Al-Sweady Inquiry Report

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his opening remarks. He speaks with particular authority as a former defence Minister, and I will consider what he has said about the chain of command. As we heard from his right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), a number of interlocking issues were involved. There was the judicial review and the public inquiry, and so on. However, I think that we would all want to avoid putting members of our armed forces through this process, given the time and cost that were involved in exposing an allegation—the major allegation—that turned out to be completely untrue.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I welcome the statement, and the very clear outcome of an inquiry that was far more credible because it was judge-led. When he established the Gibson inquiry, the Prime Minister said:

“For public confidence, and for independence from Parliament, party and government, it is right to have a judge-led inquiry.”

Does the Secretary of State agree with that principle, and would he like it to be extended to other inquiries into allegations of British involvement in torture?

[Michael Fallon]

I think that my hon. Friend is tempting me to stray slightly from the subject of the statement. The inquiry clearly benefited from the professionalism and skill of Sir Thayne Forbes and his team, and I think we should leave it at that.

Points of Order

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Of course, that is not a matter for me. When the hon. Gentleman asks whether “he” can advise on this or that, I assume he means me. I am sure the hon. Gentleman does not expect the Secretary of State to criticise one of his ministerial colleagues—the Secretary of State will not do that. What I would say to the hon. Gentleman, in so far as he requires my protection or advice, is that he needs to pursue his usual approach, which is to be a busy bee. He should table questions and, in a legitimate, parliamentary sense, nag. In my experience of the hon. Gentleman, he requires no encouragement to do just that.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. In exchanges on Friday, the shadow Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), told me with regard to the privatisation of Hinchingbrooke hospital in Cambridgeshire that

“when the previous Government left office there were three bidders, one of which was an NHS provider, so he really needs to get his facts straight”—[Official Report, 21 November 2014; Vol. 588, c. 575.]

I have checked the facts with the National Audit Office, the strategic health authority at the time and the press, and the three bidders still in place when the shadow Health Secretary left office were Circle, Ramsay Health Care and Serco, which are hardly NHS providers. Indeed, none of the final five was. Could you provide an opportunity, Mr Speaker, for the shadow Health Secretary to correct the record so as to avoid misleading the House on this important issue?

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. I hope he will understand if I do not wish to intrude into what is becoming a protracted debate between him and the shadow Health Secretary, who responded by e-mail to the hon. Gentleman at 1.46 pm and 23 seconds today. I just have a sense that there is an ongoing debate and dispute between the two of them and it would be unseemly for me to intrude in that continuing argument. We will leave it there.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

The hon. Gentleman will be well aware that the DSG bids are being evaluated. I will not be in a position to enlighten the House further until the evaluation has been completed.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

T5. I listened with interest to the Minister’s responses to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) about Ebola. I welcome his commitment to providing further resources, if they are needed. Given how quickly the situation can change with Ebola, how frequently will he review the need for more personnel? Has he considered training more people to deal with Ebola before they go into the field?

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Mark Francois)]

As I hope I made plain to the House, we have taken extreme care to train all the people who will be deployed to Sierra Leone to take on this difficult disease. It is important to remember that we are doing that not in isolation, but with international partners. For instance, the United States is leading in Liberia and France is leading in Guinea. We need to get more international partners to join the fight to beat this disease.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend will be aware that, when taking training to countries we partner, we put a great deal of effort into instilling what might be called the “moral component” of warfare very directly into what we teach and into what we inculcate in them. That is a very strong part of our overall offer. We can never guarantee that the people we train will not go on to do terrible things, but we can reduce the chances of that happening and make sure that the ethos we are rightly proud of in our own armed forces is exported to others.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

21. The Minister spoke about multi-departmental work, but may I press him on multilateral work? What is he doing to make sure that a priority of work with NATO and the European Union is a focus on conflict prevention?

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend takes a great interest in this and will be aware of the large number of military and civilian missions that the European Union has mounted: there are 16 in all, four of which are military. My hon. Friend will be aware of the EU training mission to Mali—EUTM Mali—and EUCAP Nestor. It is very important to understand that in all of these scenarios we have to work with partners, meaning NATO first and foremost, but other partnerships where it is expedient to do so.

Nuclear-powered Submarines

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Given the tone of the questions today, the hon. Gentleman is right that the only threat to that capability seems to come from the Scottish National party. However, I must take issue with him on the carriers. The Government who ordered the carriers without the ability to pay for planes to go on them were his Government.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

Does the Secretary of State agree with Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham and General Sir Hugh Beach that

“Nuclear weapons have shown themselves to be completely useless as a deterrent to the threats…we currently…face”,

and that

“the case is much stronger for funding our armed forces with what they need to meet the commitments actually laid upon them”?

Will he accept their expert advice?

[Mr Hammond]

I might observe that those people all have one thing in common that might make them slightly partial in this debate. I find it extraordinary that anyone can stand up in this House after 65 years of nuclear-armed peace and say that a strategic deterrent does not make people safer. The possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent has ensured this country’s safety. It ensured that we saw off the threat in the cold war and it will ensure our security in the future.

Trident

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am pleased that you are chairing the debate, Mr Gale, and that we have secured it. I regret that it will be only 30 minutes long, but we will do our best. A number of hon. Members want to intervene during my contribution, and I will be happy to take all those interventions, including from the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who possibly will not agree with one word of what I am about to say. If he can just contain his disagreement until he reaches an appropriate point of disagreeability, I will happily give way to him.

First, I should declare an interest in the debate. I am chair of the parliamentary CND group and vice-chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at national level. I have to confess to having first joined CND at the age of 15, and I remain a member, so it is a very short membership that I have had.

The subject of the debate is the cost of the Trident nuclear missile and submarine replacement. This is an issue of parliamentary accountability, costs and, of course, the relationship between vast levels of defence expenditure and our foreign policy. Huge numbers of figures can be cited, and I will cite some. Main-gate consideration of the replacement of the whole system has been delayed until 2016. By that stage, £4 billion will have been spent on the concept and assessment phases of the replacement submarine and £500 million on ordering long-lead construction items. Plans have recently been announced for spending of £2 billion at the warhead facility at Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston. That coincides with the suggestion in the recently available redacted value for money review that a decision will be taken on the warhead much sooner than previously anticipated.

This debate is therefore designed to point out the amount of money being spent, but also to ask very serious questions about when Parliament will be effectively able to scrutinise what are massive levels of expenditure on a weapon of mass destruction.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this much needed debate. He talked about the 2016 main gate. Will he welcome the fact that that has now been delayed until after the next election and that that gives his party an opportunity to take the same view that he and I share about whether it would be desirable to go ahead with the main gate at all? Perhaps even the Conservatives might join us in a triumvirate of sense.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I would be happier if we killed off the whole project straight away—but I suspect that that might not happen.

I also draw to the House’s attention the fact that the Secretary of State for Defence has announced that he has no plans to publish the Trident alternatives review, which was commissioned to please the Liberal Democrats, who went into the last election promising not a like-for-like replacement of Trident, but something different. We do not know what that something different might be. The review will not be published, which is astonishing. I hope that, when the Minister replies to the debate, he can explain why that is the case.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

13. What steps he is taking to ensure that any increase in the level of defence exports is transparent.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

19. What steps he is taking to ensure that any increase in the level of defence exports is transparent.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey)]

The UK has one of the most rigorous and transparent export control systems in the world. All applications to export controlled military goods are assessed against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria, and decisions are published in the quarterly reports on strategic export controls. Following the Arab spring, the Foreign Secretary undertook a review of export licensing for equipment that might be used for internal repression. That concluded

“that there was no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom.” —[Official Report, 18 July 2011; Vol. 531, c. 79WS.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

The Minister is, I am sure, aware of the number of cases in which there have been allegations that defence exports have ended up with people whom we would not want to have them and used for purposes that we would not want to see. He will also be aware that there are a number of cases of defence lobbyists acting in a shady and disreputable manner. Will he consider taking further steps to ensure transparency in who gets the weapons, what checks there are and how lobbyists operate?

[Nick Harvey]

The Government are committed to a thriving British defence and security industry because it is vital for our economy. It is worth more than £6 billion a year to the economy, but we will maintain strict export controls. We promote defence exports that are consistent with the criteria, because that strengthens British influence and helps support British industry and jobs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

The hon. Gentleman raises a very important issue, not least because PTSD can take many years—up to 16 years—to show itself. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has read the report of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), called “Fighting Fit”, which leads a way forward.

Things are not perfect yet, but we are going forward. We are deploying additional mental health nurses across the country in NHS hospitals and we are working closely with Combat Stress to ensure that ex-service personnel get the opportunity, through both a call line and otherwise, to get treatment as necessary. It is extremely important that they get that treatment.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

Today is world homeless day. What recent progress has the Secretary of State made in reducing the number of ex-service people who find themselves homeless?

[Mr Robathan]

This looks like my afternoon.

Although there are homeless ex-service personnel, in fact their number is much less than one might expect. Analysis has shown that those ex-service personnel who are homeless very often left the forces some 20 and more years before.

Armed Forces Bill

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Thomas Docherty]

I will be brief, as an important set of new clauses are to be discussed next and I know colleagues wish to have a full debate on them.

I have been heartened by some of the Minister’s remarks. I did not agree with all he has said, but he nevertheless offered an eloquent defence of his position. I was particularly heartened by his offering me a meeting with his ministerial colleague, the Minister for the Armed Forces, and I will be delighted to accept that offer. In turn, I am sure he will be delighted to know that the Defence Committee has decided to undertake a review of the basing decisions in the autumn. I suspect he and his colleagues will therefore eagerly anticipate appearing before the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), who chairs the Select Committee, along with his Select Committee colleagues, including myself.

Based on the assurances I have received and the good debate we have had this evening, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 7

Voluntary discharge of under-18s

‘(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 329 (Terms and conditions of enlistment and service), after subsection (3) there is inserted—

“(3A) The regulations shall make provision that any person under the age of 18 shall be entitled to end their service with a regular force by giving not less than 14 days’ notice in writing to their commanding officer, and shall ensure that any person enlisting under the age of 18 is informed of this right when they enlist.”’.—(Dr Huppert.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Temporary Chair (Dr William McCrea)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 11 —Enlistment of minors

‘(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 328(2)(c) (Enlistment) the words “without the consent of prescribed persons” are omitted.’.

[Dr Huppert]

It is a great pleasure to move this amendment in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wells (Tessa Munt), who is present. It would allow under-18s to leave the armed forces as of right, if they so wished. There have already been some discussions on this with the Minister, so I shall not detain the Committee for too long. It is an important issue, however, and a number of groups have worked hard, along with my hon. Friend, myself and others, to press for this change. I wish to note in particular the efforts of the Quakers in Britain, especially Michael Bartlet, who has spearheaded much of the awareness-raising that has led to our reaching this point.

The proposal to allow under-18s to leave as of right has also been supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I should declare that I was a member of it at the time, which may or may not be coincidental. It gave a clear recommendation that—astonishingly—fits extremely well with the amendment I am now proposing:

“We recommend that a right to discharge for under-18s be established, and that all those recruited under the age of 18 be told of this right.”

[Thomas Docherty]

The hon. Gentleman has referred several times to under-18s having a right to leave. I had the privilege of serving on the Armed Forces Bill Select Committee and we took some evidence on this matter, and I am sure the hon. Gentleman would accept that they do currently have a right to leave, but that the length of notice is different from that which he proposes.

[Dr Huppert]

They do not have the right to leave before they turn 18. After the first six months, a 17-year-old, or a 16-year-old even, does not have the right to leave. In the case of the Army, they are there for, I believe, six years after they pass that first six months. In practice, that is not necessarily enforced, but that is not the same as their having a right.

[Thomas Docherty]

I have heard the argument about five or six years before. When personnel turn 18, they have an absolute right to choose to leave at that point. I accept that, perhaps, that is not as well publicised as it might be, but this talk of their being in for five or six years is not entirely accurate.

[Dr Huppert]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point, but I think he would agree that somebody who joins on their 16th or 17th birthday currently has no right to leave, although in practice they might be allowed to, which is a slightly different issue.

Why is this an issue for under-18s? We have a whole lot of rules for under-18s: we do not allow them to vote—although many of us think that we should because they are adult enough to do that—we do not allow them to have credit cards or to enter into other legal decisions because they are not treated as adults who are able to commit themselves for such a long time; and they cannot bind themselves to a credit agreement to pay a certain sum of money the next month, except in very exceptional circumstances. They can, however, commit themselves to an extended period in the armed forces.

It is quite clear that in many cases they are allowed to leave, even though they do not have that right. It is hard to be sure, however, whether that covers every case of somebody under 18 who wishes to leave. We would not know if they were too scared to ask their commanding officer or if some other social pressures made it hard. We know that there are cases of bullying in the armed forces and although I am sure we all abhor the fact that that goes on, there are a number of such cases and it is hard to know what would happen then.

The situation is unclear, so we proposed an amendment to make it absolutely clear what was and was not allowed. I am grateful to the Minister for responding to the report produced by the Select Committee on the Bill after the amendment was tabled and after a number of discussions, parliamentary questions and so on. He has made a welcome announcement, stating that

“for those under the age of 18, the ability to be discharged will in future be a right up to the age of 18, subject to an appropriate period of consideration or cooling off.”—[Official Report, 19 May 2011; Vol. 528, c. 26WS.]

I want to place on record my thanks to the Minister for taking that step, which is very welcome to a number of the people involved. I have a few specific questions, however, and I hope that he will be able to clarify the situation for me.

First, what is this period of consideration or cooling off and roughly how long would it last? My amendment allowed 14 days’ notice; I suspect he has a different figure in mind and it would be helpful to know what it is. The second part of the JCHR’s report and of the amendment state that any person enlisting under the age of 18 should be informed of their right and I hope the Minister would agree that it would ideal for them to be told that they have it, even though he would hope that many of them would not avail themselves of it. Finally, will he update the Committee on the process as it stands? Has he given instructions that the rule should apply as of now and will people be told that there is this right? He talks about requiring secondary legislation to make such a provision, which I look forward to seeing, but when will such an instrument be laid before the House?

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

I want, briefly, to support new clause 7 and I also want to express my thanks to the Minister for his statement about improving the system. He seems somewhat surprised to get unanimous support—

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I thank the Minister for answering all my questions. My only reservation is that I hope that the time period for cooling off will not be too much longer than two weeks. Sixteen days would be absolutely fine. I look forward to seeing what the Minister says.

I also thank the Minister for his comments about adulthood at 16. I look forward to his joining our campaign to get votes at 16. That is a welcome step. He shakes his head, but I assume he really means to be supportive. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 15

Defence statistics

‘(1) The Secretary of State for Defence shall publish annual statistics on—

(a) defence spending by each Government Office Region by—

(i) equipment expenditure;

(ii) non-equipment expenditure;

(iii) service personnel costs;

(iv) civilian personnel costs; and

(b) defence spending in each local authority area by—

(i) equipment expenditure;

(ii) non-equipment expenditure;

(iii) service personnel costs;

(iv) civilian personnel costs.

(2) The Secretary of State for Defence shall publish annual estimates of national and regional employment dependent on MoD expenditure and defence exports.’.—(Angus Robertson.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Angus Robertson]

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to speak in favour of new clause 15 on defence statistics, which, for some, might appear a dry subject but which, after a strategic defence and security review and during an ongoing basing review, is quite important. It is especially important to those of us who have concerns that the way in which the Ministry of Defence has been managing its infrastructure, manning levels and spending is grossly imbalanced. We know all this because it has consistently provided parliamentary answers that show it to be true. It is true in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in a number of English regions. The worrying prospect is that the result of this basing review will confirm that many of the trends that I have raised repeatedly here, in Westminster Hall and in parliamentary questions will continue.

There are reasons to be worried. For example, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed that since the last strategic defence review in 1997, 10,000 defence jobs have been lost in Scotland. We also know that between the last strategic defence review and this current review, the gap between Scotland’s population share of defence spending and the amount of money actually spent on defence in Scotland was £5.6 billion. The underspend statistics for Wales and Northern Ireland during the same period are £6.7 billion and £1.8 billion.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Monday 14th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

They just don’t get it, do they? We do not wish to have that capability gap, but were forced to take additional risks in the defence budget because of the mess we inherited from the Labour party. I regret that and do not welcome it, but it is a risk that we have to take.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

4. What assessment he has made of the implications for his Department’s policies of proposals for further regulation of the international trade in arms; and if he will make a statement.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey)]

We strongly support proposals for an arms trade treaty. It should reduce the proliferation of conventional weapons and technology in unstable regions. By agreeing and implementing criteria that set high standards for the export of conventional weapons and technology, the Government maintain a rigorous and transparent arms export control system, whereby all export licence applications are assessed case by case against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. The arms trade treaty will better regulate the international trade in conventional weapons and contribute towards preventing conflict, which is a key interest for the Department.

[Dr Huppert]

Our Government should be congratulated on their strong role in the international arms trade treaty talks in New York last week, which will lead to a great improvement around the world. However, does the Minister accept that sales of British defence and security equipment, licensed under this Government and the previous Government, to countries such as Libya and Bahrain show that we need to take a far more careful look at our exports, as well as advising the rest of the world?

[Nick Harvey]

I agree with my hon. Friend that the progress towards an arms trade treaty is encouraging. The recent preparatory committee meeting certainly went well. As I have said, the UK maintains rigorous controls. Clearly, the changing political situation means that we will have to monitor sales to various countries far more closely. When considering future export licensing applications, we will follow the terms of the newly agreed UN arms embargo in the case of Libya. In terms of other countries, such sales have been going on for some time, as my hon. Friend said, but I am pleased to say that there have been no recent sales to Bahrain, for example.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

The hon. Gentleman asks where the £38 billion has gone; he should know; he left it behind. It was his Government who were responsible for it. We shall diminish that unfunded liability and put the Department back on a sound footing—something that Labour Members were incapable of doing.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

T2. The United Nations Secretary-General’s special representative on children and armed conflict recently reported on the Afghan national police’s recruitment of children to fight and on the sexual exploitation of young boys by Afghan police and military commanders. Given this disturbing evidence, will the Secretary of State explain what guidance is given to British military and police trainers when they encounter children in the Afghan national security forces?

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey)]

Afghan civilians must be 18 or above to join either the Afghan national police or the army. That is checked as rigorously as possible through the much-improving recruitment process. If there is any allegation of wrongdoing brought to the attention of the British forces, it will be taken extremely seriously and reported to the Afghan commanders. We would unreservedly condemn any act of abuse or brutality. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior addresses children’s rights issues and certainly recognises 18 as the age of majority. If there are any specific allegations, he should—

Trident

Julian Huppert Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on securing this excellent debate, which is generating a lot of interest. Does she agree that a key issue is that the main gate decision in 2016 should be a proper decision? There is real concern that if too much money is spent before then, the next Parliament may not have a proper decision to make. It may be trapped, as the present Parliament has been over aircraft carriers.

[Katy Clark]

The hon. Gentleman is correct, and I am delighted that he is here today, and, indeed, about the cross-party support that has been raised. An early-day motion has been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), which highlights some of the issues and the concern that contracts are being made, perhaps, in a way that goes against the spirit of undertakings made in the 2007 debate. That may mean that the decision that Parliament will take later will be tied by the amount of money already spent on the project. That is one reason for some requests that I will make of the Minister today. The first is that we should, as has been mentioned, publish the value-for-money review undertaken in 2010. Equally importantly, we need to ensure that the House has a full debate on the initial gate report and that decisions are taken with its consent.

I urge the Minister to explain some of the figures that I have cited today, particularly why the 2010-11 budget for the Trident replacement has exceeded the planned budget for the whole of the concept phase, which ran from 2006 to 2010. I urge the Government to publish an up-to-date budget for work done during the assessment phase before the main gate decision, and to say how much they plan to spend on orders for construction before the scrutiny of main gate, in view of recent statements and information provided by the Ministry of Defence. Given the clear increase in costs, it is only fair that the Government should publish the estimated full project costs in current prices, as it is clear that the information provided to the House in 2007 will no longer be accurate. Finally, I ask for a full strategic review of the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons before the main gate decision is made and orders for construction begin, and to give MPs the opportunity to debate and vote on the continuation of the programme, based on up-to-date information.

I have consented to the vice-chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), making a short contribution to the debate, and I understand that the Minister, too, has consented. I hope, Mr Benton, that you have no objection to my hon. Friend making a short contribution.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

I genuinely congratulate the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) on securing this debate.

In recent weeks, there has been quite a lot of commentary on the replacement submarine programme for Britain's independent nuclear deterrent system, often referred to as the Trident programme. Much of it was incorrect, so I welcome the opportunity to discuss the matter. I doubt whether I shall reassure the hon. Lady on every question, as there is disagreement between us on the principles involved, but I have some good news and some clarification.

Before dealing with the scrutiny of the successor systems to our current nuclear deterrent, and for the avoidance of any doubt—I answer also the points raised by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)—let me be clear about the Government’s policy on the nuclear deterrent. The first duty of any Government is to ensure the security of the people. The nuclear deterrent provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security, and has done so for more than 50 years.

The argument is often made that, because there is no immediate threat to the UK, there is no need to replace the current deterrent system; however, if history has taught us anything it is that predicting future events is difficult. We do not know how the international environment will change over the next 50 years. For example, how many people predicted the current speed and the scale of change in north Africa?

[Dr Huppert]

Will the Minister give way?

[Peter Luff]

I shall not give way. I have some important points to answer, and I do not have time to take interventions—except, of course, from the hon. Lady.

We cannot be certain that no existential threat to the UK will ever emerge. As a result, we cannot unilaterally do away with this ultimate insurance policy. That is not to say that, when the time is right, we will not move away from nuclear weapons. Our long-term goal is to have a world without them, and we will do all that we can to counter proliferation, to make progress on multilateral disarmament, and to build trust and confidence across the globe.

In our strategic defence and security review, we went further than any previous Government in giving assurances to non-nuclear members of the non-proliferation treaty that we would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. As part of that confidence-building initiative, we announced that our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling will reduce from not more than 225 to fewer than 180 by the mid 2020s. In addition, we announced that over the next few years we will cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads on board each deployed submarine from 48 to 40, that we will reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120, and that we will reduce the number of operational missiles carried to no more than eight. None the less, on 9 February, the Prime Minister said:

“I profoundly believe that we should maintain our independent nuclear deterrent. I have looked at all the alternatives over the years, and I am completely convinced that we need a submarine based alternative—a full replacement for Trident—in order to guarantee the ultimate insurance policy for this country. I am in favour of a full replacement for Trident, a continuous at-sea deterrent and making sure that we keep our guard up”—[Official Report, 9 February 2011; Vol. 523, c. 296.]

I take this opportunity on behalf of the House to pay tribute to the professionalism of all those Royal Navy and civilian personnel who answer this country’s call to operate and support this vital national capability on behalf of us all—seven days a week, 365 days a year. Last year, I visited HMS Vanguard and met some of our dedicated service personnel; I was truly impressed by their commitment. It is important that hon. Members should remember that, as we speak, those men are out there somewhere in the oceans at this very moment providing Britain’s and NATO’s ultimate security guarantee. They and their predecessors have so far provided a 42-year unbroken chain of continuous at-sea deterrence, keeping all of us and our allies safe. It is a fact of life that the current class of Vanguard submarines is ageing, yet while the nuclear threat remains we will maintain a nuclear deterrent. That is why we are continuing with a programme to replace the current deterrent.

One theme that has emerged—it emerged in the hon. Lady’s speech today—from those who do not see merit in this policy is that the Government are embarking on a programme of replacing the Trident system by stealth and that Parliament has not had the opportunity to consider the issue. That is simply not true. In 2006, the previous Administration published the White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent,” which clearly set out why the UK needed to renew its deterrent system, what options were available and how much they were likely to cost. The conclusions of the White Paper remain as valid today as they were when they were first published. That paper was scrutinised by the House of Commons Defence Committee and was debated in full in July 2007. The House voted by a significant majority to

“take the steps necessary to maintain the UK's minimum strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the existing system.”—[Official Report, 14 March 2007; Vol. 458, c. 298.]

That is exactly what we are doing.

Given the serious economic conditions that we inherited, we decided to commit ourselves to reviewing the Trident replacement programme to ensure that we were spending only the minimum necessary. That is why, in addition to the disarmament measures I have already mentioned, following the value for money review conducted last year, we announced a number of changes to the Trident replacement programme. For the submarine, this included deferring the delivery of the first boat to around 2028 and consequently deferring the main investment decision—or main gate—until 2016. I note the hon. Lady’s call for the publication of the value for money study, but I have to disappoint her. It contains a number of highly classified documents that are not suitable for release. However, all the important conclusions were published in full on page 38, paragraph 3.10 of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

We were also able to announce our intention to work more closely with industry to improve efficiency in the programme. Since that announcement, we have taken huge steps with our three key suppliers—BAE Systems, Babcock and Rolls-Royce—to develop what we now call the submarine enterprise performance programme, which has three key aims: to retain and develop our world-class design, build and support skills, which are essential for delivering the nuclear programme; to realise significant savings by improving our approach to designing, building and supporting these submarines and, by way of example, through the rationalisation of facilities and sharing of resources; and, with industry, to improve our delivery performance. I saw that for myself a few weeks ago when I visited Barrow and Furness with the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), whom I am pleased to see in his place. I was hugely impressed with what I saw and with the dedication of the work force.

The Ministry of Defence, industry and the work force have risen to this challenge, and I have seen a step change in the way in which we are working with industry to ensure that our nuclear programme is delivered successfully. All in all, the decisions we took during the SDSR allowed us to save £1.2 billion and defer a further £2 billion of expenditure over the next 10 years. I can confirm to the hon. Lady that the figures for the total cost of the programme are as quoted in paragraph 3.10 in the SDSR.

“The review has concluded that the overall cost of the submarine and warhead replacement programmes and associated infrastructure”—

the three separate parts of the programme—

“ remains within the £20 billion cost estimate foreseen in 2006 at 2006 prices.”

Therefore, the cost estimate remains valid. However, we did not say that we would do nothing until 2016. As for the reference to the delay of the Astute programme, I have to say that we have learned our lesson the hard way—if one stops doing something it costs a lot to start doing it again. That is the root of the problem and a mistake that we must not make again with its successor.

Let me stress again that we did not say that we would do nothing until 2016. We must be clear about the scale and challenge of this project. A submarine designed to carry the nuclear deterrent ranks with the space shuttle as one of the most complex engineering feats in the world. The submarine has a nuclear reactor; nuclear weapons; steam systems; hydraulic systems; electrical and electronic systems; and computing systems, as well as tactical weapons and sensors. It needs to sustain its crew while remaining submerged and undetected for months on end. It is a tremendous challenge to bring those complex components together, and we have an enormous programme of work to complete if we are successfully to see the delivery of the first boat in around 2028. The first significant milestone in this process is the so called “initial gate” investment point.

At initial gate, we will agree the broad outline design of the submarine and some of the component designs, including the propulsion system, and set out the programme of work we need to complete so that we are ready to start building the first submarine in 2016. We will also agree the amount of material and parts—and for which boats—we will need to buy in advance of the main investment decision, and yes, that will include steel. However, we are not planning to procure any such items for the fourth boat at this point.

The precise value of the steel and the other long-lead items will depend on the final initial gate approval, but it is likely to amount to around £500 million, some way short of the £1 billion that the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) has cited in the past. There is nothing unusual in that; it is normal practice for most large procurement programmes.