Wednesday 13th December 2017
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberData Protection Act 2018 View all Data Protection Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 74-II Manuscript amendment for Report (PDF, 72KB) - (13 Dec 2017)
16:31 - Division on Amendment 31 - Ayes: 229 / Noes: 232 - Amendment 31 disagreed.
18:02 - Division on Amendment 42 - Ayes: 92 / Noes: 222 - Amendment 42 disagreed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)
My Lords, I am not quaking in my boots when addressing an amendment from my noble friend, first, because he is a helpful man and, secondly, because I am getting quite used to it, to be quite honest, particularly after the Digital Economy Bill.
As we heard, my noble friend’s amendment would restrict the provision in the Bill that allows anti-doping bodies to process sensitive personal data without consent to just UK Anti-Doping. It would permit other bodies to process sensitive data only if allowed by the Secretary of State. This House agrees, I think, how important sport is and that it can only continue to be successful if it is, and is seen to be, clean. It should therefore come as no surprise when I say that the Government remain fully committed to combating doping and protecting the integrity of sport. We are at one with the noble Baroness, Lady Billingham, on that.
At the moment, a large number of organisations, both domestic and international, work to prevent and eliminate doping in sport in this country in accordance with agreed international standards. UKAD, as the UK’s national anti-doping organisation, plays a vital role. But we must recognise that other bodies, some of which have been mentioned, also have important roles to play, including in particular sports’ national governing bodies. The amendment would see UKAD as the only body with automatic responsibility for processing sensitive data for the purposes of preventing doping in the UK. Other bodies would have a role only if named by the Secretary of State.
I am not convinced that this is a positive change for a number of reasons. First, it is not immediately clear to me why such an amendment is needed. UKAD’s role, and that of other sporting bodies, is set out in the national anti-doping policy, and this arrangement is largely seen to be effective, not just here in the UK but internationally. But we can never be complacent, and that is why my honourable friend the Minister for Sport, Tracey Crouch, has already commissioned a review of UKAD. That review is looking closely at UKAD’s functions, efficiency and effectiveness and has consulted widely. The findings of this review will be published early next year and will inform the revision of the UK national anti-doping policy, which will also take account of the recently published review of the criminalisation of doping. As part of this policy revision process, the Government will consult all relevant stakeholders, and will no doubt welcome discussions with my noble friend Lord Moynihan.
In addition, the arrangement outlined in my noble friend’s amendment would appear to present a number of risks. As he mentioned, the World Anti-Doping Code and the UNESCO convention set a clear framework that allows major events organisers and international federations to conduct their own anti-doping activities. Their ability to test cannot, without risking a breach of the convention, be contingent on them having obtained prior authorisation by a national Government.
Sports bodies change regularly as new sports are recognised and new bodies gain funding and manage competitions. A new round of designations would be required every time a new sporting body came into being or organised competitions or an old body changed its name. Under the system proposed by my noble friend, even a short delay in doing so could allow a drugs cheat to escape sanction by challenging the validity of the data processing undertaken by a sports body weeks, months or even years prior. That is not least because the Secretary of State’s decision to designate a body would itself be subject to judicial review. This could turn a relatively straightforward process of designation into a lengthy process of review, consultation and litigation. Similarly, if international bodies wanted to hold competitions in this country, they would, on the face of it, need to be officially designated by the Secretary of State. In a competitive marketplace, this could discourage organisers of major events from bringing their events to the UK.
To summarise, the Government believe that my noble friend’s amendment will put the UK’s status as a leading destination for clean sport at risk. It will create uncertainty in the sporting world and will be out of step with the recognised international framework that is already in place. It is widely understood that UKAD is the recognised body in the UK with responsibility for enforcing anti-doping rules. But the Bill must not be used as a tool to limit interventions by internationally recognised sporting bodies, such as the England and Wales Cricket Board, the Football Association and the Rugby Football Union. They, like UKAD, should be allowed to set and enforce anti-doping rules in sports. The fact that these bodies are not governed entirely by UKAD’s rules does not make their need to process data without consent for anti-doping purposes any less important. We are clear on that, the World Anti-Doping Code is clear on that, and the bodies themselves are clear on that.
Indeed, I have a statement from four of our leading sports bodies: the Football Association, the Rugby Football Union, the England and Wales Cricket Board, and the British Horseracing Authority. They are not speaking with different voices. This is a joint quote, which they have authorised me to announce. They say:
“We welcome further discussion with all parties on this issue but do not believe that this Amendment, that has not been discussed with or subject to any consultation with our organisations, is the right way to proceed today”.
In answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Falkland, who asked about the horseracing authority, I am afraid he should direct his question to my noble friend Lord Moynihan, because it is his amendment that would change the current system. Therefore, while I understand the desire of my noble friend to assist in the fight against doping, which we all support, I do not believe that the Bill is the proper vehicle to achieve it; nor do I believe that my noble friend’s amendment would in fact achieve it.
Let me be clear: if my noble friend or the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, want to keep talking about anti-doping in general, I am very happy to do so, as is my honourable friend the Minister for Sport; I have already said that. But the Government have spent a great deal of time working with UKAD and sports bodies to design paragraph 23 of Schedule 1, and I have heard nothing in the debates in Committee and today that would suggest that we should alter our view before the review of UKAD is complete. On that basis, I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Moynihan
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed. I will respond to the Minister first. I was disappointed that he did not respond to the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which I also touched on, namely, that it was important, if at all possible, to take away this amendment and consider it in greater detail so that the Government could bring it back at Third Reading. The Government have decided not to do so, and in so doing they have argued the following points.
The first was that there has been inadequate consultation—for example, no discussion between the BHA and myself. If I may respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Falkland, I had a conference call with, I think, four BHA people last Friday to discuss in detail the consequences of the proposed amendment. It was a constructive and helpful discussion. It was very important to them that they did not come under the umbrella of UKAD, and they would not. Amendment 31 says very specifically that the references are,
“to be read as references to … UKAD … , its successor bodies or a body designated by the Secretary of State”.
They asked me whether that would be a cumbersome process, and I said, “Certainly not”. The Secretary of State could respond to a letter pretty much immediately by saying, “Continue the good work that you’re doing”. That would be absolutely fine under the amendments I have tabled to Schedule 1.
This would apply to any organising group that exercises authority in anti-doping in this country outside UKAD, which covers the wide majority. Indeed, UKAD can test any athlete in this country, if it so wishes, at any level of competition. But there are organisations which will operate outside UKAD, for example the international federations and the International Olympic Committee. The other organisations which the noble Lord mentioned operate within UKAD in any event. Organisations such as the Football Association and the Rugby Football Union have a relationship with it to continue its good work, not least because those are Olympic sports, so they are covered in any event by the phrase,
“a body designated by the Secretary of State”.
I want further to assist my noble friend the Minister by suggesting that, instead of simply leaving it at that, every single point that he made could be covered by the regulations that he is being asked to bring forward under the Bill. There would be no uncertainty; there would be complete clarity, and we would have the opportunity to address those points in detail prior to that secondary legislation coming forward.
Why was it important to amend a general catch-all clause on sport to deal with these issues? It was important so that the BHA knew its position and could continue the good work with minimum bureaucracy, simply by a letter recognising that it continues the good work. I have heard nobody—not from the Bill team, which I met, not the policy advisers from DCMS and not the BHA, which I had a long conference call with last Friday—mention that there is anybody who seeks to change the way in which the BHA does excellent work in this area. It would simply be recognised on the face of the secondary legislation and so it should be—
Lord Ashton of Hyde
Does my noble friend not accept, then, that if the situation is exactly the same as now, he is proposing a new process which will possibly be subject to litigation and achieve exactly the same status that we have today?
Lord Moynihan
First, there is no evidence whatever that it is subject to litigation. If the Secretary of State—
Lord Ashton of Hyde
I am sorry to interrupt again. Of course there has not been any litigation because the system that my noble friend proposes has not been put in place.
Lord Moynihan
But there are no grounds for litigation. If the BHA is doing good work in anti-doping then, in the context of this paragraph, all that is being done is for that to be recognised within the legislation and by the Secretary of State in designating the BHA to continue its good work. Who would wish to litigate on that? Nobody is changing any relationship between the BHA, and those who work within it, and the excellent anti-doping policy that it currently runs. I am sure the Government would not want to change that.
The reason why this should be on the face of the Bill and in the secondary legislation—the regulations—is that this is of serious importance. We are asking athletes to give up a lot of personal data, and we should protect them when giving up personal data. It is important and right for an anti-doping policy that they should do so, but its importance should be recognised and my noble friend the Minister did not even mention it in his response. It is about the data management.
I conclude by saying simply this, and I will happily give way to my noble friend the Minister. If he is prepared, as I hope he is, to follow the initiative of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which I fully support, on improving the wording of the amendment, I stand absolutely ready to find consensus with all governing bodies, the Government, the Bill team and everybody else who is interested in the subject, including all Members of your Lordships’ House, in order to find an improved amendment. I think the amendment works perfectly satisfactorily, and I have just tried to explain that to my noble friend and the House, but I am sure it could be improved by further discussions. Is my noble friend the Minister willing to take it away and bring it back at Third Reading? If he is, I will happily give way.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
I have to be very clear about what we are doing, particularly as this is the first group on our first day on Report. To be absolutely clear, I am not content to return to this issue at Third Reading of the Data Protection Bill because we have heard nothing that would suggest to us that paragraph 23 would benefit from further consideration at this time. I have to repeat that the wording on the face of the Bill was drawn up—this is a quote from the governing bodies that I mentioned—
“in close consultation with the sports governing bodies and the Sport and Recreation Alliance and we support the original wording as the right way forward”.
Lord Moynihan
I hear what the Minister said. We have had many discussions with different members of governing bodies and others who have argued that this provision could be improved. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and I sat opposite UKAD and governing bodies last Monday, so what the right hand in some of these governing bodies is doing is clearly not what the left hand is doing. I think this amendment is a significant improvement that protects the rights of individual athletes. That is what we should be doing in this Bill because it is about data management. Regretfully, because I hoped that the Minister would take this away and come back with a consensus on something better, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, I intend to be brief, but not because this is a minor matter—quite the reverse. This is one of the biggest concerns that we should have about how we engage through the public view on the issues that affect many of our citizens. I am talking particularly here about safeguarding, especially in relation to sport, although it also has wider concerns, wherever an adult has responsibility for a child.
The public concern has mostly focused on issues such as football and swimming in recent months and the last few years, but there are wider concerns that have been dealt with under various inquiries, and we await the results. The narrow issue relating to this Bill is that those individuals or bodies that have a protective function of safeguarding children or, indeed, vulnerable adults, and need to process sensitive data, even though they have no legal obligation to do it and have no statutory function may be an issue that the Government wish to return to. There is no doubt that UK Anti-Doping has the powers that are necessary in sports. But when members of the public and their children are not being sufficiently looked after, extra vigilance must be taken, and we must ensure that the Bill in no way affects that.
I have tabled this amendment, sent to us by a number of bodies involved in sport, but there are other groups outside the sporting area with interests here. The Government are currently discussing these issues and hoping to come to a conclusion shortly. On that basis, I hope that the Minister can give us some indication of the progress that has been made here and, if he can, some sense of the timescale in which the Government will act. I beg to move.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
My Lords, I will be brief. Amendment 33 seeks to introduce a condition permitting the processing of special categories of personal data where it is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding children or vulnerable adults. The Government take the issue of safeguarding extremely seriously and recognise the need for the Bill to provide certainty to organisations with safeguarding responsibilities, so I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for raising this issue.
Organisations in all sectors wish to ensure that they have a lawful basis when they process special categories of data for safeguarding purposes. In many—maybe even all—circumstances, organisations will be able to rely on existing conditions under the Bill: for example, where processing is necessary for the purposes of preventing or detecting unlawful acts or where the processing is necessary for the exercise of functions under legislation or under a rule of law. However, I recognise that there is an argument for having a specific safeguarding condition to put the issue beyond doubt.
This is an issue which requires careful consideration and noble Lords may be assured that my department is actively working across government and with stakeholders in the voluntary and private sectors to consider the issue. We must be mindful, for example, of the broader implications of defining safeguarding and vulnerability within data protection law. Inclusion of such definitions within the Bill could have unforeseen consequences for other legislation which uses the same, or similar, terminology. As such, I can assure noble Lords that the Government are sympathetic to the objective of this amendment. However, given the importance of this issue and the potential impacts both within and beyond data protection law, we are sure that further consideration is required before any amendment can be brought forward. I can assure noble Lords that we will continue to examine this issue urgently. While it will not be possible to conclude our consideration in time for Third Reading, I am confident of doing so in time for Committee stage in the Commons. On the understanding that we will return to the issue of safeguarding in the Commons, I hope that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment this evening.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
I am grateful to the Minister for giving such a precise response to this, not only on the substance, recognising the issue and confirming that it needs to be put beyond doubt that the powers will exist, but giving us the assurance that this matter will be brought back in the Commons, which is wonderful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, we have Amendment 37 tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy in this group. The focus of our amendment is to tease out from the Dispatch Box a sense of what is meant by “meaningful” in the context of the discussions we have already had about how organisations might disclose details of algorithms used in profiling and data-driven decision systems, to meet the obligation in the GDPR to provide meaningful information about what has been going on in that space. It will be difficult to do this because “meaningful” can involve many words and obligations and is, I think, a slightly slippery concept. It will probably exercise the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in its imprecision—but do not blame us, mate; it is the GDPR, which we are not allowed to discuss. However, I think that the Minister can help us here by providing a bit more information.
We have suggested that a way of dealing with this would be to look at how the information is used and make it a requirement that it should,
“be sufficient to enable the data subject to assess whether the profiling will be beneficial or harmful to their interests”.
That may not be sufficiently strict legal language but, if it is an important distinction, it would help to get us to the point at which the Minister might say that she will bring back improved wording in an amendment at Third Reading.
The real issue which is not discussed here is the question of whether we can access the algorithms themselves. The problem, and the reason for the solution to that problem lying in terms of the test of how it works in practice, is that it is not sufficient just to have simple information about the actual mathematics of the algorithm because that in itself would not give us enough information. What we need, for those in a particular part of the population cohort, is knowledge of the consequences of being in one category or another and how that is weighed up by those carrying out the processing. This covers all the ways in which decisions are made on credit, on our purchases and how we are advertised to. It is happening now, so the sooner we can get the information, the better. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments when she comes to respond.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I start by thanking noble Lords for their amendments, which bring us back to the important issues around the use of automated processing in what is an increasingly digital world. I apologise if my smile was misleading, I was just very pleased to see the noble Baroness in her place; it did not indicate anything other than that.
The range in which automated processing is applied includes everything from suggested views on YouTube to quotes for home insurance and beyond. In considering these amendments it is important to bear in mind that automated decision-making can bring benefits to data subjects, so we should not view these provisions simply through the prism of threats to data subjects’ rights. The Government are conscious of the need to ensure that stringent provisions are in place to regulate appropriately decisions based solely on automated processing. We have included in the Bill the necessary safeguards such as the right to be informed of automated processing as soon as possible, along with the right to challenge an automated decision made by a data controller or processor. We have considered the amendments proposed by noble Lords and believe that Clauses 13, 43, 48, 94, 95, 111 and 189 provide sufficient safeguards to protect data subjects of all ages—adults as well as children.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I accept that people want to assert their rights. Of course I do. I also think that we had a very detailed debate in Committee. Points were raised about the broad-brush approach; the Government have responded, and I am happy to support their amendments.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, these amendments bring us back to the immigration exemption in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 which, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, was debated at some length in Committee. As this is Report, I am not going to repeat all the arguments I made in the earlier debate, not least because noble Lords will have seen my follow-up letter of 23 November, but it is important to reiterate a few key points about the nature of this provision, not least to allay the concerns that have been expressed by noble Lords.
Let me begin by restating the core objective underpinning this provision. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, specifically asked for further clarity on this point. The UK’s ability to maintain an effective system of immigration control and to enforce our immigration laws should not be threatened by the impact of the GDPR. It is therefore entirely appropriate to restrict, on a case-by-case basis, certain rights of a data subject in circumstances where giving effect to those rights would undermine that objective. That is the sole purpose and effect of this provision—nothing more, nothing less.
The GDPR recognises this by enabling member states to place restrictions on the rights of data subjects where it is necessary and proportionate to do so to safeguard,
“important objectives of general public interest”.
The maintenance of effective immigration control is one such objective. This is the basis for the provision in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2.
The noble Baroness referred to article 23 of the GDPR. It does not expressly allow restrictions for the purposes of immigration control. She asked whether the immigration restriction is legal. She pointed to Liberty’s claim that the exemption is unlawful. It is not the case.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister is reading from her brief, but I do not think I made any of the statements it anticipated I would make.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I have been badly advised somewhere. Shall I just get on with what I was going to say?
I made clear in Committee that the exemption is not a blanket provision applying to a whole class of data subjects. It is important to note that Schedule 2 does not create a basis for processing personal data. The exemptions in that schedule operate as a shield allowing data controllers to resist the exercise or application of the data subjects’ rights as set out in chapter III of the GDPR. It is the assertion or application of those rights that triggers the exemptions in Schedule 2. Given this, it is simply not the case that the Home Office, or any other data controller, can invoke the immigration exemption or, for that matter, any other exemption as a default response to subject access requests by a group of persons. Instead, an individual decision must be taken as to whether to apply the exemption in circumstances where a data subject’s rights are engaged.
Moreover, before a right can be restricted, the controller must be satisfied that there would be a likelihood of prejudice to the maintenance of effective immigration control or the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control. Only if that test is satisfied will the controller be able to apply the restriction on the data subject’s rights. I should also stress that this restriction should be seen as a pause button and not something to be applied in perpetuity to the data subject. If circumstances change so that the test is no longer satisfied in a given case, then the restriction will have to be lifted.
Having said that, I recognise the concerns that were expressed in Committee about the breadth of the exemption, and government Amendments 43 and 44, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, respond to those concerns. These amendments remove the right to rectification and the right to data portability from the list of data subjects’ rights that may be restricted. On further examination of the listed GDPR provisions in paragraph 1 of Schedule 2, we have concluded that the risk of any prejudicial impact on our ability to maintain effective immigration control that might arise from the exercise of the rights in articles 16 and 20 of the GDPR is likely to be low.
Having clarified both the purpose of this provision and the way it will operate, and having addressed the concerns about the extent of the exemption, I would ask the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw her amendment and support the government amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am obviously disappointed by both those speeches. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that immigration control should be effective and fair, which is precisely what I was driving at. He referred to balance; I quoted article 23(1), which requires necessity and proportionality.
I thank the Minister for her answers and for her response to Liberty. She talked about taking this “case by case”, but is that not how we deal with all our immigration control? We do not apply wholesale visa bans; we are not Trump’s poodle. Data requests are made on a case-by-case, individual basis, but you need to know what data is held in order to make the request.
The Minister referred to a “pause button”. I am afraid that does not, to me, have the air of reality or really offer any assurance in the real world.
Amendment 44 does not respond to our concerns. As I commented, you cannot exercise the right of rectification unless you know what is said about you. I feel we are hardly even talking the same language, although it gives me no pleasure to say that. I think I must seek to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, for taking the time to meet me and officials to explain in detail the concerns following the debate in Committee. The question about the interaction of the fundamental principles of trust law and the GDPR is a valid one that we understand, and which deserves a response.
In Committee, my noble friend the Minister conveyed that it is not our intention to compel trustees to disclose the kind of information described in the noble Lord’s amendment. The Government both understand and are sympathetic to the noble Lord’s concerns in this respect.
Article 15 of the GDPR confers a general right for a data subject to seek access to personal data held by a controller, but there are a number of exemptions, set out directly in both article 15 and in Schedule 2 to the Bill. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seeks to add an additional exemption to Schedule 2 to preserve the confidentiality of trustees’ decision-making and to minimise the risk of disagreement between beneficiaries and trustees, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, referred. The Government’s position remains that article 15(4) of the GDPR already prevents the disclosure of the material the noble Lord’s amendment is concerned with. This is because the Government consider that the,
“rights and freedoms of others”,
referred to in article 15(4) includes the rights of both trustees and other beneficiaries. Where disclosure under data protection law would reveal information about a trustee’s deliberations or reasons for their decisions that would otherwise be protected from disclosure under trust law, the Government’s view is that disclosure would adversely affect the rights and freedoms of trustees and beneficiaries in the trustees’ ability to make independent decisions in the best interests of the trust without fear of disagreement with beneficiaries.
While I appreciate the noble Lord’s concerns, rushing to codify what in trust law is generally referred to as the Londonderry principle would, we consider, be a disproportionate step. The wider potential risks and unintended consequences involved mean that pre-emptive action in this area, far from clarifying the position, might actually confuse it. Should the law be tested after Royal Assent and found wanting—which, I stress, the Government do not expect to happen—the delegated power in Clause 15(1) allows the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to correct this. By that point it will be much clearer what deficiency, if any, has in fact been identified in the law and we would expect a Government to consider those powers in such circumstances. I hope that is a full and adequate response to the three points the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. In those circumstances, I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Pannick
I am very grateful to the Minister. He has responded positively to each of the points that I made. I know that the House is anxious to move on to reaffirming freedom of speech. Therefore, I will say no more other than to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
Lord Keen of Elie
“(2) Sub-paragraph (2A) applies to the processing of personal data carried out for the special purposes if—(a) the processing is being carried out with a view to the publication by a person of journalistic, academic, artistic or literary material, and(b) the controller reasonably believes that the publication of the material would be in the public interest.(2A) The listed GDPR provisions do not apply to the extent that the controller reasonably believes that the application of those provisions would be incompatible with the special purposes.”
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, exactly a month ago, we had an interesting debate concerning a range of amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Black. It was a surprisingly consensual debate, and I am rather hoping for more of the same this evening. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, agreed that there were serious issues raised that needed to be addressed. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, agreed that the Bill needed amending to ensure that it did not undermine the work of investigative journalists. The Government have listened, as we have on so many issues raised by noble Lords, and we have tabled appropriate amendments.
Government Amendment 50 deals with the issue raised by my noble friend that the Bill applies the exemptions only where processing is for the special purposes. We heard the persuasive example of the media being penalised if, for example, the police sought the pre-broadcast disclosure of journalistic material in relation to an undercover investigation because they wanted to see whether the alleged wrongdoing uncovered by the broadcaster’s investigation merited further police investigation. We agree that it is unfair and our amendment puts this right.
Government Amendment 57 concerns the list of journalistic codes of practice that appears in paragraph 24 of Schedule 2, which is also the focus of a number of amendments tabled by noble Lords, from whom I am sure we will hear in due course. In Committee, the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Stevenson and Lord Skidelsky, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, all highlighted that the editors’ code is incorrectly described in the Bill as the IPSO editors’ code. Having looked at this further, we concede the point and the Government’s amendment removes the reference to IPSO. The legal effect of this is nil but we should use the correct label. We are grateful to noble Lords for bringing this fault to our attention.
Government Amendment 61 is a further concession to deal with further concerns raised by noble Lords. Article 36 of the GDPR would have required investigative journalists to consult with the ICO before instigating covert filming, such as when investigating allegations of abuse against vulnerable residents at a care home. Article 44 of the GDPR might disproportionately impact on collaborative investigative journalism, including the sharing of data across borders where appropriate, such as with, for example, the Panama papers. The government amendment allows journalists to be exempted from these restrictions where the public interest test is otherwise met.
Government Amendments 150, 156 and 161, as well as a number of consequential amendments, create journalistic defences to the offences in Clauses 161 and 162 in respect of unlawfully obtaining personal data or unlawfully reidentifying de-identified data. We accept the arguments of my noble friend Lord Black that what processing is permitted for the special purposes under Schedule 2 should not be criminalised later in the Bill. These amendments remove any doubt on this matter. We wish to ensure that we do not criminalise journalistic or whistleblowing activities that are believed to be in the public interest.
Government Amendment 162 removes paragraph (c) from Clause 164(3). This measure allowed the Information Commissioner to determine prepublication whether processing could be done without reliance on the special purpose provisions. Many noble Lords felt this was a power to allow the commissioner to overreach and interfere in journalistic decisions. I am grateful for the advice of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, together with that of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, who took the time to come and see me about this provision and further explain its dangers. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, set out similarly powerful arguments in Committee. Following further discussions with stakeholders and the commissioner, the Government have concluded that giving the commissioner power to take such enforcement action in relation to data being processed for the special purposes before the journalist or author publishes their work goes beyond what we consider is the appropriate role of the commissioner as the regulator and enforcer of the data protection legislation. With Amendment 162, the circumstances in which enforcement action would be available to the commissioner in relation to the special purposes would be limited to that of the existing position under the 1998 Act.
I will respond in full on the other amendments in this group once noble Lords have explained their intent. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
My Lords, I have to inform the House that if Amendments 50 or 50A are agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 51 or 52 by reason of pre-emption.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I follow what the noble Lord, Lord Low, said, which is of considerable importance. In doing so, I address Amendment 55, which has not yet been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I have both an observation and suggestion to make and I would be very grateful if he could let me have his views on them.
I suggest to your Lordships that Amendment 55, as it stands, goes too far, in that it gives great power to the commissioner, who is in no way subject to parliamentary control. Given the nature of the powers to determine appropriate guidance and practice, that is undesirable, on the face of it. That said, I have considerable sympathy for the proposition that the commissioner should be involved in the formulation of policy and in identifying amendments to the list. One way to address that is as follows: under subsection (6) of the clause we are dealing with, the Secretary of State has a power to make regulations that amend the list, which is itself subject to affirmative procedure. If we were minded to do so, we could make it explicit that the power exercised by the Secretary of State under subsection (6) should be used after representations made to him or her by the commissioner, and furthermore that, in any event and at all times, the power to amend the regulation should be used after consultation with the commissioner. If we went down this road, it would enable the commissioner to play a proactive role in shaping a very important list; in any event, it would involve the commissioner in the policy-making process.
Lord Keen of Elie
It may have gone unnoticed in Committee, because we considered no fewer than 432 amendments, but I say this in the context of Amendment 55—to be spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson—and in the light of observations made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham: the then Amendment 181 amended Clause 169 to ensure that when regulations are made to amend the list of codes of practice, the Secretary of State must consult the Information Commissioner.
Viscount Hailsham
That is extremely helpful and I am grateful to hear it, but I do not think that it says that the commissioner can be proactive in the regulation. The point made by my noble and learned friend is that the Secretary of State must involve the commissioner in discussions but it does not make it explicit that the commissioner can be proactive by making suggestions to the amendment of the list. My suggestions are twofold and I would be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would share his thoughts on the matter.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, I had better deal with Amendment 55, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy. I am loath to do so at any length, so I simply say that it will be answered by the Minister when he responds. He has partially given me the answer and it would be wrong for me to anticipate the rest of it. I reassure him that I do not intend to press that amendment.
This debate is not about free speech; it is the latest exchange in a long-running debate on how in a democratic society we enshrine the press’s freedom to publish as it sees fit, root out the culture of abuse, illegality and criminality which has for too long involved all the newspapers at some point or other, and make sure that victims can get effective redress when such abuse happens. We should not lose sight of those cardinal aims.
If the House believes that everything in the garden is rosy, as the previous speaker tried to persuade us, we can of course do nothing and simply allow the Data Protection Bill to go forward as amended. I agree that the Minister has moved a long way and agree with the noble Lord, Lord Black, that we could now rely on the processes and procedures that have worked so well since 1998—for nearly 20 years. They could be allowed to continue, because they are tried and trusted and seem to do most of what we require.
But it is not like that. One could not listen to my noble friend Lord Prescott and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for any length of time without feeling that there is still a canker. Something needs to be cut out of what we currently do and we are failing as a House if we do not do what we must to get this right. We have a lot of problems. We had a cross-party agreement; that has gone. We have let down the victims grievously time and again. We are unable to discuss this without accusations of a ridiculous nature being thrown at us about our intentions and processes. We need to do this properly; we need to do it coolly and with some consideration. We need evidence of the changes that are affecting the press. Is it true that the traditional press as we know it is going down the tube? Is it true that fake news, other news sources and the other things that our children are reading and reporting to us will destroy our understanding in a democratic society of what it is to be informed about the way things are done? Will we lose the extremely good points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Cavendish, who said that she was an investigative journalist and proud of her record, which is exemplary? We want that to continue, but we do not want people such as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to suffer as a result of it. We have to be mature about this; we have to get it right.
I have an amendment, Amendment 165, to be taken on Wednesday 10 January—buy your tickets now—which will rehash a lot of our discussion today. It is focused on running a proper inquiry into what needs to happen now to deal maturely with the issues which the press does not wish to be regulated. It tries to find a way forward, to investigate the illegality of the past and learn lessons from it. Above all, it seeks to get a handle on this whole issue and come forward with a proper set of recommendations that we can implement. I hope that the House will look at that carefully when we come to it. In the interim, my advice to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, whom I admire for the fantastic work she is doing and I want to be with her on it, is to withdraw her amendment now and live to fight another day on 10 January.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has reminded us a number of times in this House of the need for suitable press regulation, and she has some interesting arguments. I am grateful for the time she took earlier this week to meet me and explain her perspective and concerns. However, the position remains that the Government cannot accept her Amendment 50A. The Government support objective, high-quality journalism and a free press. We are committed to ensuring there is a sustainable, effective business model for high-quality media. Of course, we also need a fair system and this Bill is designed to strike a fair balance between individual privacy rights and the right to freedom of expression. The noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, have just alluded to the requirement in law for us to maintain that balance. I do not seek to repeat that, but I gladly adopt the observations they made about the need for balance in the context of convention rights with regard to privacy and freedom of expression.
Lord Elton (Con)
The noble Lord, Lord Low, in an intervention on the noble Lord, Lord McNally, referred to a provision, the name of which I do not recall. They both agreed that that, if implemented by the Government, would resolve the problem. Can the Minister say what the position is on that?
Lord Keen of Elie
It would not necessarily resolve any problem. As noble Lords may be aware, we have consulted on the question of Section 40 and the second part of the Leveson inquiry and there will in due course be a report upon that consultation. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has assisted my lip-reading by saying “soon”. He may be aware that a letter was recently sent by the Secretary of State to the Committee with regard to the timing of that report. If not, I can bring that news to him. Sir Brian Leveson himself has indicated that he would like the opportunity to consider the responses to the consultation and that will take a little time—of course, that has to be accommodated.
Lord Puttnam (Lab)
Will the Minister do the House an enormous favour and make it clear that this not a debate between people who favour press freedom and people who are opposed to press freedom? There is nobody in your Lordships’ House who is opposed to press freedom. It is very important for all our sakes that this is made absolutely clear.
Lord Keen of Elie
I hope that I indicated that in my earlier comments but I make it clear that we are all concerned with maintaining the very delicate balance between the right to privacy and press freedom.