Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her interjection. I am referring to the treaties emerging from the post-Second World War world, which was very much a European world at that time, to deal with circumstances such as the Holocaust and others, which had been left over from and arisen from it. I agree that there has been constant movement in this area. For instance, the European court at Strasbourg continues to make judicial interventions that sometimes try to push the European Convention on Human Rights much further than it was initially drafted to cover.

However, if I might continue, these treaties were conceived for a European world, by and large, and circumstances very different from our own. As I have said, these arrangements provide for potentially unlimited numbers of people from outside this country to command priority over the express and explicit wishes of its citizens.

Today, mass immigration threatens the democratic arrangements of western countries, the political systems on which they rest, and the stability on which societies and their economies depend. The threat does not stand over Britain alone. The failure of Governments all over Europe to stop clandestine or illegal immigration is destabilising them and their political arrangements. The difficulty of controlling long land borders all over Europe and the difficulties thrown up by the Schengen rules—now, I fear, ignored in many cases—have brought instability and undermined the democratic order. So too have international obligations embedded in domestic law and constitutions. The Sweden Democrats, who advocate tight controls on immigration, have shot to being the largest party in the centre-right governing bloc. For Denmark’s left and its social democratic Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, Denmark’s greatest challenge is non-western immigration. Italy can no longer process the volumes of asylum seekers arriving in small boats in Lampedusa and has called on the EU to help. France passed a measure on immigration, only to have the very amendments that had allowed it to pass, after 18 months to two years of wrangling, struck down by the constitutional court.

The UK is in a more fortunate position than these countries, since it is subject neither to Schengen nor the constraints of EU membership. This country and its people have the power to make their own laws. Their legitimacy derives not from arrangements made for times and circumstances different from our own—for a Eurocentric world, to be interpreted by internationalist institutions at a remove from democratic accountability that are often unaccountable for the consequences of the rules they liberally apply. I refer to my noble friend Lord Howard, who is not in his place: the question of democratic accountability must be central to any debate on controlling the UK’s borders.

Our Government have indeed recognised this in drawing up the present Bill, but they have held back from the final measure needed to make it effective. My amendment, like the same one proposed in the other place, will ensure that the Bill is fit for purpose—a purpose fervently desired by the people of this country.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor. I will speak generally about the Bill very briefly, and the amendment, and also say why I strongly oppose the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which are pernicious and dangerous. I cannot believe that, when my noble friend Lord Hailsham sought election in the county constituency of Sleaford and North Hykeham in 2010, he would have told his constituents that he would seek to disregard the rights and privileges of Parliament in favour of supranational legal entities and international treaties, because I suspect that that would not have been a very popular point of view to take. But that seems to be the logical implication of the amendment he has put forward today.

The Bill does contain some important statements of principle, in that it reasserts the sovereignty of Parliament and its right to legislate to cut through the morass of alleged international norms which currently frustrate the ability of the United Kingdom to control its own borders, in Clause 1(4). The partial disapplication of aspects of the Human Rights Act—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Does the noble Lord realise that the Government, and previous Governments, have signed and ratified the international agreements and treaties about which we are talking?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Well, I will develop my argument about the tension between domestic legislation, parliamentary sovereignty and the rights and privileges of Parliament, and the international obligations and a universalist human rights regime which many noble Lords seem very content to support in preference to the former.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, whose complaint appears to be about supranational bodies. I do not know if he is aware—I am sure he is—that his own amendment disapplies

“any provision made by or under the Immigration Acts,”—

that is domestic law—

“the Human Rights Act 1998”—

that is domestic law—and

“any other provision or rule of domestic law (including any common law)”.

Why is he complaining only about supranational bodies when his amendment seeks to disapply great tranches of domestic law?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Well, the noble and learned Lord will be well aware that the Human Rights Act 1998, for instance, arose from the European Convention on Human Rights and the obligations in domestic legislation to that particular convention. I am sure there are other examples—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The hour is late, so if the noble and learned Lord will permit me—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I would be grateful for an answer to the question of what the noble Lord says about

“any other provision or rule of domestic law (including any common law)”.

Nobody could suggest that was derived from abroad.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

As the noble and learned Lord will know, the amendment is worded such that it is declaratory and unambiguous. I am glad he has allowed me to make the point that the amendment my noble friend Lady Lawlor and I put down is explicit and unambiguous, so that it cannot be misinterpreted further down the line, outside this Chamber in the judicial setting. That is why it is copper-bottomed. It may not be quite to his liking, but it is there for a reason and the wording serves a specific purpose.

I will continue, as the hour is late. As I have explained, the amendment aims to disapply, for the purposes of this Act, the relevant international arrangements and other laws which prevent the UK controlling its borders, as the people of this country have elected their Government and their Members of Parliament to do. To that end, the laws we pass in this Parliament must be clear and unambiguous. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, the President of the Supreme Court, in dismissing one claim in a judgment on 15 November—that of ASM, an Iraqi—said that a court may not

“disregard an unambiguous expression of Parliament’s intention”.

I agree with what my noble friend Lady Lawlor said about the narrowness of contemporary theory and the universalist view, a logical corollary of which leads to a belief in open borders. It is practically impossible, in the current regime, for us to control our borders while we remain encumbered by international obligations which seek to subvert and undermine the sovereignty of this Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that we do indeed need to address the immigration problem, but surely it would be better to address it in accordance with the law than in breach of the law.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I hope to address the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Yesterday, I was in Huntingdon town hall watching a play recreating the trial of Charles I, which took place from 20 to 30 January 1649. Obviously, it did not end well for Charles I, who was arraigned on a charge of treason for making war against his own people. What he really did, of course, was that he usurped Parliament. He grabbed for himself the age-old privileges, that Parliament then said it bestowed upon itself, of a sovereign Parliament. It was the ultimate demonstration of the rights and privileges of that Parliament to put to death for the first time in history its own King. The point is that the sovereignty of this place is a precious thing, and I think that the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lord Hailsham unbalances the three-legged stool that the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who is no longer in his place, referred to in his earlier comments.

I draw attention specifically on that issue to—noble and learned Lords will no doubt be aware of this reference—AV Dicey’s doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament. The eighth edition of the textbook, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, was published in 1915. It outlines the concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of Parliament. The three key points of parliamentary supremacy were that: Parliament can make any laws, it cannot be overridden by any body and cannot bind its successors nor can it be bound by its predecessors. The wider point is that we are a dualist Parliament. We do not cut and paste international treaties into law without proper scrutiny and oversight. Obviously, that involves primary and secondary legislation going through the proper procedures in this Parliament. That has been upheld by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in its time and of course by the Supreme Court. Treaty obligations have effect in domestic law only so far as they are expressly incorporated into domestic law. The sovereignty of Parliament is fundamental to our rule of law and cannot be circumscribed by international law, opinions or even conventions.

In the case of R v Lyons in 2002—it is a very important point, so I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I read it in full— Lord Hoffmann, stated that

“it is firmly established that international treaties do not form part of English law and that English courts have no jurisdiction to interpret or apply them... It is not the treaty but the statute which forms part of English law. And English courts will not (unless the statute expressly so provides) be bound to give effect to interpretations of the treaty by an international court, even though the United Kingdom is bound by international law to do so. ... The sovereign legislator in the United Kingdom is Parliament. If Parliament has plainly laid down the law, it is the duty of the courts to apply it, whether that would involve the Crown in breach of an international treaty or not”.

In Bradley and Ewing’s authoritative book Constitutional and Administrative Law, it is clearly stated that the legislative supremacy of Parliament is not limited by international law:

“the courts may not hold an Act void on the ground that it contravenes general principles of international law”.

Indeed—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will be aware—the Labour Government in 1998 specifically reaffirmed the sovereignty of Parliament in relation to the Human Rights Act.

The amendment that we put down specifically makes that point. As I draw to a finish, I want to say to noble Lords that convention and international treaty obligations can be circumscribed and undermined to an extent by government. I draw noble Lords’ attention, for instance, to the prisoner vote issue of 2005. When I served in the other place, it was very much the settled view across the parties, including the Labour Government and the leader of the Opposition, that we would not accept prisoners who had been incarcerated with custodial sentences over a certain period receiving the vote. That was anathema to David Cameron, the case being Hirst v UK (No. 2) ECHR 681 [2005]. There was no outcry or uproar then; there was a settled consensus in this sovereign Parliament that the British people were not prepared to subsume their views, attitudes and opinions on prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment having the vote, having those civil and human rights that other people did. This issue will come up again when we debate later in this Committee the issue of marriage of whole life-tariff prisoners. One other example of course is that Madam Merkel disregarded the Dublin convention in 2015, allowing over a million Syrian refugees to come to the country in breach of Germany’s obligations under various treaties.

In conclusion, this Bill is of course imperfect; it is flawed. I may not even have voted for it when I was still in the other place, but that is another issue. Some noble Lords clearly want to hobble the Bill, make it inoperable and kill it with multiple amendments. We know that; it is only honest to say so. But the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Hailsham moves the dial far too much towards judicial activism and away from parliamentary sovereignty. For that reason, I must ask noble Lords to resist it.

Finally, to those potentially assuming a ministerial responsibility later this year on the other side of this Chamber, I say, “Be careful what you wish for”. If Labour is elected to government, it will have to put into place an election manifesto; the people will have given it the faith and trust so to do. To undermine that by subjugating parliamentary sovereignty to international treaty obligations, which may change against the interests of a Labour Government and the British people, is a hostage to fortune. Undermining parliamentary sovereignty may seem a prudent thing to do in Opposition, but the burdens of higher office mean that, one day, the boot may well be on the other foot. For those reasons, I very strongly support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor and resist the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I may be pre-empting the noble Lord—incidentally, I very much hope that if there is a Labour Government he will be a senior figure in it, because his service in the other place was exemplary—but what is his answer to the material change in geopolitical circumstances since the time of the 1951 convention and the European Court of Human Rights? There is an incompatibility between the weapons available in current domestic law and the stresses from international treaty obligations. What will his party do to square the circle?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We will not take unilateral action but seek to work within the international framework to bring about any refinement that needs to be made, as many other countries across the world do in the light of their circumstances. I ask the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, a question that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, just posed: why can we take action in the Red Sea? Because we are conforming with international law. Why can we say what we are saying to China about its attitude to Taiwan and its appalling attitude to Hong Kong? Because of international law. Why can we support Ukraine in the way we are? Because of our adherence to international law. In the past, as he will know, serious questions have been raised when people have been said to have acted in a way that was inconsistent with international law. That is its importance.

Anarchy will arise across the world if everyone simply abandons that and pursues what they consider to be their own interests. That way lies disaster. All I am saying, in a small but very important way, is that we do not believe we should be able simply to ignore international law in this Rwanda Bill. That is not the right approach for His Majesty’s Government.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am listening carefully to the noble Lord. In all sincerity, what is the difference between a foreign, unaccountable and anonymous single judge in a court over which the British people have no control, accountability or democratic sanction, and some of the more unappetising and less benign regimes and legal procedures to which he refers?

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The noble Lord is well aware that the Strasbourg court has decided to pass various reforms and the anonymity of the judge is a thing of the past. I am not an expert on the Strasbourg court. However, I am a believer that if we maintain that we believe in the rule of law, we cannot pick and choose which bits of international law we comply with. That is a point I put forward at Second Reading and one I feel very strongly about. I do not see how we can, in good conscience, pass Clauses 5(2) and 5(3), which is why I added my name to Amendments 57 and 59 as moved by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to follow those who have supported some of this group of amendments. I do not want to follow on to the territory of the European Court of Human Rights. A number of previous speakers, though not the most recent one, have expressed my views perfectly well.

I take issue, briefly, with the lamentable use of the phrase “foreign court” by the Prime Minister, which I regard as an extraordinary breach of British diplomatic history and practice. When he winds up, I would like the Minister to answer the following questions. We accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. We have no member of that court at the moment, lamentably, due to diplomatic ineptitude. Is that a foreign court? We accept the International Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, do we not? We are delighted when the International Criminal Court indicts Mr Putin for abducting Ukrainian children. Do we accept it? Is it a foreign court? We are pretty pleased when the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rules that the Chinese are ultra vires in seizing large chunks of the South China Sea. Is that a foreign court? I could go on. We have been trying to sustain the dispute settlement procedure of the World Trade Organization against the worst efforts of our closest ally, the United States. Is that a foreign court? We accept its jurisdiction. Could we please stop talking about “foreign courts”, and realise that it is in the interests of this country to stick with the obligations it has undertaken to obey such tribunals?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I want to speak very briefly to group 5 amendments. Specifically, I go back to the answer that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gave to me earlier. Yes indeed, the plenary court—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It might just be helpful if the noble Lord would apologise to my noble friend, to say that he was not in the Chamber at the commencement of this group.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

It was very observant of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, but I was in here. I left to get my notes that I needed, but I am touched by his interest.

On the issue from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the plenary session on 13 November did indeed undertake to de-anonymise the individual single judges involved in adjudication, but that has not yet happened, and there is no timetable for that. So I suppose each of us is half right.

The important thing to state, again, is that the wider context, as touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, is that the public are exceedingly concerned about the issue of illegal migration. It cannot be brushed aside when we talk about arcane legal and legislative points. People are angry and they want answers. As a Parliament, we have to find a way to face up to those very difficult issues. The point I made a week or so ago is that if there is a change of government, the Labour Party is most likely going to have to face those challenges as well. Instead of just criticising the Government, it will have to come forward with some really significant proposals to address those issues.

The Strasbourg court, as it happens, has never asserted or conferred, via member states, the right to authorise the court to grant interim relief in terms of the ECHR convention treaty. Indeed, domestic courts—the Supreme Court and the Appeal Court—have found quite the contrary, as was mentioned by the noble Lord on the Cross Benches earlier.

There is a concern about this battle between parliamentary sovereignty and accountability in this House and in the other place, and the idea that a decision which could have very profound public safety ramifications—this is a tiny minority, but it could possibly—is taken in foreign court with an anonymous judge where the Government are not permitted to present evidence in a timely way. There is no real accountability. I am sorry to say that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, finds it disobliging to call it a foreign court, but that is how many voters, taxpayers and British citizens see it.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. My complaint about the use of the term “foreign court” was not due to any discomfort, but because people such as himself and the leader of his party encourage people to call courts which are not foreign courts “foreign”. They are courts of organisations which we have endowed with certain powers, and which often have British judges on their tribunals. That is my complaint.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I think that is a moot point, in so far as—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Oh!

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am always delighted to amuse the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Articles 26 and 27 of the ECHR expressly limit the competence of a single judge vis-à-vis the Chamber of the Court or the Grand Chamber. I agree that in a case such as Hirst v UK (No. 2) [2005] on prisoner votes, we—as a Government, Ministers and the Executive—specifically set our face against a decision of the Grand Chamber. That was liable for criticism.

But the fundamental question here is: is the use of Rule 39 interim measures at the heart of what you would call international law? As I will set out very briefly, that is not necessarily the case, because the ECHR makes express provision for the constitution of the court and its jurisdiction. A single anonymous judge at the court breaches the limit of what the ECHR establishes as the competence of that single judge as the legal authority. Indeed, interim measures are not, in effect, de facto rulings of the Strasbourg court at all, and the Minister is therefore not in breach of “international law”. I make reference again to Articles 26 and 27 of the convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I am very interested in his points about international law and so on. As a matter of basic common sense and logic, does he understand why there is value in the interim measures of any court, domestic or international? Does he understand why it is sometimes necessary to have some kind of mechanism for preventing a case becoming totally academic and preventing the outcome being decided before the case has been properly and finally heard, whether in a domestic or an international court? If he agrees that there is sometimes value in that, and if he has concerns about the way the Strasbourg procedures work, does he not think that the first thing to do would be to try to negotiate reforms to those procedures, rather than just taking domestic powers to ignore them?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I say, gently, to the noble Baroness that this issue with unrestricted, unprecedented levels of geopolitical change and immigration is sui generis. Therefore, one has to see it through that prism. Yes, broadly and in principle, it is better to negotiate than to withdraw from a convention or another legal regime. But you cannot always use the case that, because Putin has been beastly, we self-evidently and axiomatically have to deal with his breach of international law. After all, invading a sovereign country such as Ukraine is a bit different from some of the other cases the noble Baroness used. It does not mean that you cannot be critical of the overall application of the legal regime we are discussing.

In fairness, my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s amendment is very fair-minded, enabling the Government potentially to present the evidence that, hitherto, they were not able to do in the 2022 case. Indeed, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coker, is eminently sensible—actually, it is rather otiose, because one would always assume that the Home Secretary would seek the advice of the Attorney-General in proceeding in these small number of cases.

Two of the amendments the noble Baroness put forward are clearly wrecking amendments. The amendment that would disapply Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act would specifically remove the express parliamentary sanction and authorisation of non-compliance with the interim measure, which, in itself, is a draconian move. Amendments 58 and 60 go to the heart of what we assume to be international law, in terms of what is justiciable in domestic law.

Let us be honest and put our cards on the table. This is about tying up the Bill in endless judicial reviews to stop any people being removed and to stop us tackling one of the biggest, endemic, troubling issues in politics. It is about bringing this back under the purview of domestic legislation in order to establish a roadblock via judicial review.

My final point is about the Human Rights Act 1998. It does not give legal effect in domestic legislation to the Strasbourg court’s Rule 39 practice, which is grounded in Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and is not one of the Commission rights set out in Schedule 1 to the 1998 Act. For those reasons, therefore, there is a very big question mark over the use of Rule 39 interim measures. Are they really international law as we would define it? Noble Lords would be wise to consider that when they come to vote for these amendments.

[Lord Hoffmann (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Howard, did me the honour of quoting a passage which I had written in a foreword to the paper by Professor Ekins of St John’s College, Oxford, on the jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions. I adhere to what I said in that foreword, but I ought to go a bit further. I will not go into the reasons Professor Ekins gave. He looked into the terms of the treaty, the travaux préparatoires and what the court had been saying until relatively recently, and he came to the conclusion that it had simply invented the power to grant interim injunctions. Indeed, the court in Strasbourg does not even have the power to grant final injunctions. If it is determined that there has been a breach of the treaty, what is to be done about it is a matter for the Committee of Ministers and not for the court itself.

However, the power to grant an interim injunction is an important part of the armoury of any court. Anyone who has held judicial office will know that it usually involves not so much any question of law but a practical question of deciding what lawyers perhaps rather frivolously call the balance of convenience between facts, which means the power to balance the possibility of injustice in one direction or the other. That is to say, you say to yourself, “Well, what is the position? Assuming that he turns out to be right but I don’t stop this going ahead, what injustice will he have suffered; and likewise, if I do stop it, what injustice will have been suffered by the person who has been stopped?” You weigh these things against each other and come to a practical conclusion.

It seems to me that it was sensible for the original treaty not to have included a power to grant interim injunctions, because this is essentially a practical and local matter which ought to be considered by English courts—by the courts of this country—and particularly not by a court in Strasbourg, whose sole function is to say what the terms of the convention mean. What the convention means is what it says it means, and that is perfectly well understood. However, the power to grant injunctions seems really to be a question for local courts.

If we go ahead with Clause 5, we have the bizarre situation in which the courts are, by virtue of the other clauses we discussed earlier, prevented from themselves granting interim injunctions. For the reasons I have given, I wholly supported the amendments proposed earlier today by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble and learned friend Lady Hale. They seem absolutely essential to enable our courts to give justice.

On the other hand, however, what we have is a provision by which the orders of a court which, in my view, does not have jurisdiction can nevertheless be enforced, provided that the Minister—like the Emperor at the Colosseum—puts his thumb up rather than his thumb down in relation to those particular orders. That seems an extremely strange situation. For that reason, I am unwilling to support the amendment that gives effect to the interim injunctions in our report, but I certainly supported the amendments that were moved earlier.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the amendments in this group. I do so for three reasons.

First, whatever one’s views about international law, parties to any dispute must have some access to interim relief—whether neighbourhood disputes or business disputes, and particularly in relation to human rights concerns. The Government are resisting interim relief in our domestic courts, but they really cannot do that in relation to the European Court of Human Rights as well, or there will be no interim relief for mistakes that can lead to very dire consequences—as has happened in the past, even in immigration cases in this country.

The second reason I support the amendments in the group is this. When the Government originally raised concerns about Rule 39 last year, it was because of natural justice concerns about the procedure of the courts not always allowing Governments to be heard, or not allowing them to be heard after interim relief had been granted. Those procedural concerns have now been addressed, not least thanks to the efforts of Foreign Office Ministers, including the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, for which he is to be commended.

Finally, I think back to yesterday’s debate, which did your Lordships’ House such credit. I remind noble Lords that there are currently Rule 39 interim measures in place to prevent the Russian Federation executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. It will do our arguments and moral authority no good at all if we start saying that we can pick and choose which Rule 39 measures we accept.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—in relation to his question to the noble and learned Lord—that he might like to look at today’s Politico, where Dunja Mijatović, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, has criticised not just the present Bill but the French state for the very case that he referred to. The French were wrong to do what they did and we must do better.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Amendments 36, 37, and 38 in respect of Rule 39 interim measures. I am afraid that I will not observe or respect the admonition that we should brief necessarily. We are discussing the substantial and significant issue of parliamentary sovereignty, and the right of the British people to have their views respected and not blocked by an unelected House, especially when the elected House, the other place, has been able to make a decision in significant numbers.

In deference to the sensitivities of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I will, for the avoidance of doubt, be referring to “an international” rather than “a foreign” court. I am sure he will be pleased about that. These are fundamentally blocking or wrecking amendments, designed to make the Bill inoperable. They are designed to thwart the will of the people, expressed through an electoral mandate and the will of the other place, to reduce immigration and to fulfil the primary duty of government, which is to protect its borders and its people and, more importantly—I look to the Lords spiritual in this respect—the moral imperative to save lives in the channel and destroy the business model of evil people traffickers.

More specifically, these amendments subvert and traduce the long-held principle that our laws are made in Parliament and implemented by the courts—simply, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty—in favour of a nebulous, opaque concept of “the rule of law” and the ECHR as a living document. The former is essentially uncodified and lacks precise consensual meaning, but it is used to advance judicial activism by unelected, unaccountable jurists in an international court, undermining faith and trust in the court system, parliamentary democracy and government in this country and destroying the delicate equilibrium between the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary. There is but one rule of law, and that is made in Parliament by elected representatives. That confers legitimacy on our proceedings. These amendments will assist in furthering the trend towards the politicisation of the judiciary.

Even the concept of the separation of powers, much lauded in this House, is itself alien to the constitutional settlement of the UK, and is certainly an evolving issue. It is unclear and prey to subjective interpretation, as we established earlier this week on Report when we discussed the deeming presumption of a safe list for asylum seekers, including Greece, in the case of Nasseri v Secretary of State in 2009. This was ultimately found by the Appeal Court and the House of Lords, under Section III of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act in respect of inhuman treatment, not to have violated those pieces of legislation. That was the Blair Government, who created an unrebuttable presumption that a list of countries was safe, so there is a precedent already set many years ago.

I wish to ponder briefly the idea of the rule of law, Rule 39 interim measures and the implications for parliamentary sovereignty and the myth of the ECHR, which is eulogised with rapture by so many noble Lords in the context of our own Parliament and judicial system. Advancing the rule of law as superior to parliamentary sovereignty—“the rule of lawyers”, as my noble friend Lord Lilley said in his excellent opinion editorial in the Daily Telegraph two days ago—is what we are looking at. It is about the subjective fiat of another court, over which we have no control. It is a modern phenomenon, as opposed to parliamentary sovereignty, and an example of judicial mission creep. That said, even Lord Bingham stated, after the case of Jackson v Attorney-General on the Hunting Act 2004:

“The bedrock of the British constitution is … the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament”.


He echoed the thoughts of such eminent jurists as Lord Denning and AV Dicey, to whom I referred in Committee.

As we know, and as my noble friend Lord Lilley alluded to earlier, the French have taken an altogether more robust view of the authority and sanctity of their own domestic legislation vis-à-vis the perverse and sometimes dangerous and damaging rulings of the ECHR. In November 2023, Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin removed an Uzbek national, MA, who was allegedly a radicalised Islamist extremist, despite a Rule 39 interim measure against this being done, the first time that the French Government have openly defied such an interim measure. Indeed, they also defied the Conseil d’État, the equivalent of the Supreme Court.

The French elite is more likely to question and challenge the état de droit, the French equivalent of the rule of law. In an article in Le Figaro—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The noble Lord said earlier that he wants to speak at length because he feels the issue is important to expand on. The Companion says about Report at paragraph 8.147:

“Arguments fully deployed in Committee of the whole House or in Grand Committee should not be repeated at length on report”.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am interested that the noble Baroness for the Liberal Democrats is so keen to avoid debate but, for the avoidance of doubt, I have not repeated any points I previously raised.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

We do not make Second Reading speeches on Report.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I take on board the noble Baroness’s view, but I am not making a Second Reading speech. I am speaking specifically about these amendments.

[Lord Gascoigne (Con)]

My Lords, there is a long day ahead and there have been many deliberations on all these subjects beforehand. Good points have been made about the Companion. I ask that every noble Lord observes what is in it and tries to be as concise as possible.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the Whip for that guidance. If I can proceed to conclude my remarks—

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

No.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

However much the noble Baroness heckles from a sedentary position, I will not sit down and I will finish my speech. Rule 39 interim measures, as we learned in Committee, were not in any meaningful sense court rulings per se and, more specifically, great British statesmen and jurists such as David Maxwell Fyfe, who has been quoted, and Winston Churchill never signed up to the court taking powers upon itself to make binding injunctions. This is at the very heart of these amendments. Indeed, it was debated and specifically rejected in terms. It is only since 2005, when activist judges were acting in the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, that the court has given itself a power ultra vires to the original convention—an important point enunciated previously by, among others, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and my noble friend Lord Sandhurst.

The clause that amendments today seek to strike down, eviscerate and render otiose is not an example of arbitrary power but a specific power for this Bill and a set of unprecedented geopolitical and economic circumstances: mass migration. It is not a blanket disregard but a specific power. In summary, Rule 39 rules were never part of the European convention or constitution and there is no evidence, other than the hyperbole in this Chamber, that the UK not being bound by these interim measures undermines our overall compliance with international law and our international obligations, responsibilities or undertakings. The irony of these amendments is that they lock in the UK to adherence to a regime that even the court itself accepts is suboptimal and needs urgent reform. These amendments offer a carte blanche to a broken system.

The court itself does not work in its efficacy and the power to produce a desired result, with 48% of leading judgments being unaltered and not acted upon in the past 10 years across all 46 members of the convention. We have a failing, politicised, secret and unreformed court that some noble Lords wish to legislate to usurp the sovereignty of our Parliament. For these and other reasons, I ask your Lordships to resist these amendments because they are not only consequential but dangerous.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I follow my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in supporting these amendments. I simply say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that yesterday was the 78th anniversary of Winston Churchill’s famous speech in Missouri; it was entitled Sinews of Peace and it dealt with issues such as the Iron Curtain coming down across the Europe, and why Winston Churchill believed we needed a convention on human rights and supported the creation of the Council of Europe as the best buttress—alliances based on the rule of law—to preserve the peace of Europe and the world.

In the troubled times in which we live—the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to the debate on these things in your Lordships’ House yesterday—the upholding of the rule of law, especially in the face of all that Putin’s Russia is doing in Ukraine, is paramount—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The noble Lord has a proud and long-standing record of defending human and civil rights, which we all support and congratulate him on. However, does he not agree that a system in which you have an unnamed foreign judge in an international court imposing a late-night judgment, and which allows the UK no opportunity to give its own evidence or respond, or understand the evidence against it, is surely not an example of due process or, more importantly, the rule of law?

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I disagree with the noble Lord; the amendments are about interim measures. The Joint Select Committee on Human Rights, on which I serve, took evidence on this issue and I want to refer to that for a moment. Having heard the evidence, these were the conclusions of a committee of the sovereign British Parliament. In paragraph 105, we said:

“We recognise that there are differences of opinion over whether or not interim measures ought to be binding on the United Kingdom. However, as a matter of international law, they are binding. Failing to comply with interim measures directed at the UK would amount to a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights”.


On Clause 5, we said that the Bill

“contemplates a Minister choosing not to comply with an interim measure and thus violating the UK’s international human rights obligations. It also prevents the domestic courts taking into account what may be a relevant factor for any decision whether or not an individual should be removed to Rwanda. This is not consistent with a commitment to complying with the UK’s obligations under the ECHR”.

That was the committee’s considered, majority view; it is not a view that has been responded to by the Government. Here I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, or the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, when they come to reply, to go back to the Committee stage of this Bill, where they gave an assurance that, before we went any further, Parliament would be told the response to the findings of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As recently as Monday, I was told when I intervened on this point that there would be a response for today; I would like to know when it is going to be forthcoming.

It brings our Parliament into disrepute when we set up Joint Committees and say we will consider issues of this kind in great detail, and when reports have been made available to the Government, but no response has been forthcoming before detailed consideration of that legislation. Here we are, at the Report stage of a Bill that has gone all the way through the House of Commons, has almost completed its passage in your Lordships’ House, and we still have no proper response. When the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, defended, as he did earlier, the integrity and the nature of our Select Committee, I was with him, and not just because, like him, I have particular admiration for the chairs of Select Committees. The honourable Joanna Cherry is no exception in this respect. She is an admirable chair of that committee; she is not a partisan—ask members of the Scottish National Party and they will tell you that she is a very independent-minded lady who has considerable experience as a KC in the law, so chairs are not to be dismissed. These committees of your Lordships’ House should be taken far more seriously. Not to do so is a discourtesy to Parliament and to the kind of arguments that my noble and learned friend has put forward, and it is why, even if these amendments are not voted on today, the principles that underline them should be supported.