(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am very pleased that my hon. Friend has raised such an important question. We are hugely grateful for the amazing contribution that our foreign and Commonwealth servicepeople make. I cannot pre-empt the Government announcement on the results of the consultation, but return of service is an important principle and I think it will be at the heart of the Government’s policy when it is announced in due course.
I am glad to be such a cause of pleasure to my hon. and gallant Friend. I am not a lawyer, so this might be entirely irrelevant, but I do not think so: before he leaves this first amendment, could he say whether those serious cases of murder abroad, such as has been reported in relation to an incident in Kenya some years ago—I appreciate that that case may still be live—are affected by this tussle between the upper House and this House on the question of whether such matters should be considered by court martial or civilian court? In other words, where there is a failure of the local police in another country, is it the Government’s case that the court martial system or the civilian legal system is better able to deal with it?
I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s contribution; that is a very good case in point, and points to circumstances—although the numbers may be very small—in which the British military has to deploy to ungoverned spaces, let us say. Of course, that is not the case with regard to Kenya, but there are definitely advantages to the expeditionary capability of our service justice system.
I move now to Lords amendment 2B, which would require a report to be laid within six months of this Bill’s receiving Royal Assent, setting out the implications of not applying the new covenant duty to central Government. The Government have already committed to reviewing the operation of the covenant duty to inform us on whether other policy areas or functions could be usefully included. Having listened carefully to the issues that have been so vigorously raised, and recognising the strength of feeling across both Houses, I can now commit to going further.
Indeed, we are going further than Lords amendment 2B in the scope of the review we have in mind. We will review the operation of the new duty across the UK and will consider whether it would be beneficial to add to its scope. That will include specific consideration of whether central Government and any of their functions could usefully be added. The Government will report on the review as part of the covenant annual report in 2023, 18 months after the new duty is expected to come into effect. That timescale is more realistic than the six-month timeline from Royal Assent suggested by their lordships, which in our judgment is too short a period for any meaningful review to take place.
Given that we expect to see the new duty standing up in law by the middle of 2022 at the earliest, we also need to allow for an implementation period to give local authorities time to adjust to their new responsibilities. We therefore believe that to conduct and publish a review at the 18-month point of the new duty having been in operation is most appropriate. However, given the level of interest in the new duty, we will provide an interim update in the covenant annual report in December 2022, some six months after the duty is expected to come into effect. At that point, we will be able to say more about the scope and methodology for conducting the review, and MPs will have the opportunity to assess and comment in the 2022 covenant report debate.
The Government are committed to ensuring that parliamentarians from both Houses can contribute and give their views as part of the review process. I put on record my thanks and appreciation for the contributions of Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Craig of Radley. They, like us, want to see good law put in place to support our armed forces. In the light of the commitment that I have given, I urge the House to support the Government in resisting Lords amendment 2B.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn the right hon. Gentleman’s last point, yes, of course that it is right. We are abandoning export finance—I made that clear earlier—for the hydro-carbon industry. That massive change has been difficult because businesses in this country have benefited from export finance for many years, but we are making that change because we want the world to move away from hydrocarbons.
As for what the right hon. Gentleman said about India, I accept the points that he made, but, as I think I said, we will help the Indian Government in any way we can to move beyond coal as fast as they can. Of course, it was disappointing to see the language changed from “phase out” to “phase down”, but we have never had any commitments whatever on coal in COP before. I think that what will now happen is that the global peer pressure on countries to move away from coal will intensify very rapidly and the change will happen much faster than people think.
After the downfall of the Soviet Union, it was discovered that various multilateral agreements that we thought we had over things such as biological weapons had been systematically flouted. What confidence can we have if open societies observe the rules but closed societies cheat? Is there a regime in play to make sure that we would discover that?
One of the things that we agreed at this COP—and one of the reasons why I believe it is so historic—is, finally, the Paris rulebook, which contains, among other things, provisions for transparency and agreement about how we measure what we are trying to do around the world. That is immensely significant and it gives a tool to everybody who cares about it. Even in closed societies—about which my right hon. Friend knows a great deal—where they may not take voters very seriously, there are consumers whom they take seriously and people who are willing to protest, whom they take seriously as well.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Lady raises an important question. I can tell her that the ARAP places have not been transferred and that they continue to be valid—people on the ARAP scheme continue to be eligible. Nor is it correct to say that the initial budget of 5,000 for the resettlement scheme has already been filled. That is not correct either.
The Council for At-Risk Academics has been rescuing scholars in danger from oppressive regimes since the Nazi period in 1933. The Home Office has been sent a list of 12 such scholars, some of whom are in hiding in Afghanistan and some in hiding in Pakistan for lack of documentation. Will the Home Office make their case a priority because in them lies any hope for the future of Afghanistan?
Yes, there are many difficult cases, but I thank my right hon. Friend for drawing attention to those particular individuals who are at risk. I will ensure that the relevant Foreign Office Minister is in touch with him about the specific cases that he raises.
(3 years ago)
Commons ChamberIn his speech of self-justification after the collapse of Kabul, President Biden reduced a complex military issue to only two stark alternatives. It was a gross over-simplification for him to pose a devil’s dilemma between either a massive troop surge on a never-ending basis or a ruthless, chaotic and dishonourable departure. It is ruthless because people who trusted NATO will pay a terrible price; chaotic because of a lack of foresight to plan an orderly and properly protected departure; and dishonourable because even if our open-ended, nation-building, micromanagement strategy was wrong, as I think it was, in 20 years we created expectations and obligations which those who relied on us had a right to expect us to fulfil, as the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) has just said.
It has been pointed out correctly that for 20 years, NATO operations in Afghanistan succeeded in preventing further al-Qaeda attacks on the west from being launched under Taliban protection. That was indeed the key outcome, but unless we choose a better future strategy, the threat of its reversal is all too real. Not only may sanctuary on Afghan soil again be offered to lethal international terrorists, but other Islamist states may also decide to follow suit. How, then, should we have handled a country like Afghanistan when it served as a base and a launchpad for al-Qaeda, and how should we deal with such situations in the future?
These are my personal views on a defence issue unrelated to the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. For the past 10 years, I have argued both inside and outside this Chamber, very often to the dismay of my parliamentary colleagues, that a form of containment rather than counter-insurgency is the only practical answer to international terrorist movements sheltered and sponsored by rogue regimes like the Taliban. Containment, as older colleagues will remember, was the policy that held the Soviet Union in check throughout the cold war until its empire imploded and its ideology was discredited. Islamist extremism has a subversive reach similar to that of revolutionary communism, and our task is to keep it at bay until it collapses completely or evolves into tolerant, or at least tolerable, alternative doctrines.
In Afghanistan, the task of overthrowing the Taliban and driving al-Qaeda into exile was quickly accomplished in 2001, and at that point NATO arrived at a fork in the road. The option selected was, as we know, an open-ended commitment to impose a western version of democracy and protect it indefinitely in a country that had a strong sense of its own political and social culture and which was known to be politically allergic to foreign intervention.
Yet there was another option available to western strategists in response to the 9/11 attacks. Having achieved our immediate objectives of putting al-Qaeda to flight and punishing the Taliban, we should have announced that we were completely removing our forces but would promptly return by land and air to repeat the process if international terrorist groups were again detected in Afghanistan. When the Taliban regain full territorial control, they will lose their shield of invisibility. If they then choose to pose or facilitate a renewed threat—a terrorist threat—to western security, they should expect both their leadership and their military capability to be hit hard by our mobile land and air forces. That cycle would be repeated until the threat was removed, but we should not and would not allow our forces to be sucked in again.
My right hon. Friend is making some very important points. Has the game not changed slightly, though, with the immediate recognition of the Taliban Government by China and Russia? As they are permanent members of the Security Council, it will be very difficult to get any UN-led action in the way he describes.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right but, of course, this was a NATO intervention, and it is to NATO that we have to look when there are serious threats to international security, particularly those affecting western interests.
The point is that it has to be flexible, because al-Qaeda itself is very flexible. An active containment policy of this sort can track and match the flexibility of the terrorists. Such a policy depends on the maintenance of integrated and highly mobile land forces, positioned in regional strategic base and bridgehead areas.
My right hon. Friend is Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and for this strategy to be successful it requires excellent intelligence with good analysis so that Ministers can make sound decisions. In this case, I fear that has not been the case. Does his Committee have any plans to investigate the intelligence failures in this case so that we can deliver the strategy he is so excellently setting out?
I am glad that my right hon. Friend approves of the strategy, but I said earlier that this speech on defence is, if anything, in my capacity as a former Chairman of the Defence Committee. I am not in a position at this stage to say anything publicly about what the ISC might or might not agree to do, but obviously his suggestion is pertinent.
The point about strategic base and bridgehead areas is that they contain integrated forces that are ready to strike and then withdraw, and then to strike again whenever and wherever needed––in Afghanistan or in any other susceptible state that becomes what our Defence Secretary and now our Prime Minister have rightly described as “breeding grounds” for al-Qaeda or similar international terrorist groups. Proportionate military initiatives could be taken, and interventions made, without undue logistical complexity and without getting sucked into full scale counter-insurgency campaigning while the terrorists redirect their efforts to neighbouring countries, leaving us mired in the original countries from which they operated.
Active containment is the hard-headed solution to an otherwise intractable dilemma: whether to allow terrorists to attack us with impunity or whether to shoulder the unending burden of indefinitely occupying every reckless rogue state that shelters and supports them. It is okay for people to say, “This is over. There is no way we are going back into Afghanistan.” However, I do not want to be here, in the years or months to come, after another spectacular al-Qaeda type attack on a western country, with people looking around once again for a strategy because we are in a situation, as it seems we are, where the President of the United States can see only total withdrawal on one side or endless commitment on the other.
There is a flexible middle way, and it is an adaptation of the way in which we successfully saw off our cold war confrontation. It worked then, in a very different context, and it would work now in this context, too.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Obviously, the Taliban have for several years now controlled a considerable part of Afghanistan, as he knows, and it is during that period that we have not seen terrorist operations launched against the wider world. What may weigh on the Taliban’s minds as they think about whether to allow the Khorasan province group, the Haqqani network or al-Qaeda to return and re-form in the way that they were there in the past, and to act outside Afghanistan, is that they should remember what happened last time.
It sounds from that as if the Prime Minister is saying that if those groups go down that route again, there could be another military intervention. Does he accept that a fanatical brand of Islamist terrorism, sheltered and supported by the Taliban extremists, has not only attacked the west before but is highly likely to do so again? He mentioned that the military operations route is not great, but rather than veering from occupation to evacuation and back again in a few years’ time, will he now commission a study of an alternative containment strategy involving selective strikes with allies from strategic bases, to prevent a total terrorist takeover of Afghanistan?
I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. Afghanistan was never occupied, and nor is this an evacuation. What we will certainly look at—I think this is the point he was getting at—in addition to working with our friends and partners in the region is to what extent counter-terrorist activity can be conducted from outside Afghanistan on an outside-in basis.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI completely disagree. Looking at the broad economic situation that we face and what may happen in future, we have a well-informed and judicious electorate that will make a judgment whenever an election is called about the fitness of this Government to be returned to office or, indeed, the readiness of the Opposition or any other party to assume office, as has been seen in the past.
When Governments have sought to cut and run—when they have sought to manipulate the electoral timetable to their advantage—they have been punished. It was the case not just in 1974 with Edward Heath but in the early 1920s with Stanley Baldwin, when he sought to cut and run using the formidable advantage that he had—the support of press barons and the wealthy. Nevertheless, we saw the return of the very first Labour Government under Ramsay MacDonald, supported for all too brief a period by the Liberals of that time.
The historical case that my right hon. Friend is making is absolutely incontrovertible. The fact is that the legitimacy of previous elections has barely—if ever—been questioned. As soon as we brought in that wretched legislation, we ended up in what he rightly described as a paralysed Parliament. However, is he satisfied that clause 3 is strong enough to ensure that Parliament is not paralysed in future by political uses of the court to try to interfere with the process of dissolving Parliament? Professor Ekins in particular, I believe, has certain suggestions that might make that provision a little stronger.
I believe that clause 3 is robust and fit for purpose, but it is also the case that Professor Ekins, of the Judicial Power Project attached to the think-tank Policy Exchange, is a brilliant legal mind. We will pay close attention to his arguments and to those of my right hon. Friend and others, in order to ensure that clause 3 is robust enough.
Reference to clause 3 means that it is appropriate for me to turn to the specific clauses in this short and focused Bill. Before I do so, I just want to thank again the work of the Joint Committee under Lord McLoughlin and others, which did such a service to this House, and indeed to the other place, in scrutinising the legislation. When reviewing the original 2011 Act, the Joint Committee found that—
I begin by saying how lovely it is to see the Minister for the Constitution and Devolution, the hon. Member for Norwich North (Chloe Smith), back on the Front Bench after her absence, how well she is looking, and—without wishing the entire debate away—how much we are looking forward to her contribution at the end of this Second Reading debate.
As the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said, the Bill seeks to do two things: it repeals the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 and it reinstates the status quo before that Act came into force. Effectively, it is turning back time. It is on those two points that I shall focus my remarks.
I suspect that we shall have quite a lot of debate today about whether the Fixed-term Parliaments Act worked. The Minister has set out clearly that he believes that it did not, but I believe there is an equally valid argument that aspects of it did work, although of course it was not without its pitfalls and flaws. The best example was the 2015 general election, which took place five years after the 2010 general election. It worked in the sense of holding the coalition Government to that timetable. However, I would argue that we could also say that the 2017 general election proves that the Act worked, because there were clauses within it for having an early election and those were gone through in the 2017 election.
The debate about whether the Act works probably centres around whether the 2017 to 2019 Parliament worked. That probably highlights the flaws in the Act. The fact that the Act said the Prime Minister could control the date of the election was, I would argue, one of the main sticking points of the Act, because at that point the Opposition felt the Prime Minister might abuse the Act to leave the European Union with no deal. Therefore, the Act was not without flaw.
There are also the issues around confidence motions and the questions that they raise. I think that will probably be explored in quite a lot of detail.
I concede the hon. Member’s point that the Act did work as far as holding the coalition together until 2015 was concerned, but it did not work in 2017. If it had not been for the fact that the Scottish nationalists and the Liberal Democrats, for political reasons of their own, decided to allow the Dissolution, that stasis could have gone on for months, or years longer than it did. The Parliament would have been paralysed endlessly until the end of the five years. That cannot be right, surely.
I will let other parties answer for their own actions. I certainly do not seek to speak for them. I think it would be a misinterpretation to say that the Act was purely for the purpose of holding the coalition together. I think that was a huge reason for support in certain parts of the then Government, but actually it was an idea that had been batted around in politics long before then. Indeed, I believe it had been a matter for various private Members’ Bills before the coalition Government came into office. It was certainly not an idea that was just thought up to hold the coalition together.
The Scottish Government will stand by and have stood by their record, and have been accountable on the day of the Scottish elections for every Parliament. The Scottish Parliament knows when the next election will be, and every Government will be accountable on that day. If those in the Chamber want to look at the success of the Scottish Government—the SNP Scottish Government—as put forward and verified by the Scottish public just two months ago, let me say that I am sure there is not a Member of this House, particularly on the Liberal Democrat Benches, who would not give their eye teeth for such an endorsement. However, I will move on, Madam Deputy Speaker, because I can see that I am testing your patience somewhat.
I will come to the right hon. Gentleman in a moment, but I will take your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker, and move on.
Clause 3 of the Bill is an ouster clause. It aims in effect to put the Government’s action beyond the reach of the law, meaning that decisions made by the Government on these matters are non-justiciable. This is clearly the action of a Government who are still smarting from the humiliation of the Supreme Court’s Prorogation judgment in 2019, which said that it was not in the power of the Prime Minister to suspend Parliament for such a long time at such a critical moment.
In January, Baroness Hale and Lord Sumption gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, and they both expressed serious reservations about clause 3 of this Bill, which renders non-justiciable the powers given to the Government in clause 2. Those non-justiciable powers include controlling the space of time between the Dissolution of one Parliament and the general election and between the general election and the first sitting of a new Parliament. All of that would be in the control of a Government whose previous attempts to undermine parliamentary democracy through proroguing in 2019 were, as we have seen, deemed unlawful. The difference this time is that they hope that the Supreme Court could not intervene. Back in January, both Lord Sumption and Baroness Hale were unequivocal in saying that the minimum safeguard that this Bill needed in the event of such an ouster clause was to put a time limit on the moving of writs for parliamentary elections, which has not been done.
May I first say what an utter delight it is to see the hon. Member for Norwich North (Chloe Smith) in her place? Cancer is a bugger, and quite a lot of us have been through it. At the rate we are going, we will have a very large cancer survivors unit here in Parliament, and we shall overcome.
I know the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Michael Gove) is not present, but there is nothing more miserable than parts of one’s private life going through the public domain. I wish him and Sarah well.
The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr Wragg) has come back. I was going to criticise him because he had just departed, having said that he was looking forward to hearing what I was going to say, but now he has returned.
I am afraid that I dislike the Bill from beginning to end. I know it was in our manifesto that we would repeal the 2011 Act, but there were lots of things in our last manifesto with which I did not fully agree, so merely saying that it was in our manifesto does not cut the mustard. Our 2010 manifesto said that we wanted to move towards a fixed-term Parliament and to hand over significant elements of the prerogative to Parliament. Indeed, I note that the Conservatives’ manifesto in 2010 said that they wanted to make
“the use of the Royal Prerogative subject to greater democratic control”.
I supported bits of the 2011 Act when I was the shadow Minister dealing with it at the time, in 2010. There were bits of the Act that we criticised but, broadly speaking, we supported it. What I object to in this Bill is that it significantly increases the Government’s power over Parliament. Indeed, when the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was introduced, it was a major transfer of power away from the Executive, and a major strengthening of Parliament’s authority over its own lifetime. By definition, this Bill is exactly the opposite of that. The Bill assumes that all the players in the so-called golden triangle—why on earth do we resort to such outdated concepts?—will be good guys. I use the word “guys” advisedly, because quite often they are guys, but of course there is a danger that the Bill also brings the palace and the monarch directly into party politics.
The hon. Gentleman is making a strong case that it should not be a question of the Government against Parliament, but does he not agree that it should not be a question of Parliament against the people? That is the situation that we were nearly stuck in, because the Government, by wanting to be dissolved and have an election, wanted the people to have the final say about Brexit, but Parliament did not want the people to have the final say about Brexit. So the hon. Gentleman needs to be very careful, because there is a lot to be said for the Government not overruling Parliament, but there is not much to be said for Parliament not overruling Government when the Government are trying to give the final decision to the people.
Well, my point is simply that we need to have a level playing field in any general election. The Bill deliberately gives the Government the upper hand. It places them on the hill surrounding the territory. It means that they determine the territory on which a general election will be contested. They determine many other aspects, such as who is able to vote, who is able to register to vote, how the boundaries are constituted and so on. I start to ask myself: how much power do the Government want to have?
The hon. Gentleman is extremely kind in giving way a second time. I do not think he answered my point, which is that the key thing about Dissolution is that we are giving power to the people to have the final say.
On the hon. Gentleman’s other point, he says that the Government are able to choose a time that is to their advantage. The alternative is surely that when we have a fixed date when the election has to be held, the Government will still try to manipulate the situation so that it will coincide to their advantage at that date. We cannot really escape the question of manipulation entirely.
If there is a fixed date for a general election, there are fewer options for the Government to manipulate the situation. That is a publicly known fact to everybody, so there is a level playing field. Indeed, over the last 20 years or so we have had a set of rules in this country that mean that in the six months before a general election, the Opposition are allowed special access to the civil service. If the Opposition do not even know when the general election will be, they never have that opportunity.
Time and again, the Government get to set the rules, and there is a significant party political advantage to being able to set the date of a general election. That is why Governments never wanted to change that. They did it in 2010 for 2015 only, because they wanted to solve a specific problem. My biggest anxiety is that, while we all love the fluidity of our constitution, the downside is that it becomes the plaything of the Government of the day who want to jig and rejig bits and pieces to benefit themselves and keep themselves in power.
One instance of the kind of behaviour a Government today might conceivably think of is to hold a general election immediately after the new boundaries come in, or immediately before the boundaries come in, for their own party political advantage because that is how they will have assessed that. Alternatively, they could decide that we will not have a full judicial review producing a report on the lessons learned from the covid pandemic until after the date of the next general election. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is absolutely right that it could be after 2025—they could decide that it will not produce its result until 2027. My point is that even if a report is about to be produced, they could decide to have a general election.
The Minister herself gave evidence to our Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act saying that the public would punish nefarious activity of that kind. I am not convinced by that, because in a general election the public are making a whole series of decisions, and the simple matter of whether the general election should have been called is probably round about number No. 535 on the list of issues that are of concern to them. My simple point is that this is about having a level playing field. We insist on that for other countries and democracies. It is a fundamental principle of what constitutes a fair democracy.
I will deal with some specifics, if I may. First, five years is far too long for a Parliament. Over the past 200 years, they have tended to run for about four years, including when we had a seven-year term for Parliaments. It would make far more sense for us to have a four-year term—that would be more in keeping with the rest of the country. If the Bill passes Second Reading, I will table an amendment to curtail it to four years. We do not even say that it is five years at the moment—it is five years plus with the additional bits. The five years is not from the start of one Parliament to the start of the next Parliament; it is from the date of the Parliament’s first sitting until the general election.
The Government get to decide the date not only of a Parliament’s first sitting but of its first sitting to transact substantial and substantive business, which traditionally starts with the First Reading of the Outlawries Bill, followed by the Queen’s Speech. Even after the Queen’s Speech, it is for the Government to decide when we actually get into proper business and, during that period, whether there might or might not be a motion of no confidence. That means that after a general election, such as when Baldwin lost the general election, there had to be a motion of no confidence in the new Parliament, but that depended on the Government bringing Parliament to sit. We are almost unique in the world by not having any provisions in statute or our Standing Orders guaranteeing that the House will be able to transact business within a certain number of days, let alone set up Committees and all the rest.
I am very worried about snap elections, because often they mean that parties are not able to provide a duty of care towards potential candidates. I will mention only one, Jared O’Mara. If we had had a more sensible run- up to a general election, we would have served him better, because we would have gone through a proper process of selecting candidates. I could look at other instances across the last few years. As Chair of the Committee on Standards I am painfully aware that sometimes people become candidates without being prepared, briefed and given the support they need to enter into what can be a very difficult and painful place.
We have already seen that the Government have phenomenal powers over prorogation, and I simply do not understand why the House of Commons cannot have a vote beforehand. We would nearly always grant it, but if there were any jiggery-pokery, we might not. Government Members might say, “You are only doing that for a party political reason.” We could point to the Labour Government in the 1940s, who brought forward a special prorogation so that three Sessions of Parliament ran during one year, to meet the requirements of the Parliament Act 1911. Why does prorogation remain a simple act of the Executive? I think it is a mistake. Indeed, it would assist the Government simply to say that every time there is going to be a prorogation, just as there is before a recess, there will be a vote in the House of Commons.
I completely agree with the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, although when he is being sarcastic and ironic it is sometimes slightly difficult to determine which side of his own argument he is on. I think he was suggesting that the ouster clause may be a bit of an own goal. It sounds a bit like, “the lady doth protest too much”. It is as if we do not have confidence in the Bill of Rights.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I quite agree with my hon. Friend. In the decisions we take throughout this pandemic to tighten the system to ensure that there are no concerns, such as those expressed by hon. Members, it is important that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Ministers should have the space to make important national decisions.
Does the Minister know whether there are rules common to all Departments on where security cameras can be sited and where they must not be sited?
My understanding is that the general policy is that cameras are not sited within Ministers’ offices. I think this situation was an outlier in that regard, and we will have a better understanding of why it occurred once the Department’s investigation is complete.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberUNGA is, indeed, a very important way station, but this was a great start.
Given our shared belief that without the US and NATO there can be no security for the UK and Europe, does my right hon. Friend recall the strain on Anglo-American relations caused by Huawei’s infiltration of our critical national infrastructure? Will he therefore ensure that companies with dodgy and dubious links to the Chinese and Russian regimes will be firmly and fully shut out from building or operating our vital data and power pipelines in future?
My right hon. Friend knows a great deal about what he speaks of. That is why we have passed the recent legislation to ensure that we protect this country from the loss of intellectual property and the sale of crucial national security businesses to unreliable partners overseas.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberCombining his royal role with a very long life meant that Prince Philip met vast numbers of people in widely differing circumstances. One of his more unusual encounters was with two late friends of mine who were Fleet Air Arm veterans of the second world war.
On 29 January 1945, pilot Roy “Gus” Halliday and telegraphist air gunner Norman “Dickie” Richardson, together with their observer, were coaxing their crippled Grumman Avenger back to the safety of the British fleet. They had just completed the second stage of Operation Meridian, the destruction by dive-bombing of two heavily defended oil refineries at Palembang in Japanese-occupied Sumatra. The raids were extremely hazardous, but despite grievous losses they massively reduced the output of both refineries and scored a major strategic success. Prince Philip was the first lieutenant—the executive officer—of HMS Whelp, a brand-new destroyer and key component in the protective screen of the British Pacific fleet and its four carriers, from which the airstrikes had been launched.
As the Avenger ditched and went under, the Whelp raced to the rescue. In the nick of time, all three aircrew were plucked from their leaking life raft in heaving waters, freshly kitted out and given every support after their perilous ordeal. It was only gradually, on the return journey, that they realised the special status of their principal saviour.
In 2006, the BBC’s Siân Price reunited Gus Halliday DSC and Dickie Richardson DSM with the officer who saved their lives and who, after doing so, introduced himself simply as “Lieutenant Philip”. The programme, entitled “A Right Royal Rescue”, is still accessible online; I commend it to colleagues and to the public as a touching memento of three very brave men and as a reminder of the spirit of a great generation.
Like countless other parliamentarians, I saw Prince Philip in action on visits to my constituency and to other constituencies close to the New Forest. Such visits were greatly valued, but I felt rather underqualified to add to what has so ably been reported in the media by royal correspondents and by others who really knew him. However, my doubts were dispelled by someone fully qualified to comment on the royal family: our splendid former colleague Sir Nicholas Soames, who served both as armed forces Minister and as shadow Defence Secretary at the head of a happy team that included me. He explained that
“the whole nature of Prince Philip’s career and his devotion to Queen and Country was fashioned in his wartime training and service in the Royal Navy”.
Because of that, it seemed fitting to share with the House today this cameo of Prince Philip’s gallantry and humanity in combat, as well as expressing the sympathy of the people of New Forest East and of New Forest West with Her Majesty the Queen and all members of her family.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady should recognise that this is the biggest commitment in spending on our armed forces since the cold war. Labour left a black hole in our defence money of £38 billion. [Interruption.] Yes, they did. This is a massive investment and it is designed to deal with the chronic problems that previous Governments have failed to address—modernising our forces with AI, with the future combat air system, and finally moving into cyber. I think that is the hard-edged investment this country needs to modernise our forces and take them forward. Labour consistently failed to do that.
As the Prime Minister just mentioned the National Security and Investment Bill, I hope I can rely on him to help the Intelligence and Security Committee to remove the obstacles that are being placed in our way in wishing to scrutinise the work of the Investment Security Unit.
Although there are strong analytical aspects to this review, it is suggested on pages 62 to 63 that our adversary, communist China,
“is an increasingly important partner in tackling global challenges like pandemic preparedness”—
if you please—and that we want
“deeper trade links and more Chinese investment in the UK.”
Does not that unfortunately demonstrate that the grasping naivety of the Cameron-Osborne years still lingers on in some Departments of State?