Oral Answers to Questions

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

As I have said on several occasions, it behoves all of us as politicians—indeed, everyone in public life—to be careful about the language we use and to ensure that we give a clear a message that there is no place in our society for racism or hate crime. We should all act to ensure that we deliver on those sentiments. I thank Helene for her work at Bletchley Park and thank all those who worked there. Unsung for some considerable time, they played a crucial part in our ability to defeat fascism in the second world war. We should be very proud of their work, and I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving the House the opportunity to celebrate it.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

I begin by commending the Prime Minister for her stamina and courage in her term of office—whatever our views on Brexit and other issues—and also commend the support that she has received from her husband Philip. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] For many of us, our husbands, wives and partners are the unsung heroes. May I now ask her a specific question? She is going to the palace this afternoon, and we assume that she is going to recommend that the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson) succeed her as Prime Minister, but will she tell the House one piece of real, hard advice that she would like to give him on being Prime Minister?

[The Prime Minister]

Can I—[Interruption.] A number of my right hon. and hon. Friends are suggesting from a sedentary position that my advice should be to read my right hon. Friend’s summer reading list. However, he has also given me an opportunity to do something that I suspect many on my side may not thank me for, but I am taking a lead from you, Mister Speaker, in saying that I am pleased to be able to see my husband in the Gallery today.

Oral Answers to Questions

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

What we have seen since the apprenticeship levy was introduced is a change in the number of people doing apprenticeships, but we have also seen an increase in the quality of the apprenticeships that are being undertaken. The Government are now looking at how the levy is operating to ensure that we can do what I want to do, which is ensure that every young person has the opportunity to pursue the course, be it of education or training, that is right for them and that is going to give them the best start in life.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend should be commended for her sangfroid a week ago in dealing with a giant ego—somebody who believes that truth is fake news and leaks continually. I am not referring here to the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson); I am of course referring to President Trump, who has acted in a very bizarre way over intelligence. I know that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has to work with him, but is she not alarmed at the way in which he refused to challenge President Putin over the Russian activity that recently resulted in the death of a woman here in Salisbury?

[The Prime Minister]

I understand that there have been some clarifications of some of the statements that President Trump made. I did raise with President Trump the incident in Salisbury and the fact that we have seen somebody die here in the UK as a result of contact with a nerve agent. Of course, we took immediate action at the time after the Salisbury attack when we had been able to attribute it to Russia. The United States stood alongside us, as did many other nations across the world, and took action against Russia, which showed a united international front that sent a clear message that we will not accept this behaviour, that this is not behaviour that Russia can conduct with impunity and that we will continue to act together.

European Council

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Obviously, we have worked very closely together for the last six years, and I am very proud of the things that we have done together. It is this Government that have lifted almost 4 million people out of income tax. It is this Government that have seen an increase in disability benefit. Above all, it is this Government—a lot of this is thanks to the hard work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith)—that, because of the growing economy and the changes to welfare, have seen 2.4 million people get work in our country. Behind those statistics are human beings who are able to put food on the table and have a better life for their families because of the work that we have done together. I am sad that my right hon. Friend has left the Government, but I guarantee that the work of being a compassionate Conservative Government will continue.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

Given the nature of the terrorist threat, does my right hon. Friend agree with me about how important it is that European countries’ intelligence and security agencies co-operate fully with ours in defeating terrorism, and that it is absurd to suggest that membership of the EU is likely to result in terrorist attacks on the United Kingdom?

[The Prime Minister]

It is important that our agencies work together. On the whole, that will be on a bilateral basis, but it is worth understanding that in the modern European Union, there are a series of mechanisms to do with criminal records, border information, watch lists and passenger name records, all of which help to keep us safer than we would otherwise be. To be completely fair, if we left the EU we could try to negotiate our way back into some of those things, but it would take time, and this prompts the question: if you want to get back into them, why are you getting out of them?

ISIL in Syria

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

This may be the kiss of death for them, but I congratulate the right hon. Members for Derby South (Margaret Beckett), for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) and for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on three formidable speeches. It always takes incredible courage to stand against one’s party and they should not be denigrated for doing so.

I support the Government’s motion. I fully understand all the caveats of one kind or another that colleagues have put forward, but the most important immediate issue is making the strikes against Daesh in Syria that our intelligence and security agencies have identified and wish to carry out, because it offers a present threat to us, our constituents and our allies in Europe. This is a present threat. They may not get it entirely right. I can see my right hon. Friend for—what is his constituency? [Interruption.] I have so many friends! It would be wrong to name them all, but they think that there is no direct threat as far as intelligence is concerned. Those colleagues who have received briefings of one kind or another understand that. The intelligence and security services cannot guarantee to prevent every threat. We should support the motion primarily because we wish to extend our air campaign into Syria to help prevent the threats to this country.

Secondly, I am mindful that the elephant in the room is the Iraq war. We tend to look back to previous wars to draw lessons of one kind or another. The Prime Minister is absolutely right that we have to look at the present situation and the future. Hopefully, we have learned lessons, both political and military, from that war, but we can end up having our current operations and politics determined by past experiences.

Our predecessors sat in the Commons in the 1930s, determined never to have a great war again. The Labour party was divided—there were pacifists and those who wanted collective security. My party supported appeasement, as did the overwhelming majority of the British public, because they genuinely—these were not evil men and women—wanted to prevent another war. They failed, of course, because they were dealing with people in other countries who were not prepared to negotiate. The lessons learned from that war were used in 1956. Anthony Eden believed that Nasser was another Mussolini. He was therefore prepared to take action, but it was the wrong action at the time. I believe that we should put aside where we stood on other campaigns and look at what the situation is today.

My final point is that there has been a great debate about the 70,000 moderate or immoderate people who might or might not provide ground forces. I am sure that the leader of the SNP is, even as we speak, getting YouGov to go out and ask them whether they consider themselves to be moderates or immoderates.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Simpson]

I am sorry but I have almost run out of time.

During the second world war, when Churchill and Roosevelt were looking at resistance in Europe, it was dreadfully difficult to find out whether people were communists, non-communists, or Gaullists of one kind or another. At the end of the day, their criterion was, “Are they fighting the Nazis?” There is no easy solution, but the Prime Minister has laid out a set of proposals as far as he can, and I urge the House to vote with him on this occasion.

G20 and Paris Attacks

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I do not agree with that view. I respect the fact that it is for the Government to bring forward the argument, to make the case and to seek to persuade as many Members of this House as possible that it is the right thing to do. People who oppose that have to answer the question why it is right to take out ISIL in Iraq, but wrong to take out ISIL in Syria, particularly as the headquarters of ISIL are in Syria and it is from Syria that the attacks on this country have been planned and, for all we know, continue to be planned. That is the question that colleagues will have to answer after reading my response to the Foreign Affairs Committee. If we can get to the situation where it looks like Britain can come together as one and say, “It is right for us to take this action”, I am not asking for an overwhelming majority; just a majority would be good enough.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

The Prime Minister is only too well aware of the danger posed to our society by those returning from serving with ISIL in Syria. What measures are the Government taking to persuade those who can to speak out against what has happened? They are more likely to influence young Muslims than any of us.

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend is right. Huge numbers in Britain’s Muslim communities have made it clear that what is being done by ISIL is not in their name and that those are not representatives of Islam, but a perversion of Islam. That is incredibly powerful, and I encourage all those people who have already made such an effort to go on doing that, please. My right hon. Friend is right. Those people who have been to Syria, perhaps as part of an aid convoy, who have seen what has happened and have come back, rightly disillusioned by the butchery of those people—their hatred of people with different ways of life and the appalling way they treat women as sex slaves and throw gay people off the top of buildings—can be some of the most powerful voices saying, “Those are not people we can deal with. Those are people we have to finish.”

European Council

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Clearly we want to see a peaceful, stable and secure Turkey, but I do not think it would be right to link the arrangements that the EU is coming to with Turkey about migration, which are about financial support and Schengen countries’ visa arrangements, and the extra help that Turkey can provide on holding migrants in Turkey, with the issue that the hon. Gentleman raises.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

On Syria, the Prime Minister said that EU members were going to try to persuade the Russians to attack ISIL. It seems to most of us that the Russians are attacking everybody but ISIL. How do we persuade them not to do that?

[The Prime Minister]

My hon. Friend will be aware from my figures that 85% of the targets that Russia has attacked have not been ISIL targets. It is quite easy to tell that by looking at the parts of the country where the Russians have been attacking—ISIL are not in those parts of the country, but the Free Syrian Army and others are. It is true to say that some six days of Russian air strikes went by before a single ISIL target was attacked. The case that we have to make is that Russia, like us, is at risk of Islamist extremist violence. Indeed, in many ways, it is more at risk. Russia has a large Muslim population, principally a Sunni Muslim population. The fact that they are if anything helping ISIL by bombing the moderate opposition to Assad demonstrates that, at the moment, they are both on the side of the butcher Assad and also helping ISIL potentially to take territory as Syrian opposition groups that are not ISIL are attacked by the Russians. It is the wrong approach and we need to do everything we can to persuade them of that.

Tunisia, and European Council

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Let me add my condolences concerning the couple from Cumbernauld who have been lost in this terrible attack. The hon. Gentleman asks the absolutely correct question about travel advice. As I have said, there is no perfect way. We base our travel advice on the threat picture and the intelligence that we have at the time. Before the Bardo attack, the travel advice did say that there was a high threat from terrorism in the country, and after the Bardo attack we added a factual update on the Foreign Office website, explaining that further attacks were possible. But the key decision, both post-Bardo and now, is whether to move the advice to a level recommending nothing but essential travel to the country as a whole. Currently we are saying only essential travel to some parts of the country. We are not proposing to change the advice about the coastal region, and I think that is the right decision, based on the evidence we have today.

Were that evidence to change, we could and would change the travel advice and, as I have said, the travel advice also depends on the capacity of the Tunisian system. That is the same for all countries. As I have said, these are difficult decisions. We must not be cowed by the terrorists. They want us to wipe out the Tunisian tourist industry, which accounts for 15% of its economy. The decision we take puts the safety of British people first and foremost. If the evidence and the information changes, we will change our advice.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

Understandably, we have centred on one young Tunisian man who carried out this massacre, and possibly some other Tunisians who supported him, but should we not also put it on record that dozens of Tunisians who worked at that hotel risked their lives protecting and helping our tourists? That should be the beacon that supports the Tunisian tourist industry and encourages people to visit Tunisia.

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend makes a very important point. There were some extraordinary stories of courage and heroism by local Tunisian people who were appalled by what this man was doing, and that is a great credit to their country.

Iraq Inquiry

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Thursday 29th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and other hon. Members on bringing forward this debate. There is no doubt that pressure in this House and the other place—I also had a small debate in October in Westminster Hall on the Chilcot inquiry—was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Sir John Chilcot wrote to the Prime Minister. He realised that a large head of parliamentary steam was building, wanting to know the facts.

Sadly, I have concluded that whatever Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry finally says, there will be a considerable body of opinion in this country who—unless he actually names individuals and says they were guilty of duplicity and treason—will dismiss it as a whitewash. As several hon. Members have already said, this is now a matter of history. This is more like an official history than an inquiry, for many reasons. It was the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) who put his finger on it, and it is at the heart of what we are debating today. When such a momentous series of decisions is made, and the Government are reluctant to investigate it, although there is political pressure to do so, should we go for the short, quick inquiry, which may not be able to look at all the evidence but will probably have a good, broad picture of what happened, or do we go for a long inquiry that tries as much possible to question everybody and to get as much information as possible? With the best will in the world, the latter will take several years—although possibly not as long as this inquiry has taken.

I declare an interest as a military historian. With the best will in the world it is no good trying to compare this inquiry, under these circumstances, with perhaps the Crimean war or Mesopotamia for example. It is the equivalent of a decision at the end of the second world war to have an inquiry into British foreign policy in the 1930s—an inquiry on appeasement. It would be just as difficult. There is no doubt—I accept the point made by the hon. Member for Bradford West (George Galloway); it is a pity it is such a thin House—about the emotions that have developed here in this House to try to reach some form of agreement about what should happen, but we are here today to debate the timing of this report.

[Mr David Davis]

My hon. Friend will have noted that I deliberately avoided the Crimea, Dardanelles and other examples. The example I did cite was the Israeli Winograd inquiry, which was equally controversial and very sensitive. That inquiry was brought out, during the tenure of the Prime Minister involved, within seven and 17 months. Surely that is possible?

[Mr Simpson]

I agree with my hon. Friend, but the other factor, which has been touched on by a number of hon. Friends and colleagues, is that this is not a stand-alone British inquiry. We were the junior partner in an alliance with the United States of America. That lies at the heart of the Iraq inquiry. I would like to emphasise—I have discussed this with a number of hon. Friends and colleagues—that the Iraq inquiry is only act one of a two-act play. The second act is, of course, Afghanistan, and one feeds into the other. This is obviously a much broader subject, but we need to bear it in mind.

[Mr MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be suggesting that we have reached the end of the road for inquiries. Does he foresee a time when it might be a matter for the courts in The Hague?

[Mr Simpson]

No, I do not. I have to say, with the greatest respect to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the former Attorney-General, that my heart sinks every time I hear we are going to have lawyer-led inquiries. Ironically, despite the suspicion that it would be a cover-up, I actually think it is a great pity that we cannot have a parliamentary-led inquiry. There is enough talent in both Houses—experienced men and women—for Parliament to elect a person to chair such an inquiry and for the resources to be allocated. I would like to see that. That does not get around the length of timetable.

[Mr Grieve]

rose—

[Mr Simpson]

I see my right hon. and learned Friend wants to intervene.

[Mr Grieve]

Only to agree with my hon. Friend. I certainly do not think that these inquiries have to be led by lawyers—I want to make that absolutely clear. That was not in any part of my speech and I would not wish the House to think that I took that view.

[Mr Simpson]

I, of course, accept that from my right hon. and learned Friend. In my opinion, it is a great pity he is no longer Attorney-General—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]—but that is above my pay scale, as they say.

How can we help my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in his approach towards questioning Sir John Chilcot? One way around the problem is to suggest to Sir John Chilcot—other colleagues have touched on this—that he puts into the public domain, when he publishes his report, a lot of the correspondence and communications that went on between his inquiry, the Cabinet Office and various other organisations. My experience as a military historian is that when the official histories were published on the first and second world wars, they were interesting, but it was not until 30 years later that we were actually able to see the correspondence between official historians, individual commanders and others. We could then see how at times the official historians stood up to pressure, but how at other times things were massaged. I would be particularly interested to see the e-mails, correspondence and telephone conversations between Margaret Aldred, who ran the secretariat, Sir Jeremy Heywood and perhaps members of the Cabinet Office. That may be beyond his remit.

My final point is that we are where we are. When Sir John Chilcot publishes his inquiry, he will have a press conference. I assume that the Prime Minister of the day will make a statement, with questions and answers, but it is very important indeed that we have a full debate in both Houses, not immediately or on the next day, but within about three or four days. A report consisting of 1 million words will be a lot for us to consider. I do not blame Sir John Chilcot. I am not a man who sees a great conspiracy behind this, but I believe in transparency. It is about not just learning lessons, but trying to establish the truth.

Chilcot Inquiry (Costs)

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Wednesday 29th October 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Howarth. I congratulate the Minister on his new appointment. He understands the problems of research, writing and getting things cleared, as the author of a much respected book, “5 Days to Power”, on the formation of the coalition in 2010. He had perhaps a slightly less happy experience on publishing “The Eye of the Storm: The View from the Centre of a Political Scandal” in 2014, as it might have delayed his promotion to the Front Bench. I am also grateful that the hon. Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy), the main Opposition spokeswoman on this subject, made it—just in time—for the debate.

The full house we have here today enables me to range fairly widely over the important subject of the Chilcot inquiry. I should explain that when I applied for the debate, the Clerks quite rightly made it clear to me that I would not get a debate if I called it merely “The Chilcot inquiry”, as the Government do not have responsibility for the inquiry, which is independent. However, it is legitimate to ask about the costs of the inquiry, and I will be interpreting “costs” in a fairly broad way, so that we can have a proper debate.

My purpose is not to second-guess the content or conclusion of the inquiry’s report, nor, I emphasise, to raise the inquiry for party political reasons. As a Conservative Front-Bench spokesman at the time, I supported and voted with the then Government in nearly all the relevant major debates, including the one about going to war, even though, along with other colleagues, I expressed some concern or reservations about some aspects of the policy and the operational decisions.

I am raising the topic because the costs of the Chilcot inquiry do include not just the financial costs. There are the costs to relevance and timeliness because of the length of time the inquiry has taken so far, which is just over four years; costs to reputations, past and present, of Ministers, the military, the intelligence services and civil servants; the costs to public confidence in government, transparency and the decision to go to war; and, last but not least, the costs in terms of the anguish of relatives of those of our servicemen and women who were killed and wounded in the conflict, and who want to know why and how it happened.

A lot of expectations have built up about the inquiry’s final report. I fear that many members of the public have already made their minds up about the inquiry, and are not only allocating blame but have the fear that, somehow or other, it is an establishment stitch-up. That view was expressed at the time, even before the inquiry was announced by the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown). He announced the establishment of the inquiry in June 2009. Hearings began in November that year and the final public hearing was on 2 February 2011. To date, we have had no real indication from Sir John Chilcot of when he intends to publish the results of his inquiry, and we have received mixed messages about the delay.

Frustrations at that delay have been expressed by Members of both Houses of Parliament in questions and debates, as well as by the media and relatives of those killed and wounded. There may be good reasons for it, but neither Sir John Chilcot nor the Government have really adequately explained them. That has exaggerated the suspicion that the inquiry is an establishment stitch-up or is not a proper inquiry. At the end of the day, some people are asking: to whose benefit is it that there is a delay? I suspect that I am probably more of the view that there are understandable reasons and, perhaps, cock-ups behind the delay than I am in the camp of conspiracy.

Are the administrative costs of the inquiry related to its terms of reference? Do those costs reflect the fact that the riding instruction for the initial inquiry was too broad and comprehensive? I remind hon. Members of the instructions laid down by the then Prime Minister in June 2009. He announced that it would be

“an independent Privy Counsellor committee of inquiry which will consider the period from summer 2001, before military operations began in March 2003, and our subsequent involvement in Iraq right up to the end of July this year”—

meaning 2009. He went on:

“The inquiry is essential because it will ensure that, by learning lessons, we strengthen the health of our democracy, our diplomacy and our military…Its scope is unprecedented. It covers an eight-year period, including the run-up to the conflict and the full period of conflict and reconstruction. The committee of inquiry will have access to the fullest range of information, including secret information. In other words, its investigation can range across all papers, all documents and all material. It can ask for any British document to be brought before it, and for any British citizen to appear. No British document and no British witness will be beyond the scope of the inquiry. I have asked the members of the committee to ensure that the final report will be able to disclose all but the most sensitive information—that is, all information except that which is essential to our national security.”—[Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 23.]

It is important to note that, in that original riding instruction, the then Prime Minister kept emphasising “British”. One problem the Chilcot inquiry has faced is that a considerable amount of evidence and a considerable number of individuals were from or in the United States of America. Understandably, that caused major problems.

Sir John Chilcot, in replying to then Prime Minister, wrote:

“Our terms of reference are very broad, but the essential points, as set out by the Prime Minister and agreed by the House of Commons, are that this is an Inquiry by a committee of Privy Counsellors”.

He went on to explain that the inquiry would consider the long period stated. He also emphasised the importance of the lessons of the inquiry:

“Those lessons will help ensure that, if we face similar situations in future, the government of the day is best equipped to respond to those situations in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country.”

There is a problem with that. The Chilcot inquiry has not reported and we do not yet know what lessons have been learned. Yet, ironically, in the past year, roughly, we have faced two situations in which the Prime Minister has tried to get the House of Commons to support military action. The first, last year, was over Syria, which—

[Mr George Howarth (in the Chair)]

Order. The title of the debate focuses on the costs of the Chilcot inquiry. In his opening remarks, the hon. Gentleman chose to interpret “costs” in quite a wide way, and I am mindful of that. However, the direction of his speech needs constantly to refer back to the title of the debate. He is not out of order, but I am trying to be helpful by steering him in a direction that will keep him in order for the remainder of his speech.

[Mr Simpson]

I am grateful, Mr Howarth, and take note of that. I am not going off into a byway—one of my interpretations of “costs” is to do with the lessons of the inquiry, which I think have direct relevance not only to this debate but to the interests of nearly all colleagues in the House of Commons. Naturally, I will take note of what you have said.

The problem always was that the inquiry’s sheer breadth would incur extra costs in every possible sense of the word. Interestingly, the Government considered the historical precedents for the inquiry. They included the two inquiries from the first world war—the special commissions on the Dardanelles and on Mesopotamia—both of which were relatively cheap. The Mesopotamia inquiry reported within a year, and its lessons were immediately applied in 1917, while the financial costs of the Dardanelles inquiry, which lasted until 1919, were also pretty reasonable, although the inquiry did not, of course, have an impact on the conduct of the war. As far as the Government were concerned, however, the immediate precedent was what was called the Falklands inquiry, or the Franks inquiry, which was also a Privy Council inquiry. It reported within six months of being established and, once again, cost a relatively small amount. Once again, however, there was controversy because of the different interpretations regarding how the inquiry was set up and what lessons could possibly be learned from it.

In historical cases, as well as in the Chilcot inquiry, terms of reference are crucial. The important point about the Chilcot inquiry is that it is independent of the Government but relies on them for resources, so there is a cost factor. It is also reliant on them in terms of the cost of clearing secret and confidential documents, including those between the United States President and the British Prime Minister and those involving Departments and intelligence agencies. Will the Minister tell us, based on Government sources, the extent to which such procedures have held up the drafting of the final report, and whether Sir John Chilcot is satisfied that all those matters are now resolved? I will return to that point in greater detail.

In a letter Sir John Chilcot wrote to Sir Jeremy Heywood, the Cabinet Secretary, dated 28 May 2014, he said that, in principle, agreement had been reached with the Government on the intelligence and other materials that might be released. Can the Minister tell us what documentation and information has been withheld? If any has been, will that be reflected in the final report? In other words—this may cost more—will sections of the report be flagged up as having been redacted?

A great deal of the delay has been attributed to what is called the Maxwellisation process. For those colleagues who are not too sure what that means, it is the process of warning those who have been criticised in a report and allowing them to respond before publication. It takes its name from the experience of Robert Maxwell, who was criticised in a Department of Trade and Industry report in 1969 and took the Department to court, where the judge ruled he had been unfairly treated. In future, therefore, individuals who were to be criticised would be given advance notice and a chance to comment. Obviously, the Government wanted to allow that not only because there had been a legal judgment, but because they did not—once again, Mr Howarth, I am following your direction—want to incur the costs of legal action.

From Sir John Chilcot’s letter to Sir Jeremy Heywood in May, we can see that the process of Maxwellisation has, in one sense, only just begun. Sir John Chilcot makes it quite clear that, now that everything else has been cleared in principle, it is possible to start the process of Maxwellisation. From reading the documents, I conclude that the delay has been in two parts. One was the negotiation between Chilcot and the Cabinet Office over the US-UK political and intelligence documentation. In addition, until that was resolved, the process of Maxwellisation could not seriously begin—in fact, it has only just begun. We will therefore see more financial costs one way or another.

Given the Cabinet Office discussions with Chilcot, what is the time scale for publication? Can we realistically expect Sir John Chilcot to publish his report before May 2015? That is important because there will be a cut-off date around Christmas—probably just into the new year—when the civil service will say that Chilcot forms part of the pre-election purdah, so the report will be postponed. That has financial costs, but I would suggest that it also has costs relating to the reputation of the British Government and the individuals concerned.

Of course, Chilcot is an independent inquiry into the Iraq war, but can the Minister tell us what departmental inquiries have been held into general or specific aspects of the war, from policy through to implementation and lessons learned, by the Cabinet Office, the National Security Council, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, and perhaps the intelligence agencies? We have no idea what individual departmental reports have been done, and whether Sir John Chilcot has had access to them. If he has, that might cut down the time he needs to investigate and the cost of the overall report. Does the Minister have details of any US Government or congressional inquiries into the Iraq war, which may have published documentation that would have been relevant to Chilcot or saved time?

I now return to—literally—the costs of the Chilcot inquiry. According to a House of Commons document, the total financial cost incurred by the inquiry, from its establishment on 15 June 2009 to 31 March this year, was £9,016,500. There is an additional cost of about £1 million for the rest of this year, so we are talking so far about £10 million. Compared with the cost of the major public inquiries, that is not a large amount. Nevertheless, it is a cost on the public purse.

There is also the cost to the reputations, past and present, of Ministers, the military, the intelligence services and the civil service. We in this House would want Sir John Chilcot to be as fair as possible in any criticism he makes of any individuals, so that they have the right not only in law, but in terms of natural justice, to respond. The trouble is that that could go on for a long time, and Sir John Chilcot must have a cut-off point in mind. Has he perhaps indicated what it is to Sir Jeremy Heywood, the Cabinet Secretary?

On the costs in terms of public confidence in Government transparency and the decision to go to war, I understand the practical problems behind the delay, which I have outlined, but the longer the Chilcot inquiry continues without publication, the greater will be the public’s suspicion that the process is not transparent. In addition, the central part of the report, which is about learning lessons, will become mainly historical, although we know that such lessons could have been relevant to more recent events.

Then there is the cost in terms of the relatives’ anguish. The Chilcot inquiry will perhaps not satisfy many of them, but there is a wound there that many of them feel. They want, as far as possible, to get at the truth, and Sir John Chilcot is only too well aware of that.

On the procedures connected with the eventual publication of the Chilcot inquiry, there will presumably be a press conference, and the full report and evidence will go online—we are talking about a report of, possibly, 500 or 600 pages, with several thousand pages of evidence. From Parliament’s point of view, the danger will be that a lot of this will be in the public domain. There will be headlines naming and shaming individuals or organisations before Members of this House and the other place have the benefit of being able to debate the issue. Does the Minister think that the Prime Minister of the day will make a formal statement to the House, which will be duplicated in the other place? Will there be an opportunity for a full parliamentary debate? Colleagues will expect that, and there may even be pressure to have a vote. Will the Government accept the recommendations of the Chilcot inquiry, or will they pick and mix? Does the Minister think that the process will be rather like what happens with a Select Committee, when the publication of a report is followed by a Government response that accepts, or does not accept, some or all of the report?

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He makes a point about a pick-and-mix approach to the report. Although the Saville inquiry was quite different in nature and content, it was also exceptionally expensive and long. However, when it was concluded, the Prime Minister thought and hoped that that would be an end to the matter which, it transpired, was not the case. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important that the expense should be limited and there should be caps on legal fees, but that there should be no pick-and-mix approach on the outcome?

[Mr Simpson]

I have every sympathy for Sir John Chilcot and his inquiry. With such a broad inquiry, he has been tasked almost with an impossibility. On the one hand he wants to get to the truth, within the riding instructions, and wants to be fair to individuals, Departments and agencies. However, at the same time he has been aware—I suspect he would argue this—that the delay has not been his fault, as the Government of the day had major problems in getting agreement about putting information from the Americans in the public domain. It is understandable, for intelligence and security reasons, that there must be negotiation on what can be put in the public domain.

So far, the financial cost has, I think, been reasonable. My concern is that we are almost there, and Sir John Chilcot needs to be minded that while Parliament accepts the pressures on him, we would like the process to be concluded as reasonably as possible. He will present his report with recommendations, and will take questions on that. It will then be up to the Government of the day to say, “We accept all these recommendations,” or “In fact, we only accept some of them.” I suspect that Sir John Chilcot will be criticised by individuals, groups and some of the media for a range of issues that I have raised. As to what some of the families may conclude, if no one is put in the dock as responsible overall for mistakes that were made—taking the country to war illegally and such issues as are all out in the public domain—I suspect that the final Chilcot inquiry report will not end the matter. The Government of the day will have to take a view. It is right for Parliament to debate the matter. Colleagues in both Houses were active in government at the relevant time and will have a view. I fear that if things continue as they are for much longer, Sir John Chilcot will, through no fault of his own, lose public sympathy and perhaps come in for unfair criticism.

The Government do not have direct responsibility for the Chilcot inquiry, which is independent, but they have acted, as it were, as a control mechanism, because they control the flow of Government and non-Government foreign information. I do not think that they have tried to slow the process down, but nevertheless I suspect that the situation has at times proved very frustrating to the inquiry. We live in an age in which more and more people are suspicious of government. When a Government say that there are good intelligence and security reasons for doing something, a significant part of the public no longer accept that, even in terms of our physical security. When we debate issues such as the European arrest warrant, arguments will focus narrowly on that.

I hope that the Minister will be able to answer my questions. In particular, I should like to know from him whether he has had any indication through Sir John Chilcot of a likely notional date for the report to be published, and whether he thinks that there is a cut-off point, when the civil service will say that the period of purdah before the general election is approaching, meaning that that publication may be postponed until after the election.

Ukraine (Flight MH17) and Gaza

Keith Simpson Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

What I say to the hon. Lady is that we have the fifth largest budget defence budget in the world, and we have altered our spending so that our defence forces are more flexible, more deployable and more useful for the needs we have today. When we look at the challenge with Ukraine, we see that nobody is talking about deploying military assets into Ukraine; what we are talking about is using Europe’s combined financial resources and power to inflict on Russia an approach that means it has to change its course. It is actually political will that is required, rather than an immediate strategic defence review.

[Mr Keith Simpson (Broadland) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend has led the charge in trying to get our European friends to increase sanctions against Russia, but can he tell the House what actually influences Putin? Many people looking from the outside will feel that we are unable to change his behaviour, at least in the short term.

[The Prime Minister]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I think the only thing that will influence Russia’s strategic thinking about Ukraine is a sense that the rest of the world is actually going to team up and put in place sanctions that will damage Russia’s economy. As I said, in the end Russia needs Europe and America more than America and Europe need Russia, and we need to make the balance in that relationship show in order to change Russia’s thinking. It is not acceptable to destabilise Ukraine and instead the Russians should be seeking a civilised relationship with Ukraine. That is what we have to make them think about, and it is going to take tough action.