Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 13th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Kinnock]

I refer the hon. Lady to the impact assessment, which is of course not a forecast but a set of scenarios. In it, detail is given on expected numbers and the capacity of the system to deal with the service.

Amendments 13 and 82 to 85 relate to the appointment of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner and panel members. The amendments would put the process for the appointments out of kilter with standard practice for public or non-judicial appointments and could significantly limit the pool of individuals available. Amendment 86 would give the panel the same powers, privileges and authority as the High Court, which are significant in scope and are set out across different court rules and legislation. It is unclear how those would apply to panels in practice. They may be unworkable given that the panel is not designed to be a court.

New clause 4 and amendment 28 would put various responsibilities on the chief medical officers for England and Wales. Imposing duties in primary legislation on an individual civil servant may cause difficulties in the future if the role does not exist or if the title changes. It is usual practice for duties in primary legislation to be conferred on the Secretary of State, who may decide to delegate to the chief medical officer.

I would like to briefly respond to a number of questions directly asked of the Government. The hon. Member for South Antrim (Robin Swann) asked about medicines regulation in Northern Ireland. The amendments will not affect the application of EU law; they will instead ensure coherence between the different legislative frameworks. The sponsor will lead engagement with the devolved Governments, supported by officials.

The hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) asked about the equality impact assessment. The EQIA considers the nine protected characteristics alongside socioeconomic background, geography and mental health. The hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin) asked about the Suicide Act and advertising. I can confirm that encouraging or facilitating suicide will remain a crime under the Suicide Act. On advertising, new clause 14, if passed, would oblige the Secretary of State to make regulations prohibiting certain forms of advertising that promote voluntary assisted dying services. The exemptions to that, which may be provided under subsection (2), will not cut across the criminal offences elsewhere in the Bill or in the Suicide Act.

I hope that those observations were helpful to Members in their consideration of the technical workability of the amendments that we have debated today.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).

Question put forthwith, That the Question be now put.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 13 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Prohibition on Advertising

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision prohibiting—

(a) the publication, printing, distribution or designing (anywhere) of advertisements whose purpose or effect is to promote a voluntary assisted dying service;

(b) causing the publication, printing, distribution or designing of such advertisements.

(2) The regulations may contain exceptions (for example, for the provision of certain information to users or providers of services).

(3) Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament.

(4) But regulations under this section—

(a) may not amend this Act, and

(b) must provide that any offence created by the regulations is punishable with a fine.

(5) In this section “voluntary assisted dying service” means—

(a) any service for or in connection with the provision of assistance to a person to end their own life in accordance with this Act, or

(b) any other service provided for the purposes of any of sections 5 to 27.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This clause imposes a duty to make regulations prohibiting advertisements to promote services relating to voluntary assisted dying under the Bill.

Brought up, and read the First and Second time.

Amendment proposed to new clause 14: (b), in subsection (2), leave out from “exceptions” to the end of subsection (3) and insert—

“( ) for the following—

communication made in reply to a particular request by an individual for information about a voluntary assisted dying service;

(b) communication which is—

(i) intended for health professionals or providers of voluntary assisted dying services, and

(ii) made in a manner and form unlikely to be seen by potential service users.

(3) Regulations under this section may make provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament, but may not amend this Act or the Suicide Act 1961.”—(Paul Waugh.)

This amendment would limit the exceptions that can be created to the advertising ban set out in NC14 and also provides that regulations cannot amend the Suicide Act 1961, which includes the offence of assisting and encouraging suicide.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on amendment 546 and new clause 40, which are consequential and linked to other amendments to clause 42, relating to the commencement of the legislation.

New clause 40 would require the Secretary of State to prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a report about progress made towards implementing the Bill, and the Secretary of State’s plans for implementation in subsequent reporting periods. The reporting periods are one year after Royal Assent, and every six months thereafter, until the sixth and final reporting period. Amendment 546 provides that new clause 40 will come into force on the day the Bill is passed.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I wonder whether the Minister would entertain a suggestion. I think the extension to four years is going to cause some concern and questions in the House on Report and Third Reading. Given that the Minister is committing to reporting on a six-monthly basis, it would be helpful if the House had a broad plan against which the Government were reporting on implementation. Does the Minister think it is a good idea, on Report or Third Reading, to come forward with an outline timetable, worked up as part of the general assessment of the project?

[Stephen Kinnock]

That sounds like a sensible approach. New clause 40 sets out the report about progress made towards implementing the Bill. If I have correctly understood what he is saying, the right hon. Gentleman is looking for more flesh on the bones of what that plan should be and look like.

[Kit Malthouse]

Essentially, I was trying to point out that four years is obviously a backstop. It may well be that the Government are able to deliver the service in advance of the four-year deadline. It might be helpful at later stages of the Bill’s progress—certainly in the Lords—if the Government are able to give an indication of what they think the likely timeline might be. Admittedly, there will be flexibility in there, but that might assuage some of the concern raised by the hon. Member for Stroud that four years is quite a long time. The commissioner is going to be appointed at the 12-month mark, and that might accelerate some of the work, but I think having an indication may be helpful for Members.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I get what the right hon. Gentleman is saying now: in essence, there will be different parts of the implementation period that will be done at different times. Data may take so long, training may take so long, and so on. I think what the right hon. Gentleman is asking for is a breakdown of which parts of the Bill could be implemented—

[Kit Malthouse]

An indicative timeline.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes. I am very happy to take that up with officials and I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman in short order.

New clause 20 would introduce a requirement on the Secretary of State to lay an annual report in both Houses of Parliament on the impact of the Bill. The report would include the effect of an assisted dying service on access to healthcare, palliative care and assisted dying, and an analysis in relation to people’s socioeconomic status and protected characteristics. That report would sit alongside the existing requirement in clause 35 for a report five years after the Bill is passed. The new clause would require that the first annual report be laid before each House on its first sitting day after one calendar year from the passing of the Bill. The Committee may wish to note that, given the 12-month timeframe, the reporting requirement may start before implementation is complete.

Protected characteristics are defined in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010; however, socioeconomic status is undefined in the new clause, and is not defined elsewhere in the Bill. It is therefore not clear what the assessment of those factors is intended to involve, and it may be difficult in practice for the Secretary of State to determine whether they have fulfilled this duty.

New clause 28 would introduce a legal requirement on the Secretary of State to undertake an assessment of the Bill within 12 months of it being passed, and to publish and lay a report of that assessment in both Houses of Parliament. The Committee may wish to note that, given the 12-month timeframe, the reporting requirement may start before implementation is complete.

Under the new clause, the assessment must cover the extent to which the Bill is on course to meet its aims; the state of health and care services for persons receiving palliative and end-of-life care; the implications of the Bill on those services; any emerging concerns relating to the operation of the Bill; and any steps the Secretary of State proposes to take in response to those concerns. That requirement is in addition to clause 35, which requires a review by the Secretary of State at the end of the initial five-year period after the Bill is passed. That new requirement is wider in scope, and would be required after one year.

Palliative and end-of-life care services are broad, holistic services, provided by a range of professionals and providers—generalist and specialist—across the NHS, social care and voluntary sector organisations. Therefore, measuring the provision is difficult, as relevant consultations and tasks are not always coded as palliative or end-of-life care. Commissioning and contracting processes do not consistently support data collection, with block contracts and grants commonplace. It is also practically difficult to identify the Bill as the catalyst of the implications on those services over the specific period, as they are affected by multiple factors.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Disqualification from being witness or proxy

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

That is indeed my understanding. These would be minor changes, rather than major, fundamental changes to the Bill.

[Kit Malthouse]

I have seen these clauses in standard legislation before. As I understand it, they are often put in place where new organisations are being established and there may be knock-on effects—for example, where an organisation decides to give itself a particular name or changes its name from the one that is in the Act. It tends to be those small things where powers are vested in the Minister effectively to tinker and sandpaper at the end, to get the organisational structure correct.

[Stephen Kinnock]

That is a good description of it. The wording used in the clause is “consequential and transitional provision”, which is another way of saying exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has described.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39

Regulations

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney]

I am grateful for that intervention, but the crucial point is the vote in Parliament, so that MPs get not only an opportunity to consider whether sufficient progress has been made—as per new clause 40—but a vote to confirm that they are content for the legislation to proceed.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am sure the hon. Lady understands that a vote of that nature would not necessarily be binding, or compel the Government to do anything, but there would be other opportunities for the House to consider the legislation in debate and vote on it. She knows that there are a number of ways to do that, including via a Backbench motion or an Opposition day.

[Sarah Olney]

I refer to my earlier comments: there are few enough opportunities for MPs to have any further control over how this legislation is going to be implemented. I do not think that it is asking too much to want a further opportunity to be mandated, and not left—dare I say it—to the vagaries of the Backbench Business Committee. There are Opposition days, but this is cross-party, conscience issue. I can speak only for my own party, but I think there are a number of other issues that the Opposition would want to use those debates to address. Taken together, these amendments would ensure that Parliament is properly informed if the Secretary of State decided to commence the scheme before the four-year auto-commencement deadline.

I want to address how the Bill will be implemented in Wales. On 23 October 2024, in anticipation of the Bill being published, Senedd Cymru debated a motion calling on the Welsh Government to

“a) support the principles of assisted dying; and

b) support Westminster parliament to introduce a compassionate assisted dying law in England and Wales.”

The motion was defeated 19 to 26. Among those who voted against were a number of Welsh Government Ministers, including First Minister Eluned Morgan, and I believe that in three political parties—Labour, Plaid and the Conservatives—there was a majority against. In that context—as Professor Emyr Lewis, who gave evidence to the Committee, has stated—it would be constitutionally wrong to pass the Bill without the consent of the Welsh Senedd. He believes that this is different from other instances where legislation has been passed by Westminster against the will of Wales:

“This is not the equivalent, for instance, of trying to re-base the UK’s internal markets following the chaos of Brexit. When the UK Parliament passed Acts ignoring refusal of consent from Cardiff or Edinburgh, it did so in what were considered to be the interests of the economic coherence of the UK. This Bill, however, is a different sort of creature. It is a Bill which would bring about a profound change in the law relating to life and death, where there are strongly held (and expressed) moral, religious and cultural views against as well as in favour. How can it be constitutionally appropriate for the UK Parliament to pass such a Bill for Wales, when the Senedd has indicated its opposition by democratic vote after a thorough debate?”

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

My hon. Friend is making a good point, but I want to make a constructive suggestion. It might be worth our having a look at Switzerland, where advertising is actually banned but the provision of information is not. It is a fine line, but the Swiss seem to get the balance right.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that point. He is absolutely right that we can learn from what other jurisdictions have done, leverage that and create an amendment or new clause that works for what we are trying to achieve, and know that it will target the advertising that we seek to target.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.

The purpose of amendment 457 is to exclude a person who has less than one month to live from being eligible for the shorter second period of reflection of 48 hours if that person has voluntarily stopped eating and drinking. That person would instead be required to comply with a second period of reflection of 14 days under clause 13(2)(a). The amendment could create uncertainty as to the required length of the period of reflection. It is unclear, for example, if “voluntarily” would include where someone’s appetite has naturally declined as they approach the end of life, and therefore whose decision to stop eating or drinking may not be deliberate.

As I have said previously, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on certain amendments to bolster the legal and workability sides of the Bill, and the purpose of amendment 471 is to clarify that the co-ordinating doctor needs to be satisfied that, immediately before witnessing the second declaration, the criteria set out at subsection (4) are met, and not at any time before. That also ensures consistency with the duty on the co-ordinating doctor in respect of the first declaration.

Amendment 316 would require that where the co-ordinating doctor reasonably believes that the person seeking assistance has less than one month to live from the court declaration, they must refer that person for urgent specialist palliative care. As the referral must be made whether the patient wants that referral or not, this may result in unwanted referrals. The effect of this amendment is unclear.

As drafted, clause 13(2)(b) sets out that where the person’s death is likely to occur within one month, the period of reflection is then 48 hours. Amendment 316 sets out that the referral to urgent palliative care must be made alongside the co-ordinating doctor making the statement, which is the last step to be completed before the provision of assistance under clause 18. That would mean that in some circumstances, there may be insufficient time to make a referral before the person is provided with assistance to end their life.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I want to emphasise that at the moment the patient reaches that point, they will have had their palliative care options explained to them extensively, under the Bill, and it is highly unlikely at that point, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire said, that anyone would not be in receipt of palliative care, given the very late stage of their disease.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I happened to be at a hospice in Stafford yesterday on a ministerial visit and was extremely impressed by the work that the hospice staff were doing on family counselling, and advice and engagement both with the patient and family and loved ones, so the right hon. Gentleman is right that the hospice sector, among others, plays a vital role in that holistic engagement with patients throughout the process.

Amendment 374 requires that the co-ordinating doctor must notify the voluntary assisted dying commissioner where they witness a second declaration and where they make or refuse to make the supporting statement under clause 13(5), and that the commissioner must be provided with a copy of the second declaration and any statement. I hope that those observations were helpful to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

As ever, I absolutely agree that, as hon. Members will no doubt be thinking in response, doctors have a duty of care to patients. Nevertheless, we are talking about a new procedure that sits in an uncomfortable hybrid state between healthcare and non-healthcare. We have special rules and procedures around the particular intervention being designed here. We are still ignorant of the precise mechanisms by which healthcare professionals, and potentially others, will be involved in the administration of this process. What exactly happens in the event of a cancellation? Perhaps the promoter could explain her understanding of what the expectation should be on the providers who have been responsible for supporting the patient up to that point. If amendment 316, which would have made a palliative care referral automatic, had been accepted, we could have had some reassurance that other doctors were there to pick the patient up.

[Kit Malthouse]

rose—

[Danny Kruger]

Before I give way to my right hon. Friend, I want to posit the hypothesis of a private provider that has been established explicitly for the purpose of facilitating the assisted death procedure for patients. If that provider steps back when the patient decides to cancel their declaration, the provider is required to notify the GP as soon as practicable, whatever that means—the timeframe there is clearly at the convenience of the provider, not the patient. My concern is what happens when the patient’s GP is not quickly informed that they have decided not to proceed with the assisted death and they are sitting in limbo. Obviously, there are significant concerns about their wellbeing, given their decision and the state they are in. It is not yet fully clear to me what the obligations on the doctors would be at that stage.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am not entirely certain that my hon. Friend’s remarks are germane to the amendments, but nevertheless. As we discussed when debating clause 13, at the stage he is talking about, the patient will have had all their options—“all appropriate”, as I think we have amended the Bill to say, services that will be available to them—explained to them. If they are cancelling, the presumption has to be, in respecting their autonomy, that they are choosing one of the alternative paths that has been laid out to them. It is quite hard to legislate for a negative.

[Danny Kruger]

I am speaking to the group as a whole, which includes clause stand part. I have no objection to the amendments. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, the expectation is that the medical professionals involved in the person’s care will have laid out their options clearly. We are to a certain degree trusting in that because amendments to insist on it have been rejected, although I recognise that it will be the clear expectation. He is right that it is hard, as it were, to prove a negative.

Nevertheless, the purpose of my speech at this point is to tease out from the advocates of the Bill what their expectation is. My right hon. Friend has clearly explained his expectation, which is that we are dealing with somebody whose mind is clear, rational, uncluttered by other concerns and entirely free of any undue influences or anxieties about the different choices they might make. Having previously decided in the fullness of their autonomy that they wanted to go through the procedure, they have now decided in the fullness of their autonomy that they want to do the opposite, and we should say, “Fine. We have no further interest in your decision making. It is your choice—you’re on your own.” I am very concerned about the implication of my right hon. Friend’s comments about the sorts of patients who might be involved in the process of assisted dying.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, we certainly hope so. Nevertheless, that is inconsistent with the doctrine of absolute patient autonomy, which in this circumstance allows a patient to withdraw from the medical treatment, or at least from the support of the medics who had been facilitating their assisted death. They are rightly under no obligation to receive any other sort of care.

Of course, one would assume that in most cases medics will be closely involved in looking after these patients, because they are likely to be very ill. Nevertheless, the Bill has nothing more to say about patients who have just stepped back from the brink of suicide; the medics will have no further obligation to ensure that they will be looked after—except by the GP, as soon as it is practicable for the provider who has just been denied the business of looking after the assisted death to get round to emailing them. If that is seen as sufficient to ensure that those patients will be properly looked after, I beg to differ.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am not sure what compulsion there is in wider legislation for there to be a duty of care to patients who do not choose assisted dying in the first place. For thousands and thousands of patients who die, there is no legislation that imposes certain duties on medics or others to look after them; we rely on the professional standards and overall atmosphere of the healthcare system, as we would in the case of these patients.

As my hon. Friend knows, overseas experience shows that a large proportion of the people who obtain the right to an assisted death—up to a third—do not cancel but do not exercise it. As we have said before, for many people assisted dying is an insurance card that they may choose to use if and when they think their life becomes intolerable.

[Danny Kruger]

I recognise that, but that is not germane to the debate that we are having, which is about the actual cancellation. There is a question about why there would have been a cancellation. My right hon. Friend is right that there is no obligation to proceed once a patient passes a particular hurdle. Many will not, but when someone decides actively to renounce their decision, a big question should be asked: what is going on, and what further help is needed?

My right hon. Friend suggests that we do not step in and ensure that care is provided—that, in other circumstances, there is no additional obligation in relation to patients. I am afraid to say that he has, as ever, a coldly rationalistic vision of healthcare and of the sorts of patients we are dealing with. As I have said to him, these patients will be acting much as I imagine he would imagine—I think from a position of health and self-confidence—himself acting in that circumstance. In fact, we are dealing with people who have decided to renounce their decision to proceed, and so are by definition in some turmoil.

I crave the indulgence of the Committee, because I am talking at length about a set of amendments that I do not intend to oppose, and I recognise the value and necessity of the clause. However, I draw to the Committee’s attention that we are dealing not simply with a bit of paperwork, but with a human being who, having made one enormous decision—to die—is now making an enormous decision to live, and we are treating it as if it is only a bureaucratic question.

I finish with a question to the hon. Member for Spen Valley or to the Minister, to help me understand something that confuses me in the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Amendment 321 would require a proxy to record, when signing the declaration on behalf of the person, the reason why the person they are acting as a proxy for is unable to sign their own name. The recording of the reason may make the use of a proxy more transparent. It may also assist others involved in the scrutiny of the process to understand why a proxy was used.

Amendment 431 seeks to restrict who can be a proxy under the Bill to attorneys with a lasting power of attorney, or LPA, for health and welfare decisions—that is, those people who are able to consent to or refuse life-sustaining treatment. The amendment raises significant practical issues. First, not everyone has an LPA. Secondly, where a person has made an LPA, they will have decided whether to give the attorney the authority to refuse or consent to life-sustaining treatment. That is not automatic and means that not all attorneys would be able to meet the eligibility requirement of the amendment. Thirdly, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 enables an attorney to exercise power under an LPA only if and when someone has lost capacity.

[Kit Malthouse]

Does the Minister agree that, unfortunately, my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire seems to be labouring under the misapprehension that there is some reputational test in becoming an attorney? In truth, I can appoint anybody I want to be my attorney. There is no verification or otherwise until there is some form of dispute around the exercise of the power of attorney. In fact, the regulations may mean that we have stronger verification of the bona fides of the person who is a proxy than we would have through the LPA route.

Does the Minister not also find it slightly sad that, given the type of Conservative I know my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is, he thinks the concept of being of good standing in society is somehow meaningless?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am not a lawyer, but thankfully I am sitting next to a very eminent and distinguished one—my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green—who has confirmed that everything the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said was correct from a legal standpoint, so I shall leave it at that.

Clause 15(5) of the Bill defines a proxy as

“(a) a person who has known the person making the declaration personally for at least 2 years, or

(b) a person who is of good standing in the community.”

Amendment 473 would remove subsection (b) from the definition of proxy, instead introducing a regulation-making power to specify the persons who may act as proxy. That would avoid any ambiguity around the meaning of a person who is of good standing in the community and retain flexibility to amend the specified list in regulations.

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[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful—I really do thank the hon. Lady, because the effect of this process on the medical professionals who will be involved is a very important consideration, and one that we have perhaps not given enough attention to. That is why we will come to the conscience clause in due course, although we have discussed it a little already. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that there is a difference for the medics in the extent to which they are involved in the administration of the death. I am afraid I do not see a major moral difference between providing the wherewithal—setting things up for, or indeed helping, the patients to ingest or otherwise self-administer the fatal drug—and people performing the act themselves. The distinction is very obscure; there is a significant grey area there.

On the hon. Lady’s point about appropriate consideration of the feelings of the medical profession, if she believes in doctor autonomy, she should believe that doctors ought to have the autonomy to decide for themselves whether to perform euthanasia, if euthanasia were legal. That is what happens in other countries. In Canada, doctors can decline to take part, or they can participate.

Given the question of autonomy, it is worth noting that in countries where euthanasia is legal, it is the overwhelming choice of the patients, as I think it would be for me. If I were facing that terrible moment and choice—we will come in due course to the question of the drugs involved and the process of taking them, but swallowing all these pills is not a pleasant process—it would be far easier, more humane and less painful for a doctor to administer the drugs intravenously. I visited Canada and met a doctor who had been responsible for over 300 deaths, which she herself has performed, because that is the overwhelming choice of the patients. As I am sure the hon. Lady would agree, that doctor is acting with full professional discretion and autonomy.

To go back to my point, I am afraid this is one of the impossible dilemmas that the Bill and the whole concept of assisted dying set up: whether we allow the doctor to do it to us. My concern is that if the stress on self-administration is genuinely felt—not, as I cynically believe, because this is the only way to get assisted dying through the House of Commons—because the Bill’s authors recognise the need to be absolutely sure that the act is voluntary, and if the reason why we insist on self-administration is because we want to be sure that the act is voluntary, what does that say about all the so-called safeguards that exist up to this point? We have been told that those safeguards are sufficient to ensure that we have absolute confidence about the person’s clear and settled wish.

If we are sure that people at this stage in the process have a settled, informed and free wish to end their lives, why should they not be able to ask a doctor to do it to them? The only answer to that question can be that we do not genuinely believe that we are completely sure. We want, subsequent to death, to be sure—in terms of our own moral propriety and sense of amour-propre—that those people did it themselves. It was not our choice; it was not us doing it to them—they did it.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am a little confused by my hon. Friend’s logic. He has literally just proposed an amendment for the doctor to ask, at the last, whether the person still wants to proceed. Surely self-administration is the ultimate act of consent, which his own amendment requires a doctor to establish right at the last moment.

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[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I agree entirely with the right hon. Member’s interpretation of the Bill.

There is a further unintended consequence of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, which I am sure is not his intention but would sadly be the effect: were an individual to qualify under the Bill, should it pass and were the amendment to be adopted, they would inevitably be forced to take the final decision at an earlier stage. If there is a restriction that they can have no assistance whatsoever in performing the act, they will end up making the decision when they know that they have the entire physical strength available for them to do it, and that actually brings forward the point at which they choose to die to an earlier stage.

[Kit Malthouse]

After 10 years of campaigning on this issue and spending so much time with people whose family have gone to Switzerland, one of the things they consistently say is that people went to Switzerland much earlier than they wanted to because they had to go while they were still physically able. I think this is a critical point that people have to realise. We should not compel people to do this earlier than they would otherwise wish to simply because of these restrictions.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My right hon. Friend makes an important and powerful point. I think there is a consensus among the Committee that there is no desire for people to take this ultimate step at an earlier stage than is absolutely necessary for them. My very real fear is that, were we to adopt this amendment, we would bring forward that point of decision.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

What is hard to do in this Committee is imagine and agree on how many different scenarios there can be. Every circumstance and every individual experience will be different, so it is difficult for us to envision all the different scenarios. Nothing about this is easy, of course. We would not have been sitting in this Bill Committee for hours on end if it were all easy, but from the Government’s point of view there is a clear enough distinction between assistance and self-administration. As long as we are clear on those basic principles, we feel that that gives enough safety to the Bill and enough clarity around the process.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is perhaps unintentionally creating a lack of clarity where there is clarity? Surely there is complete clarity in the distinction between assisting a patient to be in a position to carry out their final desire and act, and performing or even jointly performing that final act with them. Is it not the case that in overseas jurisdictions there is quite a lot of assistance with technology? It needs to be prepared and put in place, but it can put even those who are the least physically able in a position in which the final act of administration can be clearly theirs. In many ways, our life is made easier by modern technology in that regard.

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[Lewis Atkinson]

That is exactly right. That will quite possibly include people’s individual homes as well as not in their homes, in places of appropriate care and peace and tranquillity.

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. Member might be interested to know that many hospices and, in fact, the hospice movement have developed what they call hospice at home, which is for people in the advanced stage of illness who want to die in their own home. Services are provided to them to palliate them as they reach death at home.

[Lewis Atkinson]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Another point we have not yet mentioned is that the Care Quality Commission regulates healthcare on the basis of location of delivery. Hospice services cannot just be provided from a random place: the place has to be registered with the CQC as suitable for the provision. I am sure that regime would continue in this instance.

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Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[Kit Malthouse]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. Is there any chance somebody could attend to the heating? I do not know whether I am the only Member who is starting to feel a bit cold. As the evening wears on, we are likely to get colder. If we could have it turned up slightly, that might assist our proceedings.

[The Chair]

I was under the impression that cold concentrated the mind, but we will see what we can do. I speak as one who will not be in the room. The point has been taken.

Clause 19

Authorising another doctor to provide assistance

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Daniel Francis]

That is what I have wrestled with. That conversation will happen, and at the end of it, I accept that the autonomy is with the individual, who may well make a decision that they believe is for the best but with which their loved one does not necessarily agree. I think there are examples from overseas of that having happened.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I agree about the primacy of autonomy, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that, given the status quo and the many stories that we have heard about individuals who took their lives but kept it secret from their families, whether by going to Switzerland or by doing it in a horrible way in lonely circumstances, a regulated atmosphere would makes it more likely that people will talk to their family about what their death will be like and, as we have learned from overseas, make arrangements for their family to be around them, or at least to say goodbye, as they move into that process? At the moment, because this area is unregulated, way more people do it in secret than need to.

[Daniel Francis]

I am not entirely persuaded. I think there is currently a mixture of cases, and there will potentially be a mixture of cases in future. I hear what the right hon. Member says, but my primary concern is about the way things are. As I say, I am minded not to support the amendments on balance, but I am concerned that we could end up hearing stories about someone’s loved one of 50 years, or their child with a learning disability, having had an assisted death—and the first they knew about it was when it was too late.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twentieth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rachel Hopkins]

The Bill already sets out a number of things that a doctor has to assure themselves of, with regard to coercion and capacity. They would do that having had a significant amount of training to establish, in the round, after consulting others, that one way or another the legal requirements have been met. The “Why?” question appears to me to bring in a judgmental element—

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Subjective.

[Rachel Hopkins]

Indeed: subjective, as the right hon. Gentleman said. That is the point that I am trying to get at. There is an objective assessment, which is wholly appropriate, but a subjective assessment would lead down a different route and muddy the objective assessment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention and he makes an important point.

[Kit Malthouse]

What is an acceptable answer? Can we have a list?

[Naz Shah]

Does the right hon. Gentleman want to intervene?

[Kit Malthouse]

indicated dissent.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member for East Wiltshire makes an important point. Where are the opportunities? When doctors are doing the assessment.

The other issue that speaks to me is the question of internalised bias. We will have professionals with subconscious bias or affirmed bias. They will be clinicians who have chosen or agreed to take part in the process; fundamentally, the majority of clinicians will not take part in this process because of their beliefs. It changes the relationship between doctor and patient from a societal perspective.

I know that a number of times I have been stopped during a process and asked a different question, and at times that opportunity for reflection—even without the pressure of knowing I have only six months to live—is of benefit to me. I am sure that others would benefit from it, too, particularly because the decision is so momentous. For that reason, I will certainly support amendment 468.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 201. I have mixed views on it. I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said about medical records, especially when it comes to women and their past, but I also appreciated what my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford said about his experience from a mental health perspective.

I am still thinking about the amendment and I am not sure whether I will support it or not, but further thought needs to be given to the subject. There are the issues of mental health and women’s rights, but another issue applies, too. If someone has experienced trauma in childhood but that trauma has come out much more recently, even though it does not necessarily affect the decision at hand—whether to choose an assisted death—is there some kind of historical post-traumatic stress disorder that would then need to be explored? I do not have the answer, but I look forward to hearing the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on that point. I would value hearing whether she has thought about that and what her understanding of it is.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. She makes a very good point. It is definitely something that needs to be explored, to ensure that people are not being excluded for the reasons she set out. It is a different example, but when voter ID was introduced a special ID card was created by the Government to cater for exactly the situation she set out. We have to find a way of ensuring that people are not excluded because of that technicality. She makes a valid point.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Scanning back through my experience of the health service, I do not remember ever having to show my ID, whatever the procedure or medical service. I do not remember showing ID to witness the birth of my children or my wife having to show her ID. I am not sure that is common in the health service. Why would we introduce it for this? I can go in and have a heart bypass and not be asked to show my ID. My assumption is that often people will have been—

[The Chair]

Order. I have asked for interventions to be short.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

There is no rule that can be applied universally in the abstract. All rules take their value from how they are introduced. On the hon. Gentleman’s hypothesis, I do not in principle suggest that every new treatment and every new obligation that is created in the NHS should require laws determining how clinicians prioritise them. In the case of a new service—I am trying not to use the word “treatment”, because I do not accept it as such, but it sounds like it will be treated as an NHS treatment—that is very significant and whose resource implications are unknown, it strikes me as appropriate that, as far as possible, we should be clear that doctors should manage the resource demands placed on them by the Bill in the context of their other obligations to patients.

[Kit Malthouse]

Can my hon. Friend not see that, as the hon. Member for Rother Valley said, the amendment is based on what could be construed as an offensive assumption: that doctors otherwise might or would? Effectively, it is the legislative equivalent of the “When did you stop beating your wife?” question.

[Danny Kruger]

I am afraid to say that we do impose obligations on doctors to do the things that we expect them to do. If that is offensive to doctors, so is all the guidance from the General Medical Council. It might well be argued that the amendment is otiose, because of course we would expect doctors to manage their resource requirements appropriately and to consider other patients. Nevertheless, the point that is being made in defence of the amendment, about which I feel strongly, is that we are creating a new service with unknowable resource implications, with strong parliamentary backing behind it, and with a whole set of guidance that will be created ex nihilo by the Secretary of State and that Parliament will have little control over.

Because we have not seen the amendments on the design of the service, we do not even know what the service will involve and how much work it will take. It is therefore appropriate to specify explicitly that doctors have an obligation to consider the potential impact on other patients.

[Kit Malthouse]

I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from. To give us fair warning, if the Committee votes the amendment down, how will he portray that publicly? Will he say to the public that the Committee has voted for doctors to harm other patients?

[The Chair]

Order. That is not a relevant question, Mr Malthouse.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

As I understand it, I do not think if someone is donating an organ that they do actually have to see a psychiatrist; they have to see somebody who is an appropriately trained assessor from the Human Tissue Authority. To me, that sounds equivalent to the second doctor in our process—someone who is appropriately trained to assess patients and what they need to do. This talk of it having to be a qualified registered psychiatrist, compared with an organ donation, is incorrect.

[Dr Opher]

I completely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. By amending clause 12 to include social workers, who specialise in spotting coercion, there would be a psychological component in that panel. I emphasise that the first two doctors are trained in psychological assessment—they have to be to become a doctor, and we must respect their knowledge and decision making. Psychiatrists will be incredibly useful in difficult cases of capacity, but using them in every case would not be using them in the best capacity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Is the hon. Member aware that in nine of the 10 cases that went before the Court of Protection, the young ladies were deemed not to have capacity, but the judge still decided that it would not be in their best interests to feed them, and they were put on palliative care pathways?

[Kit Malthouse]

They did not have capacity.

[Sarah Olney]

I am grateful for that intervention and, dare I say it, for the one from the right hon. Gentleman. That is the whole point about eating disorders: there is a very fine line to be trod between people who have capacity, people who lack capacity and people who have capacity but who can still be allowed to make an unwise choice, which is obviously a huge risk for people with eating disorders. I find that risk very much magnified in the Bill as it is currently drafted, which is why it is of the utmost importance that it provides specifically for the possibility that somebody is suffering from any kind of mental health illness, and particularly from an eating disorder—but I do not see such a provision at the moment. I heard the arguments that were made when I raised this issue in earlier sittings, and I very much welcome amendment 6, but it deals only with capacity; it does not talk about mental illness.

To conclude, amendment 363 is a crucial safeguard that would prevent assisted dying from becoming an unintended route for people suffering from mental health conditions, such as eating disorders, to end their lives prematurely. It would ensure that requests for assisted death are based on genuine, rational decisions, rather than symptoms of a treatable disorder. By aligning with best practice from other jurisdictions and addressing a critical gap in the UK’s current approach, it would strengthen the ethical foundations of the assisted dying Bill and better protect vulnerable individuals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Sorry—they did not have capacity, but the Court of Protection still ruled that they would be taken down the route of palliative care. This is not just a matter of capacity; in this instance, when we talk about mental health—before we even get to the capacity question—the issue is that anorexia is a recognised mental health condition. I beg to differ from my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central on whether we have enough provision. We keep coming back to this issue time and again.

[Kit Malthouse]

I want to be clear, because the hon. Lady and I have exchanged views on this issue: my recollection from reading the briefing—I am happy to go back to it—is that, in those nine cases, the girls were found not to have capacity, but the judge then took the decision not to force-feed them because force-feeding them was likely to be threatening to their health and might precipitate their deaths. I do not think it is quite right to say that the judges put them on a palliative pathway. They declined to force-feed them on the basis that they thought it was in their best interests and that force-feeding them might actually precipitate their deaths.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. When I came to this place, somebody said to me, “There’s the letter of the law and there’s the essence of the law.” As lawmakers, we make indications, and so do judges. By not opposing something, does that mean that by default we are supporting it? That is the question here for me. In those cases, those judges accepted—as he says—that those girls would inevitably die. Although the judges did not state that they put the girls on a palliative care pathway, by default, in my understanding, that was a palliative care pathway because it was accepted that those young girls were going to die by not being fed. It is just a matter of semantics for me.

I come back to the debate that we have just had. For me, the crux of the issue is that if someone has a mental health condition that then, by definition, becomes a terminal illness—regardless of the capacity conversation—this amendment surely strengthens the safeguard for them. By and large, this involves women who experience anorexia so this conversation is very gendered. I am happy to be corrected. That is all I have to say on the matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I rise to speak to amendment 55, in clause 71, page 4, line 33, leave out paragraph (a).

The amendment would ensure that the independent doctor has qualifications and experience in psychiatry or in assessing mental capacity. We have heard a lot in the debate about the importance of a holistic, multi-disciplinary approach to patient care at the end of life. We have also discussed the need for that to happen throughout the process and, in particular, during the crucial stages of the patient’s assessment. In the oral evidence sessions, we heard from Dr Rachel Clarke about the need for teams to be involved with patients throughout the process. By requiring the input of a psychiatrically trained clinician in the assessment by the doctors, we would be making explicit the expectation that assisted dying should adhere to the best practice, which we already see in end of life care in our country. We would also be bringing our practice into line with jurisdictions such as Oregon, which require referral to a psychiatrist, as has been discussed.

[Kit Malthouse]

On a point of order, Mrs Harris. I do not think that the amendment is actually about qualifications or training. It is about the removal of certain assessments.

[Danny Kruger]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, I apologise. I am speaking to later amendments, so I apologise to the Chair and to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

On a point of order, Mrs Harris. I am sorry to raise this again, but I think my hon. Friend might not be on point. Amendment 56 is about detention under the Mental Health Act, not the training and standing of the doctors. He seems to be speaking to the qualification of the person, whereas the amendment is about the Mental Health Act.

[The Chair]

There are a lot of other amendments grouped with amendment 56. Does anyone want to move amendment 56 or shall we move on?

--- Later in debate ---

This group of amendments would give the patient better choice.

[Kit Malthouse]

I rise briefly to oppose all four amendments, which seem to completely ignore the reality of what it is like to receive a terminal diagnosis and then die. In truth, from the moment someone is told that they have some horrible disease that is likely to kill them, their entire life becomes a contemplation or reflection on their mortality, frankly, and on the options that might be available to them. Although we have sought to strike a balance in the Bill by having periods of reflection between the various steps, we have to reflect on the fact that people will be thinking about these things all the time anyway. Although we might be going through the motions and hoping that they seek assistance and advice during that period, I guarantee that it will already be in the forefront of their minds.

These amendments—like so many from the hon. Lady from the beautiful city of York, the hon. Member for York Central—operate on the basis that people will show up at six months, enter the process at six months, do their three weeks of contemplation and then immediately take their lives, which is simply unrealistic and hardly ever going to happen. The vast majority of people will have been wrestling with their disease for months and often years before they get to the six-month period. If they are diagnosed with less than six months to go, which happens quite frequently, as we discussed in relation to pancreatic cancer yesterday, they will be immediately thinking not just about what their death will be like, but about the things they have to get done in that period—spending time with their family, the people they want to say goodbye to, the arrangements they want to make and the things they want to complete before they leave us. Imposing on people these arbitrary periods of reflection—the ones in the Bill are arbitrary, too—has to be balanced against the notion that these people have other things to do, and a hell of a lot more to think about than the bureaucracy we are trying to put in place.

The other thing to bear in mind, which the amendments do not take account of, is that disease progression is very rarely linear. I am sure the medics will tell us that there is often a period where a person thinks they are going to be okay, and then suddenly they fall off a cliff towards the end. Anybody who has been close to somebody with advanced cancer will know that they can be perfectly well and functioning until the last couple of weeks, or even days, before they suddenly decline and die. We need to design a system that satisfies the requirement for reflection, but also lets these people do what they need to do.

Although the hon. Member for Bradford West says that the amendments do not extend the amount of reflection time by that much, what in total they double it. It goes from 21 days to 42 days, which is a very significant proportion of the time that those people will have left to themselves—to sit, think, wait and go through the bureaucratic process. What most people will want to do is go through the process and secure permission, then take their time and think about what they want to do. They want to get on with their lives and to enjoy what is left because they lose the fear of what their ultimate end is going to be. Then, some weeks or months later, they can make the decision, if they wish to, to take their own lives, and we know that about a third do not because they are in palliative care.

[Jack Abbott]

On the point about almost doubling the time of the so-called reflection period, I think we have been very fixated on the Committee, and rightly so, on the six-month limit for the terminal diagnosis, but we recognise that for many people it will be much less than that. A reflection period of two months for someone with a terminal diagnosis of three months is a critical problem.

[Kit Malthouse]

I completely agree. We have to strike a balance here. The point I am making is that, within an envelope of six months, 42 days is far too long, so I am afraid that I flatly oppose the amendments. They are based on a fundamental misunderstanding: the idea that people will just show up at six months, that their disease progression will be linear, and that they will then take the decision immediately, the moment they finish the reflection period. I can tell hon. Members that the entire six months, from the moment someone gets a six-month diagnosis, will be a reflection period.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s comments. He referred to the same thing twice, yesterday and today, and I just want to clarify it. He said that most people are ill for a while. I have a genuine question. I do not have the research, but my understanding, as a member of the public and a Member of Parliament, is that for many people who get a terminal diagnosis of six months, it will have been very sudden. Does he have any research to suggest that most of these patients will have been on the kind of trajectory he describes?

[Kit Malthouse]

I depends on the disease, but many people will struggle with, for example, breast cancer for five years, go through repeated rounds of chemotherapy and undergo terrible operations to try to survive; then, there will come a point when the clinicians and oncologists say, “There isn’t much more we can do for you; we think you have a few months left to live, because there is no further treatment we can offer, so aggressive is your cancer.” Other people have cancer and are free of it within two or three months, because of the nature of the cancer. Some people will reach a six-month point suddenly—it will not be dead-on six months; it might be either side—and some people will be diagnosed with pancreatic cancer with two weeks to go. We have to strike a balance and be humane in what we impose on these people, who will have a lot more to think about than the regulations.

[Naz Shah]

I want to explore that point a bit further. When I talk about a period of reflection, I am referring to the evidence that we have had from psychiatrists, who said that people’s abilities would be impacted in this situation. That is where the amendments are coming from. To come back to the previous point, is there any research or evidence that would back up the claim that many cases are longer-term illnesses, rather than people who have just got the diagnosis?

[Kit Malthouse]

Maybe I was not clear: it depends on the disease. For example, the median survival range for pancreatic cancer is six to 12 months, because it does not exhibit symptoms; people only learn very late that they have it, and that is why the normal survival curve is quite a short one. We need to bear that in mind.

We also need to remember that the more we extend the periods of reflection, the longer people will have to live with the fear of what their death will be like, and with the nervousness about whether they will be allowed to control their own death—we are granting permission here. If I have to wait 42 days, that is 42 days out of whatever I might have left—perhaps 120 days, if I am lucky—that I am spending concerned about whether I am going to die in a particular way. To me, that seems crazy.

Two of the amendments propose extending the 48-hour period to seven days. These are people who have been told they are going to die within a month. They have less than 30 days to deal with their affairs, deal with their children, talk to their family and decide what they are going to do, and the amendments propose that for seven days of that, they will have to contemplate their fear of death, rather than rush it through. It is rushing it through in 48 hours—reflecting the fact that they are going to die.

The misunderstanding is most illustrated by the fact that amendment 314 proposes that, with the extension to seven days, there should be a mandatory referral to palliative care. With a month to go, these people are by definition already being palliated. The idea that somehow they are just waltzing up, unattended to, with a month to go, and that the NHS is going to say, “Actually, we’re not going to do anything to help you” fundamentally misunderstands what disease is like at the end of life. I am afraid that I vehemently oppose these amendments. The balance in the Bill is exactly right, and I hope that the Committee will agree.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Bambos Charalambous.)

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighteenth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

My amendments state that if a medical professional is paid for delivering assisted suicide, the money they receive should be transparent. The answer is therefore the former.

I do not propose any cap. If we end up with a private service, although the hon. Member for Spen Valley has just told us that we will not, it might be appropriate to create a scale of charges. My suggestion is that we need absolute clarity. I also think we should use the affirmative procedure to approve the regulations on the transparency of finances. This should be something that Parliament expressly approves.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

My interpretation of what the hon. Member for Spen Valley said is that, as long as the service is available on the NHS, it is up to me whether I go private. In such circumstances, I could have it on the NHS if I really wanted. If I chose to go private, as I might if I were having a baby at the Portland hospital or cosmetic surgery at King Edward VII’s hospital in Marylebone, why would my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire want to know the private arrangement between me and my physician?

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful for that clarity, although we now seem to be less clear than we were. I understood the hon. Member for Spen Valley to be saying that there will not be private provision, but my right hon. Friend is saying that there may be.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Wednesday 5th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. She makes a very good point. It is definitely something that needs to be explored, to ensure that people are not being excluded for the reasons she set out. It is a different example, but when voter ID was introduced a special ID card was created by the Government to cater for exactly the situation she set out. We have to find a way of ensuring that people are not excluded because of that technicality. She makes a valid point.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Scanning back through my experience of the health service, I do not remember ever having to show my ID, whatever the procedure or medical service. I do not remember showing ID to witness the birth of my children or my wife having to show her ID. I am not sure that is common in the health service. Why would we introduce it for this? I can go in and have a heart bypass and not be asked to show my ID. My assumption is that often people will have been—

[The Chair]

Order. I have asked for interventions to be short.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

There is no rule that can be applied universally in the abstract. All rules take their value from how they are introduced. On the hon. Gentleman’s hypothesis, I do not in principle suggest that every new treatment and every new obligation that is created in the NHS should require laws determining how clinicians prioritise them. In the case of a new service—I am trying not to use the word “treatment”, because I do not accept it as such, but it sounds like it will be treated as an NHS treatment—that is very significant and whose resource implications are unknown, it strikes me as appropriate that, as far as possible, we should be clear that doctors should manage the resource demands placed on them by the Bill in the context of their other obligations to patients.

[Kit Malthouse]

Can my hon. Friend not see that, as the hon. Member for Rother Valley said, the amendment is based on what could be construed as an offensive assumption: that doctors otherwise might or would? Effectively, it is the legislative equivalent of the “When did you stop beating your wife?” question.

[Danny Kruger]

I am afraid to say that we do impose obligations on doctors to do the things that we expect them to do. If that is offensive to doctors, so is all the guidance from the General Medical Council. It might well be argued that the amendment is otiose, because of course we would expect doctors to manage their resource requirements appropriately and to consider other patients. Nevertheless, the point that is being made in defence of the amendment, about which I feel strongly, is that we are creating a new service with unknowable resource implications, with strong parliamentary backing behind it, and with a whole set of guidance that will be created ex nihilo by the Secretary of State and that Parliament will have little control over.

Because we have not seen the amendments on the design of the service, we do not even know what the service will involve and how much work it will take. It is therefore appropriate to specify explicitly that doctors have an obligation to consider the potential impact on other patients.

[Kit Malthouse]

I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from. To give us fair warning, if the Committee votes the amendment down, how will he portray that publicly? Will he say to the public that the Committee has voted for doctors to harm other patients?

[The Chair]

Order. That is not a relevant question, Mr Malthouse.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

As I understand it, I do not think if someone is donating an organ that they do actually have to see a psychiatrist; they have to see somebody who is an appropriately trained assessor from the Human Tissue Authority. To me, that sounds equivalent to the second doctor in our process—someone who is appropriately trained to assess patients and what they need to do. This talk of it having to be a qualified registered psychiatrist, compared with an organ donation, is incorrect.

[Dr Opher]

I completely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. By amending clause 12 to include social workers, who specialise in spotting coercion, there would be a psychological component in that panel. I emphasise that the first two doctors are trained in psychological assessment—they have to be to become a doctor, and we must respect their knowledge and decision making. Psychiatrists will be incredibly useful in difficult cases of capacity, but using them in every case would not be using them in the best capacity.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I apologise for having arrived ever so slightly late, Mr Efford. In the Minister’s view, is it conceivable that he or any future Minister—or, indeed, the current or any future chief medical officer—would not consult with groups representing those with Down’s syndrome in drawing up the various guidelines on the Bill?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Extensive consultations have taken place with all the key groups and advocacy organisations on Down’s syndrome in the drafting of the guidance. The guidance is very close to publication; once it is published, it will form the basis of a further consultation. It is an iterative process.

[Kit Malthouse]

Perhaps I was not clear. I meant the guidance on this Bill. Although the Minister may not necessarily be able to say what will be in it, is it conceivable that the CMO, in drawing up guidance as a requirement under the Bill, would not consult Down’s syndrome groups? My point is that, given what has been expressed and the desire of the Committee, I cannot see that a CMO would not talk to Down’s syndrome groups in any event.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that clarification and apologise for my misunderstanding; I thought he was referring to the guidance that we are currently working on under the terms of the 2022 Act. Yes, absolutely: the Bill currently specifies a two-year commencement period, within which a whole range of operationalisation work will need to be done. All of that will need to be consulted on; we will not do it all in an ivory tower from Whitehall or Westminster.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

Absolutely. This is about professional judgment, which is what the BMA is really clear about. Doctors have to be able to use their professional judgment. They are not under any obligation to raise the issue, but they are not under any obligation not to raise it. The BMA is really clear about that. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention.

I welcome amendments 319 and 320 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and I thank him once again for his positive engagement with the Bill. He raises a very valid point about the initial discussion. While the Bill is very clear that it applies only to terminally ill adults over the age of 18, in that someone would have to be over 18 to make the first declaration, it is not clear that the initial discussion could also not happen with someone under the age of 18.

We should not prohibit open conversations with terminally ill young people and their families, as they create openness, transparency and safeguards and provide much-needed support at what most of us can only imagine must be the most difficult time of anyone’s life. However, I think it should be made clear that the actual assisted dying process cannot be embarked upon unless someone is over the age of 18. I have taken advice about how best to incorporate that into the Bill from a drafting perspective. As a result, I have tabled amendment 418, which applies to clause 5, and states that regulations must provide that the first declaration contain, among other things,

“a declaration that they have had a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner, that they were aged 18 or over when they had that discussion, and that they understand the information referred to in section 4(4)(a) to (c) that was provided during that discussion”.

As such, the aim of amendments 319 and 320 is achieved. I hope that that is to the satisfaction of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford.

With regard to amendment 339, I have listened very carefully to the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who tabled it, and the evidence from Mencap chief executive Dan Scorer, who suggested that for terminally ill people with learning disabilities

“that initial conversation has to be incredibly well supported and structured…the person should have accessible information in advance of that discussion so that they are fully informed about all their rights in terms of treatment options at end of life”. ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 280.]

I absolutely agree with the intention of the amendment. I am seeking advice on the legal and technical implications, as I believe there is some tightening up that would need to be done around some of the phrasing, such as the concept of “sufficient time” or what would constitute a “supporter”. I therefore cannot support the amendment as it stands, but I am very happy to look at ways to take this forward and to meet my hon. Friend to discuss the amendment, which, quite rightly, gives special consideration to people with autism and learning disabilities. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge is also considering tabling amendments that would have a similar effect; perhaps we could all meet together.

I also reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford that I am considering the involvement of people with learning disabilities, and groups representing them, in the development of guidance and training on assisted dying and end-of-life conversations. As Dan Scorer said,

“people with a learning disability should be involved in the development of that guidance” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 281.]

I absolutely agree.

Amendment 368, tabled by the right hon. Member for East Hampshire, has been discussed this morning. I sought advice about it as it was new to me. I believe that no statutory guidance has yet been published under the Down Syndrome Act, so we lack detail. That Act resulted from another private Member’s Bill; I am sure we can all agree what an excellent process this is for making important changes to the law. As the Minister said, the amendment is likely to be unworkable for doctors so I cannot support it. I would, however, be very happy to discuss the thoughts of the right hon. Member for East Hampshire and look at how we can meet his objectives—possibly through an addition to new clause 8, which is about the duty to consult and the Secretary of State consulting with the Equality and Human Rights Commission. At that point, the specific needs of not just people with disabilities but those with other protected characteristics will be represented. Alternatively, we could look at the codes of practice in clause 30.

I am happy to take those discussions forward and may even be able to speak to the right hon. Member for East Hampshire at the drop-in session he is doing this week with the National Down Syndrome Policy Group, ahead of Down’s Syndrome Awareness Week.

[Kit Malthouse]

As the hon. Lady will know, a number of our proceedings have been misinterpreted, shall we say, on social media. For complete clarity, with regard to the initial conversation, the Bill leaves to the discretion of the doctor whether it is appropriate to raise the matter, given their knowledge of the patient. They have no obligation to raise it. If the patient themselves indicates a wish to raise the matter, then a doctor is under an obligation to lay out all the options available to that patient. We would not want to leave the outside world with the impression that, in all circumstances, the doctor is obliged to raise the option of assisted dying. It is only when they professionally think it is appropriate or if the patient raises it with them.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. As I have said, the BMA has been very clear that doctors should use their professional judgment. For example, if they had a patient whom they knew to be deeply religious and who had no interest whatsoever in an assisted death, it is highly unlikely that they would raise the possibility. It is up to them to use their professional judgment to accommodate the wishes of the patient. It has to be a patient-centred approach.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 285, in clause 4, page 2, line 28, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—

“(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, in consultation with a specialist in the relevant illness, disease or medical condition,

(b) any treatment available and the likely effect of it, in consultation with a specialist in the provision of such treatment,

(c) any palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support, in consultation with a specialist in palliative care.”

This amendment ensures that a specialist carries out the assessment of the patient, the treatment options available and the palliative care options available, since these may not be known to a doctor coordinating an assisted death.

Amendment 343, in clause 4, page 2, line 28, at end insert

“, including any relevant probabilities and uncertainties surrounding the person’s diagnosis and prognosis.”

This amendment would make clear that the doctor conducting an initial discussion is required to discuss the probabilities and uncertainties of any estimates of how long a person may have to live.

Amendment 344, in clause 4, page 2, line 29, at end insert

“, including the risks and benefits of such treatment, potential side effects, and the impact of the treatment on the person’s quality and length of life.”

This amendment would make clear that the doctor conducting an initial discussion is required to discuss the impact of any treatment available.

Amendment 275, in clause 4, page 2, line 30, leave out “any available” and insert “all appropriate”.

Amendment 108, in clause 4, page 2, line 31, at end insert

“and offer to refer them to a registered medical practitioner who specialises in such care for the purpose of further discussion.”

This amendment would require the doctor who has an initial discussion with a person about assisted dying to offer to refer them to a specialist in palliative, hospice or other care.

Amendment 183, in clause 4, page 2, line 31, at end insert—

“(and, accordingly, such a preliminary discussion may not be conducted in isolation from an explanation of, and discussion about, the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c)).”

This amendment emphasises that the initial discussion mentioned in subsection (3) may not be conducted without also explaining and discussing the matters mentioned in subsection (4).

Amendment 425, in clause 4, page 2, line 31, at end insert—

“(4A) Where a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life in accordance with this Act, they must be referred to a multidisciplinary team to explore options for relevant care and support.

(4B) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify the requirements for the multidisciplinary team under subsection (4A).

(4C) The regulations must include a requirement for the multidisciplinary team to include all of—

(a) a registered medical practitioner or registered nurse,

(b) a person registered as a social worker in a register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales, and

(c) a practising psychiatrist registered in one of the psychiatry specialisms.”

Amendment 53, in clause 7, page 4, line 8, at end insert—

“(ca) has relevant and available palliative care options.”

This amendment would mean that someone is only eligible for assistance in ending their own life under this Act if they have relevant and available palliative care options.

Amendment 54, in clause 7, page 4, line 17, leave out “(g)” and insert “(h)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 53.

Amendment 426, in clause 7, page 4, line 26, at end insert—

“(4) The coordinating doctor may not take the steps set out in subsection (3) unless they receive confirmation from a multidisciplinary team that the person has had a meeting with that multidisciplinary team as specified in section 4.”

Amendment 286, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—

“(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, in consultation with a specialist in the relevant illness, disease or medical condition,

(b) any treatment available and the likely effect of it, in consultation with a specialist in the provision of such treatment,

(c) any palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support, in consultation with a specialist in palliative care.”

This amendment ensures that a specialist carries out the assessment of the patient, the treatment options available and the palliative care options available, since these may not be known to a doctor coordinating an assisted death.

Amendment 424, in clause 40, page 23, line 37, at end insert—

“‘preliminary discussion’ means a discussion of a kind mentioned in section 4(3);”.

This is a drafting change.

[Kit Malthouse]

On a point of order, Mr Efford. I seek your guidance on the votes that we have just taken on the last group of amendments. If any Member, or any external person, were to attempt to misrepresent part of the debate on those amendments, what could we do? For example, in respect of amendment 368, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire, with regard to people with Down’s syndrome, somebody could imply or state on social media that the Committee has refused to look at accommodations for those people, therefore disregarding their welfare under the Bill. As you will be aware, that would be a serious misrepresentation of the debate and the intention of the Committee. If a Member of the House or somebody external did that, what measures could we take to correct it?