UK Trade and Investment Strategy

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2019 Westminster Hall

[Philip Davies (in the Chair)]

Before I call Julia Lopez to move the motion, the eagle-eyed among you may have noticed that I have decided that jackets may be removed for this debate.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered UK trade and investment strategy.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies, and to see some colleagues here; I must admit that, with all the anticipation of the morning, I was expecting to see tumbleweed rather than MPs in the Chamber.

By the time the morning is out, we will know who has the honour of being our next Prime Minister. The challenges ahead of that person will be profound, but so will the opportunities to reshape this great nation. Precisely 100 days will lie ahead of them until 31 October, when the extension to our EU membership expires. Each of those days will have to be used to prepare the UK’s people and businesses for any eventuality and to move forward with confidence, intent and gritty resolve into our next chapter. In so doing, we must articulate a clear vision of our place in the world, at the heart of which must be both a coherent global trading strategy and a package of measures that demonstrate to international investors our determination to be one of the most dynamic, stable, open and innovative democracies in the world.

I intend to use the debate to press the Minister on what he sees as the Department for International Trade’s role in those 100 days; to present some thoughts about our trade and investment strategy from the two years I have served on the International Trade Committee; and to raise the profile of DIT as it prepares to take on a more central role after three years in the back room, showing how the right trade and investment strategy can deliver prosperity to the people we represent.

Formed straight after the referendum as one of the new Brexit Departments, DIT has faced the ongoing challenge of being excluded from the Brexit process, which has been driven by the Department for Exiting the European Union, the Cabinet Office and No. 10, leaving it vulnerable to the decisions and delays of others. That has stifled proper debate about the extent to which any terms agreed with the EU will limit our ability to devise an independent global trading strategy. Accounting for the threat of the backstop and the long-term view to mirror the EU’s rules via a so-called common rulebook, the Department has had to plan for everything from protracted EU negotiations that limit our room to manoeuvre to the complete freedom and vulnerability of a no-deal situation.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way so early. I may have misheard her, but I think she referred to the need to counter the threat of a backstop. The backstop is there to guarantee the Northern Ireland peace process. Unless I misheard her, can she explain why she sees that as a threat?

[Julia Lopez]

No party wants the backstop to come into place, because we hope there will be a free trade agreement in its place, but the hon. Gentleman will be well aware that there is much concern that the backstop will tie us into rules and regulations that hamper our ability to achieve the aims that the Brexit process was intended to achieve.

Inevitably, the dilemma I outlined has constrained DIT’s ability to determine what might be offered to non-EU trading partners in any roll-over agreements or future negotiations. Perhaps all that is understandable and to some extent inevitable, given the complexity of extracting ourselves from a 40-year relationship. However, in the absence of a strong DIT voice in the Brexit process, there has been a failure to understand the potential trade-offs in the withdrawal agreement and how rapidly the rest of the world is moving on. There has also been a vacuum of informed parliamentary debate on our global trading future, leaving MPs to veer wildly from visions of chlorinated chicken and the bargain basement sale of the NHS to naïve declarations about the speed, value and impact of new free trade agreements.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on securing this timely debate. She mentioned that Parliament in particular has not really debated these issues. Actually, we have. I put it to her that the Government have not been clear about what sort of trade deals, and how many, they have agreed around the world. Perhaps she can give us an answer.

[Julia Lopez]

I am not entirely sure I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. Does he want to know why the Government have not been clear about how many trade agreements they have secured?

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

indicated assent.

[Julia Lopez]

Well, at the moment the Government are not able to enter into negotiations on FTAs, but they are able to try to agree roll-overs of those deals. As I set out, the problem for the Department has been that it does not quite know what scope it has to negotiate those roll-overs, so partners have been waiting to see what is eventually negotiated with the EU to know what negotiating leverage they have over us. That leaves the Department in a rather difficult position, and that has had an impact on our ability to roll over trade agreements.

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

If the hon. Lady has looked at the news this morning, she will know that Canada and India, for a start, are not at this stage prepared to enter into a trade deal with the British Government.

[Julia Lopez]

I am not entirely sure I heard that—I do apologise.

The state of unreality we have got into in our trade debate must end now, not least because it undermines our credibility as a negotiating partner. It is time to decide our desired trading destiny, work out how we get there and then determine how to maximise our leverage along the way. If we are honest, we all want trade with the EU to remain virtually untouched at the same time as we open up new market opportunities. We want to acquire the right to regulate and tax as we please, and we would like to stop club membership rules such as freedom of movement. That is what the EU would term a “cake and eat it” strategy.

Boiling down the last three years, they have largely been about what price tag the EU wants to place on that goal and whether such a prospect is even for sale. In effect, the EU’s answer has been that no such deal is on offer and that we must instead pay to leave, tie ourselves into the EU’s regulatory sphere without a place at the table and wait to see whether we are granted any freedom to diverge. Unless we can find a middle ground between those positions, we will be walking away from the counter, which will introduce trade frictions and potentially tariffs into our relationship. It is important that we deal rapidly with the consequences of doing that, and DIT will have to be put front and centre of that task.

Earlier this month, when the International Trade Secretary appeared before the Select Committee, I was staggered to learn that DIT had apparently played so small a role in advance of the 29 March and 12 April deadlines for our leaving the EU. Overnight, we could plausibly have been left with no formal trading arrangements with the EU to allow for the continuation of tariff-free exchange. Indeed, that remains a very real prospect. Yet when I asked whether DIT had had any discussions within Government about drafting a simple framework for a future FTA to offer the EU at that juncture, the Secretary of State advised that the responsibility was DExEU’s, and that there would be little point in tabling an offer because the EU would simply reject it.

I do not want to open a debate about the contentious World Trade Organisation article 24 process and the likelihood of the EU agreeing to such a mechanism to maintain tariff-free trade. However, surely we can at least agree, because both the EU and the UK have said so, that at some point in the future—either immediately or after some time—the two parties will want to strike a free trade agreement. Why, therefore, have the Government not yet drafted an outline of how they would like such an agreement to look, and why is DIT being squeezed out of this important conversation? I have also heard surprising reports about how little the Government have utilised our expensive chief trade negotiator in our Brexit negotiations. The under-utilisation of DIT’s resource has been a strategic mistake.

In the next 100 days, we must prioritise the close working, if not the merger, of DIT and DExEU, such that our future relationship with the EU is seen in the wider context of what we are trying to achieve in trade. EU-UK trade, of course, will be a vital strand of our future prosperity, but it will not be the only strand. The past three years have been defined by aggressive lobbying by companies and organisations that would benefit most from everything staying the same. That is understandable, but we are not giving equal airtime to the costs of ongoing alignment.

To give a couple of examples, the Select Committee has heard from experts that the EU regulation concerning the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals is so onerous and expensive that all the fastest-growing developing markets are looking at adopting the non-EU model of chemicals regulation. Other experts advise that the EU’s hazard-based approach to farming standards excludes important technological advancement that could reduce the environmental impact of farming.

We must seek immediately to draft a generous framework document for an EU-UK FTA alongside a series of explicitly temporary stop-gap continuity agreements with third countries that would allow diagonal cumulation of rules of origin with pan-Euro-Mediterranean countries. At the same time, we need to return to DIT’s proposed no-deal tariff schedule and think carefully about how it can best provide leverage in any negotiation with the EU.

The Secretary of State assured our Committee that his Department would have adequate resource on 1 November to begin simultaneous negotiations on FTAs with Australia, New Zealand and the US. There is no doubt that that could introduce useful pressure and urgency to maintain a good relationship with the EU. However, we must be careful not to fetishise FTAs or to oversell what they can achieve and how quickly.

I was particularly pleased last week to see my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson) manage expectations about a US deal. The US are notoriously tough trade negotiators, with in effect two negotiating partners in the Administration and in Congress, and there is a limit to what can be achieved given the breadth of matters decided at sub-federal level. None the less, as the Minister for Trade Policy, my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley (George Hollingbery), advised our Committee last week, given the breadth and depth of our trading links with the US, even a relatively shallow agreement could reap substantial rewards.

Our North American trade commissioner, Antony Phillipson, set out to the Department this month his strategy for US-UK trade. I would be grateful if the Minister gave us an overview of what was said, particularly on how we intend to build a strong relationship at state level and whether we have the right resources to do so. The parliamentary mandate for opening formal US-UK trade talks and ongoing parliamentary scrutiny of negotiations will be critical if such a deal is not to fall at the final hurdle or to be brought down by misinformation campaigns.

The Secretary of State is proud that the public consultation on the deal was one of the largest such exercises ever undertaken. However, I noted that of the158,000 responses on a US-UK FTA, 152,000 were individual campaign emails and only 234 responses came from businesses. I fear that that may be indicative of a 38 Degrees-style effort to cause alarm about the future of the NHS or reduced animal welfare standards: two matters on which Ministers have already offered countless assurances.

We can do plenty beyond the US-UK FTA that will be less contentious and arguably reap benefits more quickly. Amid the important debate about the future of our fishing industry and sheep farmers, we overlook the fact that our economy is most heavily dependent on our world-beating financial and professional services. The FPS sector remains key to our ongoing prosperity, with its exports more than double those of any other sector. Our strength in this area far exceeds that of any other European financial centre. Meanwhile, over 30% of the trade value added in the UK’s manufacturing sector comes from services.

There are no guarantees in the withdrawal agreement of preferential access to the EU market for our critical service industries, and many in the City are now questioning whether we really want an enhanced equivalence deal that would leave us subject to the whims of EU regulators. The EU should have understood some time ago that growth in financial services is beyond Europe, with London business as likely to be lost to Singapore and New York as to Frankfurt, Paris or Dublin if it tries to diminish the City’s competitiveness. Nonetheless, it seems likely to impose tougher recognition requirements on us. Instead of responding with mercantilist reciprocity, we must seek quickly to demonstrate that markets can trade with one another without needing to regulate each other.

The best way of testing such a model could be an ambitious global financial partnership with Switzerland, which is having plenty of its own difficulties with the EU following the expiration of its equivalence regime. A dynamic Swiss-UK agreement including right of market access, mutual recognition and regulatory co-operation could set a gold standard in future services agreements that could in time be rolled out to other important financial hubs. That will require a more involved regulator, the active co-operation of the Treasury and the engagement of professional bodies to allow for recognition of qualifications.

That is where DIT’s role as convenor will become so important. The Department has established a network of new trade diplomats who sit within embassies to identify market access issues, build commercial relationships and triage problems among relevant Departments. I recommend that in key services markets we add to their number representatives from our own financial regulators, copying the example of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which has offices around the globe, in recognition of the fact that services deals are as much about regulator-to-regulator as Government-to-Government co-operation.

A gold standard financial services agreement could be complemented by gold standard FTAs with New Zealand and Australia. I have said many times that these are not the biggest markets, but in both we have willing partners who can help advance our wider global trading agenda. They have experience in big and growing Asian markets. There is complementarity of language, culture and legal systems and an appetite to co-operate on quality food production, retail, healthcare, FinTech, defence and education. Meanwhile, at the WTO we can work together to embed important work on e-commerce and reinforce the multilateral rules-based system.

Plenty of diplomatic work can be done to enhance other trading relationships without needing an immediate FTA, though FTAs can be incredibly useful in providing momentum and focus. The Minister for Trade Policy talked at the Select Committee about the staggering size of the Chinese cosmetics market, which we find hard to access due to Chinese rules that require animal testing. If work could be done to demonstrate the quality and provenance of UK goods, such additional market access could be worth in the region of $10 billion. That would overshadow the benefits of most FTAs with smaller countries.

The Institute of Directors talked of similar barriers to trade for UK engineers, architects and planners over Chinese design licences. Seemingly intractable market barriers in China can sometimes be lifted quickly in response to citizens’ concerns, particularly in areas such as food and healthcare, where a demand for high-quality international products followed a series of consumer scandals.

DIT can not only flag such barriers and work with diplomats to remove them but highlight to our domestic businesses what kinds of opportunities are out there. The Secretary of State spoke last week about how DIT has helped a Cumbrian milk producer attend a trade fair in China that opened business to him worth hundreds of thousands of pounds.

It is important that we spot legislative developments, too. To give one example, Indonesia is to demand sharia compliance of financial products by 2025. With London one of the few financial centres with expertise in the field, our insurers and financiers could steal a march in this huge market. At the latest belt and road summit in April, the Chinese state pledged to put no more capital into belt and road initiative projects, capping the level at which Chinese banks can fund each project. That change of approach could open new opportunities to UK legal advisers, financiers and construction firms.

We need to empower the Department to do even more of that work. That will require skilled personnel. I was delighted to see the launch of DIT’s new training scheme last week for trade negotiators and diplomats. We need to leave them in post long enough to develop the long-term relationships and market knowledge that reap dividends. There is currently too much churn, which is particularly problematic in markets such as China, where guanxi—relationship building with provincial governments—is key.

In advance of this debate, I was sent a briefing by the Open World Research Initiative, a collaboration between 15 UK universities, which is calling for a chief Government linguist to embed language policy across Government. That is a great idea. Technology is moving on at pace in this area, but to understand a language and its nuances is to gain deeper cultural understanding and stronger relationships in future markets of importance.

I would also like us to soup up the work of our international chambers of commerce as well as long-term, party-to-party political relationship building. I have spoken before about how good Germany is at that through its Stiftung model, which operates almost as a political diplomatic service, and its very activist chambers of commerce have presence not just in capitals but in important regional centres. We must bear in mind that some of these big Asian cities are prominent economic actors in their own right, often larger than small European countries.

Going forward, I want to see DIT work much more closely with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development to merge our international output into a coherent strategy. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Greg Hands) highlights frequently, the strength of our voice on trade is fundamental to our relevance as a respected actor on the international stage.

I was pleased to see yesterday the announcement that DIT will be able to access the overseas aid budget to link our trade and aid work much more closely. In that vein, the Government should work with and challenge the City of London to become the sustainable development finance hub of choice, cementing its position as the go-to financial centre for Africa and south Asia’s gateway to global capital markets.

DIT also has a big role to play domestically. One of the problems facing UK business is not a lack of demand for their products but a reticence in bidding for international contracts and a real nervousness about exporting. DIT has been addressing that with energy and creativity, but such work is not given the prominence it deserves. The export toolkit launched last week is an attempt by the Department to give MPs responsibility for identifying businesses and projects in their constituencies that could benefit from export and inward investment opportunities.

DIT is uniquely placed to know how to make our domestic market attractive to the kind of inward investment that creates jobs, adds value and increases tax take here in the UK. Its end-to-end service for international investors is important, but we must also look at a single window for business registration and investment information. Similarly, it is vital that we keep an eye on the competition, because the trade promotion bodies of France, Germany and Spain are stepping up their game.

There is already a business environment advisory team that flags barriers on skills, migration, tax and development, and I would like to see its work given more prominence so that we can make the UK one of the most attractive, tax-competitive markets in the world. It should also look at how we give our financial regulators an explicit competition mandate to embed our dominance in financial services. Work must be done with the Home Office to break the link between long-term labour migration and mode 4, so that our desire to control immigration numbers does not hamper the ability of companies to move key personnel.

We must be equally alert to investment that is against our national interest. There is a big difference between greenfield foreign direct investment that creates jobs, embeds skills and generates long-term tax revenue in the UK and speculative investment—the use of these shores to park dodgy money or the strategic purchase of critical assets accelerated by the cheap pound.

I was horrified to see the exposé in The Sunday Times of the tier 1 investor visa, and I am similarly concerned about the security implications of allowing critical infrastructure to be foreign-owned. Our Committee is likely to recommend improved modes of data collection on FDI, so that we can better sort the wheat from the chaff and get a more accurate sense of investment trends.

We have perhaps suffered from the naivety in recent years that all inward investment is good investment, fearful that if we clamp down on flows into the UK, people will think we are closing in on ourselves. Australia and Singapore take a much more robust approach to property and infrastructure investment—particularly that affecting national security—and that does not seem to detract from their reputations as open economies. I ask that we look at the Australian model of a foreign investment review board, which rarely sees sales blocked but can add conditions to any investment, and which applies caution over foreign influence. I am pleased that the Government are already reviewing our approach via the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy White Paper on investment that was launched in July 2018, and I would be grateful if the Minister updated us on that work.

As I said in my introduction, the next 100 days will be critical in addressing some of the strategic errors made in the Brexit process over past three years, and the Department for International Trade must play a full role in that work. It is frustrating that so little progress has been made in determining the future EU-UK trading relationship, but DIT has now had three years to establish opportunities, expand networks, and increase trade expertise, so that it is ready to go. Now is the time for the Department to be unleashed so that we can draw up a trading strategy that will grow our economy, entrench our values on the world stage, and deliver exciting exporting and value-adding investment opportunities to each and every corner of our United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

I do not doubt what the hon. Gentleman says, but that leads on to something else I was going to mention. If anything is seen to be quintessentially British, I do not have a problem with our sticking a Union flag and a picture of Big Ben—the Elizabeth tower, as it is now—on it and selling it to the world on the basis of its Britishness. I do not have an issue with that. We sell according to the strong point.

But who in their right mind is going to market British whisky with a Union flag on it? Who on earth thinks that that is a strong brand? Who is going to talk about selling British haggis? Haggis is not British; haggis is Scottish. If we stick a saltire on it, it sells better and more quickly. Who came up with these ideas? In the same way, to sell Cornish pasties we put “Cornish” on them; we do not call them “British pasties”. We might put a wee British flag on it, just to remind people the Cornwall is still part of the United Kingdom.

There are a lot of national and regional identities, particularly associated with food and drink, in the United Kingdom, and the producers rightly are intensely proud of the reputation that Welsh lamb or Irish dairy products have, for example. Why on earth would anybody want to stop marketing Irish butter and Irish cheese as Irish and start trying to invent a different brand for it as British? Why would people choose to sell quintessentially English products as not being English?

[Julia Lopez]

One of the most wonderful receptions I went to when we were on a trade trip to the WTO in Geneva was the British ambassador’s reception, where they promoted and showcased all the wonderful produce of Scotland—particularly whisky, but also other things. What positive strategy can the hon. Gentleman set out for how the Scottish National party’s devolved Administration and the SNP representation here in Westminster will try to participate in the trade promotion of their own products?

[Philip Davies (in the Chair)]

Order. Before the hon. Gentleman replies, let me say that Front Benchers traditionally have 10 minutes in these debates. Because of the time allowed, I have given quite a bit of latitude, but he is now up to double that time. Can I urge him to wind himself down so that we can move on to the other Front-Bench speeches?

--- Later in debate ---

[Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)]

It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I congratulate the hon. Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez) on her thorough speech. In her stout advocacy for the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), whom she mentioned more than once in the course of her remarks—

[Julia Lopez]

Only once.

[Bill Esterson]

Was it only once? It felt like so much more—I cannot think why.

The hon. Lady called for the merger of the Department for International Trade and DExEU. I wonder where the Minister might fit in the brave new world of the new combined Department—whether, indeed, he has a place in it. I wondered also whether the hon. Lady’s challenges to him were part of his job application for one of the roles among the new Ministers. Perhaps how well he does in that job application will depend on his responses to her questions.

I agree with the hon. Lady about the need for a coherent and global world trade strategy that is attractive to investors. We probably diverge a bit after that point, but we agree about the importance of a strong trade and investment strategy.

The folly of the Government’s strategy—or lack of one—was shown in the comments of their Canada trade envoy, who set out the stupidity of publishing zero tariff schedules. It is now pointless for the Government of Canada to spend time negotiating an agreement with us, as it will not be better than the deal that we have already unilaterally given away. Zero tariffs mean opening up to importers with no guarantee of anything in return. An effective strategy would, of course, ensure the best market access to our main trading partners and build confidence among investors.

We are about to have a new Prime Minister—I am assuming it will be the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip—who advocates a no-deal Brexit and is keen on the idea of undermining our economic relationship with our nearest neighbours and a trading bloc that accounts for well over half of our trade, either directly or through agreements with 70 countries to which we are party through our membership of that critical trading bloc. It is madness to be considering no deal. It is the opposite of the robust, considered and credible strategy that is needed. It is an act of economic self-destruction, and Parliament must do all in its power to prevent such an outcome.

Investors want us to have the best access to the EU, and so does the Labour party. Businesses need frictionless trade and regulatory alignment, and so do workers. The prospect of no deal is causing enormous damage, as businesses and investors wait or decide to move elsewhere while we delay. No deal must be ruled out. It is in our strategic interest to do so, and it is what business organisations and trade unions are calling for.

The fall in inward investment shows what is happening as a result of the lack of certainty. There has been a massive fall in investment projects and new job creation, while the number of jobs saved through investment has fallen by nearly 80%. The number of foreign direct investment projects has also dropped sharply. On the point about uncertainty, Kent County Council said in its evidence to the International Trade Committee that there is no doubt that the UK’s reputation has been significantly damaged by Brexit-related uncertainty.

The British Chambers of Commerce says that we lack consistency in provision of trade support for both imports and exports, and ADS draws attention to the poor funding of the British presence at trade shows; other countries have much larger pavilions and a more coherent national offer to prospective customers. They also give a strong signal that the Government back their domestic sector. The Society of Maritime Industries made the same point in its evidence to the International Trade Committee. It submitted a photograph of the German pavilion, which was much larger than the neighbouring British pavilion. It asked: which country’s message is more effective—the simple “Made in Germany” in large letters or “Innovation is GREAT” in much smaller letters? It also asked which pavilion made the companies more attractive to visit. It was in no doubt that its German competitors had better support. Our reputation has been damaged through Brexit incompetence. There is a lack of support for exporters, and no sign anywhere of a strategy for trade and investment.

To succeed in international trade, we must align our domestic and international strategies. That means delivering on the Government’s stated aim of moving to a zero-carbon economy. Labour recognises the benefits to be had in jobs and prosperity from investing in the $26 trillion global opportunity of moving to a zero-carbon world. That figure comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

The Government say that they are committed to net zero by 2050. However, that does not stack up when we remember that we are funding fossil fuel development overseas; 99.4% of UK Export Finance provision in the energy sector went on fossil fuel development in places such as oil refineries in Bahrain. Just £1 million was spent on renewables, but £4.8 billion went on oil and gas. Raiding the international development budget—something announced yesterday by the Secretary of State—is not the answer. We should use aid to help developing nations, not to give further support to the fossil fuel industry.

UK Export Finance should be helping with the development of renewables; otherwise, we are just exporting our emissions to the developing world and elsewhere, as of course is the case when we do not include emissions from shipping and air freight in our carbon reduction targets. The emissions do not go away as if by magic just because we pretend they are not part of our carbon footprint. Christian Aid rightly says that the support for fossil fuels is incoherent. We have world-leading marine technology in tidal energy. Where is the focus on renewable energy at the heart of an exciting and financially rewarding export strategy?

Under article 2(c) of the Paris agreement, the Government’s policy priority should be:

“Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”

The figure of 99.4% going to fossil fuels from UK Export Finance is the exact opposite of the stated policy of our Government. As Global Witness told the Select Committee, UK Export Finance should measure the greenhouse gas impact of the projects it funds. The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation adopted a greenhouse gas cap for its projects in 2007, and it is no surprise that it has shifted towards clean energy investments. If the private sector in the United States can do that, why cannot we? Labour believe we can.

Global Witness says that, for trade and domestic policies to match, UKEF should no longer invest in fossil fuel projects. Ministers like to remind us that UKEF is an award winner—but why should it not win awards for its low-carbon policy? The Canadian and French export credit agencies have more stringent controls on fossil fuel support. One of the two Swedish agencies did not lend to any fossil fuel projects in 2015 or 2016. If they can do that, why cannot we? Global Witness also says that the Department for International Trade should realign export support to renewable energy. There is an export opportunity for us, if we want to grasp it, in what it describes as floating offshore wind. Why not? UKEF has stopped investing in businesses that rely on child labour. Why not take the same approach to global warming?

The Government have woefully underprepared the UK for operating an independent trade policy. Trade remedies legislation is still not ready. There is no sign of the Trade Bill passing through Parliament. Existing trade deals are vulnerable to lapsing without replacement, not least because of the incompetence of the International Trade Secretary in announcing zero tariffs, as the hon. Member for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy) reminded us in his resignation statement as the Canada trade envoy. He described it, let us remember, as “cack-handed” planning and felt patronised by the Secretary of State when he warned of the dangers of a no-deal tariff schedule and its impact on the prospects for the roll-over of trade agreements. As the hon. Gentleman has asked, why would those who are already getting 95% of what they want rush to sign up to what the UK want in the event of no deal? It does not bode well when a Back Bencher has a better grasp of international trade policy than the Secretary of State.

Labour will align our trade and industrial strategies to promote sustainable low-carbon export growth. We will introduce a transparent and consultative framework for the development of trade agreements, and be a strong and supportive partner of our small and medium-sized enterprise exporters. We will use trade policy as a tool to elevate rights and standards domestically and with our international partners, to ensure that the benefits of global trade are shared through society—whether that is in moving to a zero-carbon world or in enhancing the achievement of the sustainable development goals.

Trade must not be used to lock future Governments into a deregulatory agenda or to erode the capacity of Governments to legislate in the public interest. Neither can trade strategy be a series of controversial arms sales. In stark contrast to the present Government and their new Prime Minister, it is only Labour that is committed to delivering the robust trade strategy that our country needs. We will play a leading role in demonstrating that trade can be the force for good that it should be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez]

I thank all hon. Members and the Minister for engaging in this very important debate.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) talked of the vital agricultural interests in his constituency and the freedom that they might have in the opening up of new markets in India, the US and China—a market that is growing particularly rapidly. He says that the sun will not stop shining if we leave the EU, and he is quite right.

The hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) has a notoriously upbeat and sunny disposition. I do not want to be impish by saying that I was very interested to learn of his intense respect for the will of the people, given the simultaneous passion that he expressed for overturning the results of both recent referendums. It is a curious world in which we live.

Scotland will play an even more important role in the future in attracting regional investment and boosting exports of in-demand products such as whisky to growing markets such as China. It would have been helpful to have had a better understanding of how the devolved SNP Government wish fully to participate in what is a very exciting project.

I appreciate that the hon. Member for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson) finds himself within a party that perhaps now welcomes only newspeak from its comrades, but I am fairly certain that my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson) is not advocating no deal as his primary objective. I would like to reassure the hon. Gentleman that his dystopian imaginings about the DIT’s work and the trade figures are rather wide of the mark. He expressed concern about an absence of green objectives in our trade work. He might be reassured by some of the exciting things that we are doing on green finance initiatives with the likes of Singapore, and might be interested to know about some of the work that we saw with the Select Committee in South Korea—in particular, on renewable energy and how that is helping it to reach its targets.

The Minister reminded us of what trade and investment is all about, which is the delivery of prosperity and prospects to the people whom we represent. On every single investment measure, we lead Europe. We are spreading wealth not just to London and the south-east, but to every region of the UK. My hon. Friend unashamedly peddles optimism, and my goodness this country is ready for it. My constituents and local businesses have so much to offer, and they expect the Government to facilitate their hopes and ambitions—for themselves, yes, but also for our great nation. Let us learn from some of the errors of the past few years, but be grateful for the strong foundation that the DIT has laid and that will allow us to go forward into this new chapter with confidence and energy and find global trade opportunities that deliver for those whom we represent.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered UK trade and investment strategy.

Future International Trade Opportunities

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Wednesday 1st May 2019 Westminster Hall

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

I shall be brief. It will be a massive challenge to recover the trade that we shall lose. We currently negotiate as Team EU; standing alone as Britain, negotiating with other countries—particularly large ones, such as the United States and China—will be very difficult. There is a debate about climate change in the main Chamber at the moment. It seems to me that we shall have to trade further afield, which will harm our climate. I hope we see the introduction of carbon pricing to save the climate, but that will not be good for trade.

The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Craig Tracey) mentioned the WTO. There are 160 countries in the WTO, many of which have dictators and so on, and they will jointly make rules that govern us. It is a massive organisation, with a panel of unelected judges that will impose rules on our courts. We will not, for instance, be able to bring the railways and water companies into public ownership, as some in the Labour party would like to.

There will also be a great threat to our standards from things such as hormone-impregnated meat, chlorinated chicken and the sale of asbestos, all of which we see in the United States. The United States is likely to put pressure on us to allow the lowering of standards in exchange for access to digital and financial markets, for example.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

I just note that when the International Trade Committee went to Japan and South Korea, the thing that sparked most concern among Japanese investors was the nationalisation of industries under a potential future Labour Government. That caused greater alarm than any discussion about Brexit. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that nationalisation may cause wider worry among international investors?

[Geraint Davies]

Ironically, the architect of the single market was largely Margaret Thatcher. As has been pointed out, it is one of the most perfect marketplaces in the world. She enabled the Japanese to platform into the European marketplace. Of course, they are all leaving now, because we are Brexiting. There is an EU-Japan deal, which we will be cut out of, and the car manufacturers are moving for that reason, too. Historically, the Japanese brought together the Government and industry in a way that allowed platforming, and used active government to help industry. That is what a Labour Government would want. The Japanese are not very happy about Brexit, and they are basically pulling out, which is a complete disaster for Britain.

On how we move ahead with the Trade Bill, I want assurances from the Minister about the scrutiny, accountability and transparency of future trade deals. It seems to me that there will be enormous pressure on standards, human rights, the environment, workers’ rights, consumer rights—everything. The Department is denying access even to the aims and objectives of trade negotiations, which are transparent in the United States and the EU. In fact, as I understand it, there is currently a freedom of information case in court because the Department is resisting providing access to that information. That is appalling. It bodes very badly, and I am very concerned.

I also want assurances from the Minister about investor-state dispute settlements, especially as fracking companies, for example, presumably will want to continue the appalling work that this Government have started. We are debating fracking to a certain extent today in the main Chamber. It is so destructive. The Minister may know that 5% of the methane is leaked, and that methane is 85 times worse than carbon dioxide for global warming, making fracking worse than coal. Under investor-state dispute settlements, big fracking companies such as Lone Pine have fined the Canadian Government hundreds of millions of dollars for imposing a moratorium on fracking in Quebec. Will he therefore rule out investor-state dispute settlements?

Will the Minister ensure that Parliament can fully scrutinise and agree on the negotiating aims of future trade deals? Will he allow MPs to access some of the documentation, and to have debates and votes? We do not want, week after week, to be presented with a deal versus no deal choice in which the Government say, “Here’s the deal with Chile. If we don’t sign it, even though it’s not as good as the one we’ve got already, we won’t get anything. Come on,” and force through appalling trade deals that are not in our interests and may undermine human rights abroad and environmental protections here and elsewhere.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell. I am sure that, given your passion about Brexit, you would like to speak in the debate yourself. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Craig Tracey) for securing the debate. What a refreshing change it is to talk about opportunity rather than threat—it is just a shame that we do not have longer to do so.

I do not wish to retread well-worn ground, but one of my abiding concerns about the withdrawal agreement is that it will, in effect, preclude us from drawing up an independent trading strategy, with the customs arrangements in the backstop effectively becoming the blueprint for the future relationship. That would cause us to enter a de facto customs union with the EU and be tethered to the EU’s regulatory regime without a seat at the table, as was confirmed by the Prime Minister’s admission about the commonalities between her customs position and that of Mr Corbyn. I do not see that loss of power as compatible with the public’s decision to leave the EU.

It is a myth that the customs arrangements in the withdrawal agreement would deliver frictionless trade with the EU. One freight forwarder told the International Trade Committee that

“a softer Brexit would deliver a harder Brexit for us”.

Indeed, with UK wet stamp certifications or similar for every consignment to or from the EU and Northern Ireland, and a customs arrangement tantamount to Turkey’s, in which the EU’s trading partners would benefit from access to the UK market without our deriving reciprocal access, the withdrawal agreement would preclude us from signing meaningful new FTAs and open up huge potential for tax leakage when it comes to tariff collection. I believe that would come very quickly to be understood as a substandard arrangement from which we would have no unilateral right of exit.

That is not to say that our future trading relationship with the EU should be deprioritised, or that to move away from the EU’s regulatory orbit will be plain sailing, or necessarily desirable in every sector. However, our future relationship must be placed on a sustainable footing, and such an asymmetric arrangement would not allow for that.

My desire has always been for us to strike a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, accept and then manage any trading friction that would cause, and offset costs through a competitive tax and regulatory regime and a broader range of new trading agreements that would—over time, admittedly—allow UK companies better to plug into growth markets or to enhance access to countries with which we already have strong trading relationships. Until that EU-UK relationship is determined, however, we have effectively put on ice the opportunities available with third countries, many of which are necessarily waiting to see the extent to which we are tied into EU structures to assess how deep a trading relationship they can have with us.

Looking to the future, it is important to underline that free trade agreements are not a panacea, but can none the less be used as a catalyst to deepen bilateral ties or simply to kick-start workstreams. We had a fascinating discussion at the International Trade Committee this morning about how Brexit has already had a positive impact simply through the creation of the Department for International Trade, which provides momentum and focus, and by sparking often overdue audits by UK companies of their agility, productivity and exposure to risk. The creation of a DIT database of trading opportunities for UK businesses has been enormously valuable, while the packaging of UK investment prospects in brands such as the northern powerhouse and the midlands engine has helped companies and trade bodies better articulate opportunities to prospective investors.

Companies have generally been impressed by the skills and energy of DIT teams in our embassies, but now they want those teams to enhance their regulatory knowledge, extend their networks to lobby more effectively and gear themselves to long-term relationships with key decision makers to act as experienced Sherpas to UK businesses. That will require lower churn of staff and a more extensive network of offices, particularly in different regions of China and states in America, where we can only achieve so much at federal level. The big prize would be in assisting mid-cap UK firms, where we currently fall short of the extensive assistance offered to the German Mittelstand by the powerful German chambers of commerce. We should also look to capitalise on and complement the existing networks of UK bodies such as the Corporation of London, which has developed city-to-city agreements with the likes of Tokyo and Shanghai on green finance, asset management and more.

With trade these days stifled much less by tariff than non-tariff barriers—admittedly the context is changing somewhat under the Trump Administration and the deteriorating relationship with China—future free trade area negotiations can be a focal point for, but need not hold up, wider country-to-country discussions on issues such as recognition between respective trade bodies of professional qualifications that would allow for the easier transfer of skilled staff; swifter, less costly visa regimes; research co-operation between universities; and working groups on regulatory harmonisation, such that close ties with countries like the United States, Australia and Singapore could create momentum for a move towards global standards in key industries of interest to us such as financial services, tech and the digital economy. Those are especially important issues for a services economy such as ours, and the coming together of powerhouses in financial services and life sciences such as the US and the UK could have a tremendous impact on the setting of those standards.

Should we ever get to the point where we can negotiate new FTAs, we ought to have completed an analysis of the errors made in the Brexit and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. I recommend, and I know the Minister agrees, that we ensure that Parliament has scoped out and agreed to a broad mandate for any new FTA and is able to access information about ongoing negotiations via a new, confidential parliamentary committee that could access relevant paperwork, trade expertise and legal advice.

Meanwhile, we should seek immediately to knock on the head unhelpful canards about chlorinated chicken or US healthcare companies being able to sue the NHS. Modern bilateral agreements are flexible and can permit carve-outs for sensitive areas of trade. The FTA between China and Australia, for instance, does not allow access to certain aspects of Australia’s pharmaceutical and healthcare system, while investor dispute settlement mechanisms are absent from large parts of the Canadian and American trading relationship. Ultimately, however, in being able to determine our own trade policy, we can be compelled neither to enter nor remain in any FTA or investment treaty that we do not believe to be in our interests, subject to notice.

There is so much more to say on this subject, but other Members wish to speak. Finally, I hope that this realignment of UK trading prospects is not hindered by the signing of a substandard withdrawal agreement that places us either implicitly or explicitly in a customs union, and that this debate marks the start of a more positive, creative discussion about the new trajectory on which we can place our nation in the years ahead. Ours is the world’s fifth-largest economy, strong in so many expanding areas such as services, science and digital technology, and able to attract huge amounts of investment despite the uncertainty that Parliament has created over Brexit. With skill, verve and leadership, the UK can eventually emerge a nimbler, more dynamic economy, not only better positioned to plug into growth markets but better able to deliver tangible benefits to the people and businesses we represent.

EU Trade Agreements: Replication

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Wednesday 13th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I was not able even to follow all that question, never mind answer it. Countries have said to us that there are areas of policy on which they will seek an agreement with the United Kingdom that they cannot get with the European Union. Data localisation is one policy area where the attitude of a number of European countries makes it impossible to reach an agreement, and that is in fact holding up the trade in services agreement. We will take a more liberal view of that and will be able to do things as an independent nation that we cannot do as a member of the European Union.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

It is my understanding, and the Secretary of State has referred to this as well, that the EU has not permitted Turkey to engage in talks with the UK on continuity of trade post Brexit under the terms of its goods-only customs agreement with that country. It is the kind of arrangement that I understand we would fall into under the backstop. Will the Secretary of State please update the House on any progress in talks with Turkey to ensure smooth future trade with this important partner? Does he share my concern about limitations on our ability to negotiate freely with trade partners should we enter into a goods-only customs arrangement with the EU?

[Dr Fox]

There are issues with Turkey, which is in a customs union, although it is a partial customs union, so we can discuss our future relationship in areas such as agriculture and services. I refer in all humility to the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner), who put it best. He said of a customs union that

“as an end point it is deeply unattractive. It would preclude us from making our own independent trade agreements with our five largest export markets outside the EU”.

That was then; it is not the policy today.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Thursday 20th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

Of course, the best thing that any of us could do is ensure that we have an agreement as soon as possible with the European Union, which Members of this House will be able to contribute to. Of course, if the House decides that we are not to come to an agreement with the European Union, there will be adverse consequences.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

It has been very difficult for the International Trade Committee to scrutinise progress in the roll-over of current trade agreements because of the sensitivity of the negotiations. Will my right hon. Friend look urgently into establishing a confidential Commons Committee that has access to restricted negotiating documents, to ensure proper scrutiny of any talks over new free trade agreements?

[Dr Fox]

My hon. Friend raises an important issue, which she has also raised in the Committee. The Government are looking at ways in which we can improve scrutiny without undermining the confidential nature of the discussions that we have. I will want to discuss the issues with the Opposition as well to see whether we can have a robust system that is also secure. That would be to the benefit of the whole House.

Leaving the EU: Future Trade Remedies

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2018 Westminster Hall

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Jack Brereton) for securing this debate on future trade remedies. He is ahead of the curve on this issue, because amid the wrangling over Brexit we have rather overlooked the profile that this issue will have. I believe that it will become ever more pressing as we chart a new path beyond the EU. It is therefore important at this stage, as we draw up our Trade Remedies Authority, that we get its basic structure right.

As I have said before in this House, we are lucky to be among the first generation of politicians in more than 40 years to be drawing up our own independent trade policy, but that means we are also very green as a nation in fully grasping trade legislation and its implications. None the less, these are issues of enormous relevance to consumers and to businesses of all sizes in our constituencies. It is all well and good for us to be free traders in principle, but in practice many of those principles can be sorely tested when producers in our own constituencies are challenged by international competition. Indeed, they can be tested to breaking point when that competition is able to undercut domestic businesses due to the state subsidy or economic structure of their own countries.

My hon. Friend spoke eloquently about the capacity of Chinese pottery firms to undercut domestic industries, with a speed that can pull the rug from under industries that have been carefully developed over many years. Equally, however, cheaper products from abroad can be a boon to other industries, for instance by providing cheap steel for car manufacture, helping to retain production on these shores and delivering cheaper prices for consumers. These are not simple issues and they must be carefully considered.

As a member of the International Trade Committee, which has been closely examining the Government’s plans to set up our own Trade Remedies Authority, I have been encouraging the Government to study the arrangements of respected trade authorities in other nations, particularly the US and Canada. Throughout the TRA process I have been concerned about the amount of power being vested in the hands of the Secretary of State, including over appointments to the TRA’s board. I am also concerned about whether the TRA will be sufficiently skilled and resourced for what can be extremely intensive investigations.

In the US, the body responsible for injury investigations alone, the United States International Trade Commission, has several hundred employees. Given the difficulty that the Select Committee has securing sufficiently knowledgeable domestic trade panellists, we have a considerable recruitment challenge on our hands. As we leave the EU, there is the chance to produce a more flexible and responsive trade remedies model. UK Steel sees the EU’s decision-making process as monolithic, with too much power in the hands of the Commission and a heavily politicised system. We have opted for an approach similar to Australia’s, but in a recent Committee session one of our panellists expressed concerns that producer interests are beginning to take a much stronger precedence in that system.

I still believe that we would do well to consider the bifurcated model of the US and Canada, with subsidy and injury investigated separately to avoid politicisation and bias. With our TRA’s chair and non-executive members all appointed by the Secretary of State, and with the Secretary of State retaining the ultimate say on the imposition of a trade remedy, I must confess that I am uneasy about the concentration of power in ministerial hands, given the prospect of a much more interventionist Opposition taking power.

Our new regime must be open and transparent, and have integrity and credibility. I therefore suggest that we try to take steps to ensure that the executive board of any TRA is open to independent scrutiny, perhaps through the Select Committee, rather than being only a matter for the Secretary of State to decide. I am sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s concerns about dumped and subsidised produce, and the issue of transparency on the economic interest and public interest tests. Trade remedies are currently a highly political issue, and it is vital that our own desire to secure trade deals does not prevent us from imposing trade remedies if we need to in the event of dumping.

It is also necessary to flesh out the appeals mechanism for trade remedies. There is much that remains up for grabs, with a lot being allocated to statutory instruments by the Secretary of State, and details remain patchy. I would be grateful if the Minister could use his contribution to the debate to assure us further of his Department’s progress in establishing a robust TRA in time for March 2019, if we are unable to secure the deal with the EU that we seek.

[Hannah Bardell (Livingston) (SNP)]

The hon. Lady makes a number of points that I find myself agreeing with. I am sure that I will get the opportunity to say this in my own contribution but, given what she has said about the Trade Remedies Authority being a transparent and fully representative body, does she agree that the amendments put forward by the Scottish National party and Labour, with the support of Plaid Cymru, to have representatives from all the devolved nations are vital?

[Julia Lopez]

I might be sympathetic to that, but there is a real concern that all those on the board of the Trade Remedies Authority should be able to rise above particular interests. Those particular interests could be strong industrial concerns in particular regions of the UK. Board members will need to be able to look at the UK as a whole and weigh up different arguments made to them. I would have concerns about being very prescriptive about exactly who should be on any board. None the less, there needs to be independent scrutiny of the Secretary of State’s decisions in making those appointments. On that note, my contribution has ended.

United States Tariffs: Steel and Aluminium

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 12th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

It is not long since I remember the SNP being delighted at some of Mr Trump’s tweets, when he was having some of his relationships with the previous SNP leader.

We can best tackle this issue as a united United Kingdom in line with our European Union partners. The hon. Lady dares to raise the issue of GI. These matters are in the roll-over of the EU trade agreement for which we are trying to get continuity in our current Trade Bill and the customs Bill. She needs to understand that she actually voted against the roll-over of those Bills that would have given the very protections for which she is asking.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

In its condemnation of President Trump’s proposed steel tariff, the EU has implicitly accepted that it would be a similarly retrograde step to impose tariffs or engage in retaliatory measures with key trading partners. How will my right hon. Friend be using the President’s announcement to make the case for open frictionless trade with the EU post Brexit and to assert the UK’s position as a leading proponent of free trade in the 21st century?

[Dr Fox]

We are seeing the sort of problems that come from introducing protectionist measures. Tariffs will very seldom—for any length of time—successfully protect a domestic industry. They are likely to add cost to the inputs for that economy. In the United States, where 140,000 people are employed in the production of steel, there are also 6.5 million people in industries dependent on steel usage who will not be helped by an increase in the price. My hon. Friend makes a good point. We should all be recommitting ourselves to an open, liberal, global trading system, rather than considering impediments to it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Thursday 22nd February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Greg Hands]

To be absolutely clear, if the hon. Lady is referring to the Trade Bill, what we are looking at is the transitioning of existing trading arrangements with the EU. All those agreements have already been through parliamentary scrutiny. If she is referring to future trade agreements, we will bring that subject back to this House in due course.

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

One of the new institutions we shall need to set up as we leave the EU is a trade remedies authority. I recently travelled to Canada and the US with the International Trade Committee. They are two countries that have robust trade remedies authorities whose impartiality can be critical in reaching economically sound judgments. What assurances can the Minister offer the House that the UK Government are similarly committed to an independent TRA that will be free from undue political interference?

[Greg Hands]

I congratulate my hon. Friend and the other members of the Committee on their recent visit to the United States and Canada. Those are two of the countries whose trade remedy systems we have studied, along with Australia and, in fact, the European Union system itself. As my hon. Friend says, it is common, although not universal, for the investigation process to be independent of the Government, but there is still a political decision at the end of the process by a Minister who is accountable to Parliament. It is worth pointing out, by the way, that all the Opposition parties voted against the creation of the trade remedies authority in the first place.

Trade Bill

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Tuesday 9th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

Admid the sparring over Brexit, it is easy to overlook our privilege in being the first MPs in over 40 years to debate the UK’s independent trade policy. This generation of parliamentarians stands at the foothills of an important new chapter in British history. When we come to look back on this era, I believe it will be regarded as a moment of crucial transition during which the post-war frameworks governing international politics underwent a crucial reform to reflect the reality of a globalised world and its changing power dynamic.

The character of that reform is up for grabs, and I therefore believe the UK has a huge role to play in ensuring that change delivers prosperity and security to people across the world. At its best, Brexit can aid in rebooting stalled progress in trade liberalisation and the setting of international standards in services and data, to govern and benefit properly from new technology, confounding the pessimists who see post-Brexit Britain as a diminished force.

Before I get too caught up in the moment, however, I record that the Bill before us today is relatively limited in its scope. Like the customs Bill yesterday, it is instead about preparedness. It sets us up for our independent status at the WTO, rolls over existing FTAs and EPAs, gives HMRC new powers to collect and share data on exports and makes way for a new trade remedies authority.

It would nevertheless be wrong to regard the Bill merely as administrative tidying, and I hope to offer my thoughts on its provisions in my capacity as a new member of the International Trade Committee. Reflecting the approach evident in the EU withdrawal Bill, this Bill is an understandable compromise between how our trade approach would look if we were starting with a blank sheet of paper and what necessarily needs to happen to prepare for March 2019 if we are to minimise disruption to UK businesses and consumers. I sympathise with the concerns expressed about the limited opportunity to scrutinise this and the customs Bill, but I accept that that is largely a result of practical constraints, rather than an Executive power grab. In time, though, it will be essential to have mechanisms in place for effective public scrutiny of new trade deals and to ensure that delegated powers do not extend beyond narrow technical changes.

The Secretary of State has been upbeat about the translation of existing trade deals when we cease to be party to the EU’s FTAs post Brexit by keeping it to a very narrow technical process without the possibility of renegotiation. I must express my own concern that that risks not proving to be such a straightforward process. I touched yesterday on the issue of tariff-rate quotas in my contribution to the customs debate. Existing trade partners might not wish to commence discussions on translating deals until they can see the shape of any EU-UK deal and might seek to change the terms of their FTAs with us. Those terms could actually improve, given that deals would be made without needing to account for the EU’s producer interests, but any renegotiation could prove time consuming. It is not clear how existing TRQs will be administered during any transition after March 2019. I would therefore welcome clarity from Ministers about which existing FTAs we are prioritising in the grandfathering process and what is being done to recruit even more specialist negotiation staff around any bilateral discussions.

In the creation of the Trade Remedies Authority, we have an opportunity to establish a globally respected, independent body that cements the UK’s credibility and reputation as a champion of competition, open trade and legal certainty. The EU’s own trade remedies process is unwieldy, bureaucratic and politicised, so there is a lot of room for improvement, but I should like to express my concern at the proposed powers being bestowed on the Secretary of State in imposing trade remedies—a structure considered to be 1970s thinking by panellists at a recent International Trade Committee hearing.

Many of us on the Conservative Benches like to think of ourselves as pro-free trade and pro-competition. None the less, our membership of the EU has sheltered us from the raw political choices that these ideas can entail. The politics of trade can be highly contentious and emotional, wrapped up in people’s livelihoods and an area’s industrial history. Less competitive domestic industries that benefit from protection often form powerful interest groups that can make trade protection measures politically alluring to any Trade Secretary, particularly when set against a consumer benefit that is very dispersed or sometimes apparent only in the medium term.

It is vital that we establish a robust, dispassionate and transparent trade remedies authority that has a clear duty to the wider economy and can unpick genuine concern about dumping or market distortion from protectionist producer interests. I should be grateful, therefore, if Ministers would consider commissioning detailed analysis of equivalent authorities in nations such as Canada, the US and Australia, in search of best practice. We might wish to establish a bifurcated model of two separate specialist bodies, the first working out whether dumping or subsidy has occurred and the second establishing whether injury has been caused. This could speed up the trade remedy process and lead to more objective outcomes. We might also want to look carefully at the TRA’s board to ensure that it contains a consumer representative.

The Bill proposes the automatic grandfathering of EPAs with developing nations. I should like to see a time limit or a mechanism for automatic review placed on these agreements. Brexit ought to spur a new approach on trade and aid, particularly with Commonwealth countries, but I fear that EPAs might prove counterproductive and even damaging to our relationship with developing nations in this regard.

There will be much to say in future trade debates about how we incorporate commitments on data sharing, cross-border services, technology and standards into modern trade deals, entrenching British values and opening up new markets to services. I would also like to talk about the UK’s high animal welfare and safety standards and traceable livestock systems, but these are things for another day. For now, I will finish with my concern that the political imperative to conclude trade deals swiftly post Brexit does not lead us to overlook our long-term economic interest. To avoid such a scenario, I ask the Minister to consider setting up an independent organisation to provide impartial and dispassionate advice on our trade policies options, which is what happens now in the US and Australia.

Exiting the European Union and Global Trade

Julia Lopez Excerpts

Thursday 6th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Julia Dockerill (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Member for West Bromwich West (Mr Bailey) for his contribution. I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for calling me to make my maiden speech in this important debate about trade. I am also thankful to my hon. Friends for gathering around me like a protective huddle of penguins; I very much appreciate it.

We must be realistic, pragmatic and determined about how we best shape this country as we leave the European Union. Too often, debate on how we do that is infected by a corrosive pessimism that betrays a lack of confidence in our nation and in what we can offer the world. Now is a time for resilience, resourcefulness and self-belief. We need not a crowing self-regard but an appreciation that our people and what we have created together have value. I want to talk today about why I believe that to be so.

First, let me pay tribute to my predecessor, Dame Angela Watkinson, a lady of grace and a lady whose service leaves a proud legacy. Dame Angela’s story embodies the essence of Conservatism. From humble working class roots in Leytonstone, she built not only a flourishing career through hard work and talent, but a record of public service in this place and beyond, particularly through her church and on behalf of children with disabilities. I offer her my profound gratitude on behalf of the people of Hornchurch and Upminster, whom I so proudly represent here today.

Rather like me, Hornchurch and Upminster may now be in London, but it will always and forever have an Essex heart. Both Hornchurch and Upminster were agricultural parishes of the county, and the vestiges of a simpler past are scattered across the seat like antique jewels—whether Upminster’s beautiful tithe barn, our Grade II listed windmill or the charming churches of St Laurence and St Andrew. From the mid-17th century onwards, the area attracted successful merchants from the City of London looking to build their country pads. By 1885, Upminster was first formally connected to the metropolis by rail. None the less, its population remained modest right up until 1906, when developer Peter Griggs spotted a chance to turn the area into a new garden suburb for aspirant workers. Hornchurch was similarly swept up in the wave of suburban growth. By 1965, both were formally incorporated into the London borough of Havering.

The area’s role in defending London during the war was played out from RAF Hornchurch, just outside my constituency. My constituency later helped to revive London and its war-weary people by providing land for a large new housing estate on Harold Hill to alleviate inner-city housing shortages, particularly among eastenders who sought better lives for their families—what more fitting location for the first sale of a council home to a tenant by the Greater London Council? For aspiration, hard work and a deep sense of family, community and nationhood flow through the veins of my constituents. Ours is a seat where an agrarian Englishness and sense of stability mixes with the upward mobility of the metropolis, and where the brash thrust of the centre breaks into something gentler, almost nostalgic. It is a place where taxis, vans and the tools of tradespeople rest on driveways after a hard day’s work; where doorways are swept and homes taken pride in; and where people hold straightforward, honest hopes for good schools, jobs, public services and homes. My constituents contribute to and believe in what this nation has to offer but they expect our nation’s politicians to hold that belief as well.

I began my career in this place working for the Minister for Asia and the Pacific, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). A person with a hugely generous spirit, he gave me the space and confidence to flourish in my own right, and it fills me with enormous joy to see him promoted to serve this country with his immense talent. Those were deceptively sunny days for our country, yet in quick succession I was to witness at close quarters the expenses crisis, the financial crisis and then a seemingly unending series of scandals that systematically undermined public trust in nearly every institution within our nation. I shared in the national mood of disillusionment. Not long afterwards, I attended a town hall meeting in Tower Hamlets where I saw councillors physically attack and issue death threats to one another. I felt a profound sense of horror over what had happened in the borough. The divisive identity politics of race, religion and class had turned out to breed only a culture of grotesque corruption, incivility and isolation, while local politicians’ self-congratulatory mantra of “fairness”, “community” and “justice” were used only as a cloak to retain power. That night inspired me to became one of five feisty Conservative councillors who fought alongside others to expose what was going on. Tower Hamlets is now a byword for what can go wrong when we fail to uphold the systems, institutions and values that make Britain work.

Later I spent time working with European and developing nations on governance issues. Witnessing developing nations battle with endemic corruption, it became ever clearer to me that without decent governance, all other efforts to raise living standards and increase prosperity will struggle. Meanwhile, seeing the EU at close quarters, I reluctantly came to the view that it was divorced from the reality of those whom it purports to represent. It is now time to return accountability to our own politicians. Indeed, I should like to see post-Brexit Britain as one of a group of modern, open nations pursuing close co-operation in matters of security and defence, and an ambitious agenda on free trade, covering goods and services, on economic prosperity and on the creation of international standards for the new technologies shaping our lives. That must sit alongside a restatement of the importance of the nation state, with a new focus on intergovernmental co-operation rather than collective decision making via costly and cumbersome bureaucracies.

Our parliamentary democracy is a precious and delicate gift, the sum of the toil, sacrifice, disagreements and compromises that generations before us have made. Its principles have proved a template for governance across the globe and provided the space for millions of individuals, institutions and enterprises to flourish. It is a dynamic system that works because it is lubricated by trust and because each generation of parliamentarians tries its best to fine-tune it to reflect the needs and wants of the citizens they represent. The past decade may have undermined trust in our economy, in our politicians and in our media, but crises and scandals can also drive improvements, and should not be taken as a reason to give up or dismiss our nation with a relentless, virulent negativity. Quite the opposite. It is the duty of our generation of politicians to learn, to reform and to lasso the hopes, ambitions and talents of British people of every background as we enter this challenging but enormously exciting new era.