Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJulian Huppert
Main Page: Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat - Cambridge)Department Debates - View all Julian Huppert's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI should add that I wish the House to agree to amendment (a).
Clause 151 defines what amounts to a “miscarriage of justice” for the purposes of compensation under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. There has been much debate about the clause, both here and in the House of Lords, and I am indebted to all who have contributed to examining this important issue. The Government have taken account of all the points that have been made and all the concerns that have been expressed, and our position has changed as a result of the very good debates that have taken place in Committee here as well as in the House of Lords.
I was pleased to note that Members of both Houses and members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights agreed with us that that the current definition set out by the divisional court in the case of Ali was not clear enough, that we needed to legislate for a clear definition of a miscarriage of justice given the ongoing uncertainty and reinterpretation of definitions by the courts, and that our aim was not to seek to restrict compensation, but to provide clarity. The question that remains before us is how it can be determined whether someone has suffered a miscarriage of justice.
This is indeed a complex issue. When a case is properly brought to court—that is, when there is evidence of a crime on which it is right to ask a jury to adjudicate—there is no miscarriage of justice when the result of the trial is an acquittal, or even in very many of the cases in which a guilty verdict is later quashed as unsafe. The Government believe that a miscarriage of justice arises only when there is in existence a fact which entirely exonerates the accused: in other words, a fact which makes it unquestionable that the accused did not commit the crime. In such cases, it is only the ignorance of this fact that allowed the accused to be convicted in the first place. What we are seeking to define is something far more than merely a failure in the investigative or trial processes. We are seeking to define a clear miscarriage of justice which is—and, in our view, can only be—the wrongful conviction of the innocent.
Our aim is to create an unambiguous statutory description of such a situation for the purposes of compensation. The fact that the definition inserted in the Bill by Lords amendment 112 is open to various interpretations is obvious from the significant number of judicial review cases awaiting consideration by the administrative court—13 at present—in which the aim is to challenge the Secretary of State’s application of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Adams. That number excludes the three cases that are awaiting judgment from the challenge to the divisional court’s decision in respect of Ali and others, which was heard by the Court of Appeal last December. A test similar to the “Adams test”—the definition that is at the heart of all these cases—is the test that is now being proposed in Lords amendment 112.
It is vitally important for us to ensure that the definition that is introduced into statute for the first time is “fit for purpose”. It must be clear and robust enough to avoid the need for further judicial interpretation, and, as far as possible, to limit the scope for argument about what will amount to a miscarriage of justice. The amendment that we propose would leave applicants in no doubt: if the new fact that led to their conviction being quashed showed that they did not commit the offence—for example, if it were shown that they had been somewhere else at the time, if someone else was proved to be the perpetrator, or if the courts acknowledged that no offence had in fact been committed—they would have suffered a miscarriage of justice, and would be likely to be compensated.
Will the Minister explain to those of us who are not lawyers what the difference is between the Government’s original wording and the wording of the amendment that they are now proposing?
I join my hon. Friend in that state of grace of not being a lawyer. The difference is that we have removed the word “innocent”. There was, I think, a feeling that the original Government proposal required people to prove their innocence, which, of course, would alter the presumptions that lie at the heart of the criminal justice system. That is what could be described as the non-legal significant difference, which is none the less a significant difference.
My hon. Friend makes a good point. I well recall the horrific case in her constituency. I do regret the fact that the Government did not accept what were reasonable suggestions on that issue. I hope we will be able to return to them in future, because we have seen some awful attacks, against children in particular but also against adults. This is something we will have to deal with in future.
We have reservations about some of the Lords amendments, but all in all we are glad that the Government have accepted them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply to some of my queries when he sums up.
There is a huge range of issues to cover in this group of amendments. I will not even try to touch on them all, but will talk about a few that I am particularly concerned about and have raised on a number of occasions.
This Bill started with pre-legislative scrutiny. It is telling, to me at least, that quite a number of the amendments made in the other place were originally recommended during pre-legislative scrutiny. Perhaps if the Government looked at pre-legislative scrutiny earlier, we might get there somewhat faster. With that in mind, I particularly welcome the changes to the injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance, or IPNA—the issue that has received perhaps the most attention—in Lords amendments 1 to 5. This is a welcome change, and I pay great tribute to my hon. Friend the Minister for his work in getting us to this place.
During the pre-legislative scrutiny, the Home Affairs Select Committee said there was a risk that the provisions could be interpreted as being too broad. The Minister has quite rightly described why some of the stories that were going round—for example, about how carol singing would be prevented—were simply not true but were good debating points. We made it clear that we had real concerns with the provisions as they stood. I am pleased that, as a result of the changes in the other place, we now have something that is much more proportionate. We have moved away from causing nuisance and annoyance in the general sense to something more serious. That is definitely right, because all of us are quite capable, I am sure, of causing nuisance or annoyance to people on various occasions.
Order. I think we go through the Chair.
I was somewhat surprised by the original amendment passed in the other place, which was backed by many, including Labour peers, because it wrote into law discrimination that I would not be happy with. We have rules about behaviour that is unfair—behaviour that is too harsh—but I was really surprised to see an amendment that said there should be one set of rules for people in social housing and a completely different set of rules for people in private housing. If someone’s behaviour is causing problems that are sufficiently serious to be dealt with under the Bill, the form of tenure should not matter. I was very disappointed by that amendment and very pleased that the Government corrected it. What we now have corrects that problem and I am happy to support it, because I would not have been able to support the previous version from the Lords.
Just for the record, the proposal for a tenure-neutral approach in fact came from Labour Lords.
I do not have the list of exactly who proposed what. The Government amendment we have is neutral; the one that Labour peers supported in the other place was not tenure-neutral. I hope the hon. Gentleman agrees that that was a flaw in it, although the other principle was there.
I welcome the change, although I remain surprised by the position of the Opposition, who felt that the version that left this place was both too draconian and too liberal. I am glad that their position has moved in a more liberal direction. The new approach is far better than the failed system of ASBOs, which many young people collected as a badge of honour. A huge number of people broke them; they simply did not work. I think that this non-criminalising approach will work much better.
Let me turn now to some of the other issues. Lords amendment 10 is important and concerns the principle that we should not be using these rules to throw children out of their own homes. The Lords pushed for that, and it is a shame that we did not manage to get it fixed in this place. The importance of care for the under-18s should have been emphasised more strongly during the Bill’s earlier stages, and I am glad that it has been emphasised more strongly now. This is another of the issues that were dealt with by the Home Affairs Committee. I am also pleased that Lords amendment 11 proposes the removal of clause 13, because it discriminated on the basis of tenure.
Lords amendments 23 and 24 deal with the rights of free expression and free assembly. The Home Affairs Committee recommended that we should ensure that dispersal powers were not used in a way that could damage those rights. Before my hon. Friend became a Minister in this Department, the Government moved some of the way towards this, and I am glad that he has now been able to persuade them to move the whole way, so that we can protect all forms of free expression and free assembly.
Lords amendments 59 to 64 deal with cases of riot. Riot is of course very serious, and we have already seen what it can lead to in this country. As a result of what happened, the Prime Minister said that he wanted stronger powers to deal with the families of people who were rioting. Many of us felt that, although we could understand the tensions that existed at the time, his suggestion went too far. It did not seem appropriate to throw everyone out of a house because a 16-year-old child had committed a minor offence where a riot was happening. I do not in any sense condone either the riot or the behaviour, but throwing an entire family out of their home seems to be a disproportionate response. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Minister for his work in this regard, which has led to the proposal that an automatic eviction should take place only if the offence is committed by an adult, and only if it is a serious, indictable offence. A trivial offence that happened to be committed near a riot would not lead to such an eviction; nor would an offence committed by a child.
Finally, let me raise two issues that we had very little time to discuss during our initial debates in this House, and that were not particular topics of interest at that stage. The first involves surveillance and the Terrorism Act 2000. Lords amendment 102 and related amendments deal with the powers of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to deal with complaints about the surveillance commissioners and their decisions. The IPT does not necessarily work as well as it needs to, and it is not as transparent and open as it needs to be, but I am glad that we are taking a step towards more transparency. Surveillance oversight is an extremely important subject, and the Bill does not finish what we need to do about it. There is much more to be done, but although the amendments represent just a tiny piece of the jigsaw, I welcome them.
Lords amendment 100 and related amendments deal with schedule 8, which amends schedules 7 and 8 to the Terrorism Act. Schedule 7 became very topical at the time of the detention of David Miranda. I am pleased that, after a great deal of argument in this House, we have managed to get some changes made in the House of Lords. People must be questioned within an hour of detention, reviews must take place within two hours of that, and people’s right to consult a solicitor is made clear. That fundamental right was omitted by the Terrorism Act when it was passed by the last Government. There is much more to be done about that as well, but I am very pleased with all the amendments. I commend the Minister and his team for their work, and look forward to our passing the amendments promptly.
I agree with the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) that it is a shame that the Government did not take more account of the pre-legislative scrutiny, relying instead on the other place. I accept that all too often, whichever Government are in play, the electoral arithmetic ensures that legislation is rushed through and guillotined here in the House of Commons, and some sensible suggestions are then made in the House of Lords, many of which—as in this instance—we end up not seeking to oppose. Given the relative paucity of legislation in the House of Commons over the next 15 months, I hope that we will pay the House a little more respect, and ensure that whatever Bills come before us during the fifth year of this five-year Parliament are given proper scrutiny.
I support what the Government are doing in Lords amendments 40, 41 and 44 to 47, which relate to public bodies that can issue a public spaces protection order. That has particular resonance in my constituency, and I am glad that a number of friends—in the broadest sense—of the City of London corporation in another place were able to make some important changes. Numerous other bodies which operate open spaces under local Acts—such as the Wimbledon and Putney commons conservators, to name but two of them—will also benefit from what the Government are doing. The proposed new clause would enable bodies other than local authorities administering open spaces under byelaws to use public spaces protection orders. I believe this is particularly relevant to trustees or local conservators who operate under byelaws inferred by private Acts of Parliament, many of which go back not just many decades but some centuries. I hope the Minister agrees with that point.
The City of London corporation operates some of the most important open spaces in London and the south-east, including Epping forest and Hampstead heath. There are also important local authority parks. In Newham there is West Ham park and there is Queen’s park in the London borough of Brent. It was often under private Acts of Parliament, frequently through bequests of what were the curtilage of large mansion houses, that these local parks and amenities were founded, often back in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Conservators have exactly the same issues as local authorities in terms of the public open spaces they administer, so it is sensible to include these places in order not to have duplication but to ensure there is not an opportunity for some of these powers to slip through the net. Conservators are not required to use the orders, and they can keep to the local byelaws if they so wish. If they do make an order, however, and the local authority for the area makes its own, the local authority’s order will take precedence. That is right.
These clauses are sensibly drafted. The powers of the City of London corporation would not in any way usurp those of the relevant local authority, but this does provide a belt-and-braces approach to ensure there is a proper focus on public order within those important open spaces.
I wish the Minister and Government well in getting this change into the Bill and I hope there will be no opposition from any corner of this House.