Ukraine

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Thursday 27th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

Sanctions have been placed on 1,500 people and 120 entities in connection with this conflict, including the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Progozhin.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

I think the Minister was slightly unfair to the shadow Secretary of State in saying that he welcomed and understood his attacking: my hon. Friend was not attacking but doing his proper and constitutional job, as a spokesperson for His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, of holding the Government to account. If this war is to drag on for some time, as it seems it will, maintaining the focus of the British Government will be essential. What can the Minister say to us about ensuring that that focus is not lost in Government as we move forward?

[Dr Murrison]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that it is not lost. I probably would not trust a member of the Government to make that assertion, but President Zelensky himself has made it plain in his remarks that the UK has played a formidable leadership role in ensuring that his country can repel Putin’s barbarism and the atrocity committed upon the state of Ukraine by Putin’s Russia.

Ukraine

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

It is important to remind the House that this is not NATO fighting Russia—that is the narrative Russia would like. NATO’s job in this process has been to improve and increase the resilience of NATO members that border Ukraine and Russia itself, to send a strong message to Russia that it is not going to contaminate further with its aggression or be allowed to push people around. Most assistance to Ukraine is bilateral—it is bilateral on many fronts. NATO has ensured it stood up its readiness. It has deployed NATO member state forces right across NATO itself. We have had troops in Poland, Estonia and Bulgaria, and flights over the Black sea by Typhoons to help with air policing in both the north and south of Europe. We have had more deployments of ships, as have many other countries. If we look at the overall map of NATO deployments, we can see that NATO has been incredibly active in not only reassuring its member states but some of its neighbours, such as Finland and Sweden, who, as yet, are not in. In summer, we sent a squadron of tanks to Finland for the first time ever to exercise with the Finnish armed forces. NATO has been busy. It is busy modernising its regional plans to come to terms with what is going to happen in the medium and long term, but at the same time it stands ready to defend its members under article 5 and article 4 should Russia take the unwise view that what it needs to do next is try to broaden the conflict.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

I welcome the Defence Secretary’s statement, as well as the response from the shadow Defence Secretary, and in particular what he said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) about brands and Russia. Should not anybody who holds shares in those companies, including Infosys, who are profiting by getting dividends from the activities of those companies in Putin’s Russia, divest themselves of those shares and invest their money in investments that will assist the people of Ukraine, rather than assist Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine?

[Mr Wallace]

I do not know the company concerned. No doubt somebody I am supposed to know has shareholdings. What I would certainly say is that I take the view that I would not wish to take money from anyone connected with the Russian state or Russian activities. I just do not think that is the right way to go. Brands that seek to sell into Russia and allow normality to be accepted on the streets of Moscow should think again. What Russia wants is to get away with this and to be able to mix in civilised society. It should not be allowed to partake in luxury brands or other brands. It should realise that the consequences of its actions are greater isolation, not a broader coalition.

Afghanistan: Independent Inquiry

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I will not get into that. Lord Justice Haddon-Cave will investigate the matter fully and report in due course.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

Just over a century ago, my father’s house—my father was a child of about the same age as some of the children who were shot during some of the incidents under investigation—was raided by British auxiliaries in the west of Ireland in a quite violent incident. I shall never forget that my grandmother, relating that story to me as a child, was eternally grateful to the British Army officer who intervened and stopped violence being perpetrated. It has always struck me that culture and leadership within our armed forces is key to our standing and reputation in the world. Does the Minister agree that principal among the outcomes from this inquiry should be clear co-operation from the leadership of our armed forces in making sure that it gets to the truth?

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Gentleman has hit the nail on the head. There is that commitment right at the very top of our armed forces that we should get this right and that we should learn any lessons that need to be learned. I can give him that commitment. I entirely understand the point that he has made and the experience that he relates.

Ukraine Update

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Wednesday 9th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

First, let me say that Putin has deployed some of his most modern equipment. He has “gone all-in” and played his full hand. Members will have seen only recently an SA-22 or a Pantsir anti-air medium-range missile system that has been defeated by the mud of Ukraine; it has a burst tyre and it is stuck in the mud. Putin has gone all-in and risked some of his most important equipment. He is using significant numbers of his missile stocks and he is taking a huge risk around the wider boundaries of Russia, which he is now leaving thinned out in terms of defence.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

There was a report from Reuters yesterday that dozens of former Paras have signed up for the Ukrainian foreign legion and that hundreds more are expected to do so. Will the Defence Secretary give the House absolute clarity on the UK Government’s position in relation to those volunteers?

[Mr Wallace]

The Government’s position is: if you are a serving member of the armed forces, you will be breaking the law. There were reports in the weekend newspaper about three members who had gone AWOL over the weekend. They will be breaking the law and they will be prosecuted when they return for going AWOL or deserting. For others, as the Government’s travel advice is “Do not go to Ukraine”, we strongly discourage them from joining these forces. My experience, having been Security Minister, is that where people went off to join the YPG and other organisations it did not end well. It is also the case, as a number of these people are now discovering, that the Ukrainians are very clear in saying, “You turn up, you are in it for the whole game. You are not in it for a selfie and six weeks. You are in it for real.” I think we have seen already some people at the border decide that that may not be the right option to follow.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend raises a very important point. Our skills are in not just the development of technology and equipment, but people, as was touched on earlier. We have a lot of world-leading companies, such as Babcock, that export their services right around the world, but we also have people’s experience of serving in the armed forces and the way in which they help and support other countries right around the world after they leave service.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

What discussions has the Defence Secretary had with the Foreign Secretary about defence exports by UK companies, and does he think that he might be Foreign Secretary by teatime?

[Gavin Williamson]

In answer to the last bit of that question, I am very confident that the answer is no. I had regular discussions with the former Foreign Secretary about exports, and I will continue to work very closely with the Foreign Office. I pay tribute to the way in which the Department for International Trade and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, especially the high commission in Canberra, have worked with the Ministry of Defence to land this vital order.

Trident: Test Firing

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

The security and effectiveness of the deterrent are of course underlined by the testing and shakedown programme, in which boats come out of their long-term refit and are tested again to see whether they are fit and ready to rejoin the operational cycle, which is what HMS Vengeance has now done.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

Does not the Secretary of State’s characteristic “Name, rank and serial number—don’t tell him, Pike” approach actually make no sense at all given that, following the reports we have had, our American counterparts in Congress will certainly be given full details of what happened in the test? Does not his stonewalling do nothing to strengthen our security and everything to undermine the credibility of this House?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

This is our deterrent carried by our submarine. The secrecy that we—I think rightly—put around it is in our national interest.

Armed Drones

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the rules of engagement and the use of armed drones.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. In all my time in the House of Commons, this is the first time that I have proposed a motion in Westminster Hall, so I beg your indulgence for any errors of procedure that I make.

The issue before us is hugely topical, particularly given the debate on Syria in the House tomorrow. Armed drones, unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned combat aerial vehicles have been described by some as just another weapon system—a modern version of the rifle or the missile—and by others as offering unparalleled operational potential, but with associated strategic risks.

In the recently published strategic defence and security review, the Government proposed 20 new Protector armed drones to

“enhance our…global strike capability”,

by which I assume the Government mean inside and outside war zones. That distinction will come up time and again in what I have to say and, I hope, in the Minister’s response.

Reconnaissance drones—I will deal with these for a second without going into the armed element—give troops enormous advantages. They are an unblinking eye in the sky for 24 hours a day, with a very wide angle of view and great precision. They are enormously valuable to special forces and in counter-insurgency operations, let alone in conventional warfare. They are reliable, give real-time intelligence, and are able to replay events quickly so that troops can know what has just happened.

Last week, the all-party parliamentary group on drones and the Royal United Services Institute had a conference on drones, at which we were addressed by probably the greatest warrior of modern times, General Stanley McChrystal, and his English counterpart, Graeme Lamb, both of whom devised and operated the strategy against al-Qaeda in Iraq and destroyed that organisation. In doing so, one of the primary tactics involved using a drone to backtrack any suicide bomb attack on the green zone, signals intelligence to follow up on the origin of it, and special forces to arrest and stop the instigators. That allowed us pretty much completely to eradicate al-Qaeda in Iraq, so it was an incredibly important element of our operation there.

McChrystal talked about the use of drones as a force multiplier. For example, if 20 people were sent in to make an attack, 80 or 100 force protection soldiers were needed. Those are no longer needed because of the reconnaissance sight capability, so drones are an incredibly important weapon system, even just as a reconnaissance system. They are also incredibly precise strike weapons. They are apparently largely riskless, with very little chance of loss of human lives on our side, and have pinpoint-accurate strike capability. The use of drones can therefore provide a never-ending threat inside and outside war zones. I will come back to the difference between the never-ending threats in those two categorisations in a moment.

Drones consist of relatively accessible technologies. As a result, we might take it that proliferation is inevitable. That is one of the strategic risks that I want the Government to consider. Beyond that, there are other genuine concerns. The first was made clear by General McChrystal last week: on one hand, drones lower the threshold for and make it easier to enter into armed conflict, and appear to remove the risk to our personnel and to render warfare almost like a video game; on the other hand, there is an illusion of precision. For those reasons, drones make the propensity to go to war far greater for countries that are worried about, say, their casualties. Most countries will concern themselves about casualties. Casualties are the political price paid for going to war and, as we will see with the Chilcot inquiry shortly, they create a great back pressure against war. As I said, there is an illusion of precision. One forgets that many of the reasons for imprecise targeting are not the drones or the weapon system, but the intelligence on which the targeting is based. Very often there is a precise weapon system, but it is not more precise than the intelligence can make it.

The other point made by General McChrystal that is worth considering is that the use of drones may make accidental conflict more likely. He cited the example of the Turkish air force shooting down a Russian aircraft a week or so ago, and said that had the incursions by the Russians into Turkish airspace been made by drones, they would have been shot down much earlier because the price of the action would have been smaller. That may lead to a lower threshold for an aerial conflict, so there are other ways that the use of drones can reduce the threshold. As such, one of the strategic risks of the use of armed drones is an increased risk of armed conflict.

The second point that came up, which is not really a strategic risk but is a matter of concern, was the effects on drone pilots. There was a great deal of concern about the fact that drone pilots, as it were, go home to their families each night with no time to decompress after effectively being in the war zone all day. They witness the violence, whereas most people who are involved in a war are distanced, at least to some extent, from the people who suffer from their weapon system. The sheer fidelity of the drone systems makes the witnessing very close and personal, in some senses. The sheer number of kills that some armed drone squadrons achieve increases the stress. One squadron was attributed with 1,626 kills, which is far more than any normal aircraft squadron would carry out. There is a long-distance version of post-traumatic stress disorder.

However, one other element worried me even more than that. It comes back to the legalities, to which I will return in a minute in putting a question to the Minister. If we undertake drone attacks outside a defined war zone, the location from which those attacks are operated may become part of a war zone, and we may legitimise a counter-attack on that area. Since many of those places are in rear areas, that has real issues for the operation of our RAF bases, such as RAF Waddington.

The big strategic risk that was raised by a number of people, particularly McChrystal, at the RUSI conference was the damaging impact on hearts and minds in battle. For those suffering drone attacks, there is an inability to strike back, a fear of constant danger, and a never-ending threat that is always there. There is strong evidence that this syndrome radicalises and militarises civilians, and unites militants. Drones can act as a recruiting sergeant. The most obvious example is the American drone operation in Pakistan, which, although it has taken out a lot of Taliban leaders, has also acted to recruit a number of others to their cause. Again, I suspect that will manifest itself in the battle against ISIL, because such organisations recruit worldwide. Last year, ISIL’s estimated recruitment was 30,000, having climbed from 15,000 during the course of the American attacks in Syria. That is an incredibly serious element of the strategic risk of using drones. From that point of view, drones are perhaps the biggest risk that we undertake.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

Was there any discussion at the conference of how soon it will be before terrorist organisations are able to organise attacks using drone technology, or at least a modified version of it?

[Mr Davis]

No, not particularly. There was a reference to it, but it was a throwaway line, and I cannot tell you the originator of the reference because of Chatham House rules. As I said earlier, plainly the nature of the technology involved in drones is awfully straightforward: the aerodynamics are straightforward; the motive power is straightforward; and the guidance systems are straightforward. Of course, lots of commercial drones are now available. Making an attack drone would take more than that, but it is pretty straightforward to achieve almost every element of building a drone—perhaps not a terribly sophisticated Predator or Reaper drone, or whatever, but a drone that might be used for a single-shot attack, or that could get to a location that is otherwise well protected against terrorist attack. It is absolutely clear that, if that is not possible now, it will be possible in the extremely close future. Drones are an element of proliferation that I suspect is already out of the bag. There is not much that we can do about it except plan our defences against drone attacks. That is too big a story for this debate, but the hon. Gentleman makes a good point.

I now come to the nub of this debate. The legal framework we create for drones has implications for strategic risk, for the way drones are used, and for whether their use acts as a recruiting sergeant. All the elements that I have talked about can be affected by the legal framework, which needs clarity to maintain the UK’s international standing and to protect the pilots and the armed forces from prosecution. It is not fair to ask our soldiers to carry out tasks without absolute legal certainty. Most of us do not know the exact background of some of the recent drone strikes—I am sure the Minister knows, but I do not. After the Khan strike, a headline in The Sunday Times stated “Army chief demanded legal cover for killing”. The article claimed that the director of special forces asked for specific legal advice on the strike. I do not know whether that is true, but it highlights one of the issues for me, which is that when we are going into a controversial military technology, we must absolutely ensure that the officers who use it are properly protected and clearly understand the limits of its use and where they might cross the rules of war, international law and so on. That is one of the major drivers of my argument.

When Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin were targeted in Syria by a UK drone on 21 August 2015, the Government claimed:

“This airstrike was a necessary and proportionate exercise of the individual right of self-defence of the United Kingdom.”

The Government also said that there was “clear evidence” that these individuals were planning and directing armed attacks against the United Kingdom. There was a lot of debate about that at the time, and there were questions about how imminent the attack might be, and how it was possible for there to be an imminent attack when these individuals were in Syria and the attack was cited as being in the UK. Some of the events that were cited happened in advance of the air strike, so it is not obvious how they could have been prevented by it. There was a series of arguments, but the basic argument was imminent self-defence.

In a letter to the United Nations, the Government cited the collective self-defence of Iraq as the second argument for the strike. I am not a lawyer, but it seems self-evident that this is a little like someone turning up in court to face an assault charge and saying, “I wasn’t there, but if I was there, he started it.” One argument undermines the other. The presentation of two arguments to the United Nations weakens, rather than enhances, the claim. I do not know why that was done, but again it highlights why we need absolute clarity on such matters. This is not an area in which we can risk having doubt—in the interests of our officers, let alone in the interest of our national reputation—about whether we have done the right thing.

As it stands, an armed attack must already have been launched, or at least be imminent, in order for states to resort to force in individual or collective self-defence; that is one element. Action against past attacks, if not done during the course of a war, risks being categorised as reprisal, which is unlawful in peacetime. Action against future attacks, which might be considered pre-emptive or preventive, is also considered unlawful. There is quite a narrow gap for strikes, which must be necessary and proportionate.

The concern raised by the Khan attack, and indeed by the subsequent attack by the Americans, relates to what we might call “targeted killing”—some have used the phrase “extrajudicial killing.” The concern, which again was raised by General McChrystal, among others, was that that could be seen as an easier alternative to arrest or prosecution when dealing with terrorists. We had that argument in Northern Ireland 30 years ago, when we were accused of hard arrests, as it were. We do not want to revisit that argument, because it was pretty unedifying at the time. If we give in to temptation and such strikes happen, it may be morally right in the case of the individuals concerned, but it would be legally dubious. At the very least, it would amount to a significant change in the Government’s stance on what is legal and what is not, and it therefore requires careful consideration.

Those concerns are amplified by the recent change in the ministerial code relating to international law. I happen not to think that the change has any legal standing but, from a political point of view, it raises concerns that, again, could be used against us by our opponents. I have argued time and again that one of our strongest counter-terrorism weapons is the fact that we abide by a high moral standard. If we do not abide by a high moral standard, we lose one battle to our opponents straightaway.

I am driving towards the relationship between the rules of engagement and the legalities I have just mentioned. This is my direct question to the Minister; I understand that she may not be able to answer it today, but hopefully she will be able to indicate where she is going towards on this question. If the rules of engagement are properly drawn up, they must be within the law, within declared Government policy and within any parliamentary limits that have been set. The Syria debate will address the limits set by Parliament, but action must fit within all three areas. I would normally assume that to be the case but, after our conference last week, I got a memo from somebody who does not want to be identified, so forgive me if I do not identify him. The memo encapsulates the problem about which I am worrying:

“Following the conference last week, I came away with the distinct impression that the MoD is using a different lexicon to the APPG and academe resulting in us talking at cross purposes. Where the APPG and Human Rights Select Committee…are talking about war zones and so forth the MoD have very carefully couched their wording in terms of RoE and operational areas.

Typically RoE have an opening preamble covering the legitimacy of the operation involved…The wording for this will be sanctioned by the MoD legal advisers and endorsed by the law officers’ staff. The RoE then set out the area of operations and it was clear to me from the comments at the conference that this area included parts of Syria—hence everything being done (including 21 Aug) was within the RoE. Typically the MoD and lower formations take the law officers’ confirmation of legitimacy as gospel. They also then seek to make the rules as flexible as possible to allow commanders the greatest possible latitude.”

Essentially, he is saying that the MOD is using a set of language to explain the rules of engagement and the area of operation that is not the same as the law officers’ definition of what is and is not a war zone and the like. That seems important.

The relationship between the rules of engagement, international and national law and policy is the point where the rubber meets the road. One can expect soldiers and airmen to operate on the basis of the rules of engagement only, and nothing else. We must be very clear in this area.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has begun an inquiry on the legality of the drones policy. There are three pages of questions—I will not read them out—that crystallise the inquiry. They are all good questions, but I finish on the point that drones are not just another weapons system; they are an incredibly effective weapons system subject to legal and technical proliferation, and to change in the behaviour patterns of both politicians and senior commanders. There is a great risk of acting in a way that is tactically incredibly successful but strategically dangerous. It seems to me that we need a clear and unambiguous legal policy, in the interests of our soldiers, our citizens and our allies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

I broadly agree with all the contributions made so far, by Members on both sides of the House. My interest in the matter was sparked when the Prime Minister announced to the House that drones had been used by the UK in Syria to kill Reyaad Khan—a UK citizen, albeit one who had been radicalised and had chosen to go and fight for ISIL/Daesh in Syria. I realised that I had met the young man many years previously, during a discussion about politics with a group of young people at a youth forum in my constituency. At that time, he was an engaging young man who was interested in politics, and whose political views seemed perfectly normal. When he was a teenager, there was no sign that he would end up being radicalised, choose to go to Syria and join ISIL/Daesh, and come to the end that he did, perhaps inevitably. It provides food for thought when a constituent one happens to have met ends up meeting such a fate.

I will not go into too much detail, because that is not necessarily within the wishes of Reyaad Khan’s family, but I should make it clear that the radicalisation horrified his parents. Many months before the outcome that eventually befell Reyaad Khan, I had written to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to ask, at the family’s request—his parents thought he was in Turkey, perhaps on his way to Syria—for any assistance the FCO could possibly provide, through our consular services in Turkey, in finding a reason to intercept the young man and return him to the UK. I want to make it absolutely clear that the family, who were desperately concerned, were making efforts to prevent the young man from travelling to Syria. That is a tale for us all; as Members of Parliament, we need to be aware of what can happen to our constituents.

Our sympathy should, of course, principally be with the victims of ISIL/Daesh, but extremely difficult and concerning questions of ethics and legality are raised when the UK Government use a remote drone to kill a UK citizen in a country with which, technically, the UK is not at war, even if that citizen has participated in actions carried out by a non-state actor, such as ISIL/Daesh, that undoubtedly presents a direct threat to the UK’s security. Many of the legal issues have already been mentioned, and because of the time I will not go into any great detail. I am not naive enough, however, to believe that the justification used by the Government, and cited by the Prime Minister in the Chamber of the House of Commons, tells us the full story about what legal advice has been given to the Government, and what the justification for the targeting of Reyaad Khan and others has been.

I know that the Minister will not be able to respond to this—I have put it directly to Ministers before—but I have to put on the record that in my view there is in the Ministry of Defence a list of names of UK citizens for whom there is, in effect, a pre-authorisation in place. There would have to be a final signing off, but if those individuals became available to be targeted, they could be targeted. That does call into question, under article 51 of the United Nations charter, the justification on the basis of the imminence of attacks.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Kevin Brennan]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis).

[Mr David Davis]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which impinges on the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). One of the most worrying things for me about American policy is the idea that the President approves a kill list every Thursday morning, or whenever it is. That is the kind of area in which I do not think we want to go in the direction of the Americans. Politicians should not have the right to strike someone from the face of the earth, no matter what the logic. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?

[Kevin Brennan]

I do agree.

[Kirsten Oswald]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Kevin Brennan]

I will just make a little progress. That is why it is so important that we have this debate, and why the Joint Committee on Human Rights inquiry is so important. I understand that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), who is not here today, has written to the Secretary of State for Defence expressing her concern about the Ministry’s lack of co-operation with that inquiry. Will the Minister, in her response, confirm that the Committee will get the Ministry’s full co-operation, obviously within the parameters of what it can say on this matter?

[Mark Field]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Kevin Brennan]

I will, briefly, but I am conscious of time. If the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) will forgive me, I probably will not give way a further time.

[Mark Field]

If article 51, which states that there has to be an imminent threat, is to mean anything, the security services—and, indeed, Ministers who are considering the issue—need to be in a position to update such a list constantly. The notion that an individual is on a list until such time as they are eliminated or assassinated seems to be at odds with article 51. There needs to be a process whereby the question of whether a person is still an imminent threat to the UK is regularly turned over in people’s minds.

[Kevin Brennan]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I will be interested to see whether the Minister illuminates that issue further in her response to the debate.

I want to raise one other issue, which is whether there should be an inquest into the death of Reyaad Khan. The case, it is fair to say, is fairly unique, but it has possibly led to similar cases. To some extent, an inquest might help establish some of the legal parameters in such cases. I have received representations on this—not from constituents, but from others. As I understand it, section 9 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 effectively grants global jurisdiction in respect of the potential unlawful killing of a British citizen. There is no question but that the issue of legality has been raised, and is under debate; we would not be here today if there was not a question mark about the legality. Can the Minister tell us whether the Government have a view on whether an inquest would be appropriate, if it is correct that the 1861 Act has global jurisdiction, and that the action that led to the death of this British citizen, albeit one who was acting in such a way as to be an enemy of the UK, was physically initiated in the UK, although the weapon used to carry it out was physically located elsewhere? Given the time constraints, I will not go on much longer, but I am interested to hear her response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Penny Mordaunt]

Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend that assurance. If we have been tardy in responding to the Committee, I apologise, and I am very happy to follow that up. The Secretary of State is due to speak to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) shortly, and I will follow that up after the debate. We certainly wish to co-operate, because putting more information into the public domain about the seriousness with which we take such issues will reassure hon. Members.

We have focused on air systems, but there are all sorts of other systems. We are investing massively in underwater systems, for which there is another set of legal requirements. My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden referred to operational areas and war zones. Clearly, we might have to use these systems and others to respond to a range of situations, including hostage situations and so forth. The picture is complex, but we take it extremely seriously. An enormous amount of time is going into developing the doctrine as the technology develops. We want to operate in a good framework with best practice, and we want our allies to do the same. There is wide international consultation, and we will be playing a full role in helping others to raise their game.

Let me turn to some of the other points that hon. Members have made. The particular weapon or platform type that we use has no bearing on our decision about whether to use force. I assure the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) that the targeting boards and processes are identical for these and other weapon systems.

Several hon. Members focused on the effect on pilots. That issue is often framed in terms of the emotional effect of taking a life on the pilots conducting the strike activity, whether they become detached from the situation and whether they have access to the same support—decompression and so forth—that people on more conventional operations can access. It is often about not what people do, but what they see. I have spoken to pilots who have said that most distressing and frustrating thing is to see something take place that they are unable to prevent, in part because of the strict restrictions placed on them, which cause stress. Of course, the health and wellbeing of our armed forces personnel is of the utmost importance, and we are mindful of the pressure and stresses that such operations cause. The personnel involved are carefully monitored and, where appropriate, have access to the highest levels of military physical and mental healthcare. Looking after them is key, and that is one of the main roles that our front-line commanders are tasked with.

The RAF stress management and resilience training team has delivered stress awareness briefs to units operating these systems, to make personnel aware of the subject and of the range of assistance and support that is available to them. We recognise the unique nature of such operations, and we have embedded TRIM—trauma risk management—providers in RAF Reaper squadrons. As hon. Members know, TRIM provides a model of peer group mentoring and support for use in the aftermath of traumatic events.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) and the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin John Docherty) asked about others having access to such systems and our ability to combat that. I assure all hon. Members that that was a key strand of our recent strategic defence and security review, and there will be ongoing work to ensure that the right defensive systems and practices are in place to prevent such technology from being used against us.

Hon. Members spoke about the effect on hearts and minds. We understand that whatever means we use to deliver precision weapons in conflict zones—air strikes, operations on the ground or remotely piloted air systems—there will be a negative effect on the civilian populations in the vicinity. However, we do not take the decision to conduct strikes lightly, and we take every step to minimise the impact on civilian populations, including using precision-guided munitions.

[Kevin Brennan]

Before the Minister finishes, do the Government have a view about whether it is appropriate to hold an inquest if a UK citizen has been killed in that way?

Oral Answers to Questions

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt]

Again, I draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the Prime Minister’s statement that, if there is a clear threat to Britain, to our people and to our streets and we are able to stop it by taking immediate action against that threat, we will always try to take that action. The action we took in Syria was legal, necessary, proportionate and in response to a clear, credible and specific threat to the UK. I reassure him that that course of action is taken only in the last resort.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

Following the drone strike that killed Reyaad Khan, will the Minister tell us whether there is in existence a list of individuals who are considered such a great risk to Britain that they can be targeted for killing by UK drones?

[Penny Mordaunt]

Again, I refer the hon. Gentleman to the Prime Minister’s statement. If that set of circumstances exist and we can act to save British lives, then we will do so.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call Alex Cunningham. Not here.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

T4. Will the Defence Secretary clarify something he said earlier about the number of boots currently on the ground in Iraq? He said 250 troops were currently deployed, whereas The Guardian reports that the deployment of an additional 125 troops will take the number of“UK military personnel involved in Iraq-related missions to 900.”The Daily Telegraph and The Independent mention similar figures. Will he clarify why those press reports are different from what he told the House earlier?

[Michael Fallon]

Let me explain to the hon. Gentleman. The figure of 900 relates to the total mission—all those involved in helping to defeat ISIL—which of course includes our air crews in Akrotiri in Cyprus and at other bases in the Gulf. We expect the numbers on the ground in Iraq to reach about 275, with the increase that was announced at the weekend. As he said, the total mission will then involve about 900 people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

Order. May I very gently point out that we are not in the reading room of the Bearsden public library and that hon. Members should not read a newspaper unless it relates to the matter currently under consideration by the House? I say that in a jocular spirit to the hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire (John Nicolson), who is a literate fellow. I am sure he will savour his enjoyment on a subsequent occasion.

[Kevin Brennan]

He was reading his horoscope. [Laughter.]

[Mr Speaker]

I would not want to suggest that the hon. Gentleman was reading his horoscope. I do not think he was doing anything of the kind—that is a calumny!

Service Personnel (Ukraine)

Kevin Brennan Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

My hon. Friend is probably as knowledgeable as anybody about the affairs of Ukraine, as he chairs the all-party group. It is very clear to us that the Ukrainian armed forces are in desperate need of further equipment and they have supplied lists of equipment they would like. We are focusing, as I have said, on the non-lethal equipment we can supply and are considering the additional requests.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

At the very least, the House is entitled to know what equipment the Secretary of State is considering supplying to Ukrainians. So far, the Secretary of State has been very unwilling to detail any of those requests. We are entitled to know what is under consideration. Will he now give us some more detail on the nature of the equipment he is actively considering, as he outlined in his response?

[Michael Fallon]

As soon as we make a decision on what equipment to supply or to gift, we will of course inform Parliament in the normal way. If the equipment is to be gifted, a minute has to be laid before Parliament and that will be done.