Trade Bill

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 20th July 2020 Commons Chamber

New clause 3 would stipulate that the parliamentary reports must be published at least 10 sitting days before any statutory instruments are made under this power. As I explained to colleagues in Committee a few weeks ago, and as I think we all know, trade negotiations have a habit of going down to the wire. I have only to remind colleagues of the negotiations surrounding the EU withdrawal agreement as evidence of that fact—although I should point out, before I get people too excited, that that particular negotiation is not included in the scope of this Bill. As such, it is possible that we may not be able to sign continuity agreements until shortly before the transition period ends. That may make it very difficult to leave a period of 10 sitting days before any SIs are brought forward if we want continuity agreements to enter into force on day one after the transition period.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his earlier comments. He talks about continuity agreements, but are they still continuity agreements? For instance, the agreement with Japan looks like it will be very different from the one that the EU had, and Canada is saying that it is not going to have the same agreement; it wants to see what we get with the EU first. Why does he still call them continuity agreements? Is this clause not looking at a position that we had two years ago? Should we not now move on?

[Greg Hands]

Let me be clear: we are talking about continuity. My hon. Friend can judge us not just by what I say but by our actions. Of the 20 reports that we have published, five have been called for debate in the other place, and not a single one of those debates has resulted in a motion of regret. He is right about one thing, and that is on Japan. I will come on to examine this shortly, but Japan is different. We have been clear that that will lead to an enhanced free trade agreement based on the original EU agreement, which is why we have put in place different and more considerable scrutiny arrangements for the Japan agreement than for the rest of the continuity programme.

We want continuity agreements to enter into force on day one to avoid a cliff edge for both businesses and consumers. I remind colleagues that all continuity agreements will be subject to the CRAG—Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—ratification procedure. That already provides for a period of 21 sitting days in which agreements, and the parliamentary reports and explanatory memoranda published alongside them, can be scrutinised by parliamentarians before they are formally ratified. I will now address amendments 1 to 5 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, as well as amendments 22 and 23.

[Mr Djanogly]

rose—

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher), as I recall I did when she made her maiden speech. I rise to speak in support of new clause 4 tabled by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), who I know is scheduled to speak immediately after me and will doubtless give a detailed account of the reasons for it. In anticipation of that, I wish to set out why the Liberal Democrats support it.

From 1 January 2021, the UK will be setting out on its own for the first time in nearly 40 years in developing its own independent trade policy and negotiating its own trade agreements. The implications of this step on everyday life in the UK are huge, and possibly not yet fully appreciated. Trade negotiations are complex and delicate. Securing access to international markets for one sector may mean conceding international access to our domestic markets for another. Securing preferential treatment on tariffs for some of our goods may mean relaxing import controls on something else.

We have a complex economy currently disrupted by the need to beat the coronavirus, and on the verge of major change as we transition away from carbon-emitting activity. Technological change offers both threat and opportunity. We must also consider that our economy is imperfect in its distribution of wealth and opportunity, and look for ways to address this challenge. Increasingly, the UK is being called on to stand up for the defence of fundamental human rights and liberal democracy and use the powers at its disposal to effect change internationally. Our trade policy and agreements touch on all those urgent challenges. How can we best leverage our economic advantages to deliver current and future prosperity for UK citizens and influence peaceful progress abroad?

To determine that those decisions are best made behind closed doors without consultation or discussion is an assault on our very idea of what Parliament is for. We need to balance all the competing pressures from different economic sectors and geographical regions, fully considering the impact on different groups of workers, and determine whether we prioritise climate commitments over economic growth. How can that be done effectively without recourse to Parliament? The British people deserve to have their interests properly represented when these questions are being asked and for the answers given by Ministers to be put on the public record and judged accordingly.

I also speak in support of new clause 9 tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and supported by the Liberal Democrats because we recognise the urgency of taking action against the very real threat of climate change. It is essential that we enshrine that urgency in our trade legislation, so that negotiating partners know, before the first papers are exchanged, that they must comply with our environmental goals. Our economy is transitioning away from carbon emissions, in accordance with the democratic mandate to achieve net zero carbon by 2050, and that progress must be underpinned in every trade agreement we negotiate. Our commitment to net zero cannot be traded away in pursuit of other goals.

The Liberal Democrats have also tabled amendments that relate to dispute resolution and human rights. Dispute resolution is fundamental to ensuring that democratic decision-making that relates to the expenditure of taxpayers’ money, or regulation of food standards, cannot be undermined by law suits from foreign corporations. At this stage, the UK Government should rule out any use of investor-state dispute settlement procedures from UK trade deals, to safeguard our ability to determine our own regulatory environment, without the threat of sanction from foreign investors. That is fundamental to ensuring that our NHS remains free at the point of use for all UK citizens, and that we set our own standards on animal welfare and food quality.

Earlier I referred to the UK’s powers to effect change internationally, and to how we can use our trade agreements as leverage. We have been forcefully reminded of our need to use those powers to influence foreign partners to respect human rights, thanks to recent events in Hong Kong and China. It would send a powerful message to the Chinese regime, and to others around the world who hope to trade with us, if we enshrined in law our commitment to upholding human rights as a non-negotiable element of our trade deals. That message will be compelling only if we lead by example, and that example starts with parliamentary oversight of negotiating mandates and trade deals. I implore colleagues to support new clause 4 this evening.

[Mr Djanogly]

I speak to the new clauses tabled in my name, and those of others, concerning the scrutiny of free trade agreements. Simply put, today the House must address the question of whether, post Brexit, the UK will have less scrutiny of free trade agreements than we had before Brexit. That is the current Government proposal, which I suggest flies in the face of the claim that we leave the EU to take back control. The Government have split FTAs into two categories. First, and in the Bill, are all trade agreements that the EU signed with third countries before Brexit, which the Government wish to roll over to become agreements with the UK. Secondly, and not in the Bill, there are FTAs with any other countries, such as the US.

New clause 4 suggests a new scrutiny process for all FTAs. It will still be the Executive that negotiate FTAs, but Parliament would get a yes/no vote on the negotiating objectives and, importantly, on the final draft agreement, as happens in the US and Japan. Not only has such a provision not ended up in the Bill, but the Government’s position has seemingly reverted to us having less scrutiny than we had as a member of the EU. For the past 40 years, the EU has negotiated our trade deals, and as part of the EU scrutiny process, a yes/no vote would be taken by the EU Parliament on the draft FTA, prior to signature.

[Neil Parish (Tiverton and Honiton) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend welcome the commitment from our Government on welfare and the environment, and all the conditions in the Bill? Does he find it somewhat confusing that the Government will not accept new clause 4? Surely scrutiny is fine, because they are going to do exactly what they said they will do.

[Mr Djanogly]

I absolutely agree. In January 2018, on Second Reading of the 2017-19 Bill, the then Secretary of State stood up and said that he would be looking for a new approval process and take soundings on that, but that has simply not happened. As things stand, there is no longer a parliamentary veto, and no formal scrutiny committee has yet been established, despite US negotiations having started.

The important point of a parliamentary veto is not that it is often used, but rather, as seen in other Parliaments, that it encourages the Executive to seek consensus on their negotiating mandate, and keeps legislators in touch during negotiations through regular discourse and discussion. A wise Executive will naturally wish to avoid an unnecessary bust-up just before signing an FTA. Of course, that is where it all went wrong with the TTIP negotiations between the US and the EU, because the US Congress and the EU Parliament were disclosing information to their respective elected representatives that was not provided to UK parliamentarians.

[Richard Fuller]

My hon. Friend is mentioning very large trade deals. Does he mean that the crux of this oversight is really required with those big trade deals, such as those with the US, China, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership?

[Mr Djanogly]

New clause 4 does deal with all trade deals, but obviously the amount of scrutiny would be proportionate.