National Security Bill (First sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I am going to move on to our next question now, from shadow Minister Jess Phillips.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

Q This is a convenient place to start, because I want to focus on part 3 of the Bill, which is obviously taken up with legal aid and civil remedies. You have already said that you are okay with parts 1 and 2 of the Bill in earlier statements, so I will just give you the floor to express your view on part 3 of the Bill.

Jonathan Hall: I have one thing to say about part 1, but we will come back to it. Part 3 is different from parts 1 and 2, because I believe that part 3 is not there to meet an operational need. Generally speaking, I think the reason why the public support terrorism legislation is that they believe that laws are being passed to improve their security—obviously, today is the anniversary of 7/7. Here, the changes are intended to be entirely symbolic. The first thing to do is to recognise that it is quite unusual in the context of terrorism legislation to enact a measure that is really symbolic, and therefore it needs to be justified with care.

My concern about the legal aid, beyond the symbolism aspect, is that the class of individuals who are going to be affected by this is very wide indeed. The justification for removing legal aid from convicted terrorists is that they have broken their links with society. Of course, we all understand that in the context of an Islamic State would-be suicide bomber or someone of that nature, but the same effect will be felt by children who are arrested for document offences—in other words, having a copy of “The Anarchist Cookbook” on their computer.

As you know, there are now many children who have been arrested and prosecuted for terrorism offences. It also catches people who do not get custodial sentences at all, so the cohort of people captured is very wide indeed, and I do not myself understand why the decision has been taken to include not just the most egregious examples of terrorism-convicted people, but also people who may never have gone to prison and may have very quickly—one hopes—gone back into normal life. That is my general point about aid. I have expressed further points about how it is possible that this measure could be counterproductive. Should I pause there?

[Jess Phillips]

Q I would agree with you. I feel it is counterproductive. You are an expert on terrorism; I am an expert on violence against women and girls, grooming and the link between people who perpetrate terrorism and a previous history of domestic abuse. Could you see a situation arising—you may well have these cases; I have seen some—where a woman who is a victim of domestic abuse falls foul of this legislation, because of an association with her abuser who goes on to be convicted of terrorism, because she cannot access civil legal aid to go to family court and stop her children being taken by that terrorist?

Jonathan Hall: I do not think so, because legal aid is termed individually. In the example you are giving, the woman in question would not be a terrorist convict, so she would be able to apply for legal aid.

[Jess Phillips]

Q But what if she had been convicted because she shared some information? I am mindful of the fact that a high percentage of those women who are referred to the Prevent programme—it is over 50%—are found to be victims of domestic abuse.

Jonathan Hall: Then, yes. A woman who has previously been convicted of a terrorism offence would be forced to resort to what is known as exceptional case funding. As I think the Justice Committee has reported, it is very difficult to get solicitors to even apply for exceptional case funding and there are great difficulties in getting hold of it urgently. I suspect it will be said that, for the worst cases of domestic violence, it would be granted. I do not know if that is the case.

[Jess Phillips]

It is not the case.

[The Chair]

I am going to have to move on to the next questioner. I would appreciate it if colleagues could be succinct with their questions. I will allow a couple if you are succinct—otherwise it is just one question.

National Security Bill (Second sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Damian Hinds]

Q I was not trying to start an argument or even a discussion or analysis of end-to-end encryption. I was just asking, relatively speaking, how much do we know? There is a hypothesis that the reason why there was apparently less material in recent American elections on Facebook than in 2016 is that large parts of it have moved to other channels where we just cannot see it. We just do not know what is there.

Poppy Wood: Let me give you a good example on Russia Today. We do a lot of work and analysis around Russia and Ukraine. Obviously, Russia Today was taken down from most national broadcast networks. It has been resurrected multiple times on social media. This week, we saw it resurrected with another name, like “Discovery Dig” or something, on YouTube, where lots of the comments, imagery and language were directing people to Telegram channels where they are actively mobilising.

What we see in the active mobilisation on Telegram channels is the outing of national security agents, the putting up of email addresses of politicians and saying, “Target them and say they are on the wrong side of the debate,” or, “Write to this national newspaper.” In all three of those examples, it is predominantly in the UK. They are telling them it is all fabricated. They are absolutely weaponising those private spaces. As you say, it is quite hard to get into them—but actually, it is not that hard. They are pretty open channels, with thousands and millions of engagements and followers. That is the scarier bit. They are private, but you are getting tens of millions of people and engagements on them. I am not sure that is the true definition of private, but it is certainly in an encrypted space.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

Q I want to touch on the whistleblower issue you raised. There have been some concerns that the Bill might not sufficiently target those with malicious intent. Is there a risk that it potentially criminalises whistleblowers?

Poppy Wood: The role of whistleblowers in society is really important. I know the Government understand that. There are some good recommendations from the ISC about whistleblowers that I do not think have been adopted in this version of the Bill. That is about at least giving some clarity to where the thresholds lie, and giving a disclosure offence and a public interest defence to whistleblowers so they can say, “These are the reasons why.” My understanding is that at the moment it sits with juries and it is on a case-by-case basis. I would certainly commend to you the recommendations from the ISC.

I would also say—this was a recommendation from the Law Commission and also, I think, from the ISC—that lots of people have to blow the whistle because they feel that they do not have anywhere else to go. There could be formal procedures—an independent person or body or office to go to when you are in intelligence agencies, or government in general or anywhere. One of the reasons why Frances Haugen came forward—she has been public about this—is that she did not really know where else to go. There were no placards saying, “Call the Information Commissioner in the UK if you have concerns about data.” People do not know where to go.

Getting touchpoints earlier down the chain so that people do not respond in desperation in the way we have seen in the past would be a good recommendation to take forward. Whistleblowers play an important part in our society and in societies all round the world. Those tests on a public interest defence would give some clarity, which would be really welcome. Building a system around them—I know the US intelligence services do that; they have a kind of whistleblower programme within the CIA and the Department of Defence that allows people to go to someone, somewhere, earlier on, to raise concerns—is the sort of thing you might be looking at. I think a whistleblower programme is an ISC recommendation, but it is certainly a Law Commission recommendation.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q On malign activity, is there a risk that through clauses 13 and 14 on foreign interference, the Bill could affect free speech, including political speech and journalism? If you think it could, what additional safeguards can be put in place to ensure that only malign activity is captured?

Poppy Wood: I have certainly read and heard concerns about journalism, about the “foreign power” test on civil society and about having Government money being quite a blunt measure for whether or not you might fall foul of these offences. On journalism, I think that is why you should never try to define disinformation: because those kinds of shape-shifting forms are very hard to pin down, particularly with questions like “What is journalism?”, “What is a mistruth?”, “What is a mis-speak?” and so on. We need to be careful about that.

On your specific question, I refer you to Article 19 and others who have really thought through the impact on journalism and free speech. I am sure it would be an unintended consequence but, again, we are seeing Russia using its co-ordinated armies on Telegram and other channels to target Ukrainian journalists. They are saying, “Complain to the platforms that the journalist is not who they say they are or is saying something false, so they are breaking the terms of service. Bombard the platforms so that that journalist gets taken down and cannot post live from Ukraine for a handful of days.”

That is just another example of how these systems are weaponised. This is where you can go much further on systems through the Online Safety Bill and the National Security Bill without worrying too much about speech. But I refer the Committee to other experts, such as Article 19, that have looked really deeply at the journalism issue. I think Index on Censorship may have done some work as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

Q Further to that, we have heard today, and I have heard from the intelligence services before today, this sense that, while hypothetical, the fear of prosecution of individuals acting under orders is having a chilling effect on the work that they need to undertake. On occasion, it has meant that they have had to pause and cease some of the operations that they feel are quite routine or essential as part of defending the UK’s national security interest. With that in mind, is there an alternative way through this? Could the provision be amended or alternative safeguards added to arrive at those individuals having the protection that they need, while having some of the safeguards and checks and balances that we are concerned might be missing at this time in clause 23?

Dan Dolan: That touches, importantly, on the point about whether clause 23 would protect officers acting overseas in the UK’s national interest, or whether it would protect politicians and officials taking actions in Whitehall, like sharing intelligence. In response to your question, I want to read a quote given by MI6 to the ISC’s detainee inquiry—quoted in the report—with respect to section 7 authorisations under the 1994 Act. The Secret Intelligence Service said that, in the cases they were talking about,

“we are … always going to go for a section 7 authorisation. Because, you know, why should my officers carry the risks on behalf of the Government personally? Why should they? So, you know, as we have already discussed, serious risk is…a subjective judgement. So we will go for belt and braces on this.”

I think that “belt and braces” is the important phrase to think about, because that is MI6 describing the separate 1994 section 7 authorisations as a belt-and-braces approach to protecting officers from criminal liability. That regime exists already, under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, so why do we need clause 23? It relates to actions taking place here in the UK—not people operating abroad on operations, but people acting in the UK—so what kind of actions are we talking about? The area that is not covered under existing legislation is the authorisation of acts or the sharing of intelligence that happens here in England or Wales.

We are therefore not of the opinion that the clause would offer additional protection over and above the 1994 Act. The clause covers a different category of offence, and that would be the encouragement or assistance of a crime from within the United Kingdom. We are talking about Ministers and officials approving things here, not people on operations overseas.

My final point—I know this was made on Second Reading—is that the Serious Crime Act 2015, sections of which would be disapplied by clause 23, already includes, in section 50, a reasonableness defence. Even if you imagine a case in which the Government argue that a Minister needs to order something that might be a crime overseas in the national interest—they would have to make a strong case for that—they would have a legal defence under reasonableness to say that their action was reasonable under section 50 of the Serious Crime Act. What we are talking about here is clause 23 disapplying legislation that would hold Ministers to account were they to encourage or assist a crime overseas.

[Jess Phillips]

Q On whistleblowing, which I was speaking to the prior witness about, do you think the Bill does enough to protect people who act against the UK Government, such as whistleblowers?

Dan Dolan: I am sorry to be unhelpful, but Reprieve’s evidence largely covers the provisions under clauses 23 and 57 to 61. I can pass it on to somebody.

[Jess Phillips]

Q That is absolutely fine. I can speak to you about part 3 of the Bill and the legal aid regime if you want. What is your view on the legal aid regime—the absence of legal aid—and how it is taken in the Bill? Specifically, I am interested in the offences that now come into that, with regard to accessing legal aid in the future.

Dan Dolan: Part 3 of the Bill—clauses 57 to 61—is in some ways the other side of the coin to clause 23. Clause 23 significantly hampers criminal accountability for ministerial or official involvement in crimes overseas, but there is also a very important civil avenue by which we might get accountability were the UK to get mixed up in torture or unlawful killing.

The Britons who were detained in Guantanamo Bay unlawfully without charge for many years and Abdel Hakim Belhaj, to whom the Government apologised, got accountability for the UK’s involvement in their appalling abuse through civil cases. They fought very hard, multi-year legal battles in the civil courts to win recognition from the Government that they had been involved in their mistreatment. Clauses 57 to 60 effectively introduce a range of so-called national security factors that would allow the Government to request a reduction of damages, potentially to nil, if those factors are present.

Say you are Mr Belhaj, who sued the Government and ultimately exposed their involvement in his torture, a national security factor that could have been applied in his case, were it in the form in the Bill, is that the UK, when it undertook the action that enabled his abuse, was acting to avert a real risk of harm. That obviously sounds convincing, but it is difficult to imagine an instance where the intelligence agencies would say they were not acting to avert a risk of harm—that is their core purpose.

The Bill also has national security factors that include the involvement of a third party. Say the UK Government passed on intelligence that led to someone’s torture by Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya, historically. Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya is a third party and its involvement would mean that UK did not need to pay damages on that front. The action happening overseas is another national security factor. If there were any wrongdoing by the UK intelligence agencies that led to torture or abuse overseas, the person would not be able to seek damages because of that factor. Effectively, what we are seeing in clauses 57 to 60 is a really sweeping effort on the part of the Government to get out of paying any damages to anyone who suffers due to Government wrongdoing overseas.

Clause 61 is really interesting, because it effectively relates to all civil cases. It allows for the freezing of damages in all civil cases, not just cases in which the Government are accused of wrongdoing. We just have not seen any basis that there is an issue with global terrorist groups receiving financing from damages in personal injury or medical negligence cases. It seems an incredibly, sweepingly broad curtailment of one’s right to receive damages—one that likely duplicates existing provisions for asset freezing and terrorist financing.

[Jess Phillips]

Q It worries me because there are lots of civil remedies in cases of abuse and violence. We made the law protect people who were victims of that so that they were able to access legal aid in a regime where most people cannot access legal aid any more. Victims of domestic abuse, for example, have an exemption. Is your reading of the Bill that you would not be able to get a non-molestation order, for example, which is a civil remedy where you seek legal aid through your exemption?

Dan Dolan: I would say that our evidence to the Committee covers clauses 57 to 60 and does not look in detail at the legal aid provisions, but my understanding of those provisions from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s notes on those is that these are extremely broad provisions, and I would note that—

[Jess Phillips]

They would not be able to access legal aid.

Dan Dolan: There are a number of people every year—teenagers—who receive non-custodial sentences under terrorism legislation. That might be someone who shares something online at the age of 16, and my understanding is that the Bill would have an incredibly sweeping impact on their ability to receive those kinds of orders, and, equally, on their rights to access the civil courts for the rest of their lives, which is a fairly dramatic constitutional action.

[Jess Phillips]

It does not stop them accessing the civil courts. To be fair, it stops them accessing legal aid to the civil courts.

Dan Dolan: Which, as you will be aware, may be, at times, the same thing.

[Jess Phillips]

Just on a point of fact, it stops them from accessing legal aid.

National Security Bill (Third sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I recognise that the Minister is trying to make progress and I apologise for intervening, but does he have any concerns about the Attorney General test? Does he think that the Attorney General does not protect the Government from embarrassment? Does he think that the law always comes above with the Attorney General?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

Earlier, we talked about sentencing guidelines. My understanding is that we are not in a position to give more detail on that yet. That is something I have discussed with the Ministry of Justice, as we will come to later.

With regard to the offence, one issue we have is the offence is designed to catch overseas activity with a strong link to the UK. It has been set at the threshold of a UK offence, so if we extend who it will to apply to, that will end up extending the scope of the offence. It is almost as if we have tried to put a safeguard in place to protect and control it, and the more we extend it, the more it will extend the scope of the offence and bring more and more within its scope, so that is the position we are in.

[Jess Phillips]

As a point of clarification, how will it apply to somebody who has indefinite leave to remain, who is not a lawful British citizen in the United Kingdom but very much operating here?

[Stephen McPartland]

It applies in the sense that if that person were to commit murder, they would be prosecuted in this country under the laws applying to murder.

[Jess Phillips]

The Minister would be surprised.

[Stephen McPartland]

Effectively, it would apply in the same way. As I have said, with all these offences the Advocate General has to sign them off, and the Crown Prosecution Service as well.

[Jess Phillips]

In actual fact, on a number of occasions I have handled cases where someone with ILR in the UK has committed murder abroad and there was absolutely nothing that could be done about it.

[The Chair]

That is well beyond the scope of the Bill.

[Jess Phillips]

But it is not beyond the scope of what—

[The Chair]

It is beyond the scope of the Bill.

National Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

North Durham.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

He hates west Durham.

[Stephen McPartland]

Sorry—North Durham.

I am grateful for the way the hon. Member for Halifax has tried to help us improve the Bill. She has been constructive throughout.

Paragraph 1 provides a delegated power for the Secretary of State to designate places where someone may be detained after arrest for foreign power threat activity under clause 21. If arrested under PACE, suspects are taken to a designated police station and held in a custody cell, unless they are being questioned, when they will be in an interview room. When arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000, suspects are taken to a TACT custody suite. If a TACT suite is not available—for example, because the nearest one is located too far away—as an alternative a police station can be used.

There are five TACT suites in England and Wales, one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland. Currently, they are all located inside police stations. Police use TACT suites in the first instance because they are designed to hold suspects for longer periods and address their specific personal needs. They are also designed to take into account the operational requirements for handling those suspects. For example, they are bigger and they ensure that, when multiple arrests have been made, suspects cannot communicate with other. The staff are also specially trained to deal with those types of suspects.

Under the designation power in paragraph 1, the Secretary of State will issue a certificate to the chief officer in charge of a facility to affirm its accreditation. The designation will be published through the routine Home Office circular update, so it will be publicly available to view. In order for a facility to be designated, it must meet the technical standards of custody suites set by the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. The power means that a bespoke custody suite or other suitable facilities built or identified in the future outside a police station, where they meet the standards above, can be designated as a place of detention by the Secretary of State. That is just future-proofing.

Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services already independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces. It already regularly inspects police custody conditions and, in 2019, published a joint inspection with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons of TACT custody suites in England and Wales.

National Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing out that typo. That is very important to us all, and I will carry on talking while I wait for some information. I think that is an important point. As we know, the Bill is evolving and will continue to evolve. We will ensure that any potential errors are corrected throughout its passage. It does look as though it should say “section 26”, so we will definitely fix that.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

We had all noticed.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his eagle eyes.

National Security Bill (Ninth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

Halewood, sorry; I am getting mixed up. I do not know who I have insulted most—Members for the west midlands or Members for Merseyside.

The Minister is still in post, so why is he not here this morning? To be fair to him, the hon. Member for Stevenage picked the Bill up at a difficult time and worked hard to master the detail. His civil servants must have been pulling their hair out about some of the questions. I have known him for many years: he will not take everything as fed in front of him, but will ask questions. The civil servants might be relieved to get rid of him. But that is not the point. If he is still in post, as we are led to believe, why is he not in Committee this morning?

It is important for us to consider this Bill. I just hope that we will get back on track, because the other thing that is needed quickly—whoever the new Minister is—is early engagement on this type of Bill with the Opposition, to see what we can get through uncontroversially and what areas need changing. Lo and behold, some parts of the Bill might then need changing yet again. The Government will have to do something that I do not ever agree with, which happened when we were in government and increasingly with this Government: leave major changes to the Lords.

The Lords has somehow become the great oracle that listens to everything and changes things that we cannot spot; the only reason why things are not changed here is that successive Governments have got into the habit of railroading things through here and making concessions there. That diminishes the House of Commons and does not lead to proper and good scrutiny. It is not a failure of a Government to admit in a House of Commons Committee that there are problems in a Bill and to change them. Unfortunately, it is seen as such, so it is left to their lordships’ House to change things. With that, I shall resume my seat.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

It is a good job that the Bill is not about anything important. I say that to start, because it reminds me of going to the Department for Education with a headteacher from my constituency. As he walked out, he said, “Thank God they aren’t in charge of anything important!” What the Committee is discussing today—what we should be discussing—is deeply important. Instead, we are discussing adjournments, different rules of the House of Commons and whether we should have this debate. Something else worries me.

I give massive credit to the Security Minister, who not only picked up the detail very quickly but quickly built relationships with members across the Committee to ensure that the right scrutiny was going on and that people felt they were being given information. I give credit to him for that, as he picked up the Bill at a very late stage.

Apart from the two other times when the Minister was replaced on this Committee, I have never been in a situation where I am debating this sort of motion, so I ask the Chair for some guidance. Is the Whip—my sympathies go out to him—who is taking the Minister’s seat required to respond to our questions?

[The Chair]

The motion is simply that the Committee will not sit this afternoon at 2 o’clock. Therefore, the Whip responsible may or may not reply to the Committee, at his own discretion.

[Jess Phillips]

I think he is a man of honour, so I will fire out the questions anyway. On whether we should go ahead and whether the Minister could be found somewhere in this building, where I am certain that he is, and pick up his very capable and able management of the Bill as he has done throughout, the fundamental question is: what faith are we meant to have that, on this very detailed and far-reaching—in some places, too far-reaching—Bill, the person who arrives on Thursday morning, who may have just been given their job, will be across that detail? Will they be able to answer my questions, as the Minister did and I hope the Whip will in his stead? What hope is there that a new Minister will be able to answer the intricate questions that, certainly, I have about issues largely in part 3?

It feels like giving in to say that we should not carry on examining the Bill, in all honesty, but we will return on Thursday as a lesser Committee. That is, in essence, what will happen, unless—I do not know because anything could happen these days: perhaps one of the civil servants who wrote the Bill will become the Security Minister, having been put in the House of Lords. They might stay in post for three months and resign afterwards. Stranger things have happened—in fact, that has happened.

Would we tolerate what has happened today from any of the services that we are debating? If they said, “Sorry, the head of counter-terrorism police has been dealing with a case and we’re just going to give it to Alan. He’s in court this morning and he’s picking up the case, but he doesn’t have any of the details”, we would not tolerate that. Yet that is what we are being asked to tolerate. This is very important legislation. It is greatly regrettable that it has been so poorly managed from beginning to end.

[Scott Mann]

I have listened intently to the points made from the Opposition Benches. My first port of call after this will be the Chief Whip’s office to discuss the arrangements for the programming of the Bill and the sittings that we currently have. That is what I will do after I have sat down, and I hope we can now adjourn.

National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

Under the Bill, courts can formally be required to consider whether to reduce or withhold damages awarded when they find for the claimant in a national security claim where the claimant’s own wrongdoing of a terrorist nature should be taken into account. I will set out the detail of the reforms when I speak to clauses 58 and 59.

On clause 57, it is important to set out the types of cases in which the powers that would be exercised in clauses 58 and 59 would apply, and those in which they would be excluded from applying. The clause establishes that the reforms to reduce damages would apply only in cases that relate to national security proceedings. Those are cases in which one of the parties in the proceedings has presented evidence or made submissions to the court on a matter of national security. That particularly applies to specified types of claims—for example, those involving the use of investigative powers or surveillance, or the activities of the UK’s intelligence services, and cases relating to terrorism-related activity in the UK or overseas. However, the legislation excludes claims brought under the Human Rights Act 1998. The clause specifies that the reforms apply only to claims that are brought against the Crown, which reflects the fact that this cohort of cases is aimed at actions brought against our national security services.

Clause 58 details the measures under which courts can be formally required to consider whether to reduce or withhold damages awarded when the court finds for the claimant in a national security claim, but the claimant’s wrongdoing of a terrorist nature should be taken into account. This measure is aimed at those cases where a claimant, often based overseas, makes a claim against UK security services that is based on, or related to, the claimant’s own involvement in terrorist activity. Although courts already have discretion over the amount of damages to award, they can in theory make a declaration on a finding of fact outcome with no award. In civil tort cases, however, this approach is very rarely taken. In such cases, the courts follow a regular pattern by seeking to establish liability, calculate compensation and award damages. The Bill would go further by requiring courts to consider reducing or removing damages in exceptional cases. These are cases involving matters of national security in which the claimant’s case relates to their involvement in terrorism—for example, to personal injury sustained in the course of such activities—where a claim is then made against UK security services.

It is important to note that the Bill does not fetter the court’s discretion; judges will still be able to determine cases fairly, independently and objectively. However, we think it is appropriate in these cases that they consider the claimant’s conduct as well as the state’s. Here, as in the companion measures on damages freezing and forfeiture, the Government have an overriding duty of public protection and the safety of society. The measures will reduce the prospect of large sums in damages being paid to people associated with terrorism, who may use those resources to fund acts of terror.

In addressing amendment 59, I have spoken about the duty imposed on the court to consider, in the circumstances of the case and on the evidence presented, whether it would be appropriate for the claimant’s damages award to be reduced, including to nil. The key word there is “consider”. The legislation is not fettering the court’s discretion. Judges will assess whether, on the balance of probabilities, the factors set out in subsection (2) are made out, and if they are, whether a reduction in damages is appropriate. If the court is satisfied, it will assess what an appropriate reduction in damages should be. In making that assessment, the court will receive submissions from both the security services and claimant, and there will be a right of appeal. The proceedings will be able to rely on the closed material procedures where necessary, to ensure that there is a fair trial and that the evidence is tested. It is also important to note that the claimant will have a right of appeal against the decision of the court.

Amendment 59, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, seeks to make it explicit in the Bill that the court will not be required to consider reducing damages when the claimant has not been involved in the commission of terrorist offences or other terrorist-related activity. The Government’s intention is not for this reform to apply in national security cases where a claimant had no involvement in wrongdoing of a terrorist nature; nor is it contemplated that the security services would make an application for this duty to be exercised by the court in such cases. The Government will seek to introduce an amendment to clarify this point in the Bill once consultations with parliamentary counsel have concluded. In such case, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment, and I will be happy to discuss the issue with her in advance of the Government tabling its proposed amendment.

Clause 59 provides some supplemental procedural requirements, including safeguards, for the Crown’s application for the court to exercise its duty under clause 58. As I have outlined, the measure is aimed at those cases where a claimant, often based overseas, makes a claim against the UK security services that is related to that claimant’s involvement in terrorist activity. Clause 59 supports and supplements clause 58 by setting out the essential requirements of an application made under that clause. The procedural and evidential requirements are set out, as well as the grounds on which the court may refuse an application. We are confident that our measures provide a reasonable, proper and proportionate balance between the right to access justice, and the need to protect national security and to properly deploy the resources devoted to it. The reforms will have a deterrent effect on litigation, so that the UK is no longer seen as such a soft touch for litigation of this nature.

Finally, clause 60 is designed to ensure that interpretation of the legislation by the courts and others will be consistent with terms defined and understood in existing statutes that concern national security, and in measures to combat terrorism. As such, the clause defines relevant terms used in the Bill, such as “terrorism offence” and “intelligence service”. That ensures that there is no inconsistency or ambiguity in the wider legal framework, and that the Bill complements existing legislation. The clause clarifies the relatively narrow cohort of cases at which these reforms are aimed, which are those brought against the Crown on matters of national security, in which a claimant has had some involvement with terrorist activities or offences.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I have heard what the Minister said. The Committee is finding common cause on these matters, as we do on much of the Bill. This is in no way a criticism of him, his speech or what he is offering, but it is a shame that there has been no Justice Ministers on this Bill. Frankly, part 3 of the Bill is far more concerned with justice measures than it is with home affairs in the classic sense. I have felt for some of the many Home Office Ministers who have been in front of us during this Committee in the role of Security Minister; they have had to justify things that did not relate to their Department.

My problem with part 3 more generally—then I will come on to my amendment—and this was clear from the evidence sessions, some four Ministers ago, concerns the nature of deterrents. As we go through the Bill and look over each acronym—we have all learned them like a second language by now—we are seeking to protect and secure our nation. Nobody in this room has any greater claim to do that than anybody else. That is all we seek to do. The trouble with much of part 3—evidence on this has been presented to us—is that it potentially reverses that. Parts of it are of concern for the prevention of terrorism. That is a fundamental line that needs to be drawn. Labour certainly wishes the Government, with their new slew of Ministers, to go back and investigate whether prevention is at the very heart of what is being suggested in part 3 more generally.

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[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. Sadly, over the past 12 years, legal aid has been cut back in this country. It is now a tax on the innocent, in my view. Would she agree that, while people find legal aid for potential terrorists abhorrent, there is a long list of other people that the public might want to withdraw legal aid from? That could include rapists, paedophiles, murderers—you name it. The core point is that those individuals need to go before a court. That is not just for those individuals, but for the potential victims, so that we can ensure that the truth comes out and justice is served.

[Jess Phillips]

I agree 100%. For much of my career, I have been painted as being very one-sided on such matters, but I know that justice has been properly served to the victims I have worked with in my life by a justice system that is properly resourced.

I have seen the degradation of legal aid harm victims’ processes in court. It holds things up and, in lots of cases—certainly in the civil courts, which is what part 3 is largely about—it has caused a perverse situation whereby perpetrators are able to cross-examine victims, as neither has access to any advocacy because neither qualified for legal aid. There is therefore the perverse situation that victims of domestic abuse or rape can, in family court, be cross-examined by their rapist. There is potential for that same unintended consequence as a result of what is being proposed in the Bill. I say that it is an unintended consequence; I think that the will to do what has been put in the Bill comes from a decent, if somewhat misguided, place.

[Mr Jones]

I am not sure that I agree with my hon. Friend. The problem with the Bill, as she suggests, is that we have a Home Office Minister, and an MOJ shadow operation in the back. The lifting of that shadow, via the dismissal of the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), might help the process and ensure that we get a Bill that is at least functional and does everything we want it to do.

[Jess Phillips]

Throughout this Committee, a lot of people have been called on to comment on what is going on internally on the Government Benches. I may be less qualified than others, but I suspect that what my right hon. Friend says about the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton may well be true. I wish him the best of luck on the Back Benches.

I will move on to the amendment. I have heard what the Minister has graciously said about the Bill not intending to come in the way of people who are caught up in acts of terrorism. However, its drafting leaves that open. I also hear what he says about proposing further amendments in this space.

Amendment 59 seeks to protect innocent bystanders, or even victims of crime, from being excluded from seeking damages for harm caused by the state. The Bill provides for a duty on the court, in cases where evidence is related to the intelligence services, to consider reducing damages that could be paid in a claim against the state. Potentially, the whole amount can be denied. While we of course support the concept that public money via damages should not be used to fund terrorism, the drafting of the clause is incredibly broad. The potential consequences of such loose and opaque language are disturbing and must be taken seriously if we are not to undermine the values we seek to uphold with this legislation.

I will demonstrate the issues—as I am sure nobody here will be surprised to hear this—through a gendered lens. In the discourse on security and terrorism, we commonly forget about women. In the assessment, analysis and debate, the impact and experiences of women do not often play a central role. I will use the platform I have to unpack the issues through consideration of how they will affect a victim of gendered violence.

Earlier this year, a case hit the headlines. The BBC claimed that an MI5 informant—I shall call him X—used his status to abuse his partner. I will share just a few of the details from the investigation. Beth—not her real name—a British national, met the MI5 informant online. As time passed, she became aware that he collected weapons, and he made her watch terrorist videos of violence. She realised he was a misogynist and extremist. Beth claimed he sexually assaulted her, was abusive and coercive, and used his position in the British security forces to terrorise her. She said:

“He had complete control. I was a shadow of who I am now,”

and:

“There was so much psychological terror from him to me, that ultimately culminated in me having a breakdown, because I was so afraid of everything—because of how he’d made me think, the people that he was involved with, and the people who he worked for.”

Beth says X told her he worked as a covert human intelligence source, infiltrating extremist networks. Beth claimed he told her that his status meant she could not report his behaviour:

“It meant that I couldn’t speak out about any of his behaviour towards me, any of the violence I went through, sexual or physical, because he had men in high places who always had his back, who would intervene and who would actively kill me, if I spoke out”.

In a video filmed on Beth’s phone, X threatens to kill her, and attacks her with a machete. She is screaming as the video cuts out. A few hours later, Beth says he tried to cut her throat. X was arrested and charged, but the case was dropped, and the BBC claims its investigation uncovered serious issues with the police response to this incident. That is an entirely different speech for an entirely different day. Heartbreakingly, Beth had a mental breakdown and was hospitalised.

Another previous partner—we will call her Ruth—says that X also abused and terrorised her. He threatened her life and that of her child:

“He said he would be able to kill me and my daughter, too, and then put our bodies somewhere and no one would ever know who I am.”

Ruth was unable to speak due to trauma and was also admitted to hospital. She said:

“I was psychologically broken, really broken”.

There are many issues to discuss around this case, regarding how the state and intelligence services should balance the need to safeguard individuals and the need for informants who infiltrate the darkest circles of society. What I want to outline, however, is the horrendous, hellish experience of those two women at the hands of this man X: the trauma, the violence, the abuse, the isolation, and how the man exploited his position to terrorise those women, who had done nothing wrong. Under the clause, if those women had sought damages for harm caused by the state, those damages could have been limited, or reduced to zero.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that it is not the state doing harm, but the individual?

[Jess Phillips]

There is almost certainly always going to be an ideological difference between the hon. Lady and me on personal responsibility and the responsibility of the state. It is of course the individual doing harm, but it is the state that intervenes to protect the parties, or the state that allows cases to be closed. The idea that the state does not have a responsibility for the human rights of a victim of crime such as this when it comes to how they are treated when they try to interact with the state is, I am afraid, for the birds. Almost every single rape victim I have ever met—I have met thousands—tells me that the initial trauma they were put through is almost nothing compared with the trauma of going through any particular state system.

The provisions of the clause, as it stands, mean that if the women had sought damages for harm, those damages would be limited, potentially, to zero. These are completely innocent bystanders, victims of crimes in which the intelligence services and their power were weaponised to abuse and control them. These women could be denied redress even if wrongdoing by the state was proven. This case, where a man was videoed attacking a woman with a machete, was then closed. Even if it were found and proven that the state was responsible, the woman would still not have a claim. The current drafting does not require that the matter over which damages are sought is directly related to terrorist activity.

I have used this case—a covert human intelligence source case—as an example, but the concerns apply to many other situations and many people whose actions will have had nothing to do with criminal activity. That cannot be right. The provisions are simply too broadly drawn.

The amendment would mean that the limitations to seeking damages apply only to those who have committed wrongdoing involving terrorism. I have made my feelings clear about part 3 of the Bill, but this is simply an amendment to make sure that innocent people definitely do not fall within the scope of the provisions when they are caught up in a terrible situation, which I am very glad the Minister has recognised. The Bill must include this constraint.

There are other broad, loose elements in the Bill that are concerning. I raise them now and urge clarification from the Minister. Seeking damages is a tool to hold the state accountable. The clauses apply only when courts have already found the UK Government liable for wrongdoing. How are the Government going to ensure the provisions in these clauses are not used to allow the Government to evade being held accountable for their actions?

The current drafting seems to suggest that, if there is any evidence related to national security or the intelligence services, the damages for harm could be reduced or erased. The Law Commission has highlighted that that could create a perverse situation where the state could introduce pointless or insignificant national security evidence in order to avoid paying damages under the provisions in the Bill. How will the Government safeguard against that situation? It is a perfectly reasonable to want to have safeguards against that situation in place.

Reprieve has argued that clauses 57 to 60 could limit the ability of victims of torture to seek legal redress for harm done. The state could claim, for example, that in becoming complicit in torture or abuse, the UK was seeking to prevent or limit some other risk of harm, and so reduce or erase damages for a claimant.

Clause 57 rightly excludes from the definition of “national security proceedings” any claims under the Human Rights Act 1998. Our concern is the breadth of the clauses. They potentially enable the state to avoid paying out for UK complicity in torture and abuse under UK civil law. Most survivors of torture seek redress through ordinary civil claims. I will not go into details because it is sub judice, but the case of Jagtar Singh Johal, which was debated in the House yesterday, springs to mind.

We seek reassurance that the clauses will not be used to evade accountability and redress for complicity in abuse. Furthermore, the involvement of the intelligence services in other countries is covered by the Bill, but how do the Government intend to ensure that conduct is legal and ethical under UK law? What safeguards exist around that?

Many concerns and questions remain about the drafting of this part of the Bill, and we urge that our amendment be included in it. We will seek to vote on this issue at the next Commons stage of the Bill’s passage should we not be satisfied, but I have heard the Minister’s words and I thank him.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

The point of this House is to indicate opinion as well. I do know two judges, under whose roofs I have lived, and both of them left me in absolutely no doubt as to who takes the decision. I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s point.

As I said in my opening speech on the clause, the courts when awarding civil tort damages will only very rarely exercise their right to limit them. That is why we believe it is right to require the courts to consider doing so, even if they then do not do so. I hope that answers the questions at this stage, and I repeat my commitment to engage in further conversation with members of the Committee.

[Jess Phillips]

Given the Minister’s words and the offer to work together, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 58 to 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 61

Damages at risk of being used for the purposes of terrorism

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 58, in schedule 10, page 140, line 12, leave out

“there is a real risk that”.

This amendment would ensure the court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that damages were to be used for terrorism purposes before frozen funds could be forfeited.

That schedule 10 be the Tenth schedule to the Bill.

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[Stewart Hosie]

My right hon. Friend is right that there is already legislation on terrorist financing. As the Minister pointed out in his opening remarks, there is already a way of freezing terrorist assets, but he said that it was complicated. If we are not just to do things properly and legally but to be seen to be doing them properly, legally and fairly, it may be worth going through those processes to do that.

Schedule 10 proposes, as the Minister said, a freezing order for two years under paragraph (1). Then, an extension is possible for four years under paragraph (2) and, even more drastically, the funds can be forfeited altogether. But the standard of proof in the Bill—the real risk—means no criminal conviction for anything. Even if the court were to think that damages would probably be used for legitimate purposes, but there was a real possibility that they might be used for something else, the damages could be frozen or forfeited entirely.

I can just about live with a general scheme—none of us is naive and none of us wants to see money from any source used to finance terrorism—but, surely, such a drastic step requires actual proof, at least on the balance of probability, that there is a risk of the funds being used for terrorism. That is precisely what the amendment, which removes reference to “real risk”, would achieve.

[Jess Phillips]

I want to speak to the amendment and to the desire of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood, who is momentarily not in her place, to speak to a case, although the Minister said that the schedule was not based on any particular case.

The right hon. Member for Dundee East asked about other moneys, specifically a lottery win. Why should the schedule be just for damages? What if we thought somebody’s lottery win, for example, was going to be used? That seems outrageous and unlikely, except it happened to me. The only time I have ever had any personal relations with anti-terror police was when they turned up mob-handed to my office, because of threats to my life that I had received from inside a prison. The threats were jihadist in nature and largely about how the person in prison—obviously a risk factor, on the balance of probabilities—was working with people on the outside to kill me and my family. The terror police came and we undertook a case against the man.

It came to pass—through the process of convicting the man, who is now in prison for a term of another 10 years for the crime against me—that the reason why the police had such grave concerns, even though they were not sure whether he was part of a particular network or indeed working with anyone else, was that while on mental health day release, he had won the lottery and had access to quite substantial sums that could have been used in the commission of crimes against me while still in prison.

[Mr Jones]

I do not know whether my hon. Friend is aware of the international comparison with the gangster in Boston called Whitey Bulger. He was a notorious gangster whose unexplained wealth was explained by a lottery win, which was outside the jurisdiction of the courts in the United States.

[Jess Phillips]

That is brilliant. I am in good company with Chicago gangland—

[Mr Jones]

Boston.

[Jess Phillips]

With Boston bosses.

One of the risk factors in the case was that issue of a lottery win. There was a certain evidential threshold in the case that was easy to prove in court, because he was threatening to kill me! Please excuse me laughing—one has to laugh at such things, because life becomes ridiculous otherwise.

Why stop with damages? Why should we have a different rule? Nothing could be done in the case that I outlined. I think it is a one in 1.8 million chance of my case happening, so if we have no cases to base it on, I wonder why the focus is on this and not on the case that I outlined.

[Mr Jones]

The Ministry of Justice and the Home Office employ a wide variety of talents among the individuals whom they recruit, but I did not realise that they actually recruit fortune tellers. That is what we are into here. We have established that there have been no such cases. I am not aware—perhaps the Minister can provide some examples—of why the security services think this is a risk. If that does not exist, this is in the realms of predicting the future, and if there is one thing that we can all agree on—possibly everyone—it is that we cannot predict what happens in the future.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley just said, why only the damages? There is already extensive legislation on the statute books to freeze proceeds of crime and bank accounts if they are to be used for criminal activities. What extra weapons will we give to the courts? I do not see anything that is not there at the moment.

As for using the measure—as opposed to freezing, for example, as I said to the right hon. Member for Dundee East—there is already legislation on the statute book to prevent someone from financing terrorism. In such a situation, what evidence would the Government or the state actually put before the courts? They cannot say simply, “We think he or she might use their proceeds for terrorist activity in future”; it has to be based on intelligence. Again, putting the evidence into court would still expose the state. I presume the existing process would be followed, but it would still mean that we might be putting intelligence in the courts that is not just historical, but actually live, in terms of things such as associations. I just think it is a very clumsy way of trying to proceed. We do not want any money, wherever it comes from, to be used for financing terrorism, but I do not understand where the proposal has come from in the first place. I would be interested if the Minister could find out, because I am also clear that we should not put measures on the statue book unless we have to.

Another point—it is quite amusing in one respect—is the idea that we can decide that an individual who is going to potentially fund terrorism is only going to get half or part of their settlement. I am reassured that the lawyers will be getting their fees, because it would be dreadful if they were having to go to food banks after not getting their pay from a case. However, the Minister then said that care costs and other things would be taken into account. How would the decision be made? Using care costs as an example, if a person gets a certain amount in damages, they might need them for a few years to come if their care costs are ongoing. So, we could not really cap where that is going to go, and that affects the individual’s ability to claim on the state for their care costs. This is a mess. It is one of the examples in the Bill where the odd thing is just thrown in that is not needed. If the Minister could demonstrate to me why this is so important to include in the Bill, I would back him 100%. However, I think that the measure is clumsy, that it will never be used, and that it will damage the reputation of this Bill, which some people have done a good enough job of doing as it is. The Minister certainly will not accept the amendment, but this is another issue that he might want to cogitate on, and decide whether it is worth the candle.

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[Stewart Hosie]

I am not sure that we are particularly enlightened by the Government’s response. I must say I share the scepticism of the right hon. Member for North Durham. How many times are the Government going to have to spend huge amounts of money to fight against somebody who has been awarded some damages on the grounds that they may then wish to use those damages to support terrorism? I am not dreadfully convinced by that argument.

I will not press the amendment, but given we are into the sphere of crystal balls, subjectivity and a judicial threshold that is far too low for this action, I would not be at all surprised if a similar amendment to this one sees the light of day at a later stage of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clause 62

Legal aid for individuals convicted of terrorism offences

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 62, page 44, line 21, leave out “F” and insert “G”.

This amendment is a paving amendment for Amendment 60.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 60, in clause 62, page 45, line 3, at end insert—

“(7A) Condition G is met where the offender is seeking legal aid for the purposes of—

(a) pursuing a civil order, where the purpose of the order is to protect a victim of domestic abuse, or

(b) participating in family court proceedings, and where the offender is a victim of domestic abuse.”

Amendment 62, in clause 62, page 45, line 42, at end insert—

““domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;”

This amendment provides a definition of “domestic abuse” for the purposes of Amendment 60.

Clause stand part.

Clauses 63 and 64 stand part.

[Jess Phillips]

The second element of part 3 of the Bill would prevent people with terrorism convictions from receiving civil legal aid—it is important to stress that it is civil, not criminal. Again, the breadth and consequences of such a broad-brush approach cause me some alarm. Our amendments would address some of those concerns.

Once again, I am looking at the issue through a gendered lens and considering the impact on domestic abuse victims and their children, who are directly referred to in my amendments—amendment 62 refers to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham commented about things being dropped and changed in Committee and during Commons stages, and the passage of the 2021 Act was a good example of where that was done completely and utterly. Obviously, I still think that more things should have been included in that legislation, but what we sent to the other place was the work of everybody in Committee. My amendment 62 draws directly on the definition of domestic abuse contained in that Act.

The clause suggests that restrictions disallowing offenders from accessing civil legal aid will last for 30 years for adult offenders and 15 years for youth offenders, and will apply to any person convicted, irrelevant of the severity of the crime or the sentence imposed for the offence. Those restrictions apply to terrorists who commit the most heinous of mass murders, and also to those who participate in crimes that receive non-custodial sentences, such as encouraging terrorism, disseminating publications or downloading terror manuals. It is an automatic restriction—a court has no discretion to apply or revoke it in any circumstances. The restrictions do not require that the seeking of legal aid be related to the terrorist conviction of the claimant, or specify what the purpose of the civil proceedings might be. It is a blanket restriction covering any civil proceedings; it could be absolutely anything in the civil courts.

The disproportionate and oppressive nature of the drafting becomes stark when we place it in the context of the types of civil cases that legal aid can be needed for. People find themselves in civil proceedings and family court proceedings, and in need of legal aid support, for a multitude of reasons, with housing issues, debt problems and domestic abuse being just a few examples. It is a realm that not everyone may know much about, but anyone who has worked in domestic abuse for as long as I have realises the role that civil and family cases, and the courts, play in people’s lives and their ability to live in the free and safe society that the Government have claimed that they are trying to protect all the way throughout our consideration of the Bill.

For example, a victim of domestic abuse might need legal aid to help her to seek an injunction against her abuser. Non-molestation orders protect a victim or their child from being harmed or threatened by their abuser, while occupation orders decide who can live in a family home or enter the surrounding area. Such injunctions protect victims and children in particular. They protect women. They save women’s lives—huge improvements are needed in how they are served and upheld, but that is not an argument for today. Funnily enough, I noticed on BBC News today that the Government were heralding some of the changes in domestic violence protection orders in cases of domestic abuse, which are usually handed out in a civil environment, and how they were helping to prevent domestic abuse. That was this morning’s news. These injunctions are not some unnecessary add-on or bonus; they are legal measures that protect women from violence and are crucial for the type of society we desire to build and protect.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

Sounds about right to me.

[Jess Phillips]

I am not sure he would agree with the Minister on many other things, but maybe we will get the two of you together. I am sorry to slag off my husband in here—although, actually, it is the perfect place, as he cannot do anything about it, can he?

This is incredibly naive. The reality is that anyone who has worked with female offenders, as I have for many years—this is why we ran their services out of Women’s Aid—recognises that the pathway to offending for the vast majority of women offenders is an abusive man.

So, yes, “Don’t be a terrorist,” is a great thing to say if your abuser is a terrorist. It is very easy to say that when the person who has complete and utter control over your every waking minute is also involved in something you do not necessarily agree with. For example, say that you made a phone call on his behalf. It is easy for everybody to sit and say, “I wouldn’t do that, because I am not a terrorist,” but we all might if we were terrorised. The fundamental thing we should all seek is to prevent that, and to prevent the idea that somebody might then fall into terrorism. The actions in the Bill mean it is much more likely that women in these cases will end up stuck with a terrorist making them be a terrorist, rather than being able to escape them.

There is a broader point to highlight about the connection between domestic abuse and terrorism, because of how commonly terrorists are also abusers in a domestic setting, and also because of female offender patterns, which I have already alluded to. Research carried out by the Home Office in 2021 showed more than a third of suspected extremists referred to the Government’s anti-radicalisation programme Prevent had experienced domestic violence. The police said that of 3,045 people referred to the scheme in 2019, 1,076 had a link to domestic abuse as an offender, victim or both. The male referrals were more likely to be offenders; the female referrals were more likely to be victims. As the national co-ordinator for Prevent, Detective Chief Superintendent Vicky Washington, said:

“This initial research has resulted in some statistically significant data which cannot, and should not, be ignored. Project Starlight has indicated a clear overrepresentation of domestic abuse experiences in the lives of those who are referred to us for safeguarding and support. It is absolutely vital that we use this information to shape what we do, and strengthen our response across all of policing, not just in counter terrorism.”

In short, tackling domestic abuse is critical to tackling terrorism. Any legislation, such as the current draft of this Bill, that undermines our ability to protect domestic abuse victims and stop domestic abuse perpetrators does nothing for the security of our country. Our amendments seek to address the breadth of the current drafting, and to tackle the issues and protect victims of domestic abuse.

I have two further points. Many people have raised concerns about the removal of legal aid. They argue that these clauses are counterproductive in protecting the public, due to the impact of effective rehabilitation. I have a deep concern for individuals who, years after a conviction and successful rehabilitation, find themselves in difficulty, facing homelessness, or are victims of abuse, or are in debt. Okay, if someone has been convicted of something to do with terrorism, they get what they deserve, but there are people working for organisations such as HOPE not hate who have completed rehabilitation pathways and who have then been used to protect the lives of people who work in this building, lest we forget. I have real worries that the blanket provision in the Bill over people who may very well have been rehabilitated could well stop them being able to get the support they might need to continue to be productive members of society. Does it help the rehabilitation, or does it create an environment where a person may make bad choices and cause harm?

As Jonathan Hall argued in the evidence session,

“I have certainly come across cases where the terrorist risk from the individual—the chance of their stabbing someone, for example—goes up if they are not taking their medication or if they are homeless.

My concern about the legal aid is that it will make it harder, for example, for a terrorist offender, maybe 10 years after they have been released and who is facing eviction, to get legal aid. That means that you might have less good decisions made…My real concern is people becoming homeless or falling into debt when they might otherwise be able to get legal assistance.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 11, Q19.]

If our primary driver is to protect the public and reduce risk, we must consider that point. The breadth of the Bill could undermine the very thing that it is trying to protect: a society where people do not live in fear of violence and danger.

[Mr Jones]

The media’s portrayal of legal aid is of giving out huge sums of money to the undeserving and those who are guilty of crimes, but we should start from the basis, as I always do, that people are innocent until proven guilty. The other motive for the Bill is clearly to get some headlines that say, “We are being tough on terrorists.” I will come on to some examples, especially the issue of under-18s, but the Bill does nothing of the sort.

There is also a more fundamental point: if someone is accused of a crime, we want to ensure that the facts are put before the court and that they are properly legally represented so that they can argue their case, and the Crown can argue its case against that evidence. At the end of the day, it is then up to the jury and the courts to decide whether that person is innocent or guilty, and the courts then decide on sentencing. That process is not just some woolly notion of a justice system that this country is proud of; it is actually fundamental to the victims. It is important that the victims of terrorism, or any crime, are assured that a person who is guilty is sentenced and gets the appropriate punishment.

When we talk about terrorists, we are talking about the appalling individuals who perpetrated the Manchester bombing or the London atrocities. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has just said, that is not the spectrum we are talking about here, as the Bill sets a broader one.

I suggest people read the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on extreme right-wing terrorism. In taking evidence for that, the most disturbing fact was that the people who are now being drawn to extreme right-wing terrorism are youngsters, some as young as 14 or 15. It is mainly online, but they are committing offences. There are quite a few—some have been reported publicly—who have been, rightly, imprisoned because they have met the threshold for the court to decide that they committed an offence.

Suppose a 15-year-old is found guilty of a terrorism offence. We are saying that, for the next 15 years, whatever they do—whether another terrorist-related incident or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, a criminal case or a civil case such as eviction—they will be barred from access to legal aid. I might be unpopular for saying this, but legal aid helps the system of justice. The idea that it is doled out willy-nilly to everyone is absolute nonsense: it is hard to meet the thresholds that have been introduced over the last few years. Those thresholds have gone too far, because they are basically a tax on justice for a lot of innocent people. I do not understand where that comes from.

I come back to the point about youngsters and rehabilitation that my hon. Friend made. It is possible that there is a perception that there is an average terrorist. We know what a terrorist is: someone who carries out horrific bombings or activities. However, that is not the case with some of the other thresholds for terrorism offences. For some youngster—a 15-year-old, or someone even a bit older—who has been imprisoned for that type of terrorism, our aim surely is to work with them to get them out of that pathway. The legal aid measures will do nothing at all to help that rehabilitation process. I am sure that many people in the room made decisions when they were 15 that they would perhaps regret now. I am sure that the Minister was a perfect child, but people make mistakes, and they hold views that 15 years later they will not hold. The idea that we penalise those people for life is unacceptable.

The measures have been parachuted into the Bill, and I would like to know the rationale for including them in the Bill. They will not make the process very easy for the Crown, either. If someone cannot get legal aid, what are they going to do? Represent themselves? All that does is make the trial very expensive and not a good process for the victims who are watching.

The broader issue is that there are many people whom we—and, I am sure, the tabloids and others—do not like. We do not like murderers, paedophiles or rapists. If we apply the measures to terrorists, why not extend them to the other people we do not like? I am not proposing that we should. If we did, that is fine: the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) might think that he will get a newspaper headline for being tough on terrorism. But it would make the situation worse. It would slow down the legal process; it would victimise people for many years. What we should be doing with those youngsters is working with them to try to get them away from some of the sick ideologies outlined in the right-wing extremism report from the ISC. We should get them back into society. Look at some of the best examples around the world of rehabilitation of terrorists or extremists—it is about rehabilitation, not punishment.

If someone has carried out an horrific terrorist attack and killed people, I am happy for them to stay in prison for the rest of their lives. I have no problem with that. However, there are those who are on the verge of doing that. It is worse these days because of the internet and social media, which is slowly corrupting some young minds; it leads them to hold ideologies and, in some cases, take steps that cause them to meet that terrorist threshold.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Occam is making his case. The right hon. Gentleman will be assured that I will respond in full, and in kind, as soon as we have had the opportunity to have this discussion among a slightly wider party of colleagues.

Clause 63 ensures that the correct data-sharing and data-processing powers are available to enforce the restriction on access to civil legal aid for those convicted of specified terrorism offences. To enforce the restriction effectively, we must be able to check that an individual has a relevant conviction that would prevent them from accessing funding. To do this, a legal gateway must exist within the legislation to use conviction data for the purposes of administering legal aid. The clause will allow the details of an individual’s conviction status to be requested from the director of legal aid casework and shared from a competent authority that holds the criminal conviction data. This data can be used only for the purpose of identifying whether an applicant for legal aid has been convicted of a specified terrorism offence, in order to determine whether the restriction will apply. Such information may include an individual’s name and date of birth, and the dates of any convictions.

[Jess Phillips]

The Minister has described the process, which, as with all Government processes, always works smoothly. Will they have to do that check on every single person who applies for legal aid?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes.

[Jess Phillips]

It is going to be quite a slow process. The suggestion is that, for every single person who applies for legal aid in any civil remedy or order, we will start writing to a competent authority to get any previous terrorism convictions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I see the right hon. Gentleman’s point. We are going to move on, because he knows that we will be talking about this later.

I thank both the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling their amendments, which seek to carve out an exception from the restriction where the case type involves domestic abuse. I recognise the strength of voice that the hon. Lady has brought to the scourge of domestic violence, and the voice that she has given to so many victims in the House. It is an enormous tribute to her that she is recognised around the country for it, and I certainly listen to her very carefully on this issue. I reassure her that I will be looking at not just the provisions in the clause but the amendment she has tabled. I will also be looking at the exceptional case funding scheme, and I will be discussing it. It is certainly true at the moment that 74% of applications to the ECF are granted, but she has already made the point that there is a hurdle before approaching the 74%. I accept that, and I will be looking at it. I will be taking it seriously. I ask her to withdraw the amendment ahead of future conversations.

[Jess Phillips]

I appreciate the tone that the Minister has taken, and I will withdraw the amendment with a view to see where we get before Report and Third Reading. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 63 and 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 39 to 44.

That schedule 11 be the Eleventh schedule to the Bill.

Clause 66 stand part.

Government amendment 64, in clause 67, page 48, line 25, at end insert—

“(za) regulations under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);

(zb) regulations under section (Meaning of ‘political influence activity’);

(zc) regulations under section (General exemptions);”

This amendment provides that regulations made under the specified provisions are to be made using the affirmative procedure.

Amendment (a) to Government amendment 64, line 4, at end insert—

“(zd) regulations under section (Registration information);

(ze) regulations under section (Information notices);”

Government amendment 65.

Clauses 67 to 73 stand part.

National Security Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will come to the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East. He is absolutely right. Forgive me—that is a drafting error, which we will look at and tidy up.

On diplomatic staff, the hon. Member for Halifax makes a fair point. This is, however, diplomatic staff and their spouses acting in an official capacity—when they are conducting duties on behalf of their nation, and on behalf of the mission that they are sent to support. It is not supposed to be a blanket exemption; it is merely when they are acting in their role.

Who will manage the unit? A scheme management unit is expected to sit within the Home Office—that is, at least, the current plan—which will administer the scheme. It is unlikely that every registration will need to be scrutinised. More likely, the register will be a resource for public scrutiny. That is where the right hon. Member for North Durham, who is not currently present, was absolutely right: sunlight is the best disinfectant, and indeed disinfectant is the best sunlight.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I am sure that the Minister has heard, just as I have, about cuts to Government Department budgets. This being a new additional spend, I wonder whether there has been any assessment of the cost of it, and whether he thinks the cost of it will survive.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As with the whole Bill, the way to think about it is as a public register, and because it is a public register the scrutiny will be provided, no doubt, by our friends in His Majesty’s press corps, who will look through every detail, as they look through every detail of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and ensure that they keep us on our toes. They will no doubt do the same for businesses.

I will have a look at the question of the 14 days as opposed to 10. I am not quite sure why there is that difference, so I will come back to the hon. Member for Halifax on that, and with further details on the management of the scheme.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 18 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 19

Registration information

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the information a person is required to provide to the Secretary of State when registering—

(a) a foreign activity arrangement under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements),

(b) an activity under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons),

(c) a foreign influence arrangement under section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements), or

(d) a political influence activity under section (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals).

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may, in particular, require the person to provide information about any arrangements made by the person pursuant to the arrangement or activity which is required to be registered.

(3) Where there is a material change to any information provided to the Secretary of State under this section or section (Information notices) in relation to a registered arrangement or a registered activity, the person who registered the arrangement or activity must inform the Secretary of State of the change before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the change takes effect.

(4) The Secretary of State—

(a) may by regulations make provision about the information to be provided to the Secretary of State under subsection (3),

(b) may issue guidance about what may or may not constitute a material change.

(5) The provision which may be made by regulations under this section includes provision about the form in which information is to be provided.

(6) A person who fails to comply with subsection (3) commits an offence if, as a result of the failure, the information provided to the Secretary of State in relation to the registered arrangement or registered activity is misleading, false or deceptive in a material way.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause provides for the information to be provided when registering arrangements and activities under the registration scheme.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 20

Information notices

“(1) The Secretary of State may give an information notice to—

(a) a person who is a party to a foreign activity arrangement registered under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);

(b) a person who is a party to a foreign activity arrangement which is required to be, but is not, registered under that section;

(c) a person who has registered activities under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons);

(d) a person the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be carrying out an activity in breach of the prohibition in that section.

(2) The Secretary of State may give an information notice to—

(a) a person who is a party to a foreign influence arrangement registered under section (Requirement to register foreign influence arrangements);

(b) a person who is a party to a foreign influence arrangement which is required to be, but is not, registered under that section;

(c) a person who has registered activities under section (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals);

(d) a person the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be carrying out a political influence activity in breach of the prohibition in that section.

(3) An information notice is a notice requiring the person to whom it is given to supply the information specified in the notice.

(4) An information notice must—

(a) specify the form in which the information must be supplied, and

(b) specify the date by which the information must be supplied.

(5) Where an information notice has been given to a person, the Secretary of State may cancel it by giving written notice to that effect to the person.

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the minimum period between the date on which an information notice is given and the date specified under subsection (4)(b);

(b) other matters which may be specified in an information notice;

(c) the cancellation of information notices.

(7) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with an information notice.

(8) The Secretary of State may not give an information notice to a foreign power.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause permits the Secretary of State to give a notice to a person to provide information in connection with arrangements or activities registrable under the registration scheme.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Confidential material

“(1) Nothing in this Part is to be taken to require any person to disclose any information that the person is entitled to refuse to disclose in legal proceedings on grounds of legal professional privilege (in Scotland, confidentiality of communications).

(2) Nothing in this Part is to be taken to require any person to disclose confidential journalistic material or to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.

(3) In this section—

“confidential journalistic material” has the same meaning as in section 264 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016;

“source of journalistic information” has the same meaning as in section 263 of that Act.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause ensures that the obligations in connection with the registration scheme do not affect legal professional privilege or require the disclosure of confidential journalistic material.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Offence of providing false information

“(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person provides information to the Secretary of State under section (Registration information) or (Information notices) in connection with a foreign activity arrangement, and

(b) the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way.

(2) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person provides information to the Secretary of State under section (Registration information) or (Information notices) in connection with an activity which is required to be registered under section (Requirement to register activities of specified persons), and

(b) the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way.

(3) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person provides information to the Secretary of State under section (Registration information) or (Information notices) in connection with a foreign influence arrangement,

(b) the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way.

(4) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person provides information to the Secretary of State under section (Registration information) or (Information notices) in connection with a political influence activity which is required to be registered under section (Requirement to register political influence activities of foreign principals),

(b) the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way, and

(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is false, inaccurate or misleading in a material way.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This new clause creates offences of providing false or misleading information in connection with the registration scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

I suspect the Minister understands the points I am making and is sympathetic to what I am trying to get at. I put him on notice that, where I think there is information that could and should be in the public domain and I meet barriers relating to national security reasons preventing it from being in the public domain, I will be a thorn in his side every step of the way. With that veiled threat—

[Jess Phillips]

It wasn’t veiled.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Not very veiled, no.