Lord Alton of Liverpool

I do not have any current plans to review the departmental practice of grouping written questions for combined answers. This has been standard practice for many years and can avoid duplication on similar questions whilst ensuring a substantive answer. I recently recirculated the Guide to Parliamentary work to all Parliamentary Branches and Lords Ministers Private Offices. The guide states that for information already in the public domain “If referring to documents in the public domain, you should include the relevant extracts in your written response as well as the relevant hyperlink.”

No one in the Attorney General’s Office advised against proceeding in these cases for diplomatic (or any other) reasons.

As I set out in my evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on 29 October 2025, in this case, consent to prosecute was given on 3 April 2024 by the then Solicitor General. Following that date, no Law Officer intervened in the case at any stage.

The decision to offer no evidence in this case was made by the CPS without input or advice from the Law Officers.

Decisions to not proceed because of evidential reasons are made independently by the CPS. The requirement on the CPS is to inform the Attorney General of the decision after it has been taken, not to consult prior to that decision.

The Director of Public Prosecutions took an independent decision to not proceed with the case as the evidential bar was not met. There was no political interference or direction in the provision of evidence.

Abhorrent practices such as modern slavery, human trafficking and human rights abuses have no place in public supply chains or in wider society. This Government is determined to stamp this out. Procurement Policy Note (PPN) 009 ‘Tackling Modern Slavery in Government Supply Chains’ encourages departments to conduct due diligence using a range of tools and approaches to assess risks. The PPN sets out key actions to identify risks and recommends the use of tools such as the Modern Slavery Assessment Tool to support departments in managing risks.

The Procurement Act 2023 also provides contracting authorities with stronger powers to exclude suppliers from public procurements where there is compelling evidence of modern slavery within their supply chains.

The Government works closely with CNI operators, alongside our National Technical Authorities and industry partners, to ensure resilience and preparedness to the broad and diverse range of threats and risks the UK faces.

As is longstanding practice, the Government does not generally comment on individual investors or investments in the national security context.

The Government continues to look at ways to make sure the government’s digital communications better reflect the way the public now consumes information online. The policy around the use of TikTok on government devices hasn’t changed.

Cabinet Office does not collect this data centrally. Where an essential business requirement necessitates the use of TikTok, this is managed through a formal exemptions and approvals process which takes place at departmental level.

From 1 July 2026, steel import quotas will be reduced by 60% compared to the steel safeguard, with a 50% tariff on imports exceeding these levels. The measure will apply to imports of steel products that can be made in the UK. To reinforce this, we will in parallel raise our maximum allowed tariff level on steel at the WTO to protect domestic industry in the long-run from the impacts of global overcapacity.

This measure is not targeted at any one country, it is a response to a global problem of steel overcapacity and the threat it poses to our national security. We remain committed to continuing open dialogue with China and to working together where possible to address global challenges, including overcapacity. The UK will also continue to apply 10 anti-dumping measures and 2 countervailing measures against imports of Chinese steel.

All CPTPP accession applications remain under consideration by CPTPP members, and any decision to progress applications must be agreed by consensus.

The UK Government does not provide an ongoing commentary on applications to protect the confidentiality of CPTPP discussions and to observe the collective principles of the group. The UK Government has met with Taiwan, and other applicants, to discuss the UK's own experience of the accession process.

The UK has a strong trading relationship with Taiwan and engages on trade policy priorities with Taiwan through annual Trade Talks and the delivery of the UK-Taiwan Enhanced Trade Partnership.

This government will continue to speak up on human rights in China, including the repression of people in Xinjiang, and will continue to hold China to account. The new Critical Minerals Strategy will help secure the supply of critical minerals vital for the UK's economic growth and clean energy transition.

The strategy will promote responsible and transparent supply chains, including through greater adoption of responsible business practices to protect local communities and the environment. The strategy will set the long term ambition of securing supply of critical minerals and harnessing our competitive advantage in midstream and recycling. It will also set out how this will be achieved by optimising domestic production and by working collaboratively with international partners to achieve this. We will continue to assess and monitor the effectiveness of the UK's existing measures, alongside the impacts of new policy tools to tackle forced labour in supply chains and take action where appropriate.

This government will continue to speak up on human rights in China, including the repression of people in Xinjiang, and will continue to hold China to account. The new Critical Minerals Strategy will help secure the supply of critical minerals vital for the UK's economic growth and clean energy transition.

The strategy will promote responsible and transparent supply chains, including through greater adoption of responsible business practices to protect local communities and the environment. The strategy will set the long term ambition of securing supply of critical minerals and harnessing our competitive advantage in midstream and recycling. It will also set out how this will be achieved by optimising domestic production and by working collaboratively with international partners to achieve this. We will continue to assess and monitor the effectiveness of the UK's existing measures, alongside the impacts of new policy tools to tackle forced labour in supply chains and take action where appropriate.

This government will continue to speak up on human rights in China, including the repression of people in Xinjiang, and will continue to hold China to account. The new Critical Minerals Strategy will help secure the supply of critical minerals vital for the UK's economic growth and clean energy transition.

The strategy will promote responsible and transparent supply chains, including through greater adoption of responsible business practices to protect local communities and the environment. The strategy will set the long term ambition of securing supply of critical minerals and harnessing our competitive advantage in midstream and recycling. It will also set out how this will be achieved by optimising domestic production and by working collaboratively with international partners to achieve this. We will continue to assess and monitor the effectiveness of the UK's existing measures, alongside the impacts of new policy tools to tackle forced labour in supply chains and take action where appropriate.

In 2017, the Government explored potential opportunities to integrate carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the coal-to-chemicals sector in Xinjiang into China’s emissions trading scheme.

Officials have been unable to locate any information sought by the noble Lord that UK funding was provided to Xinjiang during this period, nor any information indicating that representations were received from Shell regarding this potential funding or its Enhanced Oil Recovery partnership with CNPC in Xinjiang at that time.

Government expects Great British Energy (GBE) to become a sector leader in ethical supply chains.

GBE are embedding ethical standards across GBE and will develop a comprehensive Supply Chain Risk Framework overseen by Senior Accountable Director for Ethical Supply Chains, Baroness Frances O’Grady.

GBE will prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement, as required under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, setting out the steps it is taking to ensure slavery and human trafficking are not present in its business or supply chain. GBE will also utilise the debarment list as set out under the Procurement Act 2023.

1. In 2024–25, none of the UK’s contribution to the Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) supported new programming in China.

2. The International Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) Programme, which was managed under ESMAP, formally closed on 31August 2024. No UK funding was spent in 2024–25 through the CCUS programme.

Modern slavery is a serious human rights violation depriving individuals of their freedom and dignity while inflicting immeasurable harm on families, communities, and society as-a-whole. The Government is committed to tackling all forms of modern slavery, holding perpetrators to account, and ensuring that victims are supported to recover and rebuild their lives.

The Government continue to explore the use and monitor the effectiveness of new policy tools to ensure UK can effectively tackle forced labour in supply chains. The Government’s Trade Strategy launched the Responsible Business Conduct Review as a primary lever for delivering this as a cross-departmental endeavour to review and to address the UK’s policy regime and voluntary due diligence requirements for forced labour. Additionally, the Industrial Strategy Clean Energy Industries Sector Plan committed to embedding ethical supply chain standards into DESNZ public spend; and Great British Energy confirmed it will follow strict ethical standards to help ensure solar supply chains are free from exploitation.

For solar projects, the Department for Education (DfE), the Department for Health & Social Care (DHSC) and their partners are procuring the solar panels in line with strict procurement controls. While these panels could come from anywhere in the world, we know that around 95% of global polysilicon, ingot and wafer production, required for the manufacture of solar panels, happens in China [1].

Whilst China has a long-established strong position in conventional solar, there are emerging opportunities in solar supply chains which the UK can capture by leaning into our strengths as a scientific and innovation superpower. Alongside Great British Energy delivering over £200m investment for local and community energy, we have several other pioneering companies developing the next generation of cutting-edge solar technologies, including perovskite and thin film. In the Solar Roadmap, we have committed to consider the case to further support companies looking to scale up the production of these parts – so that UK companies don’t just generate innovative ideas but build them as well.

^[1]Based on previous estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA): https://www.iea.org/reports/solar-pv-global-supply-chains/

The Government recognises the critical role of subsea telecoms cables for international connectivity.

The Government works closely with international partners, including Taiwan, to ensure the security and resilience of subsea telecoms cables. This includes engaging bilaterally with priority partners and multilaterally through NATO, the EU and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

This engagement focuses on preventing damage to cables, incident preparedness and response and ensuring cables are laid in the right places to serve UK interests.

The Government meets regularly with stakeholders, including from the tech sector.

Many platforms have parental control tools to help parents manage their children’s screentime and online experience.

Google has clarified in a policy update that parental controls will remain in place beyond 13 unless a parent consents to turn these off.

The government is deeply concerned about every death by suicide, including those that occur following content viewed online. The government keeps all legislation under review and will act where needed to protect and support vulnerable people in society.

Under the Online Safety Act, in-scope services must protect all users from in-scope illegal content and children from in-scope harmful content, such as suicide content, including where it is AI generated.

The government is committed to keeping children safe online and will not hesitate to strengthen the law where required to further protect them.

The Secretary of State takes her quasi-judicial responsibilities under the Enterprise Act 2002 very seriously. She will take all relevant information available into consideration when determining whether any of the public interest tests or conditions for foreign state influence are met in any proposed purchase of the Telegraph Media Group. DCMS will keep Parliament updated on decisions relating to the transaction.

The Secretary of State takes her quasi-judicial responsibilities under the Enterprise Act 2002 very seriously. She will take all relevant information available into consideration when determining whether any of the public interest tests or conditions for foreign state influence are met in any proposed purchase of the Telegraph Media Group. DCMS will keep Parliament updated on decisions relating to the transaction.

This government is absolutely committed to freedom of speech and academic freedom. The department commenced provisions from the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 on 1 August 2025 that strengthen provider duties on free speech, including a requirement to put in place free speech codes of practice, and a requirement for the Office for Students (OfS) to promote free speech. The OfS has issued extensive guidance to higher education providers on commencement of their duties, which makes it explicitly clear that universities should not tolerate attempts by foreign states to suppress academic freedom.

We are collaborating with universities, including vice chancellors, through a series of events to discuss risks and work together on plans to develop the sector’s resilience. We have also announced a £3 million investment package and a new Academic Interference Reporting Route to support the sector to access expert advice to help institutions identify vulnerabilities.

This government is absolutely committed to freedom of speech and academic freedom. ​The department commenced the following provisions, which came into force from 1 August 2025:

• ​Strengthened higher education (HE) provider duties in relation to securing and promoting the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom.

• ​A requirement for HE providers to put in place effective codes of practice on freedom of speech and academic freedom.

• ​A ban of non-disclosure agreements in HE for staff and students where there is a complaint about bullying, harassment and sexual misconduct.

• ​A requirement for the Office for Students (OfS) to promote free speech, and enable the OfS to give advice and guidance on it.

The OfS has also issued extensive guidance to HE providers on commencement of their duties.​

We are seeking a suitable legislative vehicle to amend and repeal elements of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 at the earliest opportunity.

We must distinguish between allegations of foreign interference and the positive impact that partnership and students from China bring to our higher education (HE) sector, economy and society as a whole.

HE providers are autonomous bodies, independent of government, and we expect the sector to be alert to security risks when collaborating with international partners, ensuring their compliance with relevant legislation and regulations.

Providers must also continue to make the appropriate financial decisions to ensure their long term sustainability, with the Office for Students (OfS) monitoring the risk of over reliance on overseas income at a sector level.

The department commenced strengthened duties on providers and on the OfS in relation to free speech and academic freedom. These duties have been in effect since 1 August 2025, and the Office for Students has also issued extensive guidance to HE providers on what they should do to ensure they effectively protect and promote free speech and academic freedom as per these duties.

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology provides robust support to the UK's research sector on managing the risks of collaboration, including tailored advice from the Research Collaboration Advice Team, and the National Protective Security Authority and National Cyber Security Centre’s ‘Trusted Research’ guidance.

We must distinguish between allegations of foreign interference and the positive impact that partnership and students from China bring to our higher education (HE) sector, economy and society as a whole.

HE providers are autonomous bodies, independent of government, and we expect the sector to be alert to security risks when collaborating with international partners, ensuring their compliance with relevant legislation and regulations.

Providers must also continue to make the appropriate financial decisions to ensure their long term sustainability, with the Office for Students (OfS) monitoring the risk of over reliance on overseas income at a sector level.

The department commenced strengthened duties on providers and on the OfS in relation to free speech and academic freedom. These duties have been in effect since 1 August 2025, and the Office for Students has also issued extensive guidance to HE providers on what they should do to ensure they effectively protect and promote free speech and academic freedom as per these duties.

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology provides robust support to the UK's research sector on managing the risks of collaboration, including tailored advice from the Research Collaboration Advice Team, and the National Protective Security Authority and National Cyber Security Centre’s ‘Trusted Research’ guidance.

It is the long-standing policy of successive UK governments not to comment either on individual cases or operational intelligence.

The world-class reputation of our universities makes them a prime target for foreign states and hostile actors, who seek to erode that reputation by promoting, shaping or censoring what universities can offer.

We are working together across government and with universities themselves to defend the UK’s thriving academic environment. By working together and sharing information, we will foster the confidence needed to stand strong in the face of foreign pressure.

To tackle this enduring threat, MI5 and cyber security services delivered a rare briefing to over 70 Vice Chancellors. The government is also investing £3 million to bolster existing support and access to expert advice on national security risk management, including a new Academic Interference Reporting Route and new guidance.