European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we need a Bill to maintain within law the protections and the continuity that we have. The decision to leave the European Union having been made—whatever one thinks of it—the consequence will be that many laws on which we presently depend will fall away unless steps are taken to keep them in place. But that does not mean just any Bill. This legislation is so serious and so important—for ourselves, for our citizens, for our children—that we have to get it right, and getting a complicated and important piece of legislation right is one of the things that this House does particularly well. We need to make it fit for purpose, as my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon said, or—in the rather more graphic terms of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd—copper-bottomed, ironclad and storm-proof. She is absolutely right, because when the Bill becomes an Act it will have to withstand many storms from citizens hoping that it still delivers protections for their rights, and we must not disappoint them; and from lawyers, and I speak as one, hoping to thwart them or to provide even more.

I have never before heard a debate in which so many Lords from all parties and from none have criticised a Bill for its technical deficiencies, its assault on our constitution, its assault on parliamentary sovereignty, its extraordinary switch of power to Ministers, the jeopardy it creates to our devolution settlement and the legal uncertainty it creates, not to mention the risk it poses to the peace in Ireland and the Good Friday agreement. Whatever the differences on other matters—leave or remain, a second referendum or not—there seems to be a wide measure of agreement that the Bill, as it stands, does not do what is required to make it fit for purpose. Wanting to make it fit for purpose is not putting a spanner in the works. It is not frustrating the Bill or the people’s will. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, was right to make that point. So there will be many amendments that we will have to consider, such as dropping the word “appropriate” in many places for something much tighter. I hope the Government heard the powerful challenge to it from the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton—who as a former Cabinet Secretary and, indeed, Permanent Secretary of the most legislating department of all, the Home Office, knows a thing or two about legislation—and his comments on what Ministers might do and delegated powers. Indeed, I hope they heard the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, with his experience in local and central government.

It has been a privilege to hear so many excellent speeches and outstanding contributions, such as those from the noble Lords, Lord Higgins and Lord Patten of Barnes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, not to mention those from this side, such as the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Judd—as well as some unforgettable images, such as the gangplank into thin air of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges; the nervous maiden aunts of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, settling down to a Quentin Tarantino movie; or the rather worrying image conjured up by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, of somebody—and I am not quite sure how many people—getting into a bath to sing. But to make this Bill fit for purpose requires in my mind at least three objectives: to make sure there is legal certainty after the Bill is passed; to ensure that protections for the people, workers and women of this country, and everyone else, are not diminished—I pay tribute here to my noble friend Lady Crawley for rightly pointing out how European law has protected women; and, thirdly, to do so in a way which maintains the critical elements of our constitution, including devolution and, above all, the sovereignty of Parliament.

The damage this Bill will do to our constitution, if not significantly amended, has been powerfully described by a number of noble Lords and in the brilliant report of our Constitution Committee. They are right to say that this Bill, as it stands, is constitutionally unacceptable, including the largest transfer of power, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said. They are right to say that it risks undermining legal certainty in a number of ways.

I want to say, in the short time I have, a word or two about the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. I declare an interest in that I was, as many Members of the House will know, the representative of the Prime Minister—in fact, the United Kingdom Government representative—in the negotiation of the charter, so I had a very close involvement in its drafting. A number of other Members of your Lordships’ House were also involved. The noble Lord, Lord Bowness, was a representative of the House with my noble friend Lady Howells of St Davids as his alternate. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, was a Member of the European Parliament delegation, while the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, was at the time an alternate Member representing the House of Commons. I mention those noble Lords not to share with them any of the criticisms that have been made of the charter, but to illustrate something that is not often recalled about it. It was drawn up by a wide body representing Parliaments, the European Union institutions and Governments.

I need also to declare that I have spoken and written many times on the charter because of my close involvement with its drafting. I have no doubt that during the coming debates, some of what I said or have written will be pushed back to me, because it is the case that we in the United Kingdom were anxious to avoid confusion with other rights, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, and so emphasised the limited role of the charter. But that was then and a lot has happened since. The charter has been relied on in national and supranational courts, it has been talked about a great deal, and in Committee we will have to look at some of this. We need to remember that the rights in the charter do not derive only from the ECHR, as is sometimes thought, but from a number of sources, including EU law as well as general principles of law which have no other individual legislative base. It also adds important remedies which do not otherwise exist.

That brings me to a point made by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lady Blackstone, and by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. Why are the Government so determined that the one element of protection that will not be kept in place after the Bill has been passed is the Charter of Fundamental Rights? They say that there is no need because all the rights are protected in any event. If that is so, what is the harm in keeping it in place? If it is not the case and removing the charter will come, as many people believe, to diminish the protections they currently have, that would be a bad turn. In fact there are a number of good reasons why we need to keep the charter—reasons enumerated by, for example, the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the commentary in its report, Legislative Scrutiny: The EU (Withdrawal) Bill: A Right by Right Analysis. I respectfully commend that to noble Lords. Six powerful reasons are given why we need to keep the charter.

According to the Guardian, one of the new Brexit Ministers, Suella Fernandes, has said that exiting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights would “avoid” extra protections. If that is what is happening, that is not maintaining the protections which currently exist in this country. Even if it were right that the protections add nothing, why remove them? It will mean that the rights in the charter from which we and our fellow citizens should benefit will be less accessible and less visible. That is because making rights visible and accessible was one of the key purposes of the charter. It would be mean-spirited to remove it. To make a change in this Bill to reduce the visibility and accessibility of rights, even if eventually they can all be found somewhere else is—I say it again—mean-spirited. Having and celebrating rights, not hiding them but being proud of them, is the mark of a good, decent culture. That is the sort of culture and country in which I want my children and grandchildren to grow up.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Goldsmith]

13A: Clause 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations bringing into force subsection (1) may not be made until the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament proposals for arrangements for the continued application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to retained EU law under sections 2, 3 and 4.”

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we now come to the first group of amendments that deals with the exclusion from the Bill of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. A number of amendments relate to the exclusion of the charter and to its specific provisions, so this may be a convenient place to debate the general principle of what the Government are proposing and the issues to which that gives rise. I shall therefore speak also to Amendments 14, 20, 25 and 34. Amendments 46, 47, 333 and 347 are consequential and I apprehend that there will be no need to say anything more about them.

The starting point for these amendments is the Government’s decision to exclude the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from the carryover into domestic law of existing EU law that the Bill is otherwise designed to achieve. As noble Lords know, and as the Government have been at pains to point out, the purpose of the Bill is to maintain legal continuity, certainty and stability for businesses and individuals by incorporating EU law as it stands into UK law. As the Prime Minister said in her foreword to the White Paper, the purpose is to ensure that:

“The same rules and laws will apply on the day after exit as on the day before”.


The White Paper goes on to explain that it will then be for democratically elected representatives in the UK, in this Parliament and the devolved Administrations, to decide whether to change that law after full and proper scrutiny and debate. This decision to bring EU law into UK law at the moment of exit is an essential part of the plan to provide clarity and is necessary, it is said by the Government, to bolster confidence and planning as the Brexit process comes into effect. The noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal said at Second Reading that this is,

“about ensuring that people’s rights are maintained. It is vital to a smooth and orderly exit from the EU”.—[Official Report, 30/1/18; col. 1374.]

However, there is one glaring and deeply troubling exception to the proposal to bring EU law into domestic law so that it is the same the day after exit as it was the day before: the exclusion of the charter, in its entirety, from this exercise.

In another place, the Solicitor-General described the exercise as downloading EU law into domestic law, but what is not being downloaded is the charter. In another place, Sir Keir Starmer noted that although thousands of provisions of EU law are being converted into domestic law, and may have to be modified in some sense after that exercise, only one provision in the thousands on thousands of provisions of EU law is singled out for extinction, and that is the charter. That gives rise to a conundrum.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Is the noble and learned Lord going to come on to explaining why it was, when he was Attorney-General and working with Tony Blair, he worked so hard to try to get the charter excluded from the Lisbon treaty? Indeed, they thought they had achieved such an opt-out from the treaty until it was overruled subsequently by the European Court of Justice. Surely what we are doing now is trying to fulfil the objective that he himself had in mind.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I can see noble Lords opposite are all very well briefed. I predicted this at Second Reading. I will come on to that, but let me make some progress on the arguments which matter.

[Noble Lords]

Answer!

[Lord Goldsmith]

No, I will make some progress on the arguments which matter. As the Constitution Committee of this House said at paragraph 119 of its report, the conundrum is this:

“The primary purpose of this Bill is to maintain legal continuity and promote legal certainty by retaining existing EU law as part of our law, while conferring powers on ministers to amend the retained EU law. If, as the Government suggests, the Charter of Fundamental Rights adds nothing to the content of EU law which is being retained, we do not understand why an exception needs to be made for it. If, however, the Charter does add value, then legal continuity suggests that the Bill should not make substantive changes to the law which applies immediately after exit day”.


I want to examine the reasons that are put forward for not including the charter. The more I look at the arguments, the more convinced I become that the Government have got it wrong. I will not deny that there are issues as to the best way to bring the charter into effect in domestic law, and there are other amendments which will debate that, but Amendment 13A would require the Government to bring forward proposals for its continued application and the route by which the charter can be given effect.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Would the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee whether he is contemplating that the charter should be incorporated into domestic law as a statute, and as such be capable of amendment?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am suggesting that the charter is brought into domestic law in the same way as all the other provisions of EU law will be brought into domestic law by this Bill, if it is passed. That means that they will be subject to the powers in the clauses that will be passed for amendment through orders, if this House and the other place approve that way of doing it. They will also, of course, as always, be subject to amendment by primary legislation. I will come on to this, but it is interesting that special protection is given to the ECHR through the Human Rights Act to protect it as we go forward, but there is no protection provided at all for the rights which underlie the charter. That is one of the deficiencies that are not taken account of in the Government’s proposal.

[Baroness Deech]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that perhaps we are being tied in knots by his argument? The nub of the charter, and why it is different from the European Convention on Human Rights and our Human Rights Act, is that the charter says that judges can set aside, invalidate or nullify our Acts of Parliament. That is the nub of it and is why it does not sit with the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty. If you incorporate it in domestic law, you are in a real tangle, because if you try to repeal it, judges could set that aside. You end up in a vicious spiral.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the intervention. Of course it is not the charter which provides that, in certain circumstances, our courts have the ability to disapply domestic law; it is EU law and its ability to override Parliament. That is not what the charter has created; it is EU law that has created it. That is something which this Bill is intended to remove.

I want to get back on to the reasons why. The first reason put forward—this is the nub of the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson—is that the charter merely codifies existing rights and principles.

[Noble Lords]

Lamont!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise to both noble Lords. The proposition is that the charter does no more than codify existing rights and principles, so it is not necessary to bring it in. It has been said, for example, by the very distinguished and independent Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law that that proposition is demonstrably not correct. It sets that out in a detailed report that I commend to noble Lords. An opinion of Queen’s Counsel obtained by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission concludes that in fact this would lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the United Kingdom. Against those independent statements, it is no wonder that many NGOs and many members of civil society are deeply troubled about the exclusion of the charter. It is not just civil society that is concerned about that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, noted in the last debate, but industries such as the tech industry.

One can find examples of rights that are not protected in the report, which I also commend to noble Lords, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its right-by-right analysis it identifies which rights are already included in our law and which are not. For example, on the very first item in the charter—Article 1 on the protection of human dignity, which many people would regard as the most fundamental human right and the basis of all others—the Government’s right-by-right analysis gives two reasons for saying that that would be continued: first, an unincorporated treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which does not have enforceable effect in this country at all; and, secondly, as a general principle of EU law—but, as noble Lords will know, this Bill seeks to prevent general principles of EU law being given effect or creating any enforceable rights. That is an aspect that we will have to come back to later in the debates on the Bill.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord identifies the fact that certain rights are no longer protected adequately because the charter contains rights that are not there in the European convention or, presumably, otherwise provided for by law. Could he tell the House why the Human Rights Act was not expanded to take into account the protection of these laws? At no time from 1998 to the time when the Labour Government lost power was there any attempt to include these rights that he now says are a central part of our law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

They were, because the charter provided for them. The Human Rights Act incorporated one set of provisions only, the European Convention on Human Rights, which goes back to just after the Second World War and which provides the classic political and civil rights. The other rights that we find in the charter, which is a much longer document and refers to socioeconomic rights, were not included in the Human Rights Act because they were not included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The right-by-right analysis demonstrates which of these rights are not included. Given that the Government’s objective, as stated by the Prime Minister, is to ensure that the protections for people in this country are the same the day after exit as the day before, I respectfully suggest that it is not for me to identify why that is not right; it is for the Government to demonstrate why it is. When we have substantial independent bodies such as the Bingham Centre and independent opinions from QCs demonstrating that actually it is not the case that the protections remain the same, the Government need to explain. I shall come on to that further.

Obviously there are examples of rights in the charter that reflect precisely other rights that we have within our law. In particular, there are a number of rights in the charter that are explicitly based on the European Convention on Human Rights; they are the same. Indeed, during the negotiations I went to some pains to try to ensure that they were phrased in the same way so as to prevent lawyers from saying, “It’s written differently so it must mean something different”. However, those are not the only rights that are there. As I noted at Second Reading, the charter is based not just on the European Convention on Human Rights but on principles of EU law and on principles that are commonly accepted by the member states, and those are in a different position from the ECHR rights.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Just take one of the rights that is precisely mirrored in the convention. Is it suggested that henceforth, the wise complainant who faces primary legislation here which is incompatible with that right should therefore sue under both the charter and the convention because, lo and behold, under the convention, despite the constitutional arrangement whereby the court’s powers are limited to a declaration of incompatibility, he can disapply the primary legislation? Is that to be the consequence: that in a case where it matches, the convention trumps the constitutional settlement we arrived at, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred?

[Lord Goldsmith]

That will depend on the shape of the Bill when it is completed—in particular, what is said about the provisions which deal with primacy of EU law—but at the moment, as the noble and learned Lord will know well from the cases he sat on, people have been bringing cases by reference to both the charter and the convention. One reason for that is that the protection under the charter is more powerful. In future, if people want protection of human rights, they will want the more powerful protection, and if that remains available after the Bill is enacted, they will look to it.

[Baroness Deech]

So if that protection is more powerful, the entire British structure relating to human fertilisation and embryology, which is very liberal and go-ahead, could be wiped out by the application of Article 3. It is very fortunate that the bodies opposed to our progress in reproductive rights have not cottoned on to that. It talks about the prohibition of eugenics, whatever that is, and selection of persons. By interpretation, it would stop us doing mitochondrial research, selection of embryos to screen out disease and a whole host of other things. Another article ensures continuing freedom of movement. Surely we do not want that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Baroness raises two different points. Some of the rights in the charter plainly do not continue after exit because they are dependent on our membership of the EU. Those include freedom of movement, which is based, as the explanations of the charter plainly show, on the rights that currently exist. There are others, such as the right to vote in European elections, which will not apply.

Let me make this point now, because it is one of the objections raised to keeping the charter in. As with many other provisions of EU law, there will need to be changes—I think they are described as deficiencies in the Bill; defects. For example, other provisions of EU law refer to bodies to which we will no longer belong or to supervising agencies with which we will no longer be concerned because we will have left the European Union. That is what the provisions of the deficiency orders are intended to deal with. So, too, they can deal with matters under the charter which no longer have effect for that reason.

The noble Baroness’s first point was a different matter, which was to do with the ambit of Article 3. I am sure that she has it clearly in mind, but the explanations of Article 3 make it clear that:

“The reference to eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, relates to possible situations in which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts deemed to be international crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court”.


I do not doubt that the noble Baroness would be as opposed to those provisions as the rest of us would be. In relation to reproductive cloning, which may be what she had in mind, the explanations talk about being against reproductive cloning, but that is not the same as therapeutic cloning. We can have debates about that if need be.

Let me move on, if I may, because I have only started to deal with one aspect of the issue. In terms of the substantive protections that the charter provides but the ECHR does not, although it covers many of the same, reference has been made already to the case of Mr David Davis himself and Mr Tom Watson. I say this not because it is amusing to point the finger at Mr Davis, in his current position, having relied on the charter, as we know he did, but because it is illustrative of something significant. As a Back Bencher, he and Mr Watson brought a case against the provisions of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act—DRIPA. Mr Davis was concerned that they would impinge on the ability of MPs to have confidential communications from their constituents. In his argument, he and his lawyers relied on the charter, and they were successful in doing so. The court agreed that the charter was relevant.

Another example of new rights, developed rights or rights that have emerged through the dynamic approach of the charter is in the Google Spain case in which the right to be forgotten arose as a result of an examination of Articles 7 and 8 by the Court of Justice of the European Union. So, there are a number of examples where the substantive protections will be different. I have made it clear that there are many examples where the substantive protections are the same, but the purpose behind the Bill is to make sure that the protections for people are the same the day after leaving as the day before.

It is not just the substantive protections. There are different remedies, one of which has been referred to already—the ability to disapply legislation if that is where the Bill ends up at the end of the day. That is a more powerful remedy than the Human Rights Act. That was demonstrated in the Benkharbouche case when the State Immunity Act was disapplied so that foreign employees of an embassy could bring claims, which they would not otherwise be able to bring, so as to produce a more just situation.

The Government’s position on the substantive protections appears to have changed. I understood that the Government said that the protections would be the same, but now the formula that appears to be being used is that there will be no significant loss of substantive protection. That is not the same thing. No significant loss of substantive protection means that there is some loss of substantive protection, though someone takes the view that it is not significant. That is not the same as the principle the Prime Minister’s foreword set out.

Will the Minister respond to the following questions? First, will he confirm that the Government no longer contend that disapplying, excluding the charter, will lead to all the same existing substantive protections, or do they accept that some of them will not exist? If so, will he tell the Committee either now or subsequently what those are? Secondly, I referred to the phrase “no significant loss of substantive protections”. Does the Minister agree that that leaves aside the question of whether procedural or other protections will be excluded as a result of excluding the charter from this protection? I ask the Minister to identify what the differences are and whether he accepts that there will be a loss of protection, even though the Government wish to say that it is not significant, so that the Committee can judge. Also, he will need to say, please, why that meets the objective the Prime Minister set in her foreword to the White Paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I promise that I will not intervene again—I loathe intervening. But does the noble and learned Lord agree, although he proposes the domestication of the charter, it will still be necessary in future to decide what is within the ambit of what used to be EU law, because that is where the operation of the charter is presently confined—or does he suggest that now it opens up and encompasses all UK law, so that it is a wider application than it was originally? Are we going to have to go again through the impossible exercise, notoriously uncertain in application, of having to decide what is specifically and directly within the ambit of EU law in future as well?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I know that this is a point that troubles him, but he should bear in mind that what we have in Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the Bill are provisions to bring specific aspects of EU derived legislation and EU direct effect legislation into UK law. That is the Union law that will continue, and that is what is defined as retained EU law—and it is to that retained EU law that the charter will continue to have effect under the scheme that I advocate to your Lordships, not to anything else or more broadly UK law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

So the right to dignity would exist in the context of EU law, but not otherwise? Is that really how it is intended to work? Can the noble and learned Lord give an illustration of a case that will succeed under the right to human dignity in future—I mean, there has not ever been one in the past that has succeeded under that—when otherwise it would fail?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I find this very difficult to understand. If you look at the charter, you find reference to the Union in item after item. It begins with a series of rights, but as soon as you penetrate further you find that it is closely related to membership of the Union and things that are guaranteed by its law. If I understood the noble and learned Lord correctly, he wants the charter to be brought in and protected against that kind of amendment in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights. This charter will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU. I simply do not understand how the system is intended to work if it were brought into our law in the way the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord will recall that, whenever he opposed me with that argument from his position in the House of Lords or Supreme Court, I did my best to try to explain why there is an error in his thinking. With respect, I do the same here. If one takes, for example, one of the rights in the charter which does derive from Union law, is it to be said that although it is going to be transposed into our law as an EU retained law, it will no longer be subject to any of the protections that it has at the moment through being subject to the charter? It does not mean, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, suggested, that all UK law will be subject to this protection. It does mean that that law which is currently subject to that protection will continue to be so unless and until it is amended. That is the way that one gives effect to the intention that the law should be the same the day after Brexit as the day before.

I want to underline that we are talking about the extent of substantive protections; other protections and their extent; and the lack of enhancement of rights. These are all distinct points. I will also refer to the loss of the effect of charter principles. Noble Lords who have studied the charter will know that as well as rights there are principles. The principles are more aspirational, but they guide the legislator and that is a useful thing to have. Even leaving that aside, the other items I identified—the substantive protections, their nature and their enhancement or lack of it—are all things which mean we will not have the same protections after exit day as we have at the moment.

[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble and learned Lord telling the House that these principles are going to be actionable on their own?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Lord knows that that is not the position in relation to the principles: they are guidance and aspirational. I am not spending a lot of time on them, although some of the NGOs have. I will give one example. There was a case in which the EU’s proposed legislation in relation to plain packaging of tobacco products was challenged in the courts on the grounds that it contravened freedom of expression. One of the things that the court looking at that noted was that the charter provided for a high degree of public protection in terms of health. I hope that all noble Lords agree with that sentiment, whether or not they agree with the result of the case. That is an example of where the principles come into effect.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I apologise for interrupting the noble and learned Lord a second time. We have listened to what he has said with great care. He has spoken for 34 minutes. He said that he would answer the question I posed at the very beginning of his speech—namely, why he had altered his mind when previously he had tried to keep the charter out of the Lisbon treaty, when he then said that it ought to have no direct domestic effect. Why has he changed his mind?

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I was about to come to that and I am grateful to the noble Lord.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Goldsmith]

I said that I would come back to it, and that is what I intended to do. A number of things have happened since the charter was drafted, as I said on Second Reading. The courts have referred to provisions of the charter and have given them effect. The decision was made to give the charter legal effect, which was not the way we started the negotiation. That is what happened in the Lisbon treaty, but that was not the original intention. That is what we argued against at the time, precisely so as to avoid the situation in which the courts were in a position to give effect to rights that we had not expected them to give effect to. That is what changed. That is why we now have a situation, where, as I have said, in a number of cases the courts have said that the charter has an effect and provides enforceable rights to individuals.

I conclude. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered that the Government’s decision to exclude the charter, while effectively retaining nearly all other EU law, was taken without having undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the implications for the protection of rights. I cannot say whether that is right, but this amendment would require a focus to be given to that so that we can see what the correct analysis is and what the right way to proceed is. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 14A, 20A and 25A in this group, which stand in my name. I apologise for the absence of my noble friend Lord Bowness, who has put his name to a number of amendments but cannot be here because of weather conditions. He has asked me to apologise to your Lordships for his absence.

The purpose of the three amendments standing in my name is to ensure that the terms of the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, are capable of amendment by Parliament. This may be implied by the other amendments, but I think not. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord. While there is a capacity to remedy deficiencies by regulation, there is no capacity to enable Parliament to mount a careful scrutiny and amendment of the charter. Therefore, the purpose of my amendments is to make it explicit that the charter, if incorporated into domestic law, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment.

I do not want to say very much by way of a general justification for the need to incorporate the charter; I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord who has spoken has much greater expertise than I. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will probably speak. He, too, has much greater knowledge of this than I. I am but a journeyman lawyer and I have never had to wrestle with the charter’s significance in domestic terms. However, I noticed last week in the Times that Professor Bogdanor made a very powerful case for not scrapping the rights. The important thing that your Lordships need to keep in mind is that the charter provides a number of rights and remedies not found elsewhere in our domestic law. That point was made by the noble and learned Lord.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 14, the effect of which is to retain the charter as part of domestic law and to retain EU law under which claimants would be able to have domestic legislation struck down on the basis of incompatibility with the charter. Some noble Lords have expressed the view that they were baffled by the exclusion of the charter from this legislation, but I felt that the arguments were put very simply and cogently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, at Second Reading when he simply pointed out that the charter is only one part of our extensive framework of human rights, that there would be a risk of confusion because of conflict with the ECHR and that what this was doing was complicating the situation to no good purpose.

Furthermore, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has produced a memorandum showing how existing rights are being provided for in the legislation and in retained law. He has also gone further and said that if anyone can provide specific examples of rights that are not provided for, he will give the matter due consideration. Various people have suggested various things that may or may not be suitable for inclusion, but they will no doubt be considered by the Secretary of State and could be considered for primary legislation.

I asked the noble and learned Lord why he had changed his mind about the incorporation of the charter, which he and Prime Minister Blair strongly opposed in the Lisbon treaty. I do not want to go over that, as I think I made my point, but I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that he had very good reasons for excluding it, and that now is an opportunity—

[Lord Goldsmith]

In fact, this country accepted that the charter would become part of EU law in the Lisbon treaty—it is the opposite of what the noble Lord said.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Against the noble and learned Lord’s will. There was also an attempt to get an opt-out, which the European Court of Justice said was not valid. I see that the Minister is agreeing with me. I believe that is a correct account of what happened. It was struck down. The case in which it happened was, I think, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The potential answer is no, and the note says that my time is up. Nevertheless, and be that as it may, we will endeavour to address these issues as soon as we can. Clearly it will require us not only to consider the position we have adopted already in the document published in December last year but to take into consideration the concerns expressed by other lawyers and in this Committee in the course of the debate. We will look at those and we will want to address them at the next stage of the Bill; of that, I am confident.

At this stage I appreciate that there are some questions which I have not directly answered in the course of my response and it may be difficult to do so in the time remaining. Perhaps I may say that I endorse entirely the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood, with regard to the potential difficulties of simply drawing the charter over into domestic law. I am not going to elaborate on the consequences of doing that, but they can be summarised as confusion, uncertainty and difficulty, and ultimately could prove to be counterproductive. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have taken part in the debate. It has been wide-ranging, as we anticipated it would be. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks. I shall obviously not spend long on what I say now, given the hour. As we approached midnight, I was looking around the corner to see whether a pumpkin would arrive with horses. I was not sure whether it would be for me or for the noble and learned Lord opposite.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords—

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

We need to speak from these Benches as well.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made a powerful speech in favour of his amendment, backed by the powerful arguments of the Constitution Committee. It is apparent that this gives rise not to a difference on what the end objective should be: the need for clarity; the need for a clear status for EU law; and the recognition that retained EU law will need to retain its position of priority over pre-existing UK law because that is the status it has at the moment and because, as we have been reminded in debate after debate, the Government have promised that EU law will be passed across on exit day as it is at the moment. The routes proposed by the Constitution Committee and the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law—and in the interesting proposals put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—demonstrate that it is possible to reach those objectives by different routes.

However, the methods put forward by the Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, have the merit of simplicity and elegance. The status of the law is clear. We do not have to go through a process of trying to decide between now and next February what it is; we certainly do not have to go through a process of allowing a Minister to use powers under Clause 17 to assign a process, which would be, as the Constitution Committee says, an unacceptable approach.

It would have the additional advantage, or so it would seem to me at least, that retained EU law would then have some protection against amendability, save by the processes of this House and the other place considering the amendments which ought to be made rather than by a process of delegated legislation—I say “some” protection, because it would not be complete. Those seem reasons why the elegant solution proposed by the Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has much to commend it

I would like to read when it becomes available what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, to make sure that I fully understood all of it. I do not disagree with the intention behind it, but the proposal of the Constitution Committee may achieve it more readily and elegantly.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions and for the opportunity to respond to this debate. These provisions and amendments may be technical, but, in debating them, we must not lose sight of the real practical consequences that follow from how we deal with this issue. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, observed in passing, we are aiming at the same goal; it is a question of which route can most appropriately take us there. I shall come on in due course to look at some of the routes proposed.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I was referring to the different proposals by the Constitution Committee and the Bingham Centre, rather than to the Government’s proposals.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Then I reassure the noble and learned Lord that we are all intent on arriving in the same place; it is a question of how we arrive there. I shall deal with the routes that he touched on.

Perhaps I may correct one point: the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, referred to the work of Professor Craig and to some previous remarks that I had made about that. I commend to him what I said as recorded in Hansard. I referred to the publication of 26 February on the previous occasion; it did not come out after those remarks were made. I shall mention Professor Craig’s analysis in due course. The task of categorising such legislation would be challenging, but we would consider it as one route forward.

As we know, one of the core requirements of EU membership is the principle of supremacy of EU law. In the event of any conflict with domestic law, domestic law must give way. When we leave the EU, it would make no sense and would not be in keeping with our principles to leave that unchanged in our law; we all recognise that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right. If retained EU law were to be categorised as primary legislation, such challenges could not be brought. But the Minister resisted that suggestion in our earlier debate. I am concerned with the Bill as it is at the moment. What is the Government’s intention in this respect?

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, that short exchange has demonstrated how complicated this area is and how important the general principles of EU law are in it. It is, perhaps, late at night to be discussing this but it is extremely important because of both the principles and the way they operate. If one looks at it in this way, and takes the Government’s intention not to take away rights as a part of this process, one has to recognise that the architecture which provides rights at the moment is quite complicated. As a commentator has said, there is no single, simple answer to restoring the position in the light of what the Government propose to do.

Amendment 41, which stands in my name, follows the principle the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, initiated by saying that the general principles of EU law should continue to be capable of giving rise to rights which can be enforced by our courts. The point has already been made that there is a difference between these general rights existing as a way of interpreting other rights—as an interpretive technique—and giving rise to freestanding rights themselves. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 prevents any action being founded in contravention of one of the general principles or rendering any Executive act unlawful or disapplying any legislation, including secondary legislation, on the grounds that it offends these general principles.

The general principles of EU law have been critical to a number of legal decisions relating to people’s rights. One of those often cited is the case of John Walker, who brought a case for equal protection in pension rights for his same-sex partner, a claim upheld by the Supreme Court which recognised that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a key principle of EU law. As I apprehend it, without that the case would not have succeeded.

The principle of effectiveness of remedies has also been relied upon. When the Supreme Court struck down employment tribunal fees that disproportionately affected disadvantaged women and low-paid workers, the principle of effectiveness of remedies was relied upon. Cases concerning caps on compensation and equal pay cases have depended upon the general principle that we find in the EU principles. The amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to enable those general principles to continue to have that effect in our law. It is important that they do for a couple of other reasons. Take, for example, something that was raised in the other place. What if there is a principle of EU retained law which is deficient, defective, does not operate properly or is disproportionate? Without being able to rely upon the general principles of EU law, it may be that all the court could do if faced with that would be to say that either that principle or that particular Act or that particular piece of law, though deficient or defective, has to continue to operate because there is no principle by which it can be struck down, and that would be a loss.

The other reason goes back, I am afraid, to the debate that we had last week on the charter and the Government’s assertion that the charter is not necessary because all the rights are otherwise protected under our law. Of course, at the time the charter was drawn up we were still a member and, in many people’s minds at least, were expected to continue to remain a member of the European Union with all that that implied, including the continued application of general principles. But if one looks—

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

If the noble Lord will allow me to make this point, he can then, of course, intervene. If one looks, as we did briefly last week, at the reasons given by the Government in their right by right analysis for why certain rights would, according to them, continue to exist, we see—I take this from the JCHR’s analysis—that 16 out of 50 of the rights are based, in part at least, on the general principles of EU law. If the general principles of EU law have no more value than as an interpretive tool, that principle would disappear. That means that those rights that the JCHR saw could continue to exist and give rise to rights only because of the general EU rights.

[Lord Faulks]

When we were having the debate about the charter, I specifically asked the noble and learned Lord whether principles which were referred to in the charter were actionable or not, and he said that in his contention, they were not actionable. I am not simply trying to make some forensic point, but I seek clarity from him as to why in that context he said that the principles were not actionable—I can well understand his answer, because principles are rather difficult to identify as regards a clear breach, for example—but he now says that the Bill is wrong and that principles should somehow be actionable.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for the question, because it enables me to clarify that point. There are two sorts of principles. I was talking in answer to the noble Lord’s question last week about the principles which are contained in the charter itself. The charter says that it is a charter of rights and principles, and the principles there—it is not that easy to identify which are principles and which are not—are not actionable in themselves. They may become actionable, because as they are aspirational tools, they are then implemented into law and are actionable at that stage. The principles we are talking about here are different. These are the general principles of EU law, which are, for example, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of non-discrimination. These are different in that sense; they are general rather than specific principles, and they are actionable at the moment. That is why the Walker case I mentioned gives rise to a remedy, as did the other cases where the Supreme Court struck down tribunal fees as being disproportionately high for particular categories of workers.

That is why we believe it is important to keep this. It is one element of the architecture to retain rights. I remind noble Lords that the Prime Minister made it clear that the intention was that rights would continue the same the day after exit as the day before. To remove general principles in this way, and the ability to rely upon them, will fail to keep that promise. This amendment also—it has been referred to already—specifically proposes that the general principles of EU law should include those which are contained in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Those are environmental principles of huge importance: the precautionary principle, the principle of polluter pays and the principle for preventive action. Those principles and the others I referred to need to continue to operate to keep in place the rights that people enjoy at the moment.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their brevity.

Amendment 40ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to ensure that challenges to validity could continue on general principles of EU law grounds. I will address concerns raised on general principles in more detail later. First, Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave the EU. We recognise, however, that in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument. For example, a decision of an EU institution or body may be addressed directly to an individual or business. After exit, they would continue to be able to challenge such decisions—in so far as they apply in the EU—before the CJEU, and to have them annulled. Of course, the converted form of the decision would however remain in force within the UK as retained EU law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 would, after exit day, prevent a challenge to a provision of retained EU law by reference to common-law principles. I understand that the answer is no, it would not, and it is not intended to do so. I hope that that meets the position that he raised with me a moment ago.

Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not believe it would be right to hand them a new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU in this context. This amendment would effectively ask our courts to consider whether the EU acted incompatibly with the general principles when it made an EU instrument. Generally speaking, this is a function that we do not consider it appropriate to confer on domestic courts.

Therefore, although I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, the amendment would undermine the Government’s stated policy of a clear exclusion of both validity challenges and general principle challenges provided for within Schedule 1. However, we recognise that there might be some limited circumstances in which it would be sensible to maintain the ability to challenge retained EU law on validity grounds. The Bill therefore contains a power set out in paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1, to which the noble Baroness alluded, which would enable the Minister to make regulations providing for a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in specified circumstances.

Sub-paragraph (3) sets out that those regulations may provide that a challenge which would previously have proceeded against an EU institution may, after exit, proceed against a UK public authority, because of course there would be no EU institution against which it could be directed. I seek to reassure the noble Baroness that the word “may” is there as a precautionary term lest, in the context of trying to make such a regulatory power, it be perceived that there is no easily identifiable body against which the matter can be directed. However, the intent is that it should be possible to proceed against a public body in those circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I fully acknowledge that that is most certainly a circumstance that could arise. Of course, one might address that circumstance by Parliament legislating to reflect the outcome of that post-Brexit decision. However, I fully acknowledge that, depending on the way in which one constructs the departure on exit day, one might find that what one has retained as EU law ceases to be EU law almost immediately after one has left the EU. I believe that that has been acknowledged on a number of occasions. Indeed, it could lead to the development of two parallel jurisprudences—one for retained EU law and one for EU law. That is an inevitable outcome of our decision to leave the EU but to retain in our domestic law that which was EU law at the point of our departure. I fully acknowledge that, but it might also be a circumstance in which potentially one would seek to exercise the exceptional regulatory power that is referred to.

Reference was made to Amendments 41 and 42, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, which seek to retain indefinitely in domestic law rights of challenge based on the general principles of EU law. If agreed to, these amendments would empower domestic courts to quash administrative actions or secondary legislation or, indeed, even go as far as disapplying an Act of Parliament on the ground that it breaches one or more of the retained general principles of EU law—that could take place long after we have left the EU. That is why we have to have a point in time at which we have certainty as to the scope for such challenges, and that is reflected in the schedule.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, acknowledged, Amendment 41 would go even further. It seeks to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill. In that context, he alluded to Article 191 of the TFEU, which deals with environmental issues. I take issue with him as to whether the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle are both now accepted as general principles of EU law. I would suggest that there is considerable doubt as to whether the former, in particular, constitutes what is recognised in EU law as a general principle, so I have some difficulty with that amendment.

I come now to Amendment 63, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is, I apprehend, intended to retain this right of challenge but solely for the principle of proportionality, as she indicated, and specifically including where retained EU law is to be treated as primary legislation. It would also appear to permit the possibility of a challenge on the basis of invalidity of EU law, as well as judicial review of such legislation. It is our position that the general principles of EU law, such as proportionality, non-retroactivity and fundamental rights, will be kept in our domestic law, but in order to assist in interpreting retained EU law and not to give rise to additional stand-alone rights. Whereas some general principles are now set out expressly in EU treaties, the general principles were those that were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They are essentially judge-made and determined as principles on the basis of case law. It is those principles that we are dealing with.

I come back for a moment to Amendment 41, which goes beyond just the issue of proportionality. It would undermine the approach that we are seeking to take if we were to pursue it. In particular the inclusion of Article 191 in the amendment risks going further than the existing principles that are, as I say, set out in EU law and consequently in UK law today.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Leaving aside Article 191—we can argue about that and there is a decision that appears to demonstrate the point: the case of Artegodan, where the court appeared to be willing to extrapolate from the precautionary principle a general principle of EU law—does the Minister accept that, so far as the other general principles of EU law are concerned, to exclude them from the ability to found a cause of action and not just be an interpretative tool would be a diminution of the rights that people currently have and would include a diminution of many of the rights that the Government are saying are already protected under English law?

[Baroness Ludford]

So that the Minister does not have to bob up and down, may I also ask him a question? He talked about our approach in this Bill. That leads me to reflect on how far the approach in this Bill fits, for instance, the Prime Minister’s speech on Friday, in which she envisaged not only strong commitments in the area of trading goods but binding commitments in competition law. The noble and learned Lord talked earlier about how there would be EU law and then retained EU law in this country, the interpretation of which could diverge. How will the Prime Minister’s commitment to binding commitments in some areas to stay fully aligned with EU law be reflected in this construction of the Bill? If we diverge, would we then have to have domestic legislation to bring us back on track with the EU?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

They will have rights but they may not have the same remedy, but that is quite distinct. We are talking about maintaining rights at the point when we leave.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that Mr Walker would not have the same rights? Those are rights purely based upon EU general principles and nothing else. Does he not accept that in that case, at least, the rights would not be there?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke on this subject at Second Reading in respect of the disputes that arose under the old regime which seem to me to deserve fair treatment. I am aware of instances, in particular relating to small businesses, where it could lead to a very unfair result and deprive genuine claimants of going to the EU courts. The noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, mentioned the note by James Segan, and it raises a question which perhaps my noble and learned friend can answer about whether as it currently stands with paragraph 27 of Schedule 8, which was mentioned, and Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978, there could be action under the Human Rights Act. It would be politically unacceptable, apart from anything else, to see claimants pursuing their claims if there were that interpretation.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I look forward to the answers that the Minister will give to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I have Amendment 44 which deals with the timing of the Francovich claim. I can be brief. My noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford set out very well what we are talking about. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, indicated the problems to which the Government’s approach gives rise. One can look at it this way: at the moment the Bill appears to say that if the Government were to commit an act that was unlawful—a breach of Union law, for example—before exit day, the Francovich claim could not be brought, except in circumstances where the claim had been brought before exit day. I do not see the justification for that. That amounts to whitewashing an unlawful act and, as has been said—and it seems to me to be absolutely right—it is quite inconsistent with the promise that has been made that we will have the same rights the day after exit day as the day before.

I look forward to the answers to those questions. Even if any change does not go as far as my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford, said, it must at least apply, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, put it, to accrued rights, so that any act which is committed before exit day which gives rise to a Francovich claim should continue to do so.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged. Reference has been made to the Francovich principle. I am not sure there is such a principle, although there is the issue of Francovich damages, which arises from the case that was referred to in 1991. In order to put that into context, since 1991, and in the 20 years following, there have been 22—possibly up to 25—claims for Francovich damages in the UK courts. This is not some wide-ranging citizen or business right for the recovery of damages. There have been very few actual Francovich damages claims. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, shaking his head, but I invite him to study the case law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I have no doubt about what the noble and learned Lord says. So why are they so worried about keeping it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am just about to come on to that. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his patience in that respect, and will endeavour to deal with matters as swiftly as I can, given the hour. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, very correctly, pointed out the criteria that apply in determining whether or not there is a claim for Francovich damages: first, that the relevant provision of European Union law was intended to confer rights; secondly, that there has been a serious failure to implement European Union law; and thirdly, that there is a direct causal link between that failure and the loss complained of. I would not go so far as to suggest that Francovich damages are in some sense more generous than those available otherwise under the common law in this country, particularly those available in the context of judicial review. I have to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that damages are potentially available in a claim for judicial review.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I wonder whether the noble Lord could exercise a small degree of patience while I just complete what I have to say on this topic. But we can take as long as it takes. As I was saying, in terms of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1, the right in domestic law to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich is removed as at exit date. There is of course a proviso in paragraph 27 of Schedule 8 in respect of claims for Francovich damages which have already been raised prior to exit date—the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made. The potential lacuna is this: there may be accrued rights as at exit date where no claim has been made. We recognise that and it was noted in the other place. We are open to addressing that issue in order to ensure that those accrued rights are not removed by the application of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1. That is something that we are prepared to look at, as I have indicated, because we are aware of the criticism that has been made about the potential removal of rights that have already accrued as at the exit date.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Do I take it from that that the Minister will be bringing forward an amendment to correct this?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has taken part in this interesting debate. I think that anybody listening in from outside will be impressed that we are working hard on a very serious matter at quarter to one in the morning.

[Lord Goldsmith]

And not drinking cocoa.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Yes, not drinking cocoa, indeed—absolutely right.

First of all, I must say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has misunderstood a number of things. One is that I think he has got it wrong on the issue of damages. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is representative in what he said of the great majority of legal opinion on this subject and of the experience that any of us have had—via our constituents or otherwise—in this area of the law.

The second thing is that I think the noble and learned Lord has misunderstood that the major part of the importance of the Francovich system or jurisprudence is that it is a potential deterrent to those who might be inclined to misgovern us. People know that they are subject to this particular sanction if they do, and that has enormous effect. The fact that the power is used 25 times is not negligible—28 times I think it is in this country and 300 and something times over the Union as a whole. That does not mean to say that it is without effect, or that its effect is limited to those occasions. It would be very naive to say that; its effect is created by the presence of that particular sanction and means of redress for those who have been wronged in this way.

I also do not think that the noble and learned Lord is right in saying that the whole matter of Francovich is not very important because it applies only when there are serious issues. The principle of—to put it in language that I think he will understand—de minimis non curat lex—applies to everything really, in the Roman law tradition anyway. So it is not at all surprising that it applies in this case.

I want to leave the Committee with complete clarity about this, and there are three separate issues here. One is what we do about people who have a claim, or think they have a claim, under the Francovich principle—and I continue to call it that—and it is overtaken by events because they have not litigated before Brexit or they are half way through or they have not expressed their claim or put it in at all. What happens about them? That is important, because it may only be three or four people, and we should always be concerned about justice for anybody. I do not in any way denigrate people who have taken up a lot of time to talk about their particular subject; it is a perfectly respectable concern to have. But my concern is not really with that—mine is to my mind much more significant. Going forward, do we have the Francovich principle or something like it in our own legal system, both to enshrine that principle that the state is subject to the law like everybody else, which as I say is so important, and to make sure that we have that instrument of good government, which has a real deterrent effect on the behaviour of central and local government, public corporations and, indeed, the private sector? That is very important to me.

I disagree very strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, when he says that the Francovich system does not make any sense when we have left the European Union, because there will not be such a thing as European law here. He is quite wrong about that; there will be retained law for decades, no doubt, until it is changed by statute—if it is changed by statute over that time. It is called retained law; it is exactly the same law. The difference may be that, whereas you could litigate under it before Brexit, after Brexit you will not be able to litigate under it at all, which seems completely unreasonable. That means the loss of remedies and rights that we currently have in respect of exactly the same laws, because they are exactly the same provisions with exactly the same wording having exactly the same effect, whether they are today on 5 March, or on 1 April next year after we have left. That is what the whole principle of retained law is, as I understand it—and I think that the noble and learned Lord knows that.

It is my concern in this amendment to make sure that, when the citizens of this country have current rights and protections, they should enjoy all those after Brexit. I thought that the Government were in favour of that principle. We heard earlier from another Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Duncan, that he believes that that is the case and favours that principle—and I think that that principle is enormously important.

Then there is the third issue, which I raised—and it is probably not the last time that I shall raise it in this House. The experience of Francovich is such that I believe that it should be carried forward into the whole corpus of law in this country, Scots law and English law. We continue to have these rights and these remedies. I believe their jurisprudence in this case to be a considerable advance of civilisation in the European Union over the last 25 years; there have been many such advances and, if we are going to carry forward the assets that we take over rather than throwing them away on Brexit, we should make sure that we carry forward this one. That is not a matter for this Bill; what is a matter for this Bill is the second point that I make, which is to make sure that in respect of retained law the rights that currently exist will be carried through and not abolished.

I hope that the Government will think about that between now and Report. I would certainly welcome the opportunity to discuss the matter with them before we decide how we can take this matter further. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I rather hope that the modest amendments in my name do not take the House two hours to deliberate over. They focus on a narrow set of issues relating to pending cases.

Amendment 62 would allow our domestic courts, subject to the terms of the withdrawal or transitional agreement, to refer cases to the CJEU after exit day if the course of action arose before exit day. Amendment 61 would require the Government to obtain from the CJEU and then publish a list of pending cases referred to domestic courts before exit day. Amendment 64 changes the definition of retained EU case law to include case law relating to pending cases referred to the CJEU before exit day.

These amendments were drawn from the Constitution Committee’s excellent report on the Bill and essentially aim to deal with two issues: first, pending cases in domestic courts that might have been referred to the CJEU and, secondly, pending cases already lodged with the CJEU before exit day. In the first instance I am really asking for the Government’s assurance that, in any withdrawal or transition agreement, they will seek to clarify whether domestic courts can continue to make reference to the CJEU in relation to cases that began before exit day. I can see that there has to be a cut-off point for references but it is the timing of that point which concerns me. What criteria will Ministers apply and how will these be written into the agreement in such a way as to guarantee, and not undermine, procedural fairness and access to justice?

It may seem that this is a small or insignificant matter but, given the wide range of issues that the court considers, I think not. After all, it looks at everything from trademarks to intellectual property rights, workplace rights and even the distribution of EU funds. Given that cases started before the Prime Minister triggered Article 50 are likely to be treated differently from those which followed it, it is surely important that principles of fairness and consistency enter into any agreement which the Government can sign.

The second type of pending cases, dealt with in Amendment 64, will be those that are already with the CJEU. In another place, the Solicitor-General argued that these cases would simply continue. That is fine as far as it goes but, as the Constitution Committee pointed out, the Government intend to provide for these pending cases to be covered in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. But what happens to those cases if there is no deal? Would it not make sense to have a saving provision in the Bill saying simply that any case that is with the CJEU is determined to be treated as contributing to pre-exit case law, and in turn forms part of retained EU case law?

The Constitution Committee’s proposal that the Government should produce a list of cases on exit day that would be treated in this way made very good sense. To my way of thinking, that is a logical way of handling quite a complex set of legal issues, which are obviously well beyond my sort of competence as a non-lawyer. However, I hope that the Minister can satisfy my curiosity and set out how the Government intend to proceed. I also hope that he can satisfy the Constitution Committee, which I thought had a rather neat solution to the problem. Pending cases are of great value and will be of great interest to colleagues. I am hopeful that the Government can satisfy my simple concerns and provide us with an explanation that works. I fear that we will otherwise end up with something of a case law muddle. I beg to move.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My noble friend is absolutely right that this is not a small or insignificant matter. It is an important one with rule-of-law implications. The starting point, as he explained, is his proposed Amendment 62 which, if agreed, would add a new paragraph (6C), the purpose of which would be to encourage the negotiation of an agreement that cases can continue to be referred to the CJEU by our own courts after exit day. That would relate to new cases where the cause of action arose prior to exit day. This is logical because the important point is about whether the full remedies currently available to litigants, potential litigants and, importantly, our courts remain until we leave, while the law of the EU remains in place.

Of course, being able to refer such cases depends on an agreement, the very agreement that my noble friend’s amendment would make it an objective to negotiate. We will not be able to refer cases to the court in Luxembourg after exit day, except by agreement with the EU in such an agreement. But he is also right that there is a risk—although we hope very much that it will not happen—that if we end up without a withdrawal agreement, there would need to be legislation enabling this to continue to take place. So the principle of the amendments seems entirely right, and he is right to say that this was dealt with by the Constitution Committee at paragraphs 150 and 153 of its excellent report.

Perhaps I may refer to what the committee said in paragraph 153, having made the point that my noble friend has identified:

“We recommend that, irrespective of any implementation bill, pending cases are dealt with in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. We further recommend that rulings on cases that have been referred to the CJEU before exit day are treated as pre-exit case law—such that they form part of ‘retained EU case law’—and that the Government publishes, on exit day, a list of all such cases”.


The middle part of that, on what the significance is of,

“rulings on cases that have been referred … before exit day”,

is dealt with in a later amendment. But, as he has said, the requirement that the Government should publish a list of all such cases is dealt with in these amendments. He is right to say that the Solicitor-General in another place referred to the importance of knowing, at least as I read his remarks, what those cases are.

It seems that there has to be a justification, although I can see none, for depriving litigants and our courts of the ability to refer cases to the CJEU. It is important that noble Lords are clear on the fact that that does not mean sending cases to the CJEU for it to decide; it is for that court to determine questions of interpretation, as the treaty currently provides, although the interpretation given may in fact then decide the case. Our own courts would then take the interpretation provided by the European court and apply it to the case before them.

I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness or the noble and learned Lord, depending on who will respond to the debate—forgive me, of course it is the noble Baroness the Minister—will say to my noble friend.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, this may have been a short debate but it concerns a significant issue, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for their contributions. I am aware that a key issue of interest in this Committee is how pending cases before the European courts will be resolved, and I hope that I can respond relatively briefly to these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam.

As was acknowledged in their contributions, the Government have been clear regarding their approach to cases which have been referred to the European courts before exit day and we have made good progress in achieving this outcome in our negotiations with the EU. As such, I applaud the similar concern expressed by the noble Lord that there should be legal certainty in this area. However, as I have said previously, and indeed as my ministerial colleagues have also said, the purpose of this Bill is to provide a functioning statute book on the day we leave the EU, irrespective of the result of the negotiations on any final agreement with the EU.

The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill through this House and the other place that it is not intended in any way to prejudge the negotiations or to predict an agreement between the UK and the EU on their future relationship. For that reason, I would submit that the Bill is not a suitable vehicle for such amendments to take effect. Future legislation will be needed to implement the withdrawal agreement, including the treatment of cases that are pending before the European Court of Justice. That legislation will need to be informed by the precise terms of the agreement. The Government have already committed to introducing a withdrawal agreement and an implementation Bill, but let me try to clarify a couple of the specific points raised.

I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who in effect asked about the status of a case that has been referred to the European court before exit, but does not proceed to a judgment until after then. The intention is that a case which starts and has been referred to that court before exit would proceed to a judgment, which our courts would be bound by. That is the intention but—let me make this clear—this is pending an agreement with the EU about these issues. In relation to the request of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for a list my understanding is that, at the moment, cases registered at the Court of Justice of the European Union are made available online, so after our withdrawal we will have certainty as to how many pending UK cases have been referred to the court.

I apologise to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord if I have not specifically addressed some of their concerns. The difficulty, as was made clear in December, is that there is a clear statement of intention made in good faith by the Government, surrounding heads of agreement that have been achieved between the United Kingdom and the EU. But we need to continue with our negotiations to fine tune that, and hopefully then reduce it all to the final agreement. But I cannot pre-empt what may be in the final agreement and I hope that, in these circumstances, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise for not having properly identified the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, as the Minister responding to this debate. I wonder whether she will allow me to just press one question. She has very helpfully identified the position in relation to pending cases that have started but for which rulings have not been given at the date of exit. These amendments include an additional category of cases, as I understand it, such as cases where the cause of action has arisen prior to exit: for example, where EU law is in place and there is an issue of EU law that a litigant wants to raise but they have not actually started the case at the moment we leave; or where the case has started but a reference has not been made at that stage, because the court does not make a reference until it comes to a particular point in the proceedings. In line with her helpful answer in relation to the category of cases that are pending in the CJEU at the date of exit, does she think the same principle ought to apply, subject to agreement, to cases where the cause of action has arisen before exit or the case has started but not got any further than that? Could she help on that point?

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his point, but I am afraid my response is going to be slightly less encouraging for him. The position of the Government is that we do not agree that new cases should be initiated post exit, even when these refer to pre-exit causes of action, because it would lead to an uncertain environment. It would be impossible to predict for how long the European Court of Justice would continue to issue judgments in respect of the UK. That, in the opinion of the Government, would strike at the underlying purpose of this Bill, which is to try to achieve a snapshot—to use that phrase again—as at the date of exit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, given the time, it may be relevant, appropriate or even helpful to try to wind up this particular debate, although not in such a way that undermines the very real importance of the amendment.

I want to underline two aspects. The first aspect is legal certainty, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is very important, for example, that in considering cases where retained EU law is in question, people and businesses are able to recognise that if there are decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union that are relevant, then it is likely—though not an obligation—that the courts will take them into account. They can order their affairs on that basis, and that is a critical part of legal certainty. It seems right, therefore, that this amendment, to which I have added my name, gives direction or guidance that where such decisions are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law they should be paid regard.

The second principle is the independence of our judiciary. It is right in this context to refer to the shocking instance of the attack on our judiciary that took place at the time of the Article 50 decision. It was shocking not just that our judiciary was referred to in such terms by a popular newspaper but that it was not immediately defended and the accusation rejected by the Government, including Ministers whose job it was to do so. In dealing with this particular amendment we have to be alive to the risk that if after exit day a judge chooses—because he or she believes it right or relevant to do so; whatever word you want to use—to make reference to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that judge is not then subjected to a barrage of criticism and the accusation, “How dare you take refuge in decisions of this hated institution, one which we have left, in making decisions on this law?” It is important that we should look at this carefully and make sure that judges are protected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

Does my noble and learned friend agree that, in all fairness, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, distinctly and clearly criticised those attacking the judiciary at the time that my noble and learned friend mentioned?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for that unexpected intervention from my own Front Bench, but I am happy to take the opportunity to say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was one of the few to say the right thing and uphold the independence of the judiciary at the time of that attack. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Beecham for making the point because it deserves to be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that encouraging response, and I am grateful to the noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate.

On a matter of detail, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about new subsection (2B) in Amendment 56, giving guidance to the judges to look to the relevance of an EU agreement. The noble Lord asked how that would work. I shall give him an example. If the judge is seeking to interpret a provision of retained EU law, relating to, say, medicinal products; if the Court of Justice after exit day pronounces on a regulation which has become part of retained EU law, and if the withdrawal agreement has said that there will be close regulatory alignment between the EU and the United Kingdom in that particular area, then the judge would be encouraged to pay close regard to what the Court of Justice had said about the meaning of the regulation. Our court would still be in control but it would pay particular regard—that is the whole point of new subsection (2B).

There is widespread agreement around the House that the wording of Clause 6(2) is unsatisfactory and that Parliament needs to give as much guidance as possible to judges in this context to protect them from being seen to be required to take policy decisions, which would undermine confidence in the rule of law. The Government and Parliament would be very unwise to reject, in particular, the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. It is much more difficult to identify precisely what should be put in place of Clause 6(2). I am encouraged by what the Minister said—that the Government are listening and considering this matter. I am sure that all noble Lords who have spoken would be happy to contribute to the discussions that will take place before Report. I hope that, on Report, the Government will bring forward amendments to Clause 6(2).

[Lord Goldsmith]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, as I suspect he is going to do, can I ask him to clarify one point? He talked a moment ago about the need to protect the judges. Would he agree that it is a question not of protecting the judges from attack, but of protecting the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law?

[Lord Pannick]

I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord. I think I said in opening this debate that it is not that the judges cannot withstand criticism of their judgments, it is rather that we are all concerned about confidence in the rule of law. As the noble and learned Lord said, if the judges are left to take policy decisions in a very sensitive context, where a decision will have to be made as to the weight—if any—to give to Court of Justice judgments handed down after Brexit, there is no doubt that they will be exposed. They will be the subject of criticism which will undermine the rule of law unless we do our job and give very clear guidance on what Parliament thinks should be the appropriate approach.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the existence of these powers in the Bill has created an apprehension in a lot of people that the Government are proposing to use the powers in some way to undermine something that is valuable to them. It is therefore important—apart altogether from the argument that examines the detail—that we examine this carefully. The noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton—with his background of great success as a civil servant, no doubt contributed to by his early experience as a lawyer—has moved the amendment in a way that has made it extremely clear. It is quite clear to me that necessity is a better test on which to leave these powers than the discretionary test of “appropriate”. It is not absolutely right that discretion is not subject to judicial review, but at least an objective test is certainly more likely to lead to successful judicial review if it is transgressed.

We have to remember the huge task involved in trying to put these two systems together; the European system, which has been here for 45 years, has been working alongside our system and kept separate from it over all that time. That is by no means an easy task. Indeed, what we already discussed with regard to Clauses 2 and 3 illustrate that. It is difficult and time consuming, and we must ensure that the solutions we suggest to the Government are practical and will enable this to be done in a reasonable time so that the statute book can be right on Brexit day.

I anticipate that the test of necessity will be an easier one to apply for those entrusted with the power than the test of what is appropriate. The latter involves an element of judgment, which is not always easy to exercise; whereas if it is obvious that these two bits do not fit together, it is necessary to do something about it. As the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, said, it is not necessary to circumscribe the solution. The argument that necessity suggests not only that the amendment is required but also what particular amendment is required stretches the matter a little far. So long as it is necessary to do it, that is a sufficient test for our purpose, and then it is for the Minister to do his best to sew these two pieces together.

I am somewhat alarmed at the survey by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, of the people entitled to use this power, and the Minister may well have something to say about that. However, there is a lot of work to do, and we do not want to overwork the Ministers with necessary adjustments when they ought to be doing something else. There is certainly plenty to do between now and Brexit.

In addition, it has been said that this is surrendering the power of Parliament to the Executive. To an extent that is true, but Parliament retains a veto in respect of every single regulation, either by a negative or an affirmative resolution. It is true that we do not want to have thousands of these if we can possibly avoid it, apart from anything else. But there is an element of control there. How practical that would be is, I think, doubtful. There is an urgent need now to circumscribe these powers so that they work properly and effectively but not excessively. As I said, a lot of people have worries about human rights, equality rights and a whole lot of other rights. Sometimes people have spoken in conversation or in observations to the press or whatever, which does not represent the Government’s policy. This helps to inflame the idea that the Government are using these powers to take away all that has been so dearly won. I do not think that is true, but we should try to remove the possibility that this idea can be represented.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, these are hugely important amendments. The Minister will have noted that not a single Member of the Committee has spoken in favour of the present position in the Bill. From all sides of the Committee, it has been stated that the Bill, as it stands, is not acceptable. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is not present today, for reasons that we all entirely understand. Noble Lords will recall what he said at Second Reading, when he talked about this as the biggest transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive in peacetime. I entirely agree. I agree with what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Wilson of Dinton, Lord Cormack and Lord Lang of Monkton—with whom, or rather under whom, I was privileged to serve on the Constitution Committee, when he chaired it. I agree also with the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. Everybody has taken the same position in relation to that.

Let us look at the key amendment, Amendment 71, to which I am privileged to have added my name, just to note the importance of what it does. It would replace the statement that “the Minister considers it appropriate” with “it is necessary”. As a former Minister, as a former adviser to Ministers and as a practising lawyer, I fully see the significance of that change. I know as a lawyer that if I am able to say to the judge, “All that is required is that the Minister considers it appropriate—how can you say that he did not? How can you second guess that?”, I am home and dry. If, on the other hand, I have to show that it is necessary—not just in the Minister’s decision, not just on reasonable grounds, but that it is in fact necessary—then that is the test that the court has to undertake in order to satisfy itself. The point behind these amendments is that nothing less than that will do to enable this huge transfer of power to the Executive from this House.

I do not need to repeat the remarks made by other noble Lords about how taking back control should not mean taking back control by the Executive—that is not what anybody had in mind. I do not need to repeat the remarks about the number of Ministers that this gives power to. I am not even sure that the figure of 109 is right. I recall, in government—no doubt the Minister will tell me that it does not apply here—that all Ministers can act, and often do act, by their officials. The Carltona principle means they can sign the instruments, so it may mean that the 109 is multiplied manifold. I have no doubts about their good intentions, but this is not what our system requires, and we should not be giving it up in these circumstances.

Other noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Dykes, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, have also spoken powerfully in favour of these amendments.

I have a couple of other points to make, as most of what I wanted to say has already been powerfully and clearly expressed by noble Lords. The most important point is the one I started with, which is that the Minister must see the unanimity of view, as it appears at the moment, around the Committee about the change that needs to be made. We can debate whether it is essential or necessary. I rather agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that “necessary” has become a term well understood by the courts and so it is probably the better one to have, but the end aim is the same. That it is not a decision for the subjective view of the Ministers is the other key point on which we agree.

One point that I want to deal with, which has not had much discussion so far—although the noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised it—is Amendment 244A. It proposes that there should be a statement by a Minister as to the need for the change, and it is not simply a policy change. There is merit in that proposal, I would suggest, though not as a substitute for the amendments we are proposing. I draw attention to the similarity with Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, an excellent provision which requires that a Minister has to certify that a piece of legislation is compatible with the convention rights. We see it on the very front of this Bill itself. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, is not in his place. He had a lot of involvement in making sure that that worked, by insisting that when it came to certifying that legislation was compatible, it was not just on a wing and a prayer.

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. Taking his point, if you were to combine the certification together with the requirement that the Minister had to have reasonable grounds for triggering regulatory power, then one has a very high degree of protection, does one not?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble Viscount. I would go further. First, I would say that the amendment needs to change the test so that it is “necessary”, not “considers necessary”, not “considered on reasonable grounds”. Secondly, the way the Human Rights Act certification works is that it is not enough for the Minister to have “reasonable grounds” that it may be compatible. What is required—at least when I was in government, and as a result of the diktat that was given to the Civil Service—is that the Minister must have legal advice that, more likely than not, the court would agree. I am glad to see the Minister nodding because that means that the same principle is being applied under this Administration as under the Administration in which I was privileged to serve.

Therefore, I take the noble Viscount’s point, but it is important that it is not just a consideration but an actuality based not on reasonable grounds but on fact. Obviously there is some judgment to be made about “fact” but it needs to be clear and there might, in addition, be a role for something like Amendment 244A.

This is the second time today that this Committee has considered the use of the word “appropriate”. Those who were not able to be present may wish to read the report of the earlier debate when we considered the use of the word “appropriate” in rather different circumstances—whether judges could and should rely on European case law in reaching decisions and whether it was enough that they should find it relevant or appropriate. One noble Lord who is not in his place suggested that the judges could use the law if they found it “helpful”. My worry is that that is exactly what the Government think “appropriate” means here. If this power means that Ministers can make regulations and changes because they think it helpful to do so, that is not what this House should allow them to do.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Goldsmith]

358: Clause 19, page 15, line 21, at end insert—
“( ) If the United Kingdom agrees transitional arrangements with the European Union, a Minister of the Crown may not appoint a day on which section 6 is to come in force unless this day follows the expiration of those transitional arrangements.”

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to prevent Section 6 coming into force until after the expiration of any transitional arrangements agreed with the Union. Clause 6, somewhat innocently and perhaps misleadingly named “Interpretation of retained EU law”, does more than simply offer canons of interpretation for retained EU law. Its apparent purpose is to bring to an end in a number of respects the role of the European court, the CJEU. Once Section 6 is in force no court or tribunal would be bound by any principles laid down or any decision made on or after exit day by the CJEU. Moreover, it would bring to an end the ability to refer matters to the European Court. As the Committee will be well aware, one of the ways in which the uniformity of Union law is preserved is through the ability of national courts to refer questions of interpretation and so forth to the European Court for decision. That means that our courts can get authoritative rulings on European law from the top European court to help our courts make their decisions. Moreover, of course, while we are members of the Union we are bound by Union law as interpreted and laid down by the European Court.

Of course, because certain law will be retained as EU law after exit, if the Bill goes through, the shutters cannot and should not come down completely even after exit. Subsections (3) to (7) of Clause 6 provide how the courts and tribunals are to interpret retained EU law after exit. As one would expect, even after exit day retained EU law will need to be interpreted in the light of decisions of the CJEU on those very provisions, although at that time our most senior courts—the Supreme Court in England and Wales and the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, in its appellate role—would have the power to depart from those decisions. It is not, however, that aspect of continuing arrangements that this amendment primarily concerns. This amendment is concerned to ensure that, so long as we remain bound to follow EU law under transitional arrangements, the judicial arrangements, including the role of the CJEU, will continue to apply. That makes sense because, until the transitional arrangements have come to an end, EU law will continue to apply.

I have looked, as many noble Lords will have done, at the colourful draft agreement for withdrawal published recently. I say “colourful” because we can see the green parts that show what has been agreed at negotiator level and the yellow parts showing what has been agreed as policy objectives. As for the proposals for judicial procedures, none of that is green or indeed yellow; it is white at the moment so, as I understand it—the noble and learned Lord or the noble Baroness, whoever is replying, will explain—the current position is that we simply have, in this text, the negotiating position that the European Union wants to put forward. That is dealt with in Title X and Articles 82 to 92, particularly Articles 82 and 83. As I understand them—again, this could be confirmed or otherwise—the current proposal of the European Union is as follows.

First, the European Court will continue to have jurisdiction in any proceedings brought before it by or against the United Kingdom before the end of the transition period. So in one case its jurisdiction would remain, if that proposal were ultimately accepted.

Secondly, the European court would continue to have jurisdiction to give references or preliminary rulings from our courts referred to it before the end of the transition period. In any case, if the current draft of Article 85 from the European Union is accepted, the judgments and orders of the Court of Justice handed down before the end of the transition period, as well as those handed down in proceedings by or against the United Kingdom, will have,

“binding force in their entirety on and in the United Kingdom”.

I believe, although it would be helpful to have confirmation, that the European Union intends that, if this negotiating position is ultimately accepted, rulings and preliminary references brought before the end of the transition period will also be binding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I agree with the term “red lines”; it is not one that I am inclined to use. I am never quite sure what they are. Our position is that during an implementation period, if and when finally agreed, we will accept that there is a role for the European Court of Justice. Indeed, it is outlined in the EU’s own proposals for the agreement at Articles 82 through to 85. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, that is not yet the subject of final confirmation between the two parties but it is what is anticipated.

On a related point, during that period, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that as we cease to be a member state we will cease to have the right to have a judge in the Court of Justice of the European Union. That must follow. However, we will have the right to make interventions in cases that pertain to the United Kingdom.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, there have been moments during the 11 Committee days that we have had so far on this Bill when I felt a little sorry for the noble and learned Lord opposite for the positions that he was being expected to argue by those behind him and in other places, but never more sorry than I am today. This is the most absurd situation. We have offered him an amendment and I am grateful for the description given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, as delicate. It does not presume even that there are transitional arrangements. It simply says that, if there are transitional arrangements, this is what will happen. I cannot understand why it is not accepted. I had hoped on this 11th final day of Committee that we would have a breakthrough.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The 11th hour of the 11th day.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The 11th hour of the 11th day, as my noble friend Lady Hayter says. If we had had a breakthrough, we would have been able to say we had finished Committee with a concession—not much of a concession, it would have to be said, because it is so obvious that this ought to happen, but at least it would have been something that we could build on as we move towards Report where we hope we will have a degree of constructive engagement.

This really does not make sense at all. We all know, and the noble and learned Lord knows—indeed, he accepted it—that there will be a role for the European Court of Justice after the magic exit day, whatever day we end up with. If there is not, this amendment does not operate. It is very straightforward and simple: to suggest otherwise is cloud-cuckoo-land or Red Queen land.

The noble and learned Lord’s final recourse is to legal certainty. We all accept the importance of legal certainty, and that that is what is behind the Bill. However, there is complete legal certainty if this Bill, when it becomes an Act, says, “If something happens, this provision does not come into effect until the end of that period”. I will not quote Latin again, but we know there are principles which say that those things are certain which can be made certain, and it will be certain because we will know whether or not there is such an arrangement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to be associated with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in supporting this amendment to seek some clarity. I will simply add two further points, having said that this distinctly lacks clarity at the moment.

First, I draw attention to paragraph 3, which says:

“Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation which, immediately before exit day, is subject to an implied restriction that it is exercisable only compatibly with EU law is to be read on or after exit day without that restriction”.


A little gloss on that from the Minister would be helpful. The second thing that needs clarifying is the impact on the devolution aspects of the Bill. The Government’s Explanatory Notes say that,

“in relation to the devolved administrations these pre-existing powers”—

that is, the powers that can be used under the clause we are discussing—

“are subject to the devolution provisions described in paragraphs 36 to 41 of these notes, meaning powers in pre-exit legislation cannot be used to modify retained EU law in a way that would be incompatible with EU law as it existed on exit day until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”.

I imagine that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pricked up his ears at that phrase, because it goes to the heart of the argument we have been having about the impact of the Bill on devolution and the idea that powers will be released to the devolved Administrations only once the UK Government are satisfied with the way they will deal with the framework provisions. The appearance of the phrase,

“until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”,

in the Explanatory Notes is quite worrying. The provisions are of course there because some of the provisions here relate to existing devolved powers. The devolved Administrations must have the capacity to take this kind of action if the UK Government have the capacity to do so. However, it is subject to this rather extraordinary restriction: the Government hold on to the powers until they are satisfied that they can be released. For the benefit of clarity, I hope that the Minister can help us.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I support the amendment. There is not much to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about what the amendment does and why it is necessary, nor to add to the questions he asked or to those then added by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which in particular picked up issues with regard to the devolved Administrations.

We know that a major theme in your Lordships’ House, rightly, has been how powers are to be exercised, recognising that there may be circumstances in which they have to be exercised. Notwithstanding that, on the whole this Committee has rightly taken the view—or we hope that we will see it take the view, certainly from the interventions and contributions that have been made throughout the Committee—that this is a matter where proper parliamentary scrutiny is required. There may well be a role for certain delegated legislation, but please let us not add to it with still yet another way in which things can be done which avoid that full parliamentary scrutiny.

I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will be able to say something reassuring, both answering the questions posed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, and saying why we need not be concerned and that the Government will content themselves with relying on those delegated powers that will be specific to the Bill, once this Committee and the other place have determined just what those delegated powers should be.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by making two observations. These amendments are linked closely to the issue we have already debated in Committee of the status of retained EU law and how we deal with it in the context of its status. As has been indicated previously in Committee, the Government have been listening and considering that, and we intend to come back to the House on the matter before Report. I mention that because it is a relevant backdrop to what we are considering at this stage.

On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, essentially, the powers in paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 are, first of all, designed to remove what I might term the shadow of European law from what will be domestic legislation. However, more particularly, the noble Lord raised a point about the devolution issues and quoted from the Explanatory Notes. I understand that the section of the Explanatory Notes that he refers to addresses Clause 11 prior to its recent amendment. I appreciate that we then withdrew that amendment, but the Explanatory Notes should be read in that context. Essentially, therefore, we have moved on because of the decision to flip Clause 11—I think that was the term used—so I ask the noble Lord to look at the proposed amendment to Clause 11 to understand the context in which we now want to deal with this point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Of course, our constitutional position has altered over the last few years—say, the last 500—and, at the end of the day, we see ourselves as, essentially, an amending House. I understand the noble Lord’s point but, in that context, we also understand the precedence of the other place with regard to the final passage of legislation. Therefore, our primary tasks in this context are scrutiny and comment.

The Government have always said that this Bill is not the place for radical policy change. Essentially, what we want to do at this stage is preserve the existing domestic powers to amend legislation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, in order that we can address issues with regard to retained EU law. But the manner in which those powers will ultimately be deployed will depend on the outcome of our consideration of the question of what status we confer on retained EU law. Given that that is an ongoing issue, I invite the noble Lord at this stage to withdraw his amendment. He may, of course, choose to return to it once he has seen our proposals with regard to retained EU law, but it appears to me that the two issues are inextricably linked.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Before the noble Lord announces the fate of his amendment, I have a question for the Minister. He said several times that there is a connection here with what will happen to EU retained law and what status it will have. We have had full debates on that, as he rightly says. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles; we have heard from the Constitution Committee; we have heard a rather different proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who is not in his place at the moment. My question is simply: when will we know what the Government’s decision is? I hope that they will not stick—because they cannot stick—to the idea that it will be simply for Ministers to decide as we go along the status of a particular piece of retained law. When will we know the Government’s position? That might enable us to advance not only on that point but on points such as the one being debated at the moment. Can the Minister give us an answer as to dates?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I cannot give the noble and learned Lord an answer as to dates, but clearly we are concerned to ensure that any proposals we have to make are in place in time for consideration by the whole House before Report.

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[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I can hear the strains of the “Farewell” Symphony as we prepare to tackle the penultimate amendment to be debated in Committee, and how appropriate it is that the very final amendment should be in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.

Amendment 365 is in my name and the names of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and it is very sharply focused. The Committee has already considered the issue of tertiary legislation, with Amendments 110 and 135 as vehicles. Those amendments combined the issue of the principle of tertiary legislation with that of sunsetting. Amendment 365 is about only sunsetting, so I need not trouble the Minister to revisit the general defence of tertiary legislation, which he made at cols. 1473 and 1474 at an unearthly hour on Monday 12 March, although it was then what the rest of the world knew as Tuesday 13 March.

On that occasion, the Minister also made a defence of the exemption of tertiary legislation from sunsetting. He said:

“Where sub-delegated or transferred legislative powers are crucial to the functioning of a regime, it would not be appropriate”—


how often that word “appropriate” recurs—

“for those powers to be subject to a sunset”.—[Official Report, 12/3/18; col. 1475.]

If one accepts the principle of bodies such as the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority exercising tertiary powers in their role as continuing guardians of a regime—and the Minister made a very good case for that in his speech on that occasion—it also makes sense for them to continue to do so after two years have elapsed from exit day. Indeed, I feel that I am now starting to make the Minister’s speech for him. However, there remains a serious point, because if bodies responsible for the functioning of a regime are to continue to exercise their powers without a sunset, it is crucial that those powers are tightly drawn in the first instance, as there will be no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of the subsequent exercise of the powers that have been delegated to those bodies.

Therefore, perhaps the most helpful thing the Minister could do in replying to this debate would be to give your Lordships a clear assurance that the tertiary powers will be carefully circumscribed, and that when affirmative instruments delegating those powers come before Parliament—because the actual delegation will be subject to the affirmative process—they do not simply prescribe some general subject area in which the body is to operate and which is to be its responsibility, but are rather more specific and indeed constraining. I beg to move.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I support this amendment and am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for bringing it forward. I am also grateful to him for reminding the Committee that, when we sit past midnight, it remains the same day. I wonder what the noble Lord’s nervous maiden aunts would have made of this never-ending night. The amendment raises an important point and is yet another example of how we have to be careful and circumspect in the use of delegated powers. It is now really for the Minister to answer that question and to see whether he is prepared to give us the reassurance that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, asked for.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for introducing this amendment, which stands also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I am glad to have the opportunity to address it.

First, I reassure noble Lords that the strength of feeling around the exercise of delegated powers by those not immediately accountable to Parliament has been heard, as I said the other evening. The Government are looking very closely at the issue of transparency before Parliament, and we will of course hold that at the forefront of our minds as we consider our position ahead of Report.

At the heart of this Bill is the repeal of the European Communities Act, including Section 2(2) of that Act. As noble Lords on all sides of the Committee know, that provision has been the vires used for many statutory instruments made by many Governments in recent years. This Bill does not replace that power. Although there are several broad powers in the Bill, with some approaching the breadth of Section 2(2) of the ECA, they are, unlike that power, time limited. The Bill is not an assault on Parliament but, rather, the means by which this Parliament will take back control to itself.

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[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, this is a piece of political opportunism. The context of the 2011 Act, as those who were in the House well remember, was that there was very strong opposition in your Lordships’ House to there being referendums as the result of relatively minor transfers of powers and competences. That was rejected as being unnecessary and being a sop to the Eurosceptic wing. However, there were, incidentally, quite a few occasions on which it was conceded that all was far from perfect in the European Union, which is not something we have heard much about in the debates during the course of this Committee stage. To say that we should rely on a Bill that was most unpopular with many Liberal Democrats and a good number in the Labour Party in order to hold another referendum is really not what this is about.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, it must be unprecedented to have such a long and well-attended debate on what is almost the final repeal in the last schedule to a Bill. Given that this is the last debate that we will have in the Committee stage, perhaps I may, as the person who happens to be responding from these Benches, pay tribute to the quality of the contributions that have been made by all sides of the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Adonis. I have to say that anyone outside who says that we have been spoiling or somehow wrecking the Bill would not be able to maintain that charge in the light of the clarity and detail of the scrutiny that we have given the Bill.

As to the amendment, I admire the ingenuity which brings it forward. It is clear that the purpose behind it ultimately would be to trigger the referendum-requiring provisions set out in the 2011 Act. There are two ways of looking at that. One is to consider the political nature of the 2011 Act and compare that with what is happening at this stage, where one might well say, if I dare, that it was simply a staging post to the position we find ourselves in now. Many of us find the position of exit an unhappy one, but it would be a staging post to that and it has now passed. There is a legal question which is quite different: whether in fact the conditions in the 2011 Act are triggered. From what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has said, there are legal proceedings which may challenge that, and I do not think it is right for me to venture an opinion from this Dispatch Box as to whether those are right or not.

However, I will venture a political opinion from my position, which is this. We are well aware that there are some in this House, in particular on the Liberal Democrat Benches—we fully respect their views, even if we may not share them—who would like to see a further referendum, and many in the country would like to see that. If that is going to happen, one might say that the way for it to come about is through a direct vote on whether a referendum should be taking place rather than what might seem to be a side wind. And that is my problem with the proposed amendment, even though it is ingenious. I have reason to believe—indeed, I suspect, from what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said—that this House will have an opportunity on Report to express its view directly, full-throatedly and openly about a further referendum. The House will give its view, but I am not convinced about doing it through this route.

[Lord Adonis]

Can my noble and learned friend give his view on whether it is appropriate that the 2011 Act should be repealed in advance of the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972?

[Lord Goldsmith]

It is perfectly appropriate, although I do not like the word “appropriate”, as we all know. Perhaps the answer is that it is not necessary, but it may be appropriate.

I fully respect what the noble Lord is doing. It is not easy to say this but, politically, the 2011 Act was a staging post on the route—as it turns out—to full Brexit, even though some people still hope that we will not go that far, and it has therefore served its purpose. I am not making a legal analysis of whether the conditions in the Act apply because I can see arguments why they may and why they may not; I am explaining why, if there is a suggestion that this House will vote for a referendum, it would be better to do it on an amendment or a Motion that directly raises that question. It can then be fully debated and we can all have our say. For those reasons, I very much regret to tell my noble friend that I cannot support his amendment.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, after 115 hours of Committee debate, as observed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, it is somehow appropriate—that word again—that the last and 372nd amendment should be tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to our deep and special partnership; I think that is probably going a bit far, but to mark the occasion, I thought I would get him a gift to celebrate his perseverance. The Adonis nut bar is available in all good health shops. He is welcome to collect it later.

In responding to Amendment 372, I want to be very clear about what the European Union Act 2011 does. The Act contains a recent mechanism for two principal goals—first, to provide that where Ministers participate in certain types of decisions, those decisions are specifically approved in the UK. This normally happens via an Act of Parliament. The Act passed last year to approve the decisions—which allowed the participation of Albania and Serbia in the work of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and the conclusion of an agreement on competition law between the EU and Canada—is an example of this. Secondly, the Act also provides that where there is a revision to the fundamental treaties of the EU, akin to the treaties of Lisbon or Maastricht, there should be an Act of Parliament—and, in certain circumstances, a referendum in the UK—before the UK Government could approve those changes.

I invite noble Lords to cast their minds back, as some Members have done, to 2011 and the context in which this Act was passed. Sadly, I was not a Member of your Lordships’ House then; I was with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—not directly; we were Members—in the European Parliament. The Act was drafted in the context of its time in response to new EU methods of approving treaty changes and calls for more public and parliamentary involvement in such decisions. Its purpose was to regulate decision-making on the UK’s relationship to the EU treaties in the context of the UK as a member state. At that point, the idea of holding a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was far from the Government’s mind, let alone undertaking the most complex negotiation in history to recast that relationship with the UK outside the EU treaties.

Of course, everything has changed since then. We are leaving the EU. The 2011 Act is redundant. It is appropriate to repeal redundant legislation. It may even be necessary to repeal the 2011 Act. Amendment 372 would prevent the Bill from repealing the 2011 Act. From previous statements made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I understand that he intends to use the Act in an attempt to secure a second referendum—no surprise there. I will not revisit the positions that we have already covered extensively in debate about the merits or otherwise of holding a further referendum as part of the process of our exit from the EU; no doubt the Liberal Democrats will enable us to return to this matter on Report. We have covered that at length in this Committee; suffice it to say that the Government think, first, that a second referendum is not appropriate and, secondly, that it is most certainly not for this Bill to provide for one.

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[Lord Goldsmith]

To clarify, I did not say that. I deliberately did not express a view as to whether that argument would legally succeed precisely because I understand it is the subject of legal proceedings. I would not want for a moment to pre-empt them.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, those legal proceedings will by definition cease if the 2011 Act is repealed soon after the enactment of the Bill.

The second point that was not addressed, which is a matter of some substance, is that, on an issue of this gravity, surely it is not too much for the people to expect of Parliament that the House of Commons itself should expressly vote on the repeal of the 2011 Act. Because of the guillotine Motion in the House of Commons and the limited opportunities there were for debate in the Commons the matter was never debated, let alone voted on. That is one of our responsibilities.

My final point on the final day and the final amendment on the Bill, with such a magnificent attendance by noble Lords on the Conservative Benches, is to address the final point made by my noble and learned friend about taking a decision expressly on the issue of a referendum. I agree that it is a matter we should expressly take a decision on. The point of the 2011 Act is that it is existing statute law and should be repealed expressly only by the House of Commons.

It is clear that the dominating issue that will preoccupy us over the next six to nine months is whether the people themselves should have a say on the terms of the withdrawal treaty. What is already lurking behind the debate—it is, I am afraid, an issue of intense debate in my own party, but I suspect it will spread to other parties—is whether the people should be allowed that final say. It is clear that many people, I suspect including my noble and learned friend and maybe my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition, at the moment do not think that a referendum is the right course. What is happening is we are having a charade of big debates about what are essentially second-order issues in the House while the consensus is rolling on that, maybe to avoid too big a division of public opinion, we should allow Brexit simply to roll on next year.

That will be the dominating issue of British politics in the next nine months: whether Brexit is a done deal, whether Parliament will debate, with the option of rejection, the Prime Minister’s withdrawal treaty and whether—in considering what is the biggest and most significant issue that has faced Parliament in this generation—before we take the final plunge into the unknown and engage in Brexit, we will give the people a say on the terms of withdrawal. That is a very big and weighty issue to raise at the very last moment of the debate in Committee, but in two weeks’ time we will regroup and start Report. We can rehearse all these arguments again. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to this amendment, to which I have added my name. There is little I can add to what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said so eloquently. The current Clause 4 is unsuitable, so we have submitted a proposed new Clause 4, which covers a much broader area than the environmental concerns. However, because so much environmental legislation stems from the EU, it is particularly important for the Government’s environmental commitments that we carry these forward.

The amendment aims to preserve more comprehensively than the existing Clause 4 rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures, all derived from EU law and incorporated into domestic law via the ECA. Where such rights are incorrectly or incompletely transferred it imposes a duty to remedy this, and we feel that it is important that the Government take this duty on board. There will be transition gaps and incomplete transfers. Examples of transition gaps which put environmental protection at risk include, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said, the requirement to review and report on adequacy and implementation of laws such as the air quality directive and the habitats directive. As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, if we are not doing this in the right way, will the Minister please tell us which way we should be doing it? I fully support this amendment and I will support the amendment that comes forward on Monday.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, in supporting this amendment also, I start by just noting one thing we have learned during the passage of the Bill so far: how very complicated the process of exit will be. That is important, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, rightly reminded us, the purpose of the Bill is to enable us to leave, but with the same rights and obligations, and the same protections, the day after exit as the day before. The Prime Minister made that promise very clear. This amendment would help to make sure that this promise can be kept. If one looks at the way the Bill currently deals with rights that are being passed over, one can see the complication in the provisions as drafted.

I will not repeat the arguments that were raised in Committee, nor indeed repeat those that have been so well made by my noble friends Lady Jones and Lord Puttnam and by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell. However, one thing is clear: if there is a defect in what the Government are doing and if the provision will not pass across into our law the day after exit those things it should, the amendment simply says that this is a mechanism by which they can be brought in. I think the Government would want to welcome that, because it means they could achieve what they want to achieve in what is, as I said, a complicated area in which it may be difficult to be sure that everything has been done as it should. Of course, if it is unnecessary because all the rights have been passed across, in those circumstances there will be no need for the clause to operate. However, it will be there to achieve what is required.

I will make one other point, because it may look to some slightly paradoxical to use a ministerial power of regulation to achieve this when so much concern has already been expressed in this House, and will be on amendments to come, about the overuse of delegated powers. This differs from the other powers that concern has been expressed about. It is not a discretion of the Minister to use the power but an obligation to do so if certain conditions are met: if in fact—and it is an objective fact which can be verified or not—retained EU law does not give effect to,

“rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies or procedures created or required by EU law in force immediately before exit day”.

Therefore, it makes sense to do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made the sensible suggestion that if this amendment does not quite do it the right way, the Government can and should come back with an alternative method at Third Reading. However, that they should do something to make sure this gap is plugged seems a strong and correct argument, and for that reason I support the amendment.

[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Cambridge, in absentia for her Amendment 12 and to my noble friend Lord Deben for speaking to it on her behalf. I note that this amendment is very similar to an amendment tabled in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, to which the noble Baroness was a signatory. As was the case with that amendment, Amendment 12 seeks to amend what EU law is retained through Clause 4.

As this House is aware, and has been said earlier within the debate, one part of EU law that the Bill does not convert into our domestic law is EU directives. The reason for this is clear. As EU directives as such are not a part of our domestic law now, it is the Government’s view that they should not be part of our domestic law after we leave the EU. Instead, the Bill, under Clause 2, is saving the domestic measures that implement the directives, so it is not necessary to convert the directives themselves. This is not only a pragmatic approach but one that reflects the reality of our departure from the EU. As an EU member state, we were obligated to implement those directives. When we leave the EU, those obligations will cease.

However, the Bill recognises one exception to this approach. Where, in a case decided or commenced before exit day, a domestic court or the European Court of Justice has recognised a particular right, power, liability, obligation, restriction, remedy or procedure provided for in a directive as having direct effect in domestic law, Clause 4 will retain the effect of that right, power, et cetera within UK law.

That seems to the Government to provide a clarity which it is important for this Bill to achieve, and it is why we believe that Clause 4 as currently worded strikes the right balance—ensuring in respect of directives that individuals and businesses will still be able to rely on directly effective rights that are available to them in UK law before exit day, while also providing clarity and certainty within our statute book about what will be retained in UK law at the point of exit.

I shall explain to my noble friend Lord Deben what we see as a difficulty. This certainty would be undermined by the amendment, placing both businesses and individuals in the difficult position where they are uncertain about whether the rights they rely on will change. It could also create practical difficulties for our courts following our exit. There could be new litigation about whether implementing legislation correctly or completely gave effect to a pre-exit directive, and whether Ministers had fulfilled the duty in the amendment’s proposed new subsection (3) to make implementing regulations. This could continue for years after our exit from the EU, effectively sustaining an ongoing, latent duty to implement aspects of EU legislation long after the UK had left the European Union.

I think it would be acknowledged that it would be strange for Ministers to be obligated to make regulations to comply with former international obligations which the UK is no longer bound by. Although Ministers might find that they were obliged to make regulations under the amendment, it would presumably still be open to Parliament to reject the instrument and either require it to be revoked or decline to approve it, depending on the procedure involved, yet the Minister would, under the terms of the amendment, remain under a legal obligation to make regulations. I think that this gets to the heart of the problem: how is that tension to be resolved?

Therefore, I say to my noble friend Lord Deben that, although I understand that the genuine intention behind the amendment is to give confidence and certainty, in practice I do not think that it would necessarily achieve this, and I respectfully suggest that the real consequence would be confusion.

Furthermore, the amendment specifically implies that the Government would have to undertake a thorough investigation, as soon as possible, of all the EU directives that have been domestically implemented over the course of this country’s 40-plus years of EU membership to ensure that they have correctly and completely implemented them all.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Front Bench.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I take the sense of the House to be that the Front Benches should now speak. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has spoken, I shall speak, then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and then the amendment will go back to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. We debated the position of the charter quite fully in Committee, but it is interesting that the charter has cropped up time and again in other amendments, which indicates how important and pervasive this issue is to many people. Noble Lords have repeatedly raised the position of the charter in areas such as general equality, non-discrimination, the rights of children, workers’ rights and the rights of the elderly. Moreover, the concerns that have been expressed in this House are mirrored by concerns expressed by civil society in the form of distinguished non-governmental organisations and many others. My personal postbag has contained more about the charter than any other aspect of the Bill.

I want to say a word about the development of human rights. Of course, I fully accept that this country has played an important and proud role in that. We were very much a part of the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly after the Second World War. However—this is part of the genesis of the charter—the convention is essentially limited to classic civil and political rights, such as the right to association and the right to a fair trial. As was demanded when it was brought in, the charter deals with not only those rights—because it is intended to be comprehensive—but many other, more modern, economic rights, which mean a great deal to many people in this country.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for meeting with my noble friend Lady Hayter and I to discuss this issue. However, I have to tell him that he has failed to persuade me that the Government’s reasons for excluding the charter from the EU laws that will be downloaded on exit day are good. I am not alone in that. Your Lordships have heard about, and been reminded of, what was said by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and by the distinguished Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. They said that it was clear beyond doubt that this decision would result in a diminution of protection. Others have made the same point; the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to the well put together opinion of Mr Jason Coppel QC.

As the debate has progressed, I have sensed movement. Whereas in Committee, a view appeared to be put forward on behalf of the Government that the charter did nothing, I now detect that that is not the position; it is accepted that the charter does something, as said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, but what it does is not liked. That is a very different position. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place, put it very well: this is a debate between lawyers. That is not what we should be dealing with at this stage. The question now should not be whether this provision of EU law alone should be excluded from the EU law download, and it should not turn on nice, detailed legal argument, particularly argument that is contentious. Even if the charter does only a little, if it does something—the view of many people is that it does a lot more than a little—then, in accordance with the Government’s promise, that should be incorporated into domestic law at this stage like every other provision of EU law. Its removal or modification, if desired, should be done through the process that this House and the other place decide is the right way for us to modify retained EU law—whether that is primary legislation, which would be our preference and was the preference of this House when it voted last week on certain rights, or some other process of delegated legislation. The key point is that if the Government want to modify how the protection of the rights of workers, citizens, the elderly and children appears in the charter in any way, it should be through that process.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us, rightly, at the beginning—because it is what this is all about—the Government’s position is that the Bill is intended to be straightforward and to put on the UK statute book, on exit day, the provisions of EU law currently in force. Thereafter, radical policy changes and choices will be made—there will be occasions for that—and once the scrutiny of the Bill in this House and the other place is complete, we will know whether those routes are to be solely through primary legislation or through delegated legislation. There will be a process for that if we think it should happen.

For now, the issue is simple: should the promise from the Government—indeed, from the Prime Minister herself—in the foreword referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the rights on the day after exit will be the same as those on the day before, be respected or not? As has been said more than once, including by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, what is unique about this issue that means we apply a different process to it from that applied to everything else? That is the point I invite noble Lords to consider as we vote, as I hope we will, although it will be for the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to say.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

On the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, not assisted by the fact that the charter applies only to EU law and that the law on murder is not Union law?

[Lord Goldsmith]

It is always good to have a second argument when you are in front of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.

[Lord Judge]

Perhaps, then, we had better find out what “the sovereignty of Parliament” means.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I come back to the central point I want to make. The Government made it clear and promised that rights would remain the same on exit day, but they could then be subject to change through the processes agreed and determined by this Parliament. Of all EU laws, the charter alone is being excluded. That drives one to question why that should be. Is it an ideological reason? Is it not wanting to see something that has “EU” attached to it? Or is it—which will be even more sinister and would worry me enormously—that there is an unhappiness and suspicion about fundamental rights? If there is any element at all that what lies behind this is a suspicion about fundamental rights and a suspicion that people should not be able to exercise those rights, that would be deeply unsatisfactory and a very good reason for not accepting the Government’s exclusion of this.

[Baroness Deech]

Would the noble and learned Lord agree that what is special about this is that the judges of the ECJ, whatever sort of court he estimates that to be, will keep interpreting those rather vague principles on and on, decade after decade, and that all those interpretations will have to be brought back here, unforeseeable and maybe irrelevant as they are? That is what is different about it.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am advised that that is not a request for clarification which is appropriate on Report. I have dealt with this question before. After exit day, it will be British judges who interpret the EU retained law. There are questions about regard they will have to decisions which relate to the same law afterwards—those we will debate at another time during Report—but the idea that, if the charter is included, there will be references to the Court of Justice of the European Union is simply not right.

I have been driven, and I apologise for it, to the view that it is an ideological reason, and we have heard one or two speeches which seem to support that, but the people outside here—it is delightful that we still call them the people on the Clapham omnibus in court and in this place—will wonder what it is. They will look at the charter; they will see the rights in it, all of which they would think are very good things to have—they would not perhaps understand all the details as when they apply and when they do not—and wonder what the Government are doing in saying that it alone is excluded. There has never been a good answer for that. I do not anticipate that we will get it now either. The noble and learned Lord asks why not. It is because he and I have spoken about this several times and I have not heard it yet.

[A noble Lord]

Experience, dear boy.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I will listen attentively to what the Minister says, of course, but I do not anticipate that we will hear anything new. In those circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will ask the House to state its opinion. I will be glad to go in the Lobby with him then, as I hope will many Members of the House.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all your Lordships for an interesting debate which has addressed some of the issues in considerable depth. In a short but telling address, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, noted that he was not a lawyer, but he exhibited a depth of understanding and a delicacy of touch in respect of our constitutional settlement that is absent from many lawyers, including, I fear, one or two who have spoken in this Chamber.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Spicer (Con)]

My Lords, I shall give a brief lay man’s perspective. Being brief, I shall follow the advice of the late Cecil Parkinson, who said to after-dinner speakers, “Get up, say you’re very proud to stand before them and sit down”. I shall be a little longer than that, but not very long.

I think that we can all agree on one thing: that pretty well all of us had a fixed view on Brexit before this Bill even reached this House. Tactics is a different matter. I am very interested in the remain tactics so far as the generality of the Bill is concerned; I shall come to the specifics in a moment. They seem to be along the lines of: “We absolutely agree that we are coming out—no, we’re serious; we agree we’re coming out—but we’re coming out to a new single market backed by a strengthened court in such a way that it is quite indiscernible that we have come out in the first place”. This debate is about the court and what part it is going to play in all this. I think that it is generally accepted that the court is not only very powerful but foreign—my noble and learned friend brilliantly summed up the foreignness of the law being introduced—and different. It is based on politics rather than on precedent in law.

I first came to this in 1992. On 3 June of that year, I tabled an Early Day Motion which started the rebellion against the Maastricht treaty, so I have some form. What is the relationship between a debate which was then concerned with the single currency and today’s debate and amendment? There is a close relationship with matters to do with the currency. As Henry VIII recognised, the currency is immensely important. “This Realm of England as an Empire” was all about changing our currency back to gain control over it. The currency is vital, and the question is what the relationship between it and today’s debate is. If we did not come out of the European Union, I would not rely on us retaining our currency and our control over it. It is unimaginable that the European court would decide to run a competitive trading arrangement with the one country left to manage its own economy. It is therefore of enormous importance not only to the future of this country but to this amendment.

We debated earlier whether it counts for anything that we have become so deeply embroiled in foreign law. I suppose that where I differ from lawyers is that I believe that there are things in politics that matter as symbols, even if the lawyers can prove otherwise. It is therefore vital that we kick out Amendment 21 today.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Spicer, has made a very interesting observation, but it seems to go wider than the amendments which the House is being asked to approve, so I shall not say anything about the issues that he has raised. He referred to the “remain tactics”. I am not aware that there are any remain tactics in relation to this amendment. On the basis that we are leaving, all the amendment is about is making sure that it works properly. That has certainly been the guiding principle as far as I am concerned.

On the formulation of the amendment, I do not want to use the word “helpful”, because that is the one word that I do not like—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, knows that. The problem with “helpful” is that it is a little subjective. A noble Lord, who is not in his place so I shall not identify him, told me in the previous debate that he was going to say something. I said, “Okay. Is it going to be helpful?” He said, “You might think so”. Let me tell you that it was not helpful at all. He might have thought it was, which is the problem with “helpful”. In any event, I do not imagine that the courts will have regard to something that they do not think is helpful for the purpose of the issue before them, so I am happy with “relevant”. The important point is that it will not be perceived as a political decision being made by a court in wanting to follow a decision from the European court. That is the point that we were making in earlier stages on this part of the Bill, and I thank the Minister and his department for dealing with it.

That leads to the fourth question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which was about the protection, safeguarding and upholding of the independence of the judiciary. We raised that on the previous occasion; it is hugely important. I join the noble Lord in congratulating the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on coming out and supporting the judiciary at a time when others in government sadly were not. The assurance on that sought by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is important, and I am grateful that the noble and learned Lord has succeeded in answering it already—it was slightly out of turn, but it was good. I shall ask him to go a little further, because the obligation to uphold the independence of the judiciary does not rest just on the Lord Chancellor. I believe that the Constitutional Reform Act which set that out imposes that obligation on the whole of the Government, and it is important that it should. We cannot have a situation in which one Minister, in perhaps one of the more political jobs, is able to say unhappy and unhelpful things about the judiciary and think it okay because the Lord Chancellor will stand up and say, “We shouldn’t really be doing that; we should be protecting them”. It is important to recognise that it is the whole Government. I would single out as well the Attorney-General as one who should uphold the independence of the judiciary. When I was in that office, I certainly regarded it as part of my job, although the Lord Chancellor was in that primary position. I would be grateful if the Minister when he replies for the second time could touch on that point and see what assurance he can give.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, raised an important point about ossification, as he put it, which is the one worry I have. As this structure works, so far as the Government are concerned, I think that the effect is that, in the areas to which the subsection would apply, the lower courts will be bound to follow decisions within that scope and it is only the Supreme Court that will be able to depart from them. That leads to the risk that the law will ossify and that cases will have to go to the Supreme Court which really do not need to because they are not that important—although it is important to clarify the law. The noble and learned Lord’s suggestion that the Government should look at the possibility of widening this so that the courts of appeal in different parts of the United Kingdom would be able to depart from what would otherwise be binding law is a good one.

I think that this suggestion would also be welcomed by some others—although I have not specifically raised this with them—who are worried about this provision. They are aware that there are rights—for example, in the field of workers’ rights—where there is some movement in EU law and are concerned that, as it stands, the retained EU law that we will have will lag behind what happens in other jurisdictions, which we all hope will still be partners, although not partners in the same Union. They are concerned that if this has to go to the Supreme Court it may create an unhappy difference between them. There may be circumstances where we all know that a particular piece of law is right for consideration by the top court, but it takes time to get there and it may not always get there.

I was going to ask the Minister whether he could give any assurances about how the Government would assist, at least where they are the other party, in getting cases to the Supreme Court where there is good reason to think that a relevant decision will be departed from. But it seems to me that opening this up to the courts of appeal would actually be a neater and more traditional way of doing that. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about that. I should have mentioned at the outset that my name stands on the original amendments as well.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for the contributions that have been made. With respect to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, about the position of the Lord Chancellor and the rest of the Government, perhaps I might repeat what I said earlier: I assure the House that the whole Government, the Lord Chancellor especially, steadfastly defend the independence of the judiciary. I believed I had said that before but I am happy to repeat it.

On this question of the ossification of the law, which has been raised, particularly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—indeed, it is a matter that we have discussed—we have to remember that until exit only the Court of Justice of the European Union is in a position to see us depart from a previous decision of that court. The timeline for taking a case through the CJEU does not bear scrutiny in comparison with the timeline for taking a case to the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The feeling of the Government is that if we are removing the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is appropriate to put in its place the United Kingdom Supreme Court in that context, and that is what we have sought to do and what we intend to do.

That is a policy decision, I appreciate, and there is a suggestion that perhaps it can be brought down to the Inner House of the Court of Session, and the Court of Appeal. That has been considered, but we do not feel at this time that that is the right way forward, so I cannot give any reassurance that we intend to revisit that point. I feel that the decision we have made is the appropriate one in the circumstances but clearly we will have to consider in due course whether that gives rise to any difficulties with respect to the reference of cases to the Supreme Court.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is aware, it is open to the Supreme Court to, in effect, accelerate cases that it considers to be of particular materiality of importance. Therefore, that facility is already available. But I have discussed this matter with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and it is not our intention to revisit it before Third Reading. I hope that noble Lords will be able to support the government amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I thought the Minister was a little harsh on the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and on the amendment which the House passed by a very large majority last week, but let that pass for the moment. I am grateful to my noble friend for making a genuine attempt to understand some of the concerns which can be summarised very briefly. This House is very concerned that taking back control means Parliament taking back control, not the Executive amassing more power to themselves, so he must understand that we will all want to read what he said. Some of it seemed very helpful but we will want to look very carefully at what the Government are actually proposing. It seems a gentle move in the right direction but, just as we have to consider carefully what the Minister has said, I say to him with great respect that he has to reconsider what the House decided last week, because it decided by a very large majority.

A final word of thanks to my noble friend: he has been dismissive of a number of pleas that some matters should be returned to on Third Reading. One understands why, but at least he has been emphatic tonight in realising that we will have to come back to some matters on Third Reading, and for that I thank him.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I think three things emerge from that. First, there is a recognition, with thanks, that the Minister and the department have accepted that their previous approach to how you identify the status of retained EU law is not acceptable. That was the primary point made in the reports that we discussed at earlier stages of the Bill, and that is the first point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. I entirely agree that that is undoubtedly a step in the right direction.

The second point that emerges is the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that this touches on the amendment passed by the House and moved by my noble friend Lady Hayter, and the Government therefore have to take account of what this House has said. That leads to the third point, which is that this is very complicated, which was apparent from what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and it is perhaps difficult for us all to completely grasp the implications. Under normal circumstances it would have been enormously helpful if the Government had tabled something like this at an earlier stage so that it could have been considered by our very expert committees, the Constitution Committee and perhaps the Delegated Powers Committee. It makes it more difficult for us. However, the Minister has recognised that more needs to be said about this and more needs to be discussed, which is why he proposes that—as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, says, perhaps alone of the matters that we have discussed—this issue can come back at Third Reading.

I am not quite sure at the moment exactly what the Minister has in mind. Does he want to press these amendments today and then discuss them—or just leave them until Third Reading, which would be very welcome? I am glad that he is giving a nod that that is what he has in mind, which is what I would hope. In those circumstances, meetings with noble Lords, and indeed noble and learned Lords, can be organised to consider the matter further. Obviously we will read what he said very carefully in Hansard, and if there is any further information that the Minister can give before the meetings then that would be helpful as well. On that basis, we express qualified support for the principle of the movement that the Minister has indicated.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I can be very brief in the light of the debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed. I express particular thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for tabling her amendment, which has resulted in this helpful debate.

As I said in opening, I recognise that the state of this legislation is a complex and vexed issue. As a non-lawyer, I have been struggling to get my head around it all as well. The approach that we have taken is one of pragmatism, recognising the existing hierarchy within EU law and seeking to balance effective scrutiny with the need to ensure that the law continues to function. This has not been an easy task but obviously I believe that the solution that we have arrived at is the right one. I accept that the remarks I made earlier were long and detailed and Members will want to reflect on them, so I shall repeat what I said: we think we have addressed the areas of importance where matters turn on the distinction between primary and subordinate legislation. Our discussions so far with many both inside and outside this Chamber have not identified any other such matters, but I repeat that I am happy to return to the issue at Third Reading if other areas are identified.

I thank my noble friend Lord Cormack for his contribution. I hope my remarks were not seen as dismissive of the House’s amendment the other day; of course we accept the decision that was made, but I thought it helpful for us to outline our initial thinking on the possible effects of that amendment at the earliest possible occasion. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his remarks. I am happy to confirm that either I or officials are happy to meet any other noble Lords who have concerns once they have had a chance to read the remarks that I made earlier today. With that, I hope I have convinced the House that our approach is the right one, and I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

I wanted to move the amendments now. I am happy to reflect further if any points are identified in the meantime that can be brought forward at Third Reading, but I still want to move the amendments.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I was asking the Minister whether he was prepared to leave these amendments to be moved at Third Reading or whether he wanted to proceed with them and then allow amendments to them. I had understood from the body language that was exchanged between us that he would move them at Third Reading, which would allow time for discussions and possible tweaking or perhaps something more radical. If he is going to move them now, though, it is important that he confirms he would not have a problem if amendments to his amendments were put forward at Third Reading, because that at least would mean that whatever was required could be dealt with then, rather than him moving his amendments now and for us to be told at Third Reading, “Sorry, too late, that amendment has been passed. You can’t bring it back”. Could he confirm that? Again he is nodding but I am reluctant to interpret the nod without an element of verbal assurance. Perhaps he can help with that.

[Lord Callanan]

Yes, I am happy to provide that assurance. As I said, it was a long and detailed speech on this area, and Members will want the opportunity to read it in detail and reflect further on it. I think I want to move my amendments now while indicating that, if there are still concerns, we would be prepared to return to the issue at Third Reading.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Forgive me; would he accept that amendments could be made even to these amendments? I am not suggesting that he will accept our amendments, but does he accept that they can be made?

[Lord Callanan]

I accept that, yes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cashman]

My Lords, I added my name to this amendment but too late for it to be printed in the Marshalled List. I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on the way he moved this extremely important amendment. He referred to our earlier discussions on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, when the House was nearly full, and this connects directly to that debate.

There are deep concerns, not only within the House but outside, among respected and established non-governmental organisations and, indeed, the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I would expect the Government to clutch this amendment with open hands and embrace it to their chest, but I have worked with the Minister in the European Parliament and I know that I am not about to see that happen—although, as my noble friend Lady Lister said, the amendment puts into words the assurances offered by the Government and Ministers.

As I said earlier, there are real, deep concerns that rights will be attacked once we leave the protection of the charter and the treaty establishing the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Most of these rights arise out of Article 13 of the treaty of Amsterdam, which gave the European Union a legal basis upon which to act on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, belief, age, disability or sexual orientation; gender was covered elsewhere. They define the very societies and countries in which we choose to live.

I look forward to the Minister replying and surprising me by saying that the Government take this amendment on board and will embrace it. If I am not surprised, I will return to this issue. Others outside the House will return to this issue. I believe that it defines the kind of country we want to be post Brexit. Now more than ever, we need to offer reassurances not merely within the two Chambers of this Palace but within the Bill.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, one of the privileges I had when I served as Attorney-General was to be able to see government proposals, to consider them, to see where they were compatible with our obligations and sometimes to use incompatibility as grounds for persuading Ministers not to go down a particular path.

In considering this amendment, it is important to understand what is meant by underpinning because it risks concealing the important proposition that there are certain things that the Government simply cannot do at the moment—nor can other Governments who are members of the EU—because of the commitments that have been made. A directive has to be complied with. We cannot override it overnight. In these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, is right to raise this hugely important point: what will be the underpinning in the future?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I am trying to clarify what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, said. I think the issue is not “appropriate” versus “necessary” but “the Minister considers”. I believe the point the noble Baroness was making is that, if something has to be “necessary”, that leaves it open for a court to say whether or not it was necessary. If you say “the Minister considers it”, then the issue is whether the Minister genuinely considers it.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, and what is wrong with that?

In Committee, in a most powerful speech, the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, with his vast experience from inside the Civil Service, from knowing just what civil servants and Ministers would like to do, gave your Lordships the advice that,

“in this case, I think the scale of the powers proposed is so extensive that we should lean against giving Ministers plump cushions of legal protection”—

a very telling phrase. He continued:

“it should be the strict discipline of an objective test of what is necessary”.—[Official Report, 7/3/18; col. 1180.]

I respectfully completely agree with that. It is absolutely the case that, in circumstances where great powers are being given, one needs to be very clear where the discretion lies. Here it is not just Ministers but civil servants. We have been told that there are 109 Ministers, but under the Carltona principle—I have made this point several times and no one has yet contradicted it—many civil servants themselves in effect exercise these powers in the name of the Minister.

So Ministers and civil servants do what they think is appropriate. That is very different from things that are necessary in order to achieve the objectives set out in the clause. As a practising lawyer, I have no difficulty with the concept of what is necessary, but I believe—to use the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, in a different context—that there is a profound distinction between saying, “You can do what you as a Minister consider appropriate”, and saying, “You can do only what is necessary to achieve these objectives”. If this House has a responsibility, I respectfully suggest that it is to ensure that we do not give the Executive more power than is necessary in order to achieve their objectives. The amendment would achieve that. If the Government want to come back with further clarification on the meaning of “necessary”, although I do not believe that is necessary at all, they can do so.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I intervene to ask the Minister whether he agrees with this. Although —and I support the amendment—it is right to say that “necessary” involves a degree of objectivity, the clause would actually be applied in court on any challenge, and it would be a judicial review challenge to the making of regulation, on the basis that it is, in the reasonable opinion of the Minister, necessary. That is how the clause as amended would be applied on a challenge in court. Would he agree?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am delighted to be described as a Minister in that question—not a role that I am eager to take on—but it may be that the question was intended for the Minister himself when he comes to respond.

The important point, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made clear, as did other speakers, is that, as the Bill stands it is subjective and imposes a vague, low test. It is subjective because it is what the Minister considers, and it is a low test because it is what he considers appropriate.

As I told your Lordships previously—I will repeat it just this one last time—as someone who has spent a life as a practising lawyer, a court advocate, advising Ministers and being a Minister, I know that there is all the difference in the world between saying, “You can do this if you consider it appropriate”—nobody can second-guess that—and saying, “You can do this if it’s necessary”. It introduces an objective test, and that is what matters. This is what we invite the House to say to the Government is necessary in these circumstances. That is the only power they should take, and I hope that when the noble Lord presses the amendment to a vote, it will be supported by many Members of this House.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, I first thank all those who have contributed to today’s relatively brief debate, and the many noble Lords I have either spoken to or exchanged letters with between Committee and Report. The scope of the delegated powers in the Bill has, rightly, been one of the most intensively scrutinised areas, and I do not for one moment doubt the best intentions of many of those who have spoken against the Government’s position today. However, I hope noble Lords will listen to my remarks with an open mind, as I hope to offer some new content that we did not cover in Committee.

Let me start by addressing the specific proposition of the amendments on the Marshalled List—Amendments 31, 42, 86 and 87, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. As has been said, they would remove from the main powers in the Bill the discretion of ministerial judgment on appropriateness, and permit action only where it “is necessary” in the context of the specific power. This has been touted as a change from a subjective test to an objective one. But I hope to demonstrate that this is not the case, as I would question what exactly “necessary” means.

For example, in the context of Clause 7, would the course of action a Minister takes have to be no more than necessary to correct the deficiency? Or must it be necessary to correct a deficiency for the power to be engaged in the first place—and if so, necessary for what purpose? Let me address these different scenarios in turn. First let us say, hypothetically, that a court interprets the amendments to mean that a course of action taken by Ministers must be necessary to correct an identified deficiency. It might follow that Ministers could follow only the course of action that does no more than is strictly necessary to correct that deficiency, rather than the course of action that is most sensible.

I know the House likes concrete examples, so let me give an example of how I think this would lead to worse policy outcomes. Take, for example, Section 105B of the Communications Act 2003—with which I am sure all noble Lords are completely familiar. This includes an obligation for Ofcom to notify its regulatory counterparts in other member states, as well as the European network and information security agency, when Ofcom is made aware of a security breach that affects a public electronic communications network or service, and Ofcom thinks it appropriate to make such a notification. It could be argued that it is not strictly necessary to delete the obligation at all. Let us assume, however, that a court accepts that some action is needed in this scenario. A test of necessity could then be taken to mean that the Government should take the minimum action possible to address the deficiency. That might be simply to remove the requirement to share information.

However, the Government's preferred policy, which this House would surely support, is to change it into a discretion that makes it explicit that Ofcom may make notifications of this kind if it wishes. This is intended to support proportionate information-sharing about security matters after EU exit. That amendment is appropriate but arguably not strictly necessary, and might fall foul of the increased restriction offered by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. I understand the notional appeal of permitting Ministers to act only where it is necessary. But here I agree with my distinguished predecessor, my noble friend Lord Bridges, the midwife, as he put it, to the Bill. It should not be the role of a Minister to be a statutory firefighter, dousing deficiencies in the statute book only where it is absolutely necessary. Instead, I would argue that a more proactive role is the only way that we can ensure the best possible outcome for the statute book.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

I wonder whether the Minister would kindly consider this question: is he saying that he would want Ministers—and indeed, civil servants—to have the discretion to make policy changes from EU retained law without reference to Parliament?

[Lord Callanan]

The powers in this Bill cannot be exercised by civil servants; it has to be Ministers who make the decisions. We have said on a number of occasions that defining a policy change is quite hard. A pure correction can involve a slight policy choice—for instance, whether to designate one agency or another. It can still be a technical correction but it is a policy choice about what to do. But we are clear that we are not trying to make substantive policy choices through this secondary legislation power.

I will refrain from making the full case for the government amendments as they are not on the Marshalled List today, but I will quote the Constitution Committee in justifying our position. It said that such amendments,

“will require explanations to be given for the use of the power which can be scrutinised by Parliament. It will also provide a meaningful benchmark against which use of the power may be tested judicially. In this way, the Government can secure the flexible delegated powers it requires while Parliament will have a proper explanation and justification of their use that it can scrutinise”.

That, to me, sounds like a sensible solution.

Before I finish, let me add the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who I am sorry to see is not in his place.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking my noble friend Lord Rooker for reminding us of the work of Lord Renton. Those of us who were privileged to serve in this House with Lord Renton, and others who served in the other House with him, will well recall what my noble friend said about his work. We would do well to remember it and so I thank my noble friend for reminding us.

As for the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, not to feel the force of the logic that he so powerfully expressed. As the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said, it is not a very strong response to say that there are protections in the way in which statutory instruments will be presented to this House and the other House. I add to that the fact that there are other protections this House has said are necessary, at least in relation to certain changes, for example those which might affect elements that require—as this House has said—special protection when it comes to the use of the delegated powers this Bill is intended to provide.

Having said all that, there remains a strong logic in what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said, and I think we all hope that is carefully considered by the Government, for both this Bill and future Bills. It is fair to say—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—that at least this Bill has some restrictions on the way these powers may be used, and I commend his requirement—his request—that when Ministers give reasons for the use of these powers, we understand just what they have in mind. This House and the other place should look carefully at that. That said, we will wait to see what the noble and learned Lord will do with his amendment.

What is being said about Amendment 53 is to be welcomed. That should not be overlooked. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has added his name to this amendment. It is one of the few occasions—I think the only occasion—when one gets five names on an amendment: when a Minister sees the error of his ways and adds his name to the amendment. That remark may be churlish of me—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, is nodding vigorously—but the important point is that we welcome the Government’s acceptance of that amendment. That was the most egregious part of the Henry VIII clause: that it should be possible to use it to amend even this very Bill, which your Lordships have spent so many hours and days debating. It is, therefore, good to see that go.

I ask the Minister—I think it may be the noble Baroness—to confirm one thing. Amendment 53 omits the words “including modifying this Act”, which currently appear in the clause. My belief is that those words were there because without them it would not be possible to use the power to amend the very Act in which the power appears. I believe that is stated in parliamentary counsel’s guidelines on clauses such as this.

I very much hope the noble Baroness will confirm that when she responds to the amendment. I know that attempts were made through the usual channels to make sure that whoever responded to the debate had notice of that question. I hope, therefore, that she has been adequately briefed on it. I think, however, that your Lordships will want confirmation that that is the purpose of this amendment. It was certainly the purpose when it was tabled: that it should take away this most egregious possibility of being able to use the power to amend the very Act itself. I will give the noble Baroness time to get clarity on that, but I can assure her that attempts were made through the usual channels to ensure that she was not taken by surprise by it. I do not know quite what happened.

In any event, we would certainly want Amendment 53, when we get to it shortly, formally moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and I look forward to supporting it then. In the meantime, I wait to see how the noble and learned Lord deals with his amendment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, let me start on a positive note. My noble friend Lord Callanan was indeed pleased to add his signature to Amendment 53, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, which will remove the ability under Clause 9 to amend the Act itself. I note that this amendment is supported not just by the noble Lords in whose names it lies but by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of this House. It was one of that committee’s recommendations for the Bill and, given that the Government are happy to support this amendment, we are pleased to be in such illustrious and learned company. It is a heady experience, I have to say.

I am sure that noble Lords will welcome this amendment to a part of the Bill that has continued to cause concern to many throughout its passage. It is important to explain why the Government included such a measure at the time of introduction—this may partly address the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. When the Bill was first drafted, this provision was not an attempt to hold open a back door to circumventing or undoing any of the protections or constraints in the Bill. Rather, it was seen as a necessary step to provide the flexibility to respond to developments in negotiations. Indeed, the fact that aspects of the Bill may need to be amended, depending on the outcome of these negotiations, still remains. Our acceptance of this amendment does not reflect a change in that regard. Rather, the decision to introduce in due course a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, which will give effect to the implementation period, the citizens’ rights agreement and the financial settlement, among other provisions of the withdrawal agreement, provides another door through which the Government may make all the changes required.

Without a strong justification for retaining Clause 9’s ability to amend the EU withdrawal Bill once it becomes an Act, the Government are indeed content to remove that ability. As with our amendment to remove Clause 8, I hope this shows the Government’s commitment to working with Parliament and I reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—

[Baroness Goldie]

I listened with interest to that point, but I am not sure that I entirely agree with that construction of the change to Clause 9(2). Amendment 53 means that we will not be able to amend the Bill when it is an Act. It therefore restricts the scope of the power, which seems to have met with the satisfaction of those who have put their names to it. As I have said, that is a positive and, I hope, a helpful reassurance from the Government.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Can we just agree that, as far as the noble Baroness and the Government Front Bench are concerned, it is the belief of the Government that removing the words as proposed in the amendment to which the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has put his name, would preclude the power in this clause being used to amend the Bill once it becomes an Act?

[Baroness Goldie]

In short, yes—with this caveat. The Government regret that we are not able to be signatories to Amendment 52A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, because, as he has indicated, it seeks to remove Clause 9(2) completely, thereby removing the power to amend primary legislation. However, it is always a joy to listen to the noble and learned Lord’s eloquent and well-informed contributions.

Let me explain the Government’s position. Even with the introduction of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, Clause 9 residually serves as a supplementary measure to implement the more technical elements of the withdrawal agreement that will need to be legislated for in time for exit day. These technical amendments may need to be made to primary legislation in exactly the same way as in secondary legislation, so we cannot accept limiting the power in the way sought by the noble and learned Lord. However, I say to him, as he specifically raised this point, that the new transparency procedures for such regulations would require the Minister to make clear in the supporting memorandum what legislation was being amended. I hope that reassures him.

The Government believe that whether a change is made to primary or secondary legislation does not always reflect the significance of the changes being made. Equally, the level of detail involved may be better suited to secondary legislation. I hope that noble Lords will understand the Government’s reasoning on this and will welcome the Government’s compromise through the removal of the ability to amend the Act. I repeat the categorical assurance I have given to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on that point. This further demonstrates the Government’s commitment to restrict the scope of the powers sought wherever practical. I hope this amendment is enough to reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and that he will withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Dubs, in moving this amendment, described it as a modest proposal. It is modest in two respects. First, for the reason that he gave: all he seeks is to replicate the current arrangements, already approved by Parliament and in operation at the moment. That is not a great change at all from where we are. There is a second reason that it is modest: I pay tribute to his modesty in producing this amendment, having fought for the previous amendment, having persevered, and he is absolutely right to ask the House again to support it. I hope the House will.

It sounds as though the Government are entirely in agreement with the objectives. They agree on the need to protect the most vulnerable children and to provide this way of safety for them to claim asylum where appropriate. It sounds as if the only difference may be over the way to deal with it. Everybody, including my noble friends Lord Dubs and Lord Bassam, the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, whose names are on the amendment, recognises that this will require negotiation with other countries, because we cannot do it entirely on our own. Does the Minister agree that if this House were to say in a clear vote tonight what it thinks the Government should do, and put it in the Bill, that will actually strengthen the hand of the Government when they come to negotiate with other countries and others? They will be able to say, “This is what our Parliament wants”—assuming that the other place agrees. Those circumstances will make it much easier to negotiate; that may be the only point.

I am not going to take any more of your Lordships’ time: I think it is time either for the Government to accept the amendment, as I hope they will, or, if they fail to do so, for my noble friend Lord Dubs to divide the House, in which case we will strongly support him through the Lobby.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, we have just debated an important issue, and later I shall turn to some other very substantive matters. Nevertheless, I ask for a moment of the House’s time while I make the case for the five government amendments in this group, especially for the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who apparently does not believe that we are tabling any amendments to the Bill.

These are all consequential amendments on the status provisions that we debated on day two of Report, and which I am pleased to say that the House accepted without a Division. I know the House will look again at these complex provisions at Third Reading but, as I said on day two, I hope there will be no further amendments beyond anything that relates to additional matters where the distinction between primary and subordinate legislation is important, and therefore we should insert that distinction between retained principal direct EU legislation and retained minor direct EU legislation.

Amendments 93A, 93B and 93C clarify types of legislation that are included in the definition of “enactments” in the Bill. This definition includes a non-exhaustive list of enactments. The new status clause provides that enactments are to retain the same status as they had before exit day. The intention behind the provision was to address the concerns of some noble Lords about the effect that the Bill has on domestic legislation via Clause 2 and whether it changed the status of that legislation. As part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring clarity and certainty, we have tabled the amendments to make it clear that these additional types of legislation all continue to have exactly the same status that they had before our exit from the EU. The amendments clarify that Church Measures, Orders in Council made in exercise of Her Majesty’s prerogative and devolved enactments made in exercise of the prerogative are within the definition of “enactments” and therefore will retain the same status that they held prior to exit day. The Government have of course consulted with the Church of England, the Palace and devolved authorities before tabling the amendments. The amendments also make it clear that in the highly unlikely case that any of these instruments are related to the EU and contain deficiencies, the Government could correct those deficiencies if appropriate, although in these cases it is likely that others would use their own existing mechanisms to so do.

Amendments 112BA and 112BB simply insert the new definitions of “retained principal direct EU legislation” and “retained minor direct EU legislation” into the Interpretation Act so that the terms do not need to be defined in future legislation. I hope noble Lords will find nothing to object to in this group, and I beg to move.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand and am grateful for what the Minister has said about the purpose behind the amendments. He is quite right that, for example, the first three amendments identify as enactments things, including Church Measures, that would normally be regarded as such but were not included. My question for him is simply this: he said in moving the amendment that one of the advantages of the amendments would be to enable deficiencies, if there were connections with EU law, to be corrected through secondary legislation. Could he explain how these amendments will enable that to be done? I did not quite follow that.

[Lord Callanan]

As I said, we think it is highly unlikely that any of these instruments that are related to the EU will contain deficiencies. If appropriate, we could use secondary legislation powers to correct those deficiencies but, as I said, in virtually every case it is likely that others—the devolved Administrations, the Church and so on—would want to use their own existing measures to do so.

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Moved by

[Lord Goldsmith]

109: Clause 19, page 15, line 21, at end insert—
“( ) A Minister of the Crown may not appoint a day on which section 6 is to come in force unless this day follows the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union.”

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, this amendment deals with a point that we raised and discussed in Committee. It may be that this group will not take too long, although that will depend upon what the Minister has to say. The important point about this is that the Bill as drafted would mean that at the moment Royal Assent was given, certain things would happen, including that the jurisdiction of the CJEU would come to an end. We raised the point that, given that it appeared likely that during an implementation period the Court of Justice of the European Union would continue, by agreement, to have certain jurisdiction, it would be important not to see the CJEU’s jurisdiction fall off a cliff edge, as it were. It may be that the noble and learned Lord the Minister will be able to reassure us that they will deal with this so as to ensure that if the CJEU continues to have jurisdiction in certain circumstances—which, as I say, I believe is a likely outcome of the continuation of the discussions—the Bill will not have taken away the ability to do that.

Amendment 109 would not allow Clause 6—which, among other things, brings the CJEU’s jurisdiction to an end—to come into effect until,

“the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union”.

The amendment focuses on transitional arrangements that are in fact agreed, not hypothetical arrangements. It would achieve no mischief because transitional arrangements would in fact be agreed and we would be saying simply that the jurisdiction of the CJEU should not come to an end until the end of that period.

The Minister may put forward some alternative way of achieving the same effect. I will listen very carefully, as will other noble Lords, to what he has to say about that. For the time being, I beg to move.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, in light of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord in moving this amendment, I will make one observation at this stage in response to his invitation to me.

Part Four of the withdrawal agreement so far agreed between the United Kingdom and the EU sets out:

“During the transition period, the Union law applicable pursuant to paragraph 1 shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects as those which it produces within the Union and its Member States and shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the same methods and general principles as those applicable within the Union”.


That would mean that during the implementation period—assuming that that is actually agreed—the CJEU will continue to fulfil the role it currently does with regard to the UK’s legal structure. This effect will be provided for under the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I do not know whether that assists the noble and learned Lord but that is the position as set out.

I add only that given the terms of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment—and I appreciate that it has been deliberately framed in this way:

“A Minister of the Crown may not appoint a day on which section 6 is to come in force unless this day follows the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union”,


if that amendment was passed, it would throw into doubt what would happen if there were no transitional arrangements. That is not an outcome that we seek but it is a distinct possibility and would mean either that Section 6 did not come into force at all or that potentially we would be thrown back into the billowing mists of uncertain inference. So I have that objection but I thought it might assist noble Lords if I made clear our position with regard to the implementation period. I hope that that responds to the noble and learned Lord’s observation.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I cannot agree with the point raised by the Minister about the wording of the amendment. The amendment says that a day may not be appointed,

“unless this day follows the expiration of transitional arrangements agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union”.

If in fact no arrangements have been agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it would seem that effect could be given to the amendment.

Be that as it may, the important point is that, as I understand it, the Minister has said two things. He has said, first, that if an implementation agreement is agreed, it will include continuing jurisdiction of some sort for the Court of Justice of the European Union and, secondly, that the Government will make sure that that jurisdiction is provided under the terms of legislation to be brought forward; I think the implementation Bill is what the Minister has in mind. If that is right and the Government are telling us that they intend that legislation will incorporate a continuing jurisdiction if that is agreed, that would deal with the mischief that this amendment was designed to deal with.

If that is the position—it would be very helpful if the noble and learned Lord could confirm whether it is—I would then be able to beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I am watching his body language but I have been fooled by that before, so I would be grateful if he clarified whether what I have said is right.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is of course the position that there is no certainty that there will be an implementation agreement. In that event, I would seek to differ with the noble and learned Lord about the interpretation of his amendment but that is a matter of little moment, I agree. However, in the event of there being an implementation agreement that follows the terms of the withdrawal agreement in outline, which noble Lords have seen, then during the transition period the Union law applicable pursuant to paragraph 1 will produce the same effect in the United Kingdom as in the remainder of the EU. That would extend to the jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of the matter of the interpretation and effect of such law. The noble and learned Lord is quite right that it would be the intention of Her Majesty’s Government, in those circumstances, to ensure that such a provision was expressed in the withdrawal agreement Bill.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, in those circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 109 withdrawn.

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[Lord Dykes (CB)]

I follow the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and intervene briefly to thank the noble Lord, Lord Low, for Amendment 83A and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for Amendment 83E, and both of them together for what they have said. I agree entirely with their remarks and thank the noble Lord, Lord Low, for his characteristically forensic analytical ability to go through all the points, with which I strongly agree, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, for his remarks. This is an important matter, and, as the only speaker who is not a signatory to the amendments, I think it would be right if the Government gave a comprehensive answer. People are worried about the future of equalities legislation in this country. On the reference of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, to the possibilities, there may be a case for primary legislation in future—a new, comprehensive Act—but that subject is separate from this amendment and debate.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, the amendments have been moved so powerfully and comprehensively by the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and my noble friends Lady Lister of Burtersett and Lord Cashman that I do not want to spend much of the House’s time commenting on them. I just want to make a few points. First, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, on the new advisory role that he mentioned—or, perhaps even more, the Equality and Human Rights Commission for taking him in that advisory role. That will be very valuable for the commission.

Secondly, I very much support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said about the benefit of statements that Ministers have to make; that focuses their minds on what they are doing. I know from my own experience that that is a valuable example from the Human Rights Act, and I have no doubt that it will be very useful here.

Thirdly, on the point made by my noble friend Lord Cashman, we are talking not about preventing amendments being made to the level of protection, but preventing them being made through delegated legislation without considerably more care and scrutiny. That takes me to my final point. Amendment 11, which has already been referred to, moved by my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, will be doing exactly that. It is a very important amendment that was accepted in your Lordships’ House. It will be one of the ways in which the very important continuing protection for equality may be maintained.

I support the amendment and look forward to hearing what the Minister says in opposition.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for his time and consideration on the important issue of how we maintain our equality protections as and after we leave the EU. I appreciate the discussions on this topic that he has had with the Bill officials and my ministerial colleagues. Before addressing the noble Lord’s Amendments 83A and 83E, the Government have reflected on our conversations with him, and today tabled amendments that will extend the statements regarding the Equality Act under Schedule 7 to SIs made under the consequential power in Clause 17(1).

This and other amendments we debated in Committee have sought to reflect in statute the political commitment that the Government have already made in this area—we will maintain the existing protections in and under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 after our exit from the EU. Following requests for assurances on this point in the debate in the other place, we tabled an amendment that will secure transparency in this area by requiring ministerial Statements about the amendment made to the Equality Acts by every piece of secondary legislation made under key delegated powers in this Bill.

The statements will, in effect, flag up any amendments made to the Equality Acts, and secondary legislation made under those Acts, while ensuring that Ministers confirm in developing their draft legislation that they have had due regard for the need to eliminate discrimination and other conduct prohibited under the 2010 Act.

As previously stated, the language of a political commitment does not translate to the statute book. So while our commitment to existing equality protections works perfectly well politically, and indeed in the wider world outside this place, these terms do not and could not have a sufficiently clear and precise meaning for the purposes of statute. These statements as tabled in the other place—

--- Later in debate ---

Also in this group, however, as the noble Baroness reminded us, is Amendment 83G, which relates to the creation of criminal offences. My colleagues on the Constitution Committee are deeply hostile to the use of delegated legislation to create criminal offences. It is quite hard to envisage circumstances in which that can be justified, and the government amendment is an attempt to address the concerns of the House on this point by providing that that too will be the subject of specific explanation. If I were to try to imagine a circumstance, it might be one in which what was a criminal offence in EU law would not be a criminal offence unless we created a new law to do it. I would still rather see that done by primary legislation but I note that the Government are trying to ensure that there are at least explanations for it. If the Government are leaving that open and are still discussing what form of words will best meet that point, presumably that matter must be referred to at Third Reading. Certainly I do not intend, and do not think that my colleagues on the Constitution Committee intend, to press Amendment 83D.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beith. The Government have moved on this, and that is to be recognised and appreciated, but they could have moved further, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has made very clear. It is slightly paradoxical that, as he says, the Government’s concern not to appear to be making policy changes prevents them adopting an amendment which makes it clear that what the instrument is to do is not to make a policy change. Be that as it may, although I find it hard to believe that the Government and their advisers could not have come up with a form of words that indicated the technical nature of the change being made while not falling into the trap of appearing to make policy changes, we would not prevent that amendment being agreed.

I want to underline three points which I invite the Minister to comment on. First, the way that these Ministers’ statements are described makes it clear that it is the statement of the Minister that is required. She spoke on at least one occasion about the Government’s view that something should be done, and no doubt the Minister would not do something if it were not the Government’s view. However, it is an important and critical part of the statement obligations that the Minister in question should apply his or her mind to the issue. That is the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, rightly made in the earlier debate. Therefore, I would be grateful for her confirmation that it will be understood that, where Ministers are to make such a statement, they have a personal responsibility to be satisfied. That is the whole point of including those words—so that the House or another place has the confidence and assurance that the Minister has focused on the issue and determined that the conditions are satisfied.

The second point I want to underline is that acceptance of these amendments does not in any way undermine the importance of the amendments that the House has already agreed in relation to the “appropriate” and “necessary” distinction. That requirement will remain, and the fact that the Minister’s statement may be expressed in different terms does not undermine it in any way. It will still be necessary—to use that word—for the necessity condition to be satisfied. I would be grateful for the noble Baroness’s confirmation of that.

My third point is that I, like the noble Lord, Lord Beith, am intrigued by the reference to the Government still considering the wording to be used for the creation of criminal offences. We look forward to seeing what they say. It sounds like it will be coming back at Third Reading, and on that I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation. In any event, in doing that, and as the Government consider their words, the House might expect the Minister’s statement to explain not just that there are good reasons for creating the offence but why there are good reasons for creating it in this way. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said, there is no reason not to create criminal offences by primary legislation; our concern has been creating them by delegated legislation. The House will need to be satisfied that that is an appropriate thing to do in a given case. I look forward to hearing the response to those points.

[Baroness Goldie]

I now look forward to giving that response. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his comments. On his first point, which is fairly legitimate, he will be acutely aware that Ministers have not just a personal but a political responsibility. They are, in the office of being a Minister, responsible for having made the statement. That, I think, imputes to the Minister both a political and a personal responsibility. Governments of all colours act in good faith and the Ministers involved act in good faith. I think this House will be satisfied that Ministers of whatever political hue acting under these powers will genuinely have a personal focus on what is being discussed—I think “focus” was the word used by the noble and learned Lord.

The statement must both make the original statement and give an explanation of the delay in having brought the statement forward. I have tried to make that clear in my remarks: this is not an alternative responsibility but a complementary responsibility; the two things will apply. A Minister cannot shoal off one of them and offer the other. Both responsibilities will apply.

The final point was that, when creating an offence, the noble and learned Lord thought it was appropriate to justify not just why the offence was being created but why it was being created in this way. Again, that is ex facie. Part of the impact of the responsibilities of the Minister under the Bill, if so amended, is that they can expect to be questioned closely. Indeed, given the now very robust scrutiny procedures that are in place, Ministers will expect to be questioned closely not only as to why they are creating the offence, but why they are doing so in this way. That is implicit in the structure within which Ministers are now being asked to operate. I hope that to some extent answers the noble and learned Lord’s points.

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[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, the Government have come forward with, in effect, some concessions in this area so as to give added safeguards to Members of this House that these powers will be used responsibly.

I know that the Minister recognises how concerned Members of the House are about the way that legislative power may be exercised other than through the full parliamentary process, or sub-delegated to others. That is why it is very important that the statements that it is proposed will have to be made are carefully considered. I will not repeat what I said in previous debates about the importance of ministerial responsibility for them, but the Minister has said that the House and another place will want to scrutinise very carefully both the statements that are made and the reports that are proposed to see how this is going. I therefore appreciate the changes being made by the Government and will be happy to see them go through.

Amendment 83L agreed.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is probably attributable to a note that I have here saying, “Don’t move Amendment 116”.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I will try to help the noble and learned Lord. It might be because it is pre-empted by Amendment 19 on general principles of EU law, which the House passed at an earlier stage.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Because it was passed, Amendment 116 does not arise.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, it seems to fall to me to move the last amendment of Report, as in Committee. However, I am not going to detain the House for long because, having re-read the Committee proceedings earlier, I found myself fully persuaded by the compelling and eloquent arguments made by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. As his arguments rolled off the page about the intent of the European Union Act 2011 and how it was not intended to address a situation other than a significant accretion of powers to the European Union, I thought it would not be sensible to press this. I am entirely persuaded by the fact that if we are to have a referendum on the treaty that the Prime Minister is negotiating with the European Union, as I believe we will ultimately have, it needs to be on an explicit vote by Parliament and cannot take place as a consequence of the 2011 Act. So, at 10.38 pm, I can bring Report proceedings to a conclusion.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My noble friend was very anxious to bring proceedings to a close at 10.38 pm. Would he be clear as to whether litigation taking place relating to the argument about the 2011 Act has completed? He seems very knowledgeable about that.

[Lord Adonis]

I believe it is still ongoing. Presumably it is perfectly reasonable for it to be ongoing until the 2011 Act is repealed, which it has not been yet. That is a matter for the litigants, not for me.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for that. Does it not therefore change my noble friend’s view as to how he wants to deal with this amendment?

[Lord Adonis]

No.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, there is nothing more I want to say about that, but it would be inappropriate to finish immediately without from these Benches thanking everybody for the part that they have played in this Report stage as we move towards the conclusion of this Bill at Third Reading—and towards 10.40, which I notice it now is.

[Lord Callanan]

The House will be pleased to know that I shall not repeat all the arguments against the amendment, but, following on from the questions that the noble Lord asked me in Committee, it would perhaps be helpful for him to know that the Government intend to commence this provision of the Bill shortly after Royal Assent. That was a question that the noble Lord asked me in Committee and I wanted to be up front with the House about it.