Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

I thank everyone for the extraordinary debate that we have had on this issue today. I continue in the vein of looking for optimism in the outcomes of some of the discussions that we have had. I pay particular tribute to Members of this House who have joined Members of the other place in relentlessly pursuing this issue, to the extent that there is now a far greater understanding—not only in Parliament but in the wider country and the communities particularly affected—about the issue of SLAPPs, which perhaps a year or two ago was not understood at all.

To start by going back to the very basics, SLAPPs are, as we know, strategic lawsuits against public participation, abuses of the legal system, generally by the super-rich—and, it is important to remember, they are intended to harass, intimidate and financially and psychologically exhaust one’s opponent. I am not sure that that element has quite come through, although everyone is fully aware of it. We have talked today about this practice being embedded in the system and its close relationship to the scourge of economic crime. In other debates that we have had on the Bill so far, we have highlighted the real extent of economic crime facing this country. All of us have an obligation and commitment to come together to work out how we are going to deal with it.

As we have heard, the use of SLAPPs has been linked to Russian oligarchs. That is inevitable, given what has happened over the past year, particularly with regard to looking at ways to prevent journalists from reporting on their links to economic crime, with particular reference to the war in Ukraine. As we have seen, SLAPPs are not only used by those committing economic crime, but the amendments proposed here narrow the definition to those concerned with suppressing information on economic crime. The wider point which we need to take on board is about the serious concerns that SLAPPs are now being used to suppress democracy globally. It is important to put it as far as this.

I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has had to go, but I would like to say to him that his attempt to reassure us on the numbers has not had that effect at all. It has been clearly stated that the small numbers that reach court highlight and emphasise the problem that we have.

I shall go on to ask the Minister to comment on the view coming from the other place that SLAPPs are under a separate jurisdiction and therefore should be under a separate Bill. We have heard some great arguments as to why we should look at these amendments seriously and incorporate them into this Bill.

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments and clearly given us a full understanding of the purpose behind them and how they will contribute to the overall objective. From our position on these Benches, we look forward to engaging in full and detailed conversations as to how, as I suspect will be necessary, we present further amendments on Report. We support the principle of the Government bringing forward effective legislation and will continue to call out this issue wherever it occurs, whether on this estate or elsewhere, when anyone in a position of influence puts undue pressure on someone to make sure that important matters do not see the light of day.

I want to highlight some of the reasons why feelings are running so high. We need to understand and remember the severe power imbalance between the claimant and the defendant. In this context, journalists and media outlets are put at a disadvantage from the outset, as we have heard today. Defending a legal case can, as we know, be prohibitively expensive and a huge drain on resource. As we need to emphasise every time we speak about this, SLAPPs can create significant financial jeopardy for journalists and media outlets, with legal costs starting to accrue long before cases get anywhere near reaching court.

Putting ourselves in the place of those who have been subjected to this, I think that the process of defending a legal case in this sphere can feel like punishment: a fear of devastating financial impact, potential loss of savings, their homes, pensions and livelihoods if a case goes to court. The effort in putting a case together involves massive distraction from the work that people are trying to do. As others have said—it is a serious charge but one we should take seriously—this is having the impact of undermining the basis of democracy.

We have talked about how libel laws in the UK are weighted, but we also need to emphasise the issue of libel tourism. It remains an issue in the UK. The bar to bring a case here is problematically low, and the use of privacy and data protection laws is increasing. We need to consider that SLAPPs in the UK are often pursued against individuals rather than the organisation they work for, which undermines the resources available to mount an adequate defence.

One of the themes running through all our discussions on the Bill is the reputational damage to London and, therefore, the country. London’s obvious position as a global hub for the super-rich has compounded the problem. We must make sure that clients cannot use threats of legal action to clean up their image and remove unfavourable information from the public domain. There has been insufficient recognition by the UK Government and official bodies of the connection between protecting media freedom and countering corruption.

Returning to the personal, I suggest that other factors include the psychological impact of intimidation and harassment on those subject to legal challenges. That has not been sufficiently recognised, and such things lead to a massive impact on mental health.

Will the amendments before us today tackle those issues? I think that is a subject for further discussion, but the main question that has been put repeatedly from across the Committee today is whether the Government are serious about measures to end these practices. We had some optimism in July last year when there seemed to be a commitment that legislative reform measures would come forward, but where are they? Are they being moved forward? Will the Government follow through by supporting the measures proposed in amendments to the Bill?

We have heard that this is a serious issue. It is urgent for so many reasons that we have discussed today. My last question for the Minister is: will the Government take this opportunity to act, recognising how urgent the situation is, and meet with us to discuss ways that we can move this important matter forward?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I warmly thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and who have spoken to me directly on this issue. I also thank noble Lords for the enormous amount of thought and consideration that has been put into this issue by those who have spoken. There is significant strength of feeling across the Committee on this important issue. I begin by providing an assurance that the Government share those concerns and that it is clear to the Government that we should take legislative action against SLAPPs. As the Government have set out, for many reasons that have been mentioned in this debate, we are firmly committed to legislating effectively, comprehensively and without undue delay on this issue.

Noble Lords will not necessarily be entirely happy when I say that we do not think this Bill is the correct vehicle for tackling this issue. There are essentially two reasons for that. One is that here we are dealing with economic crime. I take my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s technical point about the scope of the Bill, but the major issue here is that, even if we were to put in an amendment to this Bill, it would still be too narrow because we are not covering matters that are not economic crime, such as freedom of expression, political interference, national security and so forth. The Government’s preference would be to handle the entire landscape of SLAPPs in one place, and that is not this Bill.

[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

The Minister talks about introducing some SLAPPs legislation “without undue delay”, but there is no possibility of a timetable to introduce that. We are only 15 or so months away from a general election, and the legislative timetable is jammed solid already. There is no fixed slot for it to come in. I utterly reject the idea that the Government want the perfect to be the enemy of the good: “We are going to do everything in one Bill”. Why not do this bit now, which will take very little parliamentary time? As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, it will deal with probably 80% of the problem, because we know that shutting down debate on economic crime is probably our biggest problem. When in 10 or 15 years’ time—this point was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—the Government finally find the perfect moment, although some of us will be dead by then, they could then repeal the relevant clauses of this Bill and do it all in one bit. But I utterly reject the pathetic excuse that this is not the right moment. I ask my noble and learned friend to be a little more straightforward in his commitment.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I entirely understand the frustrations felt by my noble friend Lord Agnew and others. It is not to be ruled out that we could find an appropriate legislative vehicle for this matter before the next general election. That is not to be ruled out. However, I cannot today go further than to say that this issue will be brought forward by the Government when parliamentary time allows. That is normally a long-grass phrase—kicking it into the long grass. I regard it today, and say it today, as a short-grass phrase because I am not at the moment giving up on having legislation relatively soon, but I can give absolutely no commitment on that matter.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I ask the noble and learned Lord, as a little test of this commitment, is there is a draft Bill? If there is one, his assurance is really wonderful but, without one, is it not just a phrase for the long grass?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I can tell your Lordships that the Government have not been idle in preparing possible drafts to deal with this matter, and I am very happy to keep in close contact with noble Lords between now and Report on progress and to discuss as widely as we need to how we should approach this matter.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

What the Minister is saying is potentially helpful. His initial statement was almost verbatim what we got at Second Reading and in previous Bills. I could almost set it to music now, I have heard it so many times, but we seem to be getting somewhere. Will he clarify whether he is happy to continue discussions with us about these Bills, which, apparently, the non-idle Government have been working on or about a possible amendment to this Bill? Will he clarify which one we are addressing here?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is the former. The second point here is that the Government are not happy, for reasons that I shall now, I hope, go into a little detail about, about the actual amendments being proposed here. I preface that by saying that we should not overlook the fact that there is one enormous conceptual issue behind all this, which is the question of access to justice. This is probably the first time that anyone has ever legislated against someone bringing something to court, which is something that we need to stop and think about. Where is the balance? If I may say so, reference has been made to the rule of law, and it is somewhat ironic to say that we must uphold the rule of law by penalising someone who seeks access to justice. That is a very difficult area, and we need to find a balance. The Government would like to explore further how that balance is to be found because, in the Government’s respectful view, it is not yet found in the amendments before the Committee today.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

I think that we are actually in agreement on that, and I hope that I made it clear earlier that what we need to do is to work together to get this right with critical friends, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who will bring a forensic examination of whether the work is right, but I go back to an earlier comment that this is difficult. Yes it is, but it is not impossible.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I entirely accept that it is not impossible and, to take the phrase of a noble Lord earlier, that it is actually doable. I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, who used that phrase.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I was hoping that someone with a great deal more legal knowledge than me would rise to speak, but I feel that I need to challenge the Minister’s comment that this proposal is unprecedented. Other noble Lords will be able to say more, but we have a process of law about vexatious litigants who are unable to bring cases. There is a whole set of rules there, and there are rules in the family courts that eventually stop cases being brought. So it is not the case that this is something that has been miraculously conjured out of the air that does not exist in any form whatever in the legal framework.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, on that last point I had primarily in mind the amendments that seek to criminalise bringing cases before the courts, which is the subject of some of the amendments.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I am sorry. I appreciate the access that the Minister is giving us. I am really following up the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made. The Government are not being inactive. Can the Minister tell us how many people are in the dedicated team that is currently pursuing this issue? It is complicated, as he pointed out, and Government do want to get more depth on this, so how many people are now working on this, and when does he think they might actually come up with something that could then go into a draft Bill? In a sense, what is the timetable and what is the amount of horsepower that is going into that timetable?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot give the noble Lord a timetable. I cannot tell him how many people are working on it, but I can tell him that important work is being done. I am not in a position, and I very much regret that, to go further than that today, but I am prepared to keep in close touch with your Lordships between now and Report to share progress and thoughts on whether there is a legislative vehicle that can conveniently—and soon—be introduced.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

I am sorry. I will press the Minister a little more on that. When will we first hear from him on that update on progress?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Can I write to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, on that point?

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

I eagerly anticipate it.

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

Can I ask that we are all included in the correspondence?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Absolutely. I will write to everybody after this debate and try to elaborate a little on what I have said. I hope noble Lords understand that in terms of my boss, I recently had a change of personnel, and it takes a little while to allow the dust to settle, if I may put it like that.

The only other thing I would respectfully draw noble Lords’ attention to, and I fully accept there is a certain amount of controversy as to how big this problem is, is that the Solicitors Regulation Authority issued a warning notice on 28 November 2022, which led to that authority undertaking investigations in relation to SLAPP complaints, so we are not without a regulatory instrument to at least hold the line until we are able to legislate. That, as far as one can tell, has had a salutary effect on the practical consequences of SLAPPs. It is not the case that nothing has been done.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister said that the amendment which I have put forward criminalises access to justice. It does not do that; it criminalises a threat of litigation that is unwarranted and known to be unwarranted without reasonable excuse. It is perfectly simple, but I would be very unhappy to leave this Room today with the thought that the Minister has in mind that my amendment is criminalising access to justice.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I expressed myself a little loosely. Let me put it like this: in the Government’s view, this is not an area where we should introduce the criminal law, whether it is in relation to pre-litigation or in any other respect in terms of litigation. One is faced with a very basic question of when is something that is a robust and justifiable approach to litigation in a pre-action letter a threat. That is not straightforward, in the Government’s view. The Government’s view is that this is not a matter where the criminal law should intrude.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt my noble and learned friend, but his reference to the Solicitors Regulation Authority prompts me to ask him a couple of questions. He makes reference to access to justice and to the Government being nervous about legislating in a way that would call that into question. As I said at the start, the amendments that I have tabled, Amendments 87, 88 and 89, are directed at the Solicitors Regulation Authority. As my noble and learned friend has already said, it issued a notice recently to reinforce the fact that this kind of activity is unacceptable.

My amendments seek to codify that yet further and give it the power, which it does not feel it has sufficiently clearly in law, to act when a solicitor is conducting themselves in a way that could be supporting somebody trying to prevent proper inquiry into what could be economic crime. I am struggling because I understand the argument my noble and learned friend is making about parliamentary time and the Government wanting to legislate for this in the round, but I also know as a former business manager that it is very difficult for any individual government department to be confident, even if it wants and hopes to be able to legislate in the way he is indicating that he and his department do, because the timetable is not in its control.

There is frustration in this context because we know that this is about only economic crime and that we are proposing amendments that would tackle only economic crime, as the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, has said several times—maybe this is a bigger issue than even the SRA is telling me. This would make a difference none the less. In my humble view—I am not a lawyer—I do not think we are proposing anything that would limit people’s access to justice. When my noble and learned friend goes back to his department, even if he cannot make any kind of commitment at the Dispatch Box today, which I understand, could he at least have a conversation with others that is a bit more open-minded than his colleagues seem to have been on this matter up to this point?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that intervention. I can certainly have that conversation. I do not want to give the impression that the Government are close-minded. We are very prepared to legislate and have said that we are willing; the question is finding the right vehicle. I will deal with my noble friend’s amendments in a moment. When I said a moment ago that there are issues around access to justice, I meant no more than that. We have to be very careful in talking about approaching a court and whether that is in some way unprofessional, subject to sanctions or otherwise criticisable.

As far as the Government can see—if I may think aloud—there are probably two essential mechanisms to deal with this, one of which is in part reflected in some of these amendments, although the Government would not entirely agree with how it is put. One is an early disposal mechanism and the other, critically, is a cost protection measure so that people are not exposed to costs. As has been said many times, the risk of having to pay the costs is the real imbalance. Those are two general thoughts that, I hope, illustrate that the Government are not closing their mind to this. We are thinking about it and hope to come forward with a comprehensive, balanced solution, but today I cannot say exactly when.

With that background, I will deal with the specific amendments, which the Government are sympathetic to but cannot accept. On Amendment 80 from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, as I have already said, new criminal offences should be created with care. That is especially true when targeting professionals with responsibility for assisting persons to achieve access to justice. There is a risk of inadvertently undermining access to justice in that way and the Government’s view, as I have said, is that a criminal approach in this area is not correct and would in any case create quite a lot of difficulties around proof beyond reasonable doubt, the concept of reasonable excuse, et cetera. Criminal offences need to be clear and we are very reluctant to see a new criminal offence created. That is our position on Amendment 80—it is too far-reaching. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, in due course to withdraw it.

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[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

Briefly, I urge my noble friend to look at the correspondence I have had with the SRA specifically about the Bill. The SRA makes it clear that what I am proposing by way of these amendments would give greater clarity to the fact that SLAPP cases which relate to economic crime would also not be subject to the current cap but would benefit from that cap being lifted, which the Government are seeking to do. To put it another way, my amendments are trying to make sure that the intention of what is already in the Bill is achieved in the way that the SRA is asking for.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Indeed. I respectfully suggest to my noble friend that she may have copied the letter to which she refers to the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice recently.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

It was also copied to the Minister’s office.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Indeed. I suggest that I meet with my noble friend and we go through it with a fine-toothed comb. I am happy to meet with anybody else who wants to go through particular amendments with a fine-toothed comb and see where we are, because there is no point in arguing about things where we are ad idem.

The same point arises on Amendment 89, which relates to POCA—I pronounce it “poker”, but others pronounce it “pocker”—and Section 327 of that Act. Amendment 89 aims to stop corrupt claimants using their criminal property to pay their legal fees. Our view on Section 327 of POCA is that that is already effectively covered because it makes it a criminal offence for anyone to convert, conceal or transfer criminal property, so the payment for legal services using criminal property is already a crime. I am led to believe that the Solicitors Regulation Authority will shortly publish new guidance on the application of POCA in relation to solicitors’ responsibilities in that respect. So our position on our amendment is that it is already covered, but again, let us discuss this in detail so that we can get it right. Formally speaking, for those reasons I ask my noble friend in due course not to press her amendment today.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his Amendments 105 and 106, and for the care and attention that he has devoted to this. Again, the Government’s position is that these amendments do not quite cut the mustard, if I may put it that way.

As drafted, Amendment 105, which seeks to create a new defence, would cut across several other areas of jurisprudence. There is a common law public interest defence for a breach of confidence, and a very careful balancing, in Section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, as to when you can have a public interest defence in defamation cases. This kind of provision should not be rushed through without a careful examination of its side effects on other legislation and potential unintended consequences. Neither does the amendment quite attack what the Government would suggest is the main problem, which is not whether you have a defence but whether you have the money to fight it in the first place. You need some cost protection to be built into the SLAPPs framework.

The same point applies to Amendment 106 on the power to strike out. There are already powers to strike out, and the noble Lord makes it clear that we need to clarify those powers—but one cannot get away from the fact that, typically speaking, a strike-out application is very expensive and complicated, because you are trying to throttle a case at the beginning and the court is having to go through a great deal of work to get there. In the end, a strike-out will probably not be effective in achieving what the noble Lord seeks to achieve. We share the objective, but we are not sure that this is the right way to do it.

While we are sympathetic to the sentiment behind the amendments, from a technical point of view, the Government do not think that they are quite right. Unscrupulous claimants could exploit all this by ensuring that the process remains very complicated, long and burdensome. That is the Government’s position on these amendments. I repeat that I am very happy to engage so far as I can in a dialogue with noble Lords to see whether we can make further progress on the technicalities of this issue and look for a proper legislative vehicle in which to carry it forward.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

I do not believe the Minister addressed the point that I and a number of other noble Lords raised about the international dimension of this, and the UK’s position in the international framework. Noble Lords may have seen that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, was joined in this Committee by some guests, one of whom was Sebastien Lai, the son of Jimmy Lai, who was a victim of what has been labelled lawfare by the Chinese state in Hong Kong. We are also seeing British institutions being used as a weapon for that lawfare. Does the Minister acknowledge that there is a true international reputational issue and that the whole rule of law across the world is under attack?

Reflecting on what the Minister said, I think we heard something of a hint about the Government’s thinking that cost protection could be one way of addressing this issue. That fails to address the point made by the Labour Front Bench and others that, even if there is cost protection, an enormous amount of time, energy and stress goes into a case. Even if you are able to take away the financial threat, you are taken away from doing other journalism if you have to spend months engaging in a case.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness. I am perfectly prepared to accept that there is an international aspect. The Solicitors Regulation Authority is on the case, it has issued its warning notice—fired its warning shot—and that is having an effect, so it is not as if the position is not being tackled. The question is about legislation, and the need to get it right from a rule of law and an access to justice point of view. There is a conflict here, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, pointed out. One has some misgivings about this because, as was also said earlier, journalists are not always right, and one must bear that in mind. If you have ever been on the receiving end of the tabloid press as a defendant, you will know that they still have not inconsiderable power if you have no money to defend yourself.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

If I may say so, one of the formative experiences of my childhood was being on the receiving end of tabloid journalism, and it is something I will never forget. That does not alter my commitment to getting this right.

I am encouraged by the Minister saying that my amendments do not quite cut the mustard—“do not quite” is a pretty good score in my book. I agree with him that early access will be a key feature of the right answer here, and cost protection, depending on what form it takes, is potentially helpful. He constantly prays in aid access to justice is a big issue, and I agree that the definitional issue of a SLAPP is very important. However, in the conversations he has promised to have, I would want him to make a distinction between harassment and denying the right to justice. Denying the right to justice, the ability to go to court if you wish, is not what I am about—I am about where people have no intention of going to court if they can possibly avoid it but are simply harassing people who want to bring economic crimes into the light. The Minister has given us a hint that there is a government Bill in draft here. I am taking that in good faith; I hope that faith will be well placed and that we will see it soon.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Again, I thank the noble Lord for his remarks. The key problem is to distinguish access to justice from harassment. It is quite difficult, but it can be done. That is my answer to that question. On where the Government are, as I said before, we are working on drafts, but I cannot go any further than that until I know whether there is a legislative vehicle and which it can be. I am sorry not to be able to commit the Government at the Dispatch Box today any further than that but, as I said, I am hoping—and I can only express as a hope—that this is a short-grass and not a long-grass issue.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee, I perhaps should have declared my position as co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong in my last intervention.

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This has been a very interesting debate. The essential point of my amendment is that I want to stop it before proceedings commence, and you can do that with criminal law and sanctions only by saying that someone who threatens litigation knows what he is doing and intends to stifle proper journalistic investigation, and he has no reasonable excuse for it. To my mind, that is within criminality. For the Minister to say, “We can’t have another criminal offence, we have too many”, is just a joke. This Bill is littered with new criminal offences —every day we debate new criminal offences in the Chamber. It is a joke to say that my simple amendment cannot be accepted because it creates a new criminal offence, as it is designed to—not to put people in prison but to stop them doing what they are doing today. It is intended to change the atmosphere and culture and prevent the use and internationally known abuse of SLAPPs in this country from going any further.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Just to clarify, as I said, the Government’s position is that it is not appropriate to introduce a criminal offence in relation to access to justice. It is not a question of just having another offence. Access to justice is a very important area, and we are on a slippery and possibly Orwellian slope if we start saying that it is criminal for someone to go to the law on some point. It is a very difficult area—that was all I said.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

So, according to the Minister, it is not criminal for a person to threaten litigation, with all the expense and worry that that involves and the way that it crimps the investigation of crime. He is saying that it is not unlawful and should not be criminal. There are criminal offences that cover conduct far less morally bankrupt than that, which is what I hope we shall discuss with the Minister before Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

I do not have an enormous amount to add but I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his comments and for the full explanation of the amendments before us in this group.

I will add a concern about the removal of the schedule naming the offences. Perhaps we will need to have a better understanding of why that would be an advantage, but I remain to be convinced on that point. On Amendment 90, I do not have much to add to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which lead to a need for greater clarification before we can move on from this.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Once again, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I will first take Amendments 81 to 84, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

Whereas our lengthy debate earlier in the day was directed at expanding the Bill, this is directed at narrowing it. It may not be a total surprise if I say that the Government are not very happy about proposals to narrow the scope of the Bill. As was said, these amendments arise, apparently, with the support of the Law Society and the Bar Council. The Government met the Law Society and the Bar Council on a number of occasions and the question of the definition of economic crime was gone into in some detail, and one is a little surprised to see that this matter is being persisted in.

The list of the offences in Schedule 9 is very close to the list of offences in the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which applies to deferred prosecutions in various cases, which are often relevant in financial matters, and, although not exactly the same, they are based on that definition.

The other introductory comment that I would, if I may, make is that, while the overwhelming bulk of the legal profession upholds the highest standards, much of this Bill would have been unnecessary were that true of all legal professionals. It is against that background that the Government are reluctant to run the risk of introducing loopholes into the Bill by reducing the scope of Schedule 9.

The first point to note is that the definition of economic crime in Clause 180 and Schedule 9 applies right across the Bill and includes the information-sharing measures in Clauses 175 and 176. Those measures, for example, entitle bank A, when it receives from bank B a large sum of money, to ask bank B whether it is a proper transaction, so there is information-sharing between financial institutions. Clause 176 enables a financial institution to notify a platform, for example, that it has concerns about particular transactions or clients. These are pretty essential powers in the Bill, and the definition of economic crime applies to those powers as well. In the Government’s view, it would not be desirable to have two definitions of economic crime across the Bill as a whole.

The definition applies to other legal services measures in Part 5 of the Bill, which amend the Solicitors Regulation Authority fining limit and information provisions. So for consistency and ease of understanding, the Government’s position is that it is sensible to have a single definition of economic crime through the Bill, and not reduce that definition at this stage. Just to make an illustration, there was some suggestion that introducing the word “theft” would go a bit too far. It may in a certain situation be quite difficult to say whether something was fraud or theft—it might well be both—but it is not the sort of argument that the Government feel that one should get into. Having worked with the Law Society of England and Wales and the Bar Council on these matters, the Government have clarified in the Explanatory Notes which offences are likely to be most relevant to the financial sector. They have not excluded them, but they have indicated that fraud, money laundering, terrorist financing, bribery, and any offences under regulations made in relation to money laundering are likely to be the ones that the profession should concern itself with most in practice. But it is important that regulators should not be unduly constrained in the ambit of the definition of economic crime in this Bill.

I can reassure noble Lords that all the existing safeguards that apply to regulators under public law principles, including what is proportionate and fair, continue to apply. Section 3 of the Legal Services Act provides that the Legal Services Board must have regard to the principles of transparency, accountability, proportionate action and consistency and target only those cases where action is required. The new objective in relation to economic crime fits within that framework. One is to an extent tilting at windmills here to try to reduce the scope of this major piece of legislation designed to tackle the very serious problems that noble Lords have now debated at length. On that basis, I shall ask the noble Lord in due course to withdraw his Amendment 81 and not press his other amendments.

I turn to Amendment 90, which affects the regulatory objective. The essential aspect of the amendment is that the objective is too wide and that we should spell out that it is all subject to legal professional privilege. Those are the essential points that were made.

I will take the point about legal professional privilege first. The Government entirely accept and agree with the noble and learned Lord that legal professional privilege is a fundamental principle of English law. It protects the confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and client in terms of legal advice, and ensures complete fairness in legal proceedings in terms of litigation privilege, for example. However, the Government are not able to accept the amendment for the following reasons.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the House and to all noble Lords who have spoken in today’s debate and in earlier debates. If I may say so, I think we have collectively changed our minds, or developed our thoughts, in various respects as a result of a collective effort, for which the Government are grateful. I am particularly grateful to those noble Lords who have engaged outside the Chamber: the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Cromwell, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and others, have all contributed most constructively to the debate. There is clearly a great deal of strength of feeling on the issue of SLAPPs. It is therefore with some optimism that I hope the amendments I am about to move formally will be accepted: Amendments 102, 103, 137, 141, 142 and 143.

I will first make a general remark. In civil litigation generally, parties are not necessarily evenly matched. One may have more private resources than the other; one may be legally aided while the other is not. That is a fact of life, but one relies on the rules of procedure and the good sense of the judge to see fair play, bearing also in mind the inherent power of the court to strike out a claim for abuse of process. But when we come to SLAPPS—short for strategic litigation against public participation, a rather unwieldy phrase—two additional factors come into play. This is probably common ground in this House. In addition to the possible imbalance of power between the parties, the two additional factors are, first, the right to free speech, which is essentially what this legislation protects, and secondly the public interest in full and frank disclosure of wrongdoing.

Effectively, to use the courts or the threat of litigation as a means of preventing free speech and possibly covering up wrongdoing is a particular kind of abuse of process. It may well be that the power to control such behaviour already exists under the inherent direct jurisdiction of the courts—as I think my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier may have observed earlier—but the Government wish to put that issue beyond doubt and to put a stop to SLAPP-type tactics. We cannot allow the misuse of our legal system to suppress public interest investigations and reports. On the other hand, we have to safeguard access to justice in the measures that we take, so there is a balance to be struck here. The Government respectfully suggest that this Bill finds that balance.

I will first take the definition of SLAPPs. What is a SLAPP claim? It has a number of components. First, it will be one where the complainant has acted, or intended to act, to restrain the defendant’s exercise of their right to freedom of speech. The defendant will typically be a journalist. Secondly, the exercise of that right is a matter relating to economic crime—this is necessarily limited at the moment to economic crime because of the scope of the Bill—and for a purpose related to the pursuit of the public interest in combating such economic crime. Lastly, the claimant will have misused the litigation to cause harm to the defendant, in the circumstances defined in the clause.

For such SLAPP claims there will be several protections. First, there is the early dismissal test. The claimant will have to establish that they are more likely than not to succeed at trial. Normally, if you try to strike something out, it is you who has to establish that, but if it is a SLAPP claim, the burden is reversed and the claimant must establish that they are more likely than not to succeed at trial. That is an important change in the onus.

Secondly, there is the costs protection of the defendant, who will not have to pay the costs, even if there is eventually an adverse outcome at trial. On pre-litigation tactics, raised on a number of occasions by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and others—it is a very fair point—in the Government’s view the costs protection and the reversal of the burden of proof very largely draw the sting of those threats. The journalist can sit back and say, “Well, do your worst. I’m protected on costs and by the change of the onus”, so the teeth are drawn from the attempt to suppress the publication of wrongdoing.

In addition—I will come to this in a moment—there are the powers of the Solicitors Regulation Authority to pursue the solicitors through its disciplinary procedures. With those protections, there is a very substantial assault by this legislation on SLAPPs. The Government’s view is that the courts will have the necessary tools and guidance from Parliament to deal with SLAPP lawsuits aimed at stifling freedom of speech and preventing journalists exposing economic crime.

As to the points rightly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that we should have gone further and so forth, the Government’s view is that we can always improve the shining hour—of course we can—but here we have, to use the words of the noble Lord, a good chunk of what is necessary. The Government’s view is that, at the moment, these provisions go far enough. As far as Scotland is concerned, discussions are continuing with our Scottish counterparts—it is a separate legal jurisdiction—and the same is true in Northern Ireland, so those matters will be pursued in due course. But the Government ask the House to accept that the provisions of this Bill as framed cut the mustard, if I may use the expression.

Of course, SLAPPs are broader than just economic crime. In answer to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, and others, the Government will come forward with completing the jigsaw as soon as a suitable legislative vehicle appears. At the moment, we are engaged in what, in another context, is called horizon scanning, to see when we can find a legislative vehicle that will do the job. This is not something the Government are going to forget about, and nor would this House allow us to do so. As soon as we can do it, we will get on to it.

It is entirely true that we now need the Civil Procedure Rules to back this up. The Civil Procedure Rule Committee will no doubt proceed as fast as it can; it is well-versed in ensuring that there are appropriate rules to make sure that legislation can have its proper effect in the courts. I have no control over the timetable of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, but the message from this House is to get on with this as fast as we can. Indeed, if I may quickly refer to the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, of course we need, as he suggests, quick, cheap and flexible procedures. One would hope that those will be developed judicially by senior judges, and that this legislation will have the desired effect. The Government have every confidence in the ability of the courts to put into effect what is the clear will of Parliament.

I turn to Amendment 94, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. With regret, the Government, although sympathetic to the amendment’s objectives, do not feel that it would be right to criminalise access to justice in the way proposed. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, pointed out, we have got rid of criminal libel. We have a balance to strike here. It would be very strong to say that it is, or is potentially, a criminal offence to commence proceedings in the courts. The courts have to be open. In the Government’s view, the balance to be struck here is civil, not criminal. Creating a criminal offence with such a broad application to tackle what is, in essence, a civil matter would be inappropriate. We do not have the evidence to support such a development. It would be entirely inappropriate to create a criminal offence that would not be very clearly defined and would potentially prevent access to justice—apart from, of course, establishing the criminal instead of the civil standard, which we are essentially dealing with here.

The creation of a criminal offence would go far beyond the Government’s measures and, I think, would mark a departure from other jurisdictions, to which some reference has been made. I might be wrong, but I do not know of one that has made this kind of activity a criminal offence. In the light of those comments, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Amendments 125H and 125J were tabled by my noble friend Lady Stowell. I thank her again for her constructive engagement on the Bill. These amendments seek to allow the Solicitors Regulation Authority to set its own fining limit for cases of professional misconduct relating to abusive litigation brought forward to suppress reporting on economic crime.

Clause 195 removes the statutory limit on the level of financial penalty that the Law Society, which delegates the matter to the SRA, may impose, and a similar provision applies to the Scottish Solicitors’ Discipline Tribunal. The intention that my noble friend expresses is shared by the Bill, but the Government’s view is that the current drafting of these clauses, which already captures disciplinary matters relating to economic crime, covers the matters to which my noble friend referred. If the SRA can demonstrate that an abusive litigation case breached a rule specifically for economic crime or

“purposes relating to the prevention or detection of economic crime”,

that should permit it to use its new fining powers, so my noble friend’s amendments are, in the Government’s view, unnecessary.

I assure my noble friend that the Government’s intention is that this measure allows the SRA to impose fines above £25,000 against solicitors and law firms that fail to comply with the rule by taking part in or facilitating abusive litigation, whether or not such cases reach court or are struck out, provided that the SRA can establish a link between this type of misconduct and the prevention or detection of economic crime. This legislation is directed not just to cases that come to court but to pre-action threats and actions to deal with attempts to intimidate.

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[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I tabled all the amendments in this group. I am very grateful to those who have added their names to them: the noble Lords, Lord Verdirame, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I am also very grateful to the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for meeting me and senior representatives of the Law Society and of the Bar Council to discuss what is now Clause 197.

All these amendments relate to the new regulatory objective in Clause 197 that amends the Legal Services Act 2007 by inserting for the Legal Services Board a new objective:

“promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime”.

As I said in Committee, this proposed new regulatory objective is extraordinarily wide and imprecise. The meaning of the word “promoting” lacks any clarity or certainty. It raises legitimate concerns about a potential lack of proportionality and overregulation by regulators, and about a lack of evidential risk as to those sectors most likely to come into contact with economic crime—for example, advisers rather than advocates. And even in the area of advisers, it is hardly likely to involve experts in the environment or town planning.

As the MoJ’s impact assessment of the new regulatory objective makes clear, the front-line regulators of the legal profession are already implicitly under a duty to ensure that lawyers are not breaching economic crime rules. The provisions in Clause 197 are merely to make explicit what is already implicit, and it is important that the Legal Services Board and the front-line regulators understand that this is the case.

The definition of economic crime for the purposes of Clause 197 is provided in Clause 187(1) by mean of cross-reference to Schedule 10, which contains a long list of statutes. This provides no focus on what is really at issue and should be the concern of regulators. That is spelled out clearly in my Amendment 95—namely,

“the offences of fraud, false accounting, money laundering or offences under any binding sanctions regime, whether at common law or in primary or secondary legislation”.

This lack of focus could well promote overregulation and a lack of proportionality.

What is needed is a clear statement from the Minister, which I would very much welcome today, on the following. First, regulators must understand that this is not a new regulatory duty but one that states explicitly what is already implicit. Secondly, there should be a focus on the particular criminal activity which is relevant: fraud, false accounting, money laundering and offences under any binding sanctions regime. Thirdly, there is a need for evidence-based regulation according to evidence of risk in particular areas of work and practice, as I described, such as transactional work rather than contentious and court-based work, and areas of advisory work which might be relevant in which economic crime might well occur. Fourthly, there will also be a need for proportionality by regulators. Fifthly, the regulators must understand, as the Minister said before, that there is to be no interference with the principle of legal professional privilege. Finally, there is a need for consultation with the profession to ensure that the new objective successfully tackles economic crime in the proportionate and evidence-based way I have described.

I hope the Minister will be able to make those points clear to the profession to enable a proper regulatory framework to work. I beg to move.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his engagement on this topic throughout the Bill and for his remarks today. I briefly reiterate that the definition of economic crime is deliberately widely drawn. It applies not only to the regulatory objective but to several other clauses of the Bill, including the information-sharing measures between various financial institutions at Clauses 182 and 183. The Government do not believe that restricting that definition would be right.

It is true that there is a long list of offences in Schedule 10, including the reference to theft. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between fraud and theft, but I am happy to acknowledge that typical forms of theft, including low-level theft such as shoplifting or street crime or similar activities, are most unlikely to be relevant to anything in the Bill. Therefore, the Government do not feel able to change the definition of economic crime specifically for the legal sector, and the regulators must be able to respond to circumstances as they develop.

I shall address in a little more detail some of the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, this afternoon. I hope to cover all those points one way or another. First, in relation to legal professional privilege, the regulatory objective already requires adherence to professional principles under the Legal Services Act. In the Government’s view, there is no need for a specific reference to legal professional privilege, but I can make it absolutely clear that the Government do not consider that the Bill makes any difference to the principle of legal professional privilege. It is in no way an assault or attack on that fundamental principle of English law. The protection of legal professional privilege, as developed in the courts, will continue to apply in this area, as in many other areas. That is the Government’s position, and I hope that it is clear

As to how the regulatory objective and the provisions of the Bill will operate in practice, and in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who made various entirely fair points, the intention and purpose of the regulatory objective is to put the onus on legal services regulators to be active in promoting and upholding adherence to the economic crime regime. The new objective will put beyond doubt and clarify that securing compliance is explicitly part of the regulatory role. We expect regulators to use all the tools available to them, but their activity should be appropriately targeted and not in any sense just a box-ticking exercise. The objective does not directly place new duties on lawyers. It is directed to the legal services regulators, and existing safeguards remain.

All those regulators will still be bound by public law principles, which will ensure that any regulation of legal services is proportionate and fair. Proportionality is particularly important. Section 3 of the Legal Services Act already requires the Legal Services Board to have regard to the principle that regulatory activity should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only for cases where action is required. The new regulatory objective on economic crime fits within this framework and existing objectives, such as supporting the rule of law, promoting the public interest and improving access to justice.

It is understood and expected that the Legal Services Board will work closely with the professions in developing guidance to support the new objective. This will include a public consultation on any necessary policy statement or guidance to ensure that the regulatory objective is implemented in a targeted and proportionate way. This will allow the LSB to capture and analyse any concerns that professional bodies or others may have, or continue to have, in relation to the new objective.

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Moved by

[Lord Bellamy]

102: After Clause 187, insert the following new Clause—
“Power to strike out certain claimsStrategic litigation against public participation: requirement to make rules of court
(1) The power to make Civil Procedure Rules must be exercised so as to secure that Civil Procedure Rules include provision for ensuring that a claim may be struck out before trial where the court determines—(a) that the claim is a SLAPP claim (see section (Meaning of “SLAPP claim”), and (b) that the claimant has failed to show that it is more likely than not that the claim would succeed at trial.(2) Rules made in compliance with subsection (1) may include rules about how a determination under that subsection is to be made, including (in particular)—(a) rules for determining the nature and extent of the evidence that may or must be considered;(b) rules about the extent to which evidence may or must be tested;(c) rules permitting or requiring the court to determine matters of fact by way of presumptions.(3) Rules made in compliance with subsection (1) must include rules under which the court may make a determination under that subsection of its own motion.(4) The power to make Civil Procedure Rules must be exercised so as to secure that Civil Procedure Rules include provision for securing that, in respect of a SLAPP claim, a court may not order a defendant to pay the claimant’s costs except where, in the court’s view, misconduct of the defendant in relation to the claim justifies such an order.(5) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations provide for subsections (1) to (4) to apply in relation to any rules of court that may be specified in the regulations as those subsections apply in relation to Civil Procedure Rules.(6) In this section—“court” includes a tribunal;“rules of court” means rules relating to the practice and procedure of a court or tribunal.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause, new clause (Meaning of “SLAPP claim”) and my amendments at page 191, line 37, page 192 at line 33 and 192, line 38 provide for the making of rules of court with a view to preventing claimants from improperly using civil proceedings to restrain certain disclosures of information relating to economic crime.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord chooses to move to a vote, we will support him. This amendment would build on last year’s Bill, which introduced similar changes to unexplained wealth orders. It is a welcome development, and I hope that the noble Lord presses his amendment to a vote.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, unfortunately, the Government are not able to accept this amendment, although we are sympathetic to the points made by my noble friend Lord Agnew. The amendment is designed to protect public authorities from having costs awarded against them if they fail to recover the proceeds of economic crime under the Proceeds of Crime Act.

First, the Government are not persuaded that public authorities that lose their case should be protected in this way. Secondly, this is a major breach of the general principle applied in civil litigation in the High Court that the loser pays.

Thirdly, it is a major interference with the discretion of the court on the question of costs. Fourthly, if such a change were to be contemplated, it should be a matter for the Civil Procedure Rules and not something inserted without detailed reflection on Report in your Lordships’ House. Fifthly, it would produce even more inconsistency than allegedly we have already. I do not accept that there is material inconsistency, but you would have one rule for some POCA cases and another rule for other POCA cases, because not all POCA cases are economic crime cases.

However, the Government are prepared actively to consider a consultation to properly consider this matter and the evidence with a view to ensuring that there is a correct balance of justice and the proper consideration of the pros and cons. That, very briefly, is the Government’s position.

I will briefly deal with one or two points. This is not like unexplained wealth orders, which have been mentioned. Those are an investigative procedure and not determinative of civil rights and obligations. In some respects, the UWO procedure is closer to a search warrant than to a recovery of money in civil litigation. It does not provide an analogy to the present case.

It is true that there are various costs regimes in various cases. It is probably not useful to weary your Lordships with particular decisions, but it is not without interest that in the case of Pfizer and Flynn, which involved the Competition and Markets Authority, the authority lost at first instance and was ordered to pay some of the costs. The Court of Appeal overturned that on the basis that it did not want to have the “chilling effect” of public authorities having to pay the costs when they lose litigation. However, the Supreme Court restored the original judgment and said, “This so-called chilling effect is only one factor”. In other words, it is not decisive. You must consider in that jurisdiction all the factors. The Government draw from that case that the so-called chilling effect is not necessarily decisive, and that one must have a regime that enables the court to balance all the relevant effects.

With all respect for the motives behind it and the concerns that have been expressed, this amendment is too blunt an instrument to be a proper exercise of primary legislation in an area which very much calls for balanced consideration under the Civil Procedure Rules. As I said at the outset, the Government are perfectly prepared actively to consider reform of the Civil Procedure Rules with that aim in mind.

I hope that I have persuaded your Lordships that this is not an occasion to make an exception to the well-established rule that has stood for hundreds of years, whether it applies to HMRC, the National Crime Agency or the FCA. If they make a complete Horlicks of a case, there is no reason to let them off the costs. That is the Government’s position.

[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

I thank my noble and learned friend the Minister for his answer. He has always been entirely consistent, and I respect that. We have a genuine difference of views. English law has plenty of exceptions to the landscape which my noble and learned friend has set out—for example, when local authorities bring cases following the Booth case, law enforcement bodies when they bring cases in the magistrates’ court, the Law Society when it brings disciplinary action, its prosecutions that fail following the Baxendale-Walker case, and the Competition and Markets Authority, where the Competition Appeal Tribunal can rule in its favour when it is unsuccessful in bringing a case.

There are plenty of examples. I am not seeking to make the perfect the enemy of the good. We can bring this in with this Bill. It would send a very powerful signal. I seek to test the opinion of the House.