Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I remind the Committee that this is an intensely practical issue. We have managed to lure many of our learned noble Lords from their chambers today—so clearly it has been a fairly expensive afternoon. I am only a humble solicitor and I tend to focus on what is practical and necessary for those whom we advise. The fundamental basis of these amendments is the concern in many sectors—manufacturing, retail, health, information technology and financial services in particular—that the free flow of data between ourselves and the EU continues post Brexit with minimum disruption. With an increasingly digital economy, this is critical for international trade.

We have been briefed by techUK, TheCityUK, the ABI, our own Lords EU affairs sub-committee, and the UK Information Commissioner herself. They have persuasively argued that we need to ensure that our data protection legislation is ruled as adequate for the purposes of permitting cross-border data flow into and out of the EU post Brexit. The first question that arises is: will the Government, even before any transition period, start the process needed to obtain an adequacy decision from the EU before we arrive at the status of a third country for EU data adequacy purposes?

However, as the Committee has heard today, if an adequacy ruling is to be sought, a major obstacle has been erected by the Government themselves in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which makes it clear that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights will not become part of UK law as part of the replication process. Many noble Lords have spoken of their fears about the interaction with Article 8 of the charter, yet this article, relating to the protection of personal data, underpins the GDPR. How will we secure adequacy without adhering to the charter? Will the Government separately state that they will adhere to Article 8? We are not trying today to confer “special status”, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on Article 8. The wording of the amendment reflects Article 8, but it is designed to create certainty, post Brexit, for the sectors of business which I mentioned earlier.

Let us not forget that the EU Select Committee heard from witnesses who highlighted the ongoing role of the European Court of Justice and the continued relevance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in relation to adequacy decisions. The amendment is not frivolous: it is essential to underpin an adequacy decision by the EU post Brexit. Does the House really want to put that decision at risk? I am sure that it does not. Whether now or in the future, we need to pass this kind of amendment. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say, which will determine whether or not the House divides.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, when I came into the Chamber, I had not the faintest intention of speaking in this debate. I do so, above all, for one reason: not because I am opposed to the amendment, although I am, very substantially, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I do so because, in my experience, it is very unusual nowadays to vote at the outset of Committee stage on so fundamental a question as that raised by the amendment. It is surely yet more unusual—spectacularly so—to do so on a manuscript amendment filed this morning, which none of us has had sufficient time to deal with, on a very tricky area of the law, which so fundamentally alters the original amendment. As we have heard, that amendment was completely hopeless. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, described it as “constitutionally illiterate”. At least this one tries to introduce the concept of a balanced right which previously was missing.

It is true that I come from a different tradition where you do not vote on anything or decide anything unless you have heard the arguments. I rather gather that there may be a whipped vote on the other side, so the amendment is going to be voted on by noble Lords who have not heard the arguments of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick, Lord Faulks and Lord Lester, and who do not recognise the difficulties and the fundamental importance of this amendment. I seriously urge that it is not pressed to a Division today.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, many of whom do not appear to support these amendments. I particularly thank the lawyers in the House, who have instructed us on the legal position. I feel slightly like the lay person who was talked about, which I am, I hasten to add.

On a political view, it is important to remember that only three weeks ago at Second Reading it was clear that the Bill was widely supported across the House. Many noble Lords highlighted areas where further scrutiny and perhaps improvement were desired, but the House was unanimous in the view that data protection laws needed updating, that the general data protection regulation standards were the right standards, and that we must do everything to maintain future free flows of data. We shared those conclusions because we understand the role and value of data in our digital world and how it is the basis of delivering education, social mobility and economic advantage. That is why it is so sad that in this first group of amendments, on the first of seven days of Committee, for a Lords starter Bill, the opposition parties have threatened to suspend the usual business arrangements whereby we can debate in Committee, meet subsequently outside the Chamber and often come to agreement before the Bill leaves our House—an arrangement which does not prevent votes when they are needed, but which has worked well in the past. I urge noble Lords not to put this at risk. The Data Protection Act has stood the test of time because it was not a partisan piece of legislation, and we must not allow this Bill to become one.

Many noble Lords have said that these amendments are made in good faith to ensure that the UK is given a data protection adequacy agreement by our largest trading partner. This is the right ultimate objective, but it is the wrong route to get there. Contrary to the charge of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, we have not forgotten the importance of a free flow of data. In fact, ensuring we maintain a free flow of data is our number one priority, and we want to achieve that from the moment of Brexit, not wait to become a third country and then start the application process for adequacy. I direct those remarks especially to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. That is why last year we committed to ensuring that the UK adopts GDPR standards. That is why in August we published our plans and ambitions for the free flow of data once we leave the EU. That is why we have presented this House with this Bill: a Bill which builds a comprehensive regulatory system for personal data that covers everything that could be scrutinised in future adequacy negotiations, including areas which are not currently subject to EU jurisdiction. That answers the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on adequacy and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.

In the past, 12 countries have negotiated adequacy agreements with the EU Commission, including Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the USA. None of these was forced by the EU Commission to put the charter into their law in order to obtain adequacy. It is not a requirement and it is peculiar to suggest that it will be. It is a myth that we need this amendment to secure a future agreement. Why is that? The GDPR itself, which will become part of our law, says in Recital 4:

“This Regulation respects all fundamental rights and observes the freedoms and principles recognised in the Charter as enshrined in the Treaties, in particular the respect for private and family life, home and communications, the protection of personal data”.


Recital 173 says:

“This Regulation should apply to all matters concerning the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms vis-à-vis the processing of personal data”.


The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was reported over the weekend to be claiming that the Government were scaremongering. We were not. We were deadly serious about the risks, so I am delighted that the noble Lord has now recognised that Amendment 4 needs further thought. What a pity, therefore, that he was unable to discuss it with the Government.

I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who addressed the original Amendment 4. The problem, which I think has been alluded to, is that subsection (3) of the proposed new clause creates an absolute unqualified right to data protection. As attractive as that sounds, it is fatal, for two reasons. First, data protection is not an absolute right, as many noble Lords have said, and the GDPR says it explicitly, too:

“The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality”.


Secondly, both the GDPR and the Bill create a number of exemptions from data rights, which we will debate over the next few weeks. However, while we may disagree on some exemptions, I think that we all agree on the important ones. Terrorists must not be given unrestrained access to information held about them by the security services. Scientists must not usually be prevented from advancing research and furthering understanding. Therefore, the original Amendment 4 creates a risk at precisely the time we need reassurance.

However, Amendment 4A is a welcome improvement. We received this amendment just before noon today. Data protection is not the simplest area of our law, and at Second Reading many noble Lords commented on the complexity of the subject. It would be irresponsible of the Government to accept an amendment of this sort with just a few hours to consider it. What does it mean for future data flows and trade? How does it interlock with the rest of our legislation on information rights? What will the courts make of it?

At best, Amendment 4A is unnecessary or may not achieve what it seeks to achieve. Two particular problems with it were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. First, it has no value, and it only creates legal confusion. Secondly, subsection (4) of the proposed new clause is unwise. Rights often conflict; the Bill and the Human Rights Act manage those conflicts, while subsection (4) does not. At worst, as my noble friend Lord Faulks, outlined, it may have unintended consequences which nobody has been able to consider. Our initial analysis is similar to that given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that Amendment 4A probably does very little. It does little other than summarise what the Bill does. The Bill protects personal data rights, and Amendment 4A reminds us of this. None the less, with so much at stake, we must give this amendment full and careful legal analysis.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has been placed in a difficult position. Labour is in a muddle over this. But that is exactly why we do not usually vote in Committee. This stage is for resolving muddles and for understanding the issues. It is not the stage for tabling amendments on the day and voting on them hours later, without even discussing it with the Government. I cannot see how this is a service to the House, which prides itself on careful reflection.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, reminded us at Second Reading about the number of Bills that he and I have worked on together. He said that this was the sixth. I pay tribute to the careful, detailed—and sometimes even enjoyable—scrutiny he has given. We have had many useful meetings. Today is the first day in Committee and the first group of amendments on the Bill. We should continue with the positive spirit that we have built together, setting out our arguments and concerns. We can continue to meet outside the Chamber, and I and the Bill team are always happy to listen to and meet other interested noble Lords. On Report, we can reflect and, where we disagree, we can divide.

Therefore, I hope that noble Lords will see that now is not the time and these are not the amendments on which we should divide at this stage. They are unnecessary and they may be deficient. This Bill is essential for our social and economic future, and we risk wrecking it at the first hurdle. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

16: Schedule 1, page 115, line 25, at end insert—
“ This condition is met if the processing is—(a) in the exercise of a function of either House of Parliament, and(b) necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.”

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in my name, prompted by House officials, covers a number of issues concerning parliamentary privilege. The Bill in its present form contains some exemptions to its application to Parliament, but these are considered rather too narrow in scope. The group relates to four areas which have been raised by officials—that is, counsel and clerks of both Houses—as giving rise to concerns about how the Bill as drafted risks infringing parliamentary privilege. These concerns have been discussed extensively with the Bill team and the Leader’s office at official level, and drawn to the attention of the Senior Deputy Speaker, who is of course chairman of the Committee for Privileges and Conduct of this House. I say at once that these discussions have been most helpful and constructive. I pay tribute to the Bill team for its co-operation throughout.

Happily, the Bill team is now, as I understand it and as I expect the Minister shortly to confirm, satisfied that amendments to the Bill in all four areas of concern are appropriate, so that those will be forthcoming before Third Reading in the new year. I recognise and accept that those amendments may not follow the precise wording suggested in the present proposals but, provided they address the substance of these various specific concerns, we shall obviously be disposed to accept them.

In these circumstances, and given that we shall obviously not divide the House at this stage, it is unnecessary to outline the detailed nature of each of these proposed amendments. It is, I hope, sufficient to indicate that they include, for example, meeting concerns lest the Information Commissioner take enforcement action against Members or the corporate officers of either House—here, the Clerk of the Parliaments—in respect of the processing of personal data in parliamentary proceedings. Such action could lead to very substantial administrative penalties amounting to millions of pounds. There are concerns, too, about the liability of both corporate officers to prosecution for certain specified offences for things done on behalf of the two Houses of Parliament. I hope that that is sufficient, and at this stage I beg to move Amendment 16 and ask that the eight other amendments be accepted.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches I support the noble and learned Lord, who is absolutely the right person to pursue this matter. If I might simply add to what he said, it is important that we bear in mind that in the same way as legal professional privilege is the privilege of the client, these provisions would be for the benefit of the public, the running of good democracy, good scrutiny and holding the Government to account. It is not a personal benefit that is proposed here and I hope—I trust, because this is very important—that the Government can find a way through this. I look forward to hearing from them, as the noble and learned Lord said, early in the new year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I agree with the noble Lord, and we will take that into account.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I am most grateful for the reassurance given to us by the Minister. On the basis that all these matters will be brought back in some shape or form at Third Reading, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

28: Schedule 1, page 122, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) A member of the House of Lords is to be treated as an elected representative for the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 20.”

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, this pair of amendments, like the earlier group that I proposed, promoted by House officials, concerns another aspect of parliamentary privilege. Unlike the earlier group, these amendments have failed thus far to attract the support of the Bill team and government. Also unlike the earlier group, they relate only to this House, and not the House of Commons. But I shall have to address the issue at a marginally greater length than previously.

As will readily be apparent from the text of the two amendments, they propose that, with regard to a particular aspect of the processing of sensitive personal data, a Member of this House should be treated in the same way as a Member of the other House—or, for that matter, as Members of every other elected body in the country down to the smallest local authorities. There are really compelling reasons why in this context we should be treated on the same basis as elected representatives.

I begin with two acknowledgements. First, I readily concede that, unlike all the other representatives in public life, Members of this House are not elected. I put aside the Minister’s observation in Committee that he speaks as an elected Member,

“albeit with a fairly small electorate”.—[Official Report, 13/11/17; col. 1818.]

Secondly, I recognise that the Bill as drafted would essentially continue the position that has existed for the past 15 years, established under the Data Protection Act 1998 by secondary legislation in a ministerial order which followed in 2002.

The benefit of the particular provisions in Schedule 1 to the Bill which we are now seeking to amend by our proposed inclusion of Members of this House is that it would better enable elected representatives by dispensing in certain limited circumstances with the need for the express consent of the data subject to campaign on behalf of individuals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, Amendments 28 and 29 create a new processing condition for Members of this House. The Government’s view is that the provisions in paragraphs 19 and 21 of Schedule 1 are intended to reflect the unique and special nature of the relationship between an elected representative and their constituent.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, I am very aware of the important and valuable work that many noble Lords carry out on behalf of members of the public, advocating for their rights, taking up their cases with government departments and representing their interests in any number of scenarios. However, this relationship between a Peer and a member of the public is of a different nature and order from that conferred on an elected representative by their constituents. Elected representatives have particular rights and duties to act on behalf of the citizens they represent. The Government therefore consider it appropriate for them to be able to deal with urgent situations where they could not reasonably be expected to obtain consent; for example, in the case of an individual facing imminent deportation. There is no such need for Peers to be exempted from the provisions on consent. I stress again that nothing in the Bill or the GDPR prevents Peers undertaking casework if they first obtain the consent of the individual concerned.

I emphasise that these provisions are not new. The position under the 1998 Act is very similar and, in answer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, it has not prevented Peers who are interested in undertaking casework doing so. Indeed, I have not found difficulty in this respect; I have just obtained consent first.

I hope I have reassured the noble and learned Lord that the Government understand the concerns raised, and that in this instance he will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I confess to being disappointed by the Minister’s response to this. I dealt with the fact that things have changed over the 15 years since the 2002 order. Of course there will continue to be circumstances in which it is possible to get, without inhibiting problems, the express consent of the person concerned. However, it will not always be possible, and to that extent it will inhibit the future ability of Members to discharge a function they have been discharging. Of course I will not divide the House at this stage; nevertheless, I urge the Government to reread the arguments and submissions that the noble Baroness and I have advanced today and see whether they cannot bring themselves to recognise that there is a substantial point here. Although there is a natural reluctance to treat us as elected Members, they should for this limited purpose do so; that is justified in the narrow circumstances in which this point arises.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before the noble and learned Lord finishes, if the House permits me, I will raise something with the Minister. A number of individual cases are brought to us through other organisations, which may have the consent of the individuals. We would want to pursue a matter in the way the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, just mentioned—I was not at Question Time today but I can imagine the kind of situation. It would add considerably to the difficulty of doing that if the consent obtained by the organisation was thought not to extend to a Peer taking up the matter. I do not know how we would deal with that. It would be a considerable barrier to our doing what I regard as our job.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who puts forward a dimension to the problem that she is much more alive to than I am. However, there it is. I urge the Minister to reread these speeches and, in the meantime, I have no option but to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 28 withdrawn.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, the government amendment is excellent and I support it. However, it does not go far enough. I have therefore introduced a manuscript amendment.

My Amendment 50A would simply add two further provisions—my Amendments 51 and 52—into government Amendment 50, and would do no more than what Lord Justice Leveson recommended: to rebalance data protection law and prevent speculative trawling for stories. Operation Motorman was a police investigation in 2003, which I have mentioned before in debate, and it found that private data was being stolen on behalf of newspapers. That information, taken from private, medical, police, local authority, bank and many other confidential records, was used for stories or to hack phones. Those findings were considered by Leveson, who also reviewed the submissions of media organisations, and he was able to cut through some of the rhetoric—the kind of rhetoric that we have seen splashed across several newspapers today. He found that data protection law was fundamentally imbalanced in favour of publications at the expense of the public. That is not right. Just as the Human Rights Act strikes a balance between Article 10 speech rights and Article 8 privacy rights, so the GDPR obliges us to strike the same balance on data protection. This is not just following our own precedent; it is the right thing to do and is a legal requirement.

This amendment would implement some of Leveson’s recommendations. First, it would change the test for the exemption to apply to ensuring that the data processing in breach of the individual’s rights was necessary for future or continuing publication rather than undertaken just with a view to publication, as in the DPA and currently in the Bill. This is Leveson recommendation 48A and would protect the public from fishing operations when journalists process data without any specific intention to publish. Let me be clear: the data itself would not have to be published but the processing would need to have been done with an intention to publish—that is all. Secondly, this amendment would ensure that the exemption should be available only where the likely interference with privacy resulting from the processing of the data is outweighed by the public interest in publication. This properly strikes the balance between privacy and freedom of expression—this is Leveson recommendation 48C—and this balance is specified in the GDPR.

These amendments are the product of representations from all sides at the Leveson inquiry which sought a compromise—a way to protect the free-expression rights of publishers and to ensure that the public are protected. I thank the noble Lords, Lord McNally and Lord Stevenson, who have supported this amendment, and I also acknowledge assistance from a number of sources including the victim-representative organisation Hacked Off. I hope the House will support these reforms to bring balance to data protection law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, in this group of amendments I support government Amendment 50 and oppose, therefore, the plainly incompatible manuscript amendment to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, just spoke. Its incompatibility is surely obvious. First, and perhaps most critically, in proposed new sub-paragraph (2)(a) it would substitute the words,

“necessary for the future or continuing publication”,

for the Minister’s words,

“being carried out with a view to the publication”.

There would be two important consequences of that. First, as the noble Baroness said, it would involve establishing the necessity of processing, plainly a steeper and more exacting test to be satisfied than the test of processing “with a view to” publication. I respectfully suggest that necessity is too high a hurdle to demand with regard to processing data in these most important areas of our life—journalism, academe, art and literature. Linked to that, the proposed change would seriously inhibit prepublication preparatory work, most obviously and particularly work of investigation and research with a view to publication but which may in the end never result in publication.

As the noble Baroness also rightly told your Lordships, the second change from the Minister’s draft is the proposed addition by her of new sub-paragraph (2)(c), which again is designed to stand as a possible obstacle to the journalistic processing of data. Essentially, I am sure it will be accepted that Amendment 50A attempts to tip the balance rather against journalists and others who are seeking to invoke these exemptions. They tend to introduce a presumption in favour of privilege whereas I suggest it ought properly to be a presumption in favour of freedom of speech.

I would respectfully remind the House of Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which is headed “Freedom of expression”. It basically forbids any restraint on pretrial publication unless the court or tribunal,

“is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”;

and it requires that particular regard be had to the importance of the convention right to freedom of expression and, so far as journalistic, literary or artistic material is concerned, regard also to the extent to which publication would be in the public interest.

I respectfully urge the Minister to stick with his draft, brought before us in the shape of Amendment 50.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to support the cross-party amendments in this group, spoken to so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to remedy imbalances in the Data Protection Bill and provide new incentives for the press to join a properly independent system of self-regulation, which is what Leveson recommended and both Houses of Parliament agreed.

Let us remember what led to the establishment of the Leveson inquiry: we had revelations of data breaches on a massive scale. I have never met Hugh Grant—I have not even seen any of his films—but I suppose that one can say that film stars and politicians, as we are public people, are perhaps considered fair game by the media. I do not believe that, but it is an understandable point of view. However, we saw ordinary members of the public and anyone vaguely of press interest being targeted. That meant victims of crime, the bereaved and other totally innocent, private people. Medical records were stolen, mobile phones were hacked and bins were sifted through. Often, there was no public interest or even a suspected story. It was speculative—or “fishing”, as it is known.

Before we get bogged down in legal arguments that this is not the right Bill for these amendments, let us go back to basics and remember the one glaring example that started all this off. A little girl called Milly Dowler disappeared and the media hacked into her voicemails even before her murdered body was found. Despicable as that was, the police did nothing about it, because it was accepted that it was par for the course and that journalists did that sort of thing. That was the view I had as a Member of Parliament in the other place; we took it for granted that that would happen. It was part of the police/media mutual back scratching. Police tipped off friends in the media about arresting the actress Gillian Taylforth performing what was called “a sex act” on her boyfriend in a Range Rover and the media returned the favour by giving some crime story greater coverage in order to help the police.

All parties at the time recognised the need for reform and the Leveson inquiry was established. The inquiry was established to make recommendations to protect freedom of expression and take the matter of press regulation out of the hands of government and give it to an independent body. That is the proper way to reform regulation of the press: a public inquiry the recommendations of which all sides sign up to. Governments of left and right are always vulnerable to pressure from the press, whether it is from Murdoch, Dacre or other individuals, to sway policy in their direction, often at the expense of the public. Let us be honest that no Government have been immune from those pressures. All Governments run scared of doing anything on press regulation when the press might criticise it and not back the party at the next election. That is no way to settle policy, least of all when it overrides the will of both Houses of the British Parliament.

These are not new points; they are a summary of Sir John Major’s evidence to Leveson. I am supporting these amendments today in order to bring those reforms into effect, as Leveson recommended and as Parliament intended and voted for. As noble and noble and learned Lords have said, it is vital that newspapers have access to the exemptions necessary for investigative journalism—Leveson recommended that. We are all defenders of free speech. Newspapers that wish to continue to enjoy the broadest range of exemptions need only sign up to an independent regulator, whereupon they will enjoy not only all of the exemptions already in the Bill, but three new exemptions added by these amendments.

Let us be clear that we mean an independent regulator, not the in-house, fey, bogus, patsy system that the media have created for their own benefit and which is no better than the discredited Press Complaints Commission. We have heard enough examples from noble Lords tonight to show that they have failed to do their duty. We have a cross-party, judge-recommended way forward on these matters. We should take it and take press regulation policy out of the hands of government and into Leveson’s independent system. It is probably just as well that the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, is not here for this debate. In my 40 years in Parliament I have never agreed with anything he has said except every word tonight. I assure noble Lords that it would be as terrible a shock to the noble Lord to hear it as it is to me to say it, but he is absolutely right—we have implemented only a trivial amount of Leveson.

Noble and noble and learned Lords have said, “This is not the right Bill”. There never is a right Bill, unless the Government bring in a press regulation Bill, which I can understand that no Government would want to do. So we are forced to try to implement Leveson by tacking a bit on to this Bill, hoping that there will be another criminal justice Bill next year so we can tack another bit on and gradually, bit by bit, getting Leveson implemented. Of course, the Government could easily implement Section 40, which would give us 90% of what Leveson wanted. These amendments, or implementing Section 40, are the only ways to protect the public while ensuring freedom of the press. I hope that noble Lords from all sides of the House will support these amendments tonight—or, if not tonight if we do not have a vote, in the new year.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make very few remarks and confine them to Amendment 53—which I oppose, I should say at once. In my arguments addressed to an earlier group, I referred to Section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act, to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred again this evening. He is plainly right: if you look at the text of that, the amendment and paragraph 24(3) of the schedule—which the amendment would excise—you see that the amendment makes no sense. It would leave out precisely what is already there, which mirrors what is already in Section 12 of the Human Rights Act. If ever there were such a thing as a constitutional Act, that is. It has a considerable place in our overall constitution.

I have been searching the Leveson inquiry report, not least the paragraphs devoted specifically to the press and data protection. I certainly hope to be corrected if I am wrong, but I cannot find any suggestion by Lord Justice Leveson—Sir Brian Leveson, not Lord Leveson—that Section 12 of the Human Rights Act should be repealed. In effect, however, Amendment 53 is, if not repealing it, at least producing a position that would be inconsistent with it.

I do not seek to address Section 40. Manifestly, this is not the right Bill, but my objection is deeper still. It would be wrong and unwise, all these years on from the enactment of the 2013 Act, to bring into force Section 40. I set out all the reasons why I take that view in the full debate that we had in this Chamber on 20 December—just before Christmas—a year ago. I do not want to weary your Lordships by repeating it all, although, if I did so, I fear that what I would say would be in plain conflict with a good deal of what was just said by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Surely the right course now on Section 40 is to wait to see the Government’s final response to their admittedly prolonged consultation process. We will not get there tonight, so I leave it at that. I oppose the amendments.

[Baroness Wheatcroft (Con)]

My Lords, it is late, so I will be brief, but I cannot avoid speaking against Amendment 53. I declare my interest as someone who spent most of her career in journalism and now chairs the Financial Times complaints commission, which is, I assure your Lordships, a very serious commission. The FT aims to put things right.

I absolutely accept that the public were justifiably incensed by the hacking scandal. It was atrocious and, as has been pointed out, illegal. The fact that it was not dealt with as it should have been at first instance through the criminal process was absolutely wrong. In the end, as we heard from noble Lords such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, people were punished and newspapers folded. That was right, because hacking was illegal and should never have happened, and the public were right to be angry about it. But I do not believe that the British public wish to see all media tarred with that scandal. Neither do I believe that the British public, who are an inherently fair group of people, wish to see all media straitjacketed into joining an inappropriate regulator. I cannot resist echoing my noble friend Lord Black in his use of the word “bullying”; that is exactly how it feels. On the whole, I do not think that the British public would go along with bullying on that scale.

I declare another interest as somebody who, as a supporter of remain, has found myself very much on the sharp end of what newspapers can do. The Brexit media have been quite unpleasant, putting aside the fact that at some stages I have worked for the newspapers in question. That did not stop them. Nevertheless, do I want to see them subject to punitive damages in the circumstances that Leveson imagined? No, I do not, because, as everybody in this House has expressed, I too am a believer in free speech. If we believe in free speech, we need to think very carefully about there being punitive damages for not joining an inappropriate regulator. I do not believe the public want that and I do not believe we should support the amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting Hansard: House of Lords
Wednesday 10th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I too oppose the amendments in this group. I want to focus particularly on Amendment 147, which would, in effect, introduce a Section 40-type penal costs provision into the present legislation. But I seek first to dispel a basic misapprehension on this issue.

Section 40 is said simply to be implementing Leveson. I suggest that it goes very substantially further than that. The relevant Leveson recommendation is recommendation 26, under the heading “Encouraging membership”. The amendment deals, as does Section 40, with both the carrot and the stick, in both instances in more extreme terms than the recommendation. I shall forgo any question of the carrot—it is not necessary to discuss that; it is wrong, but it is not necessary to discuss it—but turn to the second part, the penal cost provision of recommendation 26. It reads as follows:

“On the issue of costs, it should equally be open to a claimant to rely on failure by a newspaper to subscribe to the regulator thereby depriving him or her of access to a fair, fast and inexpensive arbitration service. Where that is the case, in the exercise of its discretion, the court could take the view that, even where the defendant is successful, absent unreasonable or vexatious conduct on the part of the claimant, it would be inappropriate for the claimant to be expected to pay the costs incurred in defending the action”.


Given that recommendation, the suggestion is that the court could take the view that even where the newspaper wins, it would be inappropriate for the claimant to be ordered to pay the newspaper’s costs. Critically, there is nothing there about the newspaper, even when it wins, being made to pay the unsuccessful claimant’s costs.

In the provision as it is sought to be introduced, whether you look at it as Section 40 or as Amendment 147 —which is perhaps more convenient because it is in identical terms to Section 40 except in two wholly immaterial respects—subsection (3) goes way beyond that recommendation. In that instance, the court must—note the word “must” towards the end of the paragraph—award costs against the newspaper to the unsuccessful claimant unless, under this highly abstract concept in paragraph (b),

“it is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case to make a different award or make no award of costs”.

The plain intent of that provision is to drive newspapers which will not sign up to a recognised regulator to do so by threatening that they will pay the costs, come what may, except only in a vexatious case.

Anyone who is besotted with that mismatch should look also at two other passages in the report. I shall not weary your Lordships with them now but just note that they are at paragraph 5.6 of the report, at page 1770, and paragraph 6.8, at page 1514.

I shall make one final observation on this issue. Not only did Leveson’s recommendations plainly not go as far as Section 40—now the proposed Amendment 147 —but they did not win the total support of all his six assessors. Notably, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, now the shadow Attorney-General, who was the director of Liberty at the time and one of the assessors, made plain her deep reservations about Leveson’s recommended regulatory scheme and, in particular, once it came to be established under the rubric of the royal charter.

My second and briefer point is that IPSO—the noble Lord, Lord Black, made this plain a moment ago—now has in place an arbitration scheme that is fully Leveson-compliant. As we have seen, the essential justification suggested for not awarding successful newspapers their costs in these cases but rather requiring them to pay the losing claimants is that, unlike a newspaper signing up to Impress, the claimant has not got the opportunity of a low-cost arbitration. That is now categorically no longer the case. IPSO offers just such an arbitration scheme—including, incidentally, explicitly for data protection claims. This scheme was finally introduced in November after being trialled for a year. However, it was trialled on less beneficial terms than it is now introduced on. There used to be a scheme which cost £300. Now, as the noble Lord, Lord Black, made plain, you pay £50 down and the most you can be required to pay beyond that is another £50—£100 in all. This scheme is overseen by specialist barristers and managed by CEDR, which is Europe’s largest independent provider of alternative dispute resolution. There is less cause now for even the recommended possible sanction by Leveson than there used to be.

My next point is perhaps of reduced significance because of the availability of the arbitration scheme now introduced, but the Bill makes specific provision to assist a claimant in a data protection proceeding against newspapers to apply to the Information Commissioner to fund the claim. Clause 165(6)(a) makes plain that the commissioner’s assistance may include,

“paying costs in connection with the proceedings”.

Not only is this manifestly not the right Bill to introduce by a side-wind legislation that was originally designed for other cases under Section 40; it is the least possibly appropriate Bill in which to do so.

I am tempted to raise a number of other points but I shall not succumb to the temptation because many have been made by other noble Lords. However, with the best will in the world, this is an ill-judged group of amendments and it will do this House no credit to pass them.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I wonder whether I will win the sympathy of the House by saying that I am not going to make a speech. All I want to say is that I have given notice to my Chief Whip, as a cuckoo in the nest, that I cannot support these amendments and that if there is a Division I shall vote against them.

The only other point I wish to make was made by the noble Lord, Lord Black, in passing, at the conclusion of his speech, when he referred to the wider world. The rest of the free world that believes in free speech looks with amazement at these debates and thinks how on earth can we be wasting time debating this kind of thing when the press has done what it has done. With Alan Moses, a really independent Court of Appeal judge as the chair and Anne Lapping, a very independent non-lawyer, as the deputy chair of IPSO, having set up a scheme, why on earth are we wasting time in going over past history instead of letting them get on with it.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I turn now to an issue that is pertinent to us all: parliamentary privilege. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is paramount that both this House and the other place continue to be safeguarded in their processing of personal data in connection with parliamentary proceedings.

This issue was raised in previous debates by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, to whom I am very grateful. Those debates influenced our thinking on how the Bill currently provides for parliamentary activity, and I am pleased to announce that the amendments in this group have been tabled to ensure that privileges under the current law will not disappear when we enter the new data protection framework.

I will start with Amendments 5 to 8. Amendments 5 to 7 restrict information, assessment and enforcement notices served by the commissioner from requiring a person to comply with the notice if compliance would involve infringing the privileges of either House of Parliament. Put simply, the commissioner’s notices are “switched off” where there would be an infringement of parliamentary privilege. Amendment 8 prevents the commissioner giving the House a penalty notice with respect to the processing of personal data by or on behalf of the House. These amendments have been tabled to ensure that parliamentary proceedings will not be impeded by the commissioner and that Parliament will maintain the freedom to do its work that it currently enjoys.

Amendments 9 to 13 relate to criminal liability and seek to prevent corporate officers of either House of Parliament being liable to prosecution as a data controller. This is the current position in the Data Protection Act 1998, and our amendments seek to clarify the Government’s intention to maintain the effect of Section 63A of the 1998 Act. The amendments also make equivalent provision for government departments and data controllers for the Royal Household. It should be noted, however, that these provisions do not prevent corporate officers being liable for their own conduct when acting as data controllers on behalf of either House, for government departments or for the Royal Household. This maintains the current position, and we believe that it is an important safeguard that allows full parliamentary privilege while balancing the rights of data subjects.

Amendments 14 and 15 revert to the current position under the Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to the processing that is necessary for the functions of the Houses of Parliament or for the administration of justice by removing the additional “substantial public interest” test. On reflection, we could not see how such processing would not be in the substantial public interest, so the test appeared redundant. On that basis, the Houses of Parliament will have to consider simply whether processing is necessary for the purposes of their functions, as is the position now.

Amendments 20 and 21 make a corresponding amendment to Schedule 8, where processing is necessary for the administration of justice under the provisions in Part 3 for law-enforcement processing, to maintain a consistent approach across the Bill.

Amendment 18 is to Schedule 2 and extends the exemptions from the GDPR relating to parliamentary privilege to include an exemption from article 34(1) and article 34(4) of the GDPR. Article 34 requires controllers to communicate a personal data breach to the data subject where the breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the subject. The amendment excludes this requirement from applying to parliamentary proceedings and also restricts the ability of the commissioner to oblige either House to comply with it.

I hope that the House will agree that these amendments, taken as a package, will ensure that there will be no chilling effect on the functions of Parliament and will restore the regime that applies under the Data Protection Act 1998. It has the approval of the House authorities. I beg to move.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support this group of amendments, perhaps unsurprisingly given that they have now been brought forward in place of a series of broadly similar amendments which, as the Minister has mentioned, I tabled on Report. They achieve the same basic objective, which is to safeguard parliamentary privilege and thereby ensure that this House, along with the other place, can continue to go about its business and fulfil its vital constitutional role without inappropriate inhibitions and concerns with regard to the protection of data and privacy, which of course the Bill as a whole is rightly designed to protect.

As I made plain on Report, I was prompted to table the original amendments by and on behalf of the officials of both Houses, that is to say, the clerks and counsel, because of their concern about how, unamended as it then was, the Bill risked infringing parliamentary privilege in the various ways that the Minister has recounted. These concerns were raised and over recent months they have been discussed extensively between officials and the Bill team. Again I express my gratitude and pay tribute to the Bill team for its hugely constructive help and co-operation throughout. As now formulated, these amendments substantially and realistically meet the concerns of officials, and accordingly I welcome them.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we should all thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, together with officials of the House, for having prompted these amendments. In thanking the Minister I want also to mention in dispatches my noble friend Lady Hamwee. She highlighted this point early on in Committee, I think to the incredulity of the House at the time because it was thought that it was only Members of Parliament who should have the exemptions in the Bill. These elegant solutions demonstrate that parliamentary privilege covers both Houses.