Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

These measures will leave victims in destitution, unable to escape the abuses that they have been subject to. They will drive more men, women, children, young people and families into destitution. Frankly, it is a shocking change in public policy and shamefully undermines a policy of which we were all so proud.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Alton unfortunately cannot be with us today and has asked me to speak to a number of amendments in his name which I have signed—and one which I have not because there was no room left. I will be very happy to do so. I pay tribute to the enormous work he has put into this Bill on the issues that have arisen, including those mentioned so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

At the beginning of his contribution, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned the absence of an impact assessment and our ongoing interest in whether it will arrive in due course and, if so, whether it will be too late to have any impact. If ever there was a series of amendments for which the impact assessment’s absence has importance, it is this. I hope to demonstrate why in a few moments.

I will highlight the potentially devastating impact that the Bill will have on not only survivors of modern slavery but our ability as a country proudly to bring to justice those who are guilty of modern slavery offences. There is a paramount public interest here and internationally in those cases being prosecuted. If you ask a prosecutor how best to prepare a case, the answers are very simple. First, you need co-operative witnesses; for that, you need witnesses to feel safe to provide the evidence. That is when they will come to court, where they will be protected by judges behind screens or by other special arrangements and produce an overwhelming prosecution case. Anything that any Government do to inhibit the prosecution of modern slavery cases is not just regrettable but a manifestly dishonourable disgrace.

The amendments seek to put in the Bill obligations on the Secretary of State to carry out and present before Parliament and an appointed Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner reports and assessments on the potential impacts of this Bill in relation to equality, human rights and compliance. Furthermore, they require detailed information pertaining to each country or territory listed in Schedule 1 to be laid before Parliament in relation to the practical implications, including but not limited to the effect on modern slavery prosecutions.

One is entitled to assume—I ask the Minister to confirm that this assumption is accurate in this case—that, in the preparation of the list in Schedule 1, the Government have carried out due diligence on the 57 countries listed as safe territories to which a person may be removed. Was the placing of a country on the list in Schedule 1 preceded by consultation? Who should that consultation have been with? Let us start with the ambassadors and high commissioners representing the United Kingdom in those countries.

We all know that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is well staffed with people here in London who are experts in and who man desks on those countries. Were they consulted before the names of those countries were added to the list in Schedule 1? I ask this question because, having been through the list with a fine-toothed comb looking at every single country on it, I cannot accept that whatever inquiries were made could really be described as diligent. Due diligence in the world in which many of us who work in the professions operate is an absolute given in every instance. I will give your Lordships some examples before I turn to my reductio ad absurdum—if I can be allowed that phrase—of this point.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The Minister is making a very bold proposition when he says that Article 30 gives the Government an excuse to ignore ECAT. Can he give us examples of public order events which justify that bold, and in my view unjustifiable, statement?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It was Article 13(3). The events which the Government say warrant the grounds of public order which prevent observance of the 30-day reflection and recovery period are the conditions which I identified earlier in relation to the pressure placed on public services and the threat to life arising from the dangerous channel crossings.

I do not propose to address all the amendments individually, suffice to say that where the Secretary of State is satisfied that an individual is participating in an investigation or criminal proceedings relating to their alleged exploitation, and considers it necessary for them to be present in the UK to provide that co-operation, and considers that their co-operation outweighs any significant risk of harm to the public they may pose, that individual will be exempt from the disqualification. This allows the Government to protect against the threat to public order arising from the current circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK, while also ensuring that investigations can be progressed to bring perpetrators to justice. By one means or another, the amendments seek to negate, or at least roll back, the intended effect of the provisions in Clause 21 and subsequent clauses.

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The provisions in Clause 21 are a necessary and core part of this Bill if it is to achieve its purpose of deterring illegal entry into the UK. We recognise the exceptional nature of these provisions, but the way to acknowledge that is to include a sunset clause in the Bill, as we have done. This does not put barriers in the way of the successful implementation of the Bill. The sooner we can stop the boats, the sooner we can review the necessity of these provisions. On that basis, I commend Clause 21 to the Committee and invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he do the usual thing, which is to answer reasonable questions that were asked of him, particularly the question I asked about the due diligence carried out in preparation of Schedule 1 and how advice was obtained as to whether it was right to put almost entirely unqualified entries into that schedule?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I had in mind the sage words of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in the House last week. As the noble Lord will recall, the origins of Schedule 1 were canvassed at length by the Committee in the previous group. The countries listed in the schedule are an amalgam of previous pieces of legislation where the safety of those countries has been established in that legislation.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Certain things will happen when the Bill goes through; the system described within it will take effect. I assure the noble Lord that this is something that the Home Office expects to happen—that is, that returns will be effected in accordance with the duty imposed on the Secretary of State.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

If the impact assessment is to be provided in a timely way—or if not—will the Minister ensure that it contains an estimate or assessment of the number of people who would have been granted asylum but will not be because they are excluded as a result of the blanket effects of the Bill?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is not for me to dictate what is in the impact assessment. The department will provide the impact assessment in due course—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lords in due course, but I need to make progress.

The broken asylum system costs the UK £3 billion a year, and that is rising. There seems to be an impression that, without the Bill, those costs will not continue to rise at an alarming rate year on year. Doing nothing is not an option.

In conclusion, I agree with the noble Lord that returns agreements have a place, and we will seek to negotiate these where appropriate. By their nature, any such negotiations involve two parties. The UK cannot compel other countries to enter into such agreements; they are a two-way process. Moreover, it will not enhance such negotiations to require their status to be set out in a three-monthly report to be laid before Parliament.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I ask the noble Lord to bear with me for a moment.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

May we return to something that the noble Lord said a few moments ago? He said that it is not for him to dictate what appears in an impact assessment. If it is not for a Minister—either this Minister or one of his noble or honourable friends, either in this place or another—to dictate what appears in an impact assessment, for whom is it to determine what appears in one?

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[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I will endeavour not to repeat some of the arguments that have already been put forward; it is a challenge that most of us have failed, and I will probably fail it too.

In the Bill, there is an unprecedented step that it would make any asylum application made by someone who arrives irregularly in the UK permanently inadmissible. If declared inadmissible, they cannot subsequently enter the UK’s asylum process. That means that they are out of the system for ever, simply because of the method by which they have arrived in this country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said that the Bill

“would amount to an asylum ban”,

as it would the extinguish

“the right to seek refugee protection in the United Kingdom for those who arrive irregularly, no matter how compelling their claim may be”.

The UNHCR goes on to say that, if other countries followed suit, we would see an end to refugee protection. That is a pretty dismal comment, but I have no reason to doubt that the UNHCR is accurate in its assessment. I repeat something which should be beyond argument: the UNHCR knows about the 1951 convention, and surely the UNHCR must be seen as the guardian of that convention. So if the Government are going to disagree with the UNHCR, they have to be on pretty firm grounds before they do so.

I will not repeat the conditions stated in Clause 2—we are familiar with them—but I will note that, even if people cannot be removed from the UK, their claims will still be permanently inadmissible. That is a significant change from the current inadmissibility scheme put in place after the UK’s exit from the EU as it also left the Dublin system. Under this scheme, if the UK Government believe that somebody did claim or could or should have claimed asylum in another country, their asylum claim could be potentially deemed inadmissible. However, the current scheme requires another country to have agreed to take the person before the inadmissibility decision can be made. The Home Office guidance on the inadmissibility procedures says that getting an agreement should take a maximum of six months in most cases. We are in a situation where there can be no progress for those individuals, except in this very negative sense.

The Home Office’s own statistics—I rely on the Refugee Council for some of this information—show how rare an occurrence this is. Between January 2021 and the end of December 2022

“of 18,494 applications that were potentially inadmissible only 83 inadmissibility decisions have been served”,

with only 21 removals. As a result, nearly 10,000 people have had their claims subsequently admitted into the UK’s asylum system following an unnecessary delay.

This Bill changes the current inadmissibility system by removing the requirement to have a removal agreement in place with another country before an inadmissibility decision can be reached. Instead, it makes any claim automatically and permanently inadmissible. It does not give the Home Secretary any discretion to consider the claim, and indeed the noble Lord in the previous speech challenged the Home Secretary’s lack of discretion in these procedures.

The Bill does very little to make it likely that more people will be able to be removed. Clause 5 allows people from 32 countries designated as safe countries whose asylum applications have been ruled inadmissible to be returned to their home country. Nationals of all other countries outside this list cannot be returned to their home country. This includes someone whose claim is highly likely to be successful, such as an Afghan or a Syrian, or someone whose claim could potentially be refused if it was actually processed. Instead, they can be removed only to one of the 57 third countries listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill. However, the agreement with Rwanda is the only removal agreement that the UK has in place that includes third country nationals, and the legal and tactical challenges faced by that scheme are well documented. Even if it becomes operational, it will not be possible to remove the thousands of people whose claims are deemed inadmissible to Rwanda.

We are in a real difficulty with this situation. The Home Office has yet to set out how many people it believes will be impacted by the Bill, as we have already discussed. However, given the current 0.7% success rate of removing people under the inadmissibility process, the Refugee Council estimates that at the end of the third year of the Bill between 161,000 and 192,000 people will have had their asylum claims deemed inadmissible but not yet have been removed. They will be unable to have their asylum claims processed, and therefore unable to work, and will be reliant on Home Office support and accommodation indefinitely, which is predicted to cost between £5 billion and £6 billion in the first three years. They will be stuck in a permanent limbo. I hope the Minister can explain how they can get out of that limbo, unless the Government suddenly produce a range of countries with which return agreements have been agreed.

This is a pretty miserable clause in a miserable Bill. I believe that this amendment could go some little way towards making the Bill somewhat less bad than it is.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I have signed some amendments which were tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton, who has asked me to apologise for his absence today. I am not going to speak to those in any detail because, as is typical of my noble and learned friend, the explanatory statements which he has added to those amendments say it all, and make them very easy to understand.

What concerns me about this debate is that it has a degree of abstraction which perhaps conceals what really lies in front of the debates we are having. Recently, I went to a meeting to discuss asylum and refugee status in one of our cities. Present at that meeting was a woman in her 30s, with three children, who is living in a hostel in that city. She has now been waiting for 10 years—with her children, some born after her arrival here—to know the result of her wish to be treated as an asylum seeker.

The Minister earlier today—it seems like many hours ago but it is probably only about two and a half—referred, when he was answering an intervention, to an emergency having occurred. If that is an emergency—because this Government have been in place for well over 10 years—then it makes the creation of a baby elephant seem like the speed of sound. It has happened on their watch. Why? In truth—and it is long before the Minister became involved in these issues and became a valued Member of your Lordships’ House—they did not do what they needed to do to anticipate what was going to happen. That is why cases such as that of the woman I referred to took place.

In another city, I met a young man, now in his mid-20s, who had arrived in the United Kingdom illegally in the back of a lorry. He climbed out of the lorry and had nowhere to go. He slept in a doorway and the next day he did what he was told was a good thing to do and went to the local police station and asked the police for help. As it happens, they were very sympathetically disposed to him. He was then about 17 and a half. He was refused permission to remain in this country and he was refused asylum. He appealed and his appeal was allowed. I am delighted to say that the reason he came to see me was that he is about to start a career as a barrister. This is obviously a very good thing for anyone to do, as I would say, and I know a number of noble and learned friends, including the Minister, will agree with me when I say that. I am trying to discourage him, as a sort of mentor, from doing only asylum work because there is so much more to do as a barrister. I may be winning that battle. That is the actuality we are dealing with in these cases.

What we are facing here, to use the Minister’s words, is apparently an emergency to oust the use of judicial review. Before I got up to speak, we heard three really superb speeches. I do not want to repeat everything that was said but I agree with it all. All those speeches demonstrated, I suggest, that the ouster of judicial review, as has been the approach of the courts and indeed of Parliament over the decades, should happen only very rarely. It is not unheard of, but it should happen only very rarely when the necessity to oust judicial review is demonstrated and, above all, when it is fair and proportional to do so. Surely the ouster of judicial review is neither fair nor proportional in a situation in which we find many cases coming before the courts but it is not the fault of the real people who want to go to those courts. Let us not forget that a very large number of that cohort are allowed asylum and refugee status when they go to the courts. This is not an unworthy cohort going to court for the sake of it; people often win their cases. Do we in your Lordships’ House, with so many experienced people, particularly those who have seen the courts in action, really want to oust that activity of the courts?

Let us look at the figures for a moment. I know that there are many cases in tribunals. I have never had the advantage of serving as a member of the asylum et cetera tribunal or Upper Tribunal but I have had the privilege of serving as a deputy judge in the Administrative Court for many years, dealing with many asylum cases. I think everybody imagines—I wish to disabuse the non-lawyers in the Committee—that these cases are all run into the ground by long-winded lawyers such as myself who try to make the cases run for ever and ever in order to enhance our fees; the sort of Daily Mail “sidebar of shame” view of what lawyers do.

Let me tell your Lordships what happens in the Administrative Court. A judge turns up for a day’s sitting and often starts with paper applications. About 11% of the cases have already been filtered out as being totally without merit and do not even come before the judge doing the paper applications—the paper apps, as they are called. The judge then spends the day in his or her judge’s room dealing with the paper apps, usually dealing with about 12 in a day—maybe a few less, maybe a few more. They take therefore very little time at all.

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[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, before we move on to the interesting dinnertime discussion, I just want to raise a point as a non-lawyer about Amendment 20, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Its purpose is to

“enable an application for judicial review to be made while the applicant is in the UK”.

We had a very interesting point from the noble Lord, Lord German, about what he described, fairly accurately, as Daily Mail sidebar accusations about the nature of judicial review. It was very helpful to have that short seminar from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on what actually happens in the Administrative Courts and how it is not a question of lawyers making lots of money out of rather dodgy cases. I think he is right. Although I have never been to the Administrative Court, but I am sure he reflected that very faithfully.

Surely, however, if this amendment is passed, it will drive a coach and horses through the main purpose of this Bill, which is to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. If you then give them the opportunity when arriving in this country in a small boat of immediately seeking judicial review, and that is in the Bill designed to stop them coming across the channel, will that not destroy the whole purpose of the Bill? I merely put that question as a non-lawyer; it seems to me inimical to the very heart of the Bill, whatever one’s view.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I just want to ask him this question. Would he be happy about legislation being passed that meant that people who had a justifiable claim to asylum were never allowed to pursue that claim to asylum—that is, a justifiable claim under international and existing United Kingdom law?

[Lord Horam (Con)]

No, I am just saying that if the amendment were accepted, it would be entirely inimical to the purpose of the Bill.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

6: Clause 2, page 3, line 26, leave out “7 March 2023” and insert “the date on which this section comes into force”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures the duty to deport in Clause 2 does not apply retrospectively to those who entered or arrived in the United Kingdom before the Bill comes into force.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 6, which stands in my name. There are some other amendments associated with it. I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton for putting their names to Amendment 6. I am also grateful to the many well-known organisations that have made representations on these matters, including Justice and a number of others; some of them will recognise their views in what I am about to say.

These amendments are about a tension between what is fair and proportionate and what is unfair and disproportionate. Despite the fact that all those who have signed this amendment are lawyers, I do not use those terms in a narrow legal sense but as ordinary language, which I invite your Lordships to use as the template for your judgment.

I suggest that the Government are attempting to negate the legality of the exercise of rights permitted by UK law long after those rights have been exercised, and that to do so is unfair and disproportionate. We had a little discussion about strangeness in judgments that were allegedly made. In relation to these amendments, the only organisation that is doing something strange is the Government, because they are doing something that is very unusual and that falls straight into the literal definition of strange, although it is not unprecedented. The whole issue is about proportionality, as I have said, and Governments unfortunately do strange things fairly often.

These amendments deal with parts of the Bill that are retrospective in effect. Retrospectivity is contrary to the legal certainty of which we are proud and other principles that underpin our law. The amendments deal with Clauses 2, 4, 5, 15 and 21. Clause 2(3) means that the duty to deport would apply to an individual who entered or arrived in the United Kingdom on or after 7 March this year. The normal course of events is that a Bill comes into force when it is passed—at that moment when we hear that it has had Royal Assent and has gone through any other provisions contained in it as to when it comes into force. But this one is retrospective.

Clause 4(7) would disapply asylum or human rights claims which were made on or after 7 March 2023 but were simply awaiting a decision. There you are, awaiting a decision and, suddenly, the possibility of a decision is simply removed from you by the diktat of government.

Clause 5(12) and (14) would extend the removal provisions applied to those who had made an asylum or human rights claim on or after 7 March 2023 but were awaiting a decision. Clause 15(4) would give the Home Secretary retrospective power over the accommodation of unaccompanied migrant children—a very dramatic piece of retrospectivity.

Clause 21(8) to (10) would allow the Home Secretary retrospectively to revoke limited relief to remain, granted lawfully, to victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, thereby undermining commitments made by Theresa May—she was referred to earlier—when she was Prime Minister. They were very carefully considered, and rightly much vaunted, provisions to protect people from modern slavery and human trafficking.

I think we have already heard today, and I have certainly heard it at other times, that the modern slavery provisions have been abused. Yes, to an extent they have, but I would challenge anyone who has experience in the law to find any provision of a comparable nature that has not been abused and misused. That is what courts are there for: to deal with the misuse and abuse of such provisions.

The point about legal certainty is that it requires that individuals know what their rights are and how they can be implemented and enforced. This is especially important at a time when, as we have heard repeatedly from the Minister, the Government have decided that the UK’s international law obligations are dispensable and that the fundamental rights of individuals can be cast aside. The importance of legal certainty, and having very rare retrospectivity in our legal system and our common-law traditions, has been stressed repeatedly by the senior courts.

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Both amendments would remove clarity from the Bill, which will make matters clear to those to whom the provisions apply. The Bill aims to deter and prevent. A start date of the Bill’s First Reading is not only clear but fair and proportionate. Those coming to this country in breach of immigration control rules—often from France—know where they stand and what provisions will apply to them after 7 March. More importantly, the people of this country, who want the borders controlled, will see that no matter how protracted the gap between First Reading and the Bill becoming law, the arrangements under it will apply from 7 March.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The noble Baroness has had quite a lot to say today about the wishes of the people of this country. Would she like to tell us what her evidence is that the wish of the people of this country is that people should be retrospectively affected by legislation of which they plainly had no awareness at the time when it had its First Reading?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. As far as I can see, the Bill was published on 7 March. It was very well publicised at the time. It is designed to deter—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

In Calais?

[Baroness Lawlor]

I think the noble Lord is not aware of the very good access to news which people coming to this country have—and which people traffickers have. It was no surprise that this Bill had its First Reading on 7 March.

I conclude on a point made earlier. This is not a Bill against asylum seekers; it is a measure to deter and prevent those coming to this country by unsafe and unlawful routes.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will certainly place a copy in the Library of the House. I hope that suffices. I am sure that my private office can work out who is here and is participating.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the noble Lord stands up again, I feel I should bring this debate to a close. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly those who supported the amendments in my name. A number of other very interesting issues have been raised. I have no doubt that we will be returning to a number of them on Report; I certainly will.

The reasons given by the Minister for what he recognises is the exceptional course of retrospectivity—I am using his words—involved conjecture: a conjecture that a very small change in the numbers, for whatever reason, of people coming on boats shows that the retrospectivity is working. I have been a Silk for 39 years. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, we have probably met more criminals than the rest of this Committee added together. My observation would be a rather less naive one than that made by the Minister. Criminals are infinitely adaptable. If the Government think that the boats are being stopped, it is not evidence that fewer people are coming into this country, because there are different ways and means of doing it.

From what we have heard today—maybe on Report we will hear something different—I really believe that the case for exceptionality is far from proved. I take the view, therefore, that we will have to come back to these subjects. I urge the Government to meet noble Lords who have spoken in these debates before Report so that we can see whether there is some common ground we can find that will make this a better Bill rather than a battleground in your Lordships’ House. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 4 in this group, in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I have also added my name to Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I have some thoughts on Amendments 1, 3 and 5 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, is partly duplicative of mine, but focuses specifically on international anti-trafficking provisions. In as far as it adds the EU anti-trafficking directive to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, I support it; however, I think we should settle on a single, holistic list of obligations that, crucially, includes the precious refugee convention and its principles of non-penalisation, non-discrimination and non-refoulement, which the Government seem so intent on violating by this obscenity of a Bill.

I turn briefly to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I thank him for his explanation earlier. Contrary to the explanatory statement for Amendment 1, I cannot quite agree that this does anything for so-called legal certainty. To the contrary, it seems a rather circular amendment, in defining “illegal migration” according to the conditions for removal in the Government’s own Clause 2. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, suggested in her very pithy intervention, as a matter of international law, someone who qualifies for protection under the 1951 convention can never have been illegal.

Noble Lords who have come to the Committee sensibly armed with copies of the Bill might care to compare its Short and Long Titles. It has become quite fashionable in recent years for Short Titles to become creatures of political spin, but parliamentary counsel guard the Long Titles—so crucial for scope, for example —rather more jealously. While the Short Title is the Illegal Migration Bill, and our graveyard humour alights on the adjective accurately describing the second noun, the Long Title refers instead to

“persons who have entered or arrived in breach of immigration control”.

As the refugee convention was effectively the world’s apology for the Holocaust and the insufficient and inconsistent protection given to those attempting to escape the Nazis, the convention always contemplated some genuine refugees having to escape persecution and enter places of safety by clandestine means and in breach of ordinary controls.

That is why

“in breach of immigration control”

is accurate and appropriate for the Long Title and “Illegal Migration” is not appropriate in the context of refugees, who, as a matter of declaratory law, will always have been refugees, even before they were given their status—hence the excellent point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.

The probing Amendment 3 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, helps to draw attention to contradictions in the Government’s public positions around the ECHR compatibility of the Bill. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out, the Section 19(1)(b) statement on the tin indicates one thing—that no statement that the Bill is compatible can be made—but aspects of the ECHR memorandum of ingredients suggest another. However, the medicine prescribed by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is far too weak a remedy. When a Government are so intent on violating rights to protection from torture, slavery and death, allowing the same Government to issue guidance on interpreting their offending legislation is like handing burglars the keys to the house. Therefore, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is right to seek to remove Clause 1(5), which seeks to disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, which, as we have heard, requires that legislation be interpreted compatibly with the European convention so far as possible. That is why I added my name to her Amendment 2.

Amendment 4 in the names of the quartet of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and myself goes further. It does not just remove subsection (5); it replaces the whole of Clause 1 with the requirement that this legislation shall not require violation of any of the key international legal obligations that we fear would otherwise be violated by it, namely the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, the 1951 UN refugee convention, the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. I am very proud to stand with noble Lords from four corners of the Committee whose experience includes high-level legal adjudication, law enforcement, and Home Office ministerial duty. What brings the senior judge, police officer, Conservative former Immigration Minister, and human rights lawyer together around the amendment is our desire that the United Kingdom remains committed to the international rule of law.

As we heard, last week, alongside other European leaders, the Prime Minister signed the Reykjavík declaration. It begins:

“We, Heads of State and Government, have gathered in Reykjavík on 16 and 17 May 2023 to stand united against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to give further priority and direction to the Council of Europe’s work … We reaffirm our deep and abiding commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as the ultimate guarantors of human rights across our continent, alongside our domestic democratic and judicial systems. We reaffirm our primary obligation under the Convention to secure to everyone within our jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as our unconditional obligation to abide by the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in any case to which we are Parties”.


Mr Sunak said:

“We remain a proud European nation. And we must work together to defend the values we all hold so dear … Because we know what we can achieve together. Just look at this Council’s extraordinary legacy: protecting human rights, abolishing the death penalty in Europe, supporting media freedom and championing democracy across Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War”.


Those fine words from the Prime Minister must not be contradicted by the Home Secretary’s illegal Bill.

Noble Lords will no doubt explore the many violations of our common and constitutional law tradition, as well as international law, via the anxious scrutiny of this Committee. At the very least, the Bill violates Articles 2, 3, 4 and 14 of the European convention in failing to protect victims of torture and trafficking and those at risk of death, and in allowing the Government to pick and choose which refugees from different countries it finds palatable from time to time. The Bill fails to protect stateless people and children in the context of its provisions on removal, detention, accommodation and age assessment. In the words of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, it amounts to

“an asylum ban—extinguishing the right to seek refugee protection in the United Kingdom for those who arrive irregularly, no matter how genuine and compelling their claim may be”.

This must be one of the strongest condemnations of a democratic and rights-respecting nation ever uttered by the commissioner.

If Ministers seek to argue that the Bill does not violate these various linchpin treaties, many of which the United Kingdom played a leading role in negotiating, they should have no problem with the requirement that the Bill be read in that way by Ministers, officials and the courts. If, instead, Ministers wish to argue that it is time to renegotiate these obligations, fair enough. Let them try to do so with such reserves of soft power as they think we have left. In the meantime, in contrast with Russia and other pariah states, let them respect the law.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. I support her Amendment 4 for the following reason. If I was a person in a country far from here who faced torture and very serious discrimination, possibly for his or her political views or opposition to the Government, or possibly for their sexual orientation which is an issue in quite a number of these cases, I might look up what the United Kingdom stands for in international law before I make my decision as to whether to seek asylum in the United Kingdom or some other country. And what would I read? With a couple of clicks on the internet, I would read exactly what is set out, or aspired to, in Amendment 4 tabled by the noble Baroness. In my view, that is the principled position to take.

I also understand completely—I think—the views expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope when, if I can be permitted to use a little bit of transatlantic language, he pointed out certain uncertainties about the Bill in the speech with which he opened the first debate.

I want to challenge the Minister to do something he has failed to do—I say this with respect, because he is known for his clarity in this House. I challenge him to return to the very first page of the whole Bill, where the statement under Section 19(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act is set out. The first sentence reads:

“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes … to proceed with the Bill”.


Does that mean, “I don’t know if the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights”? Does it mean, “I know that it is not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights”? Or does it mean that some parts of it are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and others are not?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right; it has no legal effect. Can I put this another way? The Minister can make a Section 19(1)(b) statement and the court can find that the Act is compatible. The Minister can make Section 19(1)(a) statement and the court can find that it is not.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the noble Lord not agree that the Section 19(1)(b) statement on this Bill is very different from the Section 19(1)(b) statement on the Communications Bill? I am sure that he has looked at it. Secretary of State Tessa Jowell made the following statement:

“I am unable (but only because of Clause 309) to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Communications Bill are compatible with the Convention rights”.


By making that statement, Tessa Jowell made it clear that in a massive Bill there was only one clause that she could not make such a statement about. In effect, she stated that everything apart from Clause 309 was compliant with the Human Rights Act. That is how it was understood; we can all read the debates. Is it not incumbent upon the Government, when they make a statement as vague as that on this Bill, to explain what is and what is not compatible with the Human Rights Act?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Lord is making a political point. It may be good politics or bad politics, but whether the Government want to do that or not, my focus is on Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, which is very clear:

“A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, before Second Reading … (a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights … or (b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.


We could have a nice debate about whether the statement in the Communications Act 2003 was consistent with Section 19, but that is not my point. My point today is simply that we cannot legitimately criticise the Minister for making precisely the statement that Parliament told him to make in Section (19)(1)(b) if he cannot make a Section 19(1)(a) statement.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am reluctant to give the noble Lord a private lecture on this, but I will set out a very short answer. I will be blunt but, I hope, legally accurate. The short answer to the noble Lord’s question is yes; we could do it. International treaties are not part of our domestic law. As far as our domestic courts are concerned—please let me finish and I will give way—if we were to legislate completely contrary to an international treaty, our domestic courts would have to abide by the Act of Parliament, because that is domestic law. Of course, that would put the UK in breach of the international treaty. It is not something I would recommend, but the noble Lord asked me a direct question about how the two interrelate, and that is a necessary consequence of being a dualist state. International treaties are not part of domestic law, unless and until they are incorporated.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

This could develop into a really interesting argument, I am afraid—between lawyers. The noble Lord just referred to the dualist theory, which of course is very important, but, in reality, international treaties are not usually entered into legislation because they are made under the royal prerogative. But that does not make them any less binding.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I started my remarks by saying that international treaties are extremely important and that we should always legislate consistently with our international obligations, except in the most unforeseen and unusual circumstances. But that is not the question I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. We are a dualist state. That is why we should object to these amendments, which seek to incorporate treaties by the back door.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. I was indeed about to mention her in my next sentence. Let me address that point and repeat what I said earlier. The phrase “illegal migration” in the Short Title of the Bill refers to the fact that the act of entering otherwise than in accordance with immigration controls was criminalised by an Act passed by this House and the other place in 2022. That is why it is correct to describe such people as “illegal migrants”—because they did not enter in accordance with immigration controls. That is the long and the short of it. The interpretation of Article 31 is irrelevant as regards that point of certainty.

I turn now to Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. This amendment seeks to strike out subsection (5), which disapplies Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The disapplication of Section 3 will ensure that the Bill’s provisions will be interpreted to meet the legislative intent of Parliament, rather than the strained interpretations imposed by the courts to achieve compatibility with convention rights. As my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson, King’s Counsel, pointed out, Section 3 is an unusual provision in UK law and there is, in principle, no reason why it cannot be excluded in cases like this.

It is our view that Parliament and the Government are better suited to address the sensitive policy issues involved in this legislation. It is therefore only right that Section 3, which requires the court to interpret the provisions to achieve compatibility with convention rights, must be disapplied so that courts interpret the law in accordance with the purpose of the Bill. Through this, we are ensuring that the balance between our domestic institutions is right and that Parliament’s intent is clear to the courts.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, explained, Amendment 3 flows from the recent report of the Constitution Committee. I am very grateful to that committee for its scrutiny of the Bill. We are studying its report carefully and will respond in full ahead of Report. As for the genesis of the amendment, the noble and learned Lord explained that the Constitution Committee considered that more explanation was needed around the Section 19(1)(b) statement that I made on the introduction of the Bill in this House.

Notwithstanding that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quoted from my Second Reading speech on this issue, I reiterate the point I made at that stage: a Section 19(1)(b) statement means not that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible with the convention rights, only that we cannot be certain that they are compatible. The assertion suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his speech a moment ago, that the statement amounts to a concession that measures in the Bill are incompatible, is not the case. The purpose of Section 19, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson set out, is that it is a statement that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible with convention rights and we cannot be certain that they are compatible. It is of course a measure in a piece of legislation passed by the last Labour Government and therefore something that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would no doubt place great weight on. Those are the terms that we find in Section 19 of the Human Rights Act.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the Minister not think that it might at least be a courtesy to the Committee to set out which of the provisions, in his view and that of the Home Secretary, are or are not compatible with the convention? That would help us to determine the quality of the legislation that is proposed.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come to address the issues of the broad applicability of the Section 19(1)(b) statement. There is no requirement in the Act for a statement to identify any particular section. Indeed, I do not want to wade into the waters that were nearly ventured into during the interventions on my noble friend Lord Wolfson’s speech about whether the Section 19(1)(b) statement in relation to the Communications Bill, as it then was, was in accordance with the statute.

In any event, I return to the principle of Section 19(1)(b) statements. It is right to say that they have been made by Governments of all stripes, not least in the Communications Bill, as we heard earlier in the debate, but also by the coalition Government and by Nick Clegg in the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012. As my noble friend Lord Wolfson rightly indicated, issuing a Section 19(1)(b) statement is a legitimate choice given to Ministers under the Human Rights Act. Why else would the Act provide for such a course?

As I have said, previous Governments have issued such statements, and clearly that has not caused our international reputation to collapse. More broadly, I encourage the Committee to approach questions of international reputation with a proper perspective. The world can be in no doubt that we are defenders of rights and liberty, the most obvious example being our leading support for Ukraine.

Requiring guidance to be approved by Parliament on how the Bill’s provisions are to be interpreted within the meaning of the Human Rights Act is unnecessary. On 7 March the Government published a memorandum addressing issues arising under the ECHR, and a supplementary memorandum was published in April in relation to the government amendments tabled for Report in the Commons. These memoranda set out a provision-by-provision ECHR analysis, so I submit that the Government’s position is clear, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will find the answers to his questions about what sits behind the Section 19(1)(b) statement in those memoranda.

It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide Home Office staff, immigration officers and others with appropriate guidance to support the implementation of the Bill. It would not be appropriate for such routine operational guidance on the implementation of a particular Act to be subject to parliamentary approval.

National Crime Agency Investigation: Javad Marandi

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 17th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am going to repeat what I have said: there is a long-standing principle, first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998, that if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election, you are also eligible to donate to that party. That includes overseas electors, as noble Lords will be aware, with reference to the Elections Act. Coming back to that Act, I remind the House that the Government have already taken significant steps to strengthen the integrity of our elections and update our electoral law. This was done to ensure that our democracy remains secure, modern, transparent and fair. I could go on in considerable detail about the Elections Act, but it has been much debated in this House.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Is not the case referred to in this Question an illustration of the opacity, rather than transparency, of the financial system relating to political parties? Is it not very important that we should put all protections in place to ensure that political parties have a well-understood and common system of ensuring that donations, in particular those emanating from foreign powers, are dealt with in a proper way? In those circumstances, would the Minister agree to meet me to discuss the amendment in lieu—replacing Lords Amendment 22—which I tabled last Friday for the next stage of the National Security Bill?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would be very happy indeed to meet the noble Lord to discuss his amendment. I remind noble Lords that, as I say, any suspected breaches of the law are a matter for the Electoral Commission or the police. It is not appropriate to comment on individual cases or ongoing investigations, but if a donation is from a permissible donor, it is for the recipient to decide whether or not they want to accept that donation.

Migrants: Housing

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord well knows that it is not the Government’s practice to share working policy assumptions in relation to these issues. As I said, the effect of the Bill will be to deliver a deterrent effect; fewer people will cross the channel and therefore fewer people will need to be detained.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister give a clear undertaking to this House, without any equivocation, that all measures for dealing with asylum seekers and refugees will be in compliance with current UK law and current UK international treaty obligations?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The Government will always obey the domestic law.

National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

26: Clause 7, page 6, line 39, leave out “or the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia”
Member’s explanatory statement
Clause 97 (amended by the Government) adequately reflects the context and importance of Sovereign Base Areas to UK national security and defence, and allows for Orders in Council, with appropriate modifications, to extend Part 1 to the Cyprus SBAs. This is consistent with other UK legislation to date.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, we move from the rather contentious issues of the last two groups to a little bit of sunshine, for this group is all about Cyprus. It is slightly technical, but the point of principle is easily stated, so I will deal with the technicalities first—but not before I have stated that I am very fortunate to have as companions on this amendment my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire.

Clause 97 of the Bill has been helpfully amended by the Government. It deals with the extent of applicability of the provisions of the Bill outside the United Kingdom. Subsection (2) states:

“His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for any provision of this Act other than section 22 to extend (with or without modifications) to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia”.


That seems pretty straightforward, so it would appear from that that there is a proper procedure—an Order in Council which could be modified and which would bring into the Bill those sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. On the other hand, if one turns to Clause 7, which is headed “Meaning of “prohibited place””, the definition of a “prohibited place” means Crown land in the United Kingdom, or the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which are used for UK defence and other purposes. It seems to me, and to those of us who have put our names to this amendment, to be nothing more than a mistake.

Originally Akrotiri and Dhekelia, the sovereign base areas, were included in the Bill; the Government very sensibly changed their mind by amending the original Clause 97, but they failed to remove the part of Clause 7 that includes Akrotiri and Dhekelia. As the signatories of these amendments, we simply wish to apply some consistency to the Bill and remove those sovereign base areas, understanding, of course, that there is every potential in appropriate circumstances—and I can imagine circumstances which could be appropriate— for the extent of the Bill, apart from Clause 22, to be extended to those sovereign base areas.

I should say to your Lordships that this is not a declaration of an interest—it is the opposite, because I made the coffee myself. I had the pleasure of a visit from Andreas Kakouris, the High Commissioner of Cyprus—a very able, interesting and delightful person, and a very modest and diffident person on these issues, along with a very senior and able member of his staff. I know that other Members of your Lordships’ House have been approached by the High Commission, and so have the Government; one of the reasons why the High Commissioner came to see me, and other members of your Lordships’ House and the other place, was that he had the impression that the very simple point he was trying to make had not been fully understood by the Government.

I will remind your Lordships that Cyprus has a very new President, Nikos Christodoulides; he has formed his Government and his Cabinet members are there to see—Members can look them up on the internet if I am boring them. Not a small number of them, I am delighted to say, have legal qualifications obtained in the United Kingdom, and therefore one can safely assume that they are able at least to see both sides of some problems—but they do not see one side of this problem. The new President and his predecessor have already formed significantly close relations with the United Kingdom Government, and at a diplomatic level the High Commissioner emphasised to me the pleasure he had gained from the quality of the relations that he, his previous Government and his new Government had been able to make with the United Kingdom Government—and particularly with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

But they are understandably sensitive to the sovereign base areas being put in Clause 7 of this Bill in a way that makes them feel like some outer province of the United Kingdom, which they are not. They are, as all your Lordships will know, in the European Union, they are very west-leaning and they understand the problems that there are. There are problems in relation to economic issues in Cyprus, including the nature of investors and so on, and they are very sensitive to that. But they do not understand why they have to be treated in a way that is insulting not to the Government, because they are people who do not feel insults and just want the right thing to be done, but to the population of Cyprus. Apparently, the Cyprus Government have received significant representations to that effect.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I hope I have already made clear, it is only Clause 4 that applies. Clause 6 does not apply in this context.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am afraid I am very puzzled as a result of the Minister’s reply.

First, I think he was suggesting that the Government of Cyprus had been fully consulted. If he was suggesting that, all I can say is that that is the opposite of what I was told, and what the noble Lords, Lord Purvis, Lord Wallace and Lord Anderson, and everybody else who has been spoken to has been told. Secondly, why did the Government change Clause 97? Clause 97 provides for the powers earlier in the Bill to be operated within the SBA following an Order in Council. Are the Government saying that the justice provisions in the SBA are inadequate in some way? I can tell your Lordships that those of us who live around the legal profession know an awful lot of people who go and do cases and even sit as judges in those places, and that is not what they have found on the whole.

I would suggest that the Minister’s reply was insensitive—if I can be forgiven for using that word—and injudicious, and I invite the Government to consider it between now and the coming into law of this Bill. I am not going to press this to a Division tonight; I am not going to ask for the opinion of the House. But I feel a strong sense of dissatisfaction at the explanation, such as it is, that has been given. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 40, 41 and 50 relate to the offence of foreign interference.

Amendment 40 makes a procedural and technical tweak to address changes to the timetables of this Bill and the Online Safety Bill. The addition of foreign interference to the list of priority offences in Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill is government policy, which has been agreed at every stage of this Bill since its introduction. Designating foreign interference as a priority offence under the Online Safety Bill would disrupt state-backed disinformation targeted at the UK through the duties imposed on platforms by the relevant provisions in the Online Safety Bill.

However, now that the National Security Bill has overtaken the Online Safety Bill in its parliamentary passage, we must address the procedural challenges posed by this change to respective timetables. Government Amendment 40 will remove the reference to the Online Safety Bill from Clause 13(8) of the National Security Bill. The Government will then seek to add the offence of foreign interference to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill via an amendment to that Bill. The effect of this amendment will be exactly the same as the current approach; it is simply the change in timetabling that means this amendment is necessary.

Government Amendment 41 clarifies the scope of the foreign interference effect contained within Clause 14(1)(a) to ensure it is not misinterpreted. Foreign interference includes interference with rights and freedoms that are protected under domestic law, such as freedom of speech. We know that foreign states have sought to intimidate or threaten diaspora communities with punishment to prevent them engaging in lawful protest activities. We want such activity taking place in the UK to be covered by the offence of foreign interference. Government Amendment 41 simply changes the wording in the offence to “in the United Kingdom” as opposed to

“as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom”.

This will ensure that it is not misinterpreted to have a broader effect than we intend. It does not change our policy or affect the operational utility of the offence.

Amendment 50 is minor and does not introduce new policy. It simply reinforces the Government’s intention behind what is originally meant by “political decisions”.

Some concerns have been raised that references to proceedings in Parliament in both the offence of foreign interference and the foreign influence registration scheme risk creating unhelpful ambiguity about the prohibition on impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament contained in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Government’s position is that such references did not and could not displace provisions in the Bill of Rights and were not intended to do so. However, we have amended the provisions to ensure there can be no suggestion of interference with privilege.

To address these concerns, government Amendment 48 removes references to proceedings of the UK Parliament and devolved legislatures from the definition of “political processes”. A key element of foreign interference is the infiltration of our democracy, including the institutions and processes which uphold our democracy. The other amendments we have tabled therefore seek to ensure that the offence still protects against such interference.

Amendment 49 adds to the definition of “political processes” a reference to

“the activities of an informal group consisting of or including members of”

the relevant legislatures of the United Kingdom. The policy intention remains the same—to capture foreign interference in Parliament targeted at the heart of our democracy—but we are achieving it in a slightly different way. I will briefly explain how we will do this.

The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials within Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions.

However, with this amendment we ensure that we also capture activity that is part of our democratic processes but which does not have official status within Parliament. We have therefore added reference to informal groups, which will include APPGs, to the definition of “political processes”. Foreign powers seeking to interfere in political processes through those who do not have public functions—for example, an external secretariat—will continue to be caught by the offence.

I turn briefly to government Amendments 42 and 44, which give effect to the new approach I have outlined, with Amendment 44 relating to the “legal processes” limb. They give effect to the new approach such that those interference effects apply otherwise than in the exercise of public functions. Government Amendments 43 and 47 are consequential amendments following from the change in definitions.

Taken as a whole, the amendments do not introduce new policy but simply reinforce the existing policy on the interference from foreign states that this offence is designed to protect against. I therefore ask noble Lords to support the inclusion of these amendments and beg to move.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 51, which stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and my noble friend Lord Evans of Weardale.

This is about transparency. When the electors go to an election, obviously they consider the policies that are placed before them. They also consider the personalities that are placed before them, because they are voting for an individual to carry out the important and valuable role of their Member of Parliament. They also should be entitled to enough transparency to judge the ethical matrix in which each political party operates, as represented by the individuals who stand as candidates. This moderate and temperate Amendment 51 is an attempt to improve the knowledge that voters have about the ethical matrix of the political parties that stand behind the candidates they are able to vote for and have to choose from.

We know that there are problems about the ethical matrix of political parties. Sometimes it is not their fault, because outside forces, hostile actors from foreign countries, make interventions into elections—for example, via the internet—in an attempt to slant the vote in one direction or another. However, there is also a serious risk—I accuse no party of impropriety in this respect, at least for the purposes of this contribution to your Lordships’ debate—that foreign actors, foreign powers, may seek to influence an election, for example by making substantial donations to that party’s election fighting fund which enable it to fight the election at an advantage compared with other parties.

I will not go back to my days as a very happy Liberal and then Liberal Democrat MP and talk about the disadvantage we always started from because we had less money than the other parties. However, we were always worried, in those days at least—I am sure it is still the same today—by contributions that might have come from foreign powers and that would give an even greater advantage, concealed from the electorate, to those political parties.

So what this amendment seeks to do is protect us from the likes of Putin’s cronies, who might, one way or another, find their way to dinners, contribution events and even meeting people in this great building. We seek to establish a register. In effect, each political party would have to create a policy statement which meant that they were obliged to disclose at least the outline of contributions made by a foreign power—we are not talking about rich foreigners or wealthy businesspeople but about a foreign power which has a political reason for trying to influence the result of an election, either made directly or through an intermediary.

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Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

51: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Foreign interference in elections: duties on political parties(1) A UK-registered political party must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from a foreign power (whether made directly or through an intermediary), and must keep that policy updated in accordance with guidance issued under subsection (2). (2) Within three months of the passing of this Act the Secretary of State must publish guidance on the provisions of this section.(3) A UK-registered political party must provide the Electoral Commission with an annual statement of risk management that identifies how risks relating to donations from a foreign power (whether made directly or through an intermediary) have been managed, and what measures have been put in place by the party to such effect.(4) In this section, “UK-registered political party” means a political party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.”

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who have contributed to this debate. It is notable that around the House, apart from the Government Front Bench, everyone has spoken in favour of this amendment and nobody from the Conservative Party chapel, as it were, has spoken against it.

I was particularly taken by the metaphor from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about knowing your donor—KYD. It is analogous with KYC—knowing your client—which, as she said, is universally applied by businesses these days when they receive funding from abroad.

The Minister is trying to be as helpful as he can. However, can I say kindly to him that he has missed the point of this amendment? Amendment 51 seeks to place an overarching responsibility on political parties to say how they will deal with direct or indirect foreign donations if they are offered to them. That makes it much easier for a candidate or a party official to say, “Sorry, we can’t take that because it’s in our statement of principle as to what we do”. Even though this is a relatively modest step, it would enhance the transparency of an honourable political process. We have lost some ground, compared with some other European countries in particular—not just western European countries but some central European countries too—in the transparency that we offer in elections. People are uncomfortable about it and the media are hounding on it.

With that in mind, and despite the blandishments of the Minister, I wish to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 68 on the supplementary sheet in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The immunity that preceded this Clause 30 may have been doomed from the moment the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, began her speech in Committee by saying that

“it seems to me that it is wrong in principle for members of the security and intelligence services to have immunity from the law”.—[Official Report, 11/1/23; col. 1452.]

She was right. That was just one reminder of how fortunate we are in the calibre and integrity of our intelligence chiefs, including those who have found their way into your Lordships’ House.

We now have a further statutory defence which would bite on encouragement or assistance of foreign crimes, which, although unreasonable and thus outside the scope of the existing Section 50 defence, is none the less considered necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence service or the armed services. A defence is, as has been said, in any view more acceptable than an immunity. But the likely marginal gain of this one seems limited, and its purpose is obscured.

So I ask the Minister in this new context to deal with the issue which, as we have just heard, the ISC did not look at. Why is this defence so broad in its application to the Armed Forces? The Minister indicated in Committee that the immunity was

“confined very much to the intelligence support by the Armed Forces”.—[Official Report, 11/1/23; col. 1458.]

We all know that the Armed Forces sometimes deploy in support of intelligence work overseas by the agencies. We also know that the Intelligence Corps has its own abilities for the gathering and analysis of intelligence. That is captured by my amendment, though perhaps not by that of the noble Lord, Lord Beith.

What justification is there for extending this new defence to activities of the Armed Forces that are not intelligence related? Exceptions to the rule of law should be tightly controlled. Why should service personnel be exempt from the same law that applies to the rest of us outside the special circumstances of intelligence? From the debate in Committee, I understood those were the only circumstances thought relevant. I hope the Minster will be able either to explain this or to accept my amendment to his amendment. In the light of what we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord West, the Minister also has a great deal of explaining to do in relation to the important points that he raised.

I would like to make two comments on Amendment 67, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West. I have two reservations about it. Necessary and proportionate is the test, and I would have thought that conduct that is necessary and proportionate is also reasonable, and therefore would benefit in any event from the Section 50 defence. I just wonder how much this really adds.

Secondly—I defer to more experienced criminal lawyers than me, of whom there are at least two in the House—the concept of proportionality could be quite a complicated one to explain to a jury. I am not sure I can think of any other criminal offence in which that concept exists. Proportionality in law, as I recall, is a four-part test, explained by the Supreme Court in the Bank Mellat case. That might rather complicate the route to a verdict. However, those are technical points.

The objections raised by the noble Lord, Lord West, are very serious. It is in the interests of the agencies to co-operate to the very fullest extent with the ISC. It is in the interests of all the rest of us, and I am quite sure it is in the interest of the Home Office as well. It is very distressing to hear that that did not happen in this case. So, in view of the serious points that the noble Lord made, and despite my rather lukewarm feelings about his amendment, I shall listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say in response. I sense that perhaps this is a discussion that will need to continue.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly, I hope, to say that, first, I agree with everything that my noble friend just said and will not repeat it. Secondly, I regard Amendment 66 to be a considerable improvement on what we were faced with before we started the Bill. Indeed, it is not a provision that provides immunity, it is evidence-based, it has a strong public interest element, but it is not perfect. One of the complaints I have received—only anecdotally but from authoritative sources—is a lack of understanding, among fairly senior public servants, of why the Secretary of State no longer carries any responsibility for the sort of decisions referred to in Amendment 66. The requirement in its subsection (5) that the Defence Council must ensure that the Armed Forces must have various arrangements in place is welcome as far as it goes, by why are Secretaries of State being eased out of any level of responsibility for decisions of this kind? I am not sure there is total confidence, among the kind of officials I have referred to, in the Defence Council to be as definable a source of responsibility as the Secretary of State.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I understand that our order of business has been changed today. The Government Whip did not consult our Front Bench and, for those of us who had engagements during the dinner-break business, I think it is a discourtesy not to have at least consulted the Front Benches of other parties about changing the order of business.

That said, I welcome the government’s amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is absolutely right. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, had indicated her hope that there would be government amendment in this area, and I thank the Minister for listening during Committee and for bringing forward these amendments. In Committee, I went to some lengths to outline what domestic procedures are in this area. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked something I thought was rather threatening: if she could have a quiet word with me outside the Chamber during the hour for other business we had then. I am glad to say now that I will accept that and bring the Minister with me, because there may be an element of consensus on a more sensible way of dealing with concerns raised about immunity for, potentially, very serious crimes committed overseas.

I am grateful that the domestic practices will now be considered similar to extraterritorial processes, acknowledging that there have been distinct differences. My questions, to some extent, are linked with those raised by the noble Lord, Lord West, on how this will be operated. In Committee, I highlighted the Government’s Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. I referenced the Ministry of Defence joint doctrine publications, and I highlighted the Security Service guidelines that had been released in a trial, and we now know more about them. There are a number of existing sets of guidance for the Cabinet Office, from the MoD and within the security services themselves on how, as the amendment states,

“arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of the service to which a provision of Schedule 4 applies are necessary”.

I would be grateful if the Minister could outline how guidance will be put together that will be for both domestic activities and now those in regard to defence under this part, whether that will be made public, and how it will interact with MoD guidance to address the similar concerns of my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble Lord, Lord West.

We know what MoD joint doctrine says regarding detainees overseas, but we do not know the principles that will apply to these new areas. Therefore, we need clarification on what they will be. I welcome the Government’s move. There needs to be further illustration of how it will be operable, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide that and give an indication of when guidance will be put together and will be published.

National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I will first address Amendments 77, 78 and 79. These amendments would create a requirement on the Secretary of State to receive confirmation from the police that there is no realistic chance of prosecuting an individual before imposing a state threats prevention and investigation measure—an STPIM—on an individual under Part 2. It is our view that the current drafting would already achieve that aim. STPIMs are a tool of last resort in cases where prosecution is not possible. It is always the Government’s preference and priority to seek a prosecution against those engaged in foreign power threat activity, and where we can prosecute, we will.

Clause 44 reflects our commitment to prosecution and requires prior consultation with the police, before the imposition of a STPIM notice, in relation to

“whether there is evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of prosecuting the individual for an offence”

relating to state threats. The police must consult the relevant prosecuting authority before responding to the Secretary of State. The requirement to consult mirrors that in terrorism prevention and investigation measures—TPIMs—to which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred. Our experience of the TPIM regime is that, wherever it is apparent in the consultation that there is evidence available that means that a prosecution is feasible, such a prosecution is pursued over the imposition of a TPIM. We expect the same principle to apply in the STPIM context. I hope that that addresses some of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

Furthermore, as set out in Clause 44(5), while an STPIM is in force, the police must ensure that the investigation of the relevant individual’s conduct is kept under review, consulting the prosecuting authority with a view to pursuing a prosecution if possible. Consultation is all about exploring whether there is available evidence that could realistically be used to prosecute an individual. However, the proposed amendments require the police to confirm that there is no available evidence. Changing the threshold in that way would mean that, in the event that there is limited evidence, but not enough feasibly to prosecute, we would limit our ability to use the STPIM as an alternative measure to protect the UK against individuals involved in state threats activity.

Although I understand the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the consultation is meaningful. In each case where an STPIM is in force, the prospect of prosecuting that individual will be kept under review by the police, consulting the prosecuting authorities as necessary. The outcome of that review will be reported by the police to the Home Secretary, in accordance with their statutory duty. In some sense, that answers the point about oversight raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Where a prosecution is possible, that will be the action undertaken, rather than the imposition of an STPIM. As I have said already, if we can prosecute, we will.

I turn now to Amendment 76, which seeks to place a maximum limit of 14 hours on the number of hours an individual can be required by the Secretary of State to remain in their residence under the residence measure. It is important to note that, in each STPIM case, the facts will be different, and the specific measures will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Flexibility is therefore key to ensure that the most appropriate suite of measures can be imposed. Protection against interference with the rights of individuals under Article 5 of the European convention, as was referred to by the noble Baroness, is already provided for under the residence measure. Condition D, which must be met to impose an STPIM, outlines that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that the individual measures applied are necessary to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity. That covers not just the imposition of the measure but the exact terms of the measure. In the case of the residence measure, that would include the number of hours an individual must reside in their residence. I hope I have therefore addressed the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in relation to the time requirement.

In addition, the court must agree at both the permission hearing and the review hearing to the number of hours, set by the Secretary of State, that the individual must remain in their residence—thus providing a good measure of accountability for the number of hours provided for in the order. The number of hours a person must stay at home will therefore be determined by the facts of the individual case. It is also worth noting that the individual subject to a notice has the right to apply for a variation of measures imposed both in the short term—for example, if there is a reason why they need to be out at different times on a particular day—and generally in the long term.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked who would oversee the imposition of the measures in this regime. Under Clause 54, there will be an independent reviewer of STPIMs, in the same way that there is a reviewer for TPIMs under the other terrorism legislation.

On whether the individual will know what they are accused of doing, they will have access to special advocates who will be able to access the sensitive information in a manner similar to that for TPIMs. The special advocates will have access to the sensitive information that builds the case against the individual and justifies the measure. There will also be a duty on the Government to share the information, as far as reasonably possible, with the individual themselves. With all these points in mind, the Government cannot accept these amendments and I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 76.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Can the Minister help the Committee by giving us an estimate of the scale of the problem? Do the Government expect a number of STPIMs which is roughly the same as the number of TPIMs in existence at present or do they expect more than or fewer than a handful? An assessment must have been made of these numbers.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I do not have that information to hand. My conjecture would be that it is fewer, but I will confirm the position and write to the noble Lord.

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[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, not least because I want to make some remarks about the effect on other areas of life. I agree with her that her phrase “non-value adding bureaucracy” is an understatement, and I sometimes wonder whether the Government understand quite how much they have unleashed with the clauses we are considering in this group. I will, briefly, direct my remarks to Amendment 88, which sets out areas where it would be useful for the Government to provide guidance.

A number of Members have had a wide range of briefs of various kinds, and I draw the House’s attention to one from the Russell group of universities. In effect, I am referring to section (a) of the new clause that would be inserted by Amendment 88. In that briefing, the universities say that they fully

“understand that working with international partners is not without risk and take their responsibilities to protect national security seriously.”

They point out that they already work with the Government. However, they go on to say that the requirements of the foreign influence registration scheme

“could include a range of international activities from student exchange programmes to research partnerships, many of which are already covered in existing legislation. The potentially duplicative and complex nature of this arrangement could limit opportunities for genuine international collaboration and risk deterring global partners, which would in turn hinder national and local R&D led growth.”

Just as the noble Baroness was talking about the adverse effect on business and inward investment, similarly universities are telling the Government and the House that there would be adverse effects on international research collaboration. The briefing goes on to say:

“If university activity is to be included, the system must be clear and simple to use with accessible guidance that will ensure universities will not be penalised”—


or criminalised—

“for misinterpretation or misunderstanding the system.”

As we are talking about provisions which have a criminal aspect to them, that matters a great deal.

The other point I bring to the House’s attention is about charities, which is reflected in section (b) of Amendment 88. The amendment was tabled by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, who incidentally referred to the fact that even all-party parliamentary groups may be caught by this provision. In about half an hour, I am due to chair an all-party parliamentary group at the other end of this building, and I sometimes wonder whether, in future, we will have to register an enormous range of activity. The noble Baroness used the word “tsunami”, and that is something we would like to avoid.

I will look at charities from the point of view of the scientific community in Britain. Many key scientific societies in this country are charities, including the Royal Society and the leading sectoral scientific societies, such as the Royal Society of Biology, the Institute of Physics and the Royal Society of Chemistry. They also have extensive international networks. All are international in their nature, organising international conferences all over the world and with international links the like of which is hard to describe. Science is a very international business, and so it should be. We benefit from that, and I hope that, in future, we will not lose some of the benefits that we have hitherto had with Europe.

In drawing that to the Committee’s attention, I would like to know what the Government’s intention is in respect of the activities of scientific societies. I do not suppose for a moment that they were consulted on the Bill; I think that many do not even know that there is a possibility that they might be affected. The Russell group is an example of at least one organisation which has been on the ball. The activity of normal scientific life in this country stands to be affected by the Bill. I am very interested to hear the Minister’s reply on that point, because I wonder whether that was ever intended to be in the Government’s purview when bringing forward this legislation. I do not think that the activities of our scientific societies really run the risk to national security that might otherwise be implied, so for that reason that I bring the point to the Minister’s attention.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I absolutely support the remarks that have been made by numerous noble Lords on the primary intention of this part of the Bill, which surely is to deal with those covert and hostile activities which may be committed by, or on the behalf of, foreign Governments—or foreign entities connected closely to foreign Governments—which might damage the national security of this country.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their important amendments in this group and for the extensive and interesting debate. I would be very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others from other political parties, as she wishes. As soon as the reply to her letter is written, I will circulate it.

I assure the Committee that I have heard the strength of feeling on this issue and the calls to remove the political influence tier completely. I will be taking this back to the department to agree the next steps required to address these concerns ahead of Report, while balancing the need for a mechanism that protects us all from malign foreign influence in the UK. At the risk of upsetting the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, further information will follow.

I should say this: there should be no doubt that those who comply with the registration requirements under FIRS, by being clear and open about whom they represent, are supporting the resilience of the UK and its institutions in the face of state threats. There is no suspicion around those who register with the scheme; they are doing the right thing. However, as I said earlier, this has been an extremely valuable debate and I am grateful for all the thought and expertise that went into these contributions. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that we are not singling out the Dutch; we are merely citing an example. This is about foreign influence.

I start by addressing the amendments tabled on the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I have listened carefully, and several interesting points have been made. I have heard the concerns raised about the unintended consequences of the political tier, and the Government will consider these points carefully ahead of Report.

Today, we have heard calls to remove this part of the Bill and focus instead on amending existing lobbying laws. These laws have been designed to be suitable for the supervision of domestic lobbying where British citizens and residents have a right to participate in the political process, but they are inadequate for foreign influence, where the impact of undue influence presents a greater risk to our democracy, and therefore greater regulation is required.

This is reflected internationally, and it is not unusual for countries to have distinct lobbying and foreign influence provisions. For example, the US has a Lobbying Disclosure Act as well as foreign agent registration requirements. Similarly, the Australians have a lobbying register that is separate from their foreign influence transparency scheme. I hope that that goes some way to answering the queries on this from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis.

The United Kingdom is well behind these countries in understanding the impact of foreign influence, and both tiers of the scheme are required to rectify this. FIRS will allow the Government and the public to understand better the scale, nature and extent of foreign influence on our democratic institutions.

I refer noble Lords to the multiple calls in the other place at the point of the Bill’s introduction for a scheme to require transparency around political influence activities. Members of the other place have signalled their agreement that political transparency is essential. We also heard from the director of regulation at the Electoral Commission, who said in oral evidence:

“Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 44.]


I know that noble Lords will agree that the British people need to be able to trust the institutions that serve them. It can only be right that the UK public and our democratic institutions are protected from covert foreign influence and better informed as to the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs. I emphasise to noble Lords that the public, and Parliament, should know when these foreign political influence activities are taking place. Transparency is a source of strength. That is why we have included provisions in the scheme to make certain information public.

Those who register under the scheme will be playing an important role in supporting our efforts to strengthen the resilience of our democratic system and political institutions. While we are keen to work with business and other sectors to ensure a workable and easy-to-use scheme, the regulation of foreign communications or disbursements should not of itself be controversial for the reputable end of industry.

I reassure the Committee that the registration requirements will not be burdensome. Registering will require filling in a short online form. The scheme will not prohibit any activities carried out by foreign entities or on their behalf where these have been registered in line with the scheme’s requirements. We intend to consult widely and convene expert panels to produce targeted and practical guidance. That will be published ahead of the scheme going live to ensure that the public and business are clear on the requirements.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked about NGO workers abroad. The scheme will require the registration of political influence activities where they are to be carried out within the UK at the direction of any foreign power or foreign entity, or where they are to be carried out by a foreign entity itself. Where the activities do not take place within the UK, they will not be caught by the scheme. I think this also answers the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the Ukrainian situation.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He may be missing a point but will correct me if I am wrong. The collection of funds for that scheme, along with a lot of the organising activity, is done within the United Kingdom. As the Bill stands, that surely means there has to be registration.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, as I have just said, I do not believe that it does. If I may, I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord.

I will now turn to the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I commend her for the spirit in which they were made. The first of these, Amendment 89A, looks to constrain our definition of “foreign principal” in the political influence tier of the scheme. She is quite right to point out that the current definition includes all foreign powers and foreign entities, but I will explain why the scheme has this breadth and the ways we have constrained the scheme to compensate for it.

The amendment seeks to include only those foreign entities that are controlled by a foreign power, rather than all foreign entities, in our definition of “foreign principal”. In the development of the scheme, we considered this as an option. However, we have worked closely with our Australian partners and reviewed their submission to the parliamentary review of the foreign influence transparency scheme.

The Australians originally took a very broad definition of “foreign principal” to their Parliament. This was, through its passage, constrained to something akin to my noble friend’s amendment. However, this has caused the Australians significant challenges regarding compliance and enforcement. For FIRS to function as it should, it shall need to be crystal clear to people whether or not they are working for a foreign principal. With certain foreign entities, it can be very difficult to determine ownership and governance structures, and nearly impossible for a small business or individuals to know whether they are working for an entity owned or controlled by a foreign power. In their submission to their parliamentary review, the Australians have recommended that the “foreign principal” definition is broadened, in keeping with our proposals. To provide balance with the broad definition of “foreign principal”, we have drafted a narrower definition of “political influence activity” compared with the US and Australian precedents.

National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

I am sure that noble Lords will wish to go into that in a bit more detail when we come to talk about the whistleblowing amendment, but at this stage I would say that the amendment, however attractive on the surface, potentially represents a quite serious threat to national security. There are provisions for people to raise substantial concerns through various channels.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I share the view that I think is being proposed, at least implicitly, by those who tabled the amendment that nobody should be prosecuted if a prosecution would be contrary to the public interest. Indeed, I share the view that nobody should be prosecuted if their belief, however unreasonable, was that something was in the public interest. I would hate to see a wholly unreasonable person prosecuted for something that they believed was in the national interest if, for example, they suffered from a psychiatric condition that made their belief totally irrational.

I have to say that I believe that this clause does not achieve the purpose which it is purported to achieve. The noble Lord who opened this debate did say—I recognise this—that he is not claiming this is a perfect clause, but I suggest that, if we are to have a clause anything like this, it needs an awful lot of work done on it. As drawn, subsection (3) in effect means that a jury would have to decide, in part at least, whether what the defendant had done was or was not in the public interest and then go on to decide whether the belief that they had that it was in the public interest was reasonable. I think it is very difficult to draft a credible and usable clause that achieves the end that is aimed for.

Indeed, my belief is that the target of this amendment is wrong. The target should be that people are not prosecuted for offences that should not be offences. We should try to remove from this Bill those parts which tend to criminalise, for example, journalists, rather than using a clause of dubious validity and coherence such as this.

There are criminal charges, mostly regulatory offences and often strict liability offences, in which there is a defence of reasonable excuse. A defendant can raise the evidential burden that they had a reasonable excuse for certain activities, and the prosecution then has to disprove the claim of reasonable excuse. There are torts, for example in defamation, where a public interest defence is specifically provided for, and that has been heavily litigated, including a very important judgment that was given by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope in one relatively recent case.

However, so far as I am aware—and I am sure I will be corrected if I am wrong—I do not know of a criminal offence where a jury has to decide what was in the public interest, and I would urge those who believe that this is something that could be placed before a jury to have sympathy with the courts that would have to deal with this provision, because judges in every case have the very important responsibility of summing up the law to the jury, and they would have to describe to the jury a reasonable definition of the public interest. That would have to be done, under current practice, by judges in writing, handing a document, a route to verdict, to the jury—and I apprehend that this provision would create impossible difficulty.

I return with an apology to something that I said in an earlier debate this evening about the public interest. Subsection (3) actually does set out tests which I imagine are habitually applied by the Director of Public Prosecutions if he—it is he at the moment—is determining whether it is in the public interest for a prosecution to take place. That is the right location for this decision to lie. What is set out here is the responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I apprehend that, in the sort of case that those tabling this amendment have in mind, it would be extremely rare for the DPP to decide that it was in the public interest for a prosecution to take place. That is not the role of the jury, and in my view it would be a serious mistake to make the judgment of the public interest the role of a jury.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have very little to add to that brilliant exposition of the difficulties with this amendment. As I said in relation to a previous amendment, I am of course very concerned with any threat to public interest journalism, and therefore I have some initial sympathy with the idea of a public interest defence. But I am afraid that, the more I looked at it and thought about it, the more I was convinced that this was not the answer. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, pointed out so cogently, Article 10 is not an issue here. Article 10 has always been a qualified right. There is no violation of the convention by the absence of a public interest defence.

I am particularly concerned about proposed new subsection (2). It seems to me that what is contemplated is that, if a defendant raises some prima facie case that they disagree with government policy, or whatever their general justification is for being in breach of one of the very serious offences to which this would apply, the prosecution will have to prove that the conduct was not in the public interest. It is difficult to know how that can be done without potentially disclosing matters that, in the interests of national security, it might be most unwise to disclose. In fact, it might even result in the prosecution not going ahead because the prosecution might take the view that it would be too damaging to disclose this. That itself would not be in the public interest in appropriate cases.

I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. A jury would be given a complex direction in writing. I can then only anticipate—I have had this experience myself, but not in this sort of case—that the jurors, who may be bewildered by a direction such as this, would ask a series of supplementary questions. What is meant by this? How do we respond to this? What if we agree with the defendant but do not think this? Et cetera, et cetera. It is difficult to conceive of this being a very satisfactory procedure, or indeed in the public interest.

So, although I sympathise with what lies behind this, I am concerned that the Bill could be altered more satisfactorily to protect journalists and whistleblowers. I am afraid that this is not the answer.

National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the provisions of this clause and its defects have been set out very well by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed, and there has been some really helpful analysis from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

I will just make a preliminary point. The inclusion of the Armed Forces in this provision is wholly inappropriate, simply on the basis that it is the wrong place to deal with what is a much wider problem and raises many other issues—battlefield situations; civilian situations such as we experienced in Northern Ireland, where we have had difficult court cases to deal with; and issues around the proper defence that veterans might wish to advance when involved in contentious matters. To push this into a provision about intelligence services does not seem the right way to deal with it.

One qualification that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made was that there may be a case for including actions of the Armed Forces in direct support of the intelligence services, but that is as far as I think it reasonable to go on an issue of wide importance that affects the international reputation of this country. I would rather we were simply dealing with the issue of how we provide the appropriate cover for intelligence services when they have reason to act outside the law. What an easier world it would be if we never asked intelligence services to act outside the law, but that is not possible. The range of things that intelligence organisations can become involved in if they are acting outside the law includes things that, on discussion and explanation, most people would find understandable and acceptable, right through to things that are utterly unacceptable—and which have happened. We think particularly of torture and rendition to torture, which has been our worst recent example. Many people would understand that, if you are dealing with a covert human intelligence source engaged with a terrorist group or some other group of people, at some point you will inevitably get into a situation in which both that source and the officer running that source have questions about what is permissible. You need a mechanism that can handle those things, and we thought we had one.

The provisions we have had until now have worked in a wide range of cases, and the ultimate recourse in difficulty is the decision of the Attorney-General on whether a prosecution is in the public interest. On the face of it, it perhaps looks too limited in some ways but, as I say, for the most part it has worked. There is a case being made now that in some situations it is not sufficient, but to move from that to a general immunity, not restricted in the kinds of illegality it can cover, is worrying and dangerous. To do so by way of a system that does not embody authorisation at its heart is a really serious mistake, and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, touched on this.

It cannot be acceptable for an intelligence agency to be able to act in a way which goes outside the law, without having had to make reference to some democratic authority before doing it, whether by way of a class provision or because of the serious nature of the specific incident or action that is involved. Were we to allow that to happen, which will be the case if this provision goes through unamended, Ministers could then always say “I knew nothing about it—it’s not part of my job to know. I just tell them to get on with it and let me know when they’ve finished”. That situation is not acceptable for either Ministers or the agencies, which then of course take all the blame and have to make political decisions—for example, on whether taking such action is going to cause massive international complications. Should an intelligence agency decide that, or should it be decided at the highest political level? Of course, it leaves accountability out of the system altogether.

The accountability is inevitably limited by the nature of what we are talking about. It may depend almost entirely on the judicial forms of accountability which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, helpfully described—the commissioners and the tribunal, supported also by the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which should be told more about the kinds of operation that have to take place. There are mechanisms to have that accountability, which will only rarely be able to be exercised on the Floor of this Chamber or that of the Commons because of the nature of what is being done, but there should be a process of authorisation.

What I fear out of all this is either Ministers being able to say, “This is all very regrettable, but I knew nothing about it”—when it is not something that Ministers would be consulted about—or a situation in which the service says, “We’d better not tell the Minister because it would be very difficult for him to authorise this”. These are great dangers, and we must not pass legislation which fails to address them.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, as is his wont, the noble Lord, Lord Beith, started with a very cogent and important point. The issue about the Armed Forces is both legally and politically distinct. It hardly needs explanation in this Committee as to what those distinctions are, for they are evident to us every time one of those cases is considered.

It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, whose return to your Lordships’ House is very welcome to us. He brings a richness of experience on issues which include the quality of the jurisdiction within which we live. Great attention should be paid to the point he made about the way in which our jurisdiction should retain its fundamental values.

In the provisions suggested by the Government in the Bill, I am afraid that I see the words “double standards” above the mirror every time one looks at them. Immunity is inimical to our system of law—full stop. Take the Khashoggi case as an example. I am not suggesting for one moment that we in this country would do anything quite as bad as that murder, nevertheless there could be other outrages committed. If we look at the Khashoggi case and the way that the country that committed that outrage has brushed it under the carpet of immunity, we see how dangerous it is to go down this slippery slope. I will not say a great deal more, but it is a particular pleasure for me to be able to take, as it were, the role of junior counsel to my noble friend Lord Anderson. He opened these amendments with superb and supreme clarity, in my view, and I would only muddy the waters if I said too much more.

I want to make a couple of other points, though. It seems to me that the existing involvement of the Secretary of State in at least some of the decisions to which we are referring does much more than give cover or protection to the individuals who might commit the acts complained of. It shows that political responsibility is taken for those acts, and it is real political responsibility because that Secretary of State is almost always accountable to the other place and will have been elected to it. Misleading actions on the part of, heaven forfend, any Secretary of State could have very serious repercussions in our democratic polity.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will continue, but I will come back to that, if I may.

I want to return to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seeing as we are talking about the application of this, and also to the point on torture. There will be no change to the UK’s other domestic and international legal obligations, including those under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act, which is Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. I hope that is unequivocal enough.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. Before he moves on, could he give us two figures which I am sure he must know or could be given very quickly? First, in relation to the security services, how many cases have there been in the past 10 years of the kind we are discussing in which the Director of Public Prosecutions has had to make a decision as to whether a prosecution should take place? Secondly, how many events have been affected adversely over that period by the existing state of the law?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand. I am not sure that I will be able to get them, but I will do my very best to find out and come back to the noble Lord on that question.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Perhaps I could get to the end and then clarify this. As I said earlier in relation to the SCA, I can confirm that the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about have been provided to the ISC. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, it has agreed that this is a problem that requires a solution.

It is vital to acknowledge that Clause 28 will not create blanket criminal law immunity or change the application of all other criminal law offences, including those criminalising torture anywhere in the world, as I have said a number of times. The UK remains committed and subject to international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The amendment to the SCA offences applies only when persons acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces are acting within the proper exercise of their functions. We do not consider that the activities that are of concern and the focus of this amendment would amount to the proper exercise of those functions. I hope that is clear.

I want to be clear that any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the intelligence agencies or Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions under the SCA offences, as well as other applicable laws. Meanwhile, it will still be possible for legal challenges to be brought against the intelligence agencies and Armed Forces in relation to allegations of unlawful behaviour, whether in the form of judicial review, civil damages claims or through a referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is exactly as it should be.

In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I say that the Government’s position is that this amendment is not intended to, nor would it have the effect of, removing the role of the relevant Secretary of State from the oversight of the intelligence and security services.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke about the current reasonableness defence and effectively why it is not enough. There is an existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA, as has been noted, which was included in recognition that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again. He said that this would not remove the oversight of the Secretary of State and I absolutely accept that. Of course the Secretary of State will have oversight, but does the noble Lord accept that authorisation by the Secretary of State, at least in some cases, will no longer be a requirement?