Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

Lord Redwood Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 1, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, is very simple. It seeks to confine the powers in this Bill to genuine steel businesses. Those are undertakings consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel—or iron for the purposes of steel manufacture.

As drafted, the definition catches any business which merely includes steel-making as part of its operations. That is a very broad formulation. It could, in principle, sweep up a diversified business in which steel was only a minor part of what it does. Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether it falls within the reach of these nationalisation powers.

When this point was pressed in the other place, the Secretary of State was asked whether a business with only 1% of its operations in steel would be caught by Clause 1. He did not say that it would not be. However, a statement of intent is not a limit on the face of the Bill, and future Governments are not bound by the assurances of this one. The Government say that these powers are intended for British Steel, and British Steel is obviously and predominantly a steel business. Therefore, this amendment should create no difficulty for that purpose. If the Government’s intention is genuinely not to use these powers against businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel, they should have no difficulty in accepting this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I fully support this amendment and hope that it will tease out from the Minister a little more about what the underlying purpose of the general legislation is, as I am not too enamoured of this becoming a fully nationalised industry with the ability to acquire all sorts of other steel interests.

I felt that the Government’s policy arose out of the circumstances of British Steel at Scunthorpe and the question of blast furnace-produced steel, where we are down to our last two blast furnaces. I did not think that the intention was to build an electric arc furnace set of businesses when progress has already been made in establishing these in the private sector and where there are plans in certain cases for government grant aid to achieve an electric arc steel additional business by that combination of subsidy assistance and private capital.

I hope that the Government will accept this quite substantial narrowing of such a broad piece of legislation, because there are many with general interests in steel whom we would not like to get caught up in this. I would also like clarification on whether there is any possibility that the Government might want to build a nationalised electric arc steel set of businesses. This would be an expensive and difficult proposition.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, his team, the department and the two experts who came all the way from Coventry in 35-degree temperatures to educate the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and me on the technology of steel. It has been very co-operative and I thank them.

I am slightly confused by how narrowing these words are: “of or including” versus “predominantly”. What is predominantly? Is it 60:40? Is it 55? I do not know. You have to look upon it with the body language of the Government. The Government have shown no tendency to go on a nationalisation rampage through all businesses that have ever touched a piece of steel. It is very clearly focused in one area, as the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, alluded to. Also, I remind noble Lords that there is a sunset clause in here which closes it after two years. So the talk of subsequent Governments does not have particular purchase and I am much more relaxed than the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, on this.

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[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 2 would replace

“includes (but is not limited to)”

with the word “means” so that we knew what we were describing. The worry is that leaving it as it is could create a public interest so large that there was a mission creep that I do not think should be in the Bill, which is trying to nationalise steel. We need to be slightly more economical in the words we are using, so that we need not fear that on another day, if another public interest was being taken into account, the definition would prove far too loose. The word “means” does the job: we know exactly what one is talking about, and it lists the three elements. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, wanted to include two other areas but, for me, limiting it to those three objects seems to be where we should stop. The word “means” would stop mission creep.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome these three amendments. Amendment 2 is a necessary slight curtailment but would still leave the Government with enormous scope, given how wide-ranging the three cited reasons for public interest intervention are. Like my noble friend, I cannot think of any other reason why they might want to do this that could not be adequately covered by the wide-ranging proposals in the existing text.

I agree that it would be a good idea to change the language through Amendment 3 to stress that intervention should, in the longer term, be interested in economic growth, profitability and successful investment. Surely the Government do not want a lame-duck investment that costs a large sum of money for a limited period of time but then they have to disappoint all those people who thought that it was going to be kept going for a rather longer period or that it might break through to profitability and success. If I had to choose between the three amendments, I hope my noble friend would particularly press Amendment 8 on value for money, which sums it all up.

At Second Reading, in looking at the general legislation, we had some discussions asking: what is the medium and longer-term future of blast furnace steel? As I think we have agreed across the House, at Second Reading and now, the main reason for the previous emergency legislation and this legislation is the temporary cessation of closure of two very important blast furnaces, which are our last blast furnace-making capabilities in the country. But I believe—I would love to have the Government either confirm or deny this—that it is still their medium to longer-term intention to close all blast furnaces in this country, as previous Governments have been doing, and to transfer to electric arc steel-making, preferably with private finance and successful competitive private sector businesses doing that work. In the previous exchanges, I think the Minister signalled that the Government do not wish to build a nationalised electric arc business with these powers, although for understandable reasons they have to be general and will most likely be exercised in the case of the blast furnaces. It would be helpful to workers and taxpayers if there were greater clarity over the time period for keeping these blast furnaces open, and whether there are any limits on the costs that the Government are prepared to run, so that people can make proper plans concerning their jobs and their futures in this important steel industry, and so that taxpayers could have some reassurance.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 30, 31, 43, 44 and 46 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Wigley—who I thought made a very powerful case—and Lord Fox, for their previous speeches.

Amendment 30 goes to the valuation of a steel undertaking and the need for that valuation to reflect the real commercial environment in which the undertaking will operate. That environment is not fixed; it is being shaped directly by government policy and, in particular, by the new steel trade measure coming into effect from 1 July. Only days ago, the Government changed the detail of that policy, relaxing the original proposals somewhat, with tariff-free quota reductions pulled back from the level first proposed. We will no doubt discuss that in more detail when the Statement is taken tomorrow, and I do not intend to rehearse that debate now.

However, the fact is that the Government’s choices on trade policy will have a material effect on the commercial position, and therefore the value of any steel undertaking. A tighter quota and a higher above-quota tariff will limit import competition. The way quotas are set will affect downstream industries, supply chains, customer relationships and the availability of particular steel products. The Government cannot, on the one hand, present their trade policy as central to the future of UK steel and, on the other hand, resist any requirement for that policy to be factored into what a steel undertaking is actually worth.

The need for clarity is made more acute by the uncertainty of recent weeks. Businesses have been trying to understand what the new quota levels will be, how quickly quotas may be exhausted, which products will be covered and what the practical effect will be for producers and steel-consuming industries alike. Do the Government accept that the new steel trade measure will affect the value of steel undertakings? If so, why should the independent valuer not be required to consider it?

On Amendment 31, electricity costs are among the central determinants of the viability, competitiveness and future value of steel. The position facing British industry is stark. The United Kingdom has had some of the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. UK industrial users pay substantially more than competitors in France and Germany, and—on the most widely cited international comparison—around four times as much as businesses in the United States.

For steel-makers, the gap remains significant. That is particularly serious as the sector moves towards more electricity-intensive production methods, including electric arc furnaces. A business may have the workforce, the plant, the orders and the ambition to modernise, but it cannot compete indefinitely if one of its principal inputs costs materially more than it does for its overseas competitors. These costs, I am afraid, reflect recent policy choices by the Government. The fact that the Government provided some limited relief from network charges to eligible energy-intensive industries rather demonstrates the point.

The Government now say that further measures will bring prices closer to those in competitor countries, but closer is not the same as competitive—and nor is a future scheme with questions of timing and eligibility still to be resolved an adequate basis on which to value a business today. This amendment would require the valuer to consider the prices paid by UK steel producers, the disparity with comparator countries and the effect of any support intended to reduce energy costs, including both the costs after existing reliefs and the risk that relief may be time-limited, incomplete or dependent on eligibility. It should also include a clear comparison with major competitor countries.

Is the Government’s objective genuine parity in industrial electricity prices with our principal competitors? If not, what continuing cost disadvantage do the Government consider acceptable for a strategic trade-exposed industry? How will the valuer assess the effect of support, which is prospective rather than guaranteed, particularly where broader measures are not expected to operate fully until 2027? The Government’s own impact assessment accepts the seriousness of this problem. It states that energy costs threaten the sector’s long-term viability and its ability to compete. It also acknowledges that UK steel producers face higher electricity prices than comparable countries, and that contributes to the uncompetitive production costs and pressure on margins.

On Amendment 43, as we raised at Second Reading, the Government’s impact assessment recognises the risk of a chilling effect on investment if businesses and investors perceive a greater risk of state intervention—a point very well made by my noble friend Lord Redwood in the last group. The United Kingdom has long depended on its reputation as a stable, predictable and rules-based place in which to invest. The risk is greater in the current climate. Steel businesses are already dealing with high electricity costs, rapidly changing trade policy and significant regulatory burdens. Adding an open-ended power of nationalisation can only increase the sense of risk for those considering whether to invest in the United Kingdom. If the Government are confident that their actions will strengthen confidence and attract private capital, they should have nothing to fear from transparency.

Amendment 44 addresses a basic point of fairness. If the Government take a steel undertaking into public ownership, that business must not receive selective advantages which place comparable privately owned steel businesses at an artificial disadvantage. Without this safeguard, there is a clear risk of distortion through subsidies, preferential access to public contracts, more favourable regulatory treatment or other support unavailable to private companies. The Minister in the other place stressed the need for flexibility and for the Government to act quickly, but flexibility need not mean unfairness. It is entirely possible to support a strategic undertaking in exceptional circumstances while maintaining a level playing field for the wider sector.

On Amendment 46, if we accept the Government’s central argument that British Steel is critical national infrastructure and that domestic steel production is essential to our national security and without it we cannot build our Navy, jets or submarines, they must accept the logic of what follows from that argument: you cannot declare something critical to national security then leave it defenceless. Amendment 46 states that, where the Secretary of State has exercised a principal transfer power where steel has been brought into public ownership precisely because it is in the public interest, the Secretary of State must have the power to prevent industrial action destroying the very thing that public ownership was meant to protect.

We have seen what happens when Governments are all too timid to act. We have watched the railways held to ransom by the RMT, and we have seen it in healthcare where the former Health Secretary himself felt compelled to call out what he described as “cartel-like behaviour”. The Government have made themselves more vulnerable still. The Employment Rights Act 2025 stripped away strike safeguards that existed for a good reason. The ballot thresholds are gone: the Government unlocked the door and then expressed surprise when it was pushed open.

If a steel undertaking is nationalised in the name of national security and a trade union then calls a strike that shuts down production, what will the Secretary of State do? Will he stand at the Dispatch Box and explain that our defence supply chains have been severed because he did not want to upset the unions? Do the Government seriously want domestic steel production halted because a union decides the moment of public ownership is the moment to press its advantage?

The Government cannot have it both ways: they cannot argue that steel is so vital to this country that it must be brought into public ownership and simultaneously argue that, once it is in public ownership, it should be just as exposed to industrial disruption as any other business. The whole point of this public interest test, if it means anything at all, is that some things matter too much to be left to the ordinary run of commercial risk. Industrial action that threatens critical national infrastructure is precisely such a risk.

I invite the Minister to tell the House that the Government have considered the risk. I invite him to explain what powers the Secretary of State would have on the day a strike is called at a nationalised British Steel to keep the blast furnaces lit. If he cannot answer that question satisfactorily, this amendment provides exactly the answer that is needed.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the crucial issue of electricity prices. As the strategy is to convert more and more to electric arc furnaces, the price of electricity becomes the critical variant in determining how successful those businesses will be, how competitive their prices will be and whether they will generate cash and profit to reward those who ventured in them, or whether there will be problems for those businesses, just as there are problems in the British Steel carbon-based system through its blast furnaces. I hope the Minister can give us a little more background by way of reassurance, given that the steel strategy has been, and is still to be, based on electricity as the prime source of energy. There needs to be a policy that will consistently deliver competitive electricity prices because the current prices, without specific and targeted subsidy intervention, are way out of sync with the electricity prices in the more competitive world of our major competitor countries.

It is very important that this group of amendments raises the issue of tariffs. Of course, anybody valuing the assets that might be acquired under this legislation, or valuing what we already have by way of control and operating responsibility, will need to look at the impact of tariffs. It is a good idea to stress this because these are a very major change to the background for the conduct of steel businesses in this country, and we cannot be sure exactly what the impact is going to be. We have two types of impact arriving around the same time. There is the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which is, in effect, a fairly universal tariff based on the carbon content of imported material, which is clearly going to apply substantially to this industry. Then there are the specific tariffs which the Government have announced to come shortly, which target competitive steel coming into Britain with a very large increase in tariff and a rather low protected quota so that there will definitely be a substantial increase in cost for import.

You could argue, as I presume the Government do, that this is completely benign for our steel industry because it means that the combination of the immediate tariff and the soon to come CBAM tariff will make imported steel so much less competitive, and will therefore help reduce the pressures on our existing electric arc furnaces in the private sector and the two blast furnaces now, in effect, under the control—but not in the ownership—of the public sector. There will be some relief, as the policy intends. However, there can be other consequences which a valuer would have to take into account.

For example, the higher the cost of imported steel, the more difficult it will be for those many companies and industries that use and add value to steel in our wider steel-using industry. There will be limited scope for all users of imported steel to find exactly the right specifications of steel, and the right availability and pricing, from the rather limited-scale industry that the United Kingdom now has as a steel producer. There could well be financial difficulties, reductions in turnover and activity, or the collapse of steel-using businesses in the United Kingdom that face these very high tariff impositions on their main raw material. If they acquire more by way of import than at home and they cannot immediately substitute, you could have the paradoxical effect that the tariff designed to protect the British industry lost orders to the British industry as well as to the exporting industry from abroad. You could well have businesses here collapse—those that are substantial steel users but can no longer carry on the business efficiently to sustain their limited purchases from the UK, because of the cost of the expensive imports.

This needs careful policy examination. I am glad that the Government had one rethink about the tariff quota arrangements for this, but they probably need to do a bit more homework about the balance between the rather larger turnover at risk in steel-using businesses in the United Kingdom and the rather too small turnover available in steel production. They therefore probably need to consult a bit more widely over the medium- to longer-term impact on steel demand from domestic as well as imported sources.

I am interested in the proposals on impact on the economies, but I am not quite sure what is in mind and how it would work out. It is quite right, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, that there will have been impacts from previous closures or redundancies, and there could be future bad impacts as steel plants become more productive and need less labour, or as the final conversion is made from blast furnaces to electric arc, when there would clearly be a substantial loss of employment. There will need to be assistance and help for those who lose their jobs or have lost them in the past but still have not been able to retrain or find good alternative employment. One needs rather more by way of detail, and I am not quite sure that this Bill is the right place to do that, because it relates to a series of other government initiatives, funds and programmes that are more generally available. However, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, might be right that they need to be improved. That is a subject for another conversation on another day.

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The Government may say that they will act responsibly. I hope that they will. But the Bill will create lasting powers, and ministerial assurances are just not a substitute for statutory safeguards. The Bill, as we have said before, risks leaving taxpayers with an open-ended bill, and that is most unsatisfactory. I beg to move.

[Lord Redwood (Con)]

I am very glad that my noble friend raised the issue of an impact assessment, because if the Government press ahead with the acquisition of British Steel under the legislation, that could be the first opportunity we have for a realistic impact assessment. Yet, the taxpayer has been responsible for the losses in working capital and investment funds for over a year now, with the lack of clear reporting that we have commented on before.

We have an impact assessment for this piece of legislation. Understandably, it says that there are not any costs or benefits to report, because there is not a transaction. These are enabling powers, which would enable the Government to undertake and complete a transaction. But it would only be at that point that officials tasked with the difficult question “What is the impact?” would be able to come up with some numbers, because we would then presumably have some visibility on the cost of acquisition, if any, the operating costs and working capital costs that will go forward. That would be very helpful, in connection with the difficult investment at Scunthorpe, where, as we heard earlier, the NAO reported that there has already probably been £642 million of taxpayer expenditure up to the current month, with a very high run rate going forwards. So, I hope that the Government will offer us reassurance—if not a new clause in the Bill—to say that there will have to be a proper and timely impact assessment.

That, too, would clearly require proper due diligence, which I trust has been under way, now that the Government are responsible for the business. We would need to know that there had been a proper study of Anne and Bess, the two blast furnaces, which were either built or last substantially modified in the early 1950s. These are ageing assets. They have had deep maintenance in this century, but we would need a condition statement on that, so that the Government are reassured that however long they think they can run these blast furnaces for is feasible in terms of the condition of the plant. In order to sustain the employment for the next month, year or whatever it may be, we would need to know that there will not be major maintenance required or no question of having to cool the furnaces down, because that is a dangerous and expensive process and would raise issues about how easy it would be to spend enough money to reinstate these particular assets.

Of course, it would also require proper reporting to the Government—not supplying all the detail to us, but proper reporting on market prospects and how the steel product produced at Scunthorpe is perceived, and what the market opportunities, in general terms, might be and other supporting documents. It will require a serious impact statement, for the benefit of democratic accountability. More importantly, that would prove that the Government have done their homework, because the Government should not be taking on a plant like this unless they have a condition report, a marketing report, a proper cost examination and so forth, which I and my noble friends have been referring to.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to be the bringer of bad news to the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, but I suspect that it is pretty clear that the condition of the blast furnaces is poor and whatever happens, either to reinstate them to the level that would take them forward or to invest in electric arc, will take a lot of money. That is the point that we are focusing in on, and that is why we are focusing in on the public interest test. We have not yet gotten past Clause 2 yet, because this is the crunch.

I have a group of amendments in the next group, so I will reserve almost everything I have to say. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already disobeyed his Amendment 2, because we are seeking to broaden the scope of the public interest test. With respect to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, there is such a number of issues that have to be addressed within the particular field of potential investment that the public interest really requires focus. I will leave it at that for this group and then come back to these in the next group.