Monday 29th June 2026
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberSteel Industry (Nationalisation) Act 2026 View all Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 22-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (29 Jun 2026)
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to narrow the definition of a steel undertaking so that it had to be a business consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel, or iron for the purposes or in connection with the manufacture of steel.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 1, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, is very simple. It seeks to confine the powers in this Bill to genuine steel businesses. Those are undertakings consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel—or iron for the purposes of steel manufacture.
As drafted, the definition catches any business which merely includes steel-making as part of its operations. That is a very broad formulation. It could, in principle, sweep up a diversified business in which steel was only a minor part of what it does. Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether it falls within the reach of these nationalisation powers.
When this point was pressed in the other place, the Secretary of State was asked whether a business with only 1% of its operations in steel would be caught by Clause 1. He did not say that it would not be. However, a statement of intent is not a limit on the face of the Bill, and future Governments are not bound by the assurances of this one. The Government say that these powers are intended for British Steel, and British Steel is obviously and predominantly a steel business. Therefore, this amendment should create no difficulty for that purpose. If the Government’s intention is genuinely not to use these powers against businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel, they should have no difficulty in accepting this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Redwood (Con)
My Lords, I fully support this amendment and hope that it will tease out from the Minister a little more about what the underlying purpose of the general legislation is, as I am not too enamoured of this becoming a fully nationalised industry with the ability to acquire all sorts of other steel interests.
I felt that the Government’s policy arose out of the circumstances of British Steel at Scunthorpe and the question of blast furnace-produced steel, where we are down to our last two blast furnaces. I did not think that the intention was to build an electric arc furnace set of businesses when progress has already been made in establishing these in the private sector and where there are plans in certain cases for government grant aid to achieve an electric arc steel additional business by that combination of subsidy assistance and private capital.
I hope that the Government will accept this quite substantial narrowing of such a broad piece of legislation, because there are many with general interests in steel whom we would not like to get caught up in this. I would also like clarification on whether there is any possibility that the Government might want to build a nationalised electric arc steel set of businesses. This would be an expensive and difficult proposition.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister, his team, the department and the two experts who came all the way from Coventry in 35-degree temperatures to educate the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and me on the technology of steel. It has been very co-operative and I thank them.
I am slightly confused by how narrowing these words are: “of or including” versus “predominantly”. What is predominantly? Is it 60:40? Is it 55? I do not know. You have to look upon it with the body language of the Government. The Government have shown no tendency to go on a nationalisation rampage through all businesses that have ever touched a piece of steel. It is very clearly focused in one area, as the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, alluded to. Also, I remind noble Lords that there is a sunset clause in here which closes it after two years. So the talk of subsequent Governments does not have particular purchase and I am much more relaxed than the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, on this.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade (Lord Leong) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their constructive engagement in advance of Committee, and for all the amendments and valuable contributions that they will make during it.
Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, seeks to introduce a narrow definition of a “steel undertaking”. I fully understand the purpose of the amendment, but the Government have no desire for these powers to extend beyond what is necessary. They are exceptional powers for exceptional circumstances and should be exercised only where Parliament intends.
I respectfully suggest that the amendment would not provide greater certainty; instead, it risks introducing greater ambiguity into the Bill. The proposed test, that a business must be “predominantly” involved in steel, immediately raises difficult questions, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on how “predominantly” is measured. Is it turnover, assets, employees, production, profit or some combination of these? The amendment provides no answer. That uncertainty would inevitably invite legal challenge, precisely when swift and decisive action may be required. Businesses with significant steel operations could argue that they fall outside the definition, because steel is not their primary activity. Equally, complex corporate structures could be organised to make the test easier to avoid altogether. In seeking to narrow the definition, the amendment risks creating loopholes that undermine the legislation’s very purpose. The Government’s drafting avoids these difficulties; it provides a clear and workable definition that gives legal certainty, while ensuring that powers are used only when genuinely needed to protect the public interest.
For those reasons, while I appreciate the spirit in which the amendment was tabled, I cannot agree that it improves the Bill. I know this is not what the noble Lords intended and I can accept that the current drafting is broad, but this definition follows closely that used in the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act and it ensures that there can be no disputes about its meaning. In practice, we do not expect many companies to fall within the current definition, so the amendment would have minimal effect.
I will repeat the Government’s position expressed throughout the Bill’s passage so far: we are strongly minded to use the powers to acquire British Steel if it is in the public interest to do so, and we do not have any plans to acquire any other steel undertakings. It is therefore very unlikely that this would be used for any other company, let alone one that is engaged primarily in non-steel activity. I hope this helps clarify the matter and respectfully request that the amendment is withdrawn.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. It was remiss of me not also to thank the Minister and his team for their extensive engagement on the Bill.
This amendment is simple. I am afraid that I do not agree with the Minister’s comments or those from the noble Lord, Lord Fox. This is very straightforward. In fact, I refer noble Lords to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which says that the word “predominantly”, in formal or technical usage, can denote a precise majority, such as more than 50%, or an even higher threshold, such as 60% to 80%, depending on jurisdiction. I am not an expert on which jurisdiction we are in, but it clearly means north of 50%. The way the Bill is written, as I pointed out, could allow for as little as 1%.
I have listened to the Minister’s objections to the wording of the amendment and am very happy to work on tightening it up, if he thinks that would help. The amendment is simple: it would confine the powers in the Bill to genuine steel businesses—that is, undertakings
“consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel, or iron for the purposes or in connection with the manufacture of steel”.
I think that answers most of the Minister’s objections, which, frankly, if they are relevant to my wording, are also relevant to the wording currently in the Bill, so I do not really believe in the ambiguity argument.
Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether they fall within the reach of these nationalisation powers. The present drafting does not provide that reassurance; it permits powers to apply to an undertaking that merely includes steel-making or related iron production, as I have already pointed out. I will not press the amendment for now, but I would like further discussions with the Minister, if he is amenable, to see whether we can find a way to tighten up the language so that it both suits the Government’s purposes and makes it clearer for all those undertakings that we are discussing. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, one of the things that the briefing from the high value catapult team confirmed is the enormous difficulty there will be in creating a viable business from what His Majesty’s Government intend to take control of in Scunthorpe. There is the age of its blast furnace, the potential cost of any replacement of a blast furnace, the expense of conversion to an electric arc furnace—if that is what is intended—and the hugely competitive landscape of the global steel markets. These are just the headlines of the complexity, but the choices go beyond blast furnace or arc furnace.
If investment is found to install a new electric arc furnace, what will it produce? Will it aim to produce the full range of steels that we need—longs, flats, rebar—or will it specialise in particular steels that perhaps are more strategic and less easy to source? If it goes down the specialisation route, the UK will probably need access to much more direct reduced iron, or DRI. It is likely that this would have to be imported, and these would be very high CO2 emission imports from most countries, because making our own DRI would need a whole new bit of kit which is very pricey. Choices and making the right calls will determine whether Scunthorpe has a long-term future and what that future looks like. It will determine whether it is indeed an investable prospect and whether it can attract the private sector.
When the Government begin—assuming this Bill becomes an Act—to use the terms of the Act to take ownership of this plant, that will change the focus of these choices. Of course, there will be a new board and management to run the plant, but the cost of the choices will rest with UK taxpayers, at least at first. We will be providing the capital. As we have heard, we have already made available £555 million in working capital, but clearly these sums could increase massively at scale. It is the scale of risk that the Government are taking on that is guiding my approach and our approach, because this Bill needs more scrutiny from Parliament at all levels. From these Benches, we will be pushing those buttons.
These three amendments start at least to open up that point around accountability. I am a bit intrigued because while I do not always agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, he is normally internally consistent. However, the noble Lord started out by saying there should be no expansion of the terms of Clause 2 and then put forward two pretty reasonable ones about growth and expanding the economy. I have one that I think the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, would agree with, which is cost. We should have a clear understanding of the cost before the public interest test. I completely disagree with Amendment 2 because there needs to be a broader discussion around “public interest”. We need to understand the numbers around it, otherwise we do not know whether it is interesting to the public. I do not agree with Amendment 2. I have some sympathy with the other two amendments, and I am sure we will talk more about public interest tests as we deal with other groups.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Redwood and Lord Fox, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their contributions to this group. There are several amendments to the articulation of the public interest test in Clause 2. This is a key clause in the Bill; it is a necessary safeguard to ensure that the powers are used proportionately in response to a clear need.
Amendment 2 would limit the public interest factors that the Secretary of State may consider to those set out in the Bill. The Government agree that the three factors of national security, critical national infrastructure and support for the economy are likely to be the most relevant to the steel sector. Accordingly, the current approach ensures that they are given particular weight when assessing whether to pursue an intervention. However, circumstances may arise in which a case for intervention may not be clearly made on the basis of these three factors, yet it would clearly be in the public interest to take action. It is therefore pragmatic to build some flexibility into the Bill to address this issue.
I turn to Amendment 3. It has been suggested that the third public interest factor should refer specifically to
“economic growth and international competitiveness”,
rather than “supporting the economy”. With respect, this is a distinction without a meaningful difference. It is largely a matter of drafting rather than substance. The phrase “supporting the economy” is deliberately broad. It clearly encompasses economic growth and international competitiveness but also recognises that the economy is more than growth figures alone. It includes strengthening economic resilience, protecting strategically important industries, supporting employment, safeguarding supply chains, encouraging investment and ensuring the long-term productive capacity of the United Kingdom. By contrast, narrowing the text to
“economic growth and international competitiveness”
could unintentionally exclude other legitimate public interest considerations that any responsible Government should be able to take into account.
There may be circumstances where intervention is necessary to preserve critical industrial capability or economic resilience, even where the immediate effect on growth or competitiveness is less direct. The Government’s intention is to provide Ministers with a sufficiently broad framework to consider the full range of economic factors that may arise. The existing wording achieves precisely that: it is flexible, comprehensive and future-proofed, while fully capturing the objectives that the amendment seeks to emphasise. For those reasons, I do not believe that the amendment would improve the Bill. The Government believe that protecting our sovereign capability in what is a foundational sector for the economy will help to underpin our resilience and leave us less exposed to volatile international trading conditions. The Government therefore cannot support the amendment.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral, and by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. In different ways, all three noble Lords seek to require the Secretary of State to consider value for money or the impact on the public finances before exercising the principal transfer powers.
Lord Leong (Lab)
I am referring to the noble Lord’s later amendment.
I fully agree with the principle that taxpayers’ money must be spent wisely. Any decision to bring a steel undertaking into public ownership would be among the most significant interventions that a Government could make. Such a decision should never be taken lightly, and it would not be. However, these amendments seek to place into statute an obligation that already exists as a fundamental principle of government. Every significant spending decision is subject to the rigorous disciplines of managing public money—as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—Treasury approval where appropriate, and the established accounting officer framework. Ministers are already required to demonstrate that public money is being used properly, proportionately and with due regard to value for money.
The question, therefore, is not whether value for money should be considered—it absolutely should—but whether it is necessary to restate an existing, well-established constitutional obligation in the Bill. I do not believe it is. Doing so would add no new safeguard, create no new accountability and impose no duty that does not already exist. More importantly, this legislation is intended to ensure that, where a vital national interest is at stake, the Government can act decisively. Decisions of this nature will always involve weighing immediate fiscal costs against the far greater economic and strategic costs of inaction. The loss of sovereign steel-making capability, thousands of skilled jobs and critical supply chains, and industrial resilience could ultimately impose a far greater burden on the taxpayer than timely intervention would. The Government will continue to ensure that every decision made under the Bill is subject to the highest standards of financial discipline and accountability. Those safeguards already exist; they are robust and will continue to apply.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 30, 31, 43, 44 and 46 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Wigley—who I thought made a very powerful case—and Lord Fox, for their previous speeches.
Amendment 30 goes to the valuation of a steel undertaking and the need for that valuation to reflect the real commercial environment in which the undertaking will operate. That environment is not fixed; it is being shaped directly by government policy and, in particular, by the new steel trade measure coming into effect from 1 July. Only days ago, the Government changed the detail of that policy, relaxing the original proposals somewhat, with tariff-free quota reductions pulled back from the level first proposed. We will no doubt discuss that in more detail when the Statement is taken tomorrow, and I do not intend to rehearse that debate now.
However, the fact is that the Government’s choices on trade policy will have a material effect on the commercial position, and therefore the value of any steel undertaking. A tighter quota and a higher above-quota tariff will limit import competition. The way quotas are set will affect downstream industries, supply chains, customer relationships and the availability of particular steel products. The Government cannot, on the one hand, present their trade policy as central to the future of UK steel and, on the other hand, resist any requirement for that policy to be factored into what a steel undertaking is actually worth.
The need for clarity is made more acute by the uncertainty of recent weeks. Businesses have been trying to understand what the new quota levels will be, how quickly quotas may be exhausted, which products will be covered and what the practical effect will be for producers and steel-consuming industries alike. Do the Government accept that the new steel trade measure will affect the value of steel undertakings? If so, why should the independent valuer not be required to consider it?
On Amendment 31, electricity costs are among the central determinants of the viability, competitiveness and future value of steel. The position facing British industry is stark. The United Kingdom has had some of the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. UK industrial users pay substantially more than competitors in France and Germany, and—on the most widely cited international comparison—around four times as much as businesses in the United States.
For steel-makers, the gap remains significant. That is particularly serious as the sector moves towards more electricity-intensive production methods, including electric arc furnaces. A business may have the workforce, the plant, the orders and the ambition to modernise, but it cannot compete indefinitely if one of its principal inputs costs materially more than it does for its overseas competitors. These costs, I am afraid, reflect recent policy choices by the Government. The fact that the Government provided some limited relief from network charges to eligible energy-intensive industries rather demonstrates the point.
The Government now say that further measures will bring prices closer to those in competitor countries, but closer is not the same as competitive—and nor is a future scheme with questions of timing and eligibility still to be resolved an adequate basis on which to value a business today. This amendment would require the valuer to consider the prices paid by UK steel producers, the disparity with comparator countries and the effect of any support intended to reduce energy costs, including both the costs after existing reliefs and the risk that relief may be time-limited, incomplete or dependent on eligibility. It should also include a clear comparison with major competitor countries.
Is the Government’s objective genuine parity in industrial electricity prices with our principal competitors? If not, what continuing cost disadvantage do the Government consider acceptable for a strategic trade-exposed industry? How will the valuer assess the effect of support, which is prospective rather than guaranteed, particularly where broader measures are not expected to operate fully until 2027? The Government’s own impact assessment accepts the seriousness of this problem. It states that energy costs threaten the sector’s long-term viability and its ability to compete. It also acknowledges that UK steel producers face higher electricity prices than comparable countries, and that contributes to the uncompetitive production costs and pressure on margins.
On Amendment 43, as we raised at Second Reading, the Government’s impact assessment recognises the risk of a chilling effect on investment if businesses and investors perceive a greater risk of state intervention—a point very well made by my noble friend Lord Redwood in the last group. The United Kingdom has long depended on its reputation as a stable, predictable and rules-based place in which to invest. The risk is greater in the current climate. Steel businesses are already dealing with high electricity costs, rapidly changing trade policy and significant regulatory burdens. Adding an open-ended power of nationalisation can only increase the sense of risk for those considering whether to invest in the United Kingdom. If the Government are confident that their actions will strengthen confidence and attract private capital, they should have nothing to fear from transparency.
Amendment 44 addresses a basic point of fairness. If the Government take a steel undertaking into public ownership, that business must not receive selective advantages which place comparable privately owned steel businesses at an artificial disadvantage. Without this safeguard, there is a clear risk of distortion through subsidies, preferential access to public contracts, more favourable regulatory treatment or other support unavailable to private companies. The Minister in the other place stressed the need for flexibility and for the Government to act quickly, but flexibility need not mean unfairness. It is entirely possible to support a strategic undertaking in exceptional circumstances while maintaining a level playing field for the wider sector.
On Amendment 46, if we accept the Government’s central argument that British Steel is critical national infrastructure and that domestic steel production is essential to our national security and without it we cannot build our Navy, jets or submarines, they must accept the logic of what follows from that argument: you cannot declare something critical to national security then leave it defenceless. Amendment 46 states that, where the Secretary of State has exercised a principal transfer power where steel has been brought into public ownership precisely because it is in the public interest, the Secretary of State must have the power to prevent industrial action destroying the very thing that public ownership was meant to protect.
We have seen what happens when Governments are all too timid to act. We have watched the railways held to ransom by the RMT, and we have seen it in healthcare where the former Health Secretary himself felt compelled to call out what he described as “cartel-like behaviour”. The Government have made themselves more vulnerable still. The Employment Rights Act 2025 stripped away strike safeguards that existed for a good reason. The ballot thresholds are gone: the Government unlocked the door and then expressed surprise when it was pushed open.
If a steel undertaking is nationalised in the name of national security and a trade union then calls a strike that shuts down production, what will the Secretary of State do? Will he stand at the Dispatch Box and explain that our defence supply chains have been severed because he did not want to upset the unions? Do the Government seriously want domestic steel production halted because a union decides the moment of public ownership is the moment to press its advantage?
The Government cannot have it both ways: they cannot argue that steel is so vital to this country that it must be brought into public ownership and simultaneously argue that, once it is in public ownership, it should be just as exposed to industrial disruption as any other business. The whole point of this public interest test, if it means anything at all, is that some things matter too much to be left to the ordinary run of commercial risk. Industrial action that threatens critical national infrastructure is precisely such a risk.
I invite the Minister to tell the House that the Government have considered the risk. I invite him to explain what powers the Secretary of State would have on the day a strike is called at a nationalised British Steel to keep the blast furnaces lit. If he cannot answer that question satisfactorily, this amendment provides exactly the answer that is needed.
Lord Redwood (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the crucial issue of electricity prices. As the strategy is to convert more and more to electric arc furnaces, the price of electricity becomes the critical variant in determining how successful those businesses will be, how competitive their prices will be and whether they will generate cash and profit to reward those who ventured in them, or whether there will be problems for those businesses, just as there are problems in the British Steel carbon-based system through its blast furnaces. I hope the Minister can give us a little more background by way of reassurance, given that the steel strategy has been, and is still to be, based on electricity as the prime source of energy. There needs to be a policy that will consistently deliver competitive electricity prices because the current prices, without specific and targeted subsidy intervention, are way out of sync with the electricity prices in the more competitive world of our major competitor countries.
It is very important that this group of amendments raises the issue of tariffs. Of course, anybody valuing the assets that might be acquired under this legislation, or valuing what we already have by way of control and operating responsibility, will need to look at the impact of tariffs. It is a good idea to stress this because these are a very major change to the background for the conduct of steel businesses in this country, and we cannot be sure exactly what the impact is going to be. We have two types of impact arriving around the same time. There is the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which is, in effect, a fairly universal tariff based on the carbon content of imported material, which is clearly going to apply substantially to this industry. Then there are the specific tariffs which the Government have announced to come shortly, which target competitive steel coming into Britain with a very large increase in tariff and a rather low protected quota so that there will definitely be a substantial increase in cost for import.
You could argue, as I presume the Government do, that this is completely benign for our steel industry because it means that the combination of the immediate tariff and the soon to come CBAM tariff will make imported steel so much less competitive, and will therefore help reduce the pressures on our existing electric arc furnaces in the private sector and the two blast furnaces now, in effect, under the control—but not in the ownership—of the public sector. There will be some relief, as the policy intends. However, there can be other consequences which a valuer would have to take into account.
For example, the higher the cost of imported steel, the more difficult it will be for those many companies and industries that use and add value to steel in our wider steel-using industry. There will be limited scope for all users of imported steel to find exactly the right specifications of steel, and the right availability and pricing, from the rather limited-scale industry that the United Kingdom now has as a steel producer. There could well be financial difficulties, reductions in turnover and activity, or the collapse of steel-using businesses in the United Kingdom that face these very high tariff impositions on their main raw material. If they acquire more by way of import than at home and they cannot immediately substitute, you could have the paradoxical effect that the tariff designed to protect the British industry lost orders to the British industry as well as to the exporting industry from abroad. You could well have businesses here collapse—those that are substantial steel users but can no longer carry on the business efficiently to sustain their limited purchases from the UK, because of the cost of the expensive imports.
This needs careful policy examination. I am glad that the Government had one rethink about the tariff quota arrangements for this, but they probably need to do a bit more homework about the balance between the rather larger turnover at risk in steel-using businesses in the United Kingdom and the rather too small turnover available in steel production. They therefore probably need to consult a bit more widely over the medium- to longer-term impact on steel demand from domestic as well as imported sources.
I am interested in the proposals on impact on the economies, but I am not quite sure what is in mind and how it would work out. It is quite right, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, that there will have been impacts from previous closures or redundancies, and there could be future bad impacts as steel plants become more productive and need less labour, or as the final conversion is made from blast furnaces to electric arc, when there would clearly be a substantial loss of employment. There will need to be assistance and help for those who lose their jobs or have lost them in the past but still have not been able to retrain or find good alternative employment. One needs rather more by way of detail, and I am not quite sure that this Bill is the right place to do that, because it relates to a series of other government initiatives, funds and programmes that are more generally available. However, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, might be right that they need to be improved. That is a subject for another conversation on another day.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, noble Lords have raised a number of amendments to ensure that there is a level playing field across the steel industry. I thank noble Lords for their commitment to ensuring that the Bill positively impacts the UK steel industry. A number of amendments have been tabled on this topic so, with this in mind, I will address those before turning to the new clauses proposed for the Bill. I will consider Amendments 29 to 31 together, as I believe they are intended to have the same effect.
Amendment 29 seeks to specify that compensation regulations under Clause 54(4)(b) allow the independent valuer to take into account external tariffs, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, and the carbon border adjustment mechanism when valuing the steel undertaking, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Meanwhile, Amendment 30 seeks to require that any valuation of a steel undertaking takes into account the steel import quota and tariff measure that is due to take effect from 1 July 2026. Amendment 31 would require any valuation to consider the anticipated effects of electricity prices.
I am sympathetic to concerns about the impact that these trade-related measures and electricity costs may have on steel undertakings, and therefore on any compensation determinations made by an independent valuer in relation to them under any compensation scheme regulations. However, I emphasise that the Government consider it unnecessary to add these amendments to the non-exhaustive list of examples of matters for a valuer to take into account under any compensation regulations. Any valuation would reflect the wider economic and market context, including the trading environment in which the steel undertaking operates, with or without tariffs, without the need to single out specific factors in primary legislation. This means that the valuer will ultimately have discretion to determine what they consider to be the relevant factors in making their determination.
Valuing a steel undertaking would be complex. The independent valuer would necessarily have, or be advised by those who have, expertise and experience in this area and would be well equipped to make informed decisions on their approach to valuation. For this reason, the Government do not consider these amendments necessary.
I turn to Amendment 43, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the impact that any nationalisation of a steel undertaking would have on inward investment in the UK. I emphasise the commitments the Government have already made to support investment in the steel sector. The Government’s steel strategy set out commitments to removing barriers to investment and creating a more supportive business environment so that steel companies are better able to compete, are protected from carbon leakage and unfair trading practices, and have greater security and certainty. The Government welcome new entrants to the UK steel industry, which would foster a more competitive business environment. Government funding is available to support this.
I reassure noble Lords that the impact of nationalisation would be taken into account in any impact assessment on the use of transfer powers. This is the most appropriate mechanism for reporting on any expected impact on the economy. Given the complexity, interlinking and scale of investment trends, it would be difficult to report further on the exact impact of a single intervention. It is for this reason that we ask for this amendment not to be pressed.
Amendment 44 seeks to ensure that the powers in the Bill do not confer any advantage on publicly-owned steel undertakings which could distort competition and trade. I understand the concerns from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that the Bill may unfairly distort competition and investment across the steel sector. However, I reassure your Lordships that this is not the Government’s intention. Any financial assistance provided to publicly-owned steel undertakings will be time-limited, targeted and proportionate. Furthermore, we will continue to comply with domestic and international subsidy control obligations to avoid market distortions. I hope this clarifies that the Government are committed to ensuring a level playing field between state and privately-owned steel companies. This amendment is therefore not required.
Amendments 4 and 36 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who has raised concerns about what he considers to be the potential adverse impact of the Bill on local communities in steel-making areas. Amendment 4 would create an additional public interest factor for a Secretary of State to consider ahead of exercising the principal transfer power. This would be to support the local economy of any steel-making location adversely affected by the Bill.
The Government have introduced the Bill to support domestic steel-making, not to threaten it. Additionally, one of the three factors set out under the public interest test in Clause 2 is supporting the economy, including any part of the UK economy. The same applies to Amendment 36, which would allow financial assistance to be provided to compensate communities adversely affected by the Bill. I do not expect the Bill to have any adverse impacts on local communities, so I do not consider this amendment appropriate.
I emphasise to the noble Lord that the steel industry in Wales is the only part of the industry with a ring-fenced fund: £500 million for Port Talbot to transform the steelworks and secure steel production at that site and to secure the future of the south Wales steel industry. This is a significant investment that will benefit the local community in that area for years to come. This demonstrates the Government’s confidence in the Welsh steel community and the crucial role that Tata plays in it.
I understand the objective of Amendment 46, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe. We all want to ensure that any publicly owned steel undertaking can operate effectively, maintain production and continue to serve the national interest. On that objective I do not believe there is any disagreement within the Committee; where we differ is on the means of achieving it. The amendment would give the Secretary of State the power to prohibit or restrict industrial action where it is considered to pose a sufficient risk to the public interest.
The Government do not believe that curtailing workforce rights is either necessary or the right way to secure a successful and resilient steel industry. The people who work in our steel plants are not an obstacle to operational success; they are the reason it is possible. Their skills, commitment and professionalism keep furnaces running, fulfil customer orders and sustain a strategic industry on which our economy and national security depend. The long-term success of a publicly owned steel undertaking will be built on partnership with this workforce, not on restricting their rights.
Moreover, good industrial relations are an asset in themselves. Constructive engagement with employees and their trade unions is far more likely to ensure stable operations than legislation that risks damaging trust and co-operation. Indeed, imposing additional restrictions could prove counterproductive, making disputes harder rather than easier to resolve. The Government have established constructive relationships with the trade unions representing workers at British Steel and across the wider steel sector. We value the role they play in representing their members and in helping secure the future for this vital industry.
Existing industrial relations legislation already provides the legal framework for industrial action. The Government see no justification for establishing a separate and more restrictive regime merely because an undertaking has entered public ownership. Public ownership should not mean fewer workers’ rights; it should mean responsible stewardship of a strategically important industry, working with the skilled men and women whose expertise will determine its success.
I thank all noble Lords for their amendments, which aim to ensure that the Bill does not distort the market to create inequality between public and private sector steel companies. I hope I have reassured noble Lords that the Government remain committed to revitalising the steel sector, which should be achieved through co-investment from the private and public sectors. I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response on the whole range of diverse amendments we have before us. No doubt the Opposition Front Bench will have their own opinion on which ones of these they may want to return to on Report, because there are important issues that undoubtedly have arisen from those amendments.
Amendment 4 seeks to support
“the local economy of any steel-making location which may be adversely affected by this Act”.
I noted the Minister’s response, that this may be taken to be covered by other words in this subsection and in other parts of the Bill. But, with respect, words such as
“supporting the economy of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom”,
are so general that they do not actually address the point we are specifically addressing in Amendment 4, which is the impact on local communities of steel-making locations which may be adversely affected by the Act. It may well be that some such locations are not adversely affected by the Act—they may not be helped by the Act, but they may be able to get on with it—but some almost certainly will be, and there should be express and specific provision to ensure that the needs of those areas are on the face of the Bill.
In Committee, we are quite clearly only probing these matters. But I ask the Minister whether, between now and Report, he will come back and consider that. This is because the reaction against the Act will not be from the generality of the UK economy, or regional economies; it will be from specific places that are in danger of losing out because of the changes, some of which are perhaps inevitable, but which need to take place in order to facilitate the general objective of the legislation. Therefore, in begging the leave of the House to withdraw Amendment 4, I ask the Minister to consider that specific aspect between now and Report.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I do not want to be the bringer of bad news to the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, but I suspect that it is pretty clear that the condition of the blast furnaces is poor and whatever happens, either to reinstate them to the level that would take them forward or to invest in electric arc, will take a lot of money. That is the point that we are focusing in on, and that is why we are focusing in on the public interest test. We have not yet gotten past Clause 2 yet, because this is the crunch.
I have a group of amendments in the next group, so I will reserve almost everything I have to say. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already disobeyed his Amendment 2, because we are seeking to broaden the scope of the public interest test. With respect to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, there is such a number of issues that have to be addressed within the particular field of potential investment that the public interest really requires focus. I will leave it at that for this group and then come back to these in the next group.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Redwood, Lord Fox and Lord Hunt, for their contributions.
The noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Sharpe, tabled Amendments 5, 6, and 42 to provide for an independent person to assess the public interest. Further amendments tabled by the noble Lords would require the Government to publish both the criteria used to assess the public interest and their assessment on how those criteria are met, before exercising the principal transfer power. Amendment 42 would require an impact assessment to be published before any intervention or the exercise of any power under the Bill. As these amendments deal with similar issues, I will address them together.
I start by saying that I understand and sympathise with the desire for the greatest parliamentary and stakeholder scrutiny of a decision to intervene under the powers in the Bill. Stakeholder engagement is a key part of the Government’s policy approach to the sector, with Ministers regularly meeting key industry groups and representatives through the steel council and other forums. The Government have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, explaining how the public interest test will be considered. A further impact assessment will be published alongside any secondary legislation exercising the transfer of power.
The framework for decisions to intervene will stem from what has been included in Clause 2, with regard to the three public interest factors. There is no attempt on our part to obfuscate or hide the criteria that will be applied in practice. The Government will not only consider whether a steel undertaking is engaged in activity that serves the public interest; they will also consider whether the activity is at risk of not receiving government intervention.
The Government cannot support these amendments as each would create additional hurdles and process pre-intervention. In the kinds of situations that the Bill envisages, speed will be crucial. Likewise, commercial and market sensitivities mean that swift action will, in most circumstances, be necessary to avoid uncertainty.
None the less, I am aware that there are strongly held concerns about this issue, and I can confirm that the Government will consider options for Parliament to scrutinise decisions taken either at the time of or after the exercise of the transfer of powers ahead of Report stage. I hope that this offers some reassurance to noble Lords, and I look forward to continuing further conversations with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, ahead of Report. With that, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response, particularly his closing words. My hopes were raised when he started by saying that he understood everything that I had said and was sympathetic. Then the situation clouded a little as he said that these amendments would present additional hurdles at a time when speed would be essential, but then he said that the Government would consider options between now and Report—and that is what I was seeking to hear.
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Redwood for putting it all in the historical context. It is easy to forget the pace at which we entered this debate, by being summoned to Parliament in April of last year. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, reminded us, Clause 2 is the crunch. It is a key part of this Bill. To remind colleagues, Amendment 5 would require an independent assessment confirming that nationalisation is in the public interest before transfer powers could be used. Therefore, as we approach that amendment, I obviously cannot press the Minister on the options that the Government will consider, but it would be a way forward if we could find a solution comparable to that in Amendment 6, requiring the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament the criteria used to assess the public interest before using transfer powers—and then Amendment 42, which would require an impact assessment.
I recognise the point that the Minister has made about the practical difficulty of preparing a full assessment before the exercise of emergency powers—particularly, as he explained, where Ministers may need to act quickly to prevent serious harm. However, that cannot mean, as I believe the Minister accepts, that the financial consequences are treated lightly. The cost to the taxpayer of taking on a steel undertaking—its liabilities, its working capital needs and its future investment requirements—may be substantial. As my noble friend Lord Redwood pointed out, Parliament has a proper understanding and an interest in understanding those costs, the risks assumed and the basis on which the decisions have been made. Parliamentary scrutiny should not be seen as an obstacle to action. It is surely a necessary part of ensuring that exceptional powers are used responsibly and transparently.
We await the decision of the Government. I had hoped that the Minister would commit to publishing an impact assessment alongside the exercise of the power. I will examine his words carefully, because that assessment is the key. It should set out the costs incurred, the economic implications, the liabilities assumed, the anticipated future costs and the risks to the taxpayer. There is much for the Government to reflect on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for bringing forward these amendments. As he has observed, there are similarities with some amendments of ours and we are happy to work together to clarify them. He could also have said that Parliament will be acting at speed tomorrow on the National Security (State Threats) Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Hanson—so it can be done.
We have already raised significant concerns about the breadth of the public interest test in Clause 2. The amendments in this group go directly to those concerns. The noble Lord is quite right that, before such exceptional powers are used, Parliament should be told why nationalisation is considered necessary. It is also right that the Government should have to consider the effect on the public finances and whether the undertaking has any credible short-term and long-term prospect of being investable. A business may be capable of being kept open in the short term, but that is not the same as being viable, competitive or capable of attracting the investment needed for its future. The public interest also cannot be assessed without proper regard to the liabilities and continuing costs that may fall on taxpayers.
The Government’s approach so far has relied heavily on broad discretion and ministerial assurance. These noble Lord’s amendments would introduce greater transparency, discipline and realism into that process. For those reasons, we support them.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Sharpe, for their contributions. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his constructive engagement over the past few weeks. I understand that he is trying to support the steel sector and the Bill while ensuring value for money, which is the Government’s objective as well.
Amendment 10 would require the Secretary of State to take into account the impact on the public finances when applying the public interest test. Of course, any decision to nationalise a steel undertaking should not be taken lightly, given the significant costs that could be incurred. However, the principle of securing value for money for the taxpayer is already well established and embedded in government decision-making, as I said on an earlier group. Any decision to exercise the powers in the Bill is subject to the usual Managing Public Money governance and the framework of accounting officer checks, which includes consideration of the impact on the public finances. I therefore respectfully suggest that incorporating the amendment into statute would not serve any particular purpose, but we are mindful of ensuring that costs associated with the Bill are well managed.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, also proposes, in Amendment 11, that the Secretary of State should take into account the short-term and long-term investability of a steel undertaking when considering whether to intervene in the public interest. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment, but I do not think that investability should directly inform the public interest test.
If a steel undertaking is an investible prospect in the short term, it is unlikely that there would be a case for government intervention, as the need could be met by the private sector. The intention behind the Bill is not to crowd out private investment but to act where private ownership has failed. Whether a steel undertaking is investible in the longer term is highly speculative, so I do not think it would be particularly helpful for it to form part of the statutory framework for the decision. By intervening, the Government would hope to turn a steel undertaking that is not investible into something that may become investible. To the extent that this is what the noble Lord hopes to achieve, we share his ambition, but I do not think that the amendment is workable.
Amendment 7 would prevent the Secretary of State exercising the principal transfer powers until a statement explaining how the public interest test is met has been provided to Parliament. I am sympathetic to the desire for greater parliamentary and stakeholder scrutiny of any decision to intervene under the powers in the Bill.
As I said previously, the Government have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, explaining how the public interest test will be considered. Any further impact assessment would be published alongside any secondary legislation exercising the transfer powers. The framework for the decision to intervene will stem from the three public interest factors included in Clause 2. The Government will consider not only whether a steel undertaking is engaged in activity that serves the public interest but whether that activity is at risk without government intervention.
The Government cannot support this amendment, as it would create additional hurdles and processes pre-intervention. In the kinds of situations that the Bill envisages, speed will be crucial, as I said previously. Likewise, commercial and market sensitivities mean that swift action will, in most circumstances, be necessary to avoid uncertainty; I take note of what noble Lords said about speed. None the less, I am aware that there are strongly held concerns about this issue and I confirm that, ahead of Report, the Government will consider options for Parliament to scrutinise decisions taken either at the time of or after the exercise of the transfer powers. I hope that this of some reassurance to the noble Lord and ask that his amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his support for these amendments and I was pleased to hear the closing part of the Minister’s statement. We all want the costs of any nationalisation to be well managed; we are looking for those costs to be well understood in advance of any commitment by the Government on behalf of the people of this country. We look forward to those discussions and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 7.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, in this group of amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has raised important concerns about the ways in which the Bill includes the Welsh Government and legislature in decision making. Amendment 9 would amend Clause 2 on the public interest so that the Secretary of State would be required to consult the First Minister of Wales before exercising the principal transfer power in relation to an undertaking located in Wales.
The Government have been keen to engage closely with the devolved Governments throughout the passage of the Bill, and I am grateful for the approach taken by all parties in that engagement. I am delighted to inform your Lordships that the Scottish Parliament granted its legislative consent to the Bill on 23 June. I record my thanks to Ministers and officials who worked swiftly to complete the legislative consent process ahead of the Scottish Parliament’s Summer Recess.
I am happy to confirm that the Government will ordinarily consult the relevant devolved Ministers if it is likely that the principal transfer power will be used in relation to a steel undertaking with its principal place of business in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. If this is not possible because swift action in the public interest is required, Ministers will engage with their ministerial counterparts at the earliest opportunity following the exercise of the principal transfer power. I also understand that my colleagues, Ministers and the Secretary of State for Wales will meet their counterparts in the Welsh Government tomorrow to discuss the Bill further.
Amendment 19 would require the Senedd to give approval to any proposed use of the modification power that would relate to devolved regulations. Again, I am sympathetic to the sentiment of this amendment and reassure the noble Lord that the modification power in Clause 50 is targeted and limited to applications necessary to ensure that transfer powers can be exercised effectively. It is not a general power to amend legislation. The drafting does not permit any changes to other laws unless they are for the purpose of ensuring that the powers in the Bill can be exercised effectively.
Although I cannot agree with these amendments, I reiterate the Government’s desire to continue engaging closely with our partners in the devolved Governments. In particular, the Government are continuing to discuss the Bill with the Welsh Government, and I hope to be able to provide noble Lords with further updates later in the Bill’s passage. However, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Wigley (PC)
Well, well, well—I thank noble Lords for their positive responses. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Hunt, and indeed the Minister, for the tone and content of their support for the principles here, if not the exact wording on the Order Paper. I noted with interest the ongoing discussions with colleagues in Cardiff and that there are further discussions about to take place. If, arising from those discussions, the Government feel it is appropriate to tweak the Bill to cover those points, I am sure that would be widely welcomed all round. On the basis of this general positive approach, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to prevent the Secretary of State extending the sunset of the principal transfer powers.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I hope that this outbreak of agreement means that the Government will accept my Amendment 12. The Government have repeatedly spoken of a long-term plan for steel—securing private investment, increasing domestic production, safeguarding jobs and creating a viable future for the industry. Against that background, Clause 3 comes as something of a surprise. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, indicated that he was somewhat reassured by its presence, but I suspect that its actual terms have escaped his usual vulpine scrutiny. A sunset clause is intended to place a clear limit on exceptional powers, but the Bill allows the Secretary of State to substitute, by regulations, a different period for the two-year limit.
Subsection (4) makes it clear that this can be done more than once. Therefore, in practice, the powers could be extended again and again, which gives no reassurance at all. Two years could become five years, 10 years or longer. That is not a meaningful sunset clause; it is a potentially perpetual sunset clause. It is an indefinitely renewable power.
What does that say about the Government’s confidence in their own ability to secure a viable private sector-led future for British Steel? If Ministers genuinely expect these powers to be exceptional and temporary, why do they require the ability to extend them without any stated final limit? This goes directly to the concerns raised throughout our debates—the risk of open-ended liabilities for taxpayers, uncertainty for investors and a lack of clarity about the Government’s intended endpoint.
The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has considered this point and has been unequivocal. It said:
“The use of delegated powers to bypass sunset clauses undermines their purpose, and sets an unusual and unwelcome precedent”.
It recommended either that the final period of extension be set out in the Bill or that there should be a statutory time limit each time the power is used. This would not prevent the Government seeking additional time when there is a compelling case, but it would require Ministers to return to Parliament with a clear final boundary rather than retaining power capable of perpetual renewal.
Will the Minister accept the Constitution Committee’s recommendations and bring forward amendments before Report? Will the Government set a final limit on these powers and demonstrate that they have genuine confidence in securing a thriving, investible and private sector-led future for British Steel? I beg to move.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I see the point that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has made, and I commend him for getting past this amendment before 9.21 pm, which is of course sunset.
Lord Leong (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution. I note the Constitution Committee’s comments on this clause in its recently published report on the Bill. The inclusion of the sunset provision demonstrates the Government’s commitment to ensuring that powers remain on the statute book for as long as necessary to serve their purpose. Ultimately, we want to see the domestic steel sector return to a more sustainable and stable state in which government intervention is unnecessary.
As we have said, we do not currently see another use case beyond the possibility of British Steel. Therefore, we hope that noble Lords get their wish and there is no need to extend the sunset period. However, the current geopolitical landscape creates a volatile backdrop for this sector, making it difficult to anticipate what may transpire in the coming months and years. We have therefore built in some flexibility to extend or shorten the two-year sunset timetable if circumstances change. We consider this a reasonable precaution to take.
The drafting ensures that there will be full parliamentary scrutiny of any change to the sunset period through the affirmative procedure, meaning that parliamentarians will be able to test and debate any regulations brought by the Government to extend the sunset period. We anticipate needing to use this extension power only in extenuating circumstances. I therefore request that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, that was a very brief debate, and I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but I am afraid I remain unconvinced. The Government say they want to secure a sustainable private sector-led future for British Steel. But a power capable of being extended repeatedly without any final statutory limit sends exactly the opposite signal. It risks making investors more, not less, cautious about committing capital to the sector. There must be a reasonable period that the Minister can identify and put in the Bill. If the Government genuinely regard these as exceptional and temporary powers, they should be willing to set out a clear limit.
The noble Lord cannot realistically blame external circumstances. There are always external circumstances. This has fallen foul of the Constitution Committee for very clear reasons, which it has set out. Speaking personally and from experience, I think it is unwise to fall foul of the Constitution Committee.
We urge the Government to take seriously the recommendation of the committee and either specify the final extension period in the Bill or impose a statutory limit on each extension. I think we will have to return to this matter at a later stage, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I have to say I was a bit grumpy when the Conservative Party tabled these amendments that we had tabled in the Commons, but in retrospect I am very pleased. No joking—that was a tour de force from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. This is his specialist area, and that was his best speech on Henry VIII that I have heard. All the points were points that I would have made except that I am not good enough to have made them, so in that respect I am glad that he was the person proposing this, rather than I. The only thing that stops the noble Lord from being risen to the pantheon is that, having won affirmative powers, he and his colleagues never actually exercise them through fatal Motions. Frankly, that is the only flaw in what we have just heard.
I countersigned Amendments 13 to 15 and 18 but my pen ran out when we got to Clause 50 stand part. All the points that the noble Lord made are valid. I hope the Government are able to take on board both what he said and what your Lordships’ committees have said about the shortcomings in this draft.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, before I turn to the amendments in this group, I thank the members of the Select Committee on the Constitution for their report on the Bill, which relates to this grouping. The report recommended that in Clause 47 the provisions for dispute settlement should be set out more fully in the Bill. The approach to drafting here is in line with existing precedent under the Banking Act 2009 and reflects the approach taken for similar powers, such as enforcement powers. We think it is appropriate to provide for dispute settlement on a case-by-case basis through regulations.
Noble Lords have tabled a number of amendments relating to parliamentary scrutiny of and procedure on the transfer regulations. In particular, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have tabled amendments which would change the parliamentary procedure for the principal share and property transfer powers, continuity obligations and enforcement powers from negative to affirmative. I understand the concern expressed by the noble Lords. From the outset, I reassure all noble Lords that the Government take parliamentary scrutiny extremely seriously. For that reason, we have ensured that a number of substantial powers in the Bill, such as the compensation and tax powers, are subject to the affirmative procedure. However, the Government consider that changes to the procedure for transferring powers would adversely affect the Government’s ability to effect a smooth transfer where necessary in the public interest.
Steel is fundamental to the UK’s industrial base and our national resilience, making it critical to secure supply. Any delays, especially in a non-consensual transfer, would prevent the transfer from taking place, particularly if the transferer was unco-operative. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the recently published report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which did not raise any cause for concern about these powers, including the level of parliamentary scrutiny attached.
To set out the necessity for the negative procedure for these powers, I will discuss them in turn. I will address Amendments 13 and 14 together as they seek to amend the procedures for the share and property transfer powers respectively. It is important that the principal transfer powers can be exercised with speed and operational and legal certainty. The Government expect that, if these powers were exercised, it would be in a fast-moving, commercially sensitive situation. The affirmative procedure would introduce a substantial delay, creating a vacuum in ownership. Such uncertainty would significantly affect the business, particularly the supply chains and third-party contracts.
Amendment 15 seeks to amend the procedure for continuity obligations. The continuity obligations in the Bill are essential to ensure that the company continues to operate as normal following the transfer, minimising disruption and maintaining operations at the steel undertaking. This is achieved by imposing obligations on residual steel undertakings and their group companies to ensure that all services and facilities required by the transferred business continue to operate as normal. Any changes to the procedure would affect the effectiveness of the transfer. The Government’s primary objective with this provision is to ensure a smooth transfer of ownership. As I have set out, it is imperative that there be no delay to any transfer of a steel undertaking into public ownership.
Amendment 18, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, aims to amend the procedure for enforcement regulation. Clause 45 gives the Secretary of State the power to make provision in regulations for the enforcement of obligations under the share and property transfer regulations. As with the other amendments, if the Government consider it necessary to enforce obligations, they must do so at pace. Any delay in using these powers risks interrupting the transfer process and reducing its effectiveness.
For those reasons, the Government do not consider these amendments necessary. However, I have reflected on the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. While it is critical that the Government are able to preserve their ability to enforce as necessary, there is a reasonable rationale for further parliamentary scrutiny. I cannot accept this amendment but I will consider this issue further, ahead of Report.
The noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, have given notice indicating their intention to oppose Clause 50 standing part of the Bill. That would remove the modification power in Clause 50. This power is not taken lightly, but it is a necessary measure to ensure that the transfer powers under the Bill can be used effectively. The clause has precedent because the same power was used in the Banking Act 2009 to resolve complex companies in the financial sector. Given that the transfer powers would be used only in circumstances where a public interest test was met, it is crucial that the Government have the necessary tools to ensure that any such transfers can be implemented effectively to deliver the intended outcome.
The powers in Part 1 of the Bill interact with commercial, company and insolvency law. This is the law that normally governs the consensual acquisition of companies or of their businesses. The legislative environment is therefore varied and complex and, because general legislation was not designed with compulsory transfers in mind, as the Bill envisages, there will be some tension between applying the Bill’s powers to a steel undertaking and the highly complex private law that it will inevitably cut across. The clause therefore provides a necessary power to modify other laws that may ordinarily interact with a transaction of this nature in order to integrate the Bill’s powers into the existing legislative and commercial landscape.
The use of the modification power is limited to the purpose of enabling the transfer powers to be used effectively. It is not a general power to amend legislation; it is targeted and limited. It cannot be used in isolation from the use of powers in respect of a particular steel undertaking to amend or disapply laws, and it cannot be used to amend the Bill—or Act—itself. In the absence of these powers, there is a real and significant risk that the Secretary of State could not fully and effectively implement a transfer. This could result in an ineffective or incomplete transfer to public ownership, affecting a company’s ability to continue operation. If a smooth transfer is not achieved, the public interest aims could be undermined.
I turn to the potential retrospective effect of the power. The Bill permits it to be applied retrospectively but does not require it. Preserving the possibility of applying this power retrospectively anticipates circumstances in which the transfer powers may need to be exercised at pace and in which there may be limits on the ability to conduct the level of due diligence necessary to support acquisition. Similarly, it may not be possible to identify all legislative interactions in the transfer scenario before making a transfer. This may mean that any secondary legislation made under the transfer powers may not fully affect the transfer that was intended. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to address this through the modification power, with the modification backdated to the time of transfer. The use of the power will be subject to the affirmative procedure unless there are particular circumstances that justify the Secretary of State proceeding on an affirmative basis, likely due to time pressures.
I hope that I have provided some clarity on the need to include the provision, and its retrospective effect. For these reasons, I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Fox (LD)
On a number of occasions, the Minister has painted a picture of a breathless process, where all the organs of government have to operate at breakneck speed. Taking the Government at face value, we are talking largely about a particular asset that we have been talking about for around 15 months, since the discussion at Easter last year. At some point, perhaps not at the Dispatch Box but when we are having our meetings, the Minister will explain why there is this predisposition to putting everything in place to have things moving at the speed of light when, in reality, they have been moving relatively slowly.
Lord Leong (Lab)
I am happy to give that commitment in our further conversations.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, not only for his generous praise, which I felt was completely undeserved, but for his support. At some stage, this great Chamber of ours will consider better ways to deal with secondary legislation. He will know that I gave quite a lot of support, when I chaired the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, to one of his noble friends who moved that there should be a new Bill—the Statutory Instruments (Amendment) Bill. But that is for another occasion. In the meantime, I thank the noble Lord for his strong support.
There is clearly much now for the Government to consider, in particular in view of the commitments made by the Minister. How do we achieve the right balance between acting swiftly where necessary and, at the same time, ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful role in scrutinising powers, particularly where they affect property rights, liabilities and commercial arrangements? I am sure these issues will merit further discussion as the Bill progresses. For the present, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.