Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

It is an absolute pleasure to follow such sensible speeches from those on both Front Benches. There is a history to today’s legislation which I shall set out and against which my Committee colleagues can develop the Intelligence and Security Committee’s current perspectives. As the hon. Member for Cardiff Central (Jo Stevens) mentioned, it was in June 2013 that the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which I served under Sir Malcolm Rifkind’s chairmanship, published a no-holds-barred report on foreign involvement in the critical national infrastructure. It focused on the casual and cavalier way in which contracts were signed between British Telecom and Huawei prior to any ministerial involvement, and it insisted that:

“The National Security Council should ensure that there are effective procedures and powers in place…when it comes to investment in the CNI.”

We demanded an effective process by which Government are alerted to potential foreign investment in the CNI; an established procedure for assessing the risks; a process for developing a strategy to manage these risks throughout the lifetime of the contract and beyond; clarity as to what powers the Government have or need to have; and clear lines of responsibility and accountability. The Committee was

“shocked that officials chose not to inform, let alone consult, Ministers on such an issue.”

That, we concluded, must never again be allowed to happen.

The Government’s July 2013 response to the report bordered on complacency. They conceded that

“with hindsight, we agree that Ministers should have been informed”

and put their faith in the relatively new National Security Council, in conjunction with “cross industry-government groups”, to provide better protection in future. Replying to our main finding that their

“duty to protect the safety and security of its citizens should not be compromised by fears of financial consequences”,

the Government observed that

“HMG’s approach balances economic prosperity…with national security…Boosting trade and investment is a key part of the Government’s plan for growth and we are working hard to develop our economic relationships with key trading partners, including China.”

As Huawei’s chief executive officer had been given the full red-carpet treatment at 10 Downing Street only the previous September, that response was all too predictable, and thus the courtship continued, despite growing anxiety among our Five Eyes partners, such as Australia and the United States.

There can be no doubt of the sincerity of the technical advice given by our experts at GCHQ and, more recently, in the National Cyber Security Centre, its public-facing arm. They recognise—as does the Bill—that the lack of diverse suppliers is a critical future vulnerability. For telecommunications to be resilient, their networks need more than two providers on which to depend. Otherwise, the collapse of one provider means total reliance on the other. Yet should that really override the danger of ever-closer involvement with a company legally in thrall to potentially hostile Chinese intelligence services?

In a statement in July last year, the ISC acknowledged the National Cyber Security Centre’s paradoxical point that three providers might be safer than two, even when the third comes from an adversarial state. Yet it rightly pointed out that

“the issue cannot be viewed solely through a technical lens—because it is not simply about telecommunications equipment. This is a geostrategic decision, the ramifications of which may be felt for decades to come… It is about perception as much as anything: our Five Eyes partners need to be able to trust the UK and we must not do anything which puts that at risk… And there is the question as to whether other countries might follow the UK’s decision”

when they are not as capable of protecting their networks as we are of protecting our own.

Some say that the Government’s perseverance with Huawei was justified on the basis of the technical advice they were given—right up to the point earlier this year when the United States brought in its fierce further sanctions. Yet the fact that the US would take such a step should have been anticipated. Our belated U-turn in July shows what happens when multifaceted problems are examined in a one-dimensional way.

Seven long years after our Huawei report, the Government have—in the space of a fortnight—introduced two important Bills: this one and the National Security and Investment Bill. Taken together, according to the National Cyber Security Centre, they should help to establish an

“appropriately secure and resilient telecoms infrastructure”

and

“effect the security transformation we”—

the NCSC—

“believe to be necessary”.

We are assured that

“operators adhering in totality to the new security regime will be among the most secure in the world”.

Hopefully, our US partners—currently promoting an international clean network initiative—will agree and Five Eyes harmony on those vital matters can now be reinstated.

Having waited so long for two such necessary Bills, the ISC must sadly record our concern that, in both cases, their Second Reading debates were held within just four working days of their introduction on First Reading. Normally, adequate notice of about two weeks would enable our hard-working staff to obtain relevant confidential material and advance sight of such legislation to allow proper prior consideration. The tiny window of opportunity afforded by the parliamentary timetabling has prevented this from happening, and our staff had to fall back purely on publicly available sources.

Proposals such as those in this Bill, which the Committee first recommended in 2013, are therefore to be welcomed, but the public rely on the ISC to assure them that we have asked those questions in private that cannot be discussed more openly. As that has not yet happened, our support for the Bill in principle cannot be as unqualified at this stage, as we should like it to be, though I welcome the Minister’s offer to speak to the Committee later this week.

Here are a few of the questions that can be asked on the Floor of the House. First, as the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport has not traditionally specialised in national security, on whom will the Secretary of State rely for advice when deciding whether to issue restrictions against high-risk vendors, or directions to telecoms providers?

Secondly, if the answer is the National Cyber Security Centre and our wider intelligence community, will there be procedures to guarantee that they will be consulted with adequate notice, and who will ensure that their advice is given sufficient weight? Thirdly, in view of the revolving door, via which too many businessmen and ex-civil servants effortlessly glide between their former roles and the Huawei boardroom, what assurance can we have that the Government will be immune from lobbying campaigns by those on the payroll of high-risk vendors?

Finally, I have a question that I was pleased, I think, to hear the Secretary of State answer 15 minutes into his opening speech, but it would be nice to have the Minister reiterate that answer: unlike in 2013, do the Government now fully accept that national security must always be their overriding consideration where critical national infrastructure is concerned?

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I have to say that I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman on this. Although the Huawei cyber-security evaluation centre was installed, when I sat and listened to people from it making a presentation to us earlier in the year, it was almost as though we were watching people who were kind of squeezing their own genuine, real opinion, which would have been coming via GCHQ, about how the real threat was formed. Their arguments did not stand up, even in the face of people who were not every day working on security.

The truth is we need to be careful, and it should have been a tighter position from the word go. The very fact that the Government are bringing this measure forward now suggests that that was not the case. [Interruption.] Listen, I am critical of my own Government. I resigned from the damn thing at one point. I have to say that I therefore do believe it is possible for great Governments, like mine, to get things wrong.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

In defence of the Huawei cyber-security evaluation centre, its sixth annual report, from September this year, is absolutely devastating in its criticisms of Huawei’s failures to be secure or to make improvements when insecurities have been highlighted.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I agree completely. The point is that when we were talking about this earlier on, it was clear that that was, underneath it all, the centre’s real opinion, but it was kind of moving and modifying. It was also used in a political way, by the way, which I did not think was right. An opinion is either there or it is not; do not get people in to brief Back Benchers about what they should be thinking. I thought that was wrong.

We are absolutely in the right place at this point and the Bill goes a long way towards achieving that. However, we need to do some other things that could be in the Bill. For example, the Bill is about security but it does say on the front that it goes slightly wider than security: the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman) signed the bit that says:

“In my view the provisions of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”

That convention is the European convention on human rights. We need to ask ourselves whether that idea applies to many regimes—not just China—and companies that come from those regimes that may be guilty of human rights abuses.

I asked the Minister previously, in a private context, whether he would consider including in proposed new section 105Z8 of the Communications Act 2003, on designation notices, the inclusion of the ability, where it may arise, to do something in the area of genocide and the involvement of companies in that process. There is very strong evidence in a couple of cases—particularly in the Uyghur case—of the use of slave labour, which should result in those companies being outlawed. The Minister may argue that this Bill might not be the appropriate vehicle for that because it is specifically about security, but every Bill has on its face that we abide by human rights laws. I am not trying to widen the Bill’s scope; I am giving the Minister the opportunity to have that extra element as part of his possible designations. After all, we are dealing with countries and nations that have, particularly in China’s case, torn up much of the book on co-operation and diplomacy.

Let me raise a final point before I conclude. My hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) has gone, but he mentioned Australia. One of our Five Eyes partners, Australia, had the temerity to ask for an inquiry into the covid outbreak. Since then, the Chinese have attempted, in essence, massively to beat up Australia in a very undiplomatic and aggressive manner. It started with abuse of the individuals who asked for an inquiry and then went further into abuse of the Government. Subsequently, it has gone on to sanctions: the Chinese has now broken WTO rules, with sanctions of more than 200% on Australian wine.

In the past couple of days, the Chinese have produced what I think is called a meme—which is a mocked-up instrument on the internet—that shows something about an Australian soldier trying to kill a child. This is appalling behaviour and I want my Government, at some point, to be very clear that such behaviour is simply not to be borne. Although we have said that we stand with China, the key thing about this sort of thing and our co-operation with our Five Eyes partners is to do more than stand with China: we should condemn behaviour like that that deliberately targets and demeans a democratic nation that goes by the rule of law and human rights, which is something that China does not do. I do hope that the Minister will pass on to his colleagues that no matter what we do with this Bill, we need to make sure that we stand up with our Five Eyes partners, now that we have the National Security and Investment Bill and are moving in that direction, and never allow any one of them to be isolated and picked off one at a time. I commend the Bill to the House.

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[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (David Johnston). I noticed that he was speaking without notes, which was very impressive. Sadly, I still rely on mine. I thank the Minister for bringing forward the Bill, and I thank the ministerial team for talking to us and engaging with so many colleagues. It would be great if other Departments could do that. What can I say? Hint, hint!

When the Henry Jackson Society and I produced our “Defending our Data” document back in May 2019, many Members had yet to form an opinion on Huawei. I am therefore grateful to the 60-odd members of the Huawei interest group who took an interest in this subject, and to the 36 people who voted to show their concern to the Government back in early March on the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill. I am aware that that Bill was not necessarily the right place to express those concerns, but with hindsight I think it sent an important message to the Government from those 36 Members—plus two tellers, of whom I was one. The United States moving its position in subsequent months was also important. I think the change would have happened anyway, regardless of whether there was a Republican or a Democrat Administration. A combination of Back-Bench concern, quite rightly, and the United States’ understanding of the geopolitics being perhaps a little ahead of that of the United Kingdom and on a par with that of Australia helped to shape Ministers’ understanding of the problems.

I am slightly concerned that the situation came to this in the first place, because there were so many warning lights about Huawei’s deepening relationship with BT. My hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall) spoke about Nortel. We must remember that Huawei had a supply contract with Nortel, during which time it hacked its way into Nortel’s systems and stole everything, like a parasite within a body. Nortel was one of the great, spectacular Canadian bankruptcies of the early 21st century. Why? Because it went into partnership with a business that deliberately collapsed it after stealing its IP. If that is not a lesson for us, it is difficult to know what is. Huawei never was and never will be a private firm. It is 99% owned by the Chinese state via trade unions. When I heard Ministers—not this Minister, but others—using the line about Huawei being a private company, I felt that it was a deeply naive thing for the Department to say.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Just for the record, a former Prime Minister said that as well, repeatedly.

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[Matt Warman]

Those decisions, as I said, were taken in the context of the environment that people were already well aware of, and they are taken at a degree of commercial risk. However, we have worked closely with the networks to ensure that there will be no additional delays as a result of this decision. I think it is the right thing that puts national security at the absolute heart of our programme, but it also does that in the context of not jeopardising the clear economic benefits and the clear practical benefits of improving connectivity across the country that we would all like to see.

On the emergency services network, we anticipate that these announcements concerning Huawei will have a very low impact on the emergency services network. We do not anticipate any impact on the programme schedules. There is some Huawei equipment in the EE part of the emergency services dedicated core network that EE is already working towards removing.

Let me cover one other aspect raised by the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I look forward—maybe that is not quite the right phrase—to appearing before the ISC in the next few days. We will always co-operate with it, and I am very happy to work with it on the best way to balance the obvious requirement between transparency and national security, although we would always seek to be as transparent as we possibly can be within those important bounds.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I did ask a few questions. If the Minister cannot answer them now, by all means he should write to me. However, I am concerned about a situation where, for example, a former leader of the Conservative party and former Prime Minister has a major role in the China belt and road funding operation. How secure will Government be against lobbying of people with that sort of connection and prominence?

[Matt Warman]

I will simply say that the Government will always put our national security interests first, and of course we are always alive to the commercial interests of the companies that seek to engage with us in this matter or any other. I look forward to further engaging with my right hon. Friend and his Committee.

To conclude, this Bill does not simply produce a framework that will address one particular company or even one particular country. It sets up the futureproof regime that will allow us to deal with the company that we have spoken about so much this evening and also its successors in successor networks. The intention of this legislation is to persist well beyond the current challenges that we face. I am glad that it commands the support we have seen across the House. I am immensely grateful for what has been a genuinely well-informed debate and one that I look forward to carrying on in Committee. The Telecommunications (Security) Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world. It will enable us to protect our national telecoms infrastructure, and it is also a chance for the UK to become the world leader in the development of new 5G technology that we all know we can be.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 19 January 2021.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(David T. C. Davies.)

Question agreed to.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Money)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it is expedient to authorise any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(David T. C. Davies.)

Question agreed to.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Ways and Means)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it is expedient to authorise provision requiring public communications providers to pay certain costs incurred by the Office of Communications.—(David T. C. Davies.)

Question agreed to.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Carry-over)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 80A(1)(a)),

That if, at the conclusion of this Session of Parliament, proceedings on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill have not been completed, they shall be resumed in the next Session.—(David T. C. Davies.)

Question agreed to.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 25th May 2021 Commons Chamber

As we all agree, our national security is priceless, but until we see a detailed plan, a proper impact assessment and an industrial strategy, we in the Labour party will remain deeply concerned that the Government are not prepared to make the interventions necessary to ensure that our national security is safeguarded. I encourage everyone to support our new clause and take the necessary steps towards unlocking the UK’s digital potential.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The shadow Minister is a considerable specialist in this field; I particularly endorse what she says about the importance of a non-partisan approach to national security in this and other legislation. As noted on Second Reading, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has long been concerned about the security of the UK’s telecommunications networks. Our 2013 report “Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure” identified serious failings in the way that successive Governments had managed the entry of foreign telecommunications companies into the UK market—Huawei especially—and we urged the Government not to sacrifice security in the pursuit of investment when it came to our critical national infrastructure.

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It is also important to acknowledge that without an effective diversification strategy in place, we will not have a secure network. As the ISC highlighted in July 2019, the diversification strategy is therefore the most critical action to ensure our security now and for the future. The issue of national dependence goes beyond high-risk vendors. I hope that when the Minister winds up he will say more about diversification, because our most pressing requirement is not to allow ourselves to become dependent on single vendors; the case has already been made about the existing vulnerability that Britain endures in that regard.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Sir John Hayes]

I give way to the Chairman of the ISC.

[Dr Lewis]

In support of what my right hon. Friend says, he will recall that one of the main reasons why the Government felt it so difficult to rid themselves of Huawei was that there would then be only two remaining possible suppliers, and if one of them got into difficulty, we would have total dependence on a single supplier. If we do not diversify, it really has knock-on effects: we sometimes have to improperly consider using suppliers that are really a risk to our security.

[Sir John Hayes]

As my right hon. Friend knows, it is not only the Committee on which he and I serve that has highlighted that point; other Committees of this House have, too, and the Government themselves have acknowledged it. We really need to look at how, having accepted the thrust of his argument, the Government intend to respond. What is the action plan? I know that the Minister will have much to say about this, but my right hon. Friend is absolutely right.

This is part of a wider problem of the concentration of power in the hands of what I described earlier as a handful of unaccountable corporate monopolies. There is a curious assumption that somehow those organisations will be intrinsically virtuous, but that is simply not the case. Commercial organisations are just that: they are interested in commerce. They are not there to do what Governments and this Parliament exist for, which is protecting the interests of the whole of the people.

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[James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow my eminent right hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—if only I were as good.

As the final Back-Bench speaker this afternoon, it is incumbent on me to be supportive of the Government, which of course I am, and this excellent Bill. We are where we are today for two reasons. First, it shows that the Government do listen to Back Benchers. Secondly, the Bill is a pretty good bit of work and it ticks the box, as indeed it should. As defence and national security become ever more virtual and online, it has never been more important to secure our lines of communication, both domestically and internationally, with our allies. I urge all Members to consider the notion of strategic independence, which we have spoken a lot about during the covid crisis. As we go forward, it is really important that we aspire to be able to operate autonomously as a global nation alongside our allies.

I believe that the Bill is important for three reasons. First, it will allow for better security both domestically and internationally. It kicks out the high-risk vendors from our network—what’s not to like? Secondly, it placates our allies. New Zealand, Australia, the USA, Canada and others were quite noisy when Huawei was originally admitted to our network, so let us hope that this will placate them, cement that relationship and, perhaps in time, even enable us to admit Japan and other close allies. Thirdly, it opens the door for other 5G providers to come in, which is a good thing, and I support the UK’s diversification strategy.

Having sat on the Committee for this excellent Bill, it is a pleasure to see it back here on Report. The Bill takes forward the Government’s commitment to the UK telecoms supply chain review, introduces a new security framework, amends the Communications Act 2003, introduces new security duties, brings new powers to the Secretary of State and strengthens Ofcom’s regulatory powers, allowing it to enforce the new framework. That is all very positive. It also introduces new national security powers for the Government to impose, monitor and enforce controls. Again, that is a positive step.

I am pretty happy with the Bill as it stands, but in the interests of objectivity, I will talk to a number of the new clauses and amendments. On new clause 1, the Government are aware that the Bill gives Ofcom significant new responsibilities, and it will need to increase its resources and skills to meet those new demands. Ofcom’s budget is approved by its independent board, and the Minister has today confirmed that the budget limit set by the Government will be adjusted to allow Ofcom to carry out new functions effectively. Ofcom is already engaged in this space—we are already proactively looking over the horizon and scanning for future threats—so I am happy that the Government have got this about right.

New clause 2 would ensure that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is provided with information relating to a designated vendor direction. I am sympathetic to this, but the Government know what they are doing. As the Minister said, the ISC’s primary focus is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies. Its remit is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013, so the Bill is not the appropriate place to achieve an overall enhanced role for the ISC.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am sorry to have to reiterate this point. There are other ways in which our concerns could be addressed, such as by adjusting our memorandum of understanding, rather than putting it on the face of the Bill, so I am with my hon. Friend as far as that is concerned. However, it is very clearly within our remit to oversee not only the agencies but those parts of other Departments where highly classified information is concerned. That is just a matter of fact—it is in the agreement between us and the Prime Minister.

[James Sunderland]

I empathise with my right hon. Friend’s view, and I agree that he has a point. My position is the same as the Government’s: I do not think that this Bill is necessarily the vehicle through which we should look at the future of how the ISC operates. I am a keen follower of the ISC and its output. Its work is eminent, and my right hon. Friend’s point is well made.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I thank all those Members who have contributed to the debate today. It is an important debate because digital connectivity is an integral part of all our lives. For countless people across the country, having fast and reliable broadband and a good mobile connection is vital to our way of life, but for us to truly reap the benefits of the gigabit-capable broadband and 5G, we need to have confidence that they are secure and that means securing the networks on which they are built, the supply chains on which they depend, and the equipment and services that support them. The Bill demonstrates clearly the Government’s commitment to ensuring the security and resilience of our telecoms networks.

Let me turn to the new clauses and amendments. I shall start by addressing new clause 1. As the UK’s communications regulator, Ofcom already plays an important role in ensuring the ongoing security and resilience of our networks by enforcing the current security duties under the Communications Act. This Bill will build on that experience, giving Ofcom new responsibilities and a range of new powers. What the new clause would do is require it to publish an additional statement as part of its annual report. Happily, I can reassure hon. Members that the Bill already has various reporting mechanisms included within it. Under the new and snappily named section 105Z, Ofcom will need to regularly report to the Secretary of State. Subsection (4)(a) makes it clear that that report must include information on the providers’ compliance with the duties imposed on them by the Bill.

Ofcom will also need to report on telecoms security in its annual infrastructure report, and clause 11 specifies that this should include information on the extent to which providers are complying with their security duties under new sections 105A to 105D. The Secretary of State will also need to regularly report to Parliament on the effectiveness and impact of the new telecoms security framework.

On the final point in the new clause of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) about publishing information on emerging and future security risks, that is not of itself necessarily the most productive way of handling security risks, but the principle that she is trying to get to is very much part of what the Government are seeking to do and, of course, it would be part of what we intend to make sure that we talk about as much as we can within the bounds of national security.

I turn specifically to budget and resources. The hon. Member has set out her concerns about Ofcom’s access to resources and capabilities. It is an issue that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) also touched on. I can tell the House today that Ofcom’s security budget for this financial year has been increased by £4.6 million on top of its current security budget. This funding will allow Ofcom to more than double its headcount of people working on telecoms security, ensuring that it has the necessary capability and capacity to deliver its new responsibilities under the Bill. The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central is aware that I have written to the Intelligence and Security Committee about that security resourcing. It was at a level that I cannot go into on the Floor of this House, but I hope that provides the kind of reassurance that she seeks.

Specifically on the future risks that I alluded to a moment ago, we have ensured that the Bill is looking to the future. For example, clause 12(3)(b) amends Ofcom’s information-gathering powers under section 135 of the Communications Act to ensure that it can request information from providers concerning future developments in their networks that could have an impact on security and, when reporting on security, Ofcom must include any information that assists the Secretary of State in the formulation of security policy, allowing him or her to make an informed decision about what should be published as well in due course.

New clause 2 has been the subject of the majority of this debate, and rightly so. One of the phrases used about the ISC was that it adds value; this Government do not dispute for a second that it adds huge value, and I welcome the tone with which the Chairman of the ISC, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), has approached this. I appeared before the ISC with some trepidation, as is probably appropriate for all Government Ministers, but it was a hugely productive part of this process and something that I am more than happy to do again. I do not think that my right hon. Friend necessarily thinks that piecemeal changes to the ISC’s role are the way to pursue what he seeks, but the annual report that he has mentioned will certainly be looked at closely by the Government.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am very happy to agree with what the Minister has just said. It would not be necessary to keep trying to put these provisions on the face of each individual Bill every time a new unit is set up in a different Department, or a new duty laid on a different Department, if it could be agreed with the Government that the memorandum of understanding would be adjusted as it is meant to be adjusted when these changes occur. However, sadly, no Front Bencher has yet been able to give us an assurance that that is going to happen, and I know that the Minister will not be able to do so, either.

[Matt Warman]

As I say, I am sure that my right hon. Friend will make that point in the annual report, and the Government will look closely at it. However, Members can take some comfort from the fact that much of the advice in relation to the more sensitive technical and national security matters within the scope of this Bill will be provided by the National Cyber Security Centre, and its activities already fall within the scope of the ISC, as my right hon. Friend knows. However, I welcome his approach to this, and I hope that his mechanism, rather than that of new clause 2, will be the one he will support today.

I turn to the last of the new clauses tabled by Opposition Members. New clause 3 aims to include the diversification strategy in the scope of the Bill. Diversification is crucial to the future of our UK networks, which is why the Government set out their plans to diversify those networks in the 5G diversification strategy in November 2020. That strategy includes steps to invest in research and development, to remove technical and commercial barriers to entry for new suppliers, and to increase our influence in standard- setting bodies—all issues that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings and others on the ISC are keenly aware of the importance of.

We are pursuing a huge range of different mechanisms to enable diversification, because the Government are fully committed to ensuring that their strategy comes to fruition. However, the diversification strategy moves the whole market forward by broadening the supplier base in many ways that are beyond the security measures that are the purview of this Bill, including increased innovation and competition and the overall growth of the telecoms supply mechanisms.

To give the House an idea of some of the non-legislative measures that we are already pursuing, they include the investment in R&D development facilities such as the National Telecoms Lab and the SONIC—SmartRAN Open Network Interoperability Centre—lab that is jointly at work with Ofcom. We are also working to remove barriers to entry for vendors such as by co-ordinating the sunsetting of legacy network technologies, working internationally to co-ordinate diversification objectives, and exploring the use of commercial incentives to address the cost of incorporating new suppliers into a network.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 8th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Flynn]

I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Solihull (Julian Knight), although now I am really interested to know whether he prefers a curry or a pizza. When I came into the debate, I did not expect that to be the topic of discussion.

I am very conscious of time, and I know that a number of people on the Back Benches would like to make contributions to this incredibly important debate. However, I will take the opportunity to set out the SNP’s views on Lords amendments 4 and 5 and, importantly, briefly to reflect on why we are in the situation that we are in. Actually, that kind of ties in to Lords amendment 5: it is because of the mess that the Government have created in relation to Huawei.

When I first came into the House—pre-pandemic, of course—one of the biggest issues being discussed was the situation with Huawei and the flip-flopping that the Government were doing. I respectfully suggest that, in relation to Lords amendment 5, it is almost akin to the fact that they have learned nothing. There is an opportunity before them to ensure that they work with key intelligence partners, as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said, to ascertain where the biggest threat sits. But rather than take cognisance of what has been said in the other place, they are simply saying that the plan, as they have it at this moment in time, is good enough. That, from my perspective, simply does not cut it, especially, as we have heard, when some £2 billion has already been wasted on this debacle, notwithstanding the economic impact of being so many years behind in the roll-out of 5G itself. That, in many senses, covers Lords amendment 5.

On Lords amendment 4 and diversification, I will not repeat the exact detail of the amendment because that was done so eloquently by the shadow Minister, but I was a little bit surprised at what the Minister said. If I got the scope of it correctly, she was saying that Lords amendment 4 is far too narrow and would make the Government’s life too difficult. However, the amendment did not seem to suggest that when I cast my eyes on it. In fact, if I read it correctly, in the other place the Government’s position was that the framework was already sufficient, so the Government do not even seem to have clarity between the other place and this place on their actual position. I do not think that that is necessarily a surprise, because they are just looking for a reason not to back an incredibly helpful amendment.

Those are the views of the SNP on the two more contentious amendments. I look forward to the Minister perhaps providing the clarity that the Government have not been able to provide so far. I also look forward to hearing what our esteemed Back Benchers have to say on these matters.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow all the Back-Bench speeches so far.

I would like to blaze in capital letters what the Minister said:

“This is, first and foremost, a national security Bill.”

Something very similar was said when the National Security and Investment Bill—now the National Security and Investment Act 2021—was going through this House and the other place earlier this year. The Intelligence and Security Committee is, as it always has been, a non-partisan organisation. I will therefore be saying some things to please and, probably, to annoy both sides.

The Committee considered the five amendments at a recent meeting. We agreed that the entirety of Lords amendments 1 to 3 was broadly beneficial. We looked at Lords amendment 5 and we understood the temptation to flag up the importance of the Five Eyes relationship. We agreed—it is interesting how closely our deliberations, without consultation, conformed to the views of the Chairman of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Julian Knight)—that it was, as he put it, a case of gilding the lily, because whenever a serious objection is raised on security grounds by one of the Five Eyes partners, we take that with the utmost seriousness. That leaves us with Lords amendment 4. For the life of us, we cannot understand why the Government are opposing it. We believe it would strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and provide a valuable annual stocktake on the progress being made on the diversification strategy and how it is helping to improve national security. Therefore, like the Chairman of our parallel Committee, I will not be voting against Lords amendment 4 tonight.

Where does that leave us as a Committee in terms of the two Bills and the amendments thereto? You may recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, that there have been intense arguments both in this place and in the upper House about the failure of the Government to accept amendments that would allow the Intelligence and Security Committee to scrutinise closely the secret aspects that are inevitably involved in those two Bills. I will not digress on this both because I lack time and because you, Mr Deputy Speaker, would instantly call me to order. I will simply say, on ensuring that there is ISC scrutiny of the classified elements that follow from this legislation, that arguments have been advanced by the Government in the other place to say, “Well, the face of the Bill isn’t the place to do it.” We agree with that now; we are taking the Government at their word. Therefore, we have written to the National Security Adviser and asked him to take up the issue with the Prime Minister, so that the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC can be brought up to date to cater for the provisions of this Bill and the earlier Bill that should be part of our purview. That is what the Government promised in 2013 when the legislation was originally put through, for our Committee’s powers, and it is a promise that we expect them to keep.