Maritime Surveillance

Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

We are an island. That makes what happens around our coasts of great importance to us. We are a member of the permanent five in the UN Security Council, of the Commonwealth, of the European Union, of NATO and of other organisations, which, added together, means that we are a world power, with global responsibilities and interests. That makes what happens in the seas of the world of great importance to us.

We are a trading nation. We are a nation that cannot, or at any rate does not, feed itself. We rely on food, as well as countless other goods, from abroad. Most of that comes by sea. That makes what happens at sea of great importance to us. We operate under the conditions of “just in time”. Those wonderful warehouses in London’s docklands have now been turned into rather chi-chi flats, and we no longer have the reserves to feed, fuel or supply the country for many weeks, let alone months. That makes us vulnerable.

It is because of all the crucial interests that I have outlined that the defence of our country is of such importance. Within that defence, maritime surveillance plays a central role. Therefore, the Defence Committee decided to conduct an inquiry into it. We called the inquiry “Future Maritime Surveillance”, because we wanted to focus not on the decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme, the successor to the MR2, in the strategic defence and security review, but on the future needs of the nation and how, given where we are now, we could address those needs. Obviously, however, the cancellation of Nimrod was a big matter, and I shall consider that first.

Let us be clear about Nimrod. It was late—very, very late. It was vastly over budget, at a time of deep financial stringency. It was an aeroplane that had serious aerodynamic problems. It was, in other words, a deeply troubled project—and no doubt one for which, in the usual way, I should take the blame as Minister for Defence Procurement between 1995 and 1997.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

Quite right!

[Mr Arbuthnot]

No, that was a joke—at least, I think it was. But the cancellation of the project was the one change that troubled the Ministry of Defence most in the SDSR. The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff told the Defence Committee:

“It would be fair to say that among the Chiefs of Staff and in the military advice, it was one of the most difficult decisions to come to terms with, because it has multiple uses.”

In the Government’s answer to the concerns that the Defence Committee expressed in our report on the SDSR of August 2011, they said:

“Like the Committee we regret that we had to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme. It was a capability that we would, in an ideal world, have preferred to acquire…we reluctantly concluded that cancellation was the least bad option.”

The reason for that unhappiness was described to us by Professor Julian Lindley-French. He told us that

“the point is that of the seven military tasks in the SDSR, the MRA4 could have played a very important role in all of them. It was the loss of the enablers, because the single services were forced back to defend their own core competencies by the process, which for me was the biggest failing of the SDSR process. Forget all the strategic stuff: there was a haggle at that last weekend, which was utterly unacceptable in terms of the national strategic requirements.”

The report that the Defence Committee produced earlier this week on defence acquisition contains a bit of an echo of that statement.

In our report on the strategic defence and security review, we expressed concern about the resultant capability gaps of cancelling MRA4. In their response, the Government acknowledged that there is currently no single asset or collection of assets that could fully mitigate the resultant capability gap. That is enough about Nimrod; let us look at the other assets and look to the future.

The Government said in 2011 that they continued

“to maximise the use of…assets”—

other than Nimrod—

“such as Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Helicopters, Sentry and C-130 to contribute to Anti-Submarine Warfare, Search and Rescue and Maritime Counter-Terrorism where possible. In the longer term, if the Government were to conclude that it needed to close the gaps completely because”

threats emerged that could no longer be managed in the same way as today,

“some additional funding or reprioritisation would be required.”

In our report, “Future Maritime Surveillance”, we concentrated on the strategic requirements for maritime surveillance, identifying current capability gaps and the future requirements for maritime surveillance and how they might be met. Given the wide range of maritime surveillance tasks and the number of Departments and agencies that require access to maritime surveillance capabilities, we also looked at cross-Government co-operation. We published our report in September 2012 and the Government’s response in December 2012. We have also placed on our website the Minister’s response to some follow-up issues that we raised following the Government’s response. I am grateful to him for that.

I pay tribute to the Committee’s staff and military advisers, who provide us with invaluable support and advice. We are all grateful to them. I would like to thank personally the Committee members themselves. They work extremely hard to very good effect, which is one of the reasons why chairing it is the best job that I have ever had.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way and I apologise for being slightly late. May I point out that the reason why it is such a good Committee is that its Chairman is so excellent?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

The hon. Gentleman might say that, but as a former Chief Whip, I couldn’t possibly comment.

The threats that require maritime surveillance are evolving and have become more non-military in nature. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 rather illustrate that, in that they were launched from the sea. Our report concluded that it was a weakness that there was not a single individual within the Ministry of Defence who should be responsible for maritime surveillance. The Government did not agree.

We acknowledged that the new joint forces command could have a role in delivering, co-ordinating and strengthening maritime surveillance. We are nevertheless disappointed that the Government do not think that there is a requirement for an individual within the MOD to take responsibility for maritime surveillance. We accept that it is not the JFC’s role, but we are concerned that the left hand of the MOD may not know what its right hand is doing, let alone be able to co-ordinate the interests of the MOD with all the other Departments and agencies that require maritime surveillance capabilities.

Here I begin a number of requests to the Minister for information, which I will be grateful if he responds to, if not in today’s debate, perhaps in writing later, with whatever degree of classification he considers necessary. It will be helpful if he first outlines how the co-ordination that we are concerned about is being taken forward, particularly as the MOD starts work on the 2015 SDSR. Our concerns were highlighted when we were told that there was an “informal group of Ministers” who were responsible for taking forward maritime surveillance issues.

Although decisions may ultimately be taken in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we thought there should be greater ministerial involvement. This contains an echo of our report, “Defence and Cyber-Security”, published in January this year and our report, “Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses”, published in February last year: we worry that Ministers faced with a threat or a vulnerability that crosses departmental responsibilities have inadequate structures and insufficient practice in getting together to work out responses, which may be needed very quickly indeed.

Against that, we welcome the establishment of the maritime security oversight group and the National Maritime Information Centre. The Government told us that the risk assessment was expected to be completed in December 2012. Will the Minister update us on progress? What threats, including new ones, have been identified? Such strategic analysis is important. Future threats are increasingly likely to be identified through intelligence gathering.

Maritime ISTAR—forgive the acronym, which stands for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—of which maritime surveillance is a part, will be essential. Without effective surveillance, both maritime and elsewhere, the UK armed forces are operating at a much reduced effectiveness.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

As the Chair knows, we are holding an inquiry into the consequences to the UK of an independent Scotland. How would Scotland becoming an independent state impact on future maritime surveillance for England, Wales and Northern Ireland?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Maritime surveillance is carried out at the moment in a nationwide fashion. To my mind, it is difficult to see how smaller units or entities could have a separate capability not backed up by MOD resources. We as a Committee have not reached that conclusion however, as my hon. Friend knows, because we have not yet concluded our inquiry into the defence consequences of an independent Scotland. When making their decision on independence, the Scottish people will need to take that issue very seriously into account. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that important point.

The 2010 SDSR gave a commitment to enhancing ISTAR. In reply to the debate or later, will the Minister say what progress has been made in taking forward the development and strengthening of maritime ISTAR? What actual measures can he tell us about? What risk are the Government taking in delivering maritime ISTAR for the future?

Our report also looked at the future of maritime surveillance capabilities and what was required. We thought, frankly, that the MOD was sending out mixed messages. On the one hand, its studies identified a maritime patrol aircraft as the solution in the short to medium term, but on the other hand, a maritime patrol aircraft is not in the equipment programme. The MOD seems prepared to wait until the 2015 SDSR before making any decisions or assessing options. It seems to regard the risk as tolerable, on the basis that such equipment could be bought with unprecedented speed and efficiency. I have high hopes for the MOD’s acquisition process being reformed dramatically, but that might be the triumph of hope over experience.

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend acknowledge that the report found that, though we had concerns over the situation in the short to medium term, the MOD has begun to explore options for future maritime surveillance in the much longer term, looking at unmanned systems and space technology in particular?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I do acknowledge that. My hon. Friend, whose membership of the Select Committee is extremely helpful, anticipates a point that I was about to come on to—as I would expect her to.

Situations change rapidly: we have been deployed in Libya, and we are now involved in Mali. The question is whether the Ministry of Defence could rapidly regenerate a maritime surveillance requirement. Will the Minister set out what general contingencies are in place to deal with the unexpected? The problem is that he probably cannot, because they are unexpected, but we nevertheless need to have a general ability to deal with contingencies.

We also highlighted the potential for further capability gaps to emerge in maritime surveillance. For example, the Sea King will be taken out of service in 2016, to be replaced by Project Crowsnest, operating from Merlin mark 2 helicopters. The Minister has now confirmed that there will be a capability gap, as Crowsnest is not coming into service until 2020 and existing assets will be required to cover the gap. Will he tell us why that gap has occurred, and why it was not better anticipated?

In the longer term, as my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) rightly points out, the Government have committed themselves to exploring all the alternatives for maritime surveillance provision, including unmanned aerial vehicles and hybrid air vehicles. We commend them on that approach and the work that they have already undertaken to facilitate it.

We are grateful to the Government for their commitment to keeping us updated on the issues and to including wider cross-Government issues in such updates. We look forward to the first update in summer 2013, and to the second in summer 2014. We expect the updates to be as full as possible and in a form that we can share as widely as possible. An important part of the work on future maritime surveillance will be specific work in the run-up to the next SDSR. Some might say that that will be the most important part of the next defence review.

[Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)]

I, too, welcome the opportunity to take part in this debate. As our Chairman, the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) said, a great deal of hard work went into the production of the report. I add my thanks to the Clerks and special advisers to the Committee. The report makes a very positive contribution to the debate on the future of maritime surveillance.

As the Chairman also said, the Committee has previously expressed serious concerns about the decision in the 2010 strategic defence and security review to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme. Despite all the associated problems that the Chairman rightly mentioned, its cancellation involved a vast waste of public money; even so, as he also said, the MOD described that as the least worst option—I dread to think what the other options would have been. The cancellation has been analysed and re-analysed by the Public Accounts Committee and others, and in any case it is a fait accompli, so instead of dwelling on that, it seemed logical for the Committee to concentrate on its consequences, and those of other decisions in the SDSR, for maritime surveillance now and in the future.

[Mr Graham Brady in the Chair]

Given that the protection of the nuclear deterrent would have been one of Nimrod’s primary roles, one main concern about the cancellation is the capability gap in deterrent protection that might arise. I for one—I may be the only one here—would like the nuclear deterrent to be cancelled altogether. However, the former Defence Secretary Lord Browne has called into question the like-for-like renewal of Trident, suggesting that people who support it

“want to pour limited national resources into an increasingly ineffective nuclear system while being unwilling either to call for higher defence spending to meet conventional shortfalls or to scale back the UK’s level of international ambition. They want a gold-standard nuclear deterrent while under-investing in everything else.”

We all know that many within the military share that perspective. At the very least, that is worth considering and, for example, it would free resources to fill the capability gap in maritime surveillance in relation to new threats.

We do not have the luxury of a crystal ball and must look at circumstances as they are. We know that it is almost universally accepted, including by the MOD, that a replacement maritime patrol aircraft programme would, along with other assets, afford the optimum capability for the next 20 years, but that will not be seriously considered until at least 2015. Will the Minister update us on that situation, because that seems an awful long time?

I want to concentrate on the capability gap as it affects the nuclear deterrent. To understand the implications of cancelling the Nimrod programme, it is useful to look at the wider assets that, historically, have been involved in the protection of the nuclear deterrent. For understandable reasons, the MOD is cautious about providing too much information about that. In 2007, the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) received an answer to his parliamentary question on the conventional forces that had either a committed or a contingent role in the protection of the nuclear deterrent which stated:

“In addition to the four Vanguard-class submarines, all of which are dedicated to Military Task 1.2—Nuclear Deterrence—the current planned force elements assigned to support nuclear deterrence are”—

in a primary role, one mine warfare vessel and one survey vessel and, as contingent, two attack submarines, one destroyer, three mine warfare vessels, one Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel, five Merlin helicopters and eight maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The broad order estimate of the costs was £25 million to £30 million for committed and about £250 million to £300 million for contingent for a range of tasks, including

“in support of the deterrent.”—[Official Report, 8 March 2007; Vol. 457, c. 2130-31W.]

In evidence to our Committee in November 2010, General Sir David Richards also made the point that maritime surveillance aircraft provide one of five layers of defence for the SSBN fleet, although he would not go into detail about those layers of activity, again for understandable reasons.

The fact remains that a gap in capability in the protection of the deterrent exists, and we need answers about what is to be done to fill the gap in the medium to long term. The Royal Navy SDSR question and answer document states:

“The NSC judge that there is a sufficient balance of capabilities within the SSBN, SSN, Frigate, RW”—

rotary wing—

“and MCM fleets to maintain the required level of assurance for CASD”—

continuous at-sea deterrence, and that the—

“decision to delete MRA 4 was made after carefully considering the risks associated with this.”

In written evidence to the Committee in 2012, the MOD specifically flagged up the following assets as playing a role in the protection of the nuclear deterrent: the SSN fleet—Trafalgar and Astute class—although the MOD highlighted that the primary role of the SSN is anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, including protection of the deterrent; and the Merlin HM mark 1 helicopter, which, the MOD noted,

“has evolved organic Anti Submarine Surveillance to a Maritime Patrol Helicopter multirole capability deployed globally and in support of the strategic deterrent.”

The MOD also informed our Committee that several international agreements allow allies to contribute directly to UK surveillance tasks in support of deterrent protection.

Of the list of assets alluded to in the SDSR, the Merlin HM mark 1 is the only asset whose primary role involves maritime surveillance. There are 40 Merlin helicopters in service with the Fleet Air Arm, in both training and front-line squadrons. All four squadrons are based at Royal Naval Air Station Culdrose in Cornwall. The helicopters have a range of 450 miles, and I understand that they are being upgraded to mark 2 and will enter service as such this year. Will the Minister confirm that?

With the indulgence of the House, Mr Brady, I will raise a local issue. The HMS Gannet search and rescue service at Prestwick airport will close in the next few years. It straddles my constituency and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr Donohoe). The airport is extremely important to our local area, and indeed to Scotland. It is suffering at the moment as a result of a number of factors, including the air passenger duty, and it is up for sale.

It seems daft on the surface that the Merlin helicopters, which protect the deterrent, are based hundreds of miles away in Cornwall when there is a site available on Faslane’s doorstep that has been used by helicopters for years. I urge the Minister to consider that matter, which may be small-scale in the grand scheme of things, but it is important to us locally, and I do not think that any Member will fault me for raising it.

To get back to the capability gap, several commentators gave evidence to the Committee, outlining their concerns about the potential shortcomings of helicopter maritime surveillance as a replacement for maritime patrol aircraft. The Coastal Command and Maritime Air Association said:

“The absence of the MPA together with a shortage of Towed Array fitted escorts, and the possible re-tasking of SSNs to land-strike targets (Tomahawk), results in a much reduced ASW capability. The helicopter is an effective ASW platform when operating relatively close to their base or battleship, but inevitably it has limited range and acoustic processing capability as well as restricted weapon-carrying capacity. Modern underwater detection systems using arrays fixed to the ocean bed and towed arrays on surface vessels—if one of those relatively few assets is available—can produce impressive results, but bad weather and noisy environments, both in the open sea and particularly at choke points, can totally disable these systems.”

Air Vice-Marshal A. L. Roberts, who is retired, also commented that

“while helicopter surveillance, in lieu of that by MPA, in support of the deterrent is entirely practicable in the approaches to Faslane, the range of the helicopter, if it is to remain on station for long, is limited. Adequate cover for the deterrent therefore becomes more difficult further out along transit routes and may be impracticable in SSBN patrol areas. The amount of noise generated in the water by a helicopter, which can be counter detected by any opposing submarine, is also a significant operational limitation.”

In March 2011, an article in Defence Management said:

“Mitigating the lack of Nimrods when it comes to clearing a path for Trident will be very asset-intensive in terms of Merlin ASW and towed-array frigates. But it is manageable. Just don’t expect those helicopters or frigates to be doing every task around the world that they currently undertake”.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) raised the matter in a debate in the Chamber on 26 January 2012. She is not here today because she has a constituency engagement. I am sorry about that because she really concentrates on this issue and is something of an expert on it.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I entirely confirm what the hon. Lady has just said. The hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) was the first to demand this inquiry, and has led it throughout. We are grateful to her for her commitment, even though she is not here today.

[Sandra Osborne]

That is entirely true. In the debate in the main Chamber, my hon. Friend referred to a letter that the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) sent to the Prime Minister in which he said:

“Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.”—[Official Report, 26 January 2012; Vol. 539, c. 466.]

Will the Minister tell us the state of play of these matters as they stand today?

My hon. Friend also referred to an article in The Scotsman, which said that a Type 42 destroyer had to be detached from Portsmouth when a Russian navy battle group appeared off the coast of Scotland. A number of Russian submarines have also made a similar appearance. Previously, we would have swiftly and discreetly despatched a Nimrod to keep an eye on the situation, but, on this occasion, we sent out a Type 42 destroyer. Clearly, that illustrates a problem; we do not know what is going on in such areas without a maritime patrol aircraft.

It is also the case that the north of Scotland, which is referred to as the “high north”—that is not something that I can identify with, as I refer to it as the highlands and islands—needs close attention as it is an area of strategic and economic importance in a fast-changing environment. I hope that the fast change does not include Scotland becoming a separate country from the UK as opposed to being the north of the UK, but I will not go down that road now. The Chairman of the Select Committee has already stated that we are in the throes of an inquiry into the defence implications of an independent Scotland.

I welcome the Minister’s input into these matters, which have been brought to the Committee’s attention by people who are astronomically more expert than I am, and I look forward to his response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my hon. Friend. I certainly do agree. It is good that we have those bodies, and I may speak about that a little at the end.

SDSR 2010 got rid of a number of frigates, including Type 22s and Type 23s, as well as their on-board helicopters. That has further reduced our maritime reach and capabilities. The good thing about such Royal Navy vessels is that they can travel great distances, remain at sea for considerable periods and, crucially, demonstrate intent and presence when that is needed, as part of a combined taskforce or individually.

Collectively, members of the Defence Committee are concerned about the loss of our sovereign long-range maritime surveillance capability. They are also concerned about the United Kingdom’s current dependency on its allies for operations out into the Atlantic and in terms of our wider military defence capability.

The Committee was advised that the anti-submarine warfare capability gap that resulted from the loss of the Nimrod MRA4 is covered by a mix of helicopters, ships at sea and support by our allies. I do not buy that argument. The external situation has not changed. Indeed, with a resurgent Russia and the proliferation of smaller submarines in many areas of the world, it has arguably got worse. To counter such threats, the UK has reduced its capability and capacity by removing maritime patrol aircraft completely, as well as by removing appropriate frigates and destroyers, including their organic helicopters.

As has been mentioned, the Ministry is considering a number of future options. In particular, a decision on maritime patrol aircraft may be considered as part of SDSR 2015. However, such a decision would result in delivery of the new operational capability closer to the 2020 time scale. I would prefer us not to wait until 2015 to make such a decision. I would like it to be considered as soon as possible.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Bob Stewart]

To my Chairman? With the greatest of pleasure.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Mr Brady, you are our Chairman, of course.

[Bob Stewart]

Forgive me, Mr Brady. Two Chairmen in one—I’ll buy it.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

My hon. Friend danced lightly over the possibility of regenerating the capacity and the skills to fly these aircraft. Such skills are difficult to maintain, let alone to regenerate. Is he coming to that important point, which needs to be covered?

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my other Chairman. The answer is that I was not, but I am glad that he has raised the matter. We also highlighted the difficulty of keeping these skills alive, and no one has mentioned it. Perhaps the Minister will tell us—you will, won’t you, Minister?

--- Later in debate ---

[Thomas Docherty]

As I said, I know that my hon. Friend played no part in the decision to proceed. I cannot quite remember who was the Minister responsible for acquisition in the previous Conservative Government, but perhaps it will come back to me later in the debate.

Not just Ministers need to take some responsibility for mistakes; Ministry of Defence officials and the Royal Air Force need to take some, too. There was an 86% change in the aircraft specification from the time of commissioning under that previous Minister and October 2010. Mr Brady, you worked in industry prior to coming to the House. You know that making that amount of change to a project means that costs will go up and it will be delayed.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Does 86% of the blame therefore need to lie with the Labour Government?

[Thomas Docherty]

I am sure that a previous Minister with responsibility for defence acquisition would always be happy to take responsibility for all the decisions that he made, even if he was not always fully aware of that at the time.

As our report on acquisition makes clear, the MOD must learn the lessons of past acquisition decisions. I think that I speak for the whole Committee when I say that, although we welcome the Government’s progress on acquisition, we are not convinced that they have learned all the lessons yet. There is still more work to be done. Perhaps the Minister will say more about what improvements can be made, in the light of those lessons.

The third responsible party is BAE Systems. It should not sit around and blame the MOD, the RAF and the two Governments, and try to get by without accepting some responsibility for its decisions. The Minister nods, and I welcome the fact that there is acceptance on both sides of the Chamber that BAE was not an exemplar: in much the same way as I have been critical of Lockheed Martin’s approach to the strike fighter, I consider that BAE Systems bears some blame.

--- Later in debate ---

[Thomas Docherty]

Well, I cannot possibly comment on the sums. However, that principle of not committing to a future increase in spending is exactly what this Government have done. We saw it again yesterday at Prime Minister’s questions, when the Prime Minister, in response to what was not the most difficult question from the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire, the Chairman of the Defence Committee—

[Mr Arbuthnot]

It was a very important question.

[Thomas Docherty]

Indeed, but in response to it the Prime Minister failed to give a clear commitment to increase spending.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be able to help us further? Has he heard Leader of the Opposition give a commitment to increase defence spending after 2015?

[Thomas Docherty]

I will say two things. First, I have heard my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition speak on many occasions of his great appreciation for the role of our armed forces. Secondly, however, I am also fairly conscious that I am not sitting on the Opposition Front Bench—

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Yet.

[Thomas Docherty]

It may not be happening any time soon after my earlier remarks, and I will perhaps leave it to other colleagues—including perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who is sitting on the Opposition Front Bench—to address the right hon. Gentleman’s point later in the debate.

The hon. Member for Beckenham made a point about seedcorn. On pages 41 and 42 of the Committee’s report, we very clearly tackled the point about seedcorn and future remuneration. We welcome seedcorn as a principle; we very much welcome the notion that we would use our international allies to provide training and personnel support. However, we are also very clear that we do not believe that that can continue beyond 2019, and we actually say that there is huge scepticism about it continuing until 2030. The more that we have examined the issue—again, the Minister can correct me if he wants to—the more that it looks as though 2030 is the realistic time line now, in light of both our inquiry and of course our recent correspondence with the Minister, before we will get back that full capability. I wonder whether the Minister has absolute confidence that our partners—particularly our Five Eye partners—will be able to continue to provide that support to us for effectively 17 years, or perhaps even longer?

On replacement platforms, I hope that one of the things that the Minister reflects on, particularly given the BAE Systems debacle, is that there are other ways to procure replacement platforms. Of course, he will be aware of the model of Saab aircraft. In effect, an existing, tried and proven airframe is taken and then the software is fitted on to that system. Obviously, that model needs to be considered in the light of our report on Tuesday about the need for a defence industrial strategy. Can the Minister confirm whether or not the MOD is actively considering that model as one of the options?

There has also been mention of what the MOD has now called remotely piloted aircraft, which we know as unmanned aerial vehicles, and their future role. Again, there was talk about joined-up government. When we had the debate before Christmas, with the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), who is the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement, the point was made by a number of colleagues that, in relation to maritime surveillance and the role of RPAs, a number of Departments clearly have an interest in maritime surveillance. The Minister might be able to correct me if I miss any on the list, but my note would say that, as well as the MOD, other Departments that have an interest in maritime surveillance include the Department for Transport and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which has lead responsibility for fishing and ensuring that Icelandic boats or, indeed, those of our European partners do not break the law. The Home Office has a role for maritime surveillance, as has the Foreign Office, with its responsibilities for overseas territories.

I hope that the Minister takes this as genuinely helpful advice: the Committee believes that we need a much more joined-up Government. Perhaps the Minister can clarify, in a way that the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement could not, what proactive steps the Department is taking to bring other Departments together to discuss whether we can have a shared acquisition policy for RPA, rather than having four Departments acting differently.

I think that, up to now, this has been a genuinely consensual debate, but the final issue I want to raise, which we touched on in the report, is slightly contentious with the Department. It is about the wide area maritime underwater search project. My colleagues know more about it than I do, so I will not go into any great detail. The Committee feels that WAMUS is an exercise that should have been carried out before or during the SDSR and not afterwards, while we were undertaking an inquiry. It was only after extensive questioning by the Chairman of the Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) that we discovered that the RAF and the Ministry of Defence had failed to tell us that the WAMUS project had not only started but had been completed while we were carrying out our SDSR inquiry. Air Vice-Marshal Green and the Minister’s predecessor both accepted that the information should have been shared with the Committee.

I am not suggesting that the RAF, the MOD and the Minister were malicious in withholding information, but I do suggest that there was either arrogance on the part of the Department—not the Minister—or incompetence. I think that it is fair to say that the Chairman of the Committee expressed his disappointment with both the Royal Air Force and the Minister. Mr Brady, I am sure that when the Chairman of the Committee was Chief Whip you never gave him the opportunity to express his disappointment in you. As one of the members of the Committee to whom that has occasionally happened, I can assure you that the Chairman’s disappointment is something that one does not seek to invoke. I hope that, in his response, the Minister will set out how the MOD has learnt the lesson of that mistake and how it is ensuring that the Committee is not let down by the Department again.

I commend the report to the House. This has been an excellent debate, and I look forward to hearing from colleagues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

I am delighted to take part in this extended Defence Committee discussion in Westminster Hall, which is, of course, open to a wide audience. As a former member of the Select Committee, I take this opportunity to pay tribute not just to the Chairman, who is my next-door neighbour in Hampshire, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot)—distinguished neighbour and Select Committee Chairman though he is—but to the entire Committee and its advisers for their detailed analysis of important policy and project considerations. In so doing, the Committee provides an immense service to not just the House of Commons, but the wider public and the Ministry of Defence and its officials.

I confess that I had not realised that the debate would be happening today, but as soon as I heard that it would be I decided that I would like to take part. This is the first time I have taken part in a detailed debate on defence matters since I ceased to be the Minister with responsibility for international security strategy at the Ministry of Defence, and I participate because I feel so passionately about the issue.

Maritime surveillance is of fantastic importance to this country and as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) said in an intervention on the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), it is not simply about the protection of the deterrent. I salute 201 Squadron and the other Nimrod squadrons that perform that fantastically important role. They provide a hugely important capability that is applicable all around the world; we face a much more dangerous and volatile world now than ever before. The capability also, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham pointed out, has a civil dimension. We have responsibilities under the international convention on maritime search and rescue. I think that is what it is called; I tried to establish the exact title, although I seem to remember from my days in the Department that it is called the Chicago convention. As my hon. Friend said, the United Kingdom has an obligation to provide search and rescue right out into the Atlantic, but currently we are not able to provide that capability. It is important to see this as part of a jigsaw. It is not just the United Kingdom providing support for the United Kingdom and the international waters for which we have responsibility, but part of an interlocking NATO capability.

A year ago, I had the great pleasure and privilege of visiting Norway, where the royal Norwegian air force was kind enough to entrust me with its P-3 Orion. [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend the Minister need not worry; I came back safe and sound. I had the Norwegian Defence Minister as a passenger. It was an interesting experience because it enabled me to see not only what the maritime patrol capability delivers, but the role played by our allies. I pay tribute to the royal Norwegian air force for its part in policing the sea lanes between the Russian port of Murmansk and these islands. At 2 o’clock in the afternoon, when one is in complete darkness there, 1,000 feet over black, black water with no horizon and just endless water stretching to the Arctic, it is interesting to realise that without those people the sea lanes would not be patrolled. Mention has been made of the activity that the Russians undertake, and which their forebears in the Soviet Union undertook: sending their submarines around to the north-west coast of the United Kingdom, in particular to Scotland and the constituency of the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Sandra Osborne), to observe what we are up to.

The deterrent is a key part of Britain’s defence capability. I will not go into any more detail than has already been given, because we are in danger of trespassing on classified territory, but mention has been made of the importance of the deterrent and the maritime patrol capability in delivering its protection. It is terribly important, therefore, to understand the significance of the capability, and to understand too that it is part of a jigsaw with our neighbours and our NATO allies, and a key element of the defence of the free world.

I must, of course, respond to the charge that I was a member of the Department when we made the decision, as was my right hon. Friend the Minister. We were both there at the time, and it is fair to point out that although the Ministry of Defence was a key part of the whole strategic defence and security review process, there were also other players, not least the National Security Council. I have to say that I think this was the most serious capability gap that we created, but I, at least, did not create it without understanding its significance. I asked the National Security Adviser, Sir Peter Ricketts, “Does the National Security Council understand the significance of the loss of the capability?” I was given the wonderful mandarin response, “Oh, I don’t think you need to worry, Minister; I think they’re fully aware.” Frankly, I do not believe that people in the Government have been fully aware of the significance of the loss.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

To be fair to the National Security Council, describing it as a loss of a capability implies that the capability was in service, which it was not yet, due to aerodynamic and other difficulties with the aeroplane itself.

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for providing me with my cue. It says in the few brief notes that I scribbled down, “Reasons for cancellation”. The first reason for cancellation was indeed that BAE Systems had persistently failed to deliver.

BAE Systems is headquartered in my constituency, and there are people who think that I am in BAE’s pay. Lady Thatcher once said to me, “I hope BAE is still paying you.” BAE Systems has never paid me a penny piece in my life. I think that it is a great company, but on this project, as successive major project reports and National Audit Office reports showed, it failed to deliver. For those who do not understand what I mean when I say that BAE was the design authority—I speak as an aviator—the company is responsible for the design of every bit of the aeroplane. BAE did not even know that the wingsets were about 4 inches different, so it had to more or less hand-make whole new wingsets for each aircraft. That is why I believe the company to be culpable. Yes, I take the point that perhaps more diligence should have been shown by technical officials in the Department, but Ministers cannot be expected to understand all the details of aerodynamics.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

That does not surprise me at all. If we had more time, I could bore Members with some of the ludicrous ideas that were presented to me when I was a Minister by the Treasury, showing a lack of understanding.

The Ministry of Defence claims to have balanced the budget, even though we do not know what is on the whiteboard. The Minister said again this afternoon that he is not prepared to tell us what is on the whiteboard. Is the replacement on there, yes or no? Is, for example, Sentinel, another very important piece of kit, on the whiteboard? Even though it has been deployed to Mali, the Secretary of State indicated in Defence questions the other day that it will somehow be reprieved. If so, what is coming off the budget? Last week’s NAO report said that the £8 billion put aside in reserve may not be enough even to cover the risk in the existing programme. The hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff) keeps asking at Defence questions for that whiteboard. Until we get to see that and what is actually in the equipment budget, there is no way of telling when the capability will be put forward.

When the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) came before the Committee, he was clear that there was no money or indication to replace this capability until 2015. There are unanswered questions. There is clearly a capability gap; the Government admit that. The Committee and the NAO report identified that. No solution has been put forward to resolve that.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Would the shadow Minister tell us whether the Leader of the Opposition is committed to increasing defence spending year-on-year in real terms after 2015?

[Mr Jones]

I am surprised by the right hon. Gentleman. He is usually non-partisan in such matters. If we do not know what is on the whiteboard, what the budget is or the state of the remaining 55% of the budget, it is difficult to make that determination. The Government made claims last week when they got the figures mixed up and did not understand that the 1% applies only to the equipment budget, not the remaining 55%. Even the NAO report says that that might be swallowed up just by the risk in the existing programme. We need to know such things. Until we do, it is difficult to know what will be capable of replacing this piece of kit.

It has been a good debate, which shows the cross-party nature of the Defence Committee at its best. However, the Government, with the short-sighted decisions they took in the SDSR, among many others, have created a huge capability gap that I fear will have strategic implications for the nation for many years.