Telecoms Supply Chain Review

Alan Brown Excerpts

Monday 22nd July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. and learned Friend is right to highlight the ISC’s statement, which has been an important contribution to the debate. As he knows, there is a significant overlap between what it says and the review’s conclusions. On Ofcom’s powers and the resources that must flow with those, I agree that it will be necessary to make sure that Ofcom has the resources to discharge its new duties properly. We will seek to give proper attention to that in the consultation process that is to follow.

On the issue of the timescale for the consultation, my right hon. and learned Friend will understand that we are keen to proceed as quickly as possible. One of the reasons I am addressing the House this afternoon is that had I not done so this week—the House will know that I made a commitment that it would know first when we were in a position to disclose the results of this review—I would be doing it in September at the earliest, and we would be beginning this process some six weeks later than we now can. I hope he recognises that that is an indication of the Government’s intention to proceed as quickly as we can, notwithstanding what he described as an inevitable delay in relation to Huawei specifically.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

It is now three months since the national security leak that confirmed that the Government were split over allowing any Huawei involvement in the 5G network, yet it is clear that the Government are still prevaricating, while the US and Australia have been quite vocal about their concerns about the UK Government’s approach. The reality is that this statement is just a lot of words to confirm further delay. Why are the decisions now being left in the gift of the new Prime Minister? Is this just another case of putting the Tory party before the country?

When will we learn the proper definitions of core and non-core network? What happens if there is a legal challenge to the definitions? Would an outright ban not simply be more robust and effective? Further, if the Government continue to progress down the route of identifying core and non-core network, what controls and oversights will there be to ensure that there is no technological solution that allows Huawei to retrieve any data from the core network, if it is allowed to be involved in future?

What assessment has been made of the existing contracts that Huawei has, including its involvement in EE’s existing 5G roll-out to seven cities across the UK? Does not the existence of those contracts show how far behind the curve the UK Government are in taking action? It is a bit too late to be using the word “urgency”. How long will it be before the proposed telecoms security requirements are in statute, given the failures that have been identified? When will guidance be published for the voluntary code that the Secretary of State referred to? What will the Government do to create the desired diversification policy that was outlined in the statement?

Another Chinese company with security risks is ZTE. Have the Government made any risk assessments about the fact that ZTE has been picked to construct a 5G network in Jersey? What is the current status of ZTE’s partnership with BT, and has that been reviewed? Have there been wider Cabinet discussions on Chinese involvement in Hinkley Point C and the reliance on Chinese development to get the station operational? What security risks does that pose? Does this not show that the Government need much more of a bigger-picture approach, rather than the silo approach that is happening at present?

[Jeremy Wright]

The hon. Gentleman has asked a number of questions; let me try to deal with as many of them as I can.

On the hon. Gentleman’s last point about Chinese involvement in the wider economy, he will recognise that there is a balance to be struck between welcoming inward investment into our economy, which we do, and wanting to be confident that our security requirements are met. In relation to ZTE, he may know that the Government’s judgment, based on advice from the National Cyber Security Centre, is that ZTE should not have engagement particularly in the 5G communications network, which is the subject of this review and this statement.

On the hon. Gentleman’s earlier points, he describes what I am announcing as prevarication. I hope that I have been straightforward in accepting that there is a delay, and I have explained the reasons for it in relation to Huawei. I do not believe that it would be sensible, responsible or helpful to anyone, including the telecoms industry, were I to give a partial decision today when I am not in a position to give a complete decision. It follows from that that when the decision comes to be made, there will be a new Prime Minister in office—that is now a little less than 48 hours away—so it is inevitable that that will be the case.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned a legal challenge. As you would expect me to say, Mr Speaker, from a former life I am always aware of the possibility of legal challenge. In my experience, it is always a possibility, but the way that we can best insulate against it is to reach sensible decisions based on defensible criteria. Again, the best way to do that is to make sure that we have all the information that we need before we make a decision of this kind. That is precisely what the Government propose to do.

It is, of course, a possibility—and remains so—that the Government may decide that an outright ban on Huawei equipment in the 5G network is the appropriate course of action. All I say today is that we are not yet in a position to make a comprehensive decision about that. As soon as we are, we will, but the hon. Gentleman has my assurance—as I indicated to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Tom Watson)—that the decision that we take will be, first and foremost, in the interests of the United Kingdom, and that security interests and our national security equities will be the most important consideration in that.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) suggests that the actions that we are taking are behind the curve internationally. That is not so. If we produce telecoms security requirements in the way that we propose, they will be world-leading measures, and we should be proud of that. We will legislate for them as soon as we are able to do so.

The hon. Gentleman asked for more detail about what diversification of the supply chain might involve. Let me give him some possible examples. We are talking about measures such as improved access to spectrum and the promotion of new infrastructure models. He will be aware of the £200 million 5G test beds and trials programme, which we believe will support new investment, and we can and should pursue greater interoperability for equipment from different suppliers, including by requiring this in technical standards. Of course, the Government can use their buying power to promote a diverse supplier base. We should do all those things in addition to seeking to invite existing, established suppliers to come into the UK market, where they are not already present.