Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Leong Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

Unfortunately, the proposer failed to mention it in his speech. I signed it merely because I wanted to indicate that the contingent liabilities are an important part of the Bill as we discuss it. However, the main issues within this group are those that I will discuss later, in group 4. In that respect, I am going to keep my powder dry.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I start, I am sure all noble Lords want to join me in wishing the England team the very best for the rest of the match this afternoon.

First, let me thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution and his amendments. Amendment 20, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require the Government to provide a statement to Parliament outlining the value of contingent liabilities and the steps they would take to minimise taxpayer exposure to them before an intervention. As I have set out previously, the Government are somewhat constrained in the procedural steps they can take before exercising the power in the Bill. This is why the transfer powers are exercisable by regulations subject to a negative procedure. We will likely be operating in a fast-moving commercial environment where intervention needs to be done at pace, and negative procedure transfer regulations do not require prior parliamentary approval before they take legal effect.

It is not appropriate to publish details of a private company’s contingent liabilities prior to nationalisation. If a steel undertaking is brought into the public sector, its financial position will rightly be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, including the publication of its annual report and accounts. Of course, the Government will take steps to minimise taxpayers’ exposure to liabilities wherever possible. Any decision to exercise the transfer powers will be subject to the usual principles of Managing Public Money and government approval processes.

Amendment 17, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, seeks to prevent any pension regulations from reducing accrued pension rights or benefits or worsening future pension terms. I thank the noble Lord for his amendment and understand his concerns that the Bill may adversely affect pension rights, benefits or terms for employees. I reassure the noble Lord that any use of these powers would be considered on a case-by-case basis, with the primary objective of ensuring alignment across pensions. These powers give the Government the flexibility to achieve this. Any changes to the terms would likely be due to regulatory changes where pension terms may need to be standardised or contributions adjusted. The Government would seek to consult regulators, unions and employees, where possible, on any future changes.

Amendment 16 seeks to require the Secretary of State to consult with affected steel undertakings and affected pension stakeholders before exercising the pension powers. To address the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, perhaps it would be useful to set out the Government’s intent behind Clause 44. Clause 44 is essential for managing the consequences of a transfer for pension schemes and for employees’ rights under a pension scheme. It enables the Government to make provision for pension schemes where the steel undertaking is or was an employer.

These powers are necessary and give the Government flexibility on a case-by-case basis to make suitable provision for pensions during the transfer. For example, the provision would enable the Government to modify terms in the event of regulatory changes where pension terms may need to be standardised upon transfer or contribution minimums adjusted. It also gives the Government flexibility on a case-by-case basis, if needed, to consider a fair division of pension liabilities between the transferer and transferee in complex transfers.

In the case of British Steel, if, after Royal Assent, the Government decided that nationalising British Steel was necessary in the public interest, this power would not be required. To the best of our knowledge, British Steel has a defined contribution scheme, so there is nothing to transfer or leave behind.

In relation to the requirement to consult before exercising these powers, I reassure the noble Lord that, wherever possible, the Government would seek to consult with regulators. However, a statutory duty to consult could delay the transfer of the pension schemes, causing uncertainty and concern among employees. That is exactly what the Government are trying to avoid. For those reasons, I do not consider this amendment necessary and ask for it to be withdrawn.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answers and to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for correctly pointing out that I neglected to mention Amendment 20 on contingent liabilities. We will come back to that.

As regards Amendments 16 and 17, I am grateful for the Minister’s commitments, particularly on consultations where possible. Perhaps we could explore in another forum what potentially that will mean in practice. People’s pensions are their future and their security. It is vital that the Government ensure that workers’ pension rights are properly protected—I have no doubt at all that the Minister agrees with that—and that the relevant experts, regulators and representatives are fully consulted as these powers are exercised. We are merely trying to explore how that is done. I look forward to picking up that subject again in the future. For the present, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 16.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I am glad to have the opportunity to support Amendment 23, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, concerning a jobs and industrial transition strategy, which is very much in in line with the comments I made in our previous debate. The question of protecting skilled employment, in particular, and the need to reskill and deliver the tangible economic renewal, support and resilience in the local communities is very close to my heart. It is also very close to the minds of those in places such as Port Talbot who have faced insecurity in these matters. I hope that the Government, if they are not able to accept this amendment, will at least underline their agreement with its approach. I would be very surprised if it was not the Government’s approach, in fact.

When it comes to Amendment 21—I address this to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, who moved the amendment —if a duty is placed to find a private sector purchaser as soon as possible then surely that has to be constrained very much more than in the amendment. What would the situation be if an overseas company in the private sector was to make a bid? As I see it, the whole logic behind the nationalisation that we have here is to defend the United Kingdom’s strategic interests as well as its economic interests. If an important part of the steel industry was to fall into overseas hands—perhaps a perfectly reputable company but an overseas company outside the control of anybody within the United Kingdom—would that not raise serious questions? These are issues that I put to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rather than to the Minister. I regard them as a serious weakening of the Bill’s strategic objectives, which I generally support.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Fox, Lord Redwood and Lord Wigley, for their contributions. I am very grateful that the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Fox, are raising important questions about the future structure and operations of any steel undertaking that may be brought into public ownership under the Bill.

Before addressing their specific amendments, I should make this very important point: no decision has been made in relation to any particular steel company. Any decision to exercise the powers in the Bill can be made only after the Bill has received Royal Assent and only if the statutory public interest test is satisfied.

With that important caveat, I turn to the specific amendments before the Committee. Amendment 21, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to secure a private buyer for any nationalised steel undertaking at the earliest opportunity. As a matter of corporate governance, however, we would expect responsibility for exploring future ownership options to rest with the company’s board and chair, working closely with Ministers, rather than being imposed as a statutory duty on the Secretary of State. More fundamentally, I reassure the Committee that the Government share the amendment’s underlying objective. As we made clear in the steel strategy, the long-term future of the UK steel industry depends on attracting sustained private investment.

Public ownership is not an end in itself; it is a means of safeguarding a strategically important asset when exceptional circumstances require government intervention. The Government do not envisage a steel undertaking remaining in public ownership indefinitely. Our objective would be to stabilise the business, restore its commercial viability and place it on a sustainable footing so that it is well-placed to attract private investment in due course.

That said, timing is critical. A company requiring nationalisation is, by definition, unlikely to be an attractive investment on day one. It will first need financial stability and operational improvements, and in many cases a revised strategic direction, before credible private investors are prepared to commit significant capital.

Throughout that process, Ministers and the company’s leadership would remain in close dialogue about its long-term future, including the most appropriate ownership model and opportunities for private investment when the conditions are right. I hope this reassures noble Lords that the Government’s ambitions align with the intent behind this amendment. We are happy to consider further whether there are appropriate ways to make that position clearer, but we do not believe that placing a statutory duty of this kind in the Bill would improve its operation.

I turn finally to Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would require the Secretary of State to publish a jobs and industrial transition strategy after the exercise of the principal transfer power. I fully appreciate the purpose of the amendment. If the Government were required to intervene to safeguard a steel undertaking, Parliament would rightly expect a credible plan for its future. The Government share that objective. However, the success of any nationalised steel undertaking will ultimately depend on strong commercial leadership, not on a strategy prescribed by legislation.

One of the Government’s first priorities would be to appoint a board and an executive team with the expertise, commercial experience and vision to restore the business to long-term sustainability. The detailed strategy for the company’s future—including its workforce, investment, operations and industrial transition—should therefore be developed by that leadership team in close partnership with Ministers, rather than being imposed from Whitehall via a statutory reporting requirement. That approach provides the flexibility to respond to changing commercial circumstances while ensuring that the company is run on sound business principles.

That said, I recognise the importance of parliamentary scrutiny. When a steel undertaking enters public ownership, Parliament should have appropriate opportunities to understand the company’s strategic direction and to hold the Government to account for its stewardship. I am therefore happy to reflect further on the most appropriate mechanisms to provide that transparency. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising these important issues. I hope I have provided assurances about the Government’s approach. For the reasons I have set out, I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for this amendment. He is quite right to point out that decisions about the future of a steel undertaking affect a wide range of sectors that rely on secure domestic supply, including defence, construction, advanced manufacturing and critical national infrastructure.

National security has, rightly, featured prominently throughout our debates. If the Government are relying on that argument to justify the exercise of these exceptional powers, it is surely right that those with responsibility for defence and critical infrastructure should have a voice in the wider policy discussion. The number of workers potentially affected in the broader and wider supply chain, as cited by both the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and my noble friend Lord Redwood, is staggering.

It is difficult to argue that the steel-using community is really being consulted, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pointed out; that is certainly true of the representations we are getting from members of that community. I urge the Government on this occasion to have a careful think about what this amendment is trying to achieve. It recognises, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has pointed out, the importance of the workforce and of local communities. Workers, their representatives and local authorities will understand better than most the consequences of a transfer for jobs, skills, supply chains and of course the local economy. It is difficult to see how the Government can judge properly what is in the public interest without hearing from the workers, communities, industries and strategic sectors most affected by the decision. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to inform noble Lords that we have equalised—so come on, England!

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Redwood, Lord Wigley and Lord Sharpe, for their contributions. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for tabling Amendment 22, which would require the Secretary of State to consult a stakeholder advisory committee before determining whether an intervention under the Bill was in the public interest. I fully understand the motivation behind the amendment. Decisions of this significance should be informed by expert views, and I have considerable sympathy for the desire for strong parliamentary and stakeholder engagement.

However, as I said in relation to earlier amendments, the Government cannot support a statutory precondition of this nature. The powers in the Bill are intended for exceptional circumstances in which events may be moving quickly and decisive action is required. Introducing a mandatory consultation process before intervention could delay action at precisely the moment when speed is essential to protect jobs, safeguard strategic capability and secure the future of a steel undertaking. In some cases, a delay could undermine the very purpose of the intervention.

Nor do I believe that establishing a statutory advisory committee is necessary to ensure that the Government receive expert advice. My ministerial colleague, Minister McDonald, regularly maintains contact and extensive engagement with the sector through a wide range of established forums. This includes the steel council, the steel council working groups, the metals circularity group and a programme of industry round tables. Alongside those formal structures, Ministers and officials regularly meet with steel producers, downstream users, trade associations, trade unions, recyclers and other stakeholders throughout the supply chain. These relationships provide the Government with a detailed understanding of the opportunities and challenges facing the sector and ensure that policy is informed by those with direct operational experience.

I am also pleased to inform the Committee that we will shortly be inviting the UK Metals Council, which I understand is the largest downstream user group, to join the steel council, so we are reaching out to downstream users too. This will strengthen the representation of downstream users and ensure that their perspectives are fully reflected in future discussions about the sector.

The Government firmly believe that sustained engagement with industry is essential to delivering our steel strategy, but there is an important distinction between ongoing engagement and creating a statutory procedural hurdle that could impede timely intervention when the national interest requires it. For those reasons, while I fully recognise the amendment’s intent, I do not believe it would improve the Bill and I therefore respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw it.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. It was stark that when the Minister went through his long list of parties that the Minister at the other end consults with, the vast majority of the ones that the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, and I were discussing came under the “other stakeholders” category, so it is encouraging that the UK Metals Council will be invited.

I take the point about the nature of preconditions for any activity, and I understand the Minister’s reaction to that, but the purpose of the amendment was to make the point that users are underrepresented as it stands. We can wait and see whether adding the UK Metals Council is sufficient to reweight that, but I hope the Minister can go away and perhaps come back to us with a statement as to how users will become central to the Government’s philosophy in making plans, rather than being just another stakeholder, which is where they currently seem to be. Leaving that to one side, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for tabling these amendments, which raise an important point of principle. Where the Government are taking a steel undertaking into public ownership, the environmental, pension and other contingent liabilities which may fall on the taxpayer should be clear to Parliament and, of course, to the public. The Minister in the other place suggested that further disclosure was unnecessary because the Government already had a reasonably good understanding of the potential liabilities and that the independent valuer would take them into account, but that is not the same as ensuring that Parliament can see the likely costs before compensation is paid and further public money is committed.

I was very taken with my noble friend Lord Redwood’s comments about the environmental impact. From memory—and I might have this date wrong—I think the oldest of the blast furnaces dates back to 1939, so it is inconceivable that that site is not contaminated in some way, which we probably do not have any accurate historical records for.

I have also recalled the reason why I was a bit lukewarm on my own Amendment 20. I hate to say this, and I hope I never have to admit it again, but it is rather because I preferred Amendment 27 from the noble Lord, Lord Fox—a shocking admission to have to make.

Environmental remediation, pension obligations and historic liabilities can amount to very substantial sums. The Government are using taxpayers’ money, and Parliament should be able to scrutinise the liabilities assumed alongside the compensation and support provided. For those reasons, the amendments make a valuable contribution to transparency and accountability, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, just to update the Committee, we are 2-1 up.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

It was Harry Kane.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

Harry Kane, thank you.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has several amendments in relation to the compensation provisions in the Bill. I appreciate his careful attention to detail, which is a key aspect of this Bill, and will respond to the points raised in order. I will preface these points by noting that, if introduced, compensation regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, thereby providing opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 27 is on the approach to environmental liabilities in the compensation process. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has indicated that this would prevent the payment of compensation until the independent valuer has delivered to the Secretary of State a written estimate of the environmental liabilities of the steel undertaking in question and the Secretary of State has published that estimate and laid it before Parliament.

It is important that the independence of the valuation process is maintained. It is not appropriate for the inputs to the valuation exercise to be disclosed before the valuer reaches their determination. This may risk exposing the independent valuer to undue pressure while they are still deliberating on an outcome, thereby undermining the independence and fairness of the compensation scheme. None the less, the Government would have the power to direct the independent valuer to consider environmental liabilities in their determinations of compensation. We also intend to allow the final compensation determinations to be made public, including any consideration of environmental liabilities carried out. There is an opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny, as the compensation scheme regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, allowing all Members to debate the specific framework set at that stage.

Amendment 24 would prevent the payment of compensation until an estimate of liabilities arising from the environmental and health and safety matters under Clause 54(4) is provided to Parliament. An important principle of the compensation process is that it is assessed independently to ensure that affected parties are treated fairly. The proposed amendment would begin to erode this independence by making the payment of compensation contingent on parliamentary scrutiny of one of the factors that would inform the outcome. It is therefore not feasible to proceed with the proposed amendment. As a general point, compensation scheme regulations would require the independent valuer to consider environmental liabilities as part of the assessment. Additionally, in the event that a steel company is nationalised, we would expect it to publish an annual report setting out its financial position, including any liabilities.

I now turn to Amendment 28. The noble Lord has tabled a similar amendment that would require the Secretary of State to publish an estimate of the pension liabilities of the relevant steel undertaking before compensation is paid. I understand the concerns the noble Lord has about taking on unknown liabilities and putting undue pressure on the public balance sheet. If the Government decide to nationalise British Steel, subject to the public interest test, I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government would not be taking on a large contingent pension liability. The company’s pension scheme is a defined contribution scheme with a pot funded by contributions made by the employees and the company over time. In other cases, the pension scheme may be based on different arrangements, but we have built flexibility into the Bill to address these circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

The pension power in Clause 44 allows us to adapt to regulatory changes, standardise terms and adjust contribution minimums. Where necessary, it also allows for consideration of a fair division of pension liabilities between the transferor company and the government corporation. This follows the approach in the Banking Act. Where relevant, pension liabilities will form only part of the picture in the valuation exercise, and publishing them in isolation without the wider context would not be helpful. As I have already mentioned, following nationalisation we would expect contingent liabilities to be included in the company’s annual reporting.

I am more sympathetic to the noble Lord’s Amendment 25, which would require that the compensation regulations provide for the appointment of an independent valuer in all cases to determine compensation. The current wording makes it discretionary whether an independent valuer is involved in any given case. In practice, it is very likely that the Government will consider it fair to provide for an independent valuer to be established in compensation scheme regulations to consider any compensation for a transferor. The clause is currently discretionary because there could be situations where independent valuation is not required. For example, where the Government and the transferor agree on a sum, it would be unnecessary for the legislation to require that an independent valuer be engaged. However, I will reflect further on the noble Lord’s points and consider how I expect to return to this on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he please address the question of why steelworkers in Scunthorpe, Port Talbot or anywhere else should have faith in the Government’s provisions for pensions when they failed to safeguard the pensions of Allied Steel workers in Cardiff and continue to do so?

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I will have to write to the noble Lord, because I do not have specific information on that particular pension scheme.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions—particularly the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who was saying what I was thinking, but he said it with authority: he understands the issue for those workers quite viscerally. It was in my mind that some level of protection or safeguard needs to be there. I thank the Minister for his very thorough answers. They are so thorough that I will have to spend some time with Hansard, reading them through, to find out how much comfort there is in there. His comments regarding Amendment 25 were certainly encouraging, and I hope we can come to some sort of agreement. On the others, I will have to come back him later, but, with those comments, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 24.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the two noble Lords on the Front Bench for setting out this challenge to the Government. When you have a company in loss that is really struggling, there is an absolute requirement for accurate, speedy and regular financial reporting. Many years ago, I was a chairman with a large group of industrial companies reporting to me. I am pleased to say that none of the subsidiaries reported anything like the losses or the cash haemorrhage of British Steel, and we could not have afforded such a thing. I remember that if I or the chief executive saw one of our subsidiaries in danger of going into loss or dipping into bad performance, it would be put on to monthly reporting and quite often weekly reporting. That was not just because we wanted to know the bad news early but because it started a conversation between us, and other senior directors and executives, and the leading executives of the ailing subsidiary around how they could generate more cash and revenue, win more business and reduce costs in the meantime. If there was no immediate prospect of increasing the revenues, they needed to reduce the cash outflow.

My advice to Ministers, who took responsibility for British Steel many months ago, is that they should be seeing that kind of information, because it is now their responsibility. They decided to undertake this action without advice on value for money, so they need to have that sort of detailed information in front of them. They or their representatives also need that informed conversation with the people they have entrusted with running this business to find out why, as I understand it, the numbers are still not going in the right direction. You need that information weekly, and certainly monthly, because these things accumulate. The National Audit Office has led us to believe that the losses in this business have already accumulated to £642 million.

The description that the Government have offered help with working capital is true, but I do not think it is the whole story. As I understand it, there is a massive trading loss, and taxpayers—through Ministers and the Treasury—are having to pay trading losses. That means the Government are both subsidising the customer, who is getting it too cheaply, and paying for costs that the business needs to meet, which the customer is not going to pay for. In addition, the Government may need to provide additional working capital to provide for the work in progress and the stocks and raw materials for the next bit of production. I would regard the loss as a different category from the provision of additional working capital to keep the business running, and I would be much more worried about the loss.

From my business experience with industry, my conclusion is that cash is the king. By all means look at the P&L—that will give you an indication—but a business has to generate more cash than it spends. Otherwise, it goes bankrupt. That is the fundamental discipline that Ministers, through their chosen representatives, need to impose on this business. They need to see the cash line of outflow starting to reduce—otherwise, they need a fundamental rethink of policy.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on this group. I will address each of the issues raised in turn. Amendments 32 and 33, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, would impose a cap on the amount of financial assistance the Government could provide under the Bill. Amendment 32 seeks to place a statutory cap of £2.5 billion on financial assistance until 15 August 2029. Amendment 33 would apply a cap on a different basis, relating to the number of employees in a steel undertaking.

Imposing a fixed cap of any kind on financial assistance would risk constraining the Government’s ability to respond effectively to evolving circumstances. It could ultimately undermine the very objectives the Bill is designed to achieve, namely the protection of our domestic capability in a strategically vital sector. The Bill contains proportionate and robust measures to ensure transparency and accountability in the provision of financial assistance. Clause 59 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every 12 months on the use of financial assistance. Furthermore, as I am sure all noble Lords will know, any financial assistance provided by the Government will be subject to the established framework for managing public funds, including HM Treasury approval processes, departmental accounting officer responsibilities, and reporting to Parliament through the usual public spending controls.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions in this group of amendments.

Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require the Secretary of State, before providing any financial assistance, to put forward a proposal to Parliament for doing so, setting out the underlying details. The amendment stipulates that a Select Committee would have 90 days to provide any recommendations on the proposal before it can proceed. I respectfully suggest that this amendment is not realistic, given that financial assistance may need to be provided immediately following a transfer. It is unlikely that there would be time for the parliamentary scrutiny envisaged by this amendment without imposing significant risk to the continued operation of the steel undertaking. I appreciate the noble Lord’s intention in tabling this amendment but, for the reasons I have outlined, I ask that he does not move it.

Amendment 36A would require the financial assistance power in Clause 58 to be exercised by regulations specifying the purpose and estimated costs. I understand the desire for further parliamentary scrutiny of the costs that might be incurred in relation to an intervention in a steel undertaking. The Government have been transparent about the costs incurred to date as a result of the intervention in British Steel under the special measures Act. Estimating future costs relating to nationalisation is more challenging because they would depend on decisions not yet taken about the future operation of a particular steel undertaking.

I hope I can provide reassurance by emphasising the extensive controls over expenditure that would apply by default. If these provisions are used, the Government would need to consider the potential range of costs and make the usual value-for-money tests under the accounting officer. These spending processes are subject to ongoing parliamentary scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. The Permanent Secretary to the Department for Business and Trade appeared before PAC last week to discuss steel.

As with Amendment 38, I am concerned that this amendment does not reflect the operational realities of a potential intervention. It is likely that there would be urgent and immediate pressures to draw down on the financial assistance spending power to maintain operations in a way that would not be conducive to the set-up of the secondary legislation process. However, I understand that the noble Lord would like us to go further in this respect, and I appreciate the constructive engagement we have had on this and other issues. I will of course consider whether anything more can be done to give him the reassurance he desires.

Amendment 41A, also tabled by the noble Lord, would require the Secretary of State to make a Written Ministerial Statement every three months on the progress of any publicly owned steel undertaking. I am sympathetic to this amendment and recognise Parliament’s interest in the Bill’s impact on the steel industry, employment and public finances. That is why the Bill requires the Government to produce an annual report on financial assistance under it and the company will publish its annual report and accounts. I do not think reporting every three months for as long as a steel undertaking remains in public ownership is necessary. However, the principle is sound and the noble Lord made some excellent points. I recognise that our current reporting commitments may not encompass the full scope of his amendments. I ask him not to move the amendment, and the Government will consider this further before Report.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his positive response on the last amendment, and I understand the nature of his concerns on the first two. All roads point back to Clause 2 and the public interest test, frankly, so perhaps we should have another discussion about that. However, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I will be equally taciturn. I have spoken a lot about CBAM, and I do not intend to repeat it. It occurs to me that if the Government become a major owner of the steel industry, they might become more sympathetic to some of the arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has just advanced.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, for their thoughtful amendments on the UK emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism and their impact on the steel sector.

A common theme across these amendments is the proposal that a publicly owned steel undertaking should be exempt from one or both of these measures. I understand the concerns that have been raised about the sector’s competitiveness and the costs faced by steel producers. However, I must be clear that the Government cannot support this approach. We remain firmly committed to industrial decarbonisation and to securing a competitive, sustainable and low-carbon future for the UK steel industry. The UK cannot build a resilient steel sector by exempting it from the very policies designed to support the transition to cleaner production and to create a level playing field against higher-carbon imports.

The UK emissions trading scheme and the carbon border adjustment mechanism are complementary policies. Together, they encourage investment in cleaner production, while ensuring that UK producers are not undercut by imports from countries with lower environmental standards. Exempting a publicly owned steel undertaking from these measures would not only undermine those objectives but create an uneven regulatory framework within the UK steel sector. With this in mind, I will turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt.

Amendment 47 seeks to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from CBAM. I understand the noble Lords’ concern that CBAM will increase the cost of imported products for steel undertakings. However, I emphasise that the CBAM’s purpose is to ensure that imported carbon-intensive goods face comparable carbon prices to those of domestically produced goods. It will give industry the confidence to invest in the UK, knowing that its decarbonisation efforts will not be undermined. CBAM makes no exemptions for particular UK firms. Its intent is to target the problem of carbon leakage and ensure that highly traded carbon-intensive goods from overseas, including steel, pay a comparable carbon price to that paid by UK manufacturers.

Amendment 48 seeks to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from the emissions trading scheme. I am sympathetic to the fact that this also imposes a cost on activities that have significant emissions. However, as with Amendment 47, accepting Amendment 48 would provide preferential treatment based on ownership and undermine a level playing field across the industry. The transition to low-carbon steel must be fair, credible and consistent across all operators, whether publicly or privately owned.

I emphasise that the ETS includes targeted protections for energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries, including steel. Further protections will be introduced through CBAM from 2027. It is for these reasons that I cannot support these amendments and ask that they not be pressed.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister, but I have to admit that I am very disappointed in his response, and I wonder if he is a bit disappointed in the response that he had to give. It seems to me that you can either have decarbonisation or have a competitive steel industry, but at this precise moment in time you cannot have both; at this precise moment in time, they are mutually exclusive. That is not to say that we should not pursue net zero in the future—of course, we should—but this is a particularly exposed industry at a particularly critical time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I was planning to say nothing and I will say little more than nothing. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which he can answer when he gives his response to the Minister. Can he remind me when most, if not all, of these measures were brought on to the statute book?

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have tabled a number of amendments regarding the deregulation of the steel sector. These amendments focus on three core areas of regulation: industrial action, environmental regulations and reporting, and company reporting.

I recognise the concern from noble Lords that any publicly owned steel undertaking will face a significant array of reporting requirements. That is true, and the Government believe that these are necessary to ensure that any publicly owned company operates in a similar way to its privately owned counterparts. Any publicly owned steel undertaking must protect its workers’ rights, fulfil its environmental obligations and transparently report on its progress.

At the outset, I make the general point that a company under public ownership is ordinarily treated as a public corporation—that is, it is run as a private company with an independent board of directors, operating under broad strategic direction from Government Ministers. It is right, therefore, that such a company is subject to the regulatory frameworks within which any similar private company operates. I also emphasise to noble Lords that amendments seeking to level the playing field within the steel industry are inconsistent with that position. Instead, the amendments in this section seek to give preferential treatment to publicly owned steel undertakings.

I will now address the amendments directly. I believe that Amendments 50 to 52, 54 and 55 are intended to address the noble Lord’s concern that the Government’s industrial decarbonisation policies could impose additional costs and burdens on publicly owned steel undertakings. In summary, these amendments seek to exempt publicly owned steel undertakings from a number of statutory requirements, including greenhouse gas reporting, the energy savings opportunity scheme, energy and carbon reporting, forest-risk commodity due diligence, and climate-related financial disclosures. Although I recognise the noble Lord’s concern that there is a range of requirements on the steel sector with regard to environmental reporting, I cannot support these amendments.

The reporting requirements the Opposition have identified are integral to this Government’s commitments to decarbonising our industries. Our steel strategy set out a vision for a move towards green, decarbonised steel production. We are committed to supporting the sector in achieving those objectives, as evidenced by the £500 million of funding to Tata Steel for the development of its electric arc furnace in Port Talbot.

A public steel company, no more than any other steel company, should not be exempt from these important transparency requirements. Accepting these amendments would undermine the intent of the Government’s industrial decarbonisation policies, creating an unfair system for other domestic steel producers. The Government are committed to revitalising the entire UK’s steel industry, not only the companies in public ownership. Alongside this, the Government believe that these requirements are critical to industrial decarbonisation and to meeting net zero.

Finally, I will address Amendments 49 and 53 together, as both seek to exempt a publicly owned steel undertaking from existing corporate reporting requirements. Amendment 49 would disapply the strategic reporting requirements under Chapter 4A of the Companies Act 2006, while Amendment 53 would remove the requirement to publish information on executive pay ratios.

I recognise that the purpose of these amendments is to reduce the administrative burden on a publicly owned company. However, the Government do not believe that public ownership should entail lower standards of transparency or accountability. Indeed, if a steel undertaking is brought into public ownership, there is an even greater expectation that it should operate openly and be subject to appropriate public scrutiny. That is why the Government expect any publicly owned steel undertaking to comply with the standard reporting obligations that apply to comparable public corporations. Its annual report and accounts should provide Parliament, taxpayers, employees and the wider public with a clear and comprehensive overview of the company’s financial position, operational performance, governance and remuneration arrangements.

Transparency is not merely a regulatory requirement; it is an essential part of maintaining public confidence. It supports effective parliamentary scrutiny, promotes sound corporate governance and demonstrates that public assets are managed responsibly. It also serves a practical commercial function. Should the company seek external finance, strategic partners, or, in due course, a return to private ownership, prospective investors and creditors will rightly expect access to robust, reliable and consistent corporate reporting. Maintaining those standards will enhance rather than diminish the company’s long-term prospects.

For all these reasons, the Government believe that a publicly owned steel undertaking should be held to the same high standards of openness and disclosure as comparable public corporations. Public ownership should set the bar for transparency, not lower it. I therefore hope I have explained why the Government cannot support these amendments, and I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I should first deal with the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, who perhaps sought to point the finger at me as a Minister for having introduced some of these requirements. I was indeed a Minister for 16 years, and I cannot recall having introduced any of these requirements at any stage. In fact, the Minister answered the noble Lord by pointing out that, under Tony Blair, the Companies Act 2006 started a process of requiring companies to include many of the things we are now debating and discussing. That is his answer. Perhaps when the noble Lord next gets to his feet—perhaps sometime next week—he might tell us what Vince Cable, who inherited all those requirements, did about minimising the burden on business.

Undoubtedly, at the present time, there is an overregulated regime facing the private sector, and in many ways, we are seeking to alleviate that burden as far as the new, nationalised steel industry is concerned, if the Government proceed down that road.

I remain concerned that the Government do not recognise the cumulative burden that these requirements place on an energy-intensive and strategically important industry. If Ministers are serious about restoring a nationalised steel undertaking to competitiveness and attracting private sector investment, they should be looking to reduce unnecessary compliance costs, not preserve them. No doubt we will return to these issues at a later stage. For the present, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.