Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Home Office
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThat the Bill be now read a second time.
Relevant documents: 32nd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee and 12th Report from the Constitution Committee.
My Lords, this issue has been debated for years, particularly in this House. The House is full this morning; that reflects the seriousness with which your Lordships take this issue. For the first time, we have before us a Bill on assisted dying, which has come from the other place. I know that we will do what we do so well, which is scrutinise. This is a historic occasion.
The current law is confused, causes terrible suffering, and lacks compassion and safeguards. People must be at the heart of this debate. The Government’s own estimate is that, if the law was changed to introduce assisted dying, less than 1% of deaths would be assisted after 10 years. However, it is right that we allow assisted dying as an option for those who, despite the best palliative care, still want an assisted death.
Palliative care cannot alleviate the pain of everyone. Lucy Davenport’s husband, Tom, had an agonising death from bile duct cancer, despite receiving excellent care in a hospice. He died by choking on faecal vomit:
“The look on Tom’s face of terror and horror, that’s going to be with us forever. He would be horrified to think that was our last memory of him”.
For many others, it is not about pain; it is about alleviating fear or bringing to an end the terrible and continuing loss of dignity and control, which has no end, except in death.
If the patient wants to take control of the time of their own death, they are, under the current law, legally entitled to take their own life, but they must do so without any assistance, often horribly. Many of your Lordships were with me in the Archbishops’ Room in Millbank House when the widow of a man who had a lethal brain tumour described how she found her husband’s body in their garden, having stabbed himself in the heart.
Others go to Dignitas, often alone, because those who accompany them from England fear the consequences of the criminal law. Catie Fenner’s mother, Alison, had motor neurone disease and died at Dignitas in Switzerland. Catie could not join her for fear of a police investigation. She found out about the moment her mum had died by text. Catie says:
“We didn’t see her go, we didn’t hold her hand”.
The DPP’s guidelines make it clear that anyone with medical qualifications who provides assistance will certainly be prosecuted. Where the authorities learn that somebody has provided assistance or they suspect that they have, they investigate that person, invariably with compassion. But no matter how kind the process of investigation, it is an agony for the person investigated. It can go on for months, and sometimes for over a year. They fear prosecution as they grieve for the person they love.
It is right and possible to pass a law which allows those who are terminally ill to die with dignity and at a time of their own choosing, without the fear and the horror I have described and with appropriate safeguards in law, not as currently, where people, in order to have a death at their own choosing, seek to evade the law and therefore evade the protections. Some 300 million people in the world live in jurisdictions where there is such a law. There must be safeguards. The Bill we are debating today has benefited from those other jurisdictions. It is the most safeguarded assisted dying measure in the world, particularly in the light of the safeguards inserted in the Commons.
Key provisions in the Bill are as follows. The criteria for requesting assistance is that the person is terminally ill, has the mental capacity to make the decision, is 18 or over, is resident in England and Wales for the last 12 months, and is registered with a GP in England or Wales. The safeguards are designed to ensure that the patient has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their life and has made their decision voluntarily and without coercion. “Terminally ill” is defined as having
“an inevitably progressive … disease which cannot be reversed by treatment”,
with a reasonable expectation of death “within six months”.
The Bill is for the terminally ill only. It is about how you die when you are dying already. It is not for those with unbearable suffering, irrespective of their life expectancy, as in some countries, such as Canada. The Bill is clear that a person is not to be considered a person who is terminally ill if they are a person with only a disability or a mental disorder, or both.
Safeguards are layered throughout the process as set out in the Bill. First, a doctor in a preliminary conversation has to lay out all the care options, including the palliative care available in the context of the likely progress of the illness. Then two doctors, independent of each other, have to be satisfied that the illness is terminal within six months, that the patient has the mental capacity to make the decision, and finally, that it is their firm and settled wish arrived at without coercion. After that, a panel comprising a senior judge or King’s Counsel, a psychiatrist and a social worker has to be satisfied of the same things as the two doctors. If they are, then and only then can medical assistance be given.
I acknowledge that some think the process is too complicated and excludes too many people. On complicatedness, I am very conscious of the words of the Chief Medical Officer, Chris Whitty, who gave evidence in the other place that we should not create a “bureaucratic thicket”, and I very much hope we have avoided that. But it is vital that we should have a Bill that is robust in its safeguards in a matter of this gravity.
Disabled groups express fears that they may be vulnerable to being overpersuaded into an assisted death. I well understand the fears of the disabled in their dealing with healthcare providers, but the evidence strongly suggests that the disabled want the same rights as the rest of us when they become terminally ill. The Bill gives them excellent protection. There may be risks for them in other interactions with healthcare, but not in relation to this issue.
The multidisciplinary panel, which I have referred to, was added by amendment in Committee in the Commons, replacing the High Court judge alone. The panel provides a better safeguard than a judge alone because of the wider experience of the panel psychiatrist and social worker, but accompanied by the retention of the senior judge.
Beyond the current safeguards, some people have sought a compulsory psychiatric assessment for everybody. I do not believe that that is necessary or appropriate. The Bill provides that if either of the doctors have a doubt on capacity, they must refer the patient to a qualified psychiatrist. The panel includes a psychiatrist, and the panel can, if it wishes, require more psychiatric assessment.
No doctor or other person is required to participate in the provision of assistance under the Bill. Only those who opt in to participate in the work of the Bill need play any part. The Bill is explicit and wide in making that clear and provides extensive employment protections for those who do not wish to participate.
There are those who argue that it may be a terminal illness Bill now but its provisions will be expanded. Any such change would require primary legislation, and the experience of all other jurisdictions is that where they start with a terminal illness Bill such as this one, that is where they end. The Health and Social Care Select Committee in the Commons conducted an inquiry into assisted dying, ending in March 2024. Its conclusion on this issue was as follows:
“We … conclude that jurisdictions which have introduced”
assisted dying
“on the basis of terminal illness have not changed the law to include eligibility on the basis of ‘unbearable suffering’”.
It said that none of the jurisdictions which have introduced a terminal illness Bill has revoked it—and they have been there for as long as almost 30 years.
The Bill provides that for England:
“The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision securing that arrangements are made for the provision of voluntary assisted dying services”,
and that in Wales, Welsh Ministers “may” make such regulations. The difference between “must” and “may” is that we respect the devolution settlement. It is for Ministers in Wales to make their own decision in relation to that.
Concern is sometimes expressed about the cost of an assisted dying service and its effect on NHS provision. I draw your Lordships’ attention—please read the 151-page impact assessment that the Department of Health has produced—to the fact that the current budget of the National Health Service is £188 billion. On the central estimate as to what the service will cost once it is up and running, the impact assessment says it will be approximately £25 million a year. The figure does not take account of the annual savings calculated in the impact assessment, which exceed the figure of £25 million.
The NHS should have all the time it needs to introduce the service properly. It has said that it may need up to four years. The Bill has a backstop of being brought into effect after four years. We reflect what we have been told in relation to that.
The provision of assisted dying is not an alternative to palliative care. The Commons Select Committee report did not suggest that the availability of assisted dying compromised or reduced the availability of palliative care: rather, the reverse. Its conclusion was that
“we did not see any indications of palliative and end-of-life care deteriorating in quality or provision following the introduction of”
assisted dying, and
“indeed, the introduction of”
assisted dying
“has been linked with an improvement in palliative care in several jurisdictions.
The next stage is for this Bill to be scrutinised by your Lordships’ House in the normal way. I have been intimately involved with the Bill since it started its journey. This is a Private Member’s Bill, invariably and inevitably, because it is a matter of conscience. Once the Bill passed its Second Reading in the Commons, the sponsor of the Bill in the Commons, the honourable Member for Spen Valley and I, as the sponsor of the Bill in your Lordships’ House, have been provided with very substantial support from the Civil Service machine to ensure that the Bill is workable. The Government, in providing that support, did not forgo their neutrality. Rather, they provided comprehensive policy and drafting support.
I have long experience of shepherding Government Bills through Parliament. The support that I have had in relation to this Bill is second to none. The Bill passed its Third Reading in the Commons in June after more than 100 hours of debate, including 29 sittings in Bill Committee, two full days of debate on Report on the Floor of the House and a full day’s debate at both Second Reading and Third Reading.
I have to say that that compares very favourably. It is almost double the time given to scrutiny in the other place of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which we are dealing with now. Altogether, the Bill Committee considered and debated over 600 amendments, accepting around a quarter of them. Over 100 amendments were made in the sponsor’s name, and more than 30 amendments that had been tabled by MPs who voted against the Bill were passed.
I very briefly turn to the Motion in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Bridges, and the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Berger. The noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Bridges, refer to the Delegated Powers Committee report, which I have considered along with that from the Constitution Committee. I will be tabling amendments to deal with many of the points that both committees raise. They always help us in our deliberations.
There are some amendments which I will not be able to accept: for example, that your Lordships specify the drugs to be used in the process. Medical advances come thick and fast. This legislation is designed to last for the ages. Civil Service support is mentioned in the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Bridges: I have already dealt with that. With regard to the availability of government time, which is also raised, I am confident, after conversations with the Government, that your Lordships will have more than enough time to scrutinise this Bill thoroughly—as long as, of course, we start our process of scrutiny in the ordinary course of business after we have given it a Second Reading.
I turn to the amendment from my noble friend Lady Berger. Unfortunately, I only got notice of this last night. I did not have the opportunity after that of talking to my noble friend, and she had not discussed it with me previously. I make no criticism of her, but these are my initial thoughts in relation to it. It is proposed that a Select Committee precede the Committee of the Whole House. It has been clear for some time that at least seven days will be required to complete the passage of the Bill: four days in Committee, two days on Report and a day for Third Reading. There will then need to be ping-pong between the two Houses. If the process cannot start until January, which is what my noble friend’s amendment suggests, and must complete by the spring—the spring is when the Government say this Session will end—we will have to fit seven Fridays in between 9 January and 31 March. Having regard to recesses, the need for the normal intervals and the fact that other business will be conducted on some of those Fridays, so it cannot be every Friday, I am afraid that it is not possible to do that. I will therefore be opposing that amendment on the basis that it is not a workable timetable. That does not rule out a Select Committee running in parallel to the Committee stage, and I would be more than happy to discuss such a proposal with my noble friend, or anybody else who has such a proposal to make. But we must do our job in this House, and our job is not to frustrate, it is to scrutinise.
The Bill has been passed by the Commons. The decision on whether to change the law in our democracy should be for the elected representatives. We should improve where we can, but we should respect the primacy of the Commons. There are so many people who have been following the debate who recall the agonising death of a loved one or, like the people I mentioned at the beginning of this speech, fear what their own death might be like. The public want this and the elected House has expressed its will. I am confident that your Lordships will now do what you have done so well in the past. Whatever view we might take on the decision that the Commons arrived at, the way the debate was conducted there enhanced the reputation of Parliament. I hope and believe that we can embark on our scrutiny in a manner that will reflect just as well on our House.
The Bill before us has already given hope to those with personal experience of the injustice of the current law. They will be looking to us to play our proper role. If we can improve it further, we should and we will have done our duty. I commend this Bill to the House and I beg to move.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests, which refers to the facts that I have an assistant funded by Bernard Lewis to assist me in the conduct of this Bill and that Dignity in Dying funded the printing of the literature that I sent to your Lordships in connection with the Bill. I apologise for not mentioning this in my opening speech.
This has been a debate of the highest quality, probably the highest quality I have heard in 28 years in this House. Your Lordships brought passion, expertise and wisdom to the issue. I thought that every single speech that was made rose to the gravity of the occasion. I would wish to refer to every speech, but I cannot.
I pay particular tribute, however, to those of your Lordships on both sides—some people have mentioned them—who have identified their own personal suffering in relation to this. I pay tribute to all of those speeches and will mention just two of them. First, the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, was very striking. She will know that she has the wishes of the whole House with her. I also mention the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine. She, too, has the wishes of the whole House with her.
The debate shows beyond doubt that this House will bring both expertise and human understanding to the important task of scrutiny that we must now undertake. I express genuinely my gratitude to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee respectively. As I indicated in my opening speech, I will be bringing forward amendments to deal with many of the recommendations that they raise. I have to say that my experience as a Minister was that both those committees frequently made recommendations of the sort that have been made here requiring changes. I very much hope that, in consultation with the Government, I will be able to make those changes.
I also mention the status of this Bill. This is a Private Member’s Bill because it is a matter of conscience. No major political party agrees on whether or not it supports assisted dying, and I do not find that surprising. It has to remain a Private Member’s Bill for that reason. I should say, as my noble friend Lady Merron referred to, I have had assistance, as has my friend in the other place, the Member for Spen Valley, from the Government—civil servants and lawyers—seeking to ensure that the Bill is workable. That explains very many of the changes that have taken place. But, ultimately, this is a Private Member’s Bill and must be treated as such.
I believe that the Commons was very capable and proved able to properly scrutinise this Bill. It gave the Bill 100 hours of scrutiny. At the same time in this House, we are looking at the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which, as it happens, is longer, and it got 40 hours of scrutiny. We are looking at a Bill for which, in the Commons, there were no guillotines, so every clause was debated, not just those that were reached before the guillotine fell. We are looking at a Bill that has had a very large number of Select Committees look at it. The last one reported in the Commons in March 2024. We have a job of work to do, but I earnestly ask your Lordships not to approach this Bill on the basis that it has not been properly scrutinised in the other place.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for yielding. I simply wanted to say that a number of Members of the other place have said that the Bill did not receive proper scrutiny in the other place. They have also said that they expected that it would receive scrutiny in this place because that is what we do. That is profoundly important, and I do not think that what the noble and learned Lord just said is actually correct. I would also say that there were a number of amendments tabled and a number of MPs who wanted to speak who were not permitted to do so. That is reflective of the fact that the Bill did not receive proper scrutiny in the other place.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention. I have laid before the House the facts. I recognise that some Members of Parliament say that the Bill was not given proper scrutiny. I wonder if those were Members of Parliament who did not agree with the conclusion—I do not know. I have laid before your Lordships the time that was spent and the fact that it got more scrutiny than government Bills.
The essence of this Bill is that those who are terminally ill—and that means that they have a diagnosis that they will die within the next six months—should have the option, subject to safeguards, to be assisted to take their own life. One of the features of this debate was the personal experience that so many people have had of how, had that option been available, it would have ended terrible suffering. That suffering is not often about the pain but about the lack of dignity and the profound desire to keep control, because that is what people want.
I believe, from my own experience and from talking to so many people, that having that option is important. The points that have been made against it, which I have listened to incredibly carefully, are, in essence, not that people should not have that choice but that it brings dangers with it. The dangers are, first, that people will be overpersuaded and, secondly, that it will affect society in other ways.
On the idea that people will be overpersuaded, the Bill provides for the following: first, a conversation with the doctor in which all the options, including the palliative care options, are laid out; secondly, that a doctor decides that it is a free choice; thirdly, that a second doctor decides that it is a free choice; and, fourthly, that a panel, consisting of a senior judge or a King’s Counsel, a psychiatrist and a social worker, concludes that the person is not being coerced, that they are capable of making the decision and that it is their free choice. As it happens, that is probably the most safeguarded procedure in the whole of our healthcare system. It is certainly the most safeguarded process when compared with terminal illness Acts in other countries in the world.
I profoundly believe that people should have this choice—a profound belief that is based not on either my spirituality or my lack of spirituality, but on looking at the evidence from other countries that this will not lead to people being overpersuaded. I have in mind those countries that already have a terminal illness Act. The one that has been in force for longest is the one in Oregon, but there are many other states in the United States of America that have terminal illness Acts that have been in force for 20 years and more. They do not have those safeguards. They do have annual reports and record-keeping of the highest sort about assisted death. They show no evidence of the coercion that some noble Lords referred to in this debate.
I would have expected that, if there were real evidence of that, somebody in the course of the debate would have referred to a case from one of those countries where there is a terminal illness Act showing that there was coercion. There was none. I am convinced, first, that the Bill has had proper scrutiny in the other place and, secondly, that there is no real danger in relation to coercion. Thirdly, I completely accept the point made by noble Lords who said in this debate that they wanted more palliative care—I want more palliative care, and we should do everything we can to promote it. However, as so many people said, it is not either/or—it is both.
Some 75% of people in Victoria, Australia, who have had an assisted death came from palliative care, and 92% in Oregon came from palliative care. The Select Committee in the Commons to which I referred, which reported in 2024, said that palliative care in many jurisdictions went up in terms of its resources. In answer to the question that was raised about what the effect will be on palliative care: on the basis of other jurisdictions, it will get better. In fact, the debate here has provoked the Government to spend more money on palliative care.
Many noble Lords have talked about language. I take no point about language. I simply say this. For over 10 years of having been engaged in this debate, I have found that, for people who are terminally ill and want an assisted death, nothing upsets them more than saying that that is suicide. They hate that because of the impact it has on those they leave behind. What they feel is that they are dying anyway, and what they want is some degree of control over when and how it will happen.
I turn briefly to what happens next. I very much welcome my noble friend Lady Berger’s Motion to set up a Select Committee that can hear evidence. I very much welcome that it is time-limited, because, as my noble friend and I indicated in the letter we sent to every Peer, it allows for the Bill to go through all its phases after 7 November. I will therefore support my noble friend’s Motion to set up a Select Committee.
We have a job of work to do. I agree with everybody that, plainly, this House must give the Bill a Second Reading. We must listen to the evidence that my noble friend Lady Berger’s Select Committee will supply, and then we must do what we do so well, which is scrutinise and amend the Bill as necessary, and then send it back to the other place for a decision.
I have heard some noble Lords say, “Oh well, we can say no to this Bill”. Ultimately, on an issue such as this in our system, somebody has to decide. It is not the electorate because it is never in anybody’s manifesto, with the exception of the Greens. Therefore, Parliament has to decide. Ultimately, in our system, that means it will have to be those who are elected—not those who are unelected—who make that decision.
I end by expressing my profound gratitude to the House for the attention and quality of the debate it gave to the Bill. I commend this Bill to the House.
That the bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I apologise, but I rise to raise a procedural issue crucial to the reputation of your Lordships’ House. When I blocked out my diary for the Fridays scheduled for Committee on this Bill, I did so in good faith. I assumed not only that your Lordships’ House would recognise the value of the views of Members with lifelong lived experience of disability, but that steps would be taken to ensure that those views were heard on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. That would be entirely in keeping with the Equality Act 2010, which placed on organisations a legal duty to make reasonable adjustments on account of disability in, among other things, the way in which they work.
In the belief that your Lordships’ House and the Government will appreciate the crucial importance of our being seen to set an example and uphold the law, which we passed and which we expect others to abide by, I emailed the Government Chief Whip and wrote to the Prime Minister to explain that, because of my disability, I need to leave by 3 pm in order to catch my flight home. I requested an assurance that the House would not sit beyond 3 pm, which is of course the time by when the House normally rises on a sitting Friday. Regrettably, I have been given no such assurance. Instead, the Government are using a procedural technicality as a feeble fig leaf for discrimination against me as one of the House’s Members—one of its few Members—with lifelong disability. I do not believe it is beyond the wit or the will of the Government, or indeed your Lordships’ House, to ensure that we rise by 3 pm so that I can participate today and on other sitting Fridays on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. Given that not one organisation of or for disabled people supports this Bill, surely it is right that all of us—every one of us—are enabled to do our duty of subjecting this monumentally significant Bill to the forensic scrutiny it requires.
In conclusion, do we really want to send the message to those who are following our proceedings today, “Do as we say, not as we do”? That would be shameful and it would be unworthy of your Lordships’ House. For our own sake, I urge the House not to discriminate against me as one of the very few Members born disabled. I therefore ask that the House rises by 3pm.
I am sure it would be expected that safety is absolutely paramount. The point I am making—and I look forward to hearing from my noble and learned friend—is that our position in government here is not to deal with matters of policy. As I have said, we are restricted to areas to which any Government would be restricted.
We will absolutely work with the Welsh Government, NHS England and the NHS in Wales to understand the impact of any changes to the law and the provision of healthcare services in Wales, during the coming stages of the Bill.
My Lords, I make a declaration of interest: I have an assistant who is funded by Mr Bernard Lewis and who helps me on this Bill. I make a declaration that Dignity in Dying paid for the printing of the material that was circulated to Peers in my name before this process commenced.
I compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on the short way that she introduced the important issue. I very much hope that I can put to rest most of the misconceptions that were expressed during this debate.
As everybody agrees, criminal law is not devolved to the Welsh Senedd. Therefore, any change in criminal law has to come from the UK Parliament. You cannot proceed with assisted dying without changing the criminal law. Therefore, the UK Parliament has to provide a legislative change for that.
Healthcare is rightly devolved to the Welsh Ministers and the Senedd. The Bill makes provision in England for Ministers to produce regulations on how assisted dying will be implemented and regulated in England. Clause 42 requires Ministers to produce such regulations. It is wrong, as part of the devolution settlement, to require Welsh Ministers who are responsible for health in Wales to do that. It is for the Welsh Government to decide what provision to make. Unlike Clause 41, which relates to England, Welsh Ministers are given the option to introduce such regulations as they see fit. Those regulations will permit the assisted dying process to be introduced in Wales, in the National Health Service, and for Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government to provide whatever provision for it in regulations that they see fit.
The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, asked why we are legislating for England and Wales but not Scotland at the same time. It is because we are doing exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked me to do—and I am so glad he did—which is to respect the devolution settlement. Will the noble Lord let me finish? Then I will come back to him.
The way this structure works is that, first, we in this Parliament determine whether the criminal law should be changed. Secondly, the Welsh Government are given the power to introduce regulations. That power should normally be given to Welsh Ministers by an Act of the Senedd. Therefore, a legislative consent Motion has been proffered by the Welsh Government for the Senedd to decide whether it would be willing to give us consent to legislate in an area that would normally be legislated for in the Senedd.
The LCM—legislative consent Motion—in the Welsh Senedd covers the following. I give these details for noble Lords to consider them at their leisure: Clause 40, which gives Welsh Ministers power to issue guidance; Clause 42, which gives Welsh Ministers power to regulate how this is to be introduced in the health service in Wales and with what regulations; Clause 51, which gives the Welsh Government power to talk about and make regulations about the Welsh language; Clause 54, which gives them a general power to make regulations; and Clause 58, which gives the Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government power to introduce certain of the provisions.
The sponsor in the other place and I have discussed this arrangement with the Welsh Government, and by that I mean Welsh Ministers and Welsh officials. We have done what the Welsh Government would wish us to do to respect devolution. We have taken these powers in the Bill, subject to Parliament, so that there is not a position where, after this Bill is passed, Welsh Ministers lack the power to introduce regulations if they choose to do so.
I have listened to this torrent of points about Wales saying it has not been thought out. I say with suitable humility that we have thought it out and sought to reflect what good devolution practice would require. I do not invite people to come back, but please think about what I have said and consider—
Hold on. Consider whether it represents the right position.
Can I just deal with two other points? First, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in a very clear speech, said maybe one should amend the Bill to give the Welsh Senedd the power to make a decision about the criminal law in relation to assisted dying. It was a point I thought the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, was sort of flirting with. We have not taken that view. We have taken the view that the right way to deal with this is in accordance with the existing devolution settlement.
If the noble Lord, Lord Gove, has not been satisfied with my answer so far, he may continue with his question.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for the clarity there. As a broad point, the devolution settlement encompasses not just inter-governmental relations but respect for devolved legislatures and their committees. With respect to that, the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee of the Senedd has expressed concern that the Welsh Government have said that only a narrow number of clauses in the Bill should be subject to commencement by Welsh Ministers in the Senedd alone and has expressed concern about the lack of detail from the Welsh Government on these matters. I would be very interested in the noble and learned Lord’s views about the adequacy of both the Welsh Government and the UK Government’s sharing of information. More broadly, the committee also pointed out that there is dubiety at the very least about whether Clauses 42(1), 42(2), 51(2) and 51(3) of the Bill will be implemented only by regulation of Welsh Ministers or will be subject to automatic commencement through the automatic commencement backstop in due course.
In relation to the noble Lord’s first point, the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee’s point about the width of the legislative consent Motion is that it wants the LCM to extend not just to the health provisions but also to those that relate to the change in the criminal law and the safeguards. It argues that those changes in the criminal law should also be subject to it. My view—and it is a view I think shared by the Welsh Government—is that, no, you do not need a legislative consent Motion for the UK Parliament to do that which it is entitled to do, which is to change the criminal law. I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Harper.
Sorry, the noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked a second question which I did not answer.
I am very grateful for that clarity, because it is clear that as a result of that, even though Westminster will be operating within its own legislative competence, it will be doing so in a way that violates the expressed wish of the committee. Again, as I pointed out in the previous section of this debate, it is also the expressed wish of many within Welsh Labour to see criminal justice devolved, but put that to one side.
The other key question was: can Welsh Ministers commence Clauses 42(1), 42(2), 51(2) and 51(3) of the Bill by their regulations only, or might the automatic commencement backstop apply in those cases?
It will depend on the decision made by the Welsh Ministers. I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Harper.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I have listened very carefully to what he said, and I absolutely accept that he has conducted extensive engagement with Welsh Ministers based, perfectly understandably, on the framework of the Bill as he and the sponsor in the Commons have drafted it.
The noble and learned Lord will know that one of the concerns of many in your Lordships’ House is the extent of Ministers’ powers and the extent to which some of the regulations should be put in the legislation. I am sure, as Committee progresses, we will have those debates. If it ends up being the wish of this Parliament that more of the detail about how the legislation will be implemented is put in primary legislation, how will we do that in a way that satisfies the desires perhaps of this Parliament but does not trespass, given the way he has chosen to set out the framework, over the devolution framework? Therefore, did he consider just devolving the power to the Welsh Senedd to change the criminal law in this narrow case? Then the Senedd, as the noble Baroness said, would have the full power to change the law and implement it. I accept that what he has done makes sense in the way he has drafted the Bill, but if we significantly change the Bill, I think that will cause a real problem with how it is implemented.
I am not sure I understood the question. As far as devolution is concerned, I do not think the question of regulations on the face of the Bill is the right issue. The right issue is who has power to produce those regulations and does that offend against the devolution settlement. If he has a question about there being not enough detail in relation to other areas, I am happy to answer that, but this is not for this group. Those are my submissions.
He said he did not really understand my question. If we set out in the Bill some of the details he currently envisages are in regulations and therefore the House decides on them as opposed to them being for Ministers in either the UK Government or the Welsh Government, that will cause a problem for the approach to devolution that he has conducted. I just wondered whether he had thought about that. That was my question, and I am sorry for not expressing it clearly.
I am not sure the noble Lord has quite understood what I have said. It is for the regulations in so far as they deal with the Welsh health service to be delivered by Welsh Ministers, so it is quite inappropriate for us to put them in this Bill.
My Lords, I was brief at the start because I wanted to give the Minister the chance to be transparent for the benefit of this House. I am sorry to say that I hope that the letter will give that, but I am concerned that it will not. The reason I say that has been well explained in the discussions in the Welsh Senedd. In the supplementary to the latest legislative consent memorandum, it says:
“The UKG has not confirmed their position as to whether they believe the consent of the Senedd is required for this Bill as amended at the House of Commons Report stage but have acknowledged that some clauses do”.
When will the Government share with this House what they think is devolved and what is reserved? Why are they reluctant to do so? This is what I am struggling to understand. I have been asked outside this Chamber why am I bothered about Wales. I care about Wales anyway. It may not be widely known, but I went to school in Wales, I have family in Wales and both my parents are buried in Wales. But I would say that I am also here as a legislator.
Having been an MP, a Minister and a Cabinet Minister, I am used to being taken to court on details of legislation, and to the back and forth with devolved Administrations. I am not doing this simply to try to be awkward; we are trying to define the legislation. The Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee in the Welsh Senedd believes that Clause 1 should be devolved. To give another example, people might be aware of the issue of smacking. Basically, Wales was able to use its child welfare powers and then made a request. We will come on to this later in the debate about amending the Government of Wales Act, I think. If we recognise that the only context under this Bill in which there can be help with assisted death—assisted suicide—has to be healthcare settings then surely there is something there about the Welsh Senedd having the opportunity, through later amendments, to make that determination in the first place.
I mention that now because my noble friend Lord Markham and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said we should be deciding the principle of whether this Bill should be seen in that regard. Actually, recognising the whole, I am strongly of the view that this should be taken out of this Bill through an amendment to the Government of Wales Act. That is to some extent why I put tabled this. Will the Minister confirm the Government’s position on Clause 1? I would be very happy to have an answer from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on whether he believes that. The Welsh Parliament certainly does.
Further, will the Minister put in the Library the minutes of the meetings so we can understand what is happening between the two Governments about the practicality and legality of this aspect of the Bill? I know that Ministers will, understandably, often say that it is all legally privileged. Those of us who have been in government know that you tend to get small aspects of legal privilege and lots of policy content in regarding and summarising, which is not legally privileged. That is where I hope that we can get this transparency from the Minister and, if necessary, the sponsor—I do not quite understand this; it is one of the most complicated Private Members’ Bills I have ever seen—and, actually, just an answer to whether Clause 1 is reserved or not.
I was hoping to get an answer; we can speak more than once in Committee, because we are trying to understand. Otherwise, later days in Committee and Report could become quite painful. I hope to get an answer from the Minister today.
I have been absolutely clear that, in so far as Clause 1 affects a change to the criminal law, it is reserved. In so far as implementation of it by the health service is concerned, that is a matter for the Welsh Government, not the Bill. If there is any lack of clarity in that answer, let me know.
I would be grateful if any advice that has been given to the noble and learned Lord by officials is shared with the Committee. It is helpful, when determining legislation, to understand that, and it would be especially helpful if the Government, who have said they are getting involved only on legality and practicality, were to express their view. They will not even tell the Welsh Government what their view is, and that is very concerning.
My Lords, I am grateful for the insightful contributions that have been made to this debate. I will be very concise on the point. In summary, it is our view that workability concerns are less significant, although the Government are unable to confirm at this stage that the current drafting is fully workable, effective or enforceable. As noble Lords will understand, the amendment has not had technical drafting support from officials.
On this point, if the amendment is passed in isolation, it is likely to have minimal legal effect, as Clause 1 is essentially declaratory rather than operative. The remainder of the Bill would refer to the capacity to make a decision, which, as noble Lords will be aware from the Bill, is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
I anticipate coming later to discussions on amendments to Clause 3, as noble Lords have referred to, as those amendments would change the operation of the Bill. I will comment on proposals when we come to the relevant debate. These issues are, of course, rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider, deciding which test is to be used.
I will deal first with the central issue in this debate, which is the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The wording currently mentions:
“A terminally ill person in England or Wales who … has the capacity to make a decision”.
The noble Baroness proposes that “capacity” should be changed to “ability”. From what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, says, I understand that we should read that with Amendment 115, although there is another amendment that the noble Baroness proposes in relation to Clause 3. But I accept what the noble Lord says in relation to Amendment 2.
With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, she is suggesting that we remove “capacity” and replace it with “ability”. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put his finger on it when he said that “capacity” is well known to the law. You could not possibly have a Bill that did not refer to capacity because what it means, in the eyes of the law and of people in practice, is the ability to make the decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, if you do not have capacity, you cannot make the decision. That applies right across the doings of human beings, and the law recognises that. If, therefore, you replace “capacity”—
On a point of clarification, I thought that the idea of adding both words was very helpful, but when the noble and learned Lord says that you cannot make the decision without capacity, it is not any decision but this particular decision in this Bill. Can he reflect on a point that was made very well by one of his noble friends on something that happened in my family as well? Somebody with dementia was said to have capacity for a particular decision, but I would not have wanted my mother to have been trusted as having the capacity to decide whether to ask for assisted death.
The Mental Capacity Act is fantastically important, but is it appropriate for this decision—not any old decision but this decision—which is a bit more challenging than some of the decisions that the Mental Capacity Act is used to decide on?
That is very well put and is exactly the question. Is it appropriate to bring the Mental Capacity Act into this Bill? I understand that whether you have an assisted death is an incredibly important decision. You cannot remove the word “capacity”, so you have to reject the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.
Her Amendment 115 effectively draws on how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is currently drafted, except it adds two things. It removes the presumption of capacity and, separately, it requires the person making the decision to be aware of a variety of things that are connected with their illness. To summarise, the way the Mental Capacity Act operates at the moment is that if you are unable to understand information relevant to the decision, to retain that information, to use and weigh that information or to communicate your decision, you do not have capacity under the current Mental Capacity Act. The extent to which the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has referred to in her amendment would be relevant would have to be weighed in the context of the decision that has to be made.
I am more than happy to debate whether we need to make the changes to the Mental Capacity Act that she is suggesting. For my part, I do not think we do. One thing that is absolutely clear is that the amendment proposed, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, identified, is completely ridiculous. You cannot remove the question of capacity from this choice. Putting aside some detail hurdles, there are two hurdles that need to be overcome in how this Bill is constructed. You have to be capable of making the decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said, and—completely separately—you have to make that decision completely voluntarily. It has to be your own decision, not the product of pressure.
We have had—and I say this with warmth and respect—a rambling debate going over a whole range of issues, miles away from the question of whether one should remove the word “capacity” and put in the word “ability”. If this House wants to make the law completely confused in this area, either put in the word “ability” or put in “capacity and ability”. I echo the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when she says we have to approach this in a grown-up manner, and to remove the word “capacity” is not a sensible way to deal with this.
I also echo those who have said that the idea of running two systems at the same time—the Mental Capacity Act system and the separate system proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—is wrong and confusing. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for spotting what the right decision is. Of course, under the Mental Capacity Act some unimportant decisions are taken, but a decision such as whether to have the ventilation removed from you if you have motor neurone disease, that will almost certainly lead to your death, is without a shimmer of a shadow of doubt a life and death decision.
The Chief Medical Officer of England and Wales, in evidence to the Lords Select Committee, said:
“it is far better to use systems that people are used to and that are tested both in practice and, where necessary, in law”.
He went on to say:
“I have a concern that you could have a conversation in one bed in a hospital where someone is talking about, for example, an operation where they might well lose their life, because they are frail and there is the operative risk, done under the Mental Capacity Act, and, in the next-door bed, someone is trying to do the same process of having a difficult conversation about someone who might die, or could definitely die, as a result of that decision, but using a different legal framework. The risks that that could lead to confusion are not trivial”.
I also echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who sadly is not in her place, said. There are problems about practically every aspect of how various parts of the health service work, but she was part of a process that considered how the Mental Capacity Act worked. The broad conclusion was that it was a good, workable Act, and we should not stray from it in this particular case. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I just make it absolutely plain that I said that capacity was necessary but not sufficient. I am not stuck with whether it should be “and ability”, but I was absolutely plain in my very short speech that capacity was necessary but not sufficient.
I was picking up on the word necessary. What the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is suggesting is that we remove the word “capacity”. I do not know if I misunderstood the noble Lord, but that is what I thought he was saying.
I wanted to make it plain because some people listening to the noble and learned Lord might have thought I had not said that.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
Before the noble and learned Lord finishes, can he clarify for the Committee that a person who can grasp only a diluted amount of information, or who cannot retain the information in any real sense that would be intelligible to us, can be deemed to have capacity for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act, but for this Bill, which is designed to give people agency and allow an individual as much choice as possible to choose treatment or have agency over medical and palliative care decisions and so on, an entirely different threshold should, quite rightly, be expected for such a serious measure as this?
I respect the noble Baroness for repeating her speech. Section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act says that if a person is unable to
“understand the information relevant to the decision … to retain that information … to use or weigh that information ... or … to communicate his decision”,
then they do not have capacity. I am content that that should be the approach under the Bill.
I want very briefly to put on record that Professor Sir Chris Whitty is not the Chief Medical Officer for England and Wales, but for England only. I will wait for another time for the answer to the question I asked about power of attorney to be given, ideally by the Minister.
I will answer that one. No, you cannot do it by power of attorney. You have to do it yourself.
My Lords, given this very long debate, I will try to respond briefly. I declare that I had the privilege of being the first chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, which was set up following the post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act precisely because of the problems with its implementation. I worked in that role all through Covid. As the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, said, unfortunately, although it is a fantastically good piece of legislation, its implementation depends on the person who is implementing it. Although there has been training, and we worked very hard to get training in, it has unfortunately not always improved things as much as one might hope.
The other thing I draw to your Lordships’ attention is Section 62 of the Mental Capacity Act, which concerns the scope of the Act. It says:
“For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that nothing in this Act is to be taken to affect the law relating to murder or manslaughter or the operation of section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (c. 60) (assisting suicide)”.
It was with that background that I became concerned that the quality of the information the person has depends on the knowledge of the person giving that information, as well as the ability of the person to retain it. I spoke about choice at the beginning of my speech. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is not in her place, because choice is essential if we are giving patients opportunities to make decisions, but we have to have real choices. That is why I spoke about the black holes where there is no adequately provided palliative care.
Unfortunately, although the Bill has had a money resolution—forgive me if that is the wrong phrase, but there has been a commitment to fund the provision of a service if the Bill becomes an Act—it has not been matched by concurrent funding in the long term for specialist palliative care. That is a concern, but we will come back to it later.
There is another very small point that I want to make: can we please avoid using the term “commit suicide”? It is not a crime to take your own life, and “commit” is a deeply offensive term. We are talking about people who, for whatever reason, decide to take their own lives and end their lives early. We should remember that as we go forward in our debates, out of respect for everybody who has been bereaved by the tragedy of suicide or attempted suicide.
When it comes to life and death decisions, though, I suggest to the Committee that it is fundamentally different to have the decision of accepting that your disease process is going on, that your dying is inevitable and that you wish to withdraw your dialysis or ventilation. Those are decisions in which I have been involved with patients for decades. We can now take people off ventilators very gently and calmly without any of the distress that was previously associated with that, and they die of their underlying disease.
What we are talking about is suicide prevention versus suicide assistance and the point at which you decide, as a clinician with a patient in front of you, whether you are going to be working with suicide prevention, improving quality of life, or whether you are going to stop that because you are going down a different route, and some of the evidence we had was to that effect. However, because of time and the way that things have gone on, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(6 days, 1 hour ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today for their contributions on these important issues. As I have already made clear, I will keep my comments limited to the amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical and/or operational workability concerns.
On that basis, I will speak about Amendments 118 and 118B. Amendment 118, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, could prevent a person from accessing assistance where there is no clear connection between their individual circumstances and the crime that their close relative is under investigation for or has been convicted of, even if the said crime took place some years in the past. Amendment 118B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, would expand the meaning of “close relatives” to include “friends”. It is not clear who would determine the meaning of “friends” in this context. I should also say that disclosure of personal data engages Article 8 of the ECHR and is regulated by the principles set down in the Data Protection Act. Detailed financial assessment of those connected to a person seeking assistance is likely to interfere with the privacy of those individuals, particularly where there are no signs of coercion. The necessity of doing so is difficult to assess in the round rather than considering this on a case-by-case basis.
I turn to Amendments 222 and 612, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. Amendment 222 proposes a new clause to oblige the Secretary of State to provide specialist psychological assessment and support for persons considering an assisted death and their families. It would also oblige the Secretary of State to establish bereavement support services offering psychological support before an assisted death to all persons concerned. The Bill does not require families to know about an assisted death in advance, so requiring the offer of psychological services to them could create an undeliverable obligation on the Secretary of State.
Amendment 612 would mandate the video recording of a person being assisted to end their own life. The amendment would also require the person to confirm in the video recording their identity, their wish to die of their own free will, their capacity and that they are acting without persuasion or coercion. The amendment would require that this recording is sent to the coroner within 72 hours of death and it would create a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State concerning the practical arrangements for the recording, storing and transmission of the recordings. Requiring that a person’s death be video recorded where they did not wish the event to be recorded could risk being a significant intrusion into their family and private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Since the Bill includes several safeguards, this intrusion is unlikely to be considered justified, and this amendment could also raise GDPR issues and concerns.
Amendment 460, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, specifies a range of actions the panel must take into account when considering a person’s psychosocial and safeguarding circumstances. It includes a requirement to offer immediate access to safe housing and financial support where abuse is disclosed. As the Bill is drafted, neither the panel nor the commissioner is provided with such a function and it is not clear how this would interact with local authority responsibility for housing provision.
As for the other amendments in this group where I make no detailed comments, although they may be deliverable, some would be challenging to implement. For example, Amendment 47 would require assessing doctors and the panel to assess a person’s state of mind or private thoughts. Amendment 58 would require an assessment of indirect structural disadvantage, including poverty or lack of care. Although I raise specific workability issues with only a small number of amendments in this group, noble Lords will be aware that the other amendments in this group have not had technical drafting support from officials. The issues raised by these other amendments are rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider and decide on, but I note that the way in which they are currently drafted means that they may not be fully workable, effective or enforceable.
My Lords, in this debate we heard deeply personal information from the noble Lords, Lord Empey, Lord McCrea, Lord Watts, Lord Polak, Lord Griffiths, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Shinkwin, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Hayter and Lady Grey-Thompson. I express my profound respect for people being willing to share in that way. I make it clear that in nothing that I say do I in any way intend to disrespect any of what must have been quite difficult statements to make. I really treasure many of the things that have been said, whether for or against the Bill.
As all noble Lords engaged in the debate know, at the heart of the Bill—there is no dispute about this—the decision to have an assisted death has to be where the patient, to quote the Bill,
“has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and … has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.
There is no dispute in the Committee that there have to be appropriate and sufficient safeguards to ensure that there is no coercion.
The current safeguards in the Bill are as follows: first, a doctor has to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. Secondly, a second doctor has to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. Thirdly, a panel has to assess that the person is not being coerced. Fourthly, the first doctor—after a period of reflection, in signing a second declaration by the patient—has to be satisfied again that the person is not being coerced. Finally, the doctor providing the assistance has to be at the last moment satisfied that the person is not being coerced.
The two doctors who give the certificate at the beginning must both have had specialist training in domestic abuse, including training on identifying coercive control and domestic abuse, and including identifying the effect of financial control. The panel considering the matter must consist of a psychiatrist, a social worker and a senior lawyer. If either of the two doctors have any doubt about the position in relation to capacity, they have to consult a psychiatrist. Anybody who by dishonesty, coercion or pressure induces the patient to either execute a declaration that they want an assisted death or take the assistance is guilty of a criminal offence. If all that the person does by dishonesty, coercion or pressure is to induce the person to execute a relevant document, the maximum sentence is 14 years. If, on the other hand, if they induce the person to take their own life, then the maximum sentence is life.
The question before the House in this debate is whether those protections are adequate to ensure that there is not coercion. I have before me a number of amendments. Amendment 3 is proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay: she would like “independent” to come before “decision”. I wholeheartedly agree with her that the decision must be independent, in the sense that it is a free decision made by the person, unpressured or coerced in the way that I have described. I am always influenced by what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, says in relation to that; he said, “Reassure us”. There is no dispute between me and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that it has to be an independent decision. Is it clear enough in the Bill? With the deepest respect to both the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I point out that it specifically says that the person should have
“made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and … not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.
With respect, I say that it is clear enough on the face of the Bill.
I turn to Amendment 45, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, which would insert “encouraged” in addition to “coerced” and “pressured”. I have thought very carefully about this, and I am against putting it in. The reason is that I see the reality: somebody who is thinking about an assisted death will want to talk frequently to those who love them. They may want to talk to the multidisciplinary team which is looking after them. Let us suppose somebody says, “I really, really want to go now. Should I take that opportunity?” If somebody says, “I encourage you to make the decision that is best for you,”, what the noble Baroness is proposing is that that becomes a criminal offence, potentially imprisonable for 14 years or for life. To me, that does not seem sensible.
I turn to Amendment 46. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asks for “influenced” or “encouraged” to be added. I have dealt with “encouraged”. With regard to “influenced”, the multidisciplinary team or the person’s loved ones may well—with the best motives—influence somebody to go ahead with it. I do not criticise them for that if that is what the person wants and if it helps. It seems to me, again, wholly inappropriate to go beyond “coerced or pressured”.
On Amendment 47, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, suggests that it should be “external or internally” pressured that one is concerned with. We can understand external pressure—that is, somebody pressurising someone else to do it, and pressure carries with it an inappropriate degree of influence—but how does one in practice deal with an analysis of what would make me, for example, want my life to end? My noble friend Lady Merron also referred to that. The pain, the lack of dignity, the sense that I am not the person that I was in front of my own children is internal pressure. It might include me thinking, “I do not want to go on with this; in part, I’ve only got two or three weeks to live, and I want it to end”. The internal pressure is making me come to that conclusion. It is impossible to ask people, in particular the law enforcement authorities, to investigate what is going on in my mind. I have thought very carefully about that. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, that I have given each of these amendments very careful thought, because they are important, but, again, I do not think that is a practical solution.
My Lords, my name is on the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has just mentioned. This was also from Second Reading. There are loads of people signing forms saying that coercion or pressure has not happened. What is the situation with the internet? What is the situation for young people? We are failing young people if we do not make clear how that practitioner is going to know. Young people are pressured through non-human means nowadays.
The Bill makes it absolutely clear that it must be your own decision. Let us suppose that your views of the world are affected by the internet and that you are ill and an organisation is urging you to commit suicide, that organisation should be liable if that happens.
In Amendment 49, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, wants “person” to include a body corporate or an organisation in relation to pressure. If an organisation or a body corporate is putting pressure on a group of people or on individuals and that makes them do it—this is putting it crudely, but if an organisation says, “Do have an assisted death; it is the right thing for everybody or for you”—that should be covered by the Bill. The noble Baroness adverted to how “person” can generally include both corporate person and human person, but I can talk to her separately about that to make sure that it is covered.
Some clarification is needed in relation to a number of points that you have made. How does anybody know, how does the doctor know, whether any of these scenarios have happened? Is there anything in the Bill that makes the doctor ask and explore? The word I proposed was “encouragement”—that you would ask not just “Were you coerced or pressurised?” but “Were you encouraged?”—because it would develop a richer conversation. Is there anywhere in the Bill where all the things that you have just said—apologies; I should not have said “you” but “the noble and learned Lord”—can be fleshed out, discussed and teased out?
Maybe I have got this wrong, but at the moment as I understand it, you fill your form in, somebody might even ask “Were you coerced?” and you say no, and that is that, out the window and then, Bob’s your uncle, you are eligible and off you go. It does not matter how often that process happens. The noble and learned Lord spoke about “first doctor, second doctor”, but if they do not all explore it, how will we know whether it was anything other than a yes/no? The noble and learned Lord has given a very rich explanation of what could have happened, but the Bill does not allow us to find out whether any of that will have occurred before the assisted death is enacted.
I do not feel insulted by being called “you”, but I do not think that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, properly understands how the Bill operates. The two doctors and the panel have to be satisfied that the person is reaching a voluntary decision of their own, uncoerced and unpressured. Codes of practice will determine how that is done and, what is more, the panel with the three experts on it also has to be satisfied. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is saying that that is a tick-box exercise. With respect, no: this is obviously a very serious matter. I expect the doctors and the panel doing it to take it seriously.
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord knows, I have spent a lot of my life working with people in housing estates in the East End of London. Research we did some years ago discovered that virtually every nation on earth is represented in the housing estates where I worked. I have spent a lot of my time, nearly 40 years, working with Bengali families. We know each other quite well, but do I really know what is going on in the minds of that community or with that single mother, trapped in a house, who does not speak English after all these years? The truth is that I do not. It is really difficult to know. In the same way, I find it difficult, as a Yorkshireman, to help southerners understand what is really going on in Yorkshire. Even though I have tried it many times, the quality of their fish and chips really does not cut it.
One of my problems with this overcertainty is that it feels like a very white, English conversation, when actually this country is a global community, with people from many different cultures, all over the world. What concerns me is the practicality of much of the discussion that I have listened to today, and I have no idea how you actually understand coercion or encouragement—I think that is a really important word—in practice. Having spent many years of my life with these people, I would not pretend to know what I was really hearing, at such a point, and what it meant for their life in practice.
I completely agree that the noble Lord and I might well not understand what people from different cultures would say, but the two doctors and a panel would have to understand that sufficiently to reach a conclusion. If they do not, they cannot provide the satisfaction that is required by the Bill. The idea that the people who will make the Bill work are all from a particular class, demography and education is, with respect, wrong.
Will we have enough people from these different cultures with the skills and knowledge to enter into that kind of understanding, whether they are doctors or on the panels? It is really difficult to understand how that practical proposition will work in the real world—in the East End of London.
That will very much depend upon the number of people who apply from particular groups, and I think one can be pretty sure, on the basis of the impact assessment, that there will be sufficient numbers.
I think it would probably be sensible, unless the noble Lord has something to raise that we have not already dealt with, for me to make a bit of progress.
It is directly relevant to the amendment that we are discussing, if the noble and learned Lord will forgive me. I am coming back to what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about the point of the debate. I absolutely get that the noble and learned Lord is very certain about the quality of the Bill. He has set that out in his usual eloquent way. However, if he followed my injunction from the words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester yesterday and if he has listened to this debate, he must recognise that that certainty is not shared by many Members of this Committee.
I hope the noble and learned Lord will forgive me if he was coming to this on later amendments, but he has in effect said that he is not persuaded by most of the amendments. If he does not accept that many noble Lords have concerns about the Bill and thinks it is basically fine as it is, I fear that—picking up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—many noble Lords who might have been persuaded to support it had it been improved will not now be persuaded. Is he prepared to listen and amend the Bill in any way at all?
My Lords, first, I am sure that I will not be able to reach the high standard of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester, but I will try.
Secondly, I do not think I am rejecting the principle of many of the amendments. I am saying that—for example, in relation to an independent decision and to encouragement—the protection is there in practice. I also say to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that her reference to organisations is something we could discuss. I think it may already be covered but let us discuss it.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, is right: I am saying no to quite a lot of the amendments because, in my opinion, I do not think they are necessary and there is adequate protection. It does not mean I am not listening; but painful as it is, because I respect so many people who disagree with me, I do disagree with some people.
I am very conscious as well of what the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Chris Whitty, said, which is not to over-engineer this and make it a thicket people cannot get through. If you are serious about assisted dying, make sure it is genuinely accessible to people. I am trying to strike that balance.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Lab)
My Lords, I wonder if I might help my noble and learned friend on the concerns that clearly have been expressed. A number of noble Lords have been talking about what evidence there is. The concern was expressed in the last debate last Friday that if you are not going to have someone who has been intimately involved with the family or the person who is making the request, that becomes more difficult.
A number of suggestions have been made. For example, would it be possible to have a multidisciplinary assessment of need and coercion early, so that you could have the information? My noble and learned friend will know that when we make these multidisciplinary assessments, usually you hear from everyone—the social worker, the housing officer—just as we do for the multiagency risk assessment for domestic violence; and those domestic violence cases are really important. Will my noble and learned friend look again at how the Bill could make sure that the evidence upon which these decisions are going to be made is there?
Secondly, I will deal with the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on encouragement. My noble and learned friend will know—I disclosed this to the House, because, of course, I was the Attorney-General when the DPP’s guidelines were put out— that the whole purpose of looking at and assessing encouragement was to make sure that no one else had applied pressure. The word “encouragement” very much comes from the DPP’s guidelines, which has meant that since they came in, only four prosecutions have been made. They were made in relation to people who were identified as having participated in something which might have been homicide or manslaughter, and others were not prosecuted. I know that my noble and learned friend would think that entirely proper.
Will my noble and learned friend think again about looking at those issues to make sure, perhaps through regulations, that we can have that clarity, which might give reassurance to those who are desperately concerned about these issues?
In relation to the multidisciplinary team, Amendment 222 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is a bit close to that but not quite there. On the question of encouragement, of course, the reason why the DPP’s guidelines refer to encouragement is that the criminal offence at the moment is encouraging suicide, and that deals with a completely different concept.
May I go on into Amendment 50—
I would like to go back to our noble colleague from Yorkshire—I am afraid I do not know the noble Lord’s name and I apologise. He talked about working in the communities in the East End. We are short of GPs as it is, and most of our GPs come from an Anglo-Saxon background still. The noble Lord referred to the fact that, having worked with this community for a very long time, he still could not necessarily read the situation. I wonder how we deal with that, because the GPs in that community may not have had the length of time that he had to assess these situations.
I think I answered that; the noble Lord may not have been satisfied with my answer, but I did answer it by saying that people have to be satisfied that the decision is voluntary and without coercion. If they do not know, because they cannot read adequately the community, they could not be satisfied.
The noble and learned Lord has just made a point about the risk of coercion and referred to a psychiatrist. It would be very helpful to understand what clause in the Bill he is referring to, because Clause 12(6)(b) is only about the capacity of the person; it is not talking about coercion. I am also conscious that capacity is on the balance of probabilities anyway. It would be useful to understand which clause he believes referral would be in, on the grounds of coercion.
I will come to that in a moment, because I have to get through the amendments—we have to make progress a bit. However, I completely understand the question.
Amendment 50 is from the noble Lord, Lord Evans. He basically said that when anybody tries to behave badly, trying to coerce or pressure somebody into making the decision to have an assisted death, that should be sufficient to bar it for ever, even if it had no impact whatever in relation to it. I see the force of that; I think it would be a wrong amendment, for the following reasons. Somebody—a doctor—might go over the line, but it is absolutely clear that the person definitely wants an assisted death. I do not think they should be barred from doing that because they are concerned about what might happen to the doctor or to the person they love if it is absolutely clear that they have not been coerced or pressured into it.
On Amendment 52 from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, she is saying that somebody should not be subject to or at risk of coercive control. Everybody agrees that the person who is adopting the assisted death should not be subject to coercive control. If they are at risk, I would expect the two doctors and the panel to investigate that fully and, if they are not satisfied that the person is reaching a decision of their own, plainly an assisted death cannot go ahead. But I think we are all on the same page in that the risk has to be properly investigated and a conclusion reached.
Amendment 57A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, says you should not be allowed to have an assisted death if someone has been
“prompted to consider ending their own life”—
presumably in the context of assisted death—by any professional person. Clause 5 leaves it to the judgment of the doctor as to whether they raise the question with the patient. If they raise it, they have to raise it under Clause 5 in the context of the treatment available to the patient and all other options available, including palliative care. I do not think that if a doctor, or indeed any other professional person, makes a judgment that it would be sensible to raise it, that should thereby debar the person from having an assisted death. The noble Baroness wants to intervene. By all means let us prolong the debate if it is a new point.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
It is about the level of authority which the professional person, who is in a way a public servant, and the trust which one endows in one’s GP or family doctor. As we have heard today from other people who are medically qualified, that has great weight with the patient—I speak as someone who comes from a medical family. They constantly agonise about their prescriptions for patients and their emotional condition, and all that. But if one raises assisted dying with somebody who is terminally ill, the professional—the doctor, say—is planting the idea.
I completely appreciate what the noble Baroness is saying. She is, in effect, repeating what she said with such force and articulateness before. My answer to that is that there will be some professional people, and Clause 5 recognises this, who think the person is saying, “I just can’t bear this, I want this to end”. Would it be inappropriate in those circumstances for a professional person, in the context of all the other options, to raise it? In my view, it would not be, and in my view, it would be completely wrong to say that if you did raise it in those circumstances, that person, the patient, would be barred from ever having an assisted death.
On Amendment 58, the lead amender—not every other amender—said that coercion or pressure should include
“intentional or indirect structural disadvantage including poverty or lack of care”.
We are all agreed that coercion and pressure on an individual by another individual is not to be allowed. Where the reason that you want an assisted death is because in your mind you are influenced by your circumstances—for example, because you are poor—should you be barred from having an assisted death because of your poverty? In my view, you should not be. What the two doctors on the panel have to be satisfied about is that it is your own decision.
This partly follows on from the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The noble and learned Lord mentioned in his previous answer to one of my amendments that the doctors would be able to investigate. I think many of us still do not understand how that investigation would take place. In terms of understanding the standard of proof, Minister Sarah Sackman in another place said it would be on a civil standard. So, in terms of balance of probability, is the noble and learned Lord saying that the doctor has to be only 51% certain that there is no coercion for the panel to carry on and for an assisted death to be granted?
They have to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. That means that they have to do the appropriate inquiries. If, for example, as the noble Lord was saying, they do not understand the community, then they cannot be satisfied. If, for example, they do not know enough about it, they cannot be satisfied. Every case will depend upon its individual circumstances. They will have to do what is required in relation to it.
Amendment 118, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, proposes that if you have a close relative who has been convicted of fraud or you are living with somebody who has been convicted of fraud, there has to be an independent financial assessment. That means that if your child, grown up by this time, has committed a fraud, there has to be an independent financial assessment of your circumstances before you can have an assisted death. I am strongly against the idea that if a relative of yours committed such an offence, that would mean there would have to be a yet further layer that you have to go through. There are still all those protections.
This is a new practice that every answer one gives, the person then responds by repeating their speech. So, if it is new, yes—
The Companion states that in Committee we are entitled to speak more than once, and I think it is more helpful to do it this way. I am the 11th amendment in this group that the noble and learned Lord has so eloquently dismissed so far, but I think he has about another 10 to go.
I want to make two points. First, does the noble and learned Lord not reflect, on all the concerns that have been expressed, that the Bill might have had a smoother passage if he had shown any disposition whatever to take any of these issues away and reflect on them before coming back on Report? Secondly, I mentioned the Human Tissue Authority legislation that provides some protection and investigation to make sure that a donor is not getting a financial reward. Will he at least look at that to see whether there is any way in which we could reflect that in this legislation?
On my noble friend’s first question, I have not dismissed all the amendments; I have accepted that we should look at some of them, and very many of the ones I am not accepting are because they are already covered in the Bill. I am rejecting some of them on the basis that I do not think they are practical. When my noble friend talked about the donor, I think he was talking about, for example, somebody who may benefit from the will of the patient. Indeed, that was a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. Very often, the person who most supports you in relation to this is the person you love most and who is going to benefit under your will. So, very frequently the person who has taken a loved one to Switzerland is the person who is then going to inherit under their will. That does not make them bad, and I would most certainly not exclude people who benefit from the will of the person who dies because they have helped them in this respect. It seems to me to not properly recognise the importance of human relations in relation to this.
I have dealt with the point of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, about the will. His second point was that, if you had a friend who was convicted of a criminal offence involving financial fraud of some sort, you should not be able to have an assisted death unless there is an investigation of your financial position. Well, if I reject the point from my noble friend Lord Hunt in relation to a close relative or the person you speak with, then I think, for the reasons I have given, it also does not apply in relation to a friend.
In Amendment 181, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, proposes that the doctor must ask why and seek specific confirmation that a decision is not coerced. There is no specific requirement for that in the Bill: it is for the two doctors to determine what they think the right course is. If they felt that they could not reach a decision without asking why, or without asking, “Are you being coerced?”, they would have to ask that. But there is no prohibition. It is, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, a decision for the two doctors and the panel to decide, in each case, what is the best way to reach a conclusion as to whether this person is being coerced. That is the question that all these things are addressing.
So, the two doctors could ask an entirely different set of questions to each person who is requesting to end their life?
It will depend on the circumstances. If, for example, the doctor had a very severe doubt about whether somebody was being coerced, I would expect them to ask very many questions about their domestic circumstances. Suppose, however, it was somebody who was clearly not, on the face of it, at the slightest risk of coercion—a person of 60 in the full flush of his or her pomp, as it were—and who had said, right from the outset, “I can’t bear the thought of this illness”, and the idea that this person has been coerced is not really plausible, then I would expect the doctor to be asking different questions from the sorts of questions that they would be asking if the circumstances of somebody’s home life were completely different. It would obviously depend on what you knew as the doctor, or had found out as the panel, about the circumstances of the individual.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
I apologise for interrupting my noble and learned friend, but I just point out that the BMA itself is very clear that the doctors should be able to make their own judgment in all these cases.
As I understand it, Amendment 222, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would establish a specialist service to provide psychological assessment and support and then bereavement support for those seeking an assisted death. My noble friend Lady Merron has indicated the difficulties in relation to that. On the question of a psychological assessment, the position is that some work has been done abroad in relation to this. California introduced, in addition to what was required by the law in a particular part of California, a psychiatric assessment for everyone who wanted an assisted death but concluded that that was not necessary because the numbers of psychiatric assessments were producing nothing. It was only where special requirements were required that suggested it was a good thing. So I respect the suggestion but I do not think it is necessary.
I have a very quick question. I cannot find in the Bill the powers that would allow the doctors to carry out the investigation to which the noble and learned Lord has repeatedly referred. If people do not co-operate, that is it.
With the greatest respect, the noble Baroness has missed the point. If, for example, a person says to the doctor, “I’m not telling you things”, the doctor can never be satisfied. That is the protection.
Would the noble and learned Lord write to me with the answer to the question I asked earlier?
Can we perhaps shoot just one fox? There was a suggestion that there are not enough non-Anglo-Saxon GPs available to do this. I have just looked at the facts: 46% of GPs were born outside the UK and 25% of them are from Asia.
I am very grateful to my noble friend for mentioning that, because that is what was being whispered to me but I did not have the statistics. I am very grateful to him for providing them.
My Lords, this has clearly been a long debate, and I think for good reason. As one noble Lord said, coercion and pressure are a major concern for many people about the way the Bill is written. I will very briefly respond. I am well aware of the time, but a lot of points have been made. Noble Lords will all be relieved to know that I am not going to go through them all.
First, the word “encouragement” is taken from the Director of Public Prosecutions guidelines, and for good reason, because the Director of Public Prosecutions recognised the power of a person in authority over a person who is vulnerable. That is why it tends towards the prosecution of assistance coming from a person in authority. I would include doctors in that, but it was also thought to include prison staff, nurses and others employed in that role.