NATO and the High Arctic

Liz Saville Roberts Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Alex Ballinger]

I absolutely agree that the JEF is a vital alliance for our operations in the High North. I met the Estonian ambassador only a couple of weeks ago, and we were pleased to discuss opportunities for co-operation, in addition to the UK forces that are based in Estonia, as part of deterring the Russian threat to that part of the world.

Importantly, the High Arctic is a top priority for Moscow strategically, militarily and economically. Russia has been building up its military presence, and it is not subtle about it. The northern fleet is modernising: it has a more capable navy and increasingly active submarine operations, and it focuses on controlling access to the European High North. We should be clear about what that means for the UK. Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are concentrated around the Kola peninsula, and the High North is central to its nuclear deterrent strategy. That raises the stakes for NATO.

The Royal Navy has also seen a 30% increase in Russian vessels threatening UK waters over the past two years. Russia’s navy is increasingly capable and willing to test our defences from the High North. Russia wants to exploit the Arctic for more than military leverage; it wants to dominate access to sea routes and mineral resources. For Russia, this is about economics and security, which is why we cannot treat Arctic competition as “just defence”.

Recently, the big change we have seen in this region is what is happening in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has transformed European security, and the Arctic is a part of that. Two Arctic countries, Finland and Sweden, joined NATO because they concluded that, in the context of Ukraine, neutrality no longer protected them. As a result, every Arctic country except Russia is now a NATO ally. That strengthens NATO’s hand, but it means that NATO’s northern responsibilities have expanded.

The second development is Greenland. We all saw Trump’s threats and rhetoric, which have thankfully receded. I am pleased that European countries were united in saying that Greenland’s sovereignty should not be a bargaining chip.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I was fortunate to visit Nuuk in Greenland with the APPG for Greenland—of course, we discussed NATO and Trump. It is important for us to remember that the 1951 agreement between the USA and the Kingdom of Denmark gave the US rights of access to military defence. When it comes to what the United Kingdom could be doing for Greenland to develop what will none the less be geo-significant in the future, surely it is time that we should call for a consulate for the United Kingdom in Greenland.

[Alex Ballinger]

The Foreign Affairs Committee is going to Greenland in a couple of weeks. We hope to meet the Foreign Minister of Denmark, among other leaders of the Greenlanders, and that sounds like the kind of sensible suggestion that we should be talking about.

Certainly, there are lots of opportunities for NATO to base troops in Greenland already; we did not need a change in sovereignty to do that. I am pleased that that has fallen off the radar. It is concerning that Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a one-off. The US security strategy is explicit that the Arctic is becoming more important to America and to American national security, whether it is because of Russia, China, geography or critical minerals. We should not pretend that this was just a single passing storm.

In the Arctic, NATO is responding, but we need to be honest about the scale of the task. With the Arctic sentry, the alliance is trying to pull together a more coherent posture in the High North, with better visibility, better co-ordination and a clearer framework for operating in the sea, air, space and undersea environments.

We should also underline the importance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. That strategic choke point is vital to NATO. It affects how Russia can move submarines into the wider Arctic, it affects the security of reinforcement routes in a crisis and it sits alongside the undersea infrastructure that we rely on every day.

I will raise the joint expeditionary force, which my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) raised earlier. The UK-led JEF has real value in this part of the world; it is practical, northern-focused and moves faster than the full NATO machine in the early stages of a crisis. That is exactly the sort of framework we should use to build readiness, interoperability and credibility.

--- Later in debate ---

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Of course, we are at risk in our democracy of looking at things in the very short term. With climate change, 30 years from now the access to key rare earth minerals, and possibly shipping lanes, in the far north may have changed considerably.

[Jim Shannon]

That is the focus we need to have. Climate change is affecting the world. We might find ourselves in a slightly different geographical position in a short time. The right hon. Lady has illustrated that to our advantage.

The Greenland-Iceland-UK gap remains vital for monitoring submarine activity. I can never understand how anybody can get into a submarine; it is too claustrophobic for me, but I admire those who do, as they play a vital role in the defence of this great nation. It is no secret that Russia has expanded its Arctic military footprint, which may be what Trump is looking towards. We need to be aware of Russia’s input, especially its submarine operations, air bases and missile systems. The Arctic region is a key domain for undersea infrastructure. Protecting the integrity of UK security is a major priority. NATO allies must remain as a cornerstone of support in doing that.

When we focus on the importance of where we are, we support the policies that strengthen deterrence rather than encourage confrontation. I cannot remember which one, but a US President said:

“Speak softly but carry a big stick.”

That reminds us that we must have a deterrent—the nuclear power and the submarines and the strength of the Army—to persuade others not to go to war. That is the ultimate goal we all try to achieve. We must also maintain readiness to respond to threats and ensure that military deployments to Norway and the north Atlantic are exercised and fully trained. Again, we see commitment from the British Army and NATO, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Poland. Those troops are the best.

The hon. Member for Halesowen mentioned the Marines, and there are none better. When I was a wee boy, I was always saying, “I am going to be a Royal Marine.” As an eight-year-old, that was my big ambition. It obviously never happened, but I did serve part time in the Ulster Defence Regiment and in the Royal Artillery. It was a slightly different role and not as exciting as the Marines—it never could be—but it was an incredible role.

We often have discussions around defence spending. A proper budget is needed to perfect intelligence and surveillance of the High Arctic. In strategic terms, sea lanes and undersea cables are vital. I asked the Minister a question over recess, and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy came to the main Chamber maybe six or eight weeks ago and referred to undersea cables. In my question to the Select Committee Chair, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), I asked about the undersea cables that come across the North sea, down to England and across to Ireland. The Republic of Ireland is a soft belly. Do we have a role to play in securing the undersea cables that go from there across the Atlantic as well? Of course, the Republic of Ireland does not have the Royal Navy, the Army or the personnel that we have. Are there discussions, or is there a relationship or a defensive agreement, between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to ensure that the undersea cables that go across the Atlantic are protected? The Chair of the Select Committee was unable to confirm that. That is not a criticism; I am just saying that I asked a question and the answer could not be given.

The undersea cables and the Arctic’s stability affect trade, energy and global security. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and the United States have shared interests in terms of the Arctic region. Of course, President Trump has made his opinions clear in relation to Greenland, but close co-operation ensures that NATO can respond rapidly to threats, particularly from Russia. The United States, as the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) and the hon. Member for Halesowen mentioned, has bases in Greenland. It has feet on the ground and it is building up to using that footprint as a protection or a launchpad. It is important that we have that relationship with the United States.

To conclude, I stand firmly for a united NATO, a credible deterrent to aggression and robust investment in our armed forces to ensure they are equipped for operations in the High Arctic. We have an enduring partnership with the United States of America and we must strengthen our ability to defend vital waters and airspace. The hon. Gentleman asked about the number of ships being built for the Royal Navy to enhance its position. I know the Government are giving everything to enhance investment—that is never in doubt—but maybe the Minister could tell us about their commitment to the Royal Navy, which is clearly needed.

I say this with incredible respect. For 10 days our base in Cyprus was potentially under attack. My comment is not an attack on anybody, but why on earth did we not send a ship to protect Cyprus 10 days ago? It niggles me whenever we see the French and the Germans giving us protection.

--- Later in debate ---

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am very proud of the steps that the Government have taken to raise defence spending, which are very welcome off the back of many years of underspend. In fact, this is my very next line: defence spending will rise to 2.6% in 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 5% by 2035. Just as important as raising defence and security spending is making sure that we continue to pursue a NATO-first defence policy. We are a Government who are delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I appreciate that the Minister is talking about defence spend, but in my earlier intervention I raised a point about having a consulate. Many of our European neighbours are ensuring that they have a presence in the area, alongside China and the United States. Surely that would be an effective way of spending Government money at a time when we are looking to spend effectively for the future of the UK’s best interests.

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am sure the right hon. Member will understand that consulates are a matter for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. I will make sure that the FCDO is aware of her comments.