Maritime Surveillance

Thomas Docherty Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Arbuthnot]

No, that was a joke—at least, I think it was. But the cancellation of the project was the one change that troubled the Ministry of Defence most in the SDSR. The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff told the Defence Committee:

“It would be fair to say that among the Chiefs of Staff and in the military advice, it was one of the most difficult decisions to come to terms with, because it has multiple uses.”

In the Government’s answer to the concerns that the Defence Committee expressed in our report on the SDSR of August 2011, they said:

“Like the Committee we regret that we had to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme. It was a capability that we would, in an ideal world, have preferred to acquire…we reluctantly concluded that cancellation was the least bad option.”

The reason for that unhappiness was described to us by Professor Julian Lindley-French. He told us that

“the point is that of the seven military tasks in the SDSR, the MRA4 could have played a very important role in all of them. It was the loss of the enablers, because the single services were forced back to defend their own core competencies by the process, which for me was the biggest failing of the SDSR process. Forget all the strategic stuff: there was a haggle at that last weekend, which was utterly unacceptable in terms of the national strategic requirements.”

The report that the Defence Committee produced earlier this week on defence acquisition contains a bit of an echo of that statement.

In our report on the strategic defence and security review, we expressed concern about the resultant capability gaps of cancelling MRA4. In their response, the Government acknowledged that there is currently no single asset or collection of assets that could fully mitigate the resultant capability gap. That is enough about Nimrod; let us look at the other assets and look to the future.

The Government said in 2011 that they continued

“to maximise the use of…assets”—

other than Nimrod—

“such as Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Helicopters, Sentry and C-130 to contribute to Anti-Submarine Warfare, Search and Rescue and Maritime Counter-Terrorism where possible. In the longer term, if the Government were to conclude that it needed to close the gaps completely because”

threats emerged that could no longer be managed in the same way as today,

“some additional funding or reprioritisation would be required.”

In our report, “Future Maritime Surveillance”, we concentrated on the strategic requirements for maritime surveillance, identifying current capability gaps and the future requirements for maritime surveillance and how they might be met. Given the wide range of maritime surveillance tasks and the number of Departments and agencies that require access to maritime surveillance capabilities, we also looked at cross-Government co-operation. We published our report in September 2012 and the Government’s response in December 2012. We have also placed on our website the Minister’s response to some follow-up issues that we raised following the Government’s response. I am grateful to him for that.

I pay tribute to the Committee’s staff and military advisers, who provide us with invaluable support and advice. We are all grateful to them. I would like to thank personally the Committee members themselves. They work extremely hard to very good effect, which is one of the reasons why chairing it is the best job that I have ever had.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way and I apologise for being slightly late. May I point out that the reason why it is such a good Committee is that its Chairman is so excellent?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

The hon. Gentleman might say that, but as a former Chief Whip, I couldn’t possibly comment.

The threats that require maritime surveillance are evolving and have become more non-military in nature. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 rather illustrate that, in that they were launched from the sea. Our report concluded that it was a weakness that there was not a single individual within the Ministry of Defence who should be responsible for maritime surveillance. The Government did not agree.

We acknowledged that the new joint forces command could have a role in delivering, co-ordinating and strengthening maritime surveillance. We are nevertheless disappointed that the Government do not think that there is a requirement for an individual within the MOD to take responsibility for maritime surveillance. We accept that it is not the JFC’s role, but we are concerned that the left hand of the MOD may not know what its right hand is doing, let alone be able to co-ordinate the interests of the MOD with all the other Departments and agencies that require maritime surveillance capabilities.

Here I begin a number of requests to the Minister for information, which I will be grateful if he responds to, if not in today’s debate, perhaps in writing later, with whatever degree of classification he considers necessary. It will be helpful if he first outlines how the co-ordination that we are concerned about is being taken forward, particularly as the MOD starts work on the 2015 SDSR. Our concerns were highlighted when we were told that there was an “informal group of Ministers” who were responsible for taking forward maritime surveillance issues.

Although decisions may ultimately be taken in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we thought there should be greater ministerial involvement. This contains an echo of our report, “Defence and Cyber-Security”, published in January this year and our report, “Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses”, published in February last year: we worry that Ministers faced with a threat or a vulnerability that crosses departmental responsibilities have inadequate structures and insufficient practice in getting together to work out responses, which may be needed very quickly indeed.

Against that, we welcome the establishment of the maritime security oversight group and the National Maritime Information Centre. The Government told us that the risk assessment was expected to be completed in December 2012. Will the Minister update us on progress? What threats, including new ones, have been identified? Such strategic analysis is important. Future threats are increasingly likely to be identified through intelligence gathering.

Maritime ISTAR—forgive the acronym, which stands for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—of which maritime surveillance is a part, will be essential. Without effective surveillance, both maritime and elsewhere, the UK armed forces are operating at a much reduced effectiveness.

--- Later in debate ---

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Brady. I commend the Committee for its excellent report; I too have had the pleasure of serving under the chairmanship of the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot). I would probably bow to no one in my respect for the knowledge that the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) has of ageing military capabilities. [Laughter.]

[Bob Stewart]

I take that personally; I will get you later.

[Thomas Docherty]

I look forward to being shepherded out safely by the Doorkeepers later.

If the decision about the carrier was the largest financial decision, the break-up of the Nimrod aircraft is probably the most visually impressive one to come out of the 2010 SDSR. I do not think that there is anyone who did not watch those images of JCBs tearing up a multi-billion pound project with incredulity. I shall touch briefly on the lessons that the MOD must learn and things that the Committee has discussed in our subsequent report on defence acquisition.

Quite a lot has been said about the Nimrod model and its role, but other capabilities were deleted as a result of the SDSR. The most notable for maritime surveillance was, of course, the Type 22 frigate, which the hon. Member for Beckenham also mentioned. The Type 22 was, as the report says, originally designed and constructed purely as an anti-submarine warfare vessel during the cold war. In its latter years, it took on a broader role, and the Committee was, I think, unconvinced by some of the MOD’s arguments that that capability had been fully covered. Perhaps the new Minister for the Armed Forces will say something about how that matter is being addressed. I should probably take this opportunity to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his promotion to his new role.

[Mr Robathan]

You are kind. It was six months ago.

[Thomas Docherty]

It feels like yesterday, I am sure, to many in the MOD. I had the pleasure of serving with the Minister in the Armed Forces Bill Committee when he was merely an Under-Secretary, and I thank him for the letter that he kindly sent me this morning on another matter; I am most grateful that we could resolve the issue. Obviously, he is not directly responsible for many of the decisions, or the comments made by the MOD on the report; but of course he believes in collective responsibility, and I am sure that he will be happy to respond in relation to his predecessor’s comments and to our observations. I have a huge amount of time for the Minister’s predecessor, who was very able and sound, which is probably why the Deputy Prime Minister got rid of him in the Liberal Democrat reshuffle.

Without a doubt, as we said on the acquisition report earlier this week, many decisions in the lead-up to the SDSR were rushed and not fully thought through. Thinking was not done for the long term. With a little charity towards the Government, I must say that the programme is probably the finest example of how not to procure. Four parties each bear some responsibility. First, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who played no part in the decision when he was at the Ministry of Defence, will accept that my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) and other colleagues over the years perhaps did not provide enough scrutiny of the acquisition process.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend must remember that the contract was procured under the previous Conservative Government. If I remember rightly, when I was on the Select Committee, we produced a report suggesting that it should have been cancelled back in the early 2000s. I think that I moved the amendment.

[Thomas Docherty]

As I said, I know that my hon. Friend played no part in the decision to proceed. I cannot quite remember who was the Minister responsible for acquisition in the previous Conservative Government, but perhaps it will come back to me later in the debate.

Not just Ministers need to take some responsibility for mistakes; Ministry of Defence officials and the Royal Air Force need to take some, too. There was an 86% change in the aircraft specification from the time of commissioning under that previous Minister and October 2010. Mr Brady, you worked in industry prior to coming to the House. You know that making that amount of change to a project means that costs will go up and it will be delayed.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Does 86% of the blame therefore need to lie with the Labour Government?

[Thomas Docherty]

I am sure that a previous Minister with responsibility for defence acquisition would always be happy to take responsibility for all the decisions that he made, even if he was not always fully aware of that at the time.

As our report on acquisition makes clear, the MOD must learn the lessons of past acquisition decisions. I think that I speak for the whole Committee when I say that, although we welcome the Government’s progress on acquisition, we are not convinced that they have learned all the lessons yet. There is still more work to be done. Perhaps the Minister will say more about what improvements can be made, in the light of those lessons.

The third responsible party is BAE Systems. It should not sit around and blame the MOD, the RAF and the two Governments, and try to get by without accepting some responsibility for its decisions. The Minister nods, and I welcome the fact that there is acceptance on both sides of the Chamber that BAE was not an exemplar: in much the same way as I have been critical of Lockheed Martin’s approach to the strike fighter, I consider that BAE Systems bears some blame.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman is being entirely fair. The fault on the programme rests wholly and entirely with BAE Systems. It was the design authority on the aircraft and should have understood its technical capabilities. No two wing sets were the same. My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the then Minister for Defence Procurement, was perfectly entitled to rely on the bid that was put in and on the advice of the civil servants. It is not fair to blame Ministers. I do not think that it is even fair to blame officials. I think that BAE Systems, as the design authority for that aircraft, is entirely responsible for what ended as a disaster.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am always grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s thoughtful comments. I respectfully disagree, in this sense: I was having a private dinner with members of the defence community last night, and we were talking about lack of intellectual curiosity. There were examples that I shall not go into today, but I think that far too often there is a lack of the intellectual curiosity to challenge defence procurement decisions, among those in uniform, politicians—both in the Committee and perhaps in Departments—and civil servants. Too often, Governments have simply gone along with what they are told. But I absolutely accept the hon. Gentleman’s point that BAE Systems is a major villain in this play. Nevertheless, the current Government need to take some responsibility, and I will explain why shortly.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Sandra Osborne), who has had to step out briefly, talked about Nimrod and the deterrent. I was actually wondering at one point if I had wandered into a deterrent debate. She mentioned Lord Browne of Ladyton, who has been a friend of mine for more than 15 years. I typed up—I will not say that I wrote—his maiden speech for him, back in the days of 7 Millbank, Mr Brady, when you, too, first entered the House. You will remember—it is not so many years ago—Mr Browne, as he was then, as a new MP. I have a huge amount of respect for Lord Browne, but I respectfully disagree with his analysis yesterday in The Daily Telegraph. It was a thoughtful piece, but Lord Browne—who, as I say, I have known for many years and regard as a friend—has a habit of treating a conversation as a one- way talk, and I hope that what he has actually done is to help to stimulate a broader debate.

[Bob Stewart]

He was a friend of yours.

[Thomas Docherty]

Much in the same way that the hon. Gentleman is a friend of mine, probably.

As I was saying, my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock made a thoughtful contribution this afternoon, but again I must respectfully say that her logic is back to front. We need to make a decision about the deterrent and then decide, in effect, the relatively minor costs of providing maritime surveillance; maritime surveillance needs to come second. We do not say whether or not we will have a maritime surveillance capability and therefore whether or not we will have the deterrent, but I suspect that we will have that debate on more than one occasion in the next two to three years.

[Bob Stewart]

I respectfully disagree with the hon. Gentleman. We do not just need maritime patrol aircraft for the deterrent; we need maritime patrol aircraft because of our international responsibilities of oversight out to 1,200 nautical miles, and we cannot do that properly at the moment.

[Thomas Docherty]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I will come on to that very point shortly.

There has been some discussion already about the joint equipment programme and the whiteboard, and we have touched on the balanced budget. Without prejudging what the Minister might say in response to the debate, I suspect that that might be one of the arguments that he seeks to advance. He knows well my view—and, I think, that of the Defence Committee—and that is a healthy scepticism about the claims that have been made about the size of the so-called black hole and whether or not, in the space of eight months, it has been balanced.

One of the things that concerned us in producing our report was an issue that was touched on briefly by the hon. Member for Beckenham: the long-term replacement for the maritime surveillance capability is sitting on the whiteboard, without a funding line and without even a probable time line for moving off that whiteboard and into the joint equipment programme. I wonder whether the Minister, when he responds to the debate, will clarify for the House what the status is of the whiteboard. The Minister shakes his head. With the greatest of respect to him, it is difficult for the Defence Committee to believe that the Ministry of Defence has a fully funded JEP and a clear idea of what is on the whiteboard when they will not tell us what is on the whiteboard.

[Mr Robathan]

Until now, the hon. Gentleman has been making rather a lot of sense—it is unlike me to compliment him, as he knows—but the whole point of the whiteboard is that we look at things that we want to have and then we assess whether we can afford them, and if everything that we thought that we would like to have was revealed to everyone else, I am afraid that we probably would not be mentioning a whiteboard at all, because we would not want to have our internal thinking announced before we have got as far as making decisions. These are not decisions; these are things that we want to have.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am very conscious that the title of this debate is “Maritime Surveillance” rather than “Acquisition”; I suspect that we may well seek a broader debate on acquisition. Let me just say to the Minister—again, I thank him for his career-helpful advice and praise—that maritime surveillance, as the Committee has so clearly identified, is not a “like” or a “nice to have”. It is absolutely essential.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am intrigued by the Minister’s intervention on my hon. Friend. Is that not exactly what the Government did when they came into power in May 2010? They added up every piece of equipment in the future equipment programme, which covered 10 years and not one year, and somehow assumed that that is where we get to the figure of the black hole.

[Thomas Docherty]

That is entirely what happened. Let us just remind ourselves that the so-called black hole is a single line from a National Audit Office report from before the 2010 general election that said—

[Mr Jones]

It was in 2009.

[Thomas Docherty]

Indeed. I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. It said that if there was no increase in defence equipment spending during the next decade and all the current programmes went ahead, that would create a £38 billion black hole.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry, but it did not actually say that. It said £36 billion. I do not know where the extra £2 billion came from.

[Thomas Docherty]

Well, I cannot possibly comment on the sums. However, that principle of not committing to a future increase in spending is exactly what this Government have done. We saw it again yesterday at Prime Minister’s questions, when the Prime Minister, in response to what was not the most difficult question from the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire, the Chairman of the Defence Committee—

[Mr Arbuthnot]

It was a very important question.

[Thomas Docherty]

Indeed, but in response to it the Prime Minister failed to give a clear commitment to increase spending.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be able to help us further? Has he heard Leader of the Opposition give a commitment to increase defence spending after 2015?

[Thomas Docherty]

I will say two things. First, I have heard my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition speak on many occasions of his great appreciation for the role of our armed forces. Secondly, however, I am also fairly conscious that I am not sitting on the Opposition Front Bench—

[Mr Arbuthnot]

Yet.

[Thomas Docherty]

It may not be happening any time soon after my earlier remarks, and I will perhaps leave it to other colleagues—including perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who is sitting on the Opposition Front Bench—to address the right hon. Gentleman’s point later in the debate.

The hon. Member for Beckenham made a point about seedcorn. On pages 41 and 42 of the Committee’s report, we very clearly tackled the point about seedcorn and future remuneration. We welcome seedcorn as a principle; we very much welcome the notion that we would use our international allies to provide training and personnel support. However, we are also very clear that we do not believe that that can continue beyond 2019, and we actually say that there is huge scepticism about it continuing until 2030. The more that we have examined the issue—again, the Minister can correct me if he wants to—the more that it looks as though 2030 is the realistic time line now, in light of both our inquiry and of course our recent correspondence with the Minister, before we will get back that full capability. I wonder whether the Minister has absolute confidence that our partners—particularly our Five Eye partners—will be able to continue to provide that support to us for effectively 17 years, or perhaps even longer?

On replacement platforms, I hope that one of the things that the Minister reflects on, particularly given the BAE Systems debacle, is that there are other ways to procure replacement platforms. Of course, he will be aware of the model of Saab aircraft. In effect, an existing, tried and proven airframe is taken and then the software is fitted on to that system. Obviously, that model needs to be considered in the light of our report on Tuesday about the need for a defence industrial strategy. Can the Minister confirm whether or not the MOD is actively considering that model as one of the options?

There has also been mention of what the MOD has now called remotely piloted aircraft, which we know as unmanned aerial vehicles, and their future role. Again, there was talk about joined-up government. When we had the debate before Christmas, with the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), who is the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement, the point was made by a number of colleagues that, in relation to maritime surveillance and the role of RPAs, a number of Departments clearly have an interest in maritime surveillance. The Minister might be able to correct me if I miss any on the list, but my note would say that, as well as the MOD, other Departments that have an interest in maritime surveillance include the Department for Transport and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which has lead responsibility for fishing and ensuring that Icelandic boats or, indeed, those of our European partners do not break the law. The Home Office has a role for maritime surveillance, as has the Foreign Office, with its responsibilities for overseas territories.

I hope that the Minister takes this as genuinely helpful advice: the Committee believes that we need a much more joined-up Government. Perhaps the Minister can clarify, in a way that the Minister with responsibility for defence procurement could not, what proactive steps the Department is taking to bring other Departments together to discuss whether we can have a shared acquisition policy for RPA, rather than having four Departments acting differently.

I think that, up to now, this has been a genuinely consensual debate, but the final issue I want to raise, which we touched on in the report, is slightly contentious with the Department. It is about the wide area maritime underwater search project. My colleagues know more about it than I do, so I will not go into any great detail. The Committee feels that WAMUS is an exercise that should have been carried out before or during the SDSR and not afterwards, while we were undertaking an inquiry. It was only after extensive questioning by the Chairman of the Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) that we discovered that the RAF and the Ministry of Defence had failed to tell us that the WAMUS project had not only started but had been completed while we were carrying out our SDSR inquiry. Air Vice-Marshal Green and the Minister’s predecessor both accepted that the information should have been shared with the Committee.

I am not suggesting that the RAF, the MOD and the Minister were malicious in withholding information, but I do suggest that there was either arrogance on the part of the Department—not the Minister—or incompetence. I think that it is fair to say that the Chairman of the Committee expressed his disappointment with both the Royal Air Force and the Minister. Mr Brady, I am sure that when the Chairman of the Committee was Chief Whip you never gave him the opportunity to express his disappointment in you. As one of the members of the Committee to whom that has occasionally happened, I can assure you that the Chairman’s disappointment is something that one does not seek to invoke. I hope that, in his response, the Minister will set out how the MOD has learnt the lesson of that mistake and how it is ensuring that the Committee is not let down by the Department again.

I commend the report to the House. This has been an excellent debate, and I look forward to hearing from colleagues.

[Mr Graham Brady (in the Chair)]

Before I call Sir Gerald Howarth, I want to say that I hope the wind-ups will start at or by 4 o’clock.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for providing me with my cue. It says in the few brief notes that I scribbled down, “Reasons for cancellation”. The first reason for cancellation was indeed that BAE Systems had persistently failed to deliver.

BAE Systems is headquartered in my constituency, and there are people who think that I am in BAE’s pay. Lady Thatcher once said to me, “I hope BAE is still paying you.” BAE Systems has never paid me a penny piece in my life. I think that it is a great company, but on this project, as successive major project reports and National Audit Office reports showed, it failed to deliver. For those who do not understand what I mean when I say that BAE was the design authority—I speak as an aviator—the company is responsible for the design of every bit of the aeroplane. BAE did not even know that the wingsets were about 4 inches different, so it had to more or less hand-make whole new wingsets for each aircraft. That is why I believe the company to be culpable. Yes, I take the point that perhaps more diligence should have been shown by technical officials in the Department, but Ministers cannot be expected to understand all the details of aerodynamics.

[Thomas Docherty]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I will not, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, because I feel passionately about the issue, and I want to get my comments on the record and hear what my right hon. Friend and former esteemed ministerial colleague has to say.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire is right: the aircraft, which was already nine years late, had not been accepted into service by the Royal Air Force. I was told, for example, that it was porpoising through the air, and that BAE was going to deal with that by installing software to make the elevator go up and down. Forgive me, but that is metal against metal. I said to the then Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Glenn Torpy, “It’s going to wear out.” He said, “You don’t need to worry, Gerald,” but I do worry, and I did at the time. I was also told, although I do not know whether it is true, that at a certain high angle of attack, the air flow into the engine intakes was disrupted, which would lead the engine to stall. There were technical problems that were not overcome.

Secondly, as the report mentions, there was a question of finance. Again, I want to put this firmly on record. Leaving aside the £36 billion, £38 billion or whatever black hole it was, whatever chaos there was in the Department’s finances—there was chaos in the MOD’s accounts long before the last Government came into office—the fact is that this Government inherited a budget deficit of £156 billion, and we had to deal with that deficit.

I would not say this to my colleagues, but it might be true of other people listening to this debate: hands up, those who knew what the budget deficit was in 2010. I addressed a land warfare conference of 300 officers. Three put up their hands, and all three got it wrong. They were intelligent people. The country needs to understand. If people do not understand the magnitude of the deficit that we inherited—that £156 billion would have bought us three Type 45 destroyers every week of the year—nothing done in the Ministry of Defence can possibly make any sense whatever.

[Thomas Docherty]

What is it now?

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

The deficit is down, but not far enough, because of the magnitude of the challenge that faced us. Instead of pointing at me, the hon. Gentleman should get up and apologise for what his ghastly, contemptible friend the then Prime Minister did to this country—

[Thomas Docherty]

On a point of order, Mr Brady. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman, for whom I have great respect, is a little over-emotional and will want to withdraw his remarks about my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown).

[Mr Graham Brady (in the Chair)]

It is always advisable to use temperate language, especially in the Chamber. I am sure that Sir Gerald will wish to do so.

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am most grateful, Mr Brady. I just feel nothing but contempt for him. That is a personal view, and if it is unparliamentary, I am sorry.

[Thomas Docherty]

Further to that point of order, Mr Brady. I have been gracious enough to say that I think the hon. Gentleman probably regrets it. Will he now withdraw what he said about my right hon. Friend?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I am not surprised at that. I have dealt with the Treasury myself when in the Ministry of Defence. The current Secretary of State is doing the Treasury’s bidding, no doubt. What I am about to say might sound strange: at least the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), the former Secretary of State, actually argued for defence and got into disagreements. To be fair to him, he tried his best on that decision. The whole problem with the SDSR was that it put the Treasury in the driving seat. My experience of dealing with Treasury officials about our budget when I was a Minister was that they had limited knowledge and understanding of how defence works in practice. That is one of the weaknesses: letting the lion into the room, with very little understanding of how defence works.

[Thomas Docherty]

On the point of being Treasury-driven, we mentioned the deterrent several times. Is my hon. Friend as surprised as me that, in a written answer to me last year, the Treasury stated that, although leading the review of the deterrent, its representatives had not once set foot in the MOD building, and that not one single admiral or air marshal had gone across to the Cabinet Office to see them?

[Mr Jones]

That does not surprise me at all. If we had more time, I could bore Members with some of the ludicrous ideas that were presented to me when I was a Minister by the Treasury, showing a lack of understanding.

The Ministry of Defence claims to have balanced the budget, even though we do not know what is on the whiteboard. The Minister said again this afternoon that he is not prepared to tell us what is on the whiteboard. Is the replacement on there, yes or no? Is, for example, Sentinel, another very important piece of kit, on the whiteboard? Even though it has been deployed to Mali, the Secretary of State indicated in Defence questions the other day that it will somehow be reprieved. If so, what is coming off the budget? Last week’s NAO report said that the £8 billion put aside in reserve may not be enough even to cover the risk in the existing programme. The hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff) keeps asking at Defence questions for that whiteboard. Until we get to see that and what is actually in the equipment budget, there is no way of telling when the capability will be put forward.

When the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) came before the Committee, he was clear that there was no money or indication to replace this capability until 2015. There are unanswered questions. There is clearly a capability gap; the Government admit that. The Committee and the NAO report identified that. No solution has been put forward to resolve that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend asks a good question, but I am afraid that I cannot answer at this moment. I will write to him and let him know but, certainly, technological advance does not go away—it has happened.

We have not been idle in dealing with the consequences of the decision. Revised plans and operating procedures are in place for other platforms to mitigate the absence of a maritime patrol aircraft capability. I will not go into too much detail, as some things are classified, but we can request support from allies and partners if necessary and we have established a seedcorn initiative to maintain the skills and knowledge necessary to operate maritime patrol aircraft in the future, should circumstances change. I was in New Zealand last year and saw some of our RAF personnel who were taking part in the seedcorn initiative. They said it was extremely valuable, and I thought it also sounded like a pretty good posting.

[Thomas Docherty]

The Committee said that we support seedcorn, which was a sensible move by the Government, but we were specifically concerned that the capability could not be maintained beyond 2019. Given the ongoing delays, what reassurances can the Minister offer to the Committee that that issue has been met?

[Mr Robathan]

That is a perfectly good question. We are coming up to another SDSR in two years’ time, when we will consider how to take this forward. I was going to cover the subject subsequently, but we are stretched for time. Hot off the press, I point out to my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) that some of the equipment destined for the MRA4 is now destined for the Merlin Mark 2 from 2015. Living within our means will continue to guide our decisions. Hard-headed realism and rigour will determine what we buy.

I have many things that I want to put on the record, but the sitting ends at 4.30 pm, so I must be circumspect in what I say. I turn to submarines, which have been much discussed. Submarines use their stealth and global reach to collect information, indications and warnings of threatening activity; where appropriate, they operate in support of naval taskforces. Bringing in the Astute submarine is a major step forward; it is a quieter submarine and gives us greater capabilities. Also, internationally we are not operating alone. Not only the French and Norwegians, but the Americans and Canadians can provide support through maritime patrol aircraft. We have existing agreements with some of those countries and have recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Norway to co-operate on maritime air surveillance. We are also supporting a NATO smart defence initiative to look at long-term solutions to challenges, which could involve buying maritime patrol aircraft.

We are not complacent. There is a great deal of agreement in the Chamber that this is something we wish to have: greater ability for maritime surveillance. We are looking at ways to have that in future. In order to answer the questions, however, I will not go through the rest of my speech, except to comment on the helicopters. We are looking at the Merlin Mark 2 coming into service this year—two are already in service—and we have SKASaC or Sea King airborne surveillance and control, which will operate until 2016, although the airframe is quite aged, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) said. We are not in any way suggesting that life is perfect at the moment.

When winding up, one should answer Members, so I will give some replies. My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire asked five questions. We see co-ordination of maritime surveillance as being done by the maritime security oversight group, up to the National Security Council. I agree that further development is needed, and I think that it will develop further. His second question was on the strategic analysis of maritime threats and the need for surveillance. I do not have a specific answer, because that is something we are doing the whole time. If he wants to ask a specific question later, I am happy to answer it. On progress on developing maritime ISTAR, some is classified, but optimisation study is going on as we speak. The air ISTAR optimisation study will consider the potential contribution to maritime surveillance of lighter-than-air vehicles, which were mentioned earlier; the initial report will appear in April this year, for consideration of options by April next year. His fourth question was the general ability to deal with contingency operations. Generally, contingency—a much overused word in the MOD—seems to rule everything at the moment. After Afghanistan, that is very much where we are looking. His fifth question was on updates, which we will continue to provide. If we do not, he can come back to me and ask for them, as I certainly will update him.

I did not entirely agree with the point made by the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Sandra Osborne) on the deterrent, although I entirely agreed with her point about Scottish separation. We have layers of defence for the deterrent, so I echo the CDS, and I have just mentioned the Merlin upgrade to Mark 2, going into service this year. They regularly deploy to Prestwick to rehearse anti-submarine warfare in support of deterrence protection. Therefore, what she said is something we are using, although not permanently.