European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Hague of Richmond. Although I do not agree with the picture he painted of the multiple referendum scenario, I am inclined to think that we would all be better off if the Prime Minister had persuaded him to return to the Foreign Office.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Lord Beith]

The purpose of this Bill is to provide the legal mechanism to ensure that if we leave the European Union, we do so without leaving a huge hole in our law. However, we are having to consider it when we have no idea of what our future relationship with the rest of Europe will be and we have a Cabinet that cannot agree on what that relationship should be. Moreover, the Bill as drafted is incapable of carrying out its purpose without leaving a mess of legal uncertainty for the courts to sort out, without giving sweeping powers to Ministers, without undermining the sovereignty of Parliament and without undermining the devolution settlement, the Good Friday agreement and the future integrity of the United Kingdom. All that is in addition to the damage that Brexit will do to the UK economy and to European common endeavour on issues such as security, judicial co-operation and the environment. That is also in addition to the damage that leaving the customs union and the single market will do to my own region, the north-east of England, with its strengths in the motor industry, train building, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and its universities.

As this process staggers on, the demand for the eventual terms to be put to the British people will grow. In the meantime, however, let us get the Bill right; let us try to make sure that it does not further embed undemocratic practices, ambiguous laws and overcentralised government.

My priorities for the task are those of the Constitution Committee, on which I have the honour to serve in the company of some of the most expert and diligent Members of this House. There is a very convenient set of potted biographies of us all in Monday’s Daily Mail, in which we are named not as “enemies of the people” but as “The peers trying to slam the brakes on Brexit”. In this task, however, that is not what we are doing: we are trying to fix the steering and get the Bill through its MOT test.

We should first be getting the task of the courts manageable and the sovereignty of Parliament clearer by treating retained European law as primary legislation. Why a Brexit Government want to confuse the issue by retaining the concept of the supremacy of EU law in the Bill puzzles me.

Secondly, we must secure effective parliamentary control over the mass of delegated legislation which will flow from this Bill, by more narrowly defining its scope and by giving the House the power to determine, not merely to advise on, what level of scrutiny it requires. This is not just about Henry VIII powers. It extends to other statutory instruments, which can, for instance, set up new public bodies. Such an instrument would not be open to amendment, so the House could be presented with a new health or environment regulator and be unable to insist that it was more independent or had a better defined remit.

My third objective is to see that Clause 11 is amended so that it conforms to the devolution settlement. As drafted, the Bill allows the UK Government to hold on to powers which should be passing directly to the devolved Governments. There may indeed be a need for common frameworks in some fields, but as it stands these would not be discussed on an equal basis. UK Ministers could say, “We will devolve the powers, but only if you accept our view on what the common framework should include”. The power of UK Ministers to change the content of legislation previously enacted by devolved Parliaments is an offence against the principles of devolution. I have no idea why Ministers have not so far delivered on their promise to amend this clause, but we need to see whether what they propose is adequate and whether they have got the message that this House has delivered loud and clear.

Finally, I remain puzzled—or should I say mistrustful —about the position of Brexit hardliners. They say that they want to bring power back to this Parliament—this sovereign Parliament. This sovereign Parliament, however, is entitled to insist that Brexit, if it happens, does not become an accretion of power by Ministers without adequate parliamentary control. Furthermore, this sovereign Parliament is entitled, if it chooses, to insist that if we do leave the European Union we nevertheless seek to remain in the customs union and the single market, for the sake of British business and British jobs. Moreover, this sovereign Parliament, once the terms of any British exit are known and the reality of it becomes clear, is entitled—if it wants to—to seek the opinion of the British people as to whether this is what they want.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I must compliment the noble and learned Lord on his second sight. As I was about to say, the next argument put to us is that if we say that the charter is not adding anything, what is the problem with keeping it? I hope that is a fair summary of the noble and learned Lord’s intervention. With respect, this argument simply fails to take account of how the charter applies at present. The charter and the rights that it reaffirmed have a limited application. They apply to the EU institutions all of the time, but apply only to member states acting within the scope of EU law. We will no longer be a member state and so we will be no longer be acting within the scope of EU law. Simply retaining the charter would not reflect the realities of leaving the EU. It cannot be right that a document called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could continue to be used as the justification to bring cases that would lead ultimately to the striking down of UK primary legislation after we leave the EU. Outside our membership of the EU, it is simply not appropriate to retain the charter.

There are also practical questions to consider. It would be no simple matter to say that we are keeping the charter. The amendments in this group all attempt, in various ways, to solve the riddle of how an instrument inherently linked to and constrained by our membership of the EU could apply purely domestically. They each highlight the complexity involved in such an exercise.

In Amendment 13A, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires the Government to lay a report on how the charter will continue to apply to retained EU law after we leave the EU. However, his other amendments are far from clear on precisely how he intends the charter to have effect domestically after exit. They would remove the exclusion of the charter provided for in Clause 5, presumably with the intention that it would now form part of retained EU law. I note that one of his amendments would excise the definition of what the charter is from the Bill, despite going on to say that this undefined, unclear thing will continue to have effect in relation to retained EU law under Clauses 2, 3 and 4. What would our courts make of that? Many articles of the charter set out principles, not rights, which can be relied on directly by individuals. How would these have effect after exit? Eight articles of the charter constitute rights intrinsically linked to EU citizenship—for example, the right to vote in an EU parliamentary election. Of course, they claw at the air—we appreciate that—but they do nothing.

Let us pause again on the fact that the charter applies to member states only when acting within the scope of EU law. Presumably, if retained under the Bill, the charter would then apply only when we were acting within the scope of retained EU law, which I believe is the elaboration that the noble and learned Lord made in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Over time, our domestic law will evolve and new laws will be made by this sovereign Parliament and the devolved legislatures that will start to replace and supersede this category of retained EU law. We would be retaining the charter, in whatever capacity the noble and learned Lord intends, only for an ever-diminishing proportion of our law. This further risks incorporating complexity and confusion into our domestic statute book.

We should not overstate the accessibility of the current rights regime, which relies on citizens knowing—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The noble and learned Lord is right in that assertion, but it does not follow that retained European law should not be read across in the form of the charter as well as its other features on exit day. Lots of things will change over time. Parliament will no doubt amend retained European law so that it ceases to be retained European law, but the Bill is about legal continuity and what the situation is on exit day. For this purpose, surely the Minister should accept what is being proposed.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to what this Bill is about. With regard to the charter, the point is that it does not bring anything over on its own. We already have these rights and obligations, as established by the principles of EU law, convention law and the common law.

As to a concern that something is omitted at the end of the day, as I indicated, we would address that to ensure that all rights are brought across. However, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, I do not believe that you can never have too many belts and braces. If you have too many belts and braces, eventually you cannot stand up. It is therefore important that we approach this issue with a degree of proportionality, if I may use a European term.

Following on from the point I made earlier, retaining the charter for what will become a fluid and changing category of law risks legislatively binding us to a document that would bring the illusion of clarity in the short term but serve only to undermine it in the longer term. Indeed, the other amendments in this group raise similar issues to those put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham has tabled amendments that seek to build on the amendments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. They seek to assign the status of primary legislation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For reasons that we will go into in a later group, the Government believe that the question of assigning status to retained EU law is complex and should be approached with caution. I hope that we can come back to this question when we have concluded our debate on the approach to rights protection and to status more generally. I will not seek to take up time on that issue at this stage.

I suspect that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would also add to the confusion. Seeking to afford charter rights the same level of protection as convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 is fraught with difficulty. Charter rights do not correspond exactly to ECHR rights and apply in different ways. The charter also contains non-justiciable principles as well as rights, and it is unclear what status these would have in domestic law under his amendment. Moreover, it does not deal with how explanations to the charter articles should be treated or how certain sections of the Human Rights Act would apply to charter rights. I appreciate that we are in Committee and that the noble Lord is entitled to say that he will look more carefully at the form of the amendment and perhaps elaborate upon it in due course, but there are fundamental difficulties with the approach he is attempting to take in simply trying to incorporate the charter when, as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, himself observed, the expression of rights in the charter does not coincide precisely with the expression of rights in the convention.

I would like to emphasise again that we remain committed to listening to this House and indeed to working constructively to ensure that we have a functioning statute book which maximises legal certainty. I understand the concerns expressed by some about whether some rights would somehow be left behind, but if we can and do identify a risk of such rights being left behind, we are entirely open to the proposition that we have to address that by way of amendment to the Bill, and we will seek to do that. I wish to reassure noble Lords on that point.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I speak as a member of the Constitution Committee to make it clear that the committee would say that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken very lucidly for it in setting out the amendment. We are talking about provisions in Acts of Parliament—the Equality Act is one example—that implement EU obligations and would not be repealed by withdrawal or by the repeal of the European Communities Act. Yet Clause 2 opens up to the process of repeal and modification by statutory instrument provisions in UK statutes and in the legislation of the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments. These are provisions in law that are not nullified or made inoperative by the act of withdrawal; they would stay on the statute book. Of course, the legislation may contain features that do not of necessity arise from the requirements of EU directives or other EU obligations. We talk much about British gold-plating of EU measures. We will probably find in a number of measures which this clause would draw in features which were clearly not within the scope of the requirement placed on us by our membership of the European Union. The committee concluded:

“The effect is to inflate the range of domestic law—including primary legislation—in relation to which the ministerial “correction” powers … can be exercised”.


These are powers the extent and scope of which are extremely worrying to the committee.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the Bingham Centre has produced a helpful analysis of many of the things that the committee was concerned about. In almost all cases, it agrees with the committee’s analysis, but, in some, it does not agree with the committee’s proposed remedies. In this case, it suggests that if we go down the route proposed by Amendment 15, there should be an amendment to Clause 6 to make it clear that provisions in EU case law should be taken into account when interpreting EU-derived law which is already on the statute book. The logic is that it is far better that the law is in only one place rather than in two, but we would not want by that means to take away from the court the opportunity to take into account EU-derived case law prior to our withdrawal from the EU, if it ever happens.

The committee is on to an important point. I hope that we can explore as a result of this short debate ways of dealing with it.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, while I do not want this section of the debate to be dominated by members of the Constitution Committee, I should congratulate my noble friend Lord Pannick on the way he presented the amendment despite it certainly not being in the interest of the legal profession—if we manage to get legal certainty in the Bill, the lawyers will not have their field day. However, I fear that, unless we achieve legal certainty and the clarity that my noble friend mentioned, we will be in real difficulty. Our committee has put forward suggestions, but we do not think that they are the only ways forward. It is important at this stage that the Government recognise the extent of the problem and the damage that will be done if we do not have some amendment and some concessions from them in this area. It is of course an area linked to the other parts of the Bill, because, unless we make changes here, the powers that the Government will have under Clause 7 will be completely unacceptable because of the breadth of legislation there captured.

I therefore urge the Minister to reflect carefully not only on the suggestions of the Constitution Committee but on those of others outside, because this problem will dog the Bill for ever if we do not make some changes here.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brown of Cambridge (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 28, tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Krebs and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and to which I have also added my name. My noble friend Lord Krebs has already described very eloquently the purpose of the amendment. During Committee in the other place, the then Minister of State for Courts and Justice described this clause in nice, simple, visual terms. I found them slightly easier than all the legal language that we have been dealing with. He called it a sort of broom: a sweeper provision that,

“picks up the other obligations, rights and remedies that would currently have the force of UK law under section 2 of the European Communities Act”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/11/17; col. 498.]

Such a broom seems a jolly useful idea, but as it stands it is missing a few bristles.

My noble friend Lord Krebs mentioned the air quality directive. I believe that Clause 4, as it stands, could fail to sweep into UK law the requirement on the Government to review and adjust the airborne particulate PM2.5 targets in line with scientific information from the World Health Organization. The current clause could also fail to sweep, as he mentioned, details such as the aims and purposes of directives. For example, the environmental liability directive includes the really important principle of “the polluter pays”. I am not quite sure whether I am addressing the noble Baroness the Minister or the noble and learned Lord the Minister, but I would ask one of them to please let us have a broom with denser bristles.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 4 contains many ambiguities, some of which have been helpfully pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. The clause domesticates all directly effective treaty provisions whether or not they will be capable of meaningful application following exit. Several problems arise from that which the Government are aware of and say they will address. However, I am not entirely comfortable with the sort of formula the helpful Solicitor-General brought to the committee when he came to see us. He said:

“‘The Government will consider how these rights can be given effect to in the context of our exit from the EU on a case-by-case basis ahead of exit day’”.


There is an awful lot of work to be done before exit day and I look forward to receiving this case-by-case analysis at some point.

The Constitution Committee suggested amendments to deal with some of the ambiguities, but it could not deal with all of them for the reason we set out in paragraph 37. Reciprocal rights are,

“inextricably linked to the legal relationship between the UK and the EU post-exit. The full impact of Brexit upon reciprocal rights will not be known until the UK’s future relationship with the EU is determined. This highlights a broader issue that the uncertain environment in which the Bill is being considered makes it difficult fully to assess its likely consequences, including its constitutional implications, at the time of its passage”.

That is putting it gently, but that is the difficult situation in which we are operating.

I turn specifically to the effect of Amendment 26. I remain puzzled by not just the ambiguity but the conflicting language used in the clause. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, elucidated this at the start of this short debate by citing the phrase,

“not of a kind recognised by the European Court or any court or tribunal in the UK in a case decided before exit day”.

The committee responded by saying:

“It is unclear whether this means that there must be a judgment on the specific provision of the particular directive, holding that it has direct effect, or whether it simply requires that the provision in question satisfies the criteria that would be applied if the matter were to be judicially considered”.


That is a pretty hypothetical basis on which to defend a right. We said:

“The language of clause 4 supports the latter interpretation, but the explanatory notes appear to endorse the former”.


A great deal of paper is being shuffled around at the moment because it may be that the ambiguity is being resolved as I speak, although I suspect that what is really being looked at is how far we can get tonight in the course of these proceedings. However, we need some help in getting the Government’s view on this, but that might not be sufficient because we also need to ensure that the Bill is tightened up in this respect.

[The Duke of Montrose (Con)]

My Lords, we have spent a lot of time today trying to define what is a snapshot and what could give clarity in the transposition of the legislation. We are now poking around as to where the fuzzy edges are, and some of this is very much more than just fuzzy edges. In fact, it is very good that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, outlined areas that this measure would solidify and imply. My worry about Amendment 28 concerns subsection (3), which deals with law that,

“incorrectly or incompletely gives effect”.

It is hard to say what that will apply to. It is obviously drawn up that way because we do not know what it will apply to. In some ways, it seems we are now trying to include laws in the snapshot when we do not know what they are or what they might be.

My main gripe is that the amendment says that,

“a Minister of the Crown must make regulations for the purpose”.

This is one of the things for which we might say that a Minister of the Crown “may” make regulations, because we wish to leave some power to the UK Government to intervene to construct the type of law we would like to see.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, this will be brief, because my soulmate and prop has deserted me. With this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has raised what he sees as the potential conflict between the EU law retained under Clause 4 and the domestic legislation preserved under Clause 2. His amendment seeks to ensure that rights, powers, obligations et cetera provided for in EU directives which have been implemented into EU-derived domestic law—and therefore are already subject to an enactment—will not need to have their directly effective provisions domesticated through Clause 4.

The Government consider this amendment unnecessary. To the extent that there is any potential overlap between Clause 4 and Clause 2, this is no different from the situation at present in relation to EU law and how we see it given effect in UK law. A judgment may establish direct effect, and domestic legislation to implement that finding may follow. But this does not cause any practical difficulties now—indeed one process complements the other—so we simply do not agree that there will be practical difficulties under this Bill as phrased.

I am of course grateful for the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but the Bill’s position is clear and consistent with existing practice, and his amendment is unnecessary. In these circumstances, I ask him to withdraw it.

[Lord Beith]

The noble Baroness is bringing out an explanation which the committee has already considered and was not satisfied by. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained, there is a remaining ambiguity. Can I suggest to her that she composes a note to her very good friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, saying she was given a very difficult time over this and that the Government really have to look at it again? If she is agreeable to doing that, we will not spend much time making a fuss about it.

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the noble Lord very much indeed. I am sure my noble and learned friend Lord Keen does not even need the note. He will know that I have had a very difficult time.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, we are now looking again at the principle of supremacy and status. I agree with a great deal—in fact, almost all—of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. However, in the various amendments I have sprinkled around, I differ with him on one fundamental point: I always wish to preserve the rights of individuals and businesses to have legislation struck down. That is their current position in that they can have EU law struck down. I put forward my alternative plan in Amendment 32A; I will explain how I got to it.

Broadly speaking, there are three baskets of EU laws. In basket 1, there are the treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which have to be followed by the European court. They are not revocable, as I am sure noble Lords know, and it is a big procedure to change them. In basket 2, I put legislative acts, meaning regulations and directives that set policy. To be precise, they can be identified by the article of the procedure in the treaty that they were made under. In the Lisbon treaty—the TFEU—it would be Article 289. The important point for noble Lords to hold in their minds is that these regulations and directives set policy. Basket 2 legislation can also be struck down by the European court—including on an action from individuals and businesses—for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter. A recent example is the data retention regulation that was ruled disproportionate in cases brought by Digital Rights Ireland and others. In basket 3, I put the implementation of Acts and delegated Acts and their predecessors. In the Lisbon treaty, that comes under Articles 290 and 291. These can be struck down by the European court for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter, as well as for being incompatible with the powers and instructions that were delegated to it in the legislation on which it depends.

If we take rights as our guide—by which I mean the right of an individual or business to challenge the validity of a bad law—then we get to the categorisation that the EU gives to law: that it is all secondary, except for the treaties and the charter. It is quite easy to accept that retained EU general principles—corresponding to basket 1, as I called it—should have primary status. Once converted under Clause 7, it would be wrong if they were changed or revoked other than by an Act of Parliament.

Basket 3 regulations are very close to statutory instruments in the way that they are made based on delegated powers, including an all-or-nothing single vote in the Council or Parliament to turn the whole lot down. There is also similarity in the ways they can be invalidated in court. That is quite easy to map on to our statutory instrument. Basket 2 is harder. The policy content and procedure of making the law look a lot like the making of an Act of Parliament; that leads some—I think Professor Craig was one of them—to conclude that it should map on to primary legislation. But then, if primary, it cannot be quashed under the general principles, so the rights of individuals and businesses are lost. Of course, if noble Lords look at Schedule 1—as we will later today—it can be seen that the Government’s intention is that there is no right of action on a failure to comply with the general principles of EU law. That is wrong. Treating legislation as primary carries the same cost that the Constitution Committee accepts. As it says in paragraph 48 of its report:

“Treating retained direct EU law as primary legislation for all—including”,


Human Rights Act,

“purposes is not without constitutional costs”.

I consider that cost to be too high because I give more weight to maintaining status quo rights and the reasonable expectations of individuals and businesses than making judgments easier or fewer.

We have to address that question several times in the Bill. Each time, I come down on the side of the people’s rights. No manifestos have ever said, “We want to take back control, including your right to challenge bad law”. However, the secondary legislation nature of basket 2 may require some further protection from overly easy change and revocation by statutory instruments, especially once things are no longer pinned in place because we are not part of the EU. In the EU, this was not made by a statutory instrument-type process, nor is it amendable in that way, so basket 2—although of secondary legislation status—could be deemed amendable in life after Clause 7 only by an Act of Parliament. This idea is similar to the one we debated regarding Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. Such treatment means that there is a special category for these laws, but we are in an unusual situation. The fact is that basket 2 is an intermediate, piggy-in-the-middle category. It is secondary legislation-plus, or primary legislation-minus. It could be replicated more or less by secondary legislation plus amendment protection, or the other way round as primary legislation but challengeable as to validity, although that is a bit more controversial.

The piggy-in-the-middle nature shows up in other ways. Basket 2 legislation actually contains within the individual documents a great deal of detail that in the UK domestic system would be done in delegated secondary legislation. It is the same with directives: a greater level of detail is there than in the lean and mean UK Acts of Parliament. That is even more the case after implementation for the secondary legislation made under the European Communities Act. For example, look at the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, which recently received its Third Reading in this House. The money laundering regulations 2017, based on the fourth anti-money laundering directive, are some 112 pages plus a glossary. They were replaced in the Bill by one clause of 28 lines, including the headings and a three-and-a-half-page schedule listing delegated powers. It has been much amended and improved, but the contrast in content is much the same. If we made secondary legislation transposing directives into primary legislation, there would be a great deal of detail on which I would not wish to say I gave the sovereignty of Parliament a totally unchallengeable status.

There are three parts to my amendment. The first would reword the supremacy principle. I intend it to do the same thing and I am not precious about the wording. In fact, I just modified the Constitution Committee’s idea and stole the idea that you allocate precedence as if it were primary legislation, but in my plan the only bit of primary legislation it gets is the precedence. The second part would allocate secondary status to basket 2 retained legislation, and indeed to basket 3—everything except for Acts, because where we have Acts they already are and look like Acts. I then allocate primary status to EU general principles. As I have indicated, for life after Clause 7, basket 2 could be made so as to require amendment by primary legislation. Possibly that belongs in Clause 7 or somewhere else.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Bowles has identified a problem that goes beyond what the committee sought to solve in its proposal, and proposed an ingenious way of trying to deal with it. The committee’s proposal seeks to protect the important bits of that legislation from the degree of vulnerability provided by the repeal of statutory instruments under our present procedures. It is an intriguing point in some ways, because I expect this to be a shrinking area of law over time. If we leave the EU, one assumes that much of this legislation will in time be replaced by new legislation bringing that area of law up to date, not because it is EU law but because things move on and there is a need to do so.

That reminds us of the danger that the committee set out at paragraph 103 of its report. It said:

“If the ‘supremacy principle’ were to continue to feature in the Bill, clause 5(3) would need to be amended to clarify the extent to which retained EU law can be modified while retaining the benefit of that principle, and to clarify in what circumstances the modification of pre-exit domestic law would be such as to turn it into post-exit domestic law that is no longer vulnerable to the operation of the ‘supremacy principle’”.


We chose not to go down that road or try to define it because it seemed an extremely bad situation to get into. One other problem that I will add to the list so well adumbrated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, occurs in paragraph 87 of the report, which points out that Clause 5 would also need to be amended,

“to provide courts … with suitable guidance for the purpose of determining whether a rule of the common law should be taken to have been ‘made’ before or after exit”.

If that is not done then the procedure that the Government have chosen will yet again promote and continue uncertainty. In both cases it would be better to go for some version of what the committee proposed.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their brevity.

Amendment 40ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to ensure that challenges to validity could continue on general principles of EU law grounds. I will address concerns raised on general principles in more detail later. First, Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave the EU. We recognise, however, that in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument. For example, a decision of an EU institution or body may be addressed directly to an individual or business. After exit, they would continue to be able to challenge such decisions—in so far as they apply in the EU—before the CJEU, and to have them annulled. Of course, the converted form of the decision would however remain in force within the UK as retained EU law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 would, after exit day, prevent a challenge to a provision of retained EU law by reference to common-law principles. I understand that the answer is no, it would not, and it is not intended to do so. I hope that that meets the position that he raised with me a moment ago.

Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not believe it would be right to hand them a new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU in this context. This amendment would effectively ask our courts to consider whether the EU acted incompatibly with the general principles when it made an EU instrument. Generally speaking, this is a function that we do not consider it appropriate to confer on domestic courts.

Therefore, although I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, the amendment would undermine the Government’s stated policy of a clear exclusion of both validity challenges and general principle challenges provided for within Schedule 1. However, we recognise that there might be some limited circumstances in which it would be sensible to maintain the ability to challenge retained EU law on validity grounds. The Bill therefore contains a power set out in paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1, to which the noble Baroness alluded, which would enable the Minister to make regulations providing for a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in specified circumstances.

Sub-paragraph (3) sets out that those regulations may provide that a challenge which would previously have proceeded against an EU institution may, after exit, proceed against a UK public authority, because of course there would be no EU institution against which it could be directed. I seek to reassure the noble Baroness that the word “may” is there as a precautionary term lest, in the context of trying to make such a regulatory power, it be perceived that there is no easily identifiable body against which the matter can be directed. However, the intent is that it should be possible to proceed against a public body in those circumstances.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Can the noble and learned Lord envisage the circumstances in which such regulations would be made? Will Ministers have to decide between now and exit day a category of matters for which such regulation is to be provided, or are we to await a case coming up which ought to have been the subject of regulations which are then made? That surely cannot be possible.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is a precautionary power and it is intended that, where the circumstances arise, the Minister will address himself to those circumstances and contemplate the making of appropriate regulations.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is wondering why the word “appropriate” does not fit into the context of trying to limit judicial discretion, he should look at how many times it is used in this and other Bills to give Ministers the opportunity to decide one way or the other, in what are quite clearly different kinds of decisions from those you would expect judges to make.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bilimoria]

I thank the noble Viscount for that intervention. At the moment, the courts very rarely intervene. They had to intervene with Article 50 being put through Parliament; that was fundamental. This House defeated the Government twice by almost 100 votes each time in two of the biggest votes in the history of our Parliament—614 of us voted in one and 634 in the other. Do we want a situation where this Parliament or the Government are continually challenged by the courts? We do not want to go there, and this is why these amendments are important.

I conclude that the power to amend all EU-derived primary and secondary legislation by the Government without sufficient scrutiny, checks and control, bypassing Parliament, goes against the ultimate supremacy of Parliament itself.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, from this side of the Committee I shall speak to Amendment 244A, in my name, which comes from the Constitution Committee and was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, in his opening remarks. The amendment’s purpose is to provide a more objective test and a requirement for Ministers to state that they have applied an objective test. Should they have failed to do so, they become accountable for not having done so. That is the value of it. It is in no way exclusive of the series of amendments in the remainder of the group, almost all of which replace “appropriate” with “necessary”. I will come to that in a moment. I want to appreciate the words a few moments ago from the noble Lord who is the former—and much respected—chairman of the Constitution Committee. His contribution is one that Ministers really ought to note.

We are dealing with wording in this legislation that worries us enough in this context. However, noble Lords should be in no doubt that, if this wording remains in this legislation, subsequent debates will take place around the idea that, “It was included in the withdrawal Bill and there were some very serious issues raised in that, so it must be acceptable” and that it must be reasonable to use such a shallow test of appropriateness for very far-reaching statutory instrument powers. Numerous other Bills will come before us in the course of this Parliament which have statutory instrument powers in them, and this and future Governments will draw on the precedent of how this legislation is worded.

As to the distinction between “appropriate” and “necessary”, the suggestion I have heard that Ministers do not realise they are open to legal challenge is, I think, quite wrong. Ministers are well aware that they might be open to legal challenge, and that is why they prefer “appropriate” to “necessary”. It gives them a “plump legal cushion”—that wonderful expression of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson—behind which they can hide. It is just not good enough; we have to find better wording. If Ministers are unhappy with necessity, they must come up with something more effective. We find the word “appropriate” used in many contexts. It conjures to mind the sort of instructions for a day out that say “Appropriate footwear should be worn”. That clearly indicates to the person who has to make the decision that they have a fair degree of discretion—it could mean hiking boots or other firm-soled shoes, as long as it is not stilettos or ballet pumps. They have a choice. Ministers are desperately trying to preserve choice for when they bring forward statutory instruments under this legislation.

The problems of the statutory instruments are not confined to Henry VIII provisions, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out. There is the inability to amend any of these statutory instruments, whether they are Henry VIII in their impact or whether they impact merely on previous statutory instruments. The inability to amend them grossly weakens Parliament’s ability to deal with matters that would normally be in primary legislation.

I am not only sympathetic to the amendment that the committee itself has put forward, which has my name on it, or something like it, but I am also very supportive of the attempt to find a better word than “appropriate”. So far, at any rate, necessity seems the right provision.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I have added my name to a number of amendments that delete “appropriate” and insert “necessary”. They are all in this group. I do not claim any particular merit for that amendment: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is, I believe, the lead name on this amendment. The fact is, we have one thing in common. Whether is it “essential”, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham will doubtless seek to persuade us in a few minutes, whether it is “necessary”, used in the context described by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, when he moved his amendment so admirably, or whether it is a bare “necessary”, I do not mind. I frankly have a slight preference for the wording of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson.

We are in a very sad place when, having been told that we were taking back control, what we are doing is bestowing control. Parliament is bestowing control—if this goes through—on the Executive. I have quoted before in your Lordships’ House the famous Motion moved in 1781, I believe, in another place by Colonel Dunning: “The power of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished”. Substitute “Executive” for “Crown” and that is what this is all about. I also think of the immortal words of my friend the late father of my noble friend Lord Hailsham, who talked about an “elected dictatorship”.

Are we really seeking to leave the European Union—which I believe is a foolish step—to bestow on the Government the power which Parliament should take? That is the fundamental question. We should not bestow the power on or allow any Minister—whether he or she be ever so high or ever so low, whether he or she be at the top of the 109 or at the bottom, it matters not—to change the law of the land, and then indeed extend it, as the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, pointed out in his admirable speech, to public bodies and to the courts. We live in a parliamentary democracy. Your Lordships’ House rightly has much less power than the elected House, but we can act as a check and a balance and as an encourager to those in another place. These are probing amendments tonight, of course, but I am confident that this will come to a vote on Report, and we should say to our colleagues in another place, “Do not give up the power which you exercise as representatives, not delegates, of your constituents, because if you do that, it will be a real nail in the coffin of democracy”.

I personally believe that a referendum is inimical to representative democracy. But, as we have said before, we are where we are. We are moving away from the European Union, but we must move away as a parliamentary democracy, where power ultimately resides not in No. 10 Downing Street, the Treasury, or in any ministerial office but in the Chamber at the other end of the Corridor. Your Lordships’ House has a particularly important role in stiffening the sinews of those at the other end of the Corridor. There is an enormous wealth of experience in your Lordships’ House, which was demonstrated by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, this evening, and which would have been demonstrated, I am sure, with equal eloquence by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, had he been able to be with us. We in a sense must see ourselves as the servants of democracy, but with a duty to put some real strength in the directly elected House.

I hope that we will have a response from the Minister this evening that will indicate that he understands what this is about. He, of course, is one of the 109. He may be low down on the list, but he is there. Whether he is 109, 108 or 73, I know not and I care not—but he is there. I hope that at the very least he will repudiate any notion of exercising power that it is not for him to exercise. We have to address this issue, whether we think in terms of Henry VIII or Thomas Cromwell or Oliver Cromwell, all three of whom would have looked upon this as a marvellous mandate. We have a duty. Tonight we are probing, but there will come a night when we must vote if the response is not as it should be this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 82. Yet again it is the issue of using secondary legislation under Clause 7 to make changes, in this case to the Equality Act 2010 or to subordinate legislation made under that Act, or to reduce rights or remedies under EU retained law,

“in comparison with the position immediately before exit day”.

Your Lordships’ Committee made its views on the abuse of Clause 7 abundantly clear during the earlier debate. Surely the same reasoning applies.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Ludford in querying what is intended by Clause 7(3) and hope that the Minister will be able to draw on his limited stock of examples to provide me with one—indeed, with something that fulfils this definition:

“There is also a deficiency in retained EU law where the Minister considers that there is … anything in retained EU law which is of a similar kind to any deficiency which falls within subsection (2)”.


In that case, why does it not fall within subsection (2)? Can the Minister give me an example of something which subsection (3)(a) would provide for but which subsection (2) has not provided for?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short but interesting debate covering an important point. When my ministerial colleagues in the other place moved the amendment that inserted into the Bill the subsection that Amendment 80 would remove, the Government’s reasoning was accepted by the other place without a Division. That is an onerous responsibility upon me, and I hope I can replicate that performance and satisfy any concerns the noble Baroness has.

As we heard at Second Reading, most of the House accept that the power in Clause 7(1) is essential but, was as said then, the Government are looking forward to using the expertise of this House to tighten any slack in the power and ensure that it is capable of neither too much nor too little. I have just addressed the importance of retaining Clause 7(3)(b), but I repeat that the Government believe we can be a responsible Government only by ensuring that we can provide for all the types of deficiency we discover.

Subsection (3)(a) provides that the meaning of “deficiencies” in Clause 7 includes those of a similar kind to those set out in subsection (2). The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, asked what this means and whether there are any examples. This ensures that, for example, deficiencies relating to arrangements between public authorities in the British Overseas Territories and the EU and its member states, or between the UK and the EEA and EFTA states are caught by the definition of a deficiency. They are not included in the list in subsection (2) but are very much of a similar kind to the types of deficiencies listed, and it is important that the power is wide enough to allow the Government to correct them. This House accepted at Second Reading the principle of resolving all the deficiencies in retained EU law using the power in Clause 7, and we cannot do this without both a type of sweeper—I think the legal term is “ejusdem generis”—and a power to provide for additional kinds of deficiency if they are later identified. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that that is why the clause is drafted the way that it is.

May I seek clarification from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter? I was not quite clear whether she wanted to speak to Amendment 82 or whether she is forgoing that for the moment for the purposes of this debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was kind enough to refer to my amendment, which was probably misgrouped at an earlier stage when we were discussing Euratom, I wish to underline the points that he makes. At that time I asked the Minister to set out for Parliament the approach to the EU agencies that the Government were going to take in the negotiations. Frankly, the noble Lord was far too dismissive of that approach, and it would do him some good now if he were to say that at some point during the course of the Bill the Government will set out the line that they will take. After all, as has been said, the Prime Minister has set out her line in relation to some of those agencies. Unfortunately, within 48 hours, the EU has effectively said, “Sorry, that is not on”—not only for the post-transition period but for the transition period itself. While we were continuing to follow the rules and procedures of those agencies, we would no longer take part in their activities. We have an issue here.

I was a bit diffident about the coalition’s Public Bodies Bill—I did not want to embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Newby, who has been so kind to me—but, as my noble friend said, the achievement of the House of Lords was to knock out an enormous schedule. The Chief Whip, who was the Minister in charge of the Bill at that time—he is now in his place—looks less fraught with this Bill than he did when he was dealing with the Public Bodies Bill. In the end he wisely convinced his colleagues that he had to drop the huge schedule that gave carte blanche powers to the Government to abolish or tweak the responsibilities of a host of public bodies. That Bill was to abolish bodies or alter their remit; this Bill is to set up entirely new bodies. Unless we do that knowing what the overall approach is, this House cannot give the Government that degree of power.

Mention has been made of the new environmental body. Strictly speaking, under this clause as it currently stands, the Government would be able to establish, under secondary legislation, the kind of body that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, who is no longer in his place, was arguing for earlier—a body so powerful it could sanction other public bodies, including the Government, if it was able to reproduce the powers that presently rest with the European Commission. That is an enormous power, which this House would not allow the Executive arm of government on its own without primary legislation conducted through the two Houses.

I recognise that there is a timescale problem for the Government, but might it be possible to set up some of these bodies in shadow form? If there are 10 bodies, as the noble Lord suggests, there may be a need at least to stop the process before the final passage of this Bill. To have permanent public bodies to regulate large swathes of our public life, industry and personal behaviour—even if there are only a dozen of them—would require primary legislation. This House needs to assert that it does and the Government need to accept that.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Newby on one specific reason why it is primary legislation that we use, and should use, for the creation of public bodies, even in these circumstances. He referred to the somewhat limited procedures in both Houses, but particularly in the Commons, for dealing with statutory instruments, but one abiding characteristic of them is that they do not admit of amendment. When a public body is being created, even in the short timescale we are talking about here, its remit, terms of reference, composition and the powers it can exercise are incapable of amendment. The idea that the Government would produce so perfect a form that it would not benefit from amendment, or even discussion of amendment, is so fanciful that I am sure the Minister will not advance it. Surely primary legislation capable of amendment, even if addressed with greater speed than normal because of the circumstances, is the only defensible way of doing something as extensive as creating a public body.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments. I believe that public bodies should be established by primary legislation. Parliament must have the opportunity to properly scrutinise and access the expenditure associated with trying to replicate bodies to which we already belong. The Bill, and in particular Clause 7, contains elements that are frightening to those of us who believe in parliamentary democracy. Handing such powers to the Executive is a gross dereliction of duty. I encourage my noble friend to urgently ask his department to reconsider the Government’s current intention to leave so many excellent EU agencies and try to recreate our own versions.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

First, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham for bringing the matter of creating criminal offences under the powers in Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 to the attention of the Committee through their Amendments 87, 128, 156, 339 and 340, which seek to amend the relevant provisions in the Bill. As I said, I understand that similar concerns were raised during the debates on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, but that a mutually agreeable outcome has since been reached, with the Government bringing forward a requirement on Ministers to make additional statements alongside their statutory instruments. Of course, the offences envisaged under that Bill were different and carried considerably greater sentences. I hope that I can satisfy the concerns that noble Lords have expressed during this debate. However, the Government are still looking very closely at how the powers in the Bill are drawn and how they will be exercised—and, as I say, we are open to discussion on finding similar solutions in this Bill.

I shall start with the reassurance that the three main powers in the Bill are explicitly restricted from creating a “relevant criminal offence”, which is defined in the Bill as an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18, or in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland the age of 21, is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years. A vital part in achieving continuity and consistency for businesses and individuals as we leave the EU is to ensure that criminal offences continue to operate effectively after exit. As such, the Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9 powers can create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment for two years or less. In applying this two-year limit, the Government have sought a balance between appropriately limiting the three main powers and providing a functioning statute book on exit day.

The amendments would see that no criminal offences—or no criminal offences punishable by any term of imprisonment at all—could be created under the three main powers in the Bill. However, it is important that these powers are able to create certain criminal offences, as I shall come on to explain. For example, criminal offences provide an essential function of ensuring compliance with regulatory regimes which provide crucial protections for businesses and individuals. Some of the regimes criminalise particular conduct relating to the EU and some offences may no longer operate as intended after exit day if they are not corrected, particularly where functions transfer to a UK authority. For example, it could be an offence for a business to fail to provide an EU authority with certain information, but after exit day the authority collecting that information might be a UK one instead. Continuity would seem to demand penalties remaining in place—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I wonder if the Minister could help us. He seems to be arguing what might be a coherent case for some offences needing to be redefined to have the same effect as they would have had before exit day. Surely it cannot be part of what he is describing to create offences that did not exist simply to ensure that the statute book after exit day has the same effect, in terms of the criminality that people would face, as it had beforehand. Does that not need him to approach this differently and try to find a way of defining the process so that it is not about the creation of new criminal offences?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, with her normal quicksilver mind, has darted ahead to the bit of the speech that I have not yet got to, relating to where we are on Clauses 8 and 9. She makes a fair point and I intend to deal with it. I hope I have reassured noble Lords over the correction power, and I thank noble Lords who contributed to that part of the debate.

Amendments 130, 131, 132, 148, 149 and 159, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, seek to extend such a restriction to the international obligations and withdrawal agreement powers. I have listened carefully to what has been said. To avoid any shadow of a doubt, I am very happy to sit down with the noble Lord on what he says about the points raised on international agreements to look at the point on international obligations; I think it related to Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act. I am happy to look at that point with officials. However, I think he must accept, as noble Lords would, that the overriding ability in relation to international agreements must rest with the UK Government as the member state and the body able to conclude international treaties. I do not think there can be any question about that. However, I am happy to look at the valid issue he has raised on that point.

The position on international obligations and the withdrawal agreement powers must necessarily be more nuanced because we do not yet know what changes may be required, as we are not yet sure what the precise shape of the withdrawal agreement will be. However, I can confirm that this power will not be used to unpick the devolution settlements, nor to undermine or amend the Belfast agreement. As I have indicated, we are adhered to both the devolution settlements that we have and to the Belfast agreement that was reached in April 1998 and must be protected in all its parts.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The Minister speaks as though the Clause 8 and Clause 9 powers are basically the same. They are not, of course. The Clause 9 powers can be exercised only if a further piece of legislation, a withdrawal Bill, is passed. It is not clear to me why the Minister is letting himself be cornered over this when the powers do not need to be in the Bill at all.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I want to direct the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the process of defending this Parliament and trying to bring back control to it, we are in danger of legislating one of the worst set of Henry VIII powers that could possibly be imagined. They would enable the Government to change the Northern Ireland Act, the Scotland Act and any of a series of things, so long as they were matters that had been considered in the withdrawal agreement.

Having come from a position of wondering why Clause 9 was in the Bill at all, because these are all matters to do with the withdrawal agreement—we have not got one yet, so we cannot legislate for it—we are now in a situation where I am surprised that the Government want to keep it. A poison pill has been administered to it by a very helpful amendment in the other place. None of the powers which we will put on the statute book can be exercised until a piece of legislation on the withdrawal agreement has been passed. It is entirely useless from the Government’s point of view, but from the point of view of those of us who are trying to protect Parliament, it is the one place in which we have a guarantee that there has to be an Act of Parliament to complete this process—if we do, indeed, complete it.

The grouping suggests that this is where we consider clause stand part. I think it would be wrong to pass over what Clause 9 contains, without recognising that it is not what we should be putting on to the statute book at all, certainly not without knowing what the withdrawal agreement is and without therefore being able to circumscribe the powers to things which reasonably arise from it.

There are things that cannot be done under these powers which are specified in subsection (3) but an enormous range of things can be done if a Minister considers them appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. I will no longer be ready to turf Clause 9 out of the Bill, for the reason I gave. The Constitution Committee, when it considered it, thought that it was entirely inappropriate to have these powers at this stage. The stage at which we should have them, if at all, in modified form is in the withdrawal agreement Bill, and not before, but we have the compensation that the clause contains the guarantee that the process can go no further without another statute being passed in both Houses of Parliament.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 196.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

There is a good deal to be said for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, when one bears in mind the power given in each of Clauses 7, 8 and 9 to make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament under regulations made under these clauses. Of course, one can look back to an existing Act, which could be amended by the exercise of this power, for a purpose related to the Brexit arrangements. If one takes an existing Act—one can visualise all sorts of situations when that might arise—it would seem right that the same procedure should apply if the amendment is made for the purposes which one sees in Clauses 7, 8 and 9.

For future Acts I can see there is a problem, because one cannot control a future Parliament, but as far as the past is concerned I respectfully suggest that there is a lot to be said for the amendment.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry I missed the beginning of the speech of my noble friend Lord Sharkey as a result of unaccustomed speed breaking out on the Bill’s proceedings while I was having a cup of tea. Whether this will be repeated, I do not know.

I had discussions before with my noble friend to properly understand his amendment and its main aim, which is to embrace, within scrutiny procedures used for withdrawal Bill statutory instruments, all those statutory instruments for the same purpose that derive from other previous statutes. That is an interesting idea. When it comes to referring back to the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, it is worth recalling that the Act was surrounded by generous commitments, promises that prayers against negative instruments would always have time for debate on the Floor of the House and all sorts of undertakings that were completely unfulfilled in practice.

Whether the amendment can be made to work in precisely this form I am not quite sure, but I think that the purpose of ensuring that nothing is slipped through by anything less than at least the procedure of triage and scrutiny that we seek for statutory instruments under this Bill—if it becomes an Act—is extended to anything that does the same thing. We certainly would not want to create a perverse incentive for a Government to use the wrong legislation, or a different piece of legislation, for the statutory instrument simply because they could evade a form of scrutiny by doing so.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons that have already been given, I also support this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The situation that the noble Baroness described, in which the sifting committee has made a recommendation that the Government have rejected, is surely not one in which the confidence in the committee will be undermined. It is for the Government then to see whether they can persuade the House as a whole that the committee’s recommendation is unnecessary or undesirable. That is the scenario, not the one that she presented.

--- Later in debate ---

If I were expressing the strategic purpose of these amendments in military terms, I would describe them as another step in a graduated response; that is, a step between the built-in inflexibility of the existing scrutiny procedures of your Lordships’ House on the one hand, and their complete rejection and destruction on the other. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, the amendments in this group all seek to address a long-standing problem with statutory instruments: that for the most part, they are incapable of amendment. That is not absolutely always so because, many years ago in the other place, I moved an amendment to a statutory instrument arising from the Census Act but few bits of primary legislation allow one to do that. This is not an occasion on which those of us who have long been concerned about that are trying to use this legislation to improve a long-standing defect. It is peculiarly relevant to what we are considering because major matters will be dealt with by way of statutory instrument—a theme throughout the debates in recent days—and they may well include things which ought to be susceptible to amendment, such as details about the creation of public bodies, their powers and remit. To take one example, and there will be others, there are the ways in which new bodies can be held to account when they are created to replace European bodies.

We would be left in a situation where it would be said in the House of Commons, “Take it or leave it—this is the only statutory instrument you’re going to get and we clearly need to address this issue, therefore you must accept it in this form”. I am afraid that in this House, it would be, “Take it or face unspecified constitutional consequences”. Either we agreed to the statutory instrument in its present form or did something we should really not be doing at all, according to members of the Executive. That is an absurd position to put this House in, when what would be at issue would be some fundamental defect in the way the statutory instrument sought to transpose existing European processes into the British domestic statute book. The Government have to address the plea that all these amendments raise: to have some way to do something which falls short of wanting to reject a statutory instrument but insists that if it is to go through, it must be amended in some way.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 247, which seeks to do precisely that. I am delighted to have secured the support of the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Dykes. I took great comfort from the words of my noble friend Lady Goldie earlier this evening when she said that the Government welcome scrutiny. I hope that she will not regret those remarks.

My starting point this evening was paragraph 215 of the report by the Select Committee on the Constitution, which states:

“We do not consider that it is appropriate for the Henry VIII powers in this Bill to be exercisable by the negative procedure, particularly as they might be used to make legislation of substantive policy significance”.


In Amendment 247, what I seek to do is precisely that: to enable a statutory instrument to be amendable.

While this may seem radical or even revolutionary, it is not as there is a precedent. To appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who I know likes some precedents but not others, the precedent here is the Civil Contingencies Act, which legislated precisely for statutory instruments to be amended. Under that Act, specific examples would be required. In my view, there should not be a blanket provision to amend but in the specific circumstances where a statutory instrument in relation to the Bill before the Committee legislates on what amounts to a substantive policy change, it should be open to both Houses to be able to amend the statutory instrument. That is the procedure that I have set out here, once again with the expert advice of the Public Bill Office. At Clauses 19 and 20 of the Civil Contingencies Act, there is a power to make emergency regulations if certain conditions are met. These orders stand unless negated or amended by Parliament, so the power to amend the statutory instrument does exist, although I accept it is not used very often.

Further, in Clause 29, the emergency regulations should be made by statutory instrument. Statutory instruments can be made by either negative or affirmative resolution of the Houses of Parliament. Whether negative or affirmative is set out in the regulations, which will already have been agreed by Parliament, and committed and put into operation by the Government, unless later rejected or amended by Parliament within the seven-day period set down in that clause.

I am sure that my noble friend, in summing up the debate on this small group of amendments, will say that it is not appropriate to amend statutory instruments in these circumstances. I put it to your Lordships in Committee this evening that in those very specific circumstances where the Government seek to make and propose a substantive policy change by way of statutory instrument rather than by an Act of Parliament, that is simply not appropriate and outwith the actual remit of the Bill before us this evening. I therefore hope that Amendment 247 will find favour with the Committee this evening.

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[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, I have to say that I have been called many things in my life, but the appellation by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, of a “parliamentary anaesthetic” is a first. As we approach the last contribution from the Government on today’s business, though, maybe a metaphorical sleeping draught is appropriate as noble Lords contemplate their slumbers.

As I have stressed, the Government are committed to full and proper scrutiny of the statutory instruments that will come under the Bill. The sifting process seeks to provide transparency where there has been ministerial discretion in choosing the procedure that will apply to an instrument, and it is therefore extended to the main powers under the Bill. All instruments under the Bill will be subject to an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. We have also provided for additional explanatory material to ensure that there is a proper level of transparency for all the instruments and that Parliament is fully informed and can properly sift and scrutinise all the secondary legislation that is to come. If noble Lords do not approve of their contents—and sometimes that happens—the proper way to express that is to oppose the instruments and ask the Government to come back with an alternative proposal.

Nothing in the Bill is intended to be an alteration to the long-established and, in this House, well-functioning procedures for the scrutiny of secondary legislation. The Government understand the concerns around the powers in Clause 17, and I have listened closely to what your Lordships have been saying. We will consider how we might be able to provide reassurance and address concerns when we reach that clause, as we shall imminently do.

The amendments in this group raise similar issues to those in earlier groups, but I shall address—in, I hope, sufficient detail—my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s Amendments 238 and 239 concerning the creation of a new super-affirmative procedure for the scrutiny of statutory instruments under the Bill.

I cannot shy away from the fact that a significant number of statutory instruments will come before us under the Bill. I reassure your Lordships once more that a very significant element of what needs to be done will be strictly technical, making de minimis changes such as the adjustment of reference to EU law or to retained EU law. Procedures such as that suggested by my noble friend, which were described as “turbocharged” procedures, are simply disproportionate to these changes, and a procedure of the kind mooted by my noble friend is simply unnecessary. The powers in the Bill can be used only for limited purposes and are themselves subject to a number of restrictions.

For the types of major policy change that a number of your Lordships appear to be concerned that the Government might seek to make under the Bill, we do not shy away from parliamentary scrutiny. The proper means for scrutiny of such changes is primary legislation—rather than seeking to design, at pace, a new, bespoke super-affirmative process.

I know that some of your Lordships are wary of relying on assurances from the Dispatch Box but, in this case, we have acted on those assurances already, as can be seen through the passage of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill and the sanctions Bill. I understand noble Lords’ wish to ensure that Parliament can give the SIs to come consideration which is akin or similar to the consideration given to primary legislation, but I suggest that there must be some delineation—there always has been—between things that merit such full consideration and those that do not. Frankly, the alternative is legislative logjam: a complete constipation of the process.

For each of those categories, the Government wish to use the well-established procedures that Parliament has already set down. I have to say that all precedent suggests that procedures such as those suggested by my noble friend can take six months to a year or even longer. Quite simply, in the context of what we are engaged in, we do not have that time. Adopting a super-affirmative procedure would therefore prevent us from being able to deliver on a key objective of the Bill: making timeous and necessary change to maximise certainty for businesses and individuals by ensuring continuity through a functioning statute book in time for exit. In my opinion, that would be a grave failing.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham’s amendment, Amendment 248, crosses similar ground to Amendment 247 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh. They bring us to a discussion of some of the fundamental assumptions of the debates we are having today, have had on previous days and shall have in regard to other Bills, about secondary legislation. I understand the concern of my noble friends, echoed no doubt by others in the Committee, that this is a framework Bill and that the detail, wherein the devil always lies, will be available only in secondary legislation, with which we can only declare ourselves content or not content. However, I must make it clear that the Government cannot support these amendments as a solution to this problem.

It is by the processes involved in passing primary legislation that the House can amend law as it passes before Parliament. That process involves long and detailed scrutiny and debate, with the Government given an opportunity to explain their case in great detail and others given an opportunity to challenge and test that over multiple stages and in both Houses in sequence.

[Lord Beith]

I should like the Minister to envisage that she is responding on behalf of the Government to a debate on a statutory instrument which the House in general is saying that we need to have but which has a fundamental flaw that has been identified by many noble Lords. At that point, is she really going to say to the House, “The proper course for you to take is to reject this instrument, and then I will be forced to take it away and come back with a corrected instrument”? Or will she say, “We’ve no time for that now, you will just have to accept it as it is”?

[Baroness Goldie]

That would of course entirely depend on the circumstances of the instrument, the extent of the change being effected by the instrument and what was an appropriate response to the concerns being raised. I am certain that the Government would respond in a sensible manner if that situation were to arise.

I repeat that it is for primary legislation to set a policy direction and establish the framework in which government may operate. Secondary legislation has a different place in our legal framework. The Hansard Society, which many in the House will accept as an expert source in this area, has said that the power to amend SIs would be,

“essentially undermining the principle of delegation”.

If wider review of the legislative process is proposed—as a number of noble Lords would like—this Bill is not the place to do it. I note the recommendation of the Constitution Committee, in its report The Process of Constitutional Change, that substantial constitutional change should be clear when a Bill is introduced. This Bill is substantial in its repeal of the ECA, but that was clear even before the Bill was introduced and I do not think a change of this type would be appropriate for a Bill which has already completed its passage through the other place.

In the other place, my right honourable friend Dominic Grieve proposed a triage mechanism and both he and the Government accepted the sifting mechanism proposed by its Procedure Committee. This will increase the transparency surrounding secondary legislation, but will not change its nature. Secondary legislation can be scrutinised and debated and, indeed, can be of great importance. However, its purpose is to fill in the spaces where Parliament has set a course under primary legislation and empowered the Government to provide for the details in subordinate instruments. As has already been said, if Parliament is not content with an SI, it can be rejected and the Government can consider and return with another. To open statutory instruments to amendment would essentially be to create a new kind of legislation, without the scrutiny afforded to primary legislation but, at the same time, conferring on the new kind one of the essential qualities of primary legislation.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Might noble Lords be referring to the mixed metaphor they have just heard?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

May I proceed to split an infinitive?

The new arrangements must be achieved in partnership with the devolved Administrations. Crucially, that takes time to work through.

We must proceed with caution in considering any form of sunset which would change the purpose of our discussions from designing and implementing frameworks that are fit for purpose to ones that can be achieved in the time allowed. Our priority must be to continue to provide legal certainty on how these laws will work in that interim, but this could risk uncertainty where the provisions may lift before their replacement is known.

This is a substantial and significant amendment to Clause 11. It reflects the progress that we and the devolved Administrations have made on frameworks and in our discussions on Clause 11. It strikes the right balance, delivering for the devolved Administrations and for businesses and people across the United Kingdom. I am grateful for the consideration that this House will provide on this offer as we continue to refine and consider the policy in coming weeks.

The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson, Lord Griffiths and Lord Thomas, would amend elements of the amendments that we have put forward. We have heard much on the question of the consent of the devolved institutions for the use of the proposed new Clause 11 powers that would “freeze” existing UK frameworks. As I indicated earlier, I wish to be clear on two fundamental points. The first is that this will be a collaborative process. There is no suggestion or intention that we want to cut our devolved institutions out of these decisions. We have put in place a set of shared principles that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have agreed and which guide our work on frameworks—I referred earlier to the statement following the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year that sets out those principles in detail. Departments across Administrations are now working together to consider frameworks. Devolved and UK Ministers continue to discuss these matters regularly at Joint Ministerial Committee meetings. The limits on the powers make it clear that the views of the devolved Ministers must be heard and the United Kingdom Government in exercising the power must set out what those views are for Parliament’s consideration. That is not a power grab. As we have heard today, this Parliament will rightly hold us to account on how the Government act on devolution policy. The second point is that we must be clear about the implications and outcomes of this work. These decisions affect every part of the United Kingdom. It is the United Kingdom Government and the United Kingdom Parliament that are responsible for matters that affect the whole of the United Kingdom.

We must therefore be very careful about the impact of a hard-edged legal requirement, not because we do not want the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government and, once restored, the Northern Ireland Executive to be part of these decisions but because it cannot be for an Administration in one devolved nation to exercise what amounts to a veto over something that would be in the interest of the other nations of the United Kingdom as a whole. That is not and never was the purpose of the devolution settlement.

I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Wigley, for their proposals to bring the United Kingdom Government and devolved Administrations together. These are constructive suggestions for a middle way that deserve serious thought. I am encouraged by the effort being made to reach agreement.

At present, we believe that the JMC will be the right forum for engagement, working under the principles agreed for the work on frameworks in October last year, but I would like to take away the ideas that have been brought to the table here today by way of the further proposed amendments and consider how these matters might be incorporated into our policy thinking, while continuing to meet our two stated objectives on legal certainty and respect for the devolved settlements.

I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern for his amendment, which seeks to find a way forward in the context of Clause 11 and the frameworks. Again, it is an attempt to ensure engagement between all the interested Administrations to achieve consensus at the end of the day. My noble and learned friend’s amendment highlights the importance of clarity as we develop frameworks. As we have discussed during earlier debates, the work on frameworks will have to be a collaborative effort designed to ensure maintenance of a single internal market for the United Kingdom after we leave the EU. Our intention remains to reach agreement with the devolved Administrations. However we approach it, we have that as a goal.

The approach that we have put forward for Clause 11 in these amendments is, I venture, an entirely reasonable proposition. By default, and unless further action is taken, the returning EU powers in the 153 areas identified will become devolved matters. We should perhaps take pause to remind ourselves that these are entirely new powers for the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, expanding devolved competence into areas previously held and exercised by the EU and, prior to that, by the United Kingdom Parliament.

We believe that what we propose addresses the points raised by the Scottish and Welsh Governments in their legislative consent memorandums. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that we have moved a considerable way on this, but that we continue to see the importance of providing as much certainty as early as possible for businesses across the UK in order that we can avoid, or indeed manage, divergence between the individual nations of the United Kingdom. While we have not yet reached agreement with the devolved Administrations, discussions will continue and we are extremely keen to maintain our engagement with them. But we consider that it is right that noble Lords have the chance to consider these amendments—the Government committed to that on Report and we brought them forward for consideration by this Committee. I hope noble Lords whose amendments are in this group will feel able to withdraw them at this stage; we, as I indicated earlier, will do similarly with the government amendments at the end of this debate. I beg to move.

Amendment 302B (to Amendment 302A)

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

My Lords, I too regret having to refer to the behaviour of the Scottish National Party and its constant attempts to find issues on which it can exercise grievance, but that is what is happening. It is because of that attitude that we are where we are now and that the consultations that were allegedly going extremely well throughout the earlier months have run up against a time limit. We are blinding ourselves to reality if we do not take account of the fact that the Scottish Administration have a completely different agenda from this one—notwithstanding the bonhomie of Mr Russell, which my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern was fortunate enough to encounter. I regret having to say it, but it has to be said, otherwise we are blinding ourselves to reality.

I do not dismiss the Government’s past willingness to consult patiently and, again, I respect their willingness to withdraw this amendment so that it can be further debated and discussed. That is entirely in line with the path that they have pursued, which is creditable and desirable. How I wish the other participants in these discussions could unanimously take the same approach. It is a tribute to the constitutional proprieties that we all like to see, seeking as the Government did to negotiate in good faith, to find a route that would not require them to assert the sovereignty of this Parliament. But it did not work in this context and I do not think it was ever going to work. In the end, the supremacy of the union must come first, as another Constitution Committee report, The Union and Devolution, recently suggested.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, the noble Lord is a former chairman of the Constitution Committee, but he is perhaps doing a disservice to its present members by not reflecting that the committee felt that progress had to be made in this area, not least because the parliaments in both Edinburgh and Cardiff, across the parties, were unhappy with the Government’s original proposals.

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

I agree that progress has to be made, but progress is not made by constantly agreeing to give legislative consent on so many different issues, as so many amendments that we have debated in the last few days suggest. That is not progress; that goes towards unsettling the existence of the devolution within the United Kingdom parliamentary structure. We have to be realistic about these matters.

The Government’s approach of endless patience and consultation did not work. In the end, the supremacy of the union must come first. So I support the government amendment. By protecting the sovereignty of this Parliament we are best able to deliver the overall outcome, both for the devolved Administrations and for the United Kingdom to which they belong.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie]

This is all about trying to ensure that the statute book does not become cluttered with material which is irrelevant, not competent under the Bill and not within the scope of retained EU law as we have defined it.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

We would all agree with the principle that the noble Baroness has just advanced—we shall adduce it when trying to remove some other bits from the Bill later today. However, she seems to be advancing the proposition that it is for a Minister to say that something is not part of the law, because of something that the Minister judges makes it invalid. The constitution has never given that role to Ministers. Courts decide what the law is if the matter is in doubt, not Ministers. To say to the people at the National Archives, whom I visited on one occasion—a small and diligent group huddled over computer screens which have replaced scissors and paste—“Do not print it”, is not an answer to a question of doubt about the law.

[Baroness Goldie]

If we can set to one side any concept of malevolence or malign intent on the part of the Government or a Minister, perhaps we can accept that this is a genuine attempt to provide simplicity. If a Minister in a department perceives that an instrument or one of the elements of EU retained law is no longer applicable and is not going to fit in with the new body of law, it is desirable that clarification can be provided in the swiftest possible way and that it should not make its way to the Queen’s printer. I appreciate that there are deeply felt views about this, and I am certain that we will come to this again on Report. I am merely trying to indicate to the Committee what the Government think is not just a sustainable position—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lisvane]

If it assists the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, he is also the Queen’s printer for Scotland.

[Lord Beith]

I recommend that the Minister and other Ministers pay a visit to Kew, which is a very nice place, and have a look at the small but diligent unit that tries to maintain an accurate record and account of what the law of this country is.

[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, if we do not get through this debate, I will not be visiting anywhere. I must thank a group of your Lordships for their fascinating contributions, some of which have eliminated my need to write to anyone about anything. Still, I shall look at Hansard.

In the view of the Government, the mixture of defined duties and specific powers provided for in part 1 of Schedule 5 strikes the right balance. I say to my noble friend Lady McIntosh that it is comprehensive, flexible and accountable.

Part 2 of Schedule 5 ensures that after exit day questions about the meaning or effect of EU law can continue to be treated as questions of law and so can be determined by our courts when determining that such a question is necessary in order to interpret retained EU law. As I said earlier, it also contains a power, subject to the affirmative procedure, to make provision about judicial notice and the admissibility of evidence of certain matters.

I hope that my remarks have provided sufficient explanation of the rationale behind, and indeed the importance of, Clause 13 and Schedule 5 and why it is imperative that that clause and schedule stand part of the Bill.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Government’s objective is to conclude a withdrawal agreement by October of this year. That has been stated on a number of occasions and it is in that context that we intend that the present Bill should deal with the situation, whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement or an implementation period. As and when a withdrawal agreement is concluded, it will be dealt with in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Clearly, if we enter into an international treaty with the EU 27 in respect of these matters, we will respect that international treaty and our obligations inherent in it and, in accordance with the duality principle, draw down those obligations into our domestic law, using the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I suggest that it is inconceivable that we would not seek to do that.

[Lord Beith]

The noble and learned Lord has been quite clear that it will be the withdrawal Bill that is the mechanism. Is he saying that it will be that Bill and not the use of the statutory instrument powers to be found elsewhere in this Bill which will enable him to modify or repeal its sections when it is an Act?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have been clear that the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will legislate for the withdrawal agreement. That may involve us amending the terms of the present Bill, but we should remember that the present Bill is intended to accommodate the situations where there is a withdrawal agreement and where there is no withdrawal agreement and therefore no implementation period. It is to bring certainty to the statute book in that context. Clearly, there may be a situation in which we have to bring forward amendments to the present Bill in the second withdrawal agreement Bill. I recognise that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of three other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.

Amendment 358C and Amendment 360A, with which it is grouped, address the powers tucked away in Schedule 8 to modify retained direct EU legislation by the use of delegated powers that relate to subordinate legislation. A power to modify is an important matter because “modify” includes a power to repeal—see Clause 14 (1).

This Committee has debated on previous days the surprising omission from the Bill of any provision that identifies the legal status of retained EU law. Is it primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else? The powers in Schedule 8, in paragraphs 3(1) and 5(1), which we are now addressing, have attracted the attention of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee because those provisions treat retained EU law as analogous to secondary legislation for the purposes of powers to modify. That is a surprising position for the Bill to adopt, certainly in relation to that part of retained EU law which confers important rights: for example, in the fields of employment, the environment and consumer protection. It means that, in addition to the other powers to modify retained EU law, which the Bill will confer and which we have debated in detail—Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17—there is yet another set of powers recognised by Schedule 8 that will give Ministers the power to modify the retained EU law, on important subjects, which is brought into domestic law.

My concern is not reduced by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 8 saying that these powers can be used only,

“so far as the context permits or requires”,

and paragraph 5(1) says that the powers may be used,

“unless the contrary intention appears”.

These statements are opaque in the extreme and certainly do not provide any degree of legal certainty.

I therefore look forward to hearing from the Minister why these powers are needed at all in addition to the other extensive powers which the Bill confers, and I look forward to hearing from him what these powers say, if anything, about the legal status of retained EU law. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to be associated with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in supporting this amendment to seek some clarity. I will simply add two further points, having said that this distinctly lacks clarity at the moment.

First, I draw attention to paragraph 3, which says:

“Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation which, immediately before exit day, is subject to an implied restriction that it is exercisable only compatibly with EU law is to be read on or after exit day without that restriction”.


A little gloss on that from the Minister would be helpful. The second thing that needs clarifying is the impact on the devolution aspects of the Bill. The Government’s Explanatory Notes say that,

“in relation to the devolved administrations these pre-existing powers”—

that is, the powers that can be used under the clause we are discussing—

“are subject to the devolution provisions described in paragraphs 36 to 41 of these notes, meaning powers in pre-exit legislation cannot be used to modify retained EU law in a way that would be incompatible with EU law as it existed on exit day until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”.

I imagine that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pricked up his ears at that phrase, because it goes to the heart of the argument we have been having about the impact of the Bill on devolution and the idea that powers will be released to the devolved Administrations only once the UK Government are satisfied with the way they will deal with the framework provisions. The appearance of the phrase,

“until the relevant subject matters are released from the interim limit on their competence”,

in the Explanatory Notes is quite worrying. The provisions are of course there because some of the provisions here relate to existing devolved powers. The devolved Administrations must have the capacity to take this kind of action if the UK Government have the capacity to do so. However, it is subject to this rather extraordinary restriction: the Government hold on to the powers until they are satisfied that they can be released. For the benefit of clarity, I hope that the Minister can help us.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I support the amendment. There is not much to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about what the amendment does and why it is necessary, nor to add to the questions he asked or to those then added by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which in particular picked up issues with regard to the devolved Administrations.

We know that a major theme in your Lordships’ House, rightly, has been how powers are to be exercised, recognising that there may be circumstances in which they have to be exercised. Notwithstanding that, on the whole this Committee has rightly taken the view—or we hope that we will see it take the view, certainly from the interventions and contributions that have been made throughout the Committee—that this is a matter where proper parliamentary scrutiny is required. There may well be a role for certain delegated legislation, but please let us not add to it with still yet another way in which things can be done which avoid that full parliamentary scrutiny.

I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will be able to say something reassuring, both answering the questions posed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, and saying why we need not be concerned and that the Government will content themselves with relying on those delegated powers that will be specific to the Bill, once this Committee and the other place have determined just what those delegated powers should be.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by making two observations. These amendments are linked closely to the issue we have already debated in Committee of the status of retained EU law and how we deal with it in the context of its status. As has been indicated previously in Committee, the Government have been listening and considering that, and we intend to come back to the House on the matter before Report. I mention that because it is a relevant backdrop to what we are considering at this stage.

On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, essentially, the powers in paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 are, first of all, designed to remove what I might term the shadow of European law from what will be domestic legislation. However, more particularly, the noble Lord raised a point about the devolution issues and quoted from the Explanatory Notes. I understand that the section of the Explanatory Notes that he refers to addresses Clause 11 prior to its recent amendment. I appreciate that we then withdrew that amendment, but the Explanatory Notes should be read in that context. Essentially, therefore, we have moved on because of the decision to flip Clause 11—I think that was the term used—so I ask the noble Lord to look at the proposed amendment to Clause 11 to understand the context in which we now want to deal with this point.

[Lord Beith]

The noble and learned Lord is being reasonable, but he is inviting us to presume that we have moved on when we have not yet done so. The Government have indicated a willingness to look further at the Clause 11 issues and come back with something new. However, when we compare that discussion to the one we just had, it is a bit odd now to be invited to behave as if something has happened which has not happened yet.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I understand the noble Lord’s point. He appreciates the statements of intent that we have made with regard to Clause 11. Although we withdrew the amendment to Clause 11, it was tendered and withdrawn for a particular purpose, in order to ensure that it could be finalised before Report. I hope that that addresses the noble Lord’s concern about the terms of the Explanatory Note that he quoted.

We have discussed on previous occasions in Committee the risk of ossifying the statute book and how that has to be balanced against checking the ability of the Government to propose changes to retained EU law. Clearly, as I indicated, the Government have heard the debates on the question of how we should treat the status of retained EU law, and we intend to come back on that. However, we must make provision for how delegated powers outside the Bill will interact with retained direct EU legislation. To do nothing would create uncertainty and potentially—by putting it beyond the reach even of Henry VIII powers that can modify Acts of Parliament—risk placing retained EU law on a pedestal of protection beyond even the elevated position of primary legislation. That is why I say that the two issues are linked: how we deal with the status of retained EU law but also carry on with our domestic powers to deal with the entire scope of our domestic legislation, including that which is going to be defined as retained EU law.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said about the charter in his Amendment 15 and I agree with him in Amendment 19, to which I have added my name. I want to refer to Amendment 18, which deals with yet another area of legal uncertainty that will be created by this Bill. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill asserts that there will be,

“no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.

That was also quoted by the noble Lord a moment ago. However, having snatched away a citizen’s right to seek redress through the courts, paragraph 1(2)(b) of the same schedule states that in some circumstances the Executive might allow you into the court with your challenge. A Minister can make regulations to provide for that, but on what criteria and when will the regulations be made? My attempts to get clarification have yielded incomplete results. In a Written Answer to my Question of 29 March, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, referred to the fact that individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument—indeed so. He added:

“This power could be used to enable a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in such circumstances”.


How will those circumstances be defined? I am particularly concerned about the repeated reference to “individual circumstances”. Is the Executive to decide on a case-by-case basis which individual cases merit a judicial hearing and make regulations specific to individual cases? That is a quite extraordinary thought. Are Ministers to choose who is allowed the key to the courtroom?

There is a possibility that regulations which deal narrowly with an individual case could be challenged by another individual or organisation with a similar case but which did not fall within the regulation. It would be claimed that the regulation was hybrid. This House provides special procedures to protect and give a fair hearing to parties affected by hybridity in statutory instruments—parties who want to argue that they are being dealt with in a different way from others who are in the same circumstances as they are. However, these protections are removed by a provision in paragraph 23 of Schedule 7, which states that hybrid regulations under the Bill are to be treated as if they were not hybrid and that their hybridity is to be ignored.

The upshot of all this is yet more legal uncertainty. Companies and individuals claiming to be adversely affected by a retained EU law whose validity was open to challenge will not be able to take that challenge to court unless they are lucky enough to be covered by exempting regulations, but they cannot know that in advance because the regulations will not have been made or even published in draft. The Government made it clear in the same Answer to which I referred earlier that they have no plans to publish any such regulations at this stage. Parties will have no way of knowing which areas or issues might be exempted. It is not even clear whether there will be any regulations, since the Government could decide not to use this purely permissive power at all.

Given that, absent any criteria in the Bill for the scope of these regulations, I do not believe that the power to make them should remain in its present form. I would rather we solved this problem by permitting legal challenge, thus providing potential revenue for abused rights. If the general prohibitions on legal challenge were to be retained, which I would regret, Ministers should come back at Third Reading with an amendment that properly defines or provides the criteria for their potential scope so that they are not wholly subjective and Executive-controlled. If, however, noble Lords agree to Amendment 15 and are similarly disposed to agree to Amendment 19, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to which I have added my name, I would suggest that this amendment becomes a necessary consequential amendment. With the scope for appropriate legal challenge reinstated, there will be no reason for the Executive to have powers to remove the prohibition in selective circumstances of their own choosing.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Beith]

18: Schedule 1, page 16, leave out lines 11 to 15

[Lord Beith]

I beg to move an amendment that I regard as, in broad terms if not technically, consequential on our earlier decision.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

These amendments may be technical but they are none the less important. They guarantee the integrity of our devolution statutes and provide the assurance that noble Lords have sought that those Acts will be subject to appropriate scrutiny. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, these are very helpful amendments, in that they reassert respect for the constitutional importance of the devolution legislation. They are part of the context that we will return to next week when we try to sort out other devolution aspects of the Bill—perhaps with greater ease in relation to Wales than Scotland, but that is for another day. Some of them are technical and tidying-up, and have been achieved with agreement. All that is welcome.

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, it falls to me to echo what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said, and to thank the Minister for moving the amendments and for the explanations that he has given. I hope he will agree to convey to his departmental colleagues our congratulations on their very hard work, the results of which are now before us. Of course, we should recognise that this is the calm before the storm, in the sense that Clause 11 is coming along. If there are some very simple technical amendments here, there are 16 pages of amendments to Clause 11, so there will be fun and games when we get to it. Still, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said, this respects the devolution arrangements between us.

I wonder if noble Lords will be patient with me if I use this occasion to express my gratitude for the work of Carwyn Jones, the First Minister of the Welsh Assembly, who has announced that he intends to stand down. The steadiness of his hand on the tiller, and indeed his involvement in the discussions that have yielded these amendments, has been considerable. Wales, its parliament and the people of the UK owe him a great deal, and I would like to place this short tribute on the record.

So I think we are sitting pretty with this one. I know King Henry VIII was a Welshman, and he might even have voted with the Government on this one too. Without further ado, we have no problem with this at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

The noble Lord has the advantage over me. I was not thinking so much of potato seeds but the fact that the Secretary of State has said that we are to have higher standards of animal hygiene, animal health and animal welfare, which I welcome. That follows on from the little debate we have just had. There will have to be physical checks. There cannot be checks managed by technology, in which case potatoes and their seeds could effectively fall within that category. So the noble Lord has actually made and developed that point very neatly for me.

In the context of Amendment 47, I urge the Minister to maintain Clause 8 in the Bill and to keep an open mind as regards potential membership of the European Economic Area or applying to join the European Free Trade Association.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, notwithstanding the noble Baroness’s arguments, I want to address this group from a different standpoint: that of government Amendment 47A, which is to leave out Clause 8. It may be because I have a suspicious mind, but, while the removal of Clause 8 would be quite welcome to the Constitution Committee, which had considerable concerns about its breadth, I am worried that in removing it the Government have satisfied themselves that there is nothing they could do under Clause 8 that they could not do under Clause 17 and its broad powers. What is more, there are things which the Government can do under Clause 17 which they are prohibited from doing under Clause 8. When we come to Clause 17, we will perhaps have to look more carefully at it than has been done so far.

It would be helpful if the Minister could set out the Government’s argument for deleting Clause 8. I am quite sympathetic to that, even though I understand the standpoint from which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, was arguing. But were we able to get the Government to move seriously in the direction of having a customs union-EEA, as our vote last week showed that the House wants to do, I am quite confident that ways could be found to do that with or without Clause 8. I would be only too glad to assist if that happens—but I am concerned about the reliance on Clause 17, which may lie behind the removal of Clause 8.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, in Committee many noble Lords raised valuable concerns regarding the use of the consequential power, or, I should say, the misuse of this power. In response to these concerns, and being conscious of restricting the scope of the powers wherever practical, the Government have tabled an amendment to sunset the power to make consequential amendments from 10 years after exit.

I would like to point out that it is unusual for such powers to be sunset. However, given the unique nature of this Bill and the concerns about future Governments abusing the power to make consequential amendments, the Government have taken the decision that it is right in this exceptional case to apply a sunset to the power. The Government arrived at the figure of 10 years as the consequences of the Bill may only come to light long after our exit from the EU. The fact that this period is longer than that afforded to the other powers in the Bill reflects this fact. While 10 years should ensure that the majority of consequential amendments can be made, there is still a risk that some amendments that it may prove appropriate to make could not be made if they were only discovered after this time. The Government believe, however, that the value of sunsetting the power outweighs those risks.

I know that there are other concerns about Clause 17, and the Government have tabled amendments to address those, in particular arranging for negative SIs proposed under it to be sifted. I look forward to debating these on a later day.

I hope that this amendment demonstrates yet again the Government’s commitment to satisfying the concerns of this House, and I hope that noble Lords will welcome this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I recognise that the Government have moved on this issue, even though 10 years is the longest sunset that I think I have ever heard of in any Bill—it has the quality of a north Norwegian, Arctic sunset, which pleasantly never comes. However, in this case, some date by which to end these rather wide powers is welcome. Of course, the Bill also has the limitation in Clause 17(2). It was the breadth of the powers that led us to table Amendment 85, which was not moved, and it was the Government’s willingness to move on this and some other amendments that made us feel that we ought not to press it. I hope the Minister recognises that any use of these consequential powers that appeared to go beyond what is genuinely consequential would raise the spectre that we had let through excessive powers. He will be well aware by now that this House has become increasingly vigilant about the breadth of powers granted to Ministers. In recognising that the Government have moved on this issue, we have not pursued other amendments.

Amendment 86A agreed.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome Amendment 83C but will refer to Amendment 83D, to which the Minister devoted considerable attention. Amendment 83C goes some way to meet the concerns of the Constitution Committee, indicated by the tabling of Amendment 83D, even though the committee’s amendment is expressed in different terms. I will refer to that difference initially. The noble Baroness spoke at length about it, and it is a sore point with the Government. They do not want there to be any possibility of being accused of making big policy choices by delegated legislation, and indeed they ought not to do so. The Constitution Committee’s purpose in drafting its amendment was to ensure that delegated legislation is used to make technical changes which are necessary to ensure that retained EU law functions after exit day, and not to make policy choices.

I recognise that there are some cases where a technical change does in fact represent a policy choice—for example, the question of which body should handle this matter in the UK might be seen as a policy choice —but it would be no bad thing for Ministers’ attention to be focused on the need to police that boundary, so far as there is a boundary, between what provisions of EU law it is necessary to put on to our statute book in functioning form and what represents a policy change. That is what the House is anxious about.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie]

I now look forward to giving that response. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his comments. On his first point, which is fairly legitimate, he will be acutely aware that Ministers have not just a personal but a political responsibility. They are, in the office of being a Minister, responsible for having made the statement. That, I think, imputes to the Minister both a political and a personal responsibility. Governments of all colours act in good faith and the Ministers involved act in good faith. I think this House will be satisfied that Ministers of whatever political hue acting under these powers will genuinely have a personal focus on what is being discussed—I think “focus” was the word used by the noble and learned Lord.

The statement must both make the original statement and give an explanation of the delay in having brought the statement forward. I have tried to make that clear in my remarks: this is not an alternative responsibility but a complementary responsibility; the two things will apply. A Minister cannot shoal off one of them and offer the other. Both responsibilities will apply.

The final point was that, when creating an offence, the noble and learned Lord thought it was appropriate to justify not just why the offence was being created but why it was being created in this way. Again, that is ex facie. Part of the impact of the responsibilities of the Minister under the Bill, if so amended, is that they can expect to be questioned closely. Indeed, given the now very robust scrutiny procedures that are in place, Ministers will expect to be questioned closely not only as to why they are creating the offence, but why they are doing so in this way. That is implicit in the structure within which Ministers are now being asked to operate. I hope that to some extent answers the noble and learned Lord’s points.

[Lord Beith]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I assume that she is going to answer the questions I put to her, not least about Third Reading but also about the importance of Ministers recognising that the inclusion of policy choices is something we would prefer not to see in delegated legislation.

[Baroness Goldie]

I am sorry. I did not have a detailed note about the point raised by the noble Lord, so may I undertake to write to him?

[Lord Beith]

I am sorry to press the noble Baroness, who is normally so helpful, but she has not clarified what she said about the Government reconsidering the wording in relation to criminal offences. It seems to me that, if the Government are reconsidering the wording, then we have to come back to that at Third Reading.

[Baroness Goldie]

We are not reconsidering. We are simply considering the appropriate text. The general point has been made clear by the Government: that they will not want to retract what is already their policy position. They will simply undertake to inform the House when a form of words has been adjusted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I rise to move the Government’s Amendment 117. The Bill’s approach to certain EU rights of challenge and associated remedies has already been scrutinised closely. We have debated at length the substantive provisions in the Bill covering this area and this House has made clear its views. I do not intend to go over old ground again in this speech. The amendment deals with the approach to transitional cases in one important area, where Francovich damages are being sought. I will say a little about the particular substantive provisions that this relates to.

Francovich damages are a specific form of remedy that exists in EU law. They are available in certain strictly limited circumstances where member states have breached EU law, for example where a member state has failed to properly transpose a directive. The Government remain firmly of the view that, after we leave the EU, Francovich damages will no longer be relevant when we cease to be bound to follow obligations that apply to member states. This is for the simple reason that the majority of Francovich cases in the UK have been brought on the grounds of non-implementation or insufficient implementation of a directive. The UK will no longer be under an obligation to implement directives after exit and the directives will not form part of our domestic law as retained EU law, so the ability to claim Francovich damages would not be possible for a post-exit cause of action. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 therefore removes the right to Francovich damages after exit day. The Government consider this outcome to be a natural consequence of the decision to leave the EU, while ensuring Parliament is sovereign.

The impact of these provisions on transitional cases is one area that the House urged us to think again on when we debated the matter in Committee. I concede that the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Carlile, made powerful arguments, in particular on the need to look again at cases where an individual’s course of action accrued before we left the EU. The amendment responds directly to that concern.

We remain of the view that it would not be reasonable for there to be a long tail of cases based on outdated elements of EU law continuing to process through our courts, potentially for many years after we leave the EU. That would not be conducive to the legal certainty this Bill aims for. The Bill will therefore set what the Government believe to be a clear and sensible cut-off point. The amendment we have brought forward will therefore delay the prohibition in the Bill on seeking Francovich damages in domestic law for two years after exit day. This will provide individuals with a fair and sensible opportunity to seek damages for pre-exit breaches of EU law. It also ensures that we continue to have a clear and certain cut-off point after which such challenges would end. I hope that the House supports the proposals that we have put forward, which I think provide important reassurance to individuals and businesses. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could help the House, or those of us who were not following quickly enough, as to how Amendment 117 relates to Amendment 116, which, as I understand it, the Government did not move, and what the effect would be of having Amendment 117 without Amendment 116. Would that affect the Francovich damages time limitation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the intention with respect to Amendment 117 is that there should be a two-year period after exit, during which it will be possible for a claim to be made in respect of a right of action that accrued up to the point of Brexit. I hope that that clarifies the point.

[Lord Beith]

What was not clear to me was why the Government did not move the preceding amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is probably attributable to a note that I have here saying, “Don’t move Amendment 116”.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Framlingham]

With the leave of the House, may I ask a question?

[Noble Lords]

Yes.

[Lord Framlingham]

Does the noble Baroness accept that nobody is keener on the environment than me, as many people in this House know? I am simply saying that this is not the vehicle for it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 7 is in my name and in the names of three other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: our chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Beith.

The amendment addresses a difficult issue. In its report HL69, dated 29 January of this year, the Constitution Committee drew attention in paragraph 51 to what we saw as a defect in the Bill: it does not specify the legal status that would be enjoyed in our law by retained EU law—that is, the body of EU material that the Bill incorporates into domestic law as at exit day. The question is: is it going to be primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else? And if something else, what?

The Bill deals with this question in part, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, in what is now paragraph 28 of Schedule 8. But that exception simply begs the question as to what status retained EU law enjoys for other legal purposes. The recommendation made by the Constitution Committee that the issue needs to be addressed in the Bill was widely approved by expert legal opinion, in particular the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and Professor Paul Craig of Oxford University, although they disagreed with the suggestion by the committee that the status of all retained EU law should be that of primary legislation.

Ministers agreed to consider this issue and tabled an amendment on Report to introduce what is now Clause 8 of the Bill. Clause 8 is an improvement because it makes two points clear. It states that the part of retained EU law which derives from earlier statutes and earlier statutory instruments, enacted to implement EU law obligations, will retain the legal status it previously had—either primary legislation or secondary legislation. Clause 8 also addresses the circumstances in which different types of retained EU law can be amended.

However, what Clause 8 does not do is address the legal status of other retained EU law for purposes other than amendment. This may matter, as the Bingham Centre has suggested, for example, in deciding which rule takes priority if there is a conflict between different elements of retained EU law, or if the question arises of when courts may allow a challenge to retained EU law and what remedies they may give. Some distinguished legal scholars have expressed such concerns about Clause 8, particularly Professor Alison Young of Cambridge University.

The Minister made it clear on Report that because of the complexity of the issue, the Government were willing to consider the matter further at Third Reading. This amendment suggests addressing the issue of legal status by using the distinction that is in Clause 8 itself —between retained direct principal EU legislation and retained direct minor EU legislation.

I am grateful to the Minister for arranging a meeting for me yesterday with members of the Bill team and parliamentary draftsmen. They explained their concerns about the amendment. They have persuaded me that the contents of the Bill will minimise the occasions on which the legal status of retained EU law will matter. They have also pointed out that the amendment would need to specify more clearly what is meant by “primary legislation”, which covers not just Acts of Parliament but Acts of the three devolved legislatures. They also tell me that they are concerned about the generality of a deeming provision of this sort, which might cause difficulties in other contexts.

I have found these arguments compelling and I would be grateful, and I hope the House would be grateful, if the Minister would say a little more about these points when he replies to the debate. I am, however, concerned that it still appears to be the Government’s position that if any of these problems about legal status do arise in the future, they can be addressed by Ministers exercising delegated powers under the Bill. I remind the House that the Constitution Committee said in our report at paragraph 69:

“It is constitutionally unacceptable for ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.


I ask the Minister to tell the House whether or not the Government agree with that proposition.

I will add one further point—as a promise, not as a threat—which is that the Constitution Committee intends to keep a very close eye on this issue once the Bill becomes law. If it does become necessary to give particular retained EU laws a legal status, and if this is then done by Ministers exercising delegated powers, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee will certainly wish to return to the issue. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I will not add to the exposition of the amendment and the reasons for tabling it, which have been so clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The committee felt that we ought to see whether we could get a more secure place for retained European law in the hierarchy of law as it would be viewed by the courts in this country. There will probably be difficulties in this area and we are probably persuaded that they cannot be resolved by the kind of declaratory amendment that we have tabled on this occasion.

There are further difficulties which the Minister might refer to, which have been pointed out by Professor Alison Young, who was referred to earlier. For example, constitutional statutes are not subject to the doctrine of implied repeal in the same way as other legislation. What will be the position if an item of retained European law is considered to be constitutional in character and appears to be in conflict with subsequent legislation passed post exit day, when the supremacy principle has fallen away and this has to be resolved?

In passing an earlier amendment which removed a discretionary power from Ministers to, in effect, decide whether matters could be put before the courts, we wanted to assert that, wherever possible, we should protect the courts and the legal system from having to be the subject of individual ad hoc ministerial decisions in particular cases. That was part of the motivation for what the committee sought to do in this case. But clearly it cannot be solved in the way that we first suggested.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, this is an important question. It is just possible that Clause 8 could be used by the courts in a situation arising under this particular amendment to extend the provisions of Clause 8 by analogy, where that seemed suitable. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned, fitting this to everything is quite difficult. On the other hand, for a court faced with a single problem, this way of solving it might be possible. Anyway, I am entirely in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about Ministers determining this sort of matter; I do not believe that that can be right. However, I do not think the court would fail, if faced with this problem, in deciding something about it.