James Cartlidge
Main Page: James Cartlidge (Conservative - South Suffolk)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)
James Cartlidge ExcerptsTuesday 23rd November 2021
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 View all Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 November 2021 - (18 Nov 2021)
The Chair
We resume with clause 47 and amendment 30. I would like to be able to call Anne McLaughlin, but she is not here.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)
On a point of order, Mr Rosindell. On behalf of all colleagues, may I say how grateful we are that you allowed us to attend the funeral this morning, instead of sitting in Committee? I thought it was a profoundly moving occasion, and your words were very moving in particular. It showed Parliament at its best.
I just said to the Doorkeepers that I thought the moment when they walked behind the coffin was one of the most moving I have seen as an MP. I thought it appropriate to put on record my thanks for the adjournment this morning, and that we all dearly miss our great friend. It was a very fitting and beautiful service.
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 47, page 54, line 34, at end insert—
“(7) Notwithstanding the provisions above, this Act shall not come into force until the Lord Chancellor has laid before Parliament a written statement confirming that no provision in this Act contravenes Article 6 or Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(8) The statement under subsection (7) must be laid before Parliament within three months of this Act being passed.”
This amendment would prevent any Act resulting from this Bill from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor confirms, via a written statement to Parliament, that none of its provisions contravene ECHR Article 6 (right to fair trial) or ECHR Article 13 (right to effective remedy).
I thank everybody on the Committee for their forbearance during the last week, while I was struggling to move, and today, when I underestimated how long a usually seven-minute walk to get here would take me. Thankfully, I have an X-ray on Thursday, and I hope that something will come of that.
May I also associate myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East with the remarks on Sir David Amess? I did not know him; I knew exactly who he was, though. There was that smile that made him stand out—a really genuine smile that reached his eyes. I always noticed that. I did not know him personally, but listening to people speak about him, including many people in the SNP group, who knew him really well and are really hurting, makes me wish that I had. Maybe that can teach us something in this place: that there are people who we can identify with and befriend who have different views from our own. Thank you for allowing me to say that.
I sure that Conservative Members and Opposition Members will agree with the fundamental principles that we should all be afforded the right to a fair trial and effective remedy. There can be little dispute that those are the cornerstones of a justice system that respects the rule of law and principles of natural justice. Amendment 30 seeks confirmation from the Lord Chancellor that any provision in the Bill will be prevented from coming into force if it contravenes article 6 or article 13 of the European convention on human rights: the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy.
We have already debated how provisions in the Bill, such as the presumption for using prospective-only quashing orders, could risk breaching article 6.1 of the European convention on human rights on the right to a fair trial, which requires an effective judicial remedy. The amendment would ensure the Government had the opportunity to make cast-iron guarantees that that will not happen. That would be expressed via a written statement from the Lord Chancellor, laid before Parliament within three months of the Bill being passed.
The Minister may wish to point out that article 13 does not apply to the Human Rights Act 1998, but it could be applicable in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and that is why we felt it appropriate to include it in the amendment. Strasbourg does not recognise the practice of failing to give human rights without an effective remedy. Rather than stripping away rights, the Government should consider in any proposed review of the Human Rights Act that the right to effective remedy be added. As the Minister has assured us that the Bill will furnish the courts with a broader set of tools, with no risk of restricting individual claimants’ rights, he will surely consider the amendment a gift from me to him to help clarify his position.
James Cartlidge
Thank you for your generosity in allowing us to pay our tribute, Mr Rosindell, following this morning’s very moving mass at Westminster Cathedral.
The amendment would prevent any measure in the Bill from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided a written statement to say that no provision in the subsequent Act contravenes article 6 on the right to a fair hearing and article 13 on the right to effective remedy of the European convention on human rights. I assure hon. Members that none of the measures in the Bill contravenes either article 6 or article 13.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North East mentioned remedies. We have the new remedies relating to quashing orders, which are a key part of how the Bill improves judicial review. In clause 1, there are adequate safeguards to ensure that any individual exercise of the new remedial discretions provides an effective remedy in cases concerning violations of convention rights. That is because the measures do not limit the availability of any existing right for such a breach and their use remains open to the court’s discretion. Presumption in favour of any of the remedial discretions only operates in circumstances where its exercise would
“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”
and it may be rebutted where there is good reason to do so. Further, the court is required to consider the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from quashing of the impugned Act, as well as considering other factors.
On clause 2, regarding Cart judicial review, our position is that article 6 does not require a further right of judicial review in relation to decisions concerning permission to appeal from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal and therefore considers that the measure does not interfere with an individual’s right under article 6.
When the Bill was introduced, the Lord Chancellor at the time signed a statement under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to confirm his view that the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the convention rights. When the Bill passes to the other place, a second statement will be made, as required under section 19, taking into account any amendments. Should any Government or non-Government amendments be made that we felt contravened those statements, we would inform Parliament. It would be a breach of the ministerial code to proceed towards Royal Assent without either amending the provisions or informing Parliament of the issue.
In addition, ahead of introducing the Bill, the Government carried out a full ECHR analysis and published a memo for the Joint Committee on Human Rights setting out that analysis on parliament.uk. The previous Lord Chancellor wrote to the Committee’s Chair when the Bill was introduced and we will engage with the Committee fully should it choose to publish a report on the Bill. In summary, the Bill currently does not contravene either article 6 or article 13, and appropriate measures are in place should that no longer be the case at any point during its passage. I therefore urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Anne McLaughlin
I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 47, page 54, line 34, at end insert—
“(7) Notwithstanding the provisions above, nothing in this Act relating to Scotland shall come into force without a consenting resolution being passed by the Scottish Parliament.”
This amendment would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be given to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland for those provisions to come into force.
As I am sure the Minister is aware, under the Sewel convention the Scottish Parliament should have the final say over any attempt by the UK Parliament to legislate in devolved areas. In recognition of the separate and distinct nature of Scotland’s legal system, article 19 of the Treaty of Union protects the authority and privileges of Scotland’s Court of Session. This is a fundamental part of the UK constitution and this amendment would ensure that the UK Government respect the principles of the Sewel convention and the constitutional arrangements.
Without an amendment specifically guaranteeing the requirement of consent from the Scottish Parliament to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland, we risk interference with Scottish legal processes. The Faculty of Advocates, which was represented at the evidence sessions of this Committee, has said that in Scotland
“judicial review does not suffer from a lack of clarity, and any attempt to codify it is likely to undermine the very flexibility that renders it effective.”
Furthermore, Liberty has also commented on the situation and has said that
“the Act of Union does not serve to enable the UK Government to reshape the jurisdiction of the Court of Session. These are not technical or procedural points. In any event, the administration of the courts and the justice system in Scotland clearly falls within devolved competence.”
I am certain the Minister and Members opposite will be aware that this amendment is not only a reminder that this convention exists, but that it too must be respected in statute.
James Cartlidge
The amendment would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be given to any provisions in the Bill that relate to Scotland. I am emboldened to say that the word “relate” is in bold in my text, as that word is very important. I have a number of constitutional concerns about the amendment.
To reassure the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for Lanark and Hamilton East, the measures in this Bill relate wholly to reserved matters. Ministers and officials have been engaging with the devolved Administrations over the course of the Bill, and we will continue to do so when the provisions in the Bill come into force.
I believe we are in agreement that chapter 2, “Online procedure,” and chapter 3, “Employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal,” of the Bill relate to matters outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. Yet this amendment would still apply to the clauses in those chapters and require the consent of the Scottish Parliament before they could come into force.
The majority of the criminal procedure measures also relate only to England and Wales, although, as I have previously noted in Committee, we are aware that the Scottish Government’s position may be that the new automatic online procedure, introduced by clause 3, engages the legislative consent process. Furthermore, we believe that this is outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament, which, in the Government’s view, does not engage the legislative consent process.
With regard to removing Cart JR, I should make clear that the unified tribunal system is a reserved matter, where it relates to matters of reserved policy. Our measures on Cart will apply to the whole of the UK, but only in respect to the matters heard in that tribunal system that fall outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. The provisions relating to remedies apply to England and Wales only.
If it came into force, the amendment would actually lead to decisions in reserved areas operating differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill currently provides. In line with the memorandum of understanding on devolution, we will continue to engage with the devolved Administration at a ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications for the Scottish court system.
On that basis, I cannot accept this amendment and I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.
Anne McLaughlin
I am not sure what I am supposed to say, but I do not wish to withdraw the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Question negatived.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
This is one of those long ones, Mr Rosindell. This clause sets out when the measures will come into force. While some measures will come into force two months from when the Act is passed, including the coroner’s provisions and two of the criminal provisions, in clauses 14 and 15 and schedule 1, the remainder of the Bill will come into force by regulation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Short title
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
I just need to check I have enough water for this one. The clause is the short title of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
We now come to new clauses. I understand that the Opposition do not intend to press new clauses 1 and 2, which have already been debated, to a Division, so we will begin with new clause 3.
New Clause 3
Exclusion of review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
(1) Section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) Leave out subsection (8) and insert—
“(8) Subject to section 67A and subsections (9) and (10), determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction and purported determinations, awards, orders and other decisions) shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.
(9) In particular—
(a) the Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error of fact or law made in reaching any decision; and
(b) the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts does not extend to, and no application or petition for judicial review may be made or brought in relation to, any decision of the Tribunal.
(10) Subsections (8) and (9) do not apply so far as the decision involves or gives rise to any question as to whether the Tribunal—
(a) has a valid case before it;
(b) is or was properly constituted for the purpose of dealing with the case; and
(c) is acting or has acted in bad faith, with actual bias or corruption or in some other way that constitutes a fundamental procedural defect.
(11) No error of fact or law made by the Tribunal in reaching any decision is to be construed as relevant to the question.”
(3) The amendment made by subsection (2) applies to determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including purported determinations, awards, orders and other decisions) made before the day on which this section comes into force.”—(Sir John Hayes.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Andy Slaughter
That is enough, apparently—according to the Minister.
Having gone through that process, the Government decided to push forward with focused reforms to Cart judicial reviews to modify the nature of discretionary remedies only. This new clause, and indeed new clause 5 and the other new clauses that were not selected, would go much further. If these proposals were being taken seriously, they would be headline provisions in the Bill, not underdeveloped addendum clauses introduced without proper consideration and in their current form. It is inappropriate to being these measures into force as proposed.
The new clauses are not supported by, and in some cases go directly against, expert analysis or wider consultation. The measures being taken forward by the Government in this Bill were preceded by extensive consultation and engagement with experts and stakeholders. That includes the work of the independent review of administrative law and contributions from across the sector, including the judiciary.
The same cannot be said of these new clauses. In fact, the majority of experts and the Government themselves rejected some of the very measures they propose. For example, the changes to the disclosure duty in new clause 5 were considered but ultimately rejected by the independent review of administrative law. The Government agreed at the time that the reforms were unnecessary.
The new clauses try to address significant, complex areas of law in an overly simplistic way, and many of the apparent problems these new clauses seek to resolve are more complicated than the proposals seem to believe or understand. The rules on evidence disclosure, for example, have developed so that disclosure is tailored in each case to ensure that justice is done, whereas the new clauses take a blunt hammer to this sophisticated scheme. Unfairness is therefore inevitable.
The solutions are blunt and may lead to unintended consequences. Although several of the new clauses have been found to be out of scope, they amount to an attack on our constitutional balance. The result would be a great reduction in judicial protection, the disempowerment of aggrieved citizens and a Government who are unacceptably insulated from scrutiny.
Anne McLaughlin
I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention was aimed at me or the Minister. If he was aiming it at me, all I will say is that it would not be the first, second, third, fourth or fifth way in which I disagreed with the Attorney General in her reckoning. I will sit down and allow others to speak.
James Cartlidge
This has been a good debate on the new clause, which is interesting in many ways from a constitutional point of view, both theoretically and practically. My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich does not have a secondary role. I am his constituency neighbour. He has a fantastic role that he is fulfilling as a brilliant constituency MP. It was a great honour to campaign with him in the general election, and I see a return on that investment, as he is a vocal spokesman for people of all political shades in the fine county town of Suffolk.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North East may have, shall we say, come here through the use of a crutch, but she should not downplay the role that her speeches could play. Of course we listen. We listen to all sides. Indeed, I have listened intently to the debate on the new clause. I will say one thing to the hon. Member for Hammersmith: although I completely understand where he was coming from, and his points made political sense, he appeared at one point to suggest that it almost was not necessarily relevant to debate the new clause. The new clause is about judicial review, and we know the first two words of the Bill’s title. In fact, we just agreed to the clause on the short title, which includes the phrase “judicial review”; I think my speech on that was the shortest I have ever made, by the way.
My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings made some important contributions, which I am grateful for. I hope he received the letter we sent him, which I believe has been circulated to other Committee members, containing the response on the important matter of the most vulnerable children—those in care. I hope that reassures him on the safeguards. Secondly, on the make-up of the coronial stakeholder group in administrative justice, which introduces a broad umbrella because of the nature of the engagement, I hope that the letter has persuaded my right hon. Friend. I am therefore tempted to eke out the general thread of my argument and hope to encourage him that I am someone who is generally able to persuade people of things. The sword of Damocles that he holds over this speech with the threat to vote can be dealt with.
I should pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his former role as Security Minister, which he referred to. He was involved in important proceedings when our country, as was proudly illustrated this morning, faced great threats, not least terrorist threats. He was also a Transport Minister, and I met him to discuss roads in my constituency. The essence of his argument was that the Bill does not go far enough, so he wants to debate important probing amendments. I will come back to that wider point.
On the specifics, as has been explained, new clause 3 would amend section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by replacing the wording in subsection (8) and adding three additional subsections. Subsection (8) was originally drafted as an ouster clause—we have already debated ouster clauses in relation to clause 2— to ensure that certain decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would not be subject to judicial review by the High Court. A right of appeal on a point of law was later introduced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and is set out in what is now section 67A.
The tribunal was intended to be the highest authority concerning matters such as the conduct of intelligence services. However, a 2019 judgment of the UK Supreme Court rendered the ouster clause of limited effect in what we have all referred to today as the Privacy International case. The Supreme Court found that while subsection (8) was effective at excluding judicial review of IPT decisions on their merits or jurisdictional decisions involving issues of fact, it did not have the effect of wholly ousting the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.
The new clause would amend the ouster clause in section 67 by clarifying and adding to the text in that section so as to meet the objection of the Supreme Court in Privacy International. That is an interesting idea, and I am sure my right hon. Friend is aware that the Government’s consultation, published in March, expressed concern around the uncertainty that exists as to whether, or in what circumstances, ouster clauses will be upheld by the courts. We therefore consulted on options to try to add some clarity with a broad framework for the interpretation of ouster clauses, but, having reflected on the many useful responses we received, we concluded that although our intention was to add clarity, the effect may in fact be to muddy the waters yet further.
As an alternative approach, we are pursuing the ouster clause in clause 2, which is designed to overturn Cart, seeks to learn the lessons from unsuccessful ouster clauses of the past, and is drafted in a clear and explicit way. We have been open in saying that if that approach is successful, we may consider whether it can be used as a model for ousters in other areas, where it is appropriate to do so. At least conceptually, I see the link between ousting the High Court from reviewing permission to appeal decisions of the upper tribunal and ousting the High Court from reviewing decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. They are both essentially concerned with which court ultimately should have the final say on an issue.
Sir John Hayes
I am going to give the Committee the benefit of my further wisdom in a few moments, but on that particular issue, the point about the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is that it is a specialist court, and the intention of the House in establishing that court—the Minister made reference to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; the 2016 Act was the one that I took through the House, as he knows—was to indicate that had Parliament decided that the tribunal’s important work, which essentially gives authority as well as supervision to the security services, should not be questioned in an ordinary court. The Supreme Court countered Parliament’s will in that respect. That is why this is so significant. It draws into question whether the Supreme Court might do the same in respect of other primary legislation that has ouster clauses in it, which is why it is important to act now in this Bill.
James Cartlidge
I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend’s legislative prowess in taking that Bill through the House at the time. It is precisely because of his point that in paragraph 55 of our consultation response document, published in July, the example we give of a case where we may look at using a Cart-like model of ouster clause in future is exactly this one—the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. We have made clear that we are looking at that. The Government are not closed-minded to the possibility of going further on judicial review. In a recent interview with The Sunday Telegraph, the Deputy Prime Minister spoke of the importance of restoring power to Parliament, while recognising the need for reform of judicial review to be an iterative process. I am sure he will have heard today’s debate and the many forceful points made, but the Government will keep an open mind on whether that tribunal might be a candidate for an ouster clause in future.
Our focus in the Bill is to tackle the two particular issues identified by the independent review of administrative law: the efficiency of Cart JRs and the lack of remedial flexibility in judicial review. I know my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings is sympathetic on this point. There is a good reason for prioritising Cart—we have a judicial backlog, and the resource implication of it is immediate and credible. [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend says from a sedentary position that he understands. It will be important to ensure that before an ouster clause is proposed in any particular context, careful thought is given to what will be achieved by doing so and to considerations germane to that context. One size does not necessarily fit all, but we are open minded.
A key point I wanted to communicate is that my right hon. Friend invited me to become a star. His invitation to stellarhood is one I cannot begin to match, but I will at least attempt to do so by offering him an invitation to attend the Ministry of Justice to discuss with officials present some of these ideas in depth—especially given his expertise from his time as a Minister, talking in that neat language of Ministers and officials who know their Bill—and to talk through some of the technicalities. We do see the merit in what he says; it is more a question of timing.
In summary, my right hon. Friend says we do not go far enough; I would say that we go this far at this time. I hope that reassures my right hon. Friend and other colleagues that this is an issue to which the Government are already alive and to which I am sure future consideration will be given. But for now, for the specific purpose of the Bill, I respectfully request that he withdraw his new clause.
Sir John Hayes
When I said the Minister could become a star, I should have said a brighter star, because he has already shone in his response, particularly his generous invitation to meet with and discuss these matters with his officials in his Department. I take his point, of course, about the characteristics of the Bill, the need to address Cart in particular, and its relationship to the backlog in the courts. However, the Bill is about principle as well as practice. There is a practical reason for introducing the Bill, but a principle underpins it, which he has articulated a number of times during our deliberations: it is not right that the court system should be gamed to frustrate the will of the House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley spoke about his constituents wanting to see the will of the House as a manifestation of their will being delivered. The disturbing rise in judicial activism and judge-made law raises fundamental questions of parliamentary sovereignty. Mr Rosindell, whether you are or are not convinced of that I do not know, as you are the impartial Chair in our affairs, but the witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee are certainly convinced. Professor Ekins said that the Privacy International case did constitute a “very serious attack” on some fundamental questions of the constitution. He stated:
“The rule of law requires respect for the law, which includes parliamentary sovereignty and the stability of statute”.
In oral evidence, Sir Stephen Laws said:
“If the courts are deciding judicial review decisions that set the rules for future hypothetical cases, they are usurping the legislative function.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 9-15.]
That is pretty damning criticism of the Privacy International judgment and other recent cases.
Anne McLaughlin
Encouraged by the Minister, I have decided that I will say a few words, even if none of them are original. Most of what I have to say is in agreement with the hon. Member for Hammersmith, but it is good to put the opposition of the SNP on the record.
What would this new clause do? Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, this new clause would prohibit the use of oral evidence in judicial review and would also prevent courts from ordering any public body to disclose evidence in anticipation or during the course of judicial review proceedings. As we have heard, oral evidence is already rarely used in judicial review proceedings, but the courts retain a discretion to permit oral evidence where it is considered essential to the case. My understanding is that judges use that discretion appropriately, and frequently deny requests to cite oral evidence unless, as I have said, it is considered essential to the case. I am not aware of any indication that the system has the problem that the proposals seek to address.
I wonder what adding a requirement for compelling reasons would do to the existing position. It could be that that is just an alternative translation of the existing position. One compelling reason for adducing oral evidence would be that it is necessary to do so. If that is the case, the new clause is not needed. If the proposed compelling reasons requirement is seen to raise the threshold for which oral evidence is admissible, I think we should all find that problematic. Judges are already only allowing such evidence when it is considered necessary to do so. The clear result of the proposed change would be that oral evidence that is necessary for the fair resolution of the case would not be admitted. That surely cannot be acceptable to the Minister.
New clause 5 would also bar judges from ordering disclosure of evidence. Again, such disclosure is used only when absolutely essential. Judges order disclosure only when that disclosure is vital to resolve the case fairly. In many respects, the disclosure obligations act as a way of ensuring that the duty of candour is complied with where parties must submit to the court all relevant evidence and information relating to the case. In the vast majority of cases, both parties will comply, but where they do not the judge can ensure compliance by using disclosure powers. Weakening those disclosure powers would, in effect, weaken the duty of candour, which is a vital aspect of fairness in judicial review. If public bodies and Governments believe that they do not need to comply with that duty, the position of claimants would be severely weakened in judicial review proceedings. We should increase access to justice, not make it increasingly pointless.
James Cartlidge
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady, who made some perfectly reasonable points. It is disappointing that she did not rise to the bait by entering into the curry-labelling discussion instigated by the hon. Member for Hammersmith. I am not sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich is a vindaloo—I think he is a phaal. Anyone who googles that will find that it is the hottest curry there is. Maybe my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings is a phaal as well. It is inevitable, then, that they all think the Bill does not go phaal enough. As a great fan of curry, I generally go for the specials on the à la Cart menu. [Laughter.] That was not a reference to clause 2, by the way.
In new clause 5, my right hon. Friend is probing in his uniquely penetrating way of gaining the Committee’s attention and focusing on some important points. I will try to set out why, although there is merit in what he says, it is not right for this precise moment—perhaps with further work, not least as there may be other potential routes to achieving his end.
The new clause would amend the Bill to include some specific rules relating to disclosure and the duty of candour in judicial review cases. The clause would do three things. First, it would remove the ability of the court to permit oral evidence to be given unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Secondly, it would remove the ability of the court to order a public authority to disclose evidence at all, either in anticipation of proceedings or during proceedings, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Thirdly, in cases where a public authority is arguing that the subject matter is non-justiciable altogether or judicial review jurisdiction has been ousted, it would remove any evidential requirement on the public authority until the court has ruled on the subject of justiciability or jurisdiction.
The duty of candour is a common law concept that obliges parties in judicial review proceedings to disclose information relevant to the case. The independent review of administrative law examined that duty when it conducted a call for evidence last year. Legal practitioners and other stakeholders identified issues relating to a lack of clarity surrounding the exact extent and precise nature of the obligations arising from the duty. The independent review concluded that the duty of candour may have previously been interpreted in a way that causes a disproportionate burden on public authorities, and that there would be benefit in clarifying the parameters of the duty. The Government would like to ensure that the duty of candour is not invoked by claimants to rouse political debates or to discover extraneous information that would have otherwise been kept confidential.
I reassure my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich that this remains very much a live issue for the Government. The difference here, I suspect, is not a question of objective, but of how best to achieve it. The independent review recommended that the issue could be addressed through changes to the Treasury Solicitor’s guidance. Although that is, of course, a matter for the Treasury Solicitor, the advantage to using guidance to address some of the issues that have occurred with the duty of candour in the past is that it can be more flexible and dynamic than legislation.
As I have already indicated, the Government remain open-minded about the possibility of going further on judicial review reform in time. Although my instinct continues to be that any issues with the operation of the duty of candour are better addressed through other means, and not through primary legislation, I will reflect on the arguments that my right hon. Friend has made for a legislative response. We have already discussed the point of the meeting. I am quite clear that that could be wide-ranging and could include this discussion, too. They all fit within the same theme, which he has painted with a broad brush today. I am quite happy to look at it in those terms, but also in more specific terms, particularly with the benefit of officials and so on.
In the light of the complexity of the issues at stake, and the importance of getting the legislation right, I cannot accept my right hon. Friend’s new clause. I hope that, with my reassurance that that the Government will continue to actively consider the matter, he will agree to withdraw it.
Sir John Hayes
I am grateful to the Minister for again offering further discussion on these subjects. I am also pleased that he is considering other means to achieve the objectives that I set out. He is right that the independent review addressed these matters and, by the way, did so on the basis that I described: that by taking wide evidence judicial review was rehearsing decisions rather than checking on the exercise of them. Judicial review is about ensuring that, in the exercise of decision making, all has been done properly. It is not about reheating wide-ranging contextual arguments.
The problem with collecting oral evidence in a permissive way is that it is bound to lead to just that. That was identified by Professor Ekins and others, in the evidence that they gave us and beyond. The Minister is right to consider through guidance how that could be altered. Statutory guidance would be a very effective way of doing it, providing that his officials and others are confident that it is sufficient. There is always a balance to be struck between primary legislation and guidance, and we need to be clear that it will be sufficient in this case.
We talked a little about how jurisprudence has moved on, and in particular the Miller case. In the end, the decision of the Supreme Court in that case meant that it, in the words of the Attorney General,
“stepped into matters of high policy in which the UK courts have historically held themselves to have no constitutional role.”
That is a direct quote from the Government’s most senior Law Officer. In the two new clauses, and in those that were not selected because they were deemed not to be in scope, and which I will therefore not discuss, I have tried to make the case that the Bill is very welcome, but it is a korma rather than a vindaloo. It is certainly not a madras. It can be more varied and hotter, to develop the metaphor. I can match the Minister blow for blow in terms of my grasp of Indian cuisine.
James Cartlidge
On a point of information, my right hon. Friend must be aware that a madras is technically milder than a vindaloo, but a vindaloo is certainly milder than a phaal.
Sir John Hayes
That is true, but I see the Minister as something between the two. He is more of a jalfrezi—spicy, lively and deeply satisfying, in terms of his response to my new clauses at least.
It is worth drawing attention to the remarks of Lord Sumption, who of course commented on exactly these matters in his Reith lecture. Jonathan Sumption is the judge who, perhaps more than any other, has set out the proper functions of the courts in relation to Parliament. In his Reith lecture, he said:
“It is the proper function of the courts to stop Government exceeding or abusing their legal powers.”
That is exactly the role of judicial review, by the way. He continued:
“Allowing judges to circumvent parliamentary legislation, or review the merits of policy decisions for which Ministers are answerable to Parliament, raises quite different issues. It confers vast discretionary powers on a body of people who are not constitutionally accountable for what they do. It also undermines the single biggest advantage of the political process, which is to accommodate the divergent interests and opinions of citizens.”
He went on to say in that lecture that it was about developing the right kind of political culture. It is appropriate that the political culture that underpins our deliberations in this place is a means by which views can be mitigated and ameliorated, where necessary, in a way that courts cannot do because of their character and function. I remain of Jonathan Sumption’s view that much needs to be done to put right what the courts have got wrong in recent years, and I stand alongside the Attorney General in her determination to do that.
Andy Slaughter
On a point of order, Mr Rosindell. Before we conclude our proceedings on the Bill, I wonder whether it might be appropriate to offer my thanks, on behalf of me and my colleagues, to everyone who has contributed to making this, certainly compared with other Bills that I have done in the past, a smooth-running and not unenjoyable process, if I may put it that way. I will not take up a lot of time, but I would particularly like to thank you, Mr Rosindell, and Sir Mark for the efficient and not indulgent, but certainly sympathetic, way in which you have chaired these proceedings. I know that that has been difficult, particularly today, because we had Sir David Amess’s memorial service this morning. We all respect the fact that you and Sir Mark have chaired the Committee with your usual great skill and attentiveness.
I thank the Clerks, who have given us extraordinary assistance on technical matters relating to the Bill, for the way in which they have helped us, and helped me, with my rustiness, to get through the first Bill that I have done in this capacity for a number of years. I also thank everyone else who makes this a smooth-running process. That includes the Doorkeepers, Hansard and everyone else on whom we rely to ensure that these things go as smoothly and efficiently as possible.
May I say thank you to a few other people? I thank the Minister and his colleagues for the way in which they have approached the Bill. There are some fundamental differences between us. We voted against the Bill’s Second Reading and, sadly, we have not managed to carry many votes here to improve the Bill. There are a number of improvements and amendments within the changes to the courts procedure that we would fully support, but there is, at the heart of the Bill, something that we find worrying, which is a further attempt by the Executive to encroach on the discretion of the judiciary, which is one of the great sacred parts of our constitution, so I am glad that at least we have resisted today any further attempts to do that.
Notwithstanding that, this Committee has undertaken a good-natured, but at the same time thorough, investigation of the provisions. I thank all my colleagues for their assistance and prompting—even when I go on for a long time—but I would particularly like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North, who, seeing me just beginning my role and being thrown in at the deep end with the Bill, stepped up, notwithstanding having just been a shadow Minister on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, to carry the burden of dealing with the substantial bulk of the provisions here. Sadly, he is not with us today because he has tested positive for covid. Therefore, I have been told to go off and get a PCR test as well; we probably all have as a consequence of that. I gather that my hon. Friend is tired but otherwise in good spirits. He is an extremely kind and courteous gentleman at all times, and I am sure that we all wish him a speedy recovery.
We have come almost to time on the Bill. We thought that we might go short; we have taken our time, but we have not taken more time. All I will say in conclusion is that there has been a culinary theme to the Bill. We had cherries on the first day, and ended with curries on the last, but I hope that, in looking at the transcripts, those who scrutinise us will not think we have made too much of a meal of it.
James Cartlidge
Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. May I echo the remarks made by the hon. Member for Hammersmith, particularly in thanking you and Sir Mark for your dual chairmanship, which has operated effectively and efficiently, together with your officials and the Clerks? May I particularly thank the Doorkeepers? As I said earlier—I really meant it—what we saw from them today, walking behind Sir David’s coffin, was incredibly moving.
I thank all members of the Committee, on both sides. No one goes into proceedings expecting that we will all agree on all points, but that does not matter; conduct is different from that. I think we have seen effective debate, proceeding at reasonable speed most of the time, but with that combination of depth and rigour that is important in a Bill Committee. That is the point: we are going through a Bill line by line. I am grateful to SNP and Labour colleagues. I particularly thank those on my side of the Committee. We heard many excellent speeches and contributions, but they also knew when to keep their own counsel, so that we could keep the ship of the Bill sailing in the right direction.
This is an important Bill. The context is difficult. The post-pandemic situation is challenging, with a significant backlog of cases, and we are doing everything we can to deal with that. The Bill contains some significant measures on that front. It also contains the important reform of judicial review—more for another time.
It remains only for me to thank everybody for their participation. I am grateful that we have managed to move to this stage, and that we now move onwards and upwards.
Sir John Hayes
Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. On behalf of the Back-Bench Members on this side of the Committee—and I hope others too—I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister. I served as a shadow Minister and a Minister for 19 years and I know how hard it is, particularly from the other side of the Committee, to maintain the progress of debate and to retain the calibre and character of scrutiny.
I thank the Minister for the way he has gone about his business, and the shadow team for the way they have gone about theirs. I wish the hon. Member for Stockton North well, as he has now fallen ill. I also thank you, Mr Rosindell, and your fellow Chairman, and all others who have made the Bill proceedings possible.
Anne McLaughlin
Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. I want to reiterate what everybody else has said and thank everybody involved. I wish the hon. Member for Stockton North well and I hope that he recovers by a week today, St Andrew’s day, because he will be wanting to celebrate.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East—I have finally got the constituency name. That is not as great a constituency name as South Holland and The Deepings, however. I am going to visit, and I will let the right hon. Gentleman know when I do.
This has been a really interesting Bill Committee. I used to resist going on Bill Committees, but I came from the Nationality and Borders Bill Committee straight to this one, and they are the best bit of the job, because they are probably the only time we really get an in-depth understanding of what we are doing. A lot of the time, we have to skim through things because there is so much to consider. I look forward to the next Bill Committee.
I thank the Clerks and everyone involved, including the Doorkeepers. For those who are not speaking and are not involved in the debates, it must be really boring having to sit there and listen to it all. There are no nods of agreement there, but I can pick the answer up telepathically. If I have missed anyone in my thanks, I am sorry—oh, the Chairs. Thank you very much; thank you again for your forbearance, Mr Rosindell, when I was injured. I am still injured, but am recovering.
James Cartlidge
Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. I did not mention the hon. Member for Stockton North; I hope he recovers. I also wish to thank my officials, who have been excellent—very high quality—for my first Bill Committee. I hope we keep up the good work as we move forward. I am grateful to everyone who has helped us to reach this point.