Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Hunt of Wirral Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I start by congratulating the Minister on his appointment last Friday as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Business and Trade. He has a long established and proven track record of success in business. I hope that his voice will be heard loud and clear within government. I wish him well and hope that he will emerge from our debates with his reputation enhanced.

At the outset of this debate, I make it clear that my party accepts that steel is a strategic industry. Steel helped to build our past and I agree with the Minister that it will shape our future. It matters to our national resilience, to our defence capability, to our manufacturing base, to our construction sector and to communities right across the country. Recognising the importance of steel is not, however, the same as accepting that nationalisation is the necessary answer. The central issue facing the sector is competitiveness, and the Government have still to set out a credible plan to address just that.

Last week, Al Carns, who was then Minister for the Armed Forces, resigned from the Government. He has since argued that energy policy has to be treated as a matter of security, but high energy costs are making British steel less competitive globally. The Government’s chosen path towards lower carbon production will dramatically increase the sector’s reliance on electricity and therefore require very substantial capital investment. The industry itself has warned that high electricity prices risk undermining its long-term plans to decarbonise. The Government acknowledge that steel is vital to national security. If that is the case, surely the energy policy upon which steel depends must also be judged through the lens of national security, resilience and industrial capability.

The Government came to office promising a £2.5 billion steel fund—a fund that was supposed to transform the sector, modernise production, support new technology and crowd in private investment. There is now a real risk that that money will be used not to transform British Steel but simply to plug the losses created by the Government’s failure to address the underlying causes of uncompetitiveness.

If hundreds of millions of pounds are being spent merely to keep British Steel operating day to day, and if still more liabilities are now to be brought on to the public balance sheet through nationalisation, how much of that £2.5 billion will be left for genuine transformation? How much will remain available to support new technologies, energy-efficiency improvements and the investment needed to secure the industry’s long-term future?

This leads to a more fundamental question: where does this end? Will British Steel, under public ownership, be expected eventually to stand on its own two feet, or will taxpayers be asked to fund operating losses year after year, while Ministers continue to promise that help is just around the corner? Before Parliament grants these powers, surely it is reasonable to ask what the end state is, what the exit strategy is and how the Government intend to measure success beyond simply writing more and larger cheques.

The Government’s impact assessment makes it clear that the costs of this Bill will be substantial. These costs include the possibility of capital injections, working capital support, operating costs if the company remains loss making, compensation, administrative overheads, and the expenditure inherent in establishing and running a government-owned company. So I ask the Minister what the Government’s estimate of the total cost is. Will Parliament be told that figure before the Bill receives Royal Assent?

We must also question the Government’s approach to ensuring environmentally friendly steel. Ministers have chosen a pathway that the industry warned will be more costly, more electricity-intensive and thus more difficult to finance. In the other place, the Secretary of State Peter Kyle said that

“the long-term future of the UK steel sector relies on public and private investment”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/5/26; col. 787.]

If the Government’s preferred model drives up costs and makes the United Kingdom less attractive than competitor countries not operating under the same net-zero constraints, where is that private investment supposed to come from? Investors can choose where they deploy capital; if the Government make steel production more expensive, more regulated and more politically uncertain, they will look elsewhere.

The Government’s impact assessment of 13 May is clear and explicit about the risk to investment. I quote its paragraph 75:

“One potential impact is a chilling effect on investment as investors may perceive an increased risk of government intervention. This could increase uncertainty for investors and therefore deter future investment in the UK steel sector. If investors perceive these risks as material, they could further undermine the recovery of the sector, putting jobs and capabilities at risk”.


This is a remarkable admission from any Government.

The Government have also not properly addressed the wider trade risk. If British Steel is to be subject to constant and persistent subsidisation at the expense of the taxpayer, Ministers must explain how they intend to ensure that this remains compliant with the United Kingdom’s international obligations. Prolonged state support, if not carefully structured, could risk challenge under WTO subsidy rules and invite countervailing measures from trading partners. That would not be a theoretical concern; other countries could impose countervailing duties, raise disputes or just take other retaliatory action if they believe that UK steel is being unfairly subsidised.

Such action could not only harm British Steel itself but damage the wider UK steel sector and the downstream industries that rely on steel inputs, including automotive, aerospace, defence, construction and advanced manufacturing. Can the Minister therefore tell the House what assessment the Government have made of the WTO implications of the Bill and of any continuing public subsidy to British Steel? Have Ministers had any discussions with the World Trade Organization or major trading partners about the proposed structure of support? What conversations do they intend to have before any transfer into public ownership takes place?

On the issue of trade, I also raise the significant concerns expressed by stakeholders across industry about the Government’s steel strategy and, in particular, their tariff policy. The Government appear to have conducted a partial U-turn: it seems that we did not need to wait 12 months for a formal review for Ministers to discover that tariffs can be harmful—if only more than a century of economic history had already taught us that.

The first point is one of parliamentary accountability: any change to the Government’s steel tariff regime should be reported to Parliament first, so why are Members of both Houses having to learn through the media about possible changes? That is just not acceptable, and it gives the impression of a Government making up policy in response to headlines rather than setting out a coherent and properly examined trade strategy.

We have already seen the risks of retaliation. We have seen concerns in relation to the United States and questions raised on India, including the possible implications for the trade deal. We now read of concerns about the European Union, with reports that the Secretary of State has been to the EU to plead with it not to reduce tariff-free imports of British steel. What did the Government expect? If the UK chooses to escalate protectionist measures, it should not be surprised when trading partners respond in kind. Retaliation was not unforeseeable; it was predictable. We saw the European Union respond in precisely this way to President Trump’s tariffs. Did the Government really fail to assess that risk before introducing their own regime?

Countermeasures, reduced market access and increased uncertainty could all make it much harder for UK producers to export, and harder for investors to commit capital. At the same time, tariffs risk raising costs for downstream sectors that rely and depend on steel inputs —metal forming, automotive, aerospace, construction, defence and advanced manufacturing among them. These sectors are central to growth, productivity and investment. If tariffs increase their costs, reduce their competitiveness or force them to source elsewhere, the Government will have weakened the very industrial base they claim to be trying to strengthen.

I therefore ask the Minister: what assessment has been made of the impact of the steel tariff regime on downstream manufacturers? What assessment has been made of possible or likely retaliation by trading partners? Why should British businesses have confidence in a strategy that appears to protect one part of the supply chain by imposing costs and risks on so many others? We cannot just ignore the wider business climate the Government have created.

I am not going to go into detail about the Employment Rights Act 2025, but that will not stop me raising it, because it is making the business environment less competitive and less conducive to investment. Combined with those increased national insurance contributions, endless reporting requirements and carbon taxes, the Government are damaging the steel sector, along with every other sector of the UK economy. For a steel sector already operating under intense global pressure, these additional costs affect hiring, investment, margins, productivity and the ability of British steelmakers to compete. In the light of the importance to our national security, the steel sector may be a special case, but that does not mean it is immune to the effects of wider government policy.

Many questions remain to be answered. At this point, His Majesty’s Opposition are far from convinced that nationalisation is the best option, or even the so-called least worst option, but we are eager to hear some, or better still all, of those questions answered as the Bill progresses. Steel has shaped our nation’s history. The challenge now is to secure a future for the industry that is internationally competitive, financially sustainable and attractive to investors.

Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Hunt of Wirral Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

2: Clause 2, page 1, line 14, leave out “includes (but is not limited to)” and insert “means”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to limit the public interest test to the areas set out in subsections (a) to (c).

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 2, 3 and 8.

Amendment 2 limits the public interest test to the specific factors listed in Clause 2. On first reading, the test looks robust: national security, the economy and

“the construction, maintenance and operation of critical infrastructure”.

These are serious criteria that one might think provide a meaningful check on the exercise of what are very significant powers. However, when one reads on, Clause 2(2) says that the test

“includes (but is not limited to)”

those grounds. I contend that, with those five words, the floor falls away. If the test includes but is not limited to the listed grounds, surely, in practice, there is no test at all. Any Secretary of State of any political persuasion at any time can conjure a reason and call it the public interest.

The amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom would remove those words and make the listed grounds exhaustive. It would ensure that when Ministers say that these are exceptional powers subject to a robust public interest test, it is actually true—not merely true for now with this Secretary of State in these circumstances but true in the legislation for every Secretary of State who follows.

The Government may say that there need to be other grounds, beyond national security, the economy and critical infrastructure. I would genuinely like to know what they are. What situation could possibly arise that those three criteria do not already cover? If the Government can answer that question, let them do so today. Let them set out on the record what additional circumstances they have in mind. If they cannot, these words should not be in the Bill.

We have a Bill that, as we just discussed in the first group, can capture businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel. We now have a public interest test with no effective limit. Will the Minister confirm that the powers in the Bill cannot be triggered simply because of industrial pressure; for example, because a trade union decides that the answer to a dispute is public ownership? Will he rule that out?

On Amendment 3, the Government’s impact assessment describes the difficult environment in which the steel sector operates, including high domestic operating costs and a lack of long-term investment. It recognises that these pressures bear directly on the ability of UK steel producers to compete. Yet Clause 2 refers only in the broadest terms to “supporting the economy”. That phrase could cover almost any intervention; it does not require Ministers to demonstrate that the intervention will leave the United Kingdom with a stronger, more productive or more internationally competitive steel sector.

There is a difference between preserving an undertaking for the moment and putting it on a sustainable footing for the future. Nationalisation may avert an immediate crisis, but it should not become a means simply of transferring losses, risks and difficult decisions from a company to the taxpayer. The question must be whether public ownership can help to secure the investment, modernisation, productivity and commercial resilience needed for this sector to compete successfully.

There is also a point of consistency with the Government’s own drafting. The Bill makes clear that the public interest test is not intended to be limited to the matters specifically listed. It says that the test includes but is not limited to national security, critical infrastructure and the economy, as I said earlier, so the Government have already chosen not to confine the public interest test. In those circumstances, why would they resist including economic growth and international competitiveness expressly within it? Growth is the Government’s stated number one priority. International competitiveness is plainly fundamental to the future of a sector exposed to intense overseas competition and high energy costs. If the Government consider national security and critical infrastructure important enough to name in the Bill, surely growth and competitiveness should also be named. I invite the Minister to explain why those two objectives do not appear in the Bill. How will the Government assess whether an intervention is likely to strengthen competitiveness? Will that assessment include energy costs, investment, productivity, output, technological modernisation, export potential and the undertaking’s ability to operate sustainably without indefinite support from the taxpayer?

On Amendment 8, the Government have confirmed that they have already provided approximately £555 million to British Steel for working capital, including raw materials and salaries. The National Audit Office reported that, as at 31 January this year, the Department for Business and Trade had spent £377 million on its intervention. At the then current rate of spending, total costs were expected to exceed £642 million by the end of this month. More importantly, the National Audit Office warned that if spending continued at the then current rate, costs could exceed £1.5 billion by 2028—and that figure was before any potential transformation of the business, compensation to the current owner or the eventual costs of exit. The NAO also found that the intervention has

“no clear end date … has not stabilised the company’s finances”

and began

“without a clear exit strategy”.

This Bill is not simply emergency legislation to keep the furnaces operating over a weekend. It creates enduring powers to transfer businesses, assets, rights and liabilities into public ownership. Before those powers are exercised, the Government must be able to demonstrate that the proposed course represents value for money.

The facts since the emergency intervention underline why this matters. We are told that the business in its present form is structurally unprofitable. We know that substantial decisions remain to be made on its future, including any transition in production technology, the cost of investment, the length of any transition period and the eventual route to a viable and sustainable business. The taxpayer needs protection against an open-ended commitment.

The Government may argue that the Treasury’s Managing Public Money framework already requires departments to consider value for money. I suppose I could look forward to the day when there is some evidence of the Treasury acting responsibly in this way. Can the Minister tell us what value-for-money assessment will be undertaken before a principal transfer power is exercised? Will it include the expected costs of compensation, operating losses, capital investment, decommissioning, restructuring and any eventual exit?

This amendment would not frustrate the Government’s ability to act where action is genuinely justified. It would simply ensure that before nationalisation takes place, the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is a responsible use of taxpayers’ money. I beg to move.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 2 would replace

“includes (but is not limited to)”

with the word “means” so that we knew what we were describing. The worry is that leaving it as it is could create a public interest so large that there was a mission creep that I do not think should be in the Bill, which is trying to nationalise steel. We need to be slightly more economical in the words we are using, so that we need not fear that on another day, if another public interest was being taken into account, the definition would prove far too loose. The word “means” does the job: we know exactly what one is talking about, and it lists the three elements. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, wanted to include two other areas but, for me, limiting it to those three objects seems to be where we should stop. The word “means” would stop mission creep.

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I turn to the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Redwood and Lord Fox, about turning British Steel around. Should we decide in the public interest to transfer British Steel into public ownership, we will act swiftly to put in place a new board to provide leadership to the organisation and to be responsible for continuing work to drive improvements in health and safety performance and to stabilise operations and manage costs. The board would explore the options for the long-term viability of decarbonised steel-making at Scunthorpe and develop transformation plans in a way that manages the impact of that transition of the workforce in the local area. We will be debating this more in groups 10 and 13 in day 2 of Committee. For those reasons, I respectfully request that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and to the Minister for his response. I reiterate what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said earlier about the way in which the Minister has given us every opportunity to think ahead into the future and to receive expert advice as to the way ahead.

To summarise these three amendments, they do not sit easily together, as has been pointed out, but they have provoked a widespread debate. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, was absolutely right to point out that mission creep should stop here. There should not be ways that the Minister could include all sorts of other reasons. In Amendment 3, I suggested two reasons, but the Minister carefully responded by not ruling them out and not ruling anything else in. It seems that either the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, is right, or the noble Lord, Lord Fox, is right or the Committee is confused. It has considered all the various options, but it would be useful, as my noble friend Lord Redwood said, to have greater clarity in the form of some draft business plan that could look to the future and work out the way ahead. Value for money, as my noble friend said, sums it all up. Although the Minister thought that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, had signed Amendment 8, either it has not come to my attention that he has or he has not signed it. It may be a later amendment which suggests that value for money is required.

I remain far from convinced by the Government’s case. These amendments address three basic questions which ought to be answered before the state is given a power of this significance. First, in what circumstances will the power be used? Secondly, what is it intended to achieve? Thirdly, as my noble friend Lord Redwood pointed out, how will the taxpayer be protected? The Government’s response seems to be that Ministers will behave reasonably, that the powers will be used sparingly and that the existing public interest test provides sufficient protection.

As my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom said in the previous group, this Bill sends a message well beyond the immediate circumstances of British steel. Investors considering whether to commit capital to the United Kingdom will examine not simply what Ministers say today but what the legislation permits tomorrow. The Government say those risks are mitigated by a clear public interest test. But the reality is there is no actual test. There is much in this debate for the Government to consider, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

5: Clause 2, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not exercise a principal transfer power unless the Secretary of State has commissioned an independent assessment of whether the exercise of the power is in the public interest, and that assessment has demonstrated that it is in the public interest.(2B) The Secretary of State may appoint such independent person as the Secretary of State thinks fit to carry out an independent assessment under subsection (2A), and may pay remuneration and allowances to that person.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require an independent assessment of whether the public interest test had been met before the Secretary of State could exercise the principal transfer powers.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 5, 6 and 42, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, go to three basic questions which ought to be answered before the Government exercise powers of this scale. They are: on what evidence is nationalisation justified, by what criteria will Ministers make that judgment, and what will be the financial and economic consequences?

Amendment 5 would require an independent assessment before a principal transfer power is exercised, establishing that the proposed transfer is in the public interest. That is not an attempt to prevent the Government acting in a genuine emergency. It is an attempt to ensure that before private assets are transferred into public ownership, there is an objective check that the case has been made.

The sums involved may be very substantial. Once the state acquires a business, it may assume not only its assets but its liabilities, its working capital requirements, its investment needs, and the risks of continuing operating losses. These may be decisions with billions of pounds at stake. They should be based on evidence, not merely urgency or political pressure.

Amendment 6 is the natural counterpart. It would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament the full criteria by which the public interest test has been judged. The Bill currently gives Ministers a broad discretion. I believe that Parliament is entitled to know how that discretion has been exercised before a transfer takes place. What precisely has been considered? How have national security, economic consequences, competition, costs to the taxpayer and the future viability of the undertaking been weighed? Those are not matters which should be left to assertion after the event.

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[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Redwood, Lord Fox and Lord Hunt, for their contributions.

The noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Sharpe, tabled Amendments 5, 6, and 42 to provide for an independent person to assess the public interest. Further amendments tabled by the noble Lords would require the Government to publish both the criteria used to assess the public interest and their assessment on how those criteria are met, before exercising the principal transfer power. Amendment 42 would require an impact assessment to be published before any intervention or the exercise of any power under the Bill. As these amendments deal with similar issues, I will address them together.

I start by saying that I understand and sympathise with the desire for the greatest parliamentary and stakeholder scrutiny of a decision to intervene under the powers in the Bill. Stakeholder engagement is a key part of the Government’s policy approach to the sector, with Ministers regularly meeting key industry groups and representatives through the steel council and other forums. The Government have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, explaining how the public interest test will be considered. A further impact assessment will be published alongside any secondary legislation exercising the transfer of power.

The framework for decisions to intervene will stem from what has been included in Clause 2, with regard to the three public interest factors. There is no attempt on our part to obfuscate or hide the criteria that will be applied in practice. The Government will not only consider whether a steel undertaking is engaged in activity that serves the public interest; they will also consider whether the activity is at risk of not receiving government intervention.

The Government cannot support these amendments as each would create additional hurdles and process pre-intervention. In the kinds of situations that the Bill envisages, speed will be crucial. Likewise, commercial and market sensitivities mean that swift action will, in most circumstances, be necessary to avoid uncertainty.

None the less, I am aware that there are strongly held concerns about this issue, and I can confirm that the Government will consider options for Parliament to scrutinise decisions taken either at the time of or after the exercise of the transfer of powers ahead of Report stage. I hope that this offers some reassurance to noble Lords, and I look forward to continuing further conversations with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, ahead of Report. With that, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response, particularly his closing words. My hopes were raised when he started by saying that he understood everything that I had said and was sympathetic. Then the situation clouded a little as he said that these amendments would present additional hurdles at a time when speed would be essential, but then he said that the Government would consider options between now and Report—and that is what I was seeking to hear.

I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Redwood for putting it all in the historical context. It is easy to forget the pace at which we entered this debate, by being summoned to Parliament in April of last year. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, reminded us, Clause 2 is the crunch. It is a key part of this Bill. To remind colleagues, Amendment 5 would require an independent assessment confirming that nationalisation is in the public interest before transfer powers could be used. Therefore, as we approach that amendment, I obviously cannot press the Minister on the options that the Government will consider, but it would be a way forward if we could find a solution comparable to that in Amendment 6, requiring the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament the criteria used to assess the public interest before using transfer powers—and then Amendment 42, which would require an impact assessment.

I recognise the point that the Minister has made about the practical difficulty of preparing a full assessment before the exercise of emergency powers—particularly, as he explained, where Ministers may need to act quickly to prevent serious harm. However, that cannot mean, as I believe the Minister accepts, that the financial consequences are treated lightly. The cost to the taxpayer of taking on a steel undertaking—its liabilities, its working capital needs and its future investment requirements—may be substantial. As my noble friend Lord Redwood pointed out, Parliament has a proper understanding and an interest in understanding those costs, the risks assumed and the basis on which the decisions have been made. Parliamentary scrutiny should not be seen as an obstacle to action. It is surely a necessary part of ensuring that exceptional powers are used responsibly and transparently.

We await the decision of the Government. I had hoped that the Minister would commit to publishing an impact assessment alongside the exercise of the power. I will examine his words carefully, because that assessment is the key. It should set out the costs incurred, the economic implications, the liabilities assumed, the anticipated future costs and the risks to the taxpayer. There is much for the Government to reflect on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

I will be very brief and speak with some support for the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. As far as I can tell, the Bill does not require legislative consent from either Cardiff or Edinburgh. Perhaps the Minister could confirm that. If it does not, the principle set out by the noble Lord, for both Wales and Scotland—I know that there may be industrial differences, but the two things apply—would be very important. I look forward to hearing what the Minister says in that regard.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I very much echo what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just said, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for his amendments, which raise very important points. There are considerable concerns about what is happening at steel plants in Wales and the consequences for the workers, their families and the much wider community. It is right that, where these powers may affect a Welsh steel undertaking or devolved responsibilities, Wales should be properly involved. I urge the Minister to respond positively to the concerns so rightly raised by the noble Lord.

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

13: Clause 4, page 2, line 30, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to require regulations transferring securities of a steel undertaking to be subject to the affirmative procedure.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 makes regulations transferring securities in a steel undertaking subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendment 14 makes regulations transferring the property rights or liabilities of a steel undertaking subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendment 15 makes regulations on continuity obligations subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendment 18 in this group makes enforcement regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. I will begin by referring to those amendments but speaking to the question of whether Clause 50 should stand part of the Bill.

This clause gives the Secretary of State a very broad power to modify primary legislation, secondary legislation and common law in connection with a share or property transfer. It may be used retrospectively and, in some circumstances, before Parliament has had the opportunity to approve the regulations. These are considerable powers, particularly when we are discussing property rights, contractual rights and the compulsory transfer of businesses and their assets. My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom has already referred to the report of the Constitution Committee, and he speaks from personal experience of knowing the dangers of ignoring the recommendations of that committee. The committee is pretty clear about Clause 50, and I will quote from its report:

“We recommend that the broad power granted to the Secretary of State in Clause 50(1) to modify the law in relation to share or property transfer by regulations should either be removed or significantly tightened to specify the circumstances in which such law may be modified”.


I believe that the Government should take that recommendation seriously.

The Government’s delegated powers memorandum sets out at some length why Ministers believe that a broad power may be needed. It refers to the complexities of company law, insolvency law, commercial law and supply chains, and the possibility that an obstacle to a transfer may emerge unexpectedly. A compulsory transfer may well give rise to legal complications, but the memorandum does not provide concrete examples of the circumstances in which primary legislation would need to be disapplied or modified. If those circumstances can be identified, they should be placed in the Bill, or at least the power should be more tightly defined.

On Amendments 13 and 14, the Government’s own delegated powers memorandum confirms that the transfer powers in Clauses 4 to 29 are subject to the negative procedure. That is a very wide suite of powers. They not only concern the initial transfer of shares or property but include the legal effect of those transfers, continuity arrangements, the conversion and delisting of securities, the position of directors and senior managers, licences, termination rights, foreign property and supplemental onward, reverse and connected transfers. Amendments 13 and 14 focus on the central powers, the compulsory transfer of securities and the compulsory transfer of property rights and liabilities. Those are the acts by which the state takes control of a private business, or part of one.

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[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I am happy to give that commitment in our further conversations.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, not only for his generous praise, which I felt was completely undeserved, but for his support. At some stage, this great Chamber of ours will consider better ways to deal with secondary legislation. He will know that I gave quite a lot of support, when I chaired the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, to one of his noble friends who moved that there should be a new Bill—the Statutory Instruments (Amendment) Bill. But that is for another occasion. In the meantime, I thank the noble Lord for his strong support.

There is clearly much now for the Government to consider, in particular in view of the commitments made by the Minister. How do we achieve the right balance between acting swiftly where necessary and, at the same time, ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful role in scrutinising powers, particularly where they affect property rights, liabilities and commercial arrangements? I am sure these issues will merit further discussion as the Bill progresses. For the present, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Hunt of Wirral Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

21: After Clause 50, insert the following new clause—
“Duty to try to find a private sector purchaser for any nationalised steel undertakingWhere a steel undertaking has been subject to a principal transfer power under this Act, the Secretary of State must—(a) make all practicable efforts to find a private sector purchaser for the steel undertaking, and(b) lay a report before Parliament every six months which sets out progress made towards finding a private sector purchaser for the steel undertaking.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would put a duty on the Secretary of State to seek a private sector buyer for any steel company that has been nationalised, and report to Parliament on progress made every six months.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 21, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, would, ultimately, put into the Bill what the Government say is their objective. The then Secretary of State for Business and Trade said that the Government’s aspiration for British Steel was

“a co-investment agreement with a private sector partner to secure a long-term transformation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/4/25; col. 841.]

The future of British Steel cannot rest indefinitely on public ownership and continuing working capital injections, together with an open-ended commitment from the taxpayer. It must be a viable, competitive and investible business able to secure private capital for the investment and the transformation that it requires. Yet that objective does not appear in the Bill. There is no statutory duty on the Secretary of State to seek a private sector purchaser, no clear exit route from public ownership and no requirement to report to Parliament on progress. Without that discipline, there is a real risk that nationalisation becomes not just a temporary intervention to stabilise and restore business but an accumulating and indefinite cost to the taxpayer. If the Government are serious about a private sector-led future for British Steel, they should have no difficulty in accepting that duty.

Amendment 23 from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, is very important indeed. It goes to the heart of concerns raised throughout these debates, including by my noble friend Lord Redwood on the first day in Committee, that the Government need a genuine business strategy for steel. Where nationalisation is contemplated, there must be a strategy for skilled employment, retraining, reskilling and local economic renewal. Workers cannot be treated as an afterthought to a transfer of assets or as a balance sheet exercise. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 23 is in my name. I was very pleased to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, just said, because I had put in my notes that I feel that this is an important amendment. I hope it is pushing at an open door.

In the previous debate, on Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, spoke of the effect on local communities. I agreed then, and this amendment would put in place a requirement for a jobs and industrial transition strategy to follow once the Secretary of State has exercised the principal transfer power in respect of the steel undertaking. I emphasise that this would be post exercising that power.

This amendment calls for the strategy to be laid before Parliament within six months—sooner, I would hope—from the exercise of the transfer powers. This published strategy must set out the Government’s investment and transition plans to protect employment, deliver a skills and reskilling programme and, if necessary, redeployment opportunities, and deliver real economic renewal, while supporting resilience in communities that are dependent on that steel undertaking. I am happy to discuss with the Minister ways of achieving this objective, but this process is aimed at ensuring that there is an explicit plan to which Parliament will be able to hold the Government to account.

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[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of any debate in Committee is justified when the Minister responds by giving us the series of assurances that he has just done, and I warmly welcome his approach. He has clearly outlined that without a clear route towards private investment, this ownership, as I pointed out in moving the amendment, becomes an open-ended commitment. I thank my noble friend Lord Redwood and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their contributions, and I owe my good friend the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, an explanation, because this is very much a probing amendment. He is quite right that you can envisage various circumstances which are counterproductive, and that is why I warmly welcome the fact that the Minister has given such a clear commitment that there is no public ownership in perpetuity intended here. We are all determined to produce a plan which will last for generations to come and secure the future of our great steel industry, so I have no hesitation in seeking to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

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[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, just to update the Committee, we are 2-1 up.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

It was Harry Kane.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

Harry Kane, thank you.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has several amendments in relation to the compensation provisions in the Bill. I appreciate his careful attention to detail, which is a key aspect of this Bill, and will respond to the points raised in order. I will preface these points by noting that, if introduced, compensation regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, thereby providing opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 27 is on the approach to environmental liabilities in the compensation process. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has indicated that this would prevent the payment of compensation until the independent valuer has delivered to the Secretary of State a written estimate of the environmental liabilities of the steel undertaking in question and the Secretary of State has published that estimate and laid it before Parliament.

It is important that the independence of the valuation process is maintained. It is not appropriate for the inputs to the valuation exercise to be disclosed before the valuer reaches their determination. This may risk exposing the independent valuer to undue pressure while they are still deliberating on an outcome, thereby undermining the independence and fairness of the compensation scheme. None the less, the Government would have the power to direct the independent valuer to consider environmental liabilities in their determinations of compensation. We also intend to allow the final compensation determinations to be made public, including any consideration of environmental liabilities carried out. There is an opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny, as the compensation scheme regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, allowing all Members to debate the specific framework set at that stage.

Amendment 24 would prevent the payment of compensation until an estimate of liabilities arising from the environmental and health and safety matters under Clause 54(4) is provided to Parliament. An important principle of the compensation process is that it is assessed independently to ensure that affected parties are treated fairly. The proposed amendment would begin to erode this independence by making the payment of compensation contingent on parliamentary scrutiny of one of the factors that would inform the outcome. It is therefore not feasible to proceed with the proposed amendment. As a general point, compensation scheme regulations would require the independent valuer to consider environmental liabilities as part of the assessment. Additionally, in the event that a steel company is nationalised, we would expect it to publish an annual report setting out its financial position, including any liabilities.

I now turn to Amendment 28. The noble Lord has tabled a similar amendment that would require the Secretary of State to publish an estimate of the pension liabilities of the relevant steel undertaking before compensation is paid. I understand the concerns the noble Lord has about taking on unknown liabilities and putting undue pressure on the public balance sheet. If the Government decide to nationalise British Steel, subject to the public interest test, I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government would not be taking on a large contingent pension liability. The company’s pension scheme is a defined contribution scheme with a pot funded by contributions made by the employees and the company over time. In other cases, the pension scheme may be based on different arrangements, but we have built flexibility into the Bill to address these circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

The pension power in Clause 44 allows us to adapt to regulatory changes, standardise terms and adjust contribution minimums. Where necessary, it also allows for consideration of a fair division of pension liabilities between the transferor company and the government corporation. This follows the approach in the Banking Act. Where relevant, pension liabilities will form only part of the picture in the valuation exercise, and publishing them in isolation without the wider context would not be helpful. As I have already mentioned, following nationalisation we would expect contingent liabilities to be included in the company’s annual reporting.

I am more sympathetic to the noble Lord’s Amendment 25, which would require that the compensation regulations provide for the appointment of an independent valuer in all cases to determine compensation. The current wording makes it discretionary whether an independent valuer is involved in any given case. In practice, it is very likely that the Government will consider it fair to provide for an independent valuer to be established in compensation scheme regulations to consider any compensation for a transferor. The clause is currently discretionary because there could be situations where independent valuation is not required. For example, where the Government and the transferor agree on a sum, it would be unnecessary for the legislation to require that an independent valuer be engaged. However, I will reflect further on the noble Lord’s points and consider how I expect to return to this on Report.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I thought it would be helpful, on this group, to bring together the necessary levels of scrutiny about which I have spoken on various other groups in various different ways. In moving Amendment 36A, I will speak to my Amendments 38 and 41A.

As prefaced on the previous group, Amendment 36A would require financial assistance under Clause 58 to be approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament before it may be provided. By amending Clause 58, financial assistance under the relevant subsection would have to be provided through regulations specifying the financial assistance proposed to be provided and the estimated cost to public funds of that assistance. These regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure.

The Minister got his revenge in early on the previous group, because Amendment 38 outlines a mechanism by which parliamentary scrutiny of the public interest test and nationalisation could work. I propose a new clause after Clause 58 that would prevent financial assistance being provided until 90 days after information about the package of financial assistance has been made available to a Select Committee of the House of Commons or the House of Lords.

I take the Minister’s point about timing, but this is a useful probing amendment to look at the role of Select Committees going forward in the scrutiny of this. I hope the Minister will have something broader to say if he continues to shoot down the principle of the timing of this intervention. This amendment proposes that the Select Committee should look at

“details of the nature and amount of the financial assistance … the intended beneficiary or beneficiaries of the financial assistance … the expected purpose and effect of the financial assistance … any conditions, repayment arrangements, guarantees, indemnities or other liabilities attaching to the financial assistance, and … any other information the Secretary of State believes it is necessary for the Committee to have in order to complete its consideration of the proposal”.

Whether this is before or post hoc, the Select Committees —either of just the Commons, or of the Commons and the Lords—need to have this important investigation. Of course, any information that would be made public that might compromise national security, fiduciary duties or commercially sensitive issues would not be included. Going forward, it would be useful to hear from the Minister his understanding of how Select Committees will be involved.

I had hoped to persuade the Government to commit to an annual parliamentary debate on the steel industry—its strategy, the market and the state of nationalised businesses in the industry—both in the Commons and in the Lords. This would take place once a year, as long as there were still steel undertakings in public ownership. Perhaps we can discuss this, but Amendment 41A proposes an alternate approach to information sharing. It would require the Secretary of State to make a Written Ministerial Statement every three months on the progress of any nationalised steel undertaking.

During the during the passage of the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act—SISMA—just before Easter last year, Ministers committed to a debate six months following Royal Assent on the use of direction-giving powers. That took place in October 2025. This was a commitment to a single occurrence, but SISMA also included a commitment to a monthly Written Ministerial Statement on the use of direction-giving powers. If British Steel were taken into public ownership, this commitment would fall away, replaced only by any commitments associated with this Bill.

To date, there are no provisions of anywhere near this level of information sharing within the Bill. So, without this amendment, as the cost to the taxpayer increases, the level of parliamentary scrutiny would actually decrease, creating less scrutiny for steel nationalisation than there is under SISMA. I accept that a monthly report may be unreasonable, and I know that the Minister has mused in our discussions about half-yearly reports, but I think quarterly would be a sensible interval, and that is what this amendment seeks to achieve. I do not think any Minister would be afraid of doing this because, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said on the previous group, a level of public understanding of what is going on—the difficulties, the struggles, the cost and the importance of the industry—is important. This is an opportunity to restate that, coming back to the point about what is happening in the communities, and with jobs and skills. We would expect that to be included in those quarterly reports. If we are not getting a debate every year, this would be a better response, in a way.

Taken together, these three amendments are designed to deliver a level of comfort: an affirmative process for assistance, a role for the Select Committees and a quarterly reporting mechanism. I beg to move.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, this is a very important debate, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for these amendments. It is not just a case of public understanding; I think the public would expect Parliament to hold the Government to account. In many ways, I hope we are pushing at an open door with these amendments. In an area potentially involving substantial financial assistance, the Government must be able to provide both Houses of Parliament with a clear indication of the estimated cost to public funds. Parliament must be able to scrutinise not only the principle of financial assistance but its scale, purpose, conditions and likely liabilities.

The proposed 90-day period in Amendment 38, which we have already debated, strikes a sensible balance. It would allow an expert Select Committee to examine the proposals and make recommendations, while preserving the Government’s ability to proceed once that scrutiny has taken place. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, seemed uncertain several times as to whether it should be a Select Committee of the House of Commons or of the House of Lords. I have always been a great believer in Joint Committees. Something of this importance requires both Houses of Parliament to scrutinise it, and the best way to do that is through our expert Select Committee process.

Parliament has enormous expertise which should be used in determining the appropriate level and form of support. That is particularly important where taxpayers may be exposed through grants, loans, guarantees or indemnities. I hope the Minister will be able to respond positively on how he intends to proceed.

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

49: After Clause 60, insert the following new Clause—
“Strategic reports: transferred steel undertakings(1) Chapter 4A (strategic report) of the Companies Act 2006 does not apply in relation to a company carrying on a transferred steel undertaking.(2) In this section, “transferred steel undertaking” means a steel undertaking in respect of which the Secretary of State has exercised a principal transfer power.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would disapply strategic report requirements for companies carrying on transferred steel undertakings.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 49 to 55 standing in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom. As we have just discussed, the explosion of environmental, social and governance—ESG—red tape has created a vast and complex web of rules, which force businesses to comply with political targets at a cost to investment, job creation and, above all, the competitiveness of Britain.

Admittedly, I should add a declaration of interest, as a practising solicitor in the City of London. This has undoubtedly created an explosion of work and therefore I should probably declare an interest. But I do not take any pride in the fact that ESG reporting requirements have become more and more burdensome and onerous.

This is why I am delighted to confirm that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have committed to repealing a number of ESG reporting requirements, including those addressed by this group of amendments, so that unnecessary business costs can be removed and businesses can focus on investing, growing and creating jobs. However, if the Government are going to nationalise a steel undertaking, in order to minimise the cost of its transition, attract private sector investment and reduce the burden on the taxpayer, they should at least disapply these regulations in respect of that undertaking. British Steel employs more than 4,000 people and is, therefore, likely to be caught by a number of these costly and burdensome requirements.

Amendment 49 would disapply the Companies Act strategic report requirements, which require quoted companies to include annual greenhouse gas emissions information and reporting on environmental impacts in directors’ reports. Amendment 50 would disapply greenhouse gas emissions and related environmental reporting requirements. Amendment 51 would exempt a nationalised steel undertaking from the energy savings opportunity scheme, which requires large companies, including those with more than 250 employees or turnover above the relevant threshold, to carry out energy audits every four years to identify energy efficiency opportunities.

Amendment 52 would disapply the energy and carbon reporting requirements which apply to large companies and limited liability partnerships. Amendment 53 would remove executive pay ratio reporting requirements. These require certain companies to report chief executive pay against median, lower-quartile and upper-quartile employee pay, with the figures subject to audit. Amendment 54 would disapply forest-risk commodity due diligence and reporting requirements. These would require businesses using certain commodities to conduct supply chain due diligence and publish annual reports. Finally, Amendment 55 would disapply climate-related financial disclosure requirements. These require companies and LLPs to report how their boards oversee climate risks, the impact of climate change on strategy, and the metrics and targets used to assess those risks.

None of these requirements reduces electricity costs, secures orders, improves productivity or makes British Steel more competitive, yet each requires additional reporting, auditing and compliance costs on a business which the Government may have taken into public ownership at substantial expense to taxpayers. I therefore say to the Minister that, if the Government are serious about making a nationalised steel undertaking viable, investable and capable of returning to the private sector, they should focus on reducing unnecessary burdens and allowing management to concentrate on commercial recovery, investment, modernisation and jobs. I beg to move.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I was planning to say nothing and I will say little more than nothing. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which he can answer when he gives his response to the Minister. Can he remind me when most, if not all, of these measures were brought on to the statute book?

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have tabled a number of amendments regarding the deregulation of the steel sector. These amendments focus on three core areas of regulation: industrial action, environmental regulations and reporting, and company reporting.

I recognise the concern from noble Lords that any publicly owned steel undertaking will face a significant array of reporting requirements. That is true, and the Government believe that these are necessary to ensure that any publicly owned company operates in a similar way to its privately owned counterparts. Any publicly owned steel undertaking must protect its workers’ rights, fulfil its environmental obligations and transparently report on its progress.

At the outset, I make the general point that a company under public ownership is ordinarily treated as a public corporation—that is, it is run as a private company with an independent board of directors, operating under broad strategic direction from Government Ministers. It is right, therefore, that such a company is subject to the regulatory frameworks within which any similar private company operates. I also emphasise to noble Lords that amendments seeking to level the playing field within the steel industry are inconsistent with that position. Instead, the amendments in this section seek to give preferential treatment to publicly owned steel undertakings.

I will now address the amendments directly. I believe that Amendments 50 to 52, 54 and 55 are intended to address the noble Lord’s concern that the Government’s industrial decarbonisation policies could impose additional costs and burdens on publicly owned steel undertakings. In summary, these amendments seek to exempt publicly owned steel undertakings from a number of statutory requirements, including greenhouse gas reporting, the energy savings opportunity scheme, energy and carbon reporting, forest-risk commodity due diligence, and climate-related financial disclosures. Although I recognise the noble Lord’s concern that there is a range of requirements on the steel sector with regard to environmental reporting, I cannot support these amendments.

The reporting requirements the Opposition have identified are integral to this Government’s commitments to decarbonising our industries. Our steel strategy set out a vision for a move towards green, decarbonised steel production. We are committed to supporting the sector in achieving those objectives, as evidenced by the £500 million of funding to Tata Steel for the development of its electric arc furnace in Port Talbot.

A public steel company, no more than any other steel company, should not be exempt from these important transparency requirements. Accepting these amendments would undermine the intent of the Government’s industrial decarbonisation policies, creating an unfair system for other domestic steel producers. The Government are committed to revitalising the entire UK’s steel industry, not only the companies in public ownership. Alongside this, the Government believe that these requirements are critical to industrial decarbonisation and to meeting net zero.

Finally, I will address Amendments 49 and 53 together, as both seek to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from existing corporate reporting requirements. Amendment 49 would disapply the strategic reporting requirements under Chapter 4A of the Companies Act 2006, while Amendment 53 would remove the requirement to publish information on executive pay ratios.

I recognise that the purpose of these amendments is to reduce the administrative burden on a publicly owned company. However, the Government do not believe that public ownership should entail lower standards of transparency or accountability. Indeed, if a steel undertaking is brought into public ownership, there is an even greater expectation that it should operate openly and be subject to appropriate public scrutiny. That is why the Government expect any publicly owned steel undertaking to comply with the standard reporting obligations that apply to comparable public corporations. Its annual report and accounts should provide Parliament, taxpayers, employees and the wider public with a clear and comprehensive overview of the company’s financial position, operational performance, governance and remuneration arrangements.

Transparency is not merely a regulatory requirement; it is an essential part of maintaining public confidence. It supports effective parliamentary scrutiny, promotes sound corporate governance and demonstrates that public assets are managed responsibly. It also serves a practical commercial function. Should the company seek external finance, strategic partners, or, in due course, a return to private ownership, prospective investors and creditors will rightly expect access to robust, reliable and consistent corporate reporting. Maintaining those standards will enhance rather than diminish the company’s long-term prospects.

For all these reasons, the Government believe that a publicly owned steel undertaking should be held to the same high standards of openness and disclosure as comparable public corporations. Public ownership should set the bar for transparency, not lower it. I therefore hope I have explained why the Government cannot support these amendments, and I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I should first deal with the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, who perhaps sought to point the finger at me as a Minister for having introduced some of these requirements. I was indeed a Minister for 16 years, and I cannot recall having introduced any of these requirements at any stage. In fact, the Minister answered the noble Lord by pointing out that, under Tony Blair, the Companies Act 2006 started a process of requiring companies to include many of the things we are now debating and discussing. That is his answer. Perhaps when the noble Lord next gets to his feet—perhaps sometime next week—he might tell us what Vince Cable, who inherited all those requirements, did about minimising the burden on business.

Undoubtedly, at the present time, there is an overregulated regime facing the private sector, and in many ways, we are seeking to alleviate that burden as far as the new, nationalised steel industry is concerned, if the Government proceed down that road.

I remain concerned that the Government do not recognise the cumulative burden that these requirements place on an energy-intensive and strategically important industry. If Ministers are serious about restoring a nationalised steel undertaking to competitiveness and attracting private sector investment, they should be looking to reduce unnecessary compliance costs, not preserve them. No doubt we will return to these issues at a later stage. For the present, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Hunt of Wirral Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

2: Clause 2, page 1, line 14, leave out “includes (but is not limited to)” and insert “means”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would limit the public interest test to the areas set out in paragraphs (a) to (c).

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom. I have no wish to repeat at length the arguments made in Committee, but I feel that the Government should be clearer about the public interest test that lies at the heart of these powers.

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[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this debate. Noble Lords have highlighted that the public interest test in Clause 2 is a vital part of the Bill and I very much agree. It is important that we get it right. Noble Lords have tabled several amendments to this clause and we have had fruitful discussions on them at previous stages, but I am happy to return to them.

Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would limit the public interest factors that could be considered by the Secretary of State to those explicitly set out in statute in Clause 2. As I have set out previously, the Government agree that these are likely to be the most pertinent issues in relation to an intervention in the steel sector. We have sought to strike a balance in the Bill between minimising the scope as far as possible and ensuring that we can adapt to evolving circumstances. That is why we think it is necessary to retain some flexibility to consider other factors that may be relevant to a particular case, which may be difficult to anticipate.

Let me be clear that the legal test in this clause places particular emphasis on the factors that are explicitly set out. Where the Government seek to rely on other factors, they will need to be satisfied that those factors mean that an exercise of the powers is necessary in the public interest. I therefore do not consider the amendment necessary and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

Amendments 3 and 5, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would create procedural steps that would need to be fulfilled before the transfer powers are exercised. Amendment 3 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent assessment of whether the public interest test has been met and for that assessment to be met prior to using the powers. Amendment 5 would require the Secretary of State to provide details of the criteria used to demonstrate the public interest. Both are difficult to reconcile with the likely circumstances under which the powers could be exercised. The Government will likely need to act at pace to deliver an effective transfer. However, the Government will commit to publishing a Written Ministerial Statement following an exercise of the principal transfer powers, which would include details of how the public interest test has been met. I hope that provides some reassurance to the noble Lords, even if we cannot meet the full ambition of their amendments.

Finally, Amendment 4, also tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would require the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the exercise of the transfer powers would represent value for money for taxpayers. The Government are mindful of the potential costs that could be incurred in relation to the nationalisation of a steel company. This consideration is already taken into account in government decision-making under the usual public spending processes, as I have set out previously.

Additionally, as we discussed in the previous grouping, the Government are supportive of Amendments 7 and 9 from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would require the Secretary of State to consider costs prior to the exercise of the principal transfer of powers. These amendments go some way to addressing the concerns raised by the noble Lord Hunt, and I hope that will provide some reassurance.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Redwood and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their comments. I am grateful indeed to the Minister for his reassurances and the commitment that he has given, which meet many of the concerns I expressed earlier. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

8: Clause 4, page 2, line 30, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require regulations transferring securities of a steel undertaking to be subject to the affirmative procedure.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 8, 10, 12 to 14 and 40, standing in my name and that of my noble friend. I thank the Minister for working constructively with us on Amendments 12 and 13. It is vital that where the Bill confers regulation-making powers of real consequence, the default should be the affirmative procedure. Amendments 8 and 10 would apply that principle to the core transfer powers, regulations transferring securities, and regulations transferring property rights and liabilities. We understand the Minister’s argument that in exceptional cases powers may need to be exercised.

Turning to Amendment 40, I ask the Minister for a clear assurance that a thorough impact assessment will be brought before both Houses of Parliament after the various powers in the Bill have been used. Given the potential effect on taxpayers, workers, investment and the wider steel industry, they must assess whether these exceptional powers have delivered the outcomes claimed for them.

Finally, Amendment 14 would remove Clause 50. The Constitution Committee was clear that the broad power allowing the Secretary of State to modify the law in relation to a share or property transfer

“should either be removed or significantly tightened”.

That is a serious recommendation from an important committee of this House. The Government should either accept the committee’s recommendation or make much clearer in the Bill the limited circumstances in which such a power may be used. I look forward, therefore, to the Minister providing some assurance on Amendment 40 and on the Henry VIII powers. I beg to move.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 15 and 16 in my name, but first I speak in support of Amendments 12 and 13 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, which I have co-signed. Importantly, these would add necessary additional parliamentary control over continuity obligations and property transfer regulations. We moved similar amendments in the Commons that failed to attract sufficient support there.

Regarding Amendment 10, the Minister has convinced me that the need to quickly transfer property rights transcends the necessity of moving to an affirmative form of approval from a negative regulation. That is why I have not co-signed Amendment 10.

I tabled Amendments 15 and 16 as it is important that Parliament must be kept informed once any nationalisation is effected. Amendment 15 would create a new clause causing there to be a report on principal transfer powers from the point at which those powers are exercised under the Act. It says that the Secretary of State must

“make a written statement to each House of Parliament setting out … the progress, and the operational and financial performance, of the steel undertaking in respect of which a transfer power has been exercised, and … the impact of this Act, including (so far as it is possible to assess) its effects on the steel industry in the United Kingdom, on employment and on the public finances”,

and that this duty

“continues until no steel undertaking remains in public ownership”.

I hope the Minister has something positive to say on this, which includes reflecting on how the communities and skills requirements are being met in whichever part of the UK is affected by any nationalisation and subsequent changes.

It is a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, was not with us in Committee, because he would have participated in a debate on an amendment that was very similar to Amendment 15, which covers not only the territory of Northern Ireland but the whole of the United Kingdom. I feel that the noble Lord’s point is important, but if it is important for Northern Ireland then it is important for the rest of the UK. I think he will see that Amendment 15 seeks to bring that across our entire country.

Amendment 16 seeks to create a stakeholder advisory committee. I will not repeat my speech from Committee, but its aim is to have stronger input into the steel strategy from steel users. The Minister responded with news that the steel council may be augmented by additional new members. I hope he can elaborate some more on how the voice of steel users is reflected more effectively in order for the Government to avoid such issues as those that have been created by the steel tariffs.

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Finally, I thank all noble Lords across the House for their commitment to ensuring that parliamentarians have the appropriate powers to scrutinise the Bill. I hope my comments reassure all noble Lords.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an important debate. I pay tribute to the Minister. His approach to the Bill has been exemplary. We may disagree, and we do disagree, but the Minister has set an example that will be difficult for his ministerial colleagues to follow. He has listened and cared deeply about all the points we have raised. I am sure I speak for the noble Lord, Lord Fox, as well as for my noble friend and friends across the House, when I say that the Minister has not only listened to us but responded in positive terms, and, where he has not been able to agree, he has explained why he cannot agree.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for making sure that we do not forget the vitally important Welsh dimension. I thank my noble friend Lord Redwood for always scrutinising the public expenditure side of the Bill.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that, with him, I believe we have now received from the Minister a series of comprehensive assurances, particularly on the impact assessment, which will enable us to proceed in a positive way.

The noble Lords, Lord Empey and Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard, have raised issues that—as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pointed out—do not fall directly within scope, but they do fall within the impact assessment. That is why it was important that those points were raised.

The Minister will argue that there is a case for a Henry VIII power in an emergency Bill of this kind. We remain concerned about the breadth of Clause 50 and the precedent it may set, but I am grateful to the Minister for his engagement with this debate, and I thank him. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 8.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

31: Clause 58, page 39, line 5, after “assistance” insert “of a total value of no more than £2.5 billion in the period ending on 15 August 2029”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would limit the financial assistance that can be provided under the Act.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 31 I will also speak to Amendments 32, 33, 35 and 36 standing in my name and that of my noble friend. I support the similar sentiments and approach expressed in Amendment 37.

I do not wish to repeat the arguments made in Committee, but on these Benches we remain gravely concerned by the open-ended cost to the taxpayer that the Bill potentially permits. The Government have already announced £2.5 billion of taxpayer funding for the steel sector. That is the figure that Ministers have chosen to present as a demonstration of their commitment to rebuilding and modernising British Steel and the steel sector. Yet in this Bill they seek an unlimited power to provide financial assistance with no statutory ceiling whatever. I believe this is bad economics, bad politics and, unless some clarity is forthcoming, quite possibly bad faith too. If £2.5 billion is not enough, how much is? Is there any maximum figure at all that Ministers are prepared to put before us and then stand behind?

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To conclude, I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords on the amendments in this group, which I will not support.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister, in particular for those additional comments. I and my noble friend Lord Sharpe—as well as, I believe, the noble Lord, Lord Fox—have been reassured by how the Minister has termed the positive future that we all want to see. However, as my noble friend Lord Redwood pointed out, the Government have still not provided Parliament with a clear limit on the potential exposure facing taxpayers. I do not know whether the Minister has any aspiration to become a Treasury Minister. To become one, you have to believe in caps—there is no other way to become a Treasury Minister.

I say to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that the Government just have to come to Parliament. If they require more money, they should ask Parliament for more money. At the moment, they have said that £2.5 billion is necessary. If there is a need for more money, it is perfectly open to the Government to come to Parliament and ask for it. Without a clear limit, there is a real risk that the cost could run into tens of billions of pounds.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

Therefore, if they can come to Parliament to ask for it, do not put the limit in the Bill. That is what the noble Lord seeks to do in his Amendment 31.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

If the noble and right reverend Lord does not support this amendment, it will be unnecessary for the Government to come and ask for more money. It is only when there is a cap that the Government have to be accountable to Parliament. For the reasons I have outlined, and because taxpayers should never be asked to sign a blank cheque, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, before we divide the House, I need to inform the House that there have been intermittent network issues on the estate. Because of the small risk that this may cause temporary disruption to the pass readers and the Division system, I have agreed with the usual channels to extend the time for Divisions from eight to 10 minutes.

I ask all noble Lords to ensure they firmly tap their pass on the pass reader. If in doubt, they should tap their pass a second time. The system will only record a vote once. If we all remember that beep means you have voted and no beep means no vote, we will all be fine.

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Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

41: After Clause 60, insert the following new Clause—
“Exemption of iron and steel carbon border adjustment mechanism goods(1) Section 143 of the Finance Act 2026 (charge to carbon border adjustment mechanism) does not apply to emissions embodied in a CBAM good which is an iron and steel good for the purposes of Schedule 16 to that Act where the good is imported by a transferred steel undertaking for use in connection with the carrying on of its business.(2) In subsection (1), “transferred steel undertaking” means a steel undertaking in respect of which the Secretary of State has exercised a principal transfer power.” Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would exempt iron and steel CBAM goods imported for use by a steel undertaking brought into public ownership under this Act from the carbon border adjustment mechanism.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 42 and 43 standing in my name and that of my noble friend.

As we stated in Committee, the carbon border adjustment mechanism and emissions trading scheme will have a material effect on the domestic steel sector. The Government will no doubt argue that the CBAM and ETS are necessary to meet their net-zero objectives and that they will not harm British industry. We may have significant disagreements on that point. However, what cannot be disputed is that these measures will affect steel undertakings in this country. The question is whether that effect will be positive or negative on costs, production, exports and international competitiveness.

In Committee, Ministers suggested that the business environment, including the ETS and CBAM, would be relevant to valuation. But that is not the same as a clear assessment of the practical effect of these policies on the future of domestic steel-making. I therefore invite the Minister to confirm that the future impact assessment to which the Government have referred will include a full assessment of the effects of the CBAM and ETS on the domestic steel sector.

If the Government are right that these measures will protect industry, support investment and improve competitiveness, they should have no difficulty at all in providing that assurance. If, however, that assessment shows that these measures are damaging production, exports, investment or competitiveness, that would also give the Government the evidence needed to change course, and that is why I wish to move this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful that my noble friend has raised this important point. We would probably not be having these big debates about steel nationalisation if the United Kingdom in recent years had had competitive energy pricing, and if it had not gone in for carbon pricing and carbon taxes that can have an adverse bearing on energy-using industries. However, we are where we are, and so my noble friend is right to ask the Minister to give some reassurances. We seem to be involved in overtaxing carbon and then having to subsidise those businesses that suffer as a result.

Of course, the CBAM is an EU-designed scheme which we are copying, to try to offset the impact that very high carbon and energy costs have on domestic economies and industries, by imposing a similar tax or tariff on the imported goods from countries that do not impose such carbon taxes and carbon additions to the energy they are using in industrial plant. That does help in some way for the domestic steel-producing industry; it becomes a problem for the domestic steel-using industry where it is having to import steel beyond the tariff-free quota provided under the CBAM. We note that the tariff-free quota is skewed to favour European producers, rather than other producers around the world who might be otherwise cheaper or more advantageous.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on the emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which I will refer to as CBAM, and their impacts on the steel sector.

Notably, these amendments seek to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from both these environmental measures, thereby undermining the level playing field that the noble Lord mentioned in the previous group. At the outset, I emphasise the Government’s commitment to their industrial decarbonisation policies and to moving towards a green, decarbonised steel sector. Although I appreciate that there may be differing views on this issue, these amendments would completely undermine the Government’s objectives for these measures.

These commitments build on the statutory reporting requirement on financial assistance in Clause 59, the company’s annual report and accounts, and the quarterly Written Ministerial Statements, which I have already set out. Any nationalised steel undertaking would not be exempt from the corporate reporting requirements set out in the Companies Act 2006. That Act contains various reporting requirements, which vary depending on the size of the entity. Where relevant or material, our Written Ministerial Statements may refer to any wider contextual or regulatory impacts. In addition, as previously mentioned, the Secretary of State would have the ability, if needed, to request an interim report on a particular issue.

Amendment 41 seeks to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from CBAM. I understand the concern expressed by the noble Lord; however, I emphasise that CBAM’s purpose is to ensure that imported carbon-intensive goods face comparable carbon prices to those of domestically produced goods. It gives industry confidence to invest in the UK, knowing that its decarbonisation efforts will not be undermined. CBAM makes no exemptions for particular UK firms. Its intent is to target the problem of carbon leakage and ensure that highly traded, carbon-intensive goods from overseas, including steel, pay a comparable carbon price to that paid by UK manufacturers.

I understand the intention behind Amendment 42 and the desire to ensure that Parliament remains informed about the impact of carbon pricing policies on the steel sector. The Government are committed to supporting a competitive and sustainable steel industry while delivering our decarbonisation objectives. However, the UK emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism are economywide policies designed to address carbon leakage and support the transition to net zero across industry as a whole, rather than for any particular company or ownership model.

The UK ETS Authority already keeps the operation of the scheme under review. The scheme contains statutory review mechanisms. The authority has committed to continued monitoring of both free allocation policy and the interaction between ETS and CBAM. The authority has also recently confirmed the extension of the UK ETS beyond 2030 and will continue to engage with industry and consult on future scheme design, ensuring that the impacts on affected sectors are properly considered. Given these existing review mechanisms, it is not necessary to create a separate statutory requirement for a particular transferred steel undertaking.

Amendment 43 seeks to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from the emissions trading scheme. I am sympathetic to the fact that this imposes a cost on activities that have significant emissions. However, as with Amendment 41, accepting Amendment 43 would grant preferential treatment based on ownership and undermine a level playing field across the industry. The transition to low-carbon steel must be fair, credible and consistent across all operators, whether publicly or privately owned. I emphasise that the ETS includes targeted protections for energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries, including steel. Further protections will be introduced through CBAM from 2027.

The Government remain firmly committed to both a competitive steel sector and our decarbonisation objectives. Exempting a publicly owned steel undertaking from ETS or CBAM would create an uneven playing field, weaken the integrity of these schemes and undermine efforts to tackle carbon leakage. Steel producers, regardless of ownership, should operate within the same fair and consistent framework. I hope that my comments reassure noble Lords.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Redwood for highlighting the importance of ETS and CBAM. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that the British taxpayer has a right to know the effect of ETS and CBAM. I take his point that it would apply whether it was in the private or the public sector, but we are now dealing with a nationalised industry which is funded by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer has a right to know exactly what the effect of the UK ETS and CBAM will be on the costs, production, exports and competitiveness of the transferred steel undertakings.

However, I recognise that the Minister has done much to explain the method by which the Government are approaching this situation. We will keep it under careful scrutiny but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 41 withdrawn.

Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Hunt of Wirral Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 13th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, steel has shaped our nation’s history. It has built railways, bridges, factories, ships, homes, energy infrastructure and defence capability. It remains essential to our future—to growth, resilience, national security and the critical infrastructure on which our country depends. This legislation is one part of the Government’s wider commitment to the steel sector. It gives us the tools to act decisively if strategic steel-making capability is at risk. It supports our objective of restoring confidence, protecting jobs, strengthening domestic capability and securing a sustainable future for UK steel.

I express my sincere gratitude to noble Lords from across the House who have contributed to the scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Fox, for the constructive, professional and friendly way in which they have engaged throughout. I am genuinely grateful. I also thank other noble Lords who have spoken with deep knowledge of industry, constitutional practice, devolution, public finance, workers’ interests and the wider economy; their contribution has helped ensure that this House has done its job properly. Finally, I thank the Bill team, my private office, officials from across government, the devolved Government officials who have engaged with us, parliamentary counsel and the House authorities for their work in supporting the passage of this legislation at pace and under considerable pressure.

This House has sent a clear message. The United Kingdom must be able to act when a strategic industry is at risk. We must protect steel-making capability, support workers and communities, and safeguard the critical supply chains on which our national resilience depends. I beg to move.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Redwood, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their considerable contributions and the expertise they have demonstrated throughout our consideration of the Bill. I also pay tribute to the two committees of this House that have contributed so much to our understanding of this urgent matter in their excellent reports—the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

I also extend my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Leong, the Minister, who has taken a very close interest throughout not only in the case for the Government taking the action that they have but in understanding our concern on a number of aspects. I thank his officials and the Bill team for all their hard work. Although significant differences remain between us, the Minister has always engaged constructively with concerns raised on all sides of the House, and I believe that the Bill has been improved as a result of that engagement.

Working together, we have secured a more credible sunset mechanism: any extension of the principal transfer powers will be limited to two years and will require the affirmative approval of both Houses. We have secured provisions requiring the Secretary of State to consider the likely costs before exercising the share transfer power or the property transfer power. We have also ensured that the relevant environmental, pension, and health and safety liabilities must be properly reflected in the independent valuation process.

We particularly welcome the greater parliamentary controls secured in Clauses 39 and 45: regulations under Clause 39 concerning the consideration and terms attached to continuity obligations will be subject to the affirmative or “made affirmative” procedure; regulations under Clause 45 concerning the enforcement of obligations arising from share or property transfers will be subject to the “made affirmative” procedure rather than the negative procedure originally proposed.

The Minister’s commitment to debates in both Houses on the steel strategy and the impact of this legislation is also very welcome, as are his assurances that any exercise of transfer powers will require an impact assessment and that quarterly Written Ministerial Statements will be provided for at least the first year in which a steel undertaking remains in public ownership. Those Statements will give Parliament the information that it needs to scrutinise operational performance, public expenditure and the consequences for workers, communities and the wider steel industry.

Nevertheless, a great deal of work remains to be done. Nationalisation may provide the Government with an emergency power, but it is not an industrial strategy. It cannot substitute for commercially viable businesses; for competent, market-aware management; and, above all, for sustained private sector investment. I came into the House 50 years ago, and we had experience of state ownership in the 1970s. I must tell the House that that provides no grounds for confidence or complacency. We must not allow what is intended to be temporary public ownership to default into an expensive and permanent arrangement. The long-term future of British steel depends on the United Kingdom once again becoming an attractive and affordable place in which to invest, to produce and to employ people. That requires us to confront the fundamental barriers facing steel and other energy-intensive industries.

Ministers have to address our internationally uncompetitive industrial electricity prices. They must examine the cumulative burden of the emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism. They must consider the costs imposed by their employment policies as well as the ever-expanding burden of regulation, reporting and compliance. Unless those underlying problems are addressed, nationalisation will merely transfer the consequences of an uncompetitive business environment from private shareholders to the taxpayer; it will not resolve them.

Our objectives must therefore be clear: to secure the private investment that the steel industry desperately needs to preserve strategic domestic steel-making capacity and skilled employment, but also to minimise the exposure to the taxpayer. We welcome the improvements made to the Bill and the assurances placed on the record by the Minister. However, we will continue to scrutinise closely the use of these exceptional powers, the costs that arise from them and the Government’s progress in returning any nationalised undertaking to an investable, competitive and commercially viable future.