Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 29th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for making time to see me and the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, last week. The noble Lord is chairing his Select Committee this afternoon but intends to speak at later stages. By way of follow-up, the Minister will have seen the letter to her from the right honourable Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP, sent yesterday. Like them, I want to speak about human rights, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the strengthening of national resilience and diversification, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes.

On its front cover, the Bill begins with a declaration from the Minister referencing the Human Rights Act 1998 and stating that the Bill is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms—to give it its full title—was originally proposed by Winston Churchill and drafted mainly by British lawyers, and it is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among other things, the convention insists on the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from slavery, the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for family and private life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the right to marry and start a family, the right to participate in free elections, and the abolition of the death penalty. In considering a Bill which has been framed to explicitly rule out, in 5G provision, the future involvement of a company with close links to the Chinese Communist Party but which enables other links with other companies, it needs to be restated that every single one of these articles are broken each and every day by the Chinese Communist Party, and that they affect citizens outside its territory as well.

Although the Government may say that the ECHR is not the instrument with which to test their commitment to human rights, the compatibility statement should be read in line with other international law obligations, not least the prohibition on violating peremptory norms of international law, genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery and torture. The UK is, of course, a signatory to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and is bound by its own law on modern slavery. All provisions of customary international law and conventional law are binding on the UK Government, so we need to know what due diligence has been undertaken when considering their duty to prohibit and prevent genocide, along with the commissioning of other grave crimes.

The inadequacy of the compatibility statements led to an amendment to create a human rights threshold being tabled to the Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill. Later, in the Trade Bill, the House voted overwhelmingly for the all-party genocide amendment. Perhaps the Minister can say what has happened to the promised committee to examine genocide determination. In this context, the Joint Committee on Human Rights should re-examine the purpose of those declarations.

One year ago, the Minister pointed me to Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act, and she will recall promises to examine supply chain transparency and export controls. As I was assured:

“The Home Office keeps compliance under active review.”


Supply-chain transparency has been referred to in our debate by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes. In the absence of any progress on that promise to tackle the issue of supply-chain transparency, on 15 June I presented a Private Member’s Bill in your Lordships’ House to amend the Modern Slavery Act. To honour the Government’s undertaking, perhaps the Minister will consider adopting that Bill and providing it with parliamentary time.

Although this legislation is not specifically about China or Huawei, those were the country and company that have featured heavily in our debates. I welcome the explicit references to Huawei in the illustrative draft designation notices and designated-vendor direction to which the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, referred in her introductory remarks.

The situation in Xinjiang has not improved. The Government continue to say there are

“systematic human rights violations in Xinjiang, including credible and growing reports of forced labour”,

and the Foreign Secretary says this is “on an industrial scale.”

In 2019 and 2020, I specifically asked about Huawei’s compliance with the Modern Slavery Act and drew attention to China’s national intelligence law requiring Chinese organisations such as Huawei to support, assist and co-operate with state intelligence work. I also asked about reports that UK investors hold shares totalling £800 million in companies that supply CCTV and facial-recognition technology used to track Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. The Government admitted that they were aware of those reports but complacently said they had

“not undertaken analysis of British investor shareholdings in Chinese surveillance companies.”

Meanwhile, however, Foreign Office Ministers were telling me the department had

“serious concerns about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, including extensive and invasive surveillance targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. An extensive body of open source evidence suggests such surveillance, including the use of facial recognition technology, plays a central role in the restrictive measures imposed in the region.”

The House should recall that the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, urging him to

“cease consideration of Huawei as a contractor or partner for the UK’s 5G infrastructure until investigations have been conducted into Huawei’s work in Xinjiang and its relationship to the mass persecution”.

Has that investigation taken place, and what were the conclusions?

Professor Adrian Zenz, a German scholar who recently gave evidence to the independent Uyghur Tribunal, says:

“Huawei is directly implicated in Beijing police state and related human rights violations in Xinjiang … it has lied to the public about this … In 2014, Huawei received an award from Xinjiang’s Ministry of Public Security for its role in establishing citywide surveillance systems.”


Professor Zenz says that Xinjiang represents

“the largest detention of an ethno-religious minority since World War II.”

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute meticulously details the global expansion of 23 key Chinese technology companies. One of its researchers, Vicky Xu, says the idea that Huawei is not working directly with the local governments in Xinjiang is “just straight-up nonsense”.

Since the Second Reading of this Bill in the Commons last November, there have been a number of developments that make it even more important to address the implications of being joined at the hip with any company operating under the auspices of the CCP. How do we justify deepening trade relations, as the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, has told us he is seeking to do, with a country found by the House of Commons, in a vote on 22 April, to be complicit in events in Xinjiang where a genocide is under way? That was a vote in the House of Commons. It is not just my view or that of a group of human rights advocates; it is a view reached by the Commons. What action have we taken following that vote?

Last month, following that vote, Amnesty International issued a devastating report detailing arbitrary detention, forced indoctrination, torture, mass surveillance and crimes against humanity while the Daily Telegraph recently carried major first-hand reports from Xinjiang, including the destruction of 16,000 mosques. Harrowing evidence has been given to the independent Uyghur Tribunal, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, some of whose sessions I was able to attend with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and whose brave witnesses and their families are now experiencing threats and intimidation.

If we add to the charge sheet reports of forced organ harvesting and the destruction of the rule of law, free speech and democracy in Hong Kong, along with the outrageous incarceration of legislators, lawyers, journalists, and campaigners, it is obvious that as well as security questions the House should give close attention to the human rights dimensions of this Bill. Although Huawei equipment in respect of 5G must be removed by 2027, and since the beginning of the year there have been prohibitions on purchasing any Huawei equipment, I hope we will probe how the installation prohibition will work from September and whether companies have been purchasing stockpiles with the intention of installing such equipment until 2027. How will the Government monitor this? Will some parts of the network—the most sensitive parts—be prioritised?

Earlier this month the Sunday Telegraph revealed that UK local authorities will review contracts for CCTV equipment from Hikvision, a Chinese tech firm that makes cameras used to monitor Uighur Muslims in China’s detention camps. The company is blacklisted in the United States but not here. This weekend the Washington Post reported on how Hikvision had recruited former legislators to extend its power and influence despite President Biden banning Americans from investing in the company, citing its links to the Chinese military. The UK is not immune to the influence of organisations such as The 48 Group Club, with a network of links to former and current politicians—including one who now publicly urges us to tone down our criticism of the treatment of Uighurs.

Beyond such influence, the role of hidden cameras was dramatically illustrated last week, as others have said, from the office of the former Secretary of State for Health. Yesterday the Lord Speaker wrote to us all saying that there are several hundred CCTV cameras in Parliament. I hope that in Committee we will consider the implications for civil liberties of placing such power in the hands of companies that install or own these cameras.

We should also consider the implications for security of giving such power to a regime intent on the overthrow of parliamentary democracy and which makes no secret of its goal of global hegemony. The hidden hands on the levers of power was a theme explored by the admirable Dr Julian Lewis MP, chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, at Second Reading in the Commons. He asked

“in view of the revolving door, via which too many businessmen and ex-civil servants effortlessly glide between their former roles and the Huawei boardroom, what assurance can we have that the Government will be immune from lobbying campaigns by those on the payroll of high-risk vendors?”—[Official Report, Commons, 30/11/20; col. 84.]

That question was not answered in the Commons, and I would like to hear the Minister’s opinion on it. I have another question that I shall ask her directly: why have not we, like the United States, banned Hikvision? The company has been accused of helping to build the CCP’s surveillance state and profiting from human rights abuses. Does the Minister agree with that description or not? What will the Bill do to take back control of CCTV equipment in our high streets, public buildings and even government offices?

I shall speak briefly about the implications of this Bill for diversification and national resilience. During the Commons stages, Oliver Dowden, the Secretary of State, said the Bill recognises that there are real threats to the UK’s security and interests, a point that my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup explored in his excellent speech. I welcome what Oliver Dowden and my noble and gallant friend have said about security and diversification. In addition to the diversification of telecoms to companies such as Ericsson and Samsung, is that not a principle that should be applied across government?

I will give two brief examples. In May, I asked how many Covid lateral flow tests we had bought from China. The answer was a staggering 1 billion—not 1 million but 1 billion. The Government declined to say how much they had cost taxpayers or to reveal the names of the companies involved, saying “It’s commercially sensitive”. I tabled a further Question asking why we could not be told how much 1 billion lateral flow tests had cost us and which companies had carried out that trade. Are we seriously saying that we could not have used taxpayers’ money to make those tests in the UK and to give British workers jobs doing it?

My second example raises equally troubling issues. I was recently contacted by a librarian in Wigan, a lady of 34 years’ standing, who has been suspended after using social media to criticise her council’s decision to award redevelopment contracts to Chinese companies. She was fearful that they might have links to Xinjiang.

The Communities Secretary, Robert Jenrick, should require all local authorities to provide details of such deals, and demand to see whether subsidised lowest bids for council developments have undercut unsubsidised UK companies, just as has happened in the telecommunications sector.

The persistent breaking of WTO rules on subsidies and competitions has enabled CCP dominance in telecoms, and now it is happening in other sectors as well. The Minister should tell us when we are going to raise this at the WTO and across Whitehall. Does he personally believe that it is ever licit or right to deepen trade with a country credibly accused of the crime-above-all-crimes: genocide. Diversification, national resilience and the upholding of our values, especially on fundamental human rights, are all reflected in the way we trade. Genocide is a line we should never cross. I support the Second Reading of this Bill today. I hope to return to these and other issues when we get to Committee and later stages.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th July 2021 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
“(1A) The duty under subsection (1) includes a duty to review—(a) vendors of goods or services to public telecommunications providers which are prohibited in other jurisdictions on security grounds, and(b) the reasons for such a prohibition.”

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[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

In moving Amendment 1 and speaking to Amendments 20 and 27, I first thank the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, who have signed one or all of the amendments. This is a clear signal from across the Committee that the Bill must be strengthened to deal, first, with companies that have been banned in other jurisdictions, secondly, the need to dig deeper into the ownership and investment of companies and, thirdly, the desirability of acting in concert with our allies in Five Eyes.

These amendments sit comfortably alongside the call that we heard at Second Reading for additional parliamentary scrutiny, which the Intelligence and Security Committee has called for. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, said that we should focus on what other nations are doing:

“we have allies around the world and will want to be able to work with other companies and countries around the world to make sure we have that diversity of the supply chain.”—[Official Report, 29/06/21; col. 716.]

On 30 November 2020, the Secretary of State told the House of Commons:

“We must never find ourselves in this position again. Over the last few decades, countless countries across the world have become over-reliant on too few vendors”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/11/20; col. 75.]


During our debate, the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, told us:

“Other countries in the free world face the same challenges as the UK”.—[Official Report, 29/06/21; col. 718.]


The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, urged us to work

“in close partnership with our Five Eyes allies”,

reminding us that

“We have known that Huawei is a security risk since 2013.”—[Official Report, 29/06/21; cols. 726-7.]


That should enable us to avoid what the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, described as “another costly security debacle”. My noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup told us that we

“need to develop an approach ... that constantly monitors and rebalances this equation in the context of our complex and dynamic world.”—[Official Report, 29/06/21; col. 715.]

These amendments seek to address many of those points.

At Second Reading, noble Lords referred to companies that have caused security concerns in other jurisdictions, including Huawei, TikTok, ZTE Corporation, which the Government have named a high-risk vendor, Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd, Zhejiang Dahua Technology Company Ltd and Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company Ltd. I will return to Hikvision later. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, said that the Bill’s headline is

“a ban on the purchase of new Huawei equipment”.—[Official Report, 29/06/21; col. 711.]

Like the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Bennett, he referred to the genocide against Uighurs in Xinjiang. I serve as vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Uyghurs and am a patron of the Coalition for Genocide Response. Following the House of Commons’ decision to name a genocide in Xinjiang, only last week the Foreign Affairs Committee published a damning report calling for a much stronger response from the Government. These amendments, like those to the Trade Act, which the House passed with three-figure majorities, are a modest attempt to force that stronger and effective response.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has frequently pointed to the way Chinese companies can fundamentally compromise our infrastructure and, through subsidies, asphyxiate UK industry. The one billion lateral flow tests that we have bought from the CCP are a glaring example. These amendments specifically address the telecommunications sector, but they provide a road map that could be emulated in other strategic sectors.

Finding ways to protect our strategic industries has never been more important. Last week, we learned that, in a deal estimated to be worth £63 million, the Newport Wafer Fab, the UK’s largest producer of semiconductors, has been acquired by the Chinese-owned manufacturer Nexperia. Nexperia is a Dutch firm but is owned by China’s Wingtech. Newport Wafer Fab is the UK’s largest producer of silicon chips, which are vital in products from TVs and mobile phones to cars and games consoles.

This acquisition is happening during an increasingly severe global shortage of computer chips. Kwasi Kwarteng, the Business Secretary, said that the Government are monitoring the situation closely, but do

“not consider it appropriate to intervene at the current time”.

When she comes to reply, perhaps the Minister could tell us why it is not appropriate, when the right time would be to protect a key national asset, and whether, following the Prime Minister’s subsequent expression of concern, the acquisition is being reviewed under the National Security and Investment Act, which at Second Reading we were all told would protect key national assets from dangerous foreign takeovers.

There is a lamentable lack of strategic coherence or consistency in our approach. On one hand, we have the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, saying that he wants to deepen trade deals with China, while the Foreign Secretary tells us that slave labour in Xinjiang is “on an industrial scale”. We have the integrated review telling us that China is a threat to the United Kingdom, but the Business Secretary telling us that it is not appropriate to do anything at the present time.

This predatory absorption of our semiconductor industry is inimical to the material interests of our technology companies and to national security. Our Committee should consider carefully what is at stake here and why these amendments are so very relevant. Have the Government examined what is happening within the same sector in other jurisdictions, for instance? What assessment has been made of the dependency of United Kingdom manufacturers on China for imports of critical technologies such as semiconductors and semiconductor devices? The applicability of these amendments, by generating a review of other practices in other regions, is of course self-evident. We are starting with telecoms, but the same lessons apply across the board.

I also want to pursue an issue which the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and I raised at Second Reading. The Minister was asked about companies that operate and own CCTV security networks. UK local authorities are reviewing contracts for CCTV equipment made by Hikvision. This is being used to enforce China’s surveillance state in Xinjiang, but it is also operating CCTV equipment the length and breadth of Britain. Is that wise? Hikvision is banned in the United States but not here. I put a simple question to the noble Baroness at Second Reading, and I put it again: why not?

Last week in its report Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond, the Foreign Affairs Committee said:

“Cameras made by the Chinese firm Hikvision have been deployed throughout Xinjiang, and provide the primary camera technology used in the internment camps.”


The committee heard concerns that facial recognition cameras made by companies such as Hikvision operating in the UK—I repeat: operating in the UK—are collecting facial recognition data, which can then be used by the Chinese Government. Dr Hoffman, who was one of the witnesses giving evidence to the Select Committee, said that Hikvision cameras are operating “all over London”. The committee said:

“Independent reports suggest that Hikvision cameras are operating throughout the UK in areas such as Kensington and Chelsea, Guildford, and Coventry, placed in leisure centres and even schools.”


The committee concluded:

“Equipment manufactured by companies such as Hikvision and Dahua should not be permitted to operate within the UK. We recommend that the Government prohibits organisations and individuals in the UK from doing business with any companies known to be associated with the Xinjiang atrocities through the sanctions regime. The Government should prohibit UK firms and public sector bodies from conducting business with, investing in, or entering into partnerships with such Chinese firms”.


So will we? It would be good to hear from the Minister.

In parenthesis, the committee also registered concerns about

“substantial research connections between the Chinese organisations responsible for these crimes and UK universities”,

and said that,

“the role of advanced technologies in the use of oppression in Xinjiang cannot be ignored.”

At Second Reading, the Minister referred to the report into export licences. The Select Committee complains that

“the Government has not made clear when the urgent export review will be concluded. The crisis in Xinjiang is far too urgent for delay.”

Again, it would be good to hear from the noble Baroness on that specific point about export licences. Can we at least be told what plans the Government have to impose import and export controls on firms linked to China’s military-civil fusion programmes? Are we acting in concert with our allies, as these amendments require, over Hikvision? As in the US, will this Bill be used or amended to enable us to ban it?

The Select Committee also referred to our duties under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I refer to my interests as a trustee of the Arise Foundation. The committee report says:

“the issue of forced labour in Xinjiang is pervasive, widespread,”

and that

“In the Government’s own words, ‘no business can consider themselves immune from the risks of modern slavery’.”


This, too, is information that has been assessed in other jurisdictions and deemed to raise ethical and security issues of which we should make ourselves aware, as these amendments would require us to do. I can think of no compelling reason, other than vested interests, as to why we would not want to know what other jurisdictions are doing about these issues.

I turn again to telecoms. The argument for more concerted action was put well, in the context of Huawei, by Senator Marco Rubio, who said:

“Rejecting Huawei would not mean the UK going it alone, but joining a coalition of like-minded countries determined to ensure effective, market-based alternatives to Huawei are available.”


He is right. Have we examined this? Are we doing the same?

As long ago as 2018, the US put in place a block on ZTE, China’s second-largest maker of telecommunications equipment, because of violations of sanctions against Iran and North Korea. It has designated ZTE as a “national security threat” with government telecommunications funds banned from buying equipment from ZTE. Are we doing the same? In April, the Department of Commerce added seven Chinese supercomputing entities to the list, with Gina Raimondo, the US Secretary of Commerce, insisting that

“The Department of Commerce will use the full extent of its authorities to prevent China from leveraging U.S. technologies to support these destabilizing military modernization efforts.”


The US has gone further in examining investments, as these amendments do. Proposed new Clause 15 would require us to examine what others are doing in this respect. President Biden has issued an executive order banning US investors from trading shares in China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom. The list of firms in which US firms cannot invest comes to more than 60. I will not read out the full list today, but I have sent it to the Minister, who has kindly acknowledged receipt, for which I am grateful. Among those firms listed are a number specifically connected to surveillance technology including China Telecommunications Corporation, China United Network Communications Group, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Huawei Technologies, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, China Mobile Ltd and China Telecom Corporation Ltd.

However, it is not just the US. Australia is another of our closest allies and a core member of Five Eyes, which is specifically mentioned in these amendments. In blocking a A$300 million takeover offer by China State Construction Engineering Corporation, Australia cited national security grounds. As long ago as 2016, Australia forbade a deal on the basis that China’s subsidies rendered it difficult for Australian bidders to make a competitive bid, with the Treasurer saying that it may be

“contrary to the national interest”.

In 2020, the Guardian Australia reported links between companies operating in sensitive sectors including the national science research agency and technology companies and operatives from the Chinese intelligence agencies, with one reported as having ties to the CCP’s United Front Work Department, a foreign-influence body described by President Xi Jinping as an “important magic weapon”.

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[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I may need to write to the noble Lord about the technical details he has set out. I think for the approach to be effective it needs to incorporate all elements of that. An overall system cannot be a capable system if the subsystem is not. There needs to be coherence across the equipment that is supplied and our understanding of how it operates in practice and the component parts to inform the judgment about its security or not. I am happy to follow up in writing if he is agreeable.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in the debate and the Minister for her replies. I thought that the intervention just now by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, was important. It drives at one of the issues that we have debated today in the context of Nexperia and what is happening to a British company that has been acquired by a Chinese company through its Dutch affiliate. It is about computer chips. It is about semiconductors. It is about our ability to be able to control what goes into the technology that the Bill is very much about. That is not an on-the-side question; it is a very important central question and I look forward to seeing the response that the Minister gives to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, when she looks at it further.

I turn now to some of the contributions made today. The noble Baroness, Lady Northover, in a typically powerful and thoughtful intervention, invited us to delve more deeply. That is what we have been doing during this afternoon’s proceedings. She emphasised the importance of countries working together. She regretted, with sadness, that we have been forced to make some of these decisions about our own individual ability to acquire intelligence as a result of our decision to leave the European Union.

I thought it was interesting that, earlier today, the European Commission issued new guidance to combat forced labour in supply chains. It rather puts our laggardly and perfunctory efforts to shame. The guidance provides concrete, practical advice on how to identify, mitigate and address the risks. This issue has been referred to and the noble Baroness has said that she is going to write to us further on modern-day slavery and supply chains. High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borell says that the guidance

“will help EU companies to ensure their activities do not contribute to forced labour practices in any sector, region or country.”

It paves the way for future legislation which will have enforcement mechanisms and should introduce a mandatory due diligence duty, requiring European Union companies to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for sustainability impacts in their operations and supply chains.

Our amendments today would gather that kind of information. I simply do not accept that it is impossible for companies, in partnership with government—a point made by the noble Baroness in opposition to these amendments was that this would place too much responsibility on companies—or countries such as our own to collect this information. Like other noble Lords around the table, I have no staff. The information I gave to the Committee today is publicly available and, with a little bit of research, it can be obtained without too much difficulty. It is absurd to suggest that it is beyond the ability of companies or countries to collect information and share knowledge. The example from the European Union underlines what the noble Baroness said to us today.

The noble Lord, Lord Naseby, was, as always, asking all the right questions. From our many years together in another place, as well as here, I am always happy to stand with the noble Lord, not least because of his experience in many parts of the world. It is important to ensure that our people who are in post in many of our embassies are given the ability to ask these searching questions and to ensure that the information comes back to us, to prevent many of the expensive mistakes that have been made around Huawei, and which have been referred to during the debate, happening all over again.

My noble friend Lord Erroll was right to say that there are human rights abuses in many countries. Like him, I become indignant about some of those abuses; I do not argue, though, that we should no longer trade with those countries. I always prefer that we trade with countries that are on a trajectory to reform, that are law-abiding and that believe in human rights and democracy, but I accept that it would be impossible to take out of supply chains any country that carries out any kind of human rights violation.

However, there are certain markers that we can look to. One of them is our legal duty under the 1948 convention on the crime of genocide. This is not a word to be used lightly. The word “genocide” came into our vocabulary thanks to a Polish Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, who had seen over 40 of his own family murdered in the Holocaust. During the proceedings on the telecoms infrastructure Bill last year, I gave examples from that period of how companies such as Philips had their own forced labour in the camps where people were dying. I gave the example of Corrie ten Boom, a Dutch woman who had given refuge to escaping Jewish people trying to flee the Holocaust. She and her sister were arrested and sent to work in that factory; her sister died there. Corrie ten Boom wrote a deeply moving book called The Hiding Place. That is the comparison I seek to draw.

It is not just me. In April this year, the House of Commons said that what is taking place in Xinjiang is genocide—it is only the second time that it has ever made such a declaration, so this is of a different order. Where there is genocide, we, as signatories to an international treaty—the 1948 convention on the crime of genocide—have a legal obligation to predict the signs of genocide, prevent it from happening, protect those affected and prosecute those responsible. I accept my noble friend’s argument—we are not going to stop trading tomorrow with Gulf states or whomever it may be who is doing fairly odious things—but the crime of genocide is surely in a different league.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 applies the affirmative procedure to the regulations made under new Section 105B in Clause 1. It requires secondary legislation to be laid in Parliament in draft and to be subject to a debate and a vote in both Houses. Clause 1 allows the Secretary of State to introduce regulations that have wide-ranging consequences for providers, and there is no provision for any independent or specialist formal oversight of these regulations. This continues a worrying trend whereby the Government make key regulations with no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. New Section 105A introduced by Clause 1 is wide-ranging. In fact, it covers

“anything that compromises the availability, performance or functionality of the network or service”

—I repeat: “anything”.

This means that the Secretary of State has the means to make regulations that have highly onerous provisions, laying down that any provider must take “specified measures” of any kind. This is currently under the negative procedure, which, as we have noted from these Benches on many occasions, gives a near-certain guarantee of their coming into force with a minimum of scrutiny—none, it is safe to say. In Committee, the Minister’s predecessor was adamant that additional scrutiny was not desirable. She said that this was meant for technical people and had to be explained in technical language, which it was not appropriate for Parliament to discuss. However, there is the rub: the Bill covers a huge range of potential issues and, as I said, there is no formal independent or specialist oversight of these regulations, yet the Government said that they were too technical for Parliament to have its say on them. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke about the Secretary of State having unfettered power and, as usual, he was right.

Since then, the Government have slightly changed their mind, and this is seen in Amendment 3. We welcome Amendment 3 as far as it goes, which, given that it is effectively a negative process, is not very far. It does demonstrate that the Government now believe that your Lordships’ House can review technical issues and that we are capable of this onerous task, which the Minister’s predecessor deemed us incapable of doing. Clause 1 covers virtually anything the Minister decides, and we are in danger of signing a blank cheque. Amendment 1 addresses this issue and gives Parliament particular scrutiny of how these regulations affect the communications networks that are so vital to the UK’s economy and our public life. I beg to move.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment just moved by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, is about transparency, accountability and parliamentary scrutiny. It puts Parliament into the driving seat. It deserves the support of the whole House, and I hope we will give it.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, as we start Report, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, to his new ministerial role. I am sure we all look forward to working with him.

I remind the House that national security must be the first duty of any Government, which is why we welcome the intention behind the Bill. As we have said repeatedly throughout the passage of the Bill, we believe that there are a number of issues with the Bill that need to be addressed, including parliamentary oversight of the new powers, which this group focuses on. As Comms Council UK said, the Bill represents an

“unprecedented shift of power from Parliament to the Minister in relation to how telecoms networks operate”

and that

“the Minister will be able to unilaterally make decisions that impact the technical operation and direction of technology companies, with little or no oversight or accountability.”

With reference to Amendment 1, I shall not repeat the arguments made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Suffice it to say that we on these Benches appreciate and wish to stress the importance of parliamentary scrutiny, which we have stressed throughout the passage of the Bill.

I thank the Minister for tabling Amendments 3, 4 and 5. They are very similar to our Front-Bench amendments in Committee and reflect a key recommendation from the Delegated Powers Committee. I thank the former Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for her work on these amendments. As noble Lords will remember, the Delegated Powers Committee called the powers in Clause 3 unacceptable and called for the negative procedure for the new telecoms security codes of practice. This important change from the Government ensures adequate parliamentary scrutiny, which is a welcome step forward.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 8 is in my name. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Alton, for their support. It is, of course, the same as Amendment 24 that we saw in Committee, which requires that network diversification is reported on annually.

As we heard in Committee, there is wide cross-party support for the principle that our networks will not be secure if the supply chain is not diversified. For me, this is at the very heart of the Bill and what it should seek to address. Unfortunately, we still have a Bill that seeks to secure telecoms security yet seems to think it is possible to be silent on diversification. Even though the former Minister said in Committee that

“diversification is designed to enhance security and resilience”,—[Official Report, 15/7/21; col. GC 551.]

the Government have said that this amendment is not appropriate. The importance of the amendment could not be clearer. I remind noble Lords that, once Huawei is removed, the UK will be left with effectively only two service providers. This is a matter of the highest concern. We need and must have a diversified supply chain. That means diversity of supply at different points in the supply chain and that different networks do not all share the same vulnerabilities of a particular supplier. This is absolutely crucial for network resilience. It will also support British companies and grow British jobs.

If the Government fail to amend the Bill on this point by accepting this amendment, they are putting our national security at risk. Therefore, I will listen closely to the reply from the Minister, but I must stress that I am minded to test the opinion of this House on this matter. I beg to move.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. Like other noble Lords, I was remiss in not welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, to his new role earlier on. I think that is because we have all been so familiar with seeing his face throughout the proceedings on this Bill and many others. It is a great pleasure to see him in his new role.

The Government should be convinced by the arguments that the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, just advanced, simply because of what their own advisers have told them: the lack of diversification constitutes

“an intolerable security and resilience risk.”

There was widespread agreement in Committee and elsewhere about that.

I draw the Minister’s attention to the as-yet undebated report of the International Relations and Defence Committee, on which I have the privilege to serve. The report, titled The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship: A Strategic Void, was published on 10 September. It refers specifically to the supply chain vulnerability measures in this Bill, but says that

“such vulnerabilities are widespread in the economy.”

It continues:

“In order to retain its freedom of action towards China, the Government should conduct scenario planning on supply chain vulnerabilities and identify where action is needed to mitigate the risks.”


This amendment would give the opportunity for such discussion to take place in the House of Commons. We have to think about only the case of Newport Wafer Fab to see its importance. This was a deal of £63 million regarding the UK’s largest producer of silicon chips, which are vital in products from TVs and mobile phones to cars and games consoles. As we learned in Committee, a group of UK companies has now stepped up to the plate and hopes to acquire Newport Wafer Fab. When the Minister replies, I would be most appreciative if he would say what progress has been made on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and to endorse everything he has just said about Amendments 10 and 11.

In speaking to Amendment 11, about which I hope to seek the opinion of the House if there is not a satisfactory reply to the debate, although I hope there will be, I should say that I moved a similar amendment in Committee on 13 July. As in Committee, the amendment enjoys all-party support from across the House; I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but also to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Fox, for their support. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has spelled out that it would insert a new clause requiring the Government to review any telecommunications company based in foreign countries which have been banned in a Five Eyes country. It is quite straightforward. This amendment would strengthen international action and bolster UK resilience and security.

If such a provision had previously existed in statute, it might have saved this country a great deal of money over the expensive 5G Huawei debacle, which we have known was a security risk since 2013. If the House approves this amendment today, it will send a clear signal that the Bill must be further strengthened to deal with companies that have been banned in other jurisdictions, the need to dig deeper into ownership and investment of companies and the desirability of acting in concert with our Five Eyes allies. Significantly—I suppose this is another development, as the noble Lord just referred to, since Committee—there has been the, in my view, very welcome decision to create AUKUS, the security pact in the Asia-Pacific which, in addition to giving Australia greater defence capacity, also covers AI and other technologies.

At Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, urged us to work

“in close partnership with our Five Eyes allies”.—[Official Report, 29/6/21; col. 727.]

She was right. The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, asked us to guard against “another costly security debacle”. She was right. My noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup told us that we

“need to develop an approach … that constantly monitors and rebalances this equation in the context of our complex and dynamic world.”—[Official Report, 29/6/21; col. 715.]

He was right, and the amendments seek to do just that.

In Committee, I detailed many of the companies that have now been proscribed and banned in the United States of America. I would be grateful to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson—I asked this question in Committee, he will recall—if we have looked at those companies, and what action we are now taking against those that are on the list that President Biden has published. Specifically, I refer to one example, Hikvision. This is what the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons said in its unanimous report. The committee recommended

“that the Government prohibits organisations and individuals in the UK from doing business with any companies known to be associated with the Xinjiang atrocities through the sanctions regime. The Government should prohibit UK firms and public sector bodies from conducting business with, investing in, or entering into partnerships with such Chinese firms”.

I raised that in Committee. Have we acted in concert with principal Five Eyes allies in prohibiting Hikvision or not?

The failure to co-ordinate with allies leads to costs and uncertainty for business and endangers our national interest. The Government’s own estimate, based on the Huawei decision, is that it cost the Exchequer some £2 billion, excluding the broader economic cost of a delayed rollout of the 5G network caused by having to change horses. Earlier collective action could have prevented the later expensive U-turns.

Amendment 11 seeks to better protect our national interest in concert with our allies in the free world. I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I am used to hearing powerful speeches from my noble friend Lord Alton of Liverpool, but what a delight it was to hear also the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. He spelled it out exactly: it beggars belief. I cannot believe that my noble friend, a wise and intelligent Minister, will reject this amendment.

I support Amendment 11, which does not detract from the Bill in any way; it does not sabotage the Bill or pull the guts out of it, it merely adds to our arsenal. All it asks the Government to do, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, is to review the security arrangements with a telecoms provider if one of our vital, strategic Five Eyes partners bans its equipment. We are not calling for a similar immediate ban, or an eventual ban, we are just saying let us review it and come to a conclusion.

Why do I want this added? My motivation is quite simple: I believe this will be another small warning shot to China that we will start to stand up to its aggression. I share the view of the new head of MI5, Mr Ken McCallum, that Russia is an irritation but China is a threat to world peace and our whole western way of life. Yes, Russia—or Putin, more accurately—is nasty and will happily kill opponents, as we saw in Salisbury, and attempt to interfere in elections, but Russia is not capable and is afraid of the consequences of waging a world war.

China, I believe, does not share that view. It is building that massive economic and military capacity to dominate the whole world. It will overtake the USA in military capability in the next few years and has already overtaken all western powers in its attitude to using force. It is not that China wants war: it believes that war will not be necessary, since it will win when we surrender without firing a shot. If it attacks Taiwan, will the USA and the UK rush to support it? I hope so, but I do not hold my breath. China believes we do not have the moral guts to do as we did with plucky little Belgium before the First World War or Poland before the second, and guarantee their security.

To return to this amendment, it is a small symbol of our intention to begin our moral fightback—to say that we will not be bullied by China, either in our universities and supply chains or in the freedom of the seas. China has been achieving world domination by small incremental steps: making the WHO its puppet; infiltrating universities; subtly taking over international organisations; robbing African countries of all their minerals as payback for loans; and stealing every bit of technology that it can. It is, therefore, by incremental steps, such as this little amendment, that we will show that we will not be cowed—that we will resist and not become China’s slaves.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

11: After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of telecommunications companies based in foreign countries
(1) The Communications Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 105Z29 insert—“105Z30 Review of telecommunications companies based in foreign countriesWhere a Five Eyes partner bans the operation of a vendor of goods or services to public telecommunications providers in its country on security grounds, the Secretary of State must— (a) review the United Kingdom’s security arrangements with that company, and(b) decide whether to issue a designated vendor direction or take similar action with regard to the United Kingdom’s arrangements with that company.””

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister was characteristically courteous. I am grateful to him, but I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, as the Minister said, this Bill entered the other place a year ago. It has variously been urgent, in the long grass, urgent again and now quite close to passing. I will not delay its passage many more seconds. I have shelved my inner churl, but I absolutely sign up to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. There are outstanding issues that your Lordships commented on and put into the Bill as amendments that I hope can be picked up. I hope that when this Bill is finally put to bed, it really does protect the security of this country, and we will work, on these Benches, to help make that happen. There is a lot of unfinished business in this area. I fear that the Minister himself, or one of his successors, may very well be bringing other Bills before your Lordships quite soon.

I thank the Ministers, first the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, and then the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for their work and their willingness to communicate with those of us who were seeking to scrutinise this Bill. I join the noble Lord in congratulating the DCMS Bill team, and I hope he did not leave anybody out. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on their legislative debuts. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his spirited, highly principled and really important, contributions on the Bill.

Finally, I thank my noble friends Lord Clement-Jones and Lady Northover, without whom this scrutiny would not have been complete, and Sarah Pughe, our legislative officer, for her invaluable support. With that, we wish this Bill onwards, with speed and effectiveness, because it has a very important job to do.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, before we pass this Bill, may I add to a comment to what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, said? I express my thanks as well to everyone who was on the long list that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, gave us, but also to his predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran. As Ministers, I do not think they could have been more helpful and more responsive to the points we made both in Committee and on Report.

My noble friend also mentioned the all-party amendment moved last week by myself and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which we also raised in Committee. It raises the need for reviews to take place when another jurisdiction—specifically, in this case, many of us cited the United States of America—had banned a particular company which was not banned in the United Kingdom but working within the telecommunications sector.

One example the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I gave in our debates was Hikvision, which is banned in the United States. It makes the surveillance cameras that are used punitively against the Uighur people in Xinjiang but are also used in our own high streets and public buildings. That amendment called for a review: that when any such company is banned in another Five Eyes jurisdiction, it is to be reviewed in the United Kingdom. It is a very reasonable all-party amendment, but it was opposed by the Government. Before the Minister completes his remarks today, could he tell us what has happened to that amendment and how the Government intend to respond to it?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I was remiss in not adding to the long list of names I read out those of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and my noble friend Lord Blencathra, who signed that cross-party amendment to which the noble Lord just referred. Of course, the amendment goes to the other place, which will look at it, the official record and the debate we had on it. I am sorry I was not able to persuade the noble Lord and my noble friend of it, but I will work with my colleagues in DCMS to make sure that they take into account the views of your Lordships’ House as expressed in the vote. I will not pre-empt the debates that will be had in another place, but I look forward to seeing what it sends us back in continuing that debate.

In the spirit which all noble Lords have mentioned today of wanting to see this important Bill on the statute book swiftly but with the proper scrutiny that both places want to give it, I beg to move.