Online Harms Legislation

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

I look forward to working with the Scottish Government on their plans. As the hon. Gentleman knows, this is not a devolved matter, but it is important that we listen to all voices. What we did yesterday kicked off a process that I hope will be very collaborative, and we will work with as many stakeholders as we can possibly find.

I want to be absolutely clear that, whatever the hon. Gentleman might have read in some newspapers, not a single word of the response that we published yesterday was watered down at the request of tech companies. We have gone faster than many have suggested we might have been able to, and we will certainly not be delaying. My appetite is only for us to go as quickly as we possibly can.

The hon. Gentleman talked about director liability, which is something that has been effective—in financial services regulation, for instance. I look forward to looking at all possible options when it comes to sanctions. I want them to be as effective as possible, and nothing is off the table, whatever he might have read. I will leave his comments on financial matters, as they are issues that would be covered by other legislation.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

My hon. Friend has already helpfully recognised that what the regulator in this space requires is the legislative authority to act, the personnel and resources needed to act, and, of course, the sanctions and powers needed to act. Is it not also right, though, that the urgency in giving the regulator those things is not just the need, great though it is, to protect vulnerable people, but the fact that this country could and should lead globally on this, and we will only do so if we get on with it?

[Matt Warman]

I pay tribute to the work that my right hon. and learned Friend did as Secretary of State in leading this agenda. He is absolutely right. Ofcom needs the powers and resources to get this job done properly, but it also needs to make sure that we seize every possible opportunity that comes from the digital economy. Getting that balance right, alongside freedom of expression, is the priority that he set as Secretary of State. We will continue to do that, and we will not go any slower than we absolutely need to.

5G Network and Huawei

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

Although the hon. Lady raises issues that are not directly related to national security, she is absolutely right to do so. This country has ensured that it has a robust relationship with all our partners and allies, and with every other country around the world, so that we can have precisely the sorts of conversations that she asks for, because we know just how important they are.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It would be wrong to suggest, would it not, that this decision is simple. It is far from straightforward, but can I ask my hon. Friend to give us two pieces of reassurance about how it will be made? First, will he reassure us that it will be made in accordance with, and not in contradiction to, the advice given by our intelligence agencies? Secondly, will he reassure us that the Government will have considered, and will be able to share with the House, their assessment of the long-term commercial viability of Huawei equipment, given the entity listing decisions of the US Administration?

[Matt Warman]

My right hon. and learned Friend very much invites me to pre-empt the decision. I can, of course, say with absolute certainty that any decision will be made after intense engagement with the advice of the agencies. That will, of course, by its nature, have to consider the long-term consequences of the decision, so the short answer to his question is: yes, and yes.

Football Association and Bet365

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Thursday 9th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Adams]

It is worth pointing out again that seven gambling companies are involved in this arrangement with IMG. I know that the FA is in constant contact with IMG, and they have been put in no doubt about our views on the current arrangement.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) on securing this urgent question, and I thank the Minister for what he has said. He is right to highlight the progress that the FA has made on football and betting, but does he agree that bad decisions such as this one are in danger of making that perception of progress disappear in a puff of smoke? Given that there will be an increase in gambling as a result of this deal—after all, that is why Bet365 has engaged in it—there will also be an increase in problem gambling. That needs to be properly monitored, that monitoring will have a cost and that cost should be paid by Bet365 and the FA. If it can be demonstrated that there has been an increase in problem gambling, that should bring forward the review of the deal.

[Nigel Adams]

The former Secretary of State makes an incredibly good point. As I said to the Chairman of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins), nothing is off the table in respect of the conversations that we will have with the FA.

Shared Rural Network

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Monday 28th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Nicky Morgan]

I thank the hon. Lady very much for her question. In talking about the difficulties and the disappointments, she almost ran out of time to actually ask her questions. She is right to say that connectivity is hugely important for all our constituents wherever they are. There will be, as she will know if she looks at the detail, a shared rural network entity, to which all four mobile network operators will be party, and that is the way they will be held accountable by the Department for the targets they are meeting.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I suspect that, had my right hon. Friend announced a coverage improvement to 195%, the Labour party would still not have said that it was enough. Some of us can see this for what it is, which is a significant step in the right direction, on which I congratulate her. None the less, does she agree that, as she said, this is a voluntary agreement in exchange for removal of conditions on a spectrum auction, and that it is sensible to make sure that Ofcom keeps compulsory roaming on the table until the ink is dry on a voluntary agreement to make it happen?

[Nicky Morgan]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend very much. There appears to be a surfeit of former holders of my office on these Benches today, which is a sign of just how much time everyone in this job has had to invest in getting to this stage. He is right that it would not have mattered what we announced today, the Labour party would have found reason to disagree with it, which is unfair to the people they represent. He is absolutely right that we need to keep all the options on the table until that legally binding agreement is concluded, and that is what we will both be doing.

Racism in Football

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Tuesday 15th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Adams]

The hon. Gentleman is spot on. We are making that clear and, as I said, I am writing to the president of UEFA today to say that enough is enough. We have seen too many examples of this horrific abuse. We saw it on TV, and there was CCTV in the crowd—the FA also had monitors in the crowd. It is beyond belief that this is still happening, and we will support the FA, which is unable to comment today because it has asked for an investigation to be launched. We expect the UEFA response to be robust.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on his appointment and agree wholeheartedly with all that has been said so far. Is it not important that, in the support we give to players, we send a signal not just from this place but from football authorities, national and international, that if those players choose to stay on the pitch, in the face of this awful abuse, they will have our admiration for their courage and commitment to the sport, but that if they choose to walk off the pitch, we will respect that choice, too, and there will be no negative consequences for their career, either in the short term or the long term?

[Nigel Adams]

The former Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is absolutely right about there being complete support. There was an opportunity for the players to walk off the pitch for 10 minutes last night, just before half time—that is step 2 of the protocol—and I commend the referee again for giving them that opportunity, but they decided to stay on as there were only four or five minutes left. It absolutely should be down to the players, and we will respect their choice. The FA would respect it, and I am pleased to see that the referee would also have respected it last night.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Thursday 3rd October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

It is important to say in this context that what the Government are doing, via the Brexit website or any other website, is, first, nothing out of the ordinary, and secondly, serves a very useful purpose in ensuring that we, just like businesses, know our users.

[Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I warmly welcome my hon. Friend and his fellow Ministers to their leadership roles in this remarkable Department.

I urge my hon. Friend to translate the online harms White Paper into legislation as swiftly as possible, and invite him to agree that doing so is not just good for the United Kingdom, because it will create a regulator with the authority to enforce a proper duty of care on online companies, but will also be an act of global leadership, whether or not other countries are acting as swiftly as we are.

[Matt Warman]

I begin by paying tribute to the great work that my right hon. and learned Friend did in overseeing the birth of the online harms White Paper. He is completely right: we should be proud in this House that it is an open, liberal democracy such as the United Kingdom that seeks to lead the way in an immensely difficult area. He is right to say that we should move quickly, but we should also move at a pace that allows us to get this vital issue correct.

News UK: Sharing Journalistic Resources

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2019 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Jeremy Wright)]

On 10 January 2019, News UK submitted an application to vary certain conditions put in place in 1981 by the then Secretary of State for Trade. The changes proposed by News UK would allow The Times and The Sunday Times to share journalistic resources, subject to the agreement of each newspaper’s editor.

Having considered News UK’s application and representations made following an invitation to comment issued by DCMS on 17 January, I announced, in a written ministerial statement dated 11 April, that I was minded to accept News UK’s application to vary the 1981 conditions.

However, in considering the proposed new undertakings as a whole, I also noted that the existing governance arrangements lacked clarity and certainty over roles and responsibilities. Following discussions between News UK and Officials, News UK submitted revised undertakings which substantially meet my concerns.

On 27 June, as required by legislation, I issued a further consultation notice seeking views on the changes to News UK’s revised undertakings. Two responses were received. Neither response raised any issues that would warrant me seeking further modifications to the undertakings from News UK. Accordingly, I have today formally decided to accept the new undertakings and have today issued a notice of acceptance. A copy of the notice of acceptance with the final signed undertakings and the revised articles of association of Times Newspapers Ltd (TNL) and Times Newspapers Holding Ltd (TNHL) will be published on the Government website. My Department will shortly publish in the issues note circulated to News UK prior to the discussions with Officials.

The new undertakings creates an explicit requirement for the CMA and the Secretary of State to monitor the effectiveness of the obligations placed on News UK and the TNHL Independent National Directors (INDs). As part of this, I can confirm that in line with the Government's commitments on the handling of media merger cases, that DCMS will publish a non-confidential version of the reports from the TNHL INDs which have to be submitted to DCMS and the CMA annually.

[HCWS1798]

Telecoms Supply Chain Review

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Monday 22nd July 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Jeremy Wright)]

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement.

New telecoms technologies and next generation networks such as 5G and full fibre can change our lives for the better. They can give us the freedom to live and work more freely, they can help rural communities to develop thriving digital economies and they can help the socially isolated to maintain relationships. They can transform manufacturing, and make possible connected and autonomous vehicles, smart cities and agriculture. But we can begin this revolution with confidence only if our critical infrastructure remains safe and secure.

We know that there are those who have the intention and the capability to carry out espionage, sabotage and destructive cyber-attacks against our communications sector. The move to 5G brings a new dimension to those risks, given the increased dependence that our national infrastructure is likely to have on those networks over time. That is why, soon after taking up this office, I commissioned a review into the UK telecoms supply chain, involving Government, industry, international partners and the National Cyber Security Centre. It was designed to assess the security and resilience of the UK’s telecoms networks, and to determine what should be done to improve them. Today, I have published its conclusions.

The review identified three key areas of concern. First, existing arrangements may have achieved good commercial outcomes, but they have not incentivised cyber-security risk management. Secondly, policy and regulation in enforcing telecoms cyber-security need to be significantly strengthened to address those concerns. Finally, the lack of diversity across the telecoms supply chain creates the possibility of national dependence on single suppliers, which poses a range of risks to the security and resilience of UK telecoms networks.

The review concluded that the current protections put in place by industry are unlikely to be adequate to address the identified security risks and deliver the desired security outcomes. Therefore, to improve cyber-security risk management, policy and enforcement, the review recommends the establishment of a new security framework for the UK telecoms sector. This will be a much stronger, security-based regime than at present. The foundation for the framework will be a new set of telecoms security requirements for telecoms operators, overseen by Ofcom and Government.

The new requirements will be underpinned by a robust legislative framework. We will pursue legislation at the earliest opportunity to provide Ofcom with stronger powers to allow for the effective enforcement of the telecoms security requirements and to establish stronger national security backstop powers for Government. Until the new legislation is put in place, Government and Ofcom will work with all telecoms operators to secure adherence to the new requirements on a voluntary basis. Operators will be required to subject vendors to rigorous oversight through procurement and contract management. This will involve operators requiring all their vendors to adhere to the new telecoms security requirements. They will also be required to work closely with vendors, supported by Government, to ensure effective assurance testing for equipment, systems and software, and to support ongoing verification arrangements.

In addition, we must have a competitive, sustainable and diverse supply chain if we are to drive innovation and reduce the risk of dependency on individual suppliers. The Government will therefore pursue a targeted diversification strategy, supporting the growth of new players in the parts of the network that pose security and resilience risks. We will promote policies that support new entrants and the growth of smaller firms. This includes research and development support, promoting interoperability and demand stimulation—for example, through the Government’s 5G trials and testbeds programme. We will also seek to attract trusted and established firms to the UK market. A vibrant and diverse telecoms market is not just good news for our consumers; it is good news for our national security, too.

The review also concludes that there should be additional controls on the presence in the supply chain of certain types of vendor that pose significantly greater security and resilience risks to UK telecoms. The House will be particularly concerned, of course, with the position of the Chinese technology firm Huawei. The Government are not yet in a position to decide what involvement Huawei should have in the provision of the UK’s 5G network, and I want to explain why that is.

On 16 May, the US Government added Huawei Technologies Ltd and 68 affiliates to its entity list on national security grounds. US companies now have to apply for a licence to export, re-export or transfer a specified range of goods, software and technology to Huawei and named affiliates, with a presumption of denial. On 20 May, the US Government issued a 90-day temporary general licence that authorises transactions in relation to specified areas. These measures could have a potential impact on the future availability and reliability of Huawei’s products, together with other market impacts, and so are relevant considerations in determining Huawei’s involvement in the network. Since the US Government’s announcement, we have sought clarity on its extent and implications, but the position is not yet entirely clear. Until it is, we have concluded that it would be wrong to make specific decisions in relation to Huawei, but we will do so as soon as possible.

But I also believe that it would be unnecessary and unwise to delay the introduction of the remainder of the telecoms supply chain review’s conclusions. The telecoms security requirements that the review proposes must apply to all companies that want to supply equipment and services in our telecoms supply chain, wherever they come from. The review I commissioned was not designed to deal only with one specific company and its conclusions have a much wider application; the need for them is urgent. The first 5G consumer services are launching this year, and the equally vital diversification of the supply chain will take time. We should get on with it.

I recognise that colleagues may wish to pursue further the technical detail of the proposals that the telecoms supply chain review makes, not least with officials at the National Cyber Security Centre, who will be available to answer questions in Room O in Portcullis House from 10 am to 11 am tomorrow. But I hope the whole House will agree that the future of our digital economy depends on trust in its safety and security, and that if we are to encourage the future scale-up of new technologies that will transform our lives for the better, we need to have the right measures in place to make our telecoms supply chain both safe and secure. That is what the approach proposed in this review will deliver, and I commend it and this statement to the House.

[Tom Watson (West Bromwich East) (Lab)]

Good afternoon, Mr Speaker. I am grateful to the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement and notice of today’s announcement.

In January this year, the Secretary of State said that the telecoms supply chain review was

“not a Huawei specific exercise”.

I am afraid that the report published today may be stretching that phrase to its limits. The Government’s handling of the question of Huawei's involvement in the future of the UK’s 5G network has been defined by one thing: confusion. Rather than this review being published as expected—in March, including a decision on Huawei’s role in our future telecoms networks—we have had a flurry of delays, leaks and rumours.

Today’s further delay on a decision on Huawei means that this confusion will continue, leaving the telecoms industry without the clarity and the public without the confidence they need. A ban on Huawei products could significantly delay the roll-out of the 5G technology that will underpin our tomorrow’s economy. The innovative and green technologies that will form the basis of our future rely on the development and deployment of trusted 5G technology. Our digital infrastructure is already falling behind. The UK lags embarrassingly behind in international comparisons of full fibre roll-out. We are second last in the list of OECD countries, with just 4% of the UK having access to full fibre networks. What Britain needed from this review was not a muddle; we needed a new model for a genuinely world-class digital infrastructure, which we lack at the moment. So this decision must be taken as quickly and transparently as possible, because, whether the Government need to ban Huawei for security reasons or not, the Government have a roll-out target to meet: 5G for the majority of the country by 2027.

We need clarity, one way or another, and the Government should have a plan B for meeting this target if necessary. This review has provided neither. That goes directly against the advice of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which said last week that

“the extent of the delay is now causing serious damage to our international relationships: a decision must be made as a matter of urgency.”

Does the Secretary of State agree?

There are some measures in this review on diversifying the market that are welcome, but this is not an overnight solution, and surely these objectives are best achieved through working with our European partners. Hitherto, the Secretary of State has sought to keep our digital regulation regime in lockstep with Europe. Can he tell us whether the EU is following suit now that the Americans have taken action? If it has not, is he not now concerned that UK digital policy is significantly diverging from that of our closest trading partners?

The situation is indeed complex, as the Secretary of State says. The United States’ recent blacklisting of Huawei has added long-term viability concerns to the existing security considerations. But I am concerned that the future of the UK’s digital infrastructure is being held hostage by transatlantic geopolitics. The question here should be, what is in the UK’s public interest? It should not be, where does this fit into US foreign policy? The British public deserve a trustworthy and modern 5G network that is fit for the future; I fear that, under the new Prime Minister and his Administration, they will get neither.

With your indulgence, Mr Speaker, I will finish on one more point. This could be the last statement that the Secretary of State makes in his current role and, if it is, I would like to put on the record how much my team have enjoyed working with his. I have one phrase for him, from a very great man, who once sang these words:

“For what is a man, what has he got

If not himself, then he has naught

To say the things he truly feels

And not the words of one who kneels

The record shows”—

he—

“took the blows

And did it”

Huawei.

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Gentleman was doing so well until the end; I suppose I should be grateful he did not quote:

“Start spreading the news, I’m leaving today”.

First, on the hon. Gentleman’s last remarks, let me say that the feeling is entirely mutual: I have enjoyed working with him and his colleagues. Our constituents expect not just the cut and thrust of debate across this Dispatch Box, which we have also enjoyed, but that we work together where it is appropriate to do so, and I am grateful to him and his colleagues for the spirit in which they have done exactly that.

Let me say a number of things about the hon. Gentleman’s comments on the statement. First, he is right to say that this announcement is about further delay in relation to decisions on Huawei, and I have explained why that delay is necessary. He is entirely right to say that the industry requires clarity and we should seek to give it that. At the moment, we are not capable of offering that clarity, and any decision that we were to take now might end up being different in the future when that greater clarity arrives. It is not a failing of the UK Government that is at work here, but an attempt to understand the actions of the US Administration and the implications of them.

The hon. Gentleman has said that he is concerned to ensure that this should be a decision about the interests of the UK and not the priorities of the US Administration, and I understand that. I can give him the assurance that decisions we take will be decisions in the best interests of the United Kingdom, but he knows that this is a hugely interconnected sector and it simply is not possible to make sensible judgments about telecommunications without recognising those interconnections. What the US Administration do has a significant impact on Huawei, and we have a situation in which Huawei equipment has American components and intellectual property within it. If that equipment is to find its way into the UK telecoms network, of course the actions and decisions of the US Administration are important—hence the necessary delay here.

The hon. Gentleman is also right to say that this is important technology and it can have a huge impact on our economy; he heard what I said about that a little earlier in the statement. He is wrong to say that the fibre roll-out has reached 4% of the country. It has now reached 8%—it was 4% when I arrived in this job and it has now doubled. He is of course also right to say that that leaves us with a considerable distance still to travel. It is important that we do that in a number of ways, with the most important perhaps being to commit fully to a full fibre roll-out: that was a strategic decision that the Government made—again, in the past 12 months.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman makes reference to the discrepancy that there may be in the approach that different EU countries may take. Of course, it would also be right to highlight the approach that other Five Eyes colleague countries may take. A huge variety of approaches is being taken; there is no uniform approach in the EU, with each country taking a slightly different one. The same is true of the Five Eyes nations. We of course want to engage with all our international colleagues, particularly those with whom we discuss these matters on a regular basis, and make sure that we have their input. However, I go back to my earlier comment: in the end, this will be a judgment that we take in the best interests of the United Kingdom.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

I welcome the publication of the Government’s telecoms supply chain review report today. I am very pleased to see that the report reflects many of the points that the Intelligence and Security Committee raised in its statement on 5G suppliers on Friday. I specifically welcome the explicit national security direction power for the Secretary of State to compel telecoms operators in relation to high-risk vendors, because that issue was first raised by the ISC back in 2013.

With that praise in mind, may I pick up a couple of points? The timetable for providing Ofcom with increased responsibility for the new telecoms security requirements will clearly be of great importance. I ask the Secretary of State, will that be accompanied by additional resources for suitably skilled staff? If Ofcom is to do this job, it will need staff—probably brought in from elsewhere—who have skills that Ofcom does not possess. Can he give any greater clarity on the consultation timetable? I appreciate that the legislation is more difficult, but it would be helpful for the House to have an idea of the timeframe for the consultation process.

Finally, turning to Huawei, in the light of the United States’ position and the lack of clarity on entity classification, I entirely understand why the Secretary of State finds it difficult to make a decision at the moment. Clearly, if Huawei is deemed to be such an entity, the reality is that none of those inventing the technology will be able to have any dealings with that company, with long-term consequences for Huawei’s ability to deliver for anybody. That having been said, will the Secretary of State assure the House that this will not be used as an excuse for can kicking? I think that once the 90 days are up, as he may agree, there will be clarity, and the decision must then be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right to highlight the ISC’s statement, which has been an important contribution to the debate. As he knows, there is a significant overlap between what it says and the review’s conclusions. On Ofcom’s powers and the resources that must flow with those, I agree that it will be necessary to make sure that Ofcom has the resources to discharge its new duties properly. We will seek to give proper attention to that in the consultation process that is to follow.

On the issue of the timescale for the consultation, my right hon. and learned Friend will understand that we are keen to proceed as quickly as possible. One of the reasons I am addressing the House this afternoon is that had I not done so this week—the House will know that I made a commitment that it would know first when we were in a position to disclose the results of this review—I would be doing it in September at the earliest, and we would be beginning this process some six weeks later than we now can. I hope he recognises that that is an indication of the Government’s intention to proceed as quickly as we can, notwithstanding what he described as an inevitable delay in relation to Huawei specifically.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

It is now three months since the national security leak that confirmed that the Government were split over allowing any Huawei involvement in the 5G network, yet it is clear that the Government are still prevaricating, while the US and Australia have been quite vocal about their concerns about the UK Government’s approach. The reality is that this statement is just a lot of words to confirm further delay. Why are the decisions now being left in the gift of the new Prime Minister? Is this just another case of putting the Tory party before the country?

When will we learn the proper definitions of core and non-core network? What happens if there is a legal challenge to the definitions? Would an outright ban not simply be more robust and effective? Further, if the Government continue to progress down the route of identifying core and non-core network, what controls and oversights will there be to ensure that there is no technological solution that allows Huawei to retrieve any data from the core network, if it is allowed to be involved in future?

What assessment has been made of the existing contracts that Huawei has, including its involvement in EE’s existing 5G roll-out to seven cities across the UK? Does not the existence of those contracts show how far behind the curve the UK Government are in taking action? It is a bit too late to be using the word “urgency”. How long will it be before the proposed telecoms security requirements are in statute, given the failures that have been identified? When will guidance be published for the voluntary code that the Secretary of State referred to? What will the Government do to create the desired diversification policy that was outlined in the statement?

Another Chinese company with security risks is ZTE. Have the Government made any risk assessments about the fact that ZTE has been picked to construct a 5G network in Jersey? What is the current status of ZTE’s partnership with BT, and has that been reviewed? Have there been wider Cabinet discussions on Chinese involvement in Hinkley Point C and the reliance on Chinese development to get the station operational? What security risks does that pose? Does this not show that the Government need much more of a bigger-picture approach, rather than the silo approach that is happening at present?

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Gentleman has asked a number of questions; let me try to deal with as many of them as I can.

On the hon. Gentleman’s last point about Chinese involvement in the wider economy, he will recognise that there is a balance to be struck between welcoming inward investment into our economy, which we do, and wanting to be confident that our security requirements are met. In relation to ZTE, he may know that the Government’s judgment, based on advice from the National Cyber Security Centre, is that ZTE should not have engagement particularly in the 5G communications network, which is the subject of this review and this statement.

On the hon. Gentleman’s earlier points, he describes what I am announcing as prevarication. I hope that I have been straightforward in accepting that there is a delay, and I have explained the reasons for it in relation to Huawei. I do not believe that it would be sensible, responsible or helpful to anyone, including the telecoms industry, were I to give a partial decision today when I am not in a position to give a complete decision. It follows from that that when the decision comes to be made, there will be a new Prime Minister in office—that is now a little less than 48 hours away—so it is inevitable that that will be the case.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned a legal challenge. As you would expect me to say, Mr Speaker, from a former life I am always aware of the possibility of legal challenge. In my experience, it is always a possibility, but the way that we can best insulate against it is to reach sensible decisions based on defensible criteria. Again, the best way to do that is to make sure that we have all the information that we need before we make a decision of this kind. That is precisely what the Government propose to do.

It is, of course, a possibility—and remains so—that the Government may decide that an outright ban on Huawei equipment in the 5G network is the appropriate course of action. All I say today is that we are not yet in a position to make a comprehensive decision about that. As soon as we are, we will, but the hon. Gentleman has my assurance—as I indicated to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Tom Watson)—that the decision that we take will be, first and foremost, in the interests of the United Kingdom, and that security interests and our national security equities will be the most important consideration in that.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) suggests that the actions that we are taking are behind the curve internationally. That is not so. If we produce telecoms security requirements in the way that we propose, they will be world-leading measures, and we should be proud of that. We will legislate for them as soon as we are able to do so.

The hon. Gentleman asked for more detail about what diversification of the supply chain might involve. Let me give him some possible examples. We are talking about measures such as improved access to spectrum and the promotion of new infrastructure models. He will be aware of the £200 million 5G test beds and trials programme, which we believe will support new investment, and we can and should pursue greater interoperability for equipment from different suppliers, including by requiring this in technical standards. Of course, the Government can use their buying power to promote a diverse supplier base. We should do all those things in addition to seeking to invite existing, established suppliers to come into the UK market, where they are not already present.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does this mean a delay in the roll-out of 5G to constituents in Wokingham and elsewhere? If so, how long a delay are we talking about?

[Jeremy Wright]

The commercial decisions that mobile network operators are making now about what equipment to buy are part of a continuing process. All those mobile network operators will need to consider carefully the position I have outlined today and make the appropriate commercial judgments, but we are seeking to move as quickly as we reasonably can to give them the clarity they need to continue making those investments.

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

Will the Secretary of State confirm that the assessment of the National Cyber Security Centre is that the risk posed by Huawei equipment to the security of the 5G network is manageable and that that assessment is based on long experience and the unique experience of working with Huawei over 10 years, looking carefully at every Huawei product that comes on to the UK market? What is his estimate of the impact on the speed of 5G roll-out, which was rightly highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Tom Watson) as a critical question, of excluding Huawei equipment from that network?

[Jeremy Wright]

The right hon. Gentleman is right to talk about managed risk. He will recognise that we have been managing the risk presented by Huawei’s specific circumstances within the 4G network for some considerable time. He is also right, of course, that we have to consider the potential delay to the roll-out caused by any measures we decide are necessary. I repeat that the most important criterion is that we act in our national security interest. If that causes delay, it may well still be the appropriate course of action, but we will need to decide that when we are in possession of all the facts. He has my assurance that when we do that we will make the most balanced judgment we can. As I said to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), all commercial operators will need to take account not just of what we have said today but of what they already know about the position in the United States and elsewhere.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State accept that the phrase “manageable risk” is almost a contradiction in terms, because if it were fully manageable, it would not be a risk? Is he not absolutely right not to be taking a decision with such profound security implications for our future in the dying few hours of an outgoing prime ministerial Administration? Finally, does he accept that unlike other suppliers, which, it is true, may have contaminated supply chains themselves, Huawei is unique in being subject to article 14 of China’s national intelligence law, passed in June 2017, which empowers the intelligence agencies of the Chinese state to

“request the relevant organs, organisations and civilians to provide necessary support, assistance and cooperation”

to those intelligence services? We would be mad to enter into a direct security relationship with the agencies of a totalitarian communist state.

[Jeremy Wright]

I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s comments. Of course, he is right that we should take no risks that are not manageable. Once we are in possession of all the information we should have, we will have to judge whether we are capable of managing the appropriate risk effectively. If we are not, it is a risk that we should not take. On that I entirely agree, but that decision has not yet been taken.

My right hon. Friend is right to highlight the Chinese law—it is what makes Huawei different from many other suppliers in the network—but I repeat the point I made a moment ago: a process for managing that risk has been in place for some considerable time. So far as delay is concerned, I repeat that in my judgment the right way to proceed is to delay only until we are in possession of the facts and information necessary to make the right judgment. That is the process we will undertake.

[David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

The Intelligence and Security Committee issued a statement on Friday saying that the UK network had to be built in such a way as to withstand attack from any quarter. The Secretary of State knows that only Nokia, Ericsson and Huawei can provide the 5G required for the UK’s use. While his noble aspiration is to pursue targeted diversification, is that realistic given the three potential suppliers? Should we not have a resilient service that can meet any potential threat within any of those three suppliers, rather than the desperation of simple diversity?

[Jeremy Wright]

The right hon. Gentleman is right, but they are not mutually exclusive. We can and should do both. Diversification will not happen overnight, which is one reason I want to proceed as swiftly as possible with that track. It will take time for us to develop diversification in the market, but none the less we should seek to do so in the longer term. In the shorter term, he is also right—he knows this from his ISC work—that part of the reason we want a larger number of suppliers in the system is not simply that that is commercially and economically beneficial, but that there is a security benefit. Having several different suppliers’ equipment in the system helps to prevent overdependence on any one supplier’s equipment. That is an obvious security imperative. We should do that. It is part of the calculation we make about the security imperative in this decision.

[Sir Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

Given the fundamental issue of security, which for many of us here must override all the other interests, I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on this statement on a new security framework, particularly since it will be a much stronger security-based regime than that which exists at present.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Wright]

I am very grateful for my right hon. Friend’s support. As he knows, my clear intent in commissioning the review was to focus first and foremost on security. No other consideration comes ahead of security. Fundamentally, we must make a decision on the basis of what is in our security interests, but he is also right that if we were to focus solely on one company or country, we would miss the broader important point that our telecoms supply chain must be resilient and secure, regardless of where equipment comes from, because risk may transfer from place to place and our population is entitled to expect that the approach we take puts security at its heart, wherever the equipment comes from.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

It is essential that the national security implications of using Huawei equipment be fully taken into account, but what consideration, if any, is given to the use of Huawei equipment in the repression of Uyghurs? Do the UK Government take that and the use of similar equipment by other manufacturers from China into account?

[Jeremy Wright]

I know that the right hon. Gentleman regularly raises this issue with colleagues from the Foreign Office. As he knows, we are concerned about it across Government. It is important that the UK Government, in their communications with the Chinese Government, stress the importance of human rights and their protections for minorities as well as for majority populations in China, and we will continue to do that. The judgments we make in this review will not diminish the UK Government’s enthusiasm for making that case.

[Mr Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Given that Huawei is to all intents part of the Chinese state, given that China has extensive history of intellectual property theft, data theft, cyber-attacks and the development of a surveillance state in parts of its own country, given that it is building up a dominant position in advanced comms that will eventually put Nokia, Samsung and others out of business, given the increased warnings of the Cell, and given our Five Eyes colleagues’ positions, does the Secretary of State agree that having any tech from one-party authoritarian states in our critical national infrastructure raises difficult and potentially insurmountable obstacles when it comes to data protection and protecting our human rights, the rule of law, our value system in the 21st century and security?

[Jeremy Wright]

I certainly think that my hon. Friend’s description justifies his reference to difficult issues. As for whether they are insurmountable, if he will forgive me I will not answer that question, because it would predetermine the outcome of the review that still has to happen specifically in relation to Huawei. However, all the points that he has made are proper for consideration as we make that decision.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

May I take the question asked by the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) a little further? A million Uyghurs are languishing in concentration camps in Xinjiang, and the people of that province are under constant surveillance with the connivance of Huawei in the regime. All of us—especially those of us who are members of the Select Committee on Defence—are aware of the security risks of the project, but the Secretary of State and the Government have yet to answer a more fundamental question. Why should they reward a company that has been complicit in creating an authoritarian, dystopian Xinjiang with such a large Government contract?

[Jeremy Wright]

As I said to the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, the UK Government are not uninterested in this subject; far from it. The hon. Gentleman will understand, however, that the parameters of the review that we are undertaking here relate to what measures it is sensible to take to protect our security interests within the UK telecoms network. Elsewhere in the Government, we continue to take a strong interest in the welfare of minorities in China and elsewhere, and to make strong representations thereon.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

I welcome the statement, and, in particular, what my right hon. and learned Friend said about the new national security framework for telecoms. Does he agree, however, that that framework needs to reflect the rapidly changing technological landscape in which we are operating, and needs to be properly resourced to be effective and serve its purpose?

[Jeremy Wright]

Yes, I do agree with my hon. Friend. I think that both those points are important. We need to build the framework in a way that enables it to adapt as the technology develops, and we will seek to do that. He will have heard me say that we intend to consult on the specifics of the telecoms security requirements. The matter will then come to the House, because we will need to legislate for the powers that will be necessary for both the Government and Ofcom to enforce those requirements.

Ofcom Provision of Information Regulations

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Jeremy Wright)]

I would like to update the House on Ofcom’s statutory duty to share information with the Government at least 24 hours before publication, introduced under section 24A of the Communications Act 2003, inserted by the Digital Economy Act 2017. This early access to information from Ofcom is important in supporting the Government’s wider policy responsibilities in safeguarding and improving the delivery of essential communications services on which consumers rely.

To commence the duty I must specify by regulations what categories of information will be exempt from this duty, following consultation with Ofcom. Our consultation with Ofcom has now concluded and I can inform the House of our intention to proceed with the implementation of the duty via a negative statutory instrument later in the autumn.

The categories of information to be listed as exempt in these regulations include broadcasting content standards and broadcasting licensing enforcement. This is to ensure that there can be no accusations or perceptions that the Government have had inappropriate prior knowledge or been involved in these functions. Corporate functions will also be excluded. Other types of information Ofcom proposes to publish, which fall outside of the above exemption regulations, will need to be shared with the Government at least 24 hours before publication by Ofcom once the duty comes into force, unless there are exceptional circumstances or prior agreement is reached.

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) will be agreed between Ofcom, DCMS and BEIS, setting out processes to be followed for the provision of information by Ofcom. This MoU will provide the necessary assurances around who will have access to this information and when, as well as reinforcing the strong procedures Government Departments already have in place to handle sensitive information. Furthermore, additional arrangements for highly market sensitive information will see that such information only has to be shared once UK markets have closed (which may be less than 24 hours before publication), to provide necessary assurances to the companies Ofcom regulates.

The Government remain fully committed to Ofcom’s independence. This duty to provide information will not influence Ofcom’s investigations or decision making. Safeguards in the legislation legally prohibit representations being made to Ofcom before publication and also restricts with whom Ministers, and officials acting on their behalf, can share information before publication. For transparency, the consultation correspondence between DCMS and Ofcom will be published on gov.uk.

[HCWS1750]

Equality and Listed Events

Jeremy Wright Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Jeremy Wright)]

I have written today to the BBC, S4C, Ofcom and the International Paralympic Committee in a limited consultation on adding the Paralympic games to the listed events regime. I have also copied the letter to Channel 4 which currently holds the broadcasting rights for the next Paralympic games in Tokyo 2020, to other eligible free-to-air broadcasters, and to the Sport and Recreation Alliance.

The Broadcasting Act 1996 gives the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport discretion to designate sporting and other events of national interest as listed events. Once listed, broadcasting rights to such events must be offered to the main free-to-air terrestrial broadcasters (“qualifying broadcasters”) on fair and reasonable terms. Qualifying broadcasters are those which reach 95% coverage of UK viewers and at no additional cost to the viewer than the television licence fee. Broadcasters currently meeting these criteria are BBC1, BBC2, ITV1 and Channel 4.

The current list, compiled in 1998, consists of two categories of events:

Group A, in which full live coverage must be offered to the qualifying broadcasters; and

Group B, in which live coverage may be broadcast on subscription television as long as secondary coverage is offered to qualifying broadcasters.

Under section 97 of the Broadcasting Act 1996, the Secretary of State is able to amend the list providing that they have consulted with the statutory consultees. In my letter I have asked consultees to consider the following:

whether, based on the guidance and criteria given, the Paralympic games should be added to the list;

whether the Paralympic games should be listed under group A or group B of the list;

other factors affecting the likely costs and benefits to the sport concerned, to the broadcasting industry and to viewers, as set out in the guidance on the criteria for listing; and

any other factors relevant to the final decision.

While the Government do not wish to reopen the list of events for a full review, we are committed to supporting more equality in the coverage of sport on TV, and in particular, disability and women in sport. It is for this reason that I am considering whether to exercise discretion to add the Paralympics to the list, and that I intend on holding a consultation later this year on adding women’s sporting equivalent events to the regime that match the men’s events.

I will inform the House of the outcome once I have discussed fully with statutory consultees.

[HCWS1751]