Situation in the Red Sea

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 24th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I, for one, appreciated the right hon. Gentleman’s leadership of his party when Putin invaded Ukraine. Like us, he has demonstrated that the UK has been and remains totally united behind Ukraine and in confronting Russian aggression. I say to the Defence Secretary that one of the important things that the Government do by organising a debate in the House is signal the importance that all sides of the House give to the support to Ukraine. It is also a chance to explain to the British public why this matters so much, and why defence of the UK starts in Ukraine. It is essential to our interests that Ukraine prevails, not Putin.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

One way in which one can stretch the terms of the debate a little further than its precise wording without infringing any rules is to remark upon the fact that in the Red sea, British naval assets are particularly important. Does the shadow Secretary of State agree that there should be no question, now or in the near or medium future, of our losing our amphibious assault ships, which are so necessary for the combined operations that one must engage in when taking on piratical opponents?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Perfectly done, Sir Julian.

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[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. Perhaps he should refer to what was said by his hon. Friend the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee about the diplomatic effort. I thought that her point about Arab-led initiatives was well made. Perhaps the Government should listen to that as a future intention. I think that is more to the point than engaging in military action, which has been ongoing for some time.

My SNP colleagues and I gave the first round of strikes against the Houthi targets qualified support earlier this month, and we do so again in respect of the latest strikes, but as we begin to slide towards what seems almost like an inevitable longer-term commitment, it cannot be said often enough that the “what”, the “how’” and the “why” of UK grand strategy are, at least from my perspective, dangerously out of sync. Let us start with last week’s keynote announcement from the Defence Secretary, who I see is no longer in their place, that

“The era of the peace dividend is over and 2024 will mark an inflection point.”

On the surface, that is a pretty banal observation, but whether we call it the polycrisis or the age of grey-zone conflict, those of us who come to these debates on a regular basis have been talking about the possibilities of this type of thing happening at least since I arrived in 2015. I am not sure how 2024 will be anywhere near the inflection points that 2014 or 2022 were; none the less, that is a bold statement from the Secretary of State. It is important to say that he also backed it up with the announcement of a £405 million investment in so-called drone-killing Sea Viper missiles.

On the surface, it would seem that the Secretary of State has got his why and his what sorted. We just need a how, and that is where I think we begin to run into trouble. For all the high-falutin’ rhetoric from the MOD main building, I am not sure that anyone here really believes we are going to meet the how in the form of an increase in defence spending to meet these new threats, given the disastrous state of the MOD’s finances, as seen in the latest National Audit Office report.

We are in the middle of the cost of living crisis, as we all know well. Inflation seems to be coming under control; it is only worse in the defence sector, and the proliferation of US dollar-dominated contracts is not going to make things easier, especially with a soft pound and the reality that we are now living in one of the poorest countries in western Europe. Any increase in defence spending at this time means a cut elsewhere in the budget; that is simply a reality. Although there are those, particularly on the Opposition Benches, who are brave enough to say that they would like to make cuts elsewhere to do this, I have seen absolutely no indication from the Government that they intend to do so.

I am no economist—hard to believe, I know—but I believe that practitioners of that special art call it a “revealed preference”. An example would be when a potential leadership candidate advocates spending 3% of GDP, only to quietly drop the commitment when they become Chancellor. All our recent Prime Ministers have made all the right noises when it comes to the problems in international security, but none of them, at least from my perspective, has met that challenge with a significant increase. Indeed, I think we can all agree that if that redoubtable and dogged former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace)—I let him know that I was going to mention him in the debate—was only able to secure an increase to 2.5%, and even then only by the end of the decade, I do not think anyone is expecting his successor to be any more successful.

I should point out—I say this as something of a sceptic about increasing the defence budget or even the value in such arbitrary targets—that we judge Governments based on their record, and this is what this one has. Once we start to scratch at the how in the UK strategy, the what and the why also start to come unstuck. Let us take the Sea Viper order: what was presented as an announcement to counter this new and specific threat has actually been on the table since 2012, only to be constantly shifted to the right because of pressures elsewhere on the budget.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I will give way to my right hon. Friend.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I am grateful, and I regard him as my hon. Friend too. Before he leaves the issue of percentages spent on defence, would he not agree with me that, crude though they are, these are indicators of a national priority? The trouble is that if we do not spend enough on defence in peacetime, and then a conflict breaks out—we are now beginning to hear talk of having to be prepared for major conflict in the next decade or two—we will be spending vastly more than 3% or 4% on defence. So how much better is it to spend a bit more in peacetime to prevent the conflict, and how much better than that is it that America should realise that investing in Ukraine’s effort is also helping to raise the deterrence threshold?

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I both agree and disagree. Had the Ministry made sustained investment in capability, we might not have found ourselves in this situation. The right hon. Gentleman is welcome to stay for my Adjournment debate on nuclear infrastructure, in which we might go into the number crunching in far more detail—he may try to pass on that.

Far from being a simple drone killer, Sea Viper is a sophisticated ballistic missile defence system that has been in development since the 1980s. Each Aster 30 missile costs £2 million a pop. Whoever in the main building thought it was a good idea to call it a drone killer evidently had not done the cost-benefit analysis on taking out mass-produced Chinese drones, costing £100, with a £2 million missile. That is before we even get to the platforms that deliver the capability.

The Minister might be able to correct me, but the MOD is now officially refusing to publicly disclose the size of its escort fleet, which the Houthis probably already know—maybe it is in one of the TikToks that the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton mentioned. That refusal got a bit of play last week, although we should consider the why of it all.

If we can all agree that we are living in a world of increasingly complicated and interlinked threats, why is the Red sea important to the UK? I consulted two principal documents published since I became an MP—the 2015 strategic defence and security review and the 2021 integrated review—but, alas, there was no mention of the Red sea. Yemen was given a single cursory mention in each, and both in the context of other regional conflicts. The Government’s defence is that both documents were written before the Ever Given accident reminded us that the Suez canal and the Red sea are an important bottleneck for global trade.

Ultimately, neither document, one pre-Brexit and one post-Brexit, tells a compelling story about UK engagement in that part of the world, which makes it harder for me, and certainly for the public, to see why sustained engagement, if it happens, is in our long-term interest. Do not get me wrong: even as a committed north Atlanticist who believes that the primary commitment of Scotland and the UK should be to our northern European neighbourhood, I am open to being convinced. But the mood music throughout that time was on global Britain, without elucidating what that actually meant.

Do not get me started on the Indo-Pacific tilt either. The integrated review made the incredible assertion that the UK wishes to be the European state

“with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific”.

That claim received very little interrogation at the time. Again, as a committed north Atlanticist, I was perhaps never going to be on board with the idea of an Indo-Pacific tilt, but the more I try to find out about it, the less convinced I become.

The Indo-Pacific is a big place and is home to two of the three largest oceans in the world and three of the five largest states. Any tilt towards it would surely require some sort of prioritisation, but we have never heard any talk of this. The Red sea region could have been part of that, securing the freedom of maritime trade from the Indo-Pacific and bringing in European partners with a presence in the region, along with others, but there was a complete failure to communicate any of that to Members, never mind to the general public.

Forgive those of us who are sceptical about the what. With the strikes against Houthi targets, we can clearly see the how. The Royal Navy, which is doing a commendable job, is in its poorest and most diminished state for many years. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford alluded to that, and it is a consequence not only of budgetary pressures but of a complete failure of this and previous Governments to make the case for the why, be that in the Red sea or the North sea.

Instead, we have a manpower and retention crisis caused by over a decade of wage stagnation; the ongoing possibility that the two remaining landing platform docks will be mothballed, calling into question the long-term viability of the Royal Marines; and the admission in November that the entire fleet of SSNs was alongside at the same time. Yet if we were going by the MOD’s spin on things, all is well, because we can still field two carrier strike groups, even though everyone knows we would never have the manpower to do so at the same time; the AUKUS deal will allow Astute-class boats to operate in the Pacific ocean, even though, as we have heard, they sometimes cannot even get to the North sea; and—who can forget, from last week—we now have a space laser, or at least we will in 10 or 15 years’ time. So let me end with a general observation: when it comes to UK grand strategy in the Red sea, denial is not just a river you end up in if you take a wrong turn on your way there.

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[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) on a very wide-ranging speech, albeit somewhat remote from the situation in the Red sea, as you correctly pointed out, Mr Deputy Speaker. I also congratulate my right hon. Friend the new Defence Secretary, who is not in his place, and the shadow Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey), who both spoke with great care, diplomacy and sense. They fulfilled precisely what this place ought to be about, namely His Majesty’s Government laying out their views and the loyal Opposition scrutinising what they have done.

Before I say anything else, I make it clear that I strongly support the strikes in the Red sea and all the remarks made by my hon. Friends, most of whom are much better informed on these matters than me. I strongly support the strikes, the way they were carried out and the reasoning for them.

If I may, I will take a slightly different approach—rather than simply the diplomatic, foreign affairs and military approaches—and look at the way in which the strikes were ordered. Particularly after the first strike, a great many people, including a number of people in this House—perhaps we will hear from the Liberal Democrats later on—were of the view that it was quite wrong. “The House should be recalled,” they said. “We should have a vote in this House on whether the strikes were justified,” it was said. “It was quite wrong that Parliament should not have the opportunity to express our views on the most important matter facing us all, namely warfare,” it was said. I am glad to say that the Government resisted those calls, and the way in which the strikes were ordered seemed—I will come back to precisely why in a moment—to be absolutely right.

I have been talking about this subject for some time. Indeed, I wrote a book about it, which, if I may say so, is available in all good bookshops. When I expressed the view in a debate some 15 or 20 years ago that it was wrong that the House of Commons should vote on going to war, it was greeted widely with scorn. Everybody said, “That’s absurd; that’s a ridiculous thing to say.” We can check Hansard for that. Indeed, when Lord Hague wrote an extensive article on the matter, he said very straightforwardly and simply, “When we go to war, the House of Commons and the House of Lords must decide on it. It must be done by a vote.” I am glad to say that last week the noble Lord Hague went through a damascene conversion. He has changed his mind on the matter and now entirely supports my view. Equally in my view, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which wrote a report on these matters, got it wrong. It said that it thought the House of Commons should have a vote before deployment. I take a stringently different view, because there is a large number of very important reasons why that should not be the case.

First, all pretence of secrecy would of course be destroyed. We would have a debate in this place, and the enemy would know precisely what we were planning to do. Secondly, we could not take that kind of decision without consulting our neighbours. The decision might well be part of a NATO strike or, in this case, a joint UK-US strike. Are we ready to ask NATO, the United Nations or the US to wait while we discuss the matter here? What happens if we vote against it here, but those wherever else vote in favour?

Thirdly, we are galloping down a very dangerous road if we ask the Prime Minister to come to this House and share with us the secret intelligence, legal advice and strategic knowledge on which he makes these difficult decisions, as he would be exposing many of our professional supporters to criticism or, indeed, to attack one way or another. It would be quite wrong if he did so. I do not want to know the secret intelligence. I do not want to know the legal advice. I want the right to scrutinise what the Government have done after they have done it.

It is also extremely important that warfare should not be politicised. If we vote in this House either to go to war or not to do so, we as MPs are taking a view of it. We are sending people to war while squabbling among ourselves about whether the war is right, wrong or indifferent. That seems to me quite wrong from the point of view of the families, particularly of those who are killed, who would then say, “Well, one party or the other took a strongly different view from you.”

Before I come to the final reason for my strong views on this matter, I must point out to the House that, of the 274 wars that England has taken part in since 1750, we have voted in this House on only two. Only twice in all those years have we voted prior to deployment. The first time was in 2003, when Tony Blair asked this House to vote on Iraq and whipped the Labour party into supporting the war. The Conservative party was also whipped; I am glad to say I rebelled against the Whip, but none the less we were whipped into supporting the war, and what a bad decision that was—quite the wrong decision.

The second time in all that 300-year to 400-year history that we had a vote in this House on going to war was before a potential Syria strike in 2013, which did not then occur. The House voted against it, and very much of the bloodshed, the corruption and the disaster that we see in Syria to this day comes about as a result of those votes. America followed us the next day and equally did not strike against the use of chemical weapons. That was a wrong decision made by this House, as in my view was the Iraq decision of 2003, and those are the only two occasions when, prior to deployment, we have voted.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

rose—

[James Gray]

My right hon. Friend disagrees with me.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I am afraid I do. I agree with my hon. Friend’s main thrust, that there is no doubt that the Prime Minister and the Executive have the right to take initial action and seek support afterwards. Having said that, the case of Syria in particular has become a byword for a wrong and terrible decision, because the ghastly Assad remained in power, but the alternative would have been another Islamist swamp such as we saw in Libya. It was because there was a strong feeling in the House that Syria would have been another Iraq or another Libya that there was such pressure to have a vote. For my part, I think the result was absolutely right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mitchell]

I will give way in a moment; I just want to finish dealing with the comments by the shadow Secretary of State. He also asked whether HMS Diamond will be replaced on the station. The answer is yes, she will be replaced by HMS Richmond, but he will accept, I hope, that I cannot give any operational details about that.

The right hon. Gentleman also raised the issue of Israel and Gaza, which is adjacent to this debate if not directly part of it. That issue was similarly raised by the hon. Members for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) and for Manchester, Withington (Jeff Smith), whose son we thank for his service, by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Sir Liam Fox), and by the hon. Members for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill), and for Caerphilly (Wayne David). Colleagues throughout the debate have raised this point, and I reiterate that there is no link between our action of self-defence in the Red sea, and the situation in Israel and Gaza. The Houthis are using events in Israel and Gaza as an excuse to destabilise the region further. They are trying to paint themselves as protectors of the oppressed, but their own track record of oppression shows them in a very different light.

Britain wants to see an end to the fighting in Gaza as soon as possible. We are calling for an immediate humanitarian pause to get aid in and hostages out, and as a vital step towards building a sustainable, permanent ceasefire, without a return to destruction, fighting, and loss of life. To achieve that, we need Hamas to agree to release all the hostages. Hamas can no longer be in charge of Gaza, and an agreement must be in place for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza.

While I am on that point, may I say to the hon. Member for East Lothian a word or two about the reference to the International Court of Justice? The Government believe that the referral by South Africa to the International Court of Justice is unhelpful, but of course we respect the role and independence of the ICJ. I say to the House, particularly on Holocaust Memorial Day, that the suggestion that Israel is engaged in genocide against the Palestinian people is both wrong and profoundly offensive. I make it clear on Holocaust Memorial Day that we also remember the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in Bosnia in 1995 and in Sudan in 2003, as well as in Cambodia in the 1970s. If I may update the House, the ICJ has announced during the course of the debate that it will deliver its decision on South Africa’s request for provisional measures at 12 o’clock UK time on Friday 26 January.

Let me return to the excellent speeches made by so many of my right hon. and hon. Friends and Members, and I will turn first to the speech by the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee—

[Sir Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Mr Mitchell]

Before I do that, I shall give way to my right hon. Friend.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

My right hon. Friend is, as always, the model of courtesy. For the avoidance of any lingering doubt—I am sure this can be avoided as I am getting very positive signals from the Defence Secretary sitting to his left—will he confirm that HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, whose planned out-of-service dates are 2033 and 2034 respectively, not only will not be scrapped ahead of time, but will not be mothballed either?

[Mr Mitchell]

My right hon. Friend was absolutely right to detect the supportive view of the Secretary of State for Defence.