of Parliament that it should not proceed, particularly when at heart the issue is whether a clear and unambiguous promise made by a Conservative Prime Minister, with cross-party agreement, that Leveson part 2 would proceed can be tossed aside. That is the kind of issue that Parliament has to address and determine.
We feel very strongly that Leveson part 2 should proceed and that cross-party agreements and associated prime ministerial promises should be honoured and not ditched by this Government. We are unhappy with the wording of the amendment. However, whatever the outcome, we will continue to pursue all credible opportunities to ensure that the pressure is maintained and that Leveson part 2 takes place.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend Lady Brinton and associate those on our Benches with her remarks on Jill Saward. The Minister acknowledged in her remarks that there are legitimate concerns about the victims’ code, and that is why there was a Conservative Party manifesto commitment for a new victims’ law to ensure that the victims’ code is given effect. That is what my noble friend is trying to achieve through the amendment. We trust that the Government’s review will result in more effective protection for victims and more compliance by the police and the other agencies with the victims’ code. If the Minister can give that commitment, we will be prepared to accept the Government’s intention to ensure that the victims’ code is not simply a matter of words but will have some effect and that victims will be better cared for by those agencies in the criminal justice system.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, we, too, support the objectives behind the amendment that was moved so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the reasons that she herself set out. We also associate ourselves with the comments made by the noble Baroness about Jill Saward.
The issue is that the current victims’ code is not legally enforceable and there is clear evidence that it is not being applied and acted on by the relevant agencies to the extent that was clearly intended—to the detriment of the victims it was intended to help. The amendment provides for victims’ rights to be placed on a statutory footing and for the Secretary of State to address the issue of training for all relevant professionals and agencies on the impact of crime on victims.
I share the view that the Government, in the statement made by the Minister today, have been considerably more helpful and constructive in their response than they were during consideration of the Lords amendment in the Commons last week.
Finally, I, too, express my thanks to the Minister for her willingness to meet us. I hope that we have reached a stage at which there will be some accord on this issue.