Business of the House

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 28th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Oh, Mr Speaker, that was a great witticism at the end. I think we are all splitting our sides on the Government Benches. The point is that, from this very Dispatch Box and standing here, the colossus in front of the House of Commons, the Prime Minister himself, said that he would make as much time available as the Leader of the Opposition wanted—24 hours a day. Did the hon. Gentleman beg or beseech his leader to accept this offer? Did he knock on the door of the shadow Cabinet and say, “Please, sir, we want some more”? Or did the Labour party just spurn it and ignore it so that it could complain and stop Brexit, because it is a remain party, in spite of many of its Members—including the hon. Gentleman, who nobly voted for Second Reading—representing leave seats?

[Sir David Lidington (Aylesbury) (Con)]

Is not the flaw in my right hon. Friend’s argument that rather than gifting to the Leader of the Opposition only the choice about whether he might agree to a particular revised programme motion, the Government should instead have given the House as a whole that opportunity? Is it not the Government’s refusal to give the House as a whole that opportunity that is causing the criticisms that my right hon. Friend is hearing today, and will he not undertake to reflect further on this matter?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I have the greatest admiration for my right hon. Friend, who was a very distinguished Leader of the House and has held so many high offices in the Conservative party. He has been a great servant both of the state and of his party. I am afraid that on this occasion I disagree with him, because such an opportunity was given. The way this House works is that, when allocations of time are given, it is usually discussions between the two main parties that are determinative. This is a sensible way of running things, because then we can have the certainty that is needed.

Pairing

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 23rd July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The difference between the incident in the 1970s that the hon. Gentleman cites and what happened last week is that the majorities—both against and for the Government—in the two Divisions were completely unaffected by what happened over pairing.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I have probably not always been the blue-eyed boy of the Whips Office, but I have found that this Chief Whip and his predecessors have always behaved with the utmost honesty and integrity. Confected anger and attacking my right hon. Friend does not help the House—in fact, it does not help anybody—because this system generally works. We should be very cautious about moving towards proxy voting because, had I taken the paternity leave due to me, I can think of no one I would have less liked to have held my vote than the Chief Whip.

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, although I have to give him this warning: those who start out not being the blue-eyed boys of the Whips Office usually end up being recruited into it.

Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Border Arrangements

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Wednesday 28th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The mechanism is that which is set out in the joint report and in the Government’s various speeches and publications over the past 12 months, the latest of which the Prime Minister will deliver this Friday.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I wonder whether my right hon. Friend has pointed out to the Irish Government that the biggest loser if there is not a sensible agreement and tariffs are imposed on Irish goods coming into the United Kingdom will be the Irish economy. There would be huge devastation to the Irish agricultural economy in particular. I wonder whether he has suggested to the Irish Prime Minister the question of whether he is willing to sacrifice the interests of the Irish economy on the high altar of European political integration.

[Mr Lidington]

The economies of Ireland and the United Kingdom are indeed intertwined, but I reassure my hon. Friend that the Irish Government and the Taoiseach are committed to trying to resolve these matters through option A, as set out in the joint report—namely, through the means of an overall economic agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Business of the House

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 18th April 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The Prime Minister and the party she leads will take to the people the case for the Union of the four nations of our United Kingdom, and our belief that those four nations are better off working together in that unique enduring partnership of the United Kingdom. I say to the hon. Gentleman that the Prime Minister took her decision—a decision that, as she said this morning, she took with considerable reluctance—because it is in the interests of the people of this country. It is in the interests of the entire nation that we have clarity, stability and constancy of purpose as we move forwards.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Does the Lord President agree that this is actually one of the rare occasions when it is absolutely right that the statement was first made to the British people—not to this House—because it is they who are being asked to use their sovereign power to determine the composition of a new House?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes a cogent point. It will, of course, be for this House in the first place to decide whether to approve the motion that we will debate tomorrow. If the Government’s motion is carried, we will then put our case to the people.

European Affairs

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Thursday 25th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

May I first congratulate all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in the debate this afternoon?

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I thought the Minister might begin with an apology for the absence of the Foreign Secretary. It is custom for senior Ministers who have opened debates to return for the end of them. On such an important matter, it is a rather surprising discourtesy to the House that the normal convention has not been observed.

UK’s Relationship with the EU

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 2nd February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I really do not think that the hon. Gentleman should be so dismissive of issues that the Prime Minister has put on the table and which matter a great deal to the people whom both he and I represent in this House. There are very significant advantages to our national interest in remaining part of a reformed European Union, but opinions in the House have differed on the subject, quite honourably and openly, for many years and it is right that the people have the final say.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am not convinced by my right hon. Friend’s explanation of the Prime Minister’s delay, which is that we need to study the document, because although it is characteristically long on words, it is short on substance. May I draw his attention to page 15, where it notes that the emergency brake in relation to immigration will operate on a proposal from the Commission, and to the draft legislation relating to the euro outs, which says that, if there is opposition to the Council adopting something by qualified majority, the Council shall discuss the issue? Well, that is an enormous difference from what we currently have. I just wonder whether the next 24 hours will allow Downing Street the opportunity to try to make bricks without straw.

[Mr Lidington]

As I have said, this is an ongoing negotiation and we have not reached agreement on all aspects of what is in the Tusk drafts. I would just point out to my hon. Friend that the document also includes a very clear statement by the European Commission that it believes the conditions already exist in the United Kingdom for the emergency brake on welfare access to be triggered.

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 1st February 2016 General Committees

[Mr Lidington]

I will try to reply to those points. The purpose of the common foreign and security policy is set out primarily in article 21 of the treaty on the European Union. I will not recite it in full—it is lengthy—but it is basically about developing external action in a way that promotes European values and the fundamental interests of security, independence and integrity, and consolidates and supports democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law in external action. The article goes on to list other criteria too.

NATO is to some extent reactive, in that it is the ultimate guarantor of collective security for allies. I do not want to get drawn too far into this question, but I think it is fair to say that at the Wales summit and again at the Warsaw summit later this year, we are trying to ensure that NATO is less reactive and is, for example, focusing very much on questions of resilience and how to have effective deterrents and response plans in place against hybrid attack, not just conventional military attack.

EU external action has particular value added in two ways. First, of course, not every EU member state is a member of NATO, so countries such as Sweden and Finland are able to contribute to EU missions, including military missions, when they would not be able to do so as part of a NATO mission. For example, the Austrians have deployed forces as part of an EU mission in the western Balkans, whereas they could not participate in a NATO mission. Secondly, EU work can provide civilian expertise in things such as training of military personnel; training of police and security forces; border work, including the training of border forces; and missions to try to improve the governance of neighbouring or more distant countries.

The roles should be complementary. One could argue, for example, that the cyber threat to military communications and military capability should be dealt with at NATO level, but we know there is a cyber threat to key IT systems for energy distribution and even for retail distribution in a modern economy. It is much more difficult to say that those fall naturally into NATO’s remit, but effective co-operation and complementarity between NATO and the EU, if done well, can add up to a very effective security response.

On the question of scrutiny, with every CFSP document we check whether the document in question falls within the terms of the scrutiny reserve resolution. If it does, it goes to the Committee anyway for scrutiny. The challenge from the Committee—it is one I understand—is that some quite significant policy documents on EU foreign policy, including some described as action plans in the past, do not fall within the current terms of reference of the scrutiny reserve resolution. The volume of such documents is so large that I would be reluctant to agree to submit all of them for scrutiny, so it comes down to a matter of my judgment as to which I send to the Committee.

I remain open to trying to agree with the Committee a set of criteria that would enable it to have oversight of the documents that it particularly wishes to see and that are genuinely important. I would, in return, want to have a serious discussion about the fact that some documents—not necessarily CFSP documents—go to the Committee at the moment that frankly need not go through the formal scrutiny process and could be dealt with in a more streamlined fashion.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I have three groups of questions. The first is on the scrutiny issue. I draw the Minister’s attention to page 331 of the documents. The criticism on scrutiny in this case is perhaps as much of the European Union as of the Minister: it took six and a half months to prepare the report on 2014, which made proper scrutiny by this House extremely difficult. It seems improper of the European Union to be so slow in producing documents that they cannot be scrutinised properly by national Parliaments, leading to a scrutiny waiver. What can the Minister do to improve that?

In response to the Minister’s suggestion of some negotiation between the Committee and his office as to what is sent for scrutiny, may I say that if the Government were a little more up to date with the debates that had been requested, including one now outstanding for more than two years, there might be more good will between those who wish to scrutinise and those who are scrutineered?

[Mr Lidington]

On the point about the slowness with which the EU sometimes produces documents, I am sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s comments. As he will know, I have exchanged correspondence with both the present and previous High Representatives about that, reminding them of the importance of our parliamentary scrutiny processes and the need for documents to be produced in good time wherever possible. In this particular case, it is fair to say that there was quite a complex negotiation at the level of ambassadorial representatives in Brussels, so it would be wrong of me to say this was all down to the External Action Service of Mrs Mogherini.

However, my hon. Friend’s general point is well made, although I would add that there are ways in which the House of Commons could improve its own scrutiny arrangements. It was probably unavoidable that for more than three months there was no House of Commons scrutiny arrangement in place, because from the moment of Dissolution, the scrutiny structure here fell away and did not operate again until almost the end of July 2015. That is not the fault of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset and his fellow Committee members—it is a side effect of our constitutional arrangements, but the EU machine continued to turn out documents during that time. It will not surprise my hon. Friend to learn that my personal view is that scrutiny Committees ought to have some arrangement for monitoring documents and sifting them during recesses, because that would help the process.

My hon. Friend referred to the backlog from the previous Parliament. As he will know, we are making efforts to try to clear that as rapidly as possible. There is always a difficult balance to be struck in the allocation of time, both in Committee and on the Floor of the House, but the usual channels are well aware of the concerns of my hon. Friend and his colleagues and are endeavouring to clear the backlog as soon as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

As a supplementary, I cannot let the Minister get away with the suggestion that the delay in reconstituting the European Scrutiny Committee was the fault of anybody other than Her Majesty’s Government. The Whips Office determines when these things happen, so I am surprised that he uses that as a defence. I remind him that these areas are subject to unanimity and if documents are produced late, the Government are in a strong position to refuse them and to say that they must wait for scrutiny by the House. It is not a matter covered by qualified majority voting. Moving on to page 337 of the Council’s conclusions, my first very simple question requires a yes or no answer. Am I right in thinking that these conclusions are conclusions accepted by Her Majesty’s Government?

[Mr Lidington]

Let me deal with the first point. My hon. Friend is clearly right that to some extent the timing of the setting up of any Committee is in the Government’s hands, although I think that what happened in this case was that once Parliament had met, elected a Speaker and heard the Queen’s Speech, it moved on to make provision for the election of Select Committees. Quite a few Members in all parts of the House wished to stand for membership of departmental Select Committees. Because the European Scrutiny Committee is not elected in the same way, it was felt fair to wait until the outcome of those elections to Select Committees were known before we moved on to selecting members of the ESC.

It is true that because CFSP decisions require unanimity, we can block things. We have to decide, when making a decision to block something, especially if the question is one where we actually support the policy, whether blocking on scrutiny grounds is going to cause a harm to our national diplomatic interest that outweighs the offence of not awaiting the correct scrutiny procedures. However, more than once in my time as Minister, I have simply refused to agree to something, which has meant a delay in implementing a number of quite significant EU measures. In this case, we were talking about the latest annual report in a series of annual reports. This has no policy impact—it simply reports what had happened during 2014. I will be straight with my hon. Friend: in those circumstances, and knowing that the Committee only had its first meeting on 21 July, the day after the Foreign Affairs Council, and that it was not likely to meet again until after the summer recess, I decided that it would not be in the United Kingdom’s interests to block the publication of an annual report, when, as we have shown, it would be perfectly possible to have a debate at a future time. No policy has been authorised as a consequence of that decision, because the report was purely retrospective.

I confess that in response to my hon. Friend’s second question, I am slightly at a loss because the copy of the report that I have does not go up to page 337, but only goes up to page 301. There were no conclusions to the report.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I was moving on to page 337 of the package, which relates to the Council’s conclusions on the common security and defence policy, following the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May. I just wanted to check that those conclusions were agreed by Her Majesty’s Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I will check the reference, and, if I may, I will try to respond to that in my winding-up remarks at the end of the debate.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful. Perhaps the Minister may be able to find inspiration while I am asking the next question. If the Government did agree to those conclusions, I would bring to his attention paragraph 1 of the conclusions of the Council. As I understand it, Council conclusions are normally agreed by all members of the Council, so it would be odd, unless there was a specific reservation, if the Government had not agreed paragraph 1. It states:

“This calls for a stronger Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy”.

I thought that it was the policy of Her Majesty’s Government to repatriate powers from the European Union, whereas the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 May 2015, in the opening paragraph of its conclusion, calls for more powers for the European Union. If the Government agreed to that, can the Minister explain why they did so?

[Mr Lidington]

The straight answer is that yes, we did agree to any conclusions that require unanimity and, if I may say so, I think that the slip that my hon. Friend is making is to equate support for

“a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy”

with support for a stronger role for EU institutions in constraining and directing the activities of member states. What we are talking about here are security and defence policies agreed in common, unanimously, by the free decision of 28 national Governments working together, because we have seen in cases such as the Iran nuclear programme, or action in the western Balkans, that we are able to achieve more if we are working together than if even one or two of the big member states try to act on their own.

I would argue that we should be confident and ambitious about the influence that the United Kingdom can and does have on the shaping and framing of those policies. We are one of a handful of EU member states that have a history of global engagement and a worldwide diplomatic network, which is delivering the 0.7% UN target on international development. In terms of the trust fund of Turkey, for example, that enables us to put our money and our commitment on the table, and lead the actions of others at European level.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful for the further opportunity to discuss this. The Minister thinks that I have misconstrued the conclusions, but paragraph 2 of the Council conclusions goes on to say that the EU and member states

“are assuming increased responsibilities to act as a security provider”.

When it refers to the EU, that must refer to the institutions of the European Union and must refer back to the second sentence of paragraph 1. It is giving more power to the European Union institutions; it says it in the document.

[Mr Lidington]

But in this context, that is the European Union institutions acting on the basis of a unanimously agreed decision by the Governments of the member states meeting in the Council. If there is not unanimity, there is no EU foreign policy position and, therefore, no EU action.

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[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The Minister wishes to use words in a way that does not bear the normal meaning of them. Perhaps he will be able to help me in the usage of some words by the writers of the document, where the words do not have any normal meaning. Could he explain paragraph 4 of the document and tell us what the following means?

“The aim is to increase synergies in the EU response to priority horizontal issues”.

What are priority horizontal issues?

[Mr Lidington]

I have some sympathy with my hon. Friend’s dislike of what I sometimes refer to as diplo-babble. I have to confess that one finds this in national policy documents, I dread to say, as well as in European ones from time to time. I think he is being slightly unfair because he is quoting that phrase out of the context in which it is set. The context is the Council committing itself

“to further strengthen the links between external and internal security.”

The next sentence goes on to define priority horizontal issues

“such as terrorism, organised crime, foreign fighters, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, irregular migration, hybrid threats, border management, energy security and cyber security”.

The meaning behind that convoluted bit of jargon is that EU countries working together need to do more to co-ordinate. To take one example, that means co-ordinating the work that we do to strengthen our domestic arrangements to tackle terrorism with the external work that we do through diplomatic and other means.

I believe it is right, for example, that European countries, working through EU justice and home affairs provisions, should provide a system whereby we all have access to records of passenger names of people travelling within the EU or from EU airports to other flights. There is a natural synergy between that and working with countries, such as Turkey, that are used as transit routes by terrorists and organised criminals; just as there is a synergy with EU work to improve governance, public order and the rule of law in the countries of the western Balkans, which are very much prey to organised crime in all its forms, and which need and value external support from elsewhere in Europe to buttress their attempts to build the rule of law in their countries.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the Minister for his translation of diplo-babble, but there are more examples, such as

“hybrid strategies and operations by state and non-state actors”.

I wonder who is doing the acting.

Paragraph 8 reports:

“Therefore, defence issues should also be considered in coherence”—

for the benefit of Hansard, I make clear that that is two words, “in” and “coherence”, rather than “incoherence”, although one might think the alternative is better—

“with other relevant EU policies and sectors, and vice versa”.

This is an extraordinarily unclear document, except when it is clear and the Government say that it is not.

In the context of my first question on the document, I will bring the Minister to paragraph 16. Could he explain what is meant by the following?

“The establishment of a EU facility linking closer peace, security and development in the framework of one or more existing EU instruments; and a dedicated instrument to this effect, in view of the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020”.

Does that mean more powers to EU institutions?

[Mr Lidington]

No, it does not, is the straight answer. Because I do not have direct ministerial responsibility for Africa, I offer to write to my hon. Friend with further details once I have talked to the Minister for Africa. However, my reading of this section of paragraph 16 is that it is saying that an EU facility should be established to try to drive forward internal peace, security and development in African countries. It seems that those three objectives fit naturally together. An African country that is more secure is likely to be able to offer greater economic opportunities to its people, more economic growth and more employment, which in turn will reduce the attractiveness of crime, terrorism and so on.

The following line, which refers to the

“mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework”,

is saying that this new facility could be set up within the context of the mid-term review, meaning that funds that are currently spent in one particular way could be reallocated through the creation of the new programme. I can give my hon. Friend and the Committee a firm assurance that the unanimity lock remains on the ceilings that were negotiated by the Prime Minister in 2013. The mid-term review may come up with interesting ideas about how to reorganise expenditure programmes, but unless the Government changed their mind, which they have no intention of doing, those seven-year MFF ceilings remain in place.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that answer. If he does write to me, might he look at the opening part of paragraph 16? In that context, does

“the Joint Communication on ‘Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’”

refer to the development of EU competence, of which I would always urge him to be cautious?

Paragraph 17j states that the Council

“Welcomes the clarification and understanding achieved regarding the possible use of Article 44 TEU”.

Will he explain what that possible use is? Although the document welcomes the clarification, it does not explain it.

[Mr Lidington]

It is part of the Lisbon treaty and permits the Council to entrust the conduct of a CSDP mission to a willing group of member states smaller than the entire EU membership, allowing those without an interest in the mission to give it their political blessing without actually having to participate. Under article 44, a coalition of the willing could therefore take on a mission under the EU banner with the support of EU infrastructure and spending programmes. Italy and a number of southern member states are particularly keen on that at the moment because they are talking about a further CSDP mission in the Mediterranean.

The article has the potential to be useful because it would provide a way to reflect the reality that it is inevitable in a diverse EU membership that member states have different levels of interest in particular crises. It will be no shock to the Committee if I say that Malta is concerned about what is happening in Libya and that Lithuania is concerned about the situation vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Article 44 will add value only if it has some different rules that allow for greater flexibility of action. By definition, the article is likely to be used when not all member states want to be fully engaged in a mission and therefore use of the article should not come with an automatic expectation of common funding from member states that have chosen not to participate. Those who want to take part should pay for it.

We can delegate a mission to a particular group of member states, but we are very reluctant to support the idea of delegating responsibility for that mission’s conduct, even if it is being conducted by only a minority of willing member states. In any use of article 44, we would want to insist that standards of planning, organisation, governance and spending oversight in the conduct of a mission remained just as high if it took place under article 44 as it would for any other EU mission.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to both the hon. Member for North West Durham and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset for their contributions. The hon. Lady was right that the document we are debating contains no new policy. It is purely a retrospective report on what happened or what was done during 2014. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that I do not claim—and never have claimed—that everything about the EU is perfect, certainly not the way it does external policy. I probably know that better than any other member of the Committee after the last five and three quarter years. However, as I said earlier, I believe that in today’s world the reality is that, in order to protect our own citizens and advance the interests of our country, we need to work with others.

I remember my noble Friend Lord Hague saying to me after one extremely long Foreign Affairs Council when he was Foreign Secretary that, while it was utterly frustrating and infuriating to try to get 28 different countries all to sign up to a common package of sanctions against a third country, the effort was worth while, because, when that could be achieved, it was more effective than Britain acting on its own or even than Britain, France and Germany acting together. It closed down so many actual or potential loopholes for sanctions busting, and there was a greater political and economic effect on the country being targeted than if only a small group of the willing had taken action.

The safeguards that we have with regard to the exercise of the EU’s foreign and security policy responsibilities are, first, that it is laid down in the treaties that, for a foreign policy position to be adopted, all member states have to be in agreement. Every country, including the United Kingdom, has a veto. Not only that, but the European Court cannot second-guess policy positions. It has a limited right to look at the implementation of unanimously agreed decisions, for example on sanctions. An individual who is subject to EU sanctions can go to the European Court and argue that the sanction was imposed improperly or on the basis of false evidence, or for whatever other reason. However, the Court cannot intervene in the making of a foreign policy position.

In addition, the European Union Act 2011 provides explicitly for a referendum to be held in this country were any future British Government to be tempted to agree to move from unanimity towards majority voting for common foreign and security policy or common security and defence policy.

I also say to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that yes, we do need to be vigilant about attempts to stretch the envelope over competence. For example, since 2010 I have instructed my officials to be very active in resisting what we believe to be unwarranted attempts by the Commission to supplant the role of member states or the rotating presidency in representing the EU position in international organisations. That is a battle that I am sure will continue.

Also, when considering vetoing a particular measure, or at least delaying agreement to it—what my hon. Friend asks me to do more frequently—I consider what the impact of such a veto or delay would be. Sometimes, when the final unclassified version of a document has regrettably, for whatever reason, been produced late in the process by Brussels, I am faced with the decision of whether to override scrutiny in order to allow agreement, or to do as he asks and block agreement pending scrutiny. Sometimes that might mean deciding whether to put at risk the continuation of an EU peacekeeping or training mission in a country where the operation of that mission is important to the United Kingdom’s interests.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Of course I accept that there are urgent occasions, particularly in relation to sanctions, when it is right to override scrutiny, because giving us time to scrutinise sanctions would also give the person who is supposed to be caught by them time to change his affairs. This document, however, was a report on what happened in 2014, so it was in no sense urgent that it be agreed in July; it could easily have waited until proper scrutiny had taken place. It seems to me, therefore, that the urgency argument really does not apply in this case.

[Mr Lidington]

In this case, as I described earlier, had we blocked agreement on 20 July, it would have been in the knowledge that we could not return to it until scrutiny processes had been completed, which would have taken us well into the autumn, given that Parliament sat for only two weeks in September, and I think the Committee met only once in those two weeks. A debate could probably not have taken place until the second half of October at the earliest.

We had, as we always have, many political objectives at stake during a Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The Foreign Secretary and I took the view that to hold up agreement on this would simply be an unwelcome use of negotiating capital that we wanted to keep for substantive foreign policy issues where getting others to agree to the British position was challenging but important for our diplomatic interests. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset is perfectly entitled to say that we misjudged that and that we should have been more rigorous in defending parliamentary scrutiny, but that was the way in which my right hon. Friend and I approached it.

In conclusion, it remains the case, in my view, that we can achieve important objectives of this country by working co-operatively with our nearest neighbours and partners. Furthermore, the diplomatic weight that the United Kingdom brings to the European table is significant. We can and do have a major influence on shaping what later become common European policies. In that sense, we can use the European arrangements to amplify our own diplomatic reach and punching power. Indeed, people from the United States often tell British officials and Ministers that they want us to get involved in bringing other Europeans to the table. In fact, the Prime Minister was very active in ensuring that the United States and European Union positions on Russia sanctions have been very closely aligned throughout the Ukraine crisis.

Although these institutional arrangements are not perfect—I am not going to claim that we will win every single battle—I believe that we can use our power and influence effectively to shape European policy positions in a way that brings tangible benefits to the security and prosperity of the people of the United Kingdom. On that basis, I commend the Government’s motion to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsidiarity and Proportionality

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 7th December 2015 General Committees

[Mr Lidington]

I will try to respond as fully as I can within the constraints of time to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East.

As the Prime Minister said in his letter, the level of a threshold to trigger a red card that would amount to a block on legislation would be a matter for the negotiation itself. I cannot pre-empt those detailed discussions, but we envisage that at a certain point what is currently a power for national Parliaments to require the Commission to review a particular initiative should become an outright bar to further progress.

As for the yellow card, to my mind a change that would be particularly welcome would be an extension of the timeframe allowed beyond the eight weeks permitted under current law. That would enable national Parliaments to consider proposals more closely and to co-ordinate with one another. I would also like to see such a change to the yellow card take into account the very creative proposal from the Dutch Parliament for what it termed a “late card”, so that in the event of a legislative measure changing significantly during its progress through the various institutions it would be possible for national Parliaments to come back and have another look at it, because at the moment that opportunity is forbidden to them regardless of how far-reaching any amendments might be.

Finally, the Government support the green card, but it is also an initiative that is actively being taken forward by national Parliaments at the moment. Yes, we support it, but if it can be achieved through Parliaments working together in COSAC, persuading the institutions to take that change on board, then we are happy simply to support the work that the Parliaments themselves have initiated.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

May I ask the Minister a bit more about the red card? Is it fair to assume that the number of countries that would be required to send in a red card would be lower than the number required to vote against it in the Council of Ministers to provide a blocking majority under qualified majority voting?

[Mr Lidington]

The difference between the two arrangements, as my hon. Friend knows, is that to assemble a blocking majority in the Council of Ministers one has to assemble that majority on the basis of weighted votes, with the most populous countries having greater weight, in the calculation of a majority or minority, than the smaller member states, whereas in the case of the yellow card system each parliamentary chamber in the EU has a single vote. I suppose that it operates a bit like the way that the US Senate operates, with no regard to the relative populations of the different countries.

The answer to that question would therefore depend very much on what the comparator was in terms of the blocking minority among member states. I certainly envisage that a red card would have to involve a higher threshold than a yellow card would, since it would be a more far-reaching measure.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. However, could the red card serve any useful purpose if it were harder to get than a qualified majority vote against a proposal coming from the Commission, because all Governments are responsible to their Parliaments, and therefore to make it a workable proposition, the assumption would have to be that a matter had a qualified majority in favour but the Parliaments sought to stop it?

[Mr Lidington]

Having served as a Minister both in the last Parliament and this one, I have to say that I do not think that Governments can automatically assume that they have the majority in Parliaments, particularly on European matters. So, while the circumstances that my hon. Friend describes would be unusual, it would nevertheless be worth while to have that democratic back stop. Also, a strongly expressed parliamentary view would perhaps, in the case of a number of member states, put greater backbone into a Government resisting a measure to which their Parliament had declared itself opposed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

The very idea that Governments will have backbone in the face of Europe is a novel one, but I hope that we might see it one day.

Moving on to yellow cards, does my right hon. Friend think that part of the reason for the number of cards going down, apart from the lower number of proposals coming forward, is that once the decision was given about the EPP, Parliaments thought there was little point? The Commission did absolutely nothing regarding that important proposal. What is the purpose of this House or any other Chamber passing resolutions if they are just ignored?

[Mr Lidington]

As I said in my opening remarks, that might be part of the explanation. One would have to go back and talk to parliamentarians from the 27 other member states to have a clear analysis. I suspect that with some countries the lack of yellow cards might be down more to domestic political circumstances—perhaps a general election and a change of Government—than to anything happening at the EU level.

It is also fair, however, to take account of the changeover of the Commission. The Juncker Commission’s track record of launching many fewer new initiatives than the Barroso Commission, even in its first term, inevitably reduces the number of targets for national Parliaments. That too is part of the explanation. Frankly, if the Commission is going to stick to that approach and take account, in advance, of what national Parliaments and national Governments would regard as the right priorities, that is a change we should all welcome.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

On that very point, the Commission has tended to respond even when a majority has not been reached, but it has often been pretty stubborn in pushing forward with its proposal anyway. Indeed, in one of the documents we can even see that it wanted to bring forward a more ambitious proposal rather than sticking with the one it already had. To date, therefore, the yellow card has not been hugely successful, as far as one can tell. Does the Minister accept that? Does he also accept that the time limit he mentioned, which it has been argued ought to be extended, can be extended only through treaty change? Is that part of the Government’s intended renegotiation?

[Mr Lidington]

I agree that although there is innovation in the Lisbon treaty—which was an advance, and better than not having any such process—it has not been particularly successful so far. It has certainly taken time for the culture of the Commission leadership to respond to what is necessary. The fact that someone such as First Vice-President Timmermans, who has been an elected politician in a country that has given a high priority to the opinions of its national Parliament, is now a key authority within the Commission has been an important contributing factor to the change we have seen on the part of the Commission in the past year and a bit.

Whether treaty change is needed is something that we are addressing in the course of the detailed negotiations. The technical talks that took place over the summer between UK officials and the secretariats and legal services of the institutions have, on that issue and on the others on which we seek reforms, fleshed out a menu of legal and procedural options for leaders to select from, depending on what deal leaders eventually succeed in negotiating. It would be wrong of me to go further than that, when those negotiations still lie ahead.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful for that because footnote 16 on page 12 of the document gives the Commission’s view that the deadline is enshrined in the treaty and therefore would require treaty change, but the Commission can err, so I hope the Government are right.

Finally—although I may have two questions on this point, depending on the Minister’s answer—I want to ask about the green card issue. Are the Government supportive of a situation in which the Commission loses its exclusive right to propose legislation?

[Mr Lidington]

That is not part of our set of proposals and it would probably be very hard to negotiate that. My word of warning to my hon. Friend is that if that issue were opened up, we would probably see a lot of institutional pressure from the European Parliament to have a right to initiate legislation, and that there would be quite a lot of national Governments around Europe, particularly those of smaller member states, that would be quite attracted by that idea.

As for my hon. Friend’s earlier point—alas, I have lost my thread, so perhaps he could just remind me.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Prior to the green card issue, I asked about the treaty change and the Minister answered me.

[Mr Lidington]

That is right, and if I have not satisfied my hon. Friend, at least I have replied to him. I will rest it there, Mrs Main.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am a bit puzzled by the Minister’s last answer. I thought the whole point of the green card was to give a group of member states the ability to propose changes to, amend, alter or even repeal EU legislation. Now, if it is not giving them the right that is otherwise the exclusive right of the Commission, I do not see what it is doing and whether it serves any purpose.

[Mr Lidington]

The distinction is this: the green card proposal would permit the national Parliaments acting collegiately to propose changes and to seek reviews, but it would leave it then for the Commission, having reviewed the matter, to decide whether to bring forward particular amendments.

That is perhaps analogous—not exactly the same as, but analogous—to the European Parliament’s powers to propose an own-initiative report, which can put forward ideas either for new legislation or the amendment or repeal of existing legislation but which cannot bind the Commission to act in a particular way. What one has found in practice, however, is that the Commission has taken very seriously those reports and frequently acted upon them. I hope that if we got a green card accepted, we would find that the Commission responded in the same way to well-evidenced, well-argued proposals from national Parliaments.

I now recall the point on which I was going to respond to my hon. Friend earlier. He expressed doubt as to whether, in the absence of treaty change, having a red card would mean anything. Of course the Commission, while it has the sole right of initiative, can always choose whether to initiate or to persist with a particular piece of legislation, so it faces a certain political choice when it is in receipt of objections from national Parliaments.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

You are being very generous today, Mrs Main; I promise that this is my last question. Is the Minister therefore saying that the democratic deficit will be addressed by the good will of the Commission when it feels like listening to national Parliaments?

[Mr Lidington]

What I am saying is that the democratic deficit needs to be addressed by a number of different and complementary reforms. Those will include some in the culture of the institutions, which we are starting to see, such as a focus on a rigorous selection of limited priorities where the European Union can genuinely provide value-added to all its members from European-level action, rather than leaving it to member states.

I believe that our proposals on national parliaments are not a panacea, which I have never claimed for them, but will help to reconnect electors with what the European Union is doing on their behalf. Obtaining some kind of mechanism for turning the Laeken commitment into institutional reality in the EU would be a further way in which to bridge the democratic deficit.

At the end of the day, bridging the democratic deficit will be about cultural change as much as about legislative and institutional change. It will be about the EU and its institutions demonstrating through their choice of actions that they are attuned to the policy priorities that matter to the people—the citizens whom they claim to represent.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That the Committee takes note of European Union Documents No. 10651/15 and Addendum, a Commission Annual Report 2014: Subsidiarity and proportionality, and No. 10663/15 and Addendum, a Commission Annual Report 2014: relations with national parliaments; recognises the importance of the principle of subsidiarity and the value of stronger interaction between national parliaments and the EU institutions; welcomes the Government’s reform agenda and efforts to ensure that the Commission responds to future objections under the yellow card scheme by substantially amending or withdrawing the proposal that has been put forward; calls on the Commission to respond to the request of 29 national parliament chambers to establish a working group to consider reforms to strengthen their role; is encouraged by the Commission’s announcement of its intentions to forge a new partnership with national parliaments; and calls on the Commission to set out its plans to do this.(—Mr Lidington.)

Europe: Renegotiation

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 10th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

Obviously, as Parliament is sovereign, not least in the fact that EU law has direct effect in the UK only because of Acts of Parliament—decisions of this House—the irreversibility of any decision any Government take on anything is limited. To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, we are keen to avoid a repeat of the sort of thing that happened over the European financial stabilisation mechanism earlier this year, when, in the heat of a crisis in the eurozone, a deal that had been solemnly agreed by all 28 member states in December 2010 suddenly appeared to be at risk and came up for discussion in a meeting where only 19 member Governments were gathered together. That is not the way in which we can do business in Europe in the future.

[Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend must know that this is pretty thin gruel—it is much less than people had come to expect from the Government. It takes out a few words from the preamble but does nothing about the substance of the treaties; it deals with competition, for which the European Commission itself has a proposal; and it fails to restore control of our borders. It seems to me that its whole aim is to make Harold Wilson’s renegotiation look respectable. It needs to do more; it needs to have a full list of powers that will be restored to the United Kingdom and to this Parliament, not vacuously to Parliaments plural.

[Mr Lidington]

The problem with the idea of a unilateral national parliamentary veto, which my hon. Friend advocates, is that it would mean that, for example, the most protectionist Parliament in any one member state could veto every deregulatory and every single market measure that the United Kingdom believed was profoundly in the interests of our people and our prosperity. Such a unilateral veto would be incompatible even with the arrangements that Norway and Switzerland have with the European Union. I just say to him that if he had had the privilege and responsibility of sitting at Council of Ministers meetings in Brussels, a responsibility that he may well indeed enjoy at some future stage of his career, he would be less sanguine about what he terms the unambitious nature of what we are proposing. What we are proposing is going to require some very tough negotiating indeed.

European Union Referendum Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 16th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is obviously free to take legal opinion of his own, but if he looks again at the wording of section 125 and applies it to the conduct of EU business, he will find that there would be very serious problems in carrying out day-to-day business in the national interest at EU level if the section is left untouched.

We believe that applying the section would be inappropriate because the referendum is taking place as the result of a clear manifesto commitment to negotiate the terms of the UK’s relationship with the European Union and to put them to people in a referendum. Section 125 could make it impossible to explain to the public what the outcome of the renegotiation was and what the Government’s view of that result was.

The Government must be able, and legitimately should be able, to offer their views, including up to the day of the referendum. However, as I have said, the Government are not a campaign: it is not the Government’s job to supplant the role of the lead campaign organisations during the referendum campaign, and it is certainly not our intention to act in that way. We recognise and understand the strength of feeling that exists on this issue, and I am grateful for the constructive and courteous tone in which the debate has been conducted both this afternoon and in private conversations outside the Chamber.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

My right hon. Friend said that the Government may not be able to give their view on the outcomes of the renegotiation. Surely that cannot be true. It cannot be the case that the renegotiation will only be finished within the purdah period.

[Mr Lidington]

What I am saying is that the Government will need to be able to say why they have come to the conclusion and recommendation that they have reached.

As the Foreign Secretary said and as I repeated on Second Reading last week, the Government will exercise restraint during that period. We have listened to what colleagues in all parts of the House have said and are therefore committing ourselves to table amendments on Report to write into the Bill measures that will provide reassurance on that point. I accept completely the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that it is vital that the British public and both sides in the referendum debate accept that the referendum is being conducted fairly and therefore feel able to accept the result.

Commission Work Programme 2015

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Monday 9th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I think that my right hon. Friend is being too pessimistic. As I said earlier, the test will be whether at the end of five years we can look back and say that the Commission has delivered in practice what its words indicated at the start of its tenure. I completely accept that there is a real problem with the Commission’s working culture, which, to be fair, like many national Government Departments, tends to judge success by the output of new law and new regulation, rather than the quality of what is actually done on a number of core priorities.

I was pleased to note that the Commission confirmed this weekend that 73 of the measures proposed for withdrawal have now been formally withdrawn. By comparison, the 2014 work programme proposed 29 new initiatives and prioritised a further 26 measures for adoption, and in 2010 there were some 300 new measures proposed. This work programme is focused on fewer measures, and on measures that will encourage growth and jobs, deepen the single market, conclude trade agreements and improve regulation, freeing up business from unnecessary regulatory burdens. The Government welcome that new focus.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I cannot agree with my right hon. Friend. Of the 73 proposals being withdrawn, 71 are either obsolete or have already been blocked by the Council. Of the 79 actions being withdrawn under REFIT, 58 are evaluations or studies, five are proposals to codify, two are proposals to simplify, one is a proposal for a simplified framework and two are proposals for an update or a review. There is only one that would reduce something, against 452 Commission proposals, less the 73 that are sitting on the table. He tells us that this is a great success for Europe. What would be failure?

[Mr Lidington]

Failure would be Europe failing to give priority to job creation, economic growth and competitiveness at a time when a horrifying number of people, particularly young people, are out of work in this continent and when European competitiveness is not only slipping behind that of the United States, but is at risk because of the global shift of economic power to Asia and Latin America. The answer to those economic challenges lies in Europe raising its game dramatically as far as competitiveness is concerned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

We can argue about all sorts of improbable hypotheticals, but the key point is that, while President Juncker was expressing a view that he has made no secret of holding in the past, this is not a live issue for debate around the table in Brussels at the moment. In fact, both President Juncker and others who have spoken in support of a European army or defence force have said that they see it as being a very long-term objective.

Turning to the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend and a number of other members of the European Scrutiny Committee, the Government recognise public concerns about immigration from other member states and the need for the Commission to do much more to address the abuse of free movement rights and the problems to which it gives rise. That is why this Government have gone further than any previous Administration to try to tackle the problems associated with free movement both domestically and at the European level.

We have acted domestically to tackle abuse and ensure that the rules governing access to our welfare system and public services are as robust as possible. Only today, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has laid regulations in Parliament to ensure that EU jobseekers have no access whatsoever to universal credit.

At European level, we secured language in last June’s European Council conclusions on the need for the Commission to support member states in combating the misuse of free movement. We continue to work both with member states and the Commission to reform EU social security co-ordination rules so that they better reflect current migration patterns and the divergent, diverse nature of member states’ welfare systems, while ensuring that member states can maintain effective control of their own welfare systems. Welfare provision is of course set down in the treaty as belonging to the competence of member states, rather than that of European institutions.

We welcome the proposal in the work programme on the labour mobility package—it covers several such items—which will assist us in carrying forward our ideas. However, we are very clear that there is much more to do, as my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister made clear in his speech on 28 November. I therefore have no problem in welcoming the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), which will be agreed to at the end of the debate.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I commend my right hon. Friend’s wisdom in accepting the well thought through amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). In relation to the debate on free movement, will Her Majesty’s Government reconsider their stance on Switzerland? If we are serious about renegotiation, it seems to me that we must take a sympathetic view of its effort to get out of the principle of free movement. If that is one of the four fundamental principles applied to Switzerland, which is not even a member state, how can we have a thorough renegotiation?

[Mr Lidington]

The challenge the Swiss Government face is that they have entered into a series of bilateral agreements with the European Union linking a number of different elements together. For example, in the Swiss bilateral treaties with the EU, access to some of the EU’s single market provisions is explicitly linked to accepting the principle of freedom of movement. At the moment, it is written into that package of bilateral treaties that if one is revoked or renounced, all of the agreements will fall by a certain deadline. That is the challenge the Swiss Government face following the referendum early last year. We remain in close touch with Switzerland, a friendly country, and we hope that we can find a satisfactory way forward.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

If my hon. Friend will allow me, I am conscious that the debate is time limited, and I want to let other Members speak.

Before I conclude, I want to refer to the question of regulation. During his hearing in the European Parliament, Vice-President Timmermans pledged to conduct a review of pending legislation, which was completed in late 2014; to launch a revised inter-institutional agreement on better law-making in spring 2015; and to conduct a review of better regulation by October 2015.

We are continuing to work with other member states to implement the recommendations of the Prime Minister’s business taskforce on EU regulation—the introduction of EU burden reduction targets, even greater use of lighter regimes and exemptions for small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-enterprises, and greater independence and powers for the Commission’s Impact Assessment Board.

Thirteen of the 30 recommendations of the Prime Minister’s taskforce have been fully implemented at European level, and progress is being made on others. The Commission has set out its intention to review, recast, merge or replace some 79 EU Acts as part of its Refit programme. We have long pushed for EU legislation to minimise unnecessary costs to business, particularly SMEs, and it is positive to see that reflected in the work programme and what appears to be a reinvigorated approach by the Commission to better regulation.

Overall, the work programme shows encouraging signs that the Commission wishes to take the EU in what we consider to be the right direction, at least on the economic priorities. It is important to judge the Commission by what it now does in practice. In our view that means implementing the work programme in a way that respects the principle of “Europe where necessary, but national wherever possible”, reduces the burden of European regulation on business and eliminates barriers to growth, and supports increased competitiveness, trade and the completion of the single market. If that is the outcome, it will demonstrate important progress in the Government’s EU reform agenda.

During the past five years, we have already secured the first ever reduction of the EU’s budget; significant reform of the common fisheries policy, including a ban on discards; the launch of talks on an ambitious transatlantic trade deal; and important protections for non-eurozone countries in respect of banking union. Just five years ago, it would have been unthinkable for the first work programme of a new Commission, which would want to demonstrate its ambition, to contain just 23 priority initiatives. That is evidence that this country’s messages are being heard and acted on.

We launched this debate, and today there is growing consensus across Europe in favour of reform. We will continue to work energetically to ensure that the EU becomes more competitive and democratically accountable, deepens the single market to enable free movement of services and capital, and tackles abuse of the principle of free movement. I commend the motion to the House.

Commission Work Programme 2014

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Wednesday 22nd January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

No, I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman again.

Securing investment in Europe’s energy infrastructure is critical to our long-term, sustainable economic growth. A cost-effective, flexible and ambitious 2030 climate and energy framework will provide clear and stable conditions for the up to €1 trillion of investment that European countries will require in the energy sector over the next 10 years. If designed in the right way, such a framework would complement domestic reforms here to ensure that the investment is forthcoming.

As has already been said in interventions, reducing the regulatory burdens on business is integral to boosting economic growth. The Commission’s REFIT—regulatory fitness and performance—programme was a welcome step towards reducing the burden of EU regulation on business and eliminating those barriers to growth, but we believe that the Commission needs to be more ambitious still to ensure that businesses feel real change.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I remind the Minister that the REFIT programme includes proposals for the harmonising of VAT and the introduction of a common corporation tax base, both of which Her Majesty’s Government oppose. It is not about deregulating; it is about increasing the power of the European Union.

European Council

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 7th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is very precise in his language—he is a model for a learned lexicographer. I wonder therefore how he might construe this phrase in the conclusions of the Council of Ministers on the CSDP that was endorsed by the European Council, which says that the EU is

“to engage in all domains—land, air, maritime, space and cyber.”

How does that equal his assurance that what will be done will be mainly intergovernmental?

[Mr Lidington]

I take my hon. Friend’s description of me as a compliment, though I recall that Dr Johnson described a lexicographer as “a harmless drudge”—if I remember the quote from his dictionary accurately.

The answer to my hon. Friend’s question is that we must again go back to the distinction between a policy that is directed by and owned by the EU collectively and its institutions, which we do not have, and a broad policy on security and defence that rests on free co-operation between willing national Governments working together so that their capabilities complement one another, and working in partnership particularly with NATO but with other partners around the world as well. There is nothing to fear from the latter version of the common security and defence policy, and that is the version embodied in the European Council conclusions.

European Elections 2014

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 18th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I am speaking about this because it is very relevant to the communication which the European Scrutiny Committee has referred to the Floor of the House—indeed, it relates to one of the integral parts of that communication. While I am the first to argue that the European Union ought to slim down its bureaucracy, and I would probably agree with the hon. Gentleman that there are some European institutions whose absence we would not mourn because they do not contribute much to the well-being of European citizens, I believe that the arrangements for the election of a successor to President Barroso are quite important, because the holder of that office will be in a position to exercise a significant influence on policies that affect this country. It is therefore important that we are clear about the rules under which his successor will be selected. It is also important that the UK Government make it clear that we will resist any attempt to interpret the treaties as limiting the choice available to the European Council in a way that is not justified by the text of the treaties, but which some in other parts of Europe are keen to see.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

On that point, how does my right hon. Friend interpret the start of article 17(7) of the treaty on European union:

“Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations”?

Surely the only way to take into account the elections to the European Parliament is to consider the results by political party. If the Commission brought forward specific proposals in this regard, what legal response would the Government have, or how might the European Court of Justice interpret it?

[Mr Lidington]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. Minister, you are stretching the debate very widely, as the document is not legally binding and therefore that is not to do with why this matter has been referred to the Floor of the House. This is not a blue-sky thinking exercise. Of course refer to the article to which the hon. Gentleman refers, which lays out the process, but please stick to what is on the Order Paper and what is before us now, not in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), let me explain our view on article 17(7). The European Council retains complete freedom to nominate whom it wishes. It is required to take into account the elections to the European Parliament, but there is nothing in article 17(7) or elsewhere in the treaty on European union that suggests the European Council is in any way mandated to limit its election to a particular pool of candidates. Indeed, it may be that no one political family commands a majority in the European Parliament, or it may be that different combinations of European political parties within the European Parliament prefer one candidate rather than another, and it may not be possible, simply by looking at which of the larger European groupings ends up in the lead after the elections next year, to determine what the preference even of the Parliament itself might be as to the preferred candidate.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

On page 14 of the package before us of the Commission’s communications, it specifically quotes article 17(7) in support of its point about political parties and the European presidency. I therefore wonder if it is reading more into article 17(7) than the Minister believes is there.

[Mr Lidington]

I believe it is, and I think it is fair to say that there are plenty of people in and around the European Commission, and indeed the European Parliament, who believe—perfectly honourably—that the way forward is to move towards a system in which it is the European Parliament, rather than the Heads of Government assembled in the European Council, that has the key role in nominating the President of the Commission and thereafter holding the Commission to account. These are people who believe that it is right and possible to create a European demos, and see that step as a way so to do. What I am saying to my hon. Friend is that I see, and the Government see, nothing in the treaty that requires the European Council to limit its freedom of action in the way that some are suggesting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to all hon. Members who have taken part in the debate. I do not want to detain the House long, so I will try to reply briefly to the various questions raised. My hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) asked how funding from European political parties and other EU sources might influence domestic election campaigns in the United Kingdom. I want to place on the record that participation in elections in this country, including European elections, is regulated by UK electoral law, and that includes the use of funding in campaigns. United Kingdom law prohibits the use of funding from sources outside the UK, including European political party funding. A prohibition on the use of EU funding by national political parties is included in the draft new European political party proposals—those are other EU documents that the House considered in Committee a few days ago.

The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) asked whether the Commission is aware of the Government’s concerns about its communication, and the answer is a definite yes. Our—I was going to say reservation, but I think it is rather stronger than that— belief that the initiatives are simply misplaced and will not contribute to resolving the acknowledged democratic deficit of the European Union is well known, and United Kingdom officials and Ministers will continue to express their views on that in any future debates.

The hon. Lady asked about the position of the European Parliament, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) said, the AFCO committee of the European Parliament has produced a report that covers much the same area of policy as that addressed by the Commission’s communication and recommendations. Like the Commission documents, that report points towards a greater role for European political parties and the European Parliament in determining the successor to President Barroso in the Commission. The plenary Session of the European Parliament is due to debate and vote on the report next month, and I cannot predict how it will vote on that occasion.

The hon. Lady’s final question concerned what future Commission initiatives we expect to follow up the proposals. At the moment, there is no sign that the Commission plans to go further than its published recommendations, and the Government’s view is that the longer that remains the case, the better. We do not think that the recommendations add anything to the democratic problems that Europe faces.

I can give some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) about articles 10(4) and 17(7) of the treaty on the European union. The full text of those articles contains a number of statements about how the European Union should organise its business, but there is no provision for the Commission to bring forward legislation and put it to the Council or Parliament. I would contrast that with the provisions in article 223(1) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, to which I referred earlier. That provides for changes to the law to be initiated by the Commission, and to be subject to the unanimous agreement of all member states. The enabling power for new legislation is not included in the text of articles 10 and 17, and that is why I said that the only way it would be possible to impose a mandate on the European Council to limit its nominations for President of the European Commission to lead candidates nominated by European political parties, or even to the lead candidate of the leading party after a European election, would be through the mechanism of treaty change. As my hon. Friend probably knows as well as anyone else in the House, that would require a process and certainly the unanimous agreement of every member state, and have national ratifications.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My question might be too hypothetical, but if the Council puts forward somebody who has never been associated with a political party, would that be challengeable in the European Court of Justice?

[Mr Lidington]

In theory, anything is challengeable, in the same way that almost any Executive decision in this country is challengeable under judicial review. Our view is that the duty on the European Council is no more and no less than that provided in article 17(7), which is to have regard to the outcome of the European Parliament elections and engage in the appropriate consultations. If the intention of the authors of the TEU had been a mandate, it would be spelled out in the wording of the treaty. My hon. Friend is right that there is an ambition on the part of a number of people in the Commission and the European Parliament not to seek treaty change—not at the moment, at least—but to bring about a working assumption that national Governments assembled in the European Council should limit themselves in the way they wish. As I have said, we strongly resist that assumption.

I conclude on this point. We have a set of recommendations that are not legally binding, and there is currently no suggestion of legislative proposals from the Commission to give effect to its recommendations. Any such legislative proposals would need the unanimous agreement of every member state, under whichever treaty article they are brought forward. I believe—this was the view on both sides of the House—that the recommendations are fundamentally misplaced. There is a serious problem across the EU, with public disaffection with the EU and how its decisions are taken rising to record levels. We have seen that reflected in part in the rise of populist parties—some democratic, some undemocratic and neo-fascist—in many different EU countries. For that real problem to be addressed, the EU needs to show in its priorities that it is focused on those things that really matter to the prosperity and security of the peoples of Europe. The arrangements by which the EU takes decisions needs to be reformed in a way that gives greater influence and authority to national Parliaments, to which Heads of Government and Ministers in the Council are ultimately accountable.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 7648/13, a Commission Communication on preparing for the 2014 European elections and enhancing their democratic and efficient conduct, and No. 7650/13, a Commission Recommendation on enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament; notes that whilst European political parties are free to support candidates for Commission President, this does not limit the European Council’s selection of a candidate; agrees with the Government that the suggestion for a common voting day across the EU is unhelpful and would achieve the opposite of the stated intention of increasing voter turnout; and further notes that there is currently no indication that these documents are going to be followed up by formal legislative proposals.

Court of Justice of the European Union

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 11th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I beg to move,

That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 7013/13, the draft Council Decision increasing the number of Advocates-General of the Court of Justice of the European Union and, in accordance with Section 10 of the European Union Act 2011, approves Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to support the adoption of that draft Council Decision.

As you will be aware, Mr Speaker, this proposal is subject to the European Act 2011, which means that before Ministers can take a position in the Council on the proposed appointment of three additional advocates-general to the European Court of Justice, parliamentary approval must be secured for the United Kingdom’s position. That is the reason for today’s debate.

I believe that it is in the interests of this country for justice in the European Union to be delivered through the Court promptly and effectively. It is particularly important for British businesses with pan-European interests whose opportunities for business may well depend on clarity on the impact of European law.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way so early. I would just question whether we get justice from the European Court.

[Mr Lidington]

As with any other court here in the United Kingdom, I am sure there will be judgments with which my hon. Friend and I might have quarrels and wish that learned judges had come to other opinions. Where I would respond robustly to him is to say that, as far as I can tell, in coming to their decisions the justices of the European Union Courts take very seriously their duty to apply the law as it is found in the treaties and in secondary European legislation. The appointment of judges at the EU Courts is subject to approval by an expert panel. Indeed, to be eligible to serve as a justice in the European Court, the man or woman in question must either have served in a senior judicial office in their home country or be of sufficient standing in the law to be regarded as capable of exercising that kind of responsibility.

I believe that the measure we are discussing will provide quicker and more efficient justice within the European Union. The proposal is to increase the number of advocates-general to nine from 1 July 2013 and to 11 from 7 October 2015. The first advocate-general would be a permanent Polish advocate-general. Under declaration 38 in article 252 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, member states agreed in 2007 that if there were an increase in advocates-general, Poland would have a permanent advocate-general and no longer take part in the rotation of advocates-general. This step would bring Poland into line with the other big six member states, including the United Kingdom, which all already have a permanent advocate-general. An additional two advocates-general would increase the existing rotation system from three to five. Under current arrangements, we would expect the first two additional advocates-general appointed in October 2015 to be Czech and Danish.

In the 2011 report on the work load of the European Court of Justice, the House of Lords recommended that the number of advocates-general be increased. Since 2011, the Lords have repeated that recommendation several times, including in their follow-up report this year, and called for the increase to be implemented without delay. Last night, in its section 10 debate on this matter, the House of Lords approved the draft Council decision and Members of their lordships’ House spoke positively about the impact that additional advocates-general would have on the efficient functioning of the courts.

The role of advocates-general is to produce non-legally binding opinions for the Court of Justice to assist it in reaching its judgments.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. In reference to the House of Lords, the 2011 report questioned whether the quality of the advocates-general would be high enough. I wonder, therefore, what evidence has encouraged them to change their minds to be confident in the quality of the people who may be appointed.

[Mr Lidington]

I want to come on to the question of quality and the article 255 panel later. If my hon. Friend is dissatisfied at that point, then by all means I invite him to seek to intervene again. However, I think perhaps that it is best if I come to that passage at the appropriate time.

I was talking about the role of advocates-general. They produce their non-legally binding opinions in about half of all cases, particularly in those that raise a new point of law. There is no appeals process, of course, so the additional reasoned submissions help the Court to provide effective justice. Given that the number of cases before it continues to rise, the Government are satisfied that there is a need for additional advocates-general to process better the Court’s work load.

The opinions that advocates-general issue are a key element in the efficiency of the Court. As Sir Konrad Schiemann stated in his evidence to the House of Lords this year, advocate-general opinions significantly shorten the time occupied by judges in agreeing a judgment and improve the quality of the Court’s judgments. The opinions assist the Court with its own deliberations, because the Court can then test its own views against the detailed reasoning of the advocate-general conclusions. It is particularly useful in the EU Court because, unlike the practice in our own Supreme Court or Court of Appeal, it has to reach a consensus for its ruling—the possibility of separate dissenting opinions from different judges does not exist at the European level.

As well as contributing to the speed of judgments, advocates-general also improve the quality of justice dispensed by the Court. The opinions are detailed and so provide a greater insight into the approach ultimately taken by the Court, regardless of whether it agrees or disagrees in the final decision with the recommendation of the advocate-general. That means that those opinions are valuable in maintaining the consistency of the Court’s case law.

It is important that the Court is efficient, because of the impact that its judgments can have on British citizens and businesses operating in the European single market in particular. A classic example was the case brought by the National Farmers Union in the context of the BSE crisis—NFU v. Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement—against France’s refusal to lift the beef ban on UK imports. The Court ruled that since EU legislation laid down the necessary rules for the protection of public health, France was not entitled to rely on the public health exception in then article 30 of the treaty establishing the European Community to prevent the resumption of beef and veal imports from the UK. I am sure that the House needs no reminder that the beef industry was worth more than £430 million in exports to the British economy in 2011—the last year for which we have figures. Another recent example was the ruling of the Court in 2011 in the case of DHL v. Chronopost, which provides certainty for trademark owners on the extent to which a Community trademark owner could secure EU-wide relief based on action in only one member state.

The impact of the EU Courts is not limited to cases in which UK businesses are directly involved. The outcome of other cases can have significant benefits for the UK, directly or indirectly. For example, there was a case on whether EU legislation allowed for prescribing incentive schemes—arrangements to encourage doctors to prescribe cheaper generic medicines. Adopting the approach suggested by the British Government in their recommendations, the decision of the Court resulted in an estimated saving to our Department of Health of nearly £400 million.

Given the current number of advocates-general and the increasing work load of the Court, the individual advocates-general have been under pressure. There is no single reason why the Court’s work load has been increasing over the years. In 2012, 632 new cases were brought before it and it completed only 527. In 2011, 688 new cases were brought before it and it completed 554. These were the two busiest years so far recorded in the Court’s history. In 2012, the backlog of cases had risen to 886—up from 849 12 months before.

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[Mr Lidington]

If the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) applies to Mr Speaker for an Adjournment debate, he and I might have the opportunity to explore those matters in the detail that he so ardently desires.

Let me return to the issue we are debating and the criticisms the European Scrutiny Committee has raised. Let me turn first to the important issue of funding. Although broadly supporting the proposal, the Government are clear that any additional advocates-general should not and need not result in an increase in the Court’s budget. The appointment of the new post holders and their support staff should lead to a relatively small additional cost of about €4 million a year, which the Court can meet from within its existing budget. Its budget was more than €354 million for 2013, and the Court has underspent by more than the cost of the additional advocates-general in each of the last three years. In the current economic climate, there is an imperative on all the EU’s institutions, including the Court, to find ways to reduce their administrative costs.

As I set out in paragraph 12 of my explanatory memorandum to the European Scrutiny Committee, the UK is prepared to submit a minute statement in Council to set out our expectation that the increase is cost-neutral. If necessary, we will do that during voting on the Council decision. As I know the House understands, a minute statement in itself will not be enough to guarantee cost-neutrality, but would be a clear statement of the United Kingdom’s position ahead of the separate financial negotiations next year on the annual budget. Indeed, the minute statement is not intended to secure budget neutrality at this stage, but is intended to signal clearly the beginning of our negotiating position for next year.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way again. The agreement on the advocates-general is by unanimity whereas the agreement on the budget is by qualified majority vote. Are we therefore not getting it the wrong way round by agreeing to the increase in one before the debate on the other? Should we not delay our agreement by unanimity until we have the budget that we want?

[Mr Lidington]

These are two separate decisions that have two different processes. We are indeed talking about a decision that is taken by unanimity. Annual budgets are what will determine the total budget of the Court for 2014 and subsequent years. Those annual budgets will have to be agreed within the ceilings to commitments and payments that are set out in the multi-annual financial framework that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and other Heads of Government negotiated in February this year, and which I hope is approaching the final stages of negotiation with the European Parliament.

Delay of the kind that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) suggests would not get us very far. The Government’s view is that there is a persuasive case for the extra appointments to be made. The way in which EU finances are organised means that the negotiations on the annual budget will determine the total budget available to the Court. From that budget, the Court will have to meet its costs under various headings of expenditure, including this small one.

I point out to my hon. Friend that the United Kingdom is not alone in expecting the Court to absorb the costs of the additional advocates-general. We are one of a blocking minority of budget-disciplined net-contributor member states that routinely votes against increases to the EU budget. We anticipate that that like-minded group will take the same view on any request to increase the Court’s budget to accommodate the new advocates-general. The Prime Minister’s recent success at the multi-annual framework negotiations should be an indication of how strongly the Government feel about budgetary savings.

The European Scrutiny Committee also asked me to outline the Government’s view of the manner of appointing advocates-general and my view of the calibre of the likely appointees. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset made a point about this in an earlier intervention. The article 255 panel gives an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the role of advocate-general. The Government consider that the panel plays a key role in making the judicial appointments process more transparent and helping to ensure that the chosen candidates are of a high quality. The UK was a key supporter of the creation of such a panel, and we have consistently supported the application of rigour in the judicial selection process. The article 255 panel is effective in its role of assessing the suitability of nominees to serve as judges and as advocates-general. To date, the panel has delivered 43 opinions, of which five were unfavourable. In each case, the opinions delivered by the panel have been followed by the Governments of member states. When the panel has been unhappy about the calibre of a particular nominee, that nominee has subsequently been withdrawn.

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[Mr Lidington]

I am happy to write to my hon. Friend with a list of the members of the article 255 panel and their qualifications and experience. I would rather not venture an opinion from memory, but they do have to be people who would be employed in their member states in selecting very senior judicial office holders.

It might be helpful if I now set out for the House the likely next steps for this draft Council decision, if it is approved by Parliament. The Court would like to have the first additional advocate-general, the Polish one, in post from 1 July this year and the other two from October 2015, when there will be a partial replacement of the members of the Court.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

If the Court hopes to have the Polish advocate-general appointed by 1 July, is there time for that person to be properly vetted by the article 255 panel?

European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 27th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Applying the amendment to line 7 on page 1 of the Bill would make it say that the accession treaty would be approved,

“except for those provisions requiring the full application”.

It would, therefore, be a conditional approval of the treaty and I do not believe that the European Court of Justice could rule us in breach of treaty obligations, because Croatia would not have them until the treaty was ratified under our normal constitutional procedures, which, thanks to the European Act 2011—which the Minister presided over—require an Act of Parliament that is unqualified.

[Mr Lidington]

I simply do not think that we can have 27 countries agreeing unanimously on a treaty text and committing themselves to ratifying it, only for 26 countries to ratify it while one country chooses to do so up to a point and not ratify one particular element. My hon. Friend was right in his earlier intervention that it is legally and constitutionally possible for a separate protocol or derogation to be negotiated at the time of an accession treaty to exempt one or more member states from particular obligations. However, that has not happened with any other accession treaty hitherto.

The United Kingdom, under successive Governments, has been committed to the enlargement of the European Union since Margaret Thatcher championed the idea when the iron curtain began to crumble. I remain, in that respect, an enthusiastic Thatcherite. The entrenchment of not just free and open markets, but, even more importantly, the rule of law and democratic institutions in eastern and central Europe that has been brought by enlargement has been of benefit to the long-term strategic interests of the UK, as well as being in the interests of Europe as a whole.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

No, the treaties apply equally to every member state unless an explicit derogation or opt-out is laid down in a protocol or in the body of a treaty—that is the case with the UK’s and Denmark’s right not to join the euro. In this case, the Irish protocol does not provide an opt-out or derogation. Instead, it serves as a formal justiciable clarification of certain provisions of the treaty that apply equally to all member states of the EU. In the hypothetical case that my hon. Friend describes, it would be for the UK or any other member state to cite the protocol in support of its arguments.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The Minister is a mind reader—that was exactly the point I was about to ask him about. Does the protocol therefore effectively apply to all member states and not just to Ireland?

[Mr Lidington]

Yes, that clarification is of benefit to every member state, should such litigation be necessary in future.

The protocol was adopted at an intergovernmental conference in Brussels on 16 May 2012 and signed by all 27 member states. It must now be ratified by them before it can formally enter into force. As I have said, I believe that the clarifications that are provided square with the UK’s interpretation of the treaties; I support what my hon. Friend has said on this. The protocol is therefore helpful to us, and I commend it and clause 2 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Freedom of movement for Croatian nationals as workers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am sorry to trouble the scorers again, Mr Crausby. I hope I will not be the only one trying to be the Mr Pietersen of the Committee for this afternoon’s proceedings. My batting pace would never be quite as fast as his—I am probably more of a Mr Boycott, particularly when it comes to anything to do with the European Union.

The transition arrangements for the free movement of people are an important part of the treaty. What is important here is that the time has come for us to recognise that we need to look at whether the free movement of people is something the United Kingdom can any longer support. The commitments we have made to our immigration policy throughout the European Union have made a nonsense of the rest of our immigration policy. We discovered that yesterday, when we asked a very distinguished person to come and be the head of one of the most important institutions of our country. He will have to queue up in Croydon, even though he is married to a British lady, his children are British subjects and he is a subject of the Queen. If he were coming from Croatia, he would be subject to transition arrangements that would make it a good deal easier for him to come here. That does not seem to be a sensible way of establishing our immigration policy.

There are two problems: first, the number of people who have the right to reside and work here from the European Union, which is legion; and the very tight controls that we have to have on everybody else in the world to make the system vaguely work at all. It is out of balance that countries with which we have much closer and longer standing associations than Croatia—I think, of course, of India, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Zimbabwe—and with which we have had intimate relationships, do not have the transition arrangements to allow their people to come and work here. They have to go through an extremely arduous and onerous process. Even if their grandparents were British citizens, they find it very difficult to get here. On the other hand, if they come from member states of the EU they can just waltz in, or if they cannot waltz in, they can come in under transition arrangements. After a mere seven years at the most, they will be able to come in freely. This has become disproportionate.

In that sense, enlargement has created a problem for Europe. In other ways, enlargement is much to be welcomed, and I agreed with the Minister when he quoted the noble Baroness—something that should be done in this Chamber more often to reinforce any argument that is being made. We have found that there are simply too many people who are eligible to reside here. Transition arrangements are not really enough. They ameliorate to some extent the problem of Croatia, but Croatia is not the problem. As we have already discussed, there are only a little more than 4 million people in Croatia, and unless they were all going to come here and leave Croatia empty for us to go and have our holiday homes there as the Minister suggested, there would not be any real immigration problem from Croatia. It is what has happened in the past, and the effect that that has had on other nations with which we are friendly and with which we have long-term relationships and historic ties, that I am referring to.

I am pleased that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department has decided to look into this to see whether the free movement of people is something we can continue to cope with. I think that we cannot, and as we reform our relationship with Europe, it is one of the aspects of the European Union—I accept that it is a fundamental aspect—to which we can no longer subscribe.

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[Mr Lidington]

This boils down to differences in the legal systems operating in different parts of the United Kingdom. I presume that the hon. Gentleman is referring to subsections (4) to (6).

Subsection (4) provides that an offence by virtue of these regulations will be a summary offence and that any fines or prison sentences imposed will not exceed the applicable maximum levels or terms on the relevant scale. Subsections (5) and (6) provide clarity on the maximum prison terms applicable for these offences and the differences between maximum terms of imprisonment in England and Wales, and Scotland and Northern Ireland. For England and Wales, the maximum possible prison term is 51 weeks. For Scotland and Northern Ireland, the maximum possible prison term for an employee or a deception offence is three months, whereas for an employer this stands at six months.

Subsection (6) further clarifies that if the offences were committed in England and Wales before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, they will be liable for the same penalties previously outlined for Scotland and Northern Ireland—three and six months respectively—but, as the Committee will know, section 154(1) has not yet commenced, so the applicable maximums for the whole United Kingdom will remain at three and six months respectively for the time being. I hope that that provides the hon. Gentleman with the assurance he seeks.

We have had an interesting debate on some of the concerns in the Committee and the country about the freedom of movement, but I think there has also been a consensus in support of transitional regulations. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.



Clause 5

Orders under section 4: Parliamentary control.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 4, line 4, at end insert ‘or subsequent’.

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Lidington]

I would not impute that to my hon. Friend, but I was conscious of the fact that Simon de Montfort, despite his contribution to our constitutional developments, ended up being slain at the battle of Evesham, after which his body was hacked apart and the various portions sent to please those members of the nobility who had taken the lead in supporting Prince Edward against him. Although I have absolute confidence in the generosity of spirit with which my hon. Friend spoke, I hope I can count on him to speak for all members of the European Scrutiny Committee and on others to adopt a different role towards de Montfort than he has taken today.

I have thought carefully about the amendments that my hon. Friends have proposed. The initial regulations that we intend to make pursuant to clause 4 would set out in detail the scheme of restrictions to be applied to Croatian nationals. They would set out the circumstances under which a Croatian national may be authorised to take employment and the penalties that may be applied for any breach of the restrictions. It is clearly appropriate that there should be a presumption that such regulations, setting out a broad scheme of controls and penalties, should require the positive approval of the House. We are therefore providing for the affirmative resolution procedure. However, any subsequent regulations pursuant to clause 4 are likely to be different in character and to have only a limited and technical purpose. For example, it may become necessary to make technical adjustments to the regulations to reflect European Court of Justice case law on the exercise of free movement rights or to adjust the circumstances in which work authorisation may be given, to reflect particular labour market circumstances.

Let us look at the precedent of the regulations applied to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals, recalling that our intention is to apply the same transitional regime to Croatian migrants as already applies to migrants from those two countries. There have been subsequent amendments to the original regulations, but to address minor and technical issues. For example, further amendments to the regulations have referred to arrangements for students undertaking employment during their holidays or vocational employment linked to their studies. Those amendments have brought the treatment of such students into line with the treatment extended to third-country nationals. There have also been technical changes to the arrangements for family members of Bulgarian and Romanian workers, which the treaty required be lifted once the restrictions had been in force for two years.

Those were matters concerned with responding to legal issues about the proper administration of restrictions, as they arose, rather than matters pertaining to their general shape and force. Equally, it might prove necessary to make amendments to the initial regulations simply in order to ensure that they take account of changes made to the controls applied to third-country nationals. I do not think it is proportionate that amendment of the regulations to deal with this kind of technical issue should require the affirmative resolution procedure.

Of course, if a future hypothetical Government were, through sleight of hand, to use the negative resolution procedure to make a more substantive change to the character of the transitional regulations—which I am sure that this Government would not do—I am confident that the political reaction in the House of Commons would be such as to require, through a prayer tabled under the normal procedures of the House, a debate and vote in Committee and then in the House as a whole. It is unlikely that such a major amendment would be brought forward, however, and there are sufficient safeguards in our proposals. It is probable, however, that there will be a need for minor and technical amendments to be made. The negative resolution procedure accords with the precedent adopted in respect of previous accessions and it is proportionate to the case.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North tabled amendment 5, which would allow Parliament to amend the secondary legislation. He will know that the procedure that he is proposing does not fall within the normal forms of House approval. I do not blame him for raising the subject; it has cropped up in more than one debate since I have been a Member of Parliament. However, it would be wrong to use the Bill as an occasion for adopting what would amount to a significant precedent in how Parliament holds the Government to account. There might be a case for what he is proposing, but it would best be addressed, if it is going to be, as a matter of general principle rather than in this way.

Under our current procedure, secondary legislation is not subjected to the type of line-by-line scrutiny and the possibility of amendment that we afford to primary legislation. The affirmative process, which we are suggesting for the first set of regulations, requires a motion in favour in both Houses before the regulations can be made. The House will be able to reject the draft statutory instrument if it is not content with it. The Government believe that that is an appropriate level of scrutiny, and that the use of the negative resolution procedure for what are likely to be minor and technical amendments is also proportionate to the probable course of events. I hope that, having heard those assurances, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset will be willing to withdraw his amendment.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I have listened to the Minister with great care. The problem with comparing anybody to the great figures of history is that so many of them came to a sticky end. That does not, however, undermine the valour of their actions before they met their sticky end. It is the way of politics nowadays that people are reshuffled, whereas in olden times they were rather more finally dealt with. This is perhaps one respect in which I am a moderniser, in that I am glad and reassured that political careers now end more gently than they did in times gone by. I was comparing my right hon. Friend the Minister to Simon de Montfort at the height of his powers when he was successfully commanding the country and advancing democracy.

The mood of the Committee today suggests that it would probably not vote in support of my amendment, and I shall therefore seek leave to withdraw it. However, I would just add that, to use an old cliché, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It would be an advantage to place in the legislation a requirement for the affirmative resolution procedure, because we cannot guarantee what future Governments will do or, more particularly, what the European Court of Justice will do. The Minister referred to that possibility. There is a risk that the Court could make a highly political judgment that would change the regulations or cause them to be changed by the Government. That could allow the Government to use the negative resolution procedure, because the decision had come from the ECJ, without giving the House the opportunity to debate a genuinely important political matter. I regret that Her Majesty’s Government are not going to accept my proposal, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.



Clause 6

Extent, commencement and short title

European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The answer is that we cannot go beyond the period for transitional controls laid down in the treaties. I will say a little more about arrangements for Croatia later. For Romania and Bulgaria, we have extended the transitional controls for the maximum period committed and they have to come to an end by the end of 2013.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

May I add a rider to the Minister’s answer? This is without a “notwithstanding” clause to the European Communities Act 1972, but this Parliament could of course do that if it wanted to.

[Mr Lidington]

This Parliament can of course pass any legislation it wishes to. In that sense, what my hon. Friend says is constitutionally correct, although I in no way want to mislead him into thinking that the Government intend to introduce such an amendment to the 1972 Act.

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[Mr Lidington]

It is very welcome that the Irish protocol makes that assertion about tax sovereignty, which is in line with our own interpretation of the Lisbon treaty and previous European Union treaties. The Irish protocol also confirms that neither the charter of fundamental rights nor the Lisbon treaty in the area of freedom, security and justice affects the scope and applicability of the Irish constitution as regards the right to life, protection of the family and protection of rights in respect of education. It confirms that the Union’s action on the international stage, particularly under common security and defence policy arrangements, does not prejudice the security and defence policy of individual member states or the obligations of any individual member states. It also deals with other matters specific to Ireland, such as its long-standing position of military neutrality. It was formally agreed by Heads of State and Governments of the 27 member states in June 2009. It amounts to a guarantee in international law that the concerns raised in Ireland were unaffected by the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. Once all 27 countries have formally ratified the Irish protocol, it becomes binding in terms of the European Union as well as of international law.

The Government’s original intention had been that we might include with this legislation a comparable but differently worded protocol as regards the Czech Republic. That is still stalled in the Brussels decision-making process. The European Parliament has yet to produce an opinion on the Czech protocol, and until that has come out of the Brussels negotiations it would be premature for us to think about bringing forward legislation here in Parliament.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I wonder whether, while negotiating the Irish protocol and the Czech protocol, Her Majesty’s Government considered repatriating any powers to the United Kingdom which could have been part of this treaty negotiation.

[Mr Lidington]

As I said, the protocol was negotiated in 2009, so I fear that my hon. Friend’s challenge has to be for my predecessors in office who are now on the Opposition side of the House. Nothing would have been served in terms of the United Kingdom’s interest by our now saying that we would block ratification of the Irish protocol unless we obtained some concession of our own, because the thing at stake would not have been the ratification of the Lisbon treaty but the ratification of the Irish protocol, to which we have no objection and which is wanted by one of those countries with which we have an extremely close bilateral relationship.

[Mr Lidington]

Yes, I do.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I wanted my right hon. Friend to confirm, as I think he has, that it was open to the UK, as with any treaty negotiation, to use this as an opportunity to negotiate for our own interests, but the Government decided on this occasion that it was not worth doing so.

[Mr Lidington]

The point of principle that my hon. Friend makes is certainly right—that during a treaty negotiation it is open to any member state to withhold its consent unless it receives a concession that it is seeking. Obviously, during such a negotiation every member state has to calculate where its national interest lies and what kind of bargain it wants to achieve. However, this is now water under the bridge, as these events took place before the previous general election.

Court of Justice of the European Union

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Thursday 12th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

We can debate, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) does so robustly, whether the European Court of Justice should enjoy such widespread jurisdiction. However, what we are talking about is how we should address the problems in the system as it currently exists under treaty—the backlogs and delays, both at first instance and appeal. A system of courts in which justice is denied simply because the system is unable to cope with its work load is not in anybody’s interests.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way on that very point?

[Mr Lidington]

Of course I will give way to my hon. Friend, although I will be anxious to make progress thereafter.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My right hon. Friend is exceptionally generous, as usual. However, I am not entirely sure that his last point is right. It could be in people’s interests for the Court to be bunged up. If one takes the view that the European Court of Justice is increasingly extending its powers into areas where it ought not interfere, anything that stops it doing that is all to the good.

[Mr Lidington]

A court of law and legal system should serve the interests of parties to that legal system. I go back to the old English adage that justice delayed is justice denied; my hon. Friend will be familiar with that and no doubt champion it as a matter of principle. I would argue that that principle should apply on a European level as well as on a United Kingdom or English level.

The reforms that we are discussing involve, first, the creation of a vice-president to assist the president of the Court in their role of managing litigation and overseeing the business of the Court. The vice-president will be appointed from among existing judges; an additional judge will not be required.

Secondly, there is to be an increase in the number of judges sitting in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice, which generally handles the most sensitive cases. That is to allow broader participation by ECJ judges in general in Grand Chamber cases. It should increase the wider expertise of the Court and ensure greater consistency in how cases are handled. Thirdly, the reforms propose a reduction in the number of presidents of five-judge chambers who have to sit in the Grand Chamber at the same time. That will allow the chamber presidents more time to administer their separate chambers, each of which handles a substantial case load that should, as a consequence of this reform, be enabled to progress more quickly.

The reforms also include the power to appoint up to three temporary judges to the civil service tribunal, which is the employment tribunal for European Union officials. The problem with the tribunal at the moment is that it has only seven judges, which means that if even one judge is absent for a lengthy period, perhaps because of illness, cases can be delayed. Appointing temporary judges will prevent those delays from occurring. The temporary judges will be appointed from a panel of former judges of the European Court and will be paid only for the days that they actually work; they will not be on a long-term retainer or salary.

Finally, there is a key reform to the lower court, the General Court, which has a substantial backlog of cases. As is proposed for the ECJ—the upper tier—a vice-president will be created for the General Court, again from among the existing judges, to assist the president in managing litigation.

The Government have been active in negotiating the details of these reforms, and I am glad to say that because of our efforts two potential reforms about which we had concerns that we explained to the European Scrutiny Committee have now been removed. One of those was the proposal to remove the 10-day so-called period of grace granted to litigants to submit pleadings to the ECJ over and above the standard deadline period. We and other member states argued that removing the period of grace would harm our ability to submit pleadings and damage our national interest. We have protected the period of grace and ensured that not only the Government but, importantly, British businesses that may be party to ECJ cases have the maximum possible time to submit pleadings to the Court.

The other potential reform was the addition of 12 judges at the General Court. The Council has concluded that that reform requires further consideration and should be reserved for a later date. The rationale for the proposal was, again, the substantial backlog of cases—currently more than 1,300—at the General Court. It was also, in our view, very important that the reform was got right. We wanted to ensure that the arrangements for appointing any new judges are fit for purpose and that any increase in the number of judges should be consistent with the requirement for minimal spending in the current economic climate. We argued that any increase in the number of judges should go hand in hand with a programme of efficiency savings in the ECJ’s budget. The removal of the reform from the package at this stage is in line with our interests, but we may return to it at a future date.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I would question the judges’ probity on one thing in particular: their ruling that their own pay should be increased, which was fundamentally improper.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend has made his point clearly for the record.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stone asked about the risk of further efforts to enhance the powers and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. He referred in particular to the possibility of the introduction of a right to petition the Court and take cases there. I can assure him that, notwithstanding what learned professors might say, no such proposal is on the table at the moment. No such proposal forms part of the regulations before us. The subject has not crossed my desk and it is not a matter of live discussion among Governments at present.

My hon. Friend also asked about the timing of the debate and expressed concern at what he believed to be an absence of time for the European Scrutiny Committee to consider this matter. I would challenge him on that. Looking back at the record, I see that we provided explanatory memorandums to that Committee at various times during the course of the negotiations: first, on 28 April 2011, then on 24 June 2011, 30 September 2011 and 20 April this year. I wrote to him last week to advise him of the latest developments and to request that the Committee clear these measures from scrutiny.

As for the most recent developments, we are working against the decision by the Cypriot presidency to table these measures for discussion and decision at a Council meeting in the very near future. My concern in writing to my hon. Friend as I did was to ensure that his Committee was aware of the need for urgency if the Committee and Parliament were to have the opportunity to express their views and, in the case of Parliament, to take a decision about the UK’s approach to these regulations ahead of that Council meeting.

The final point on which I was questioned—

EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Thursday 12th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I can give the hon. Gentleman two assurances. We are members of the UN Human Rights Council in our own right. When there is no unanimously agreed common foreign and security policy position, the United Kingdom’s representative will speak on behalf of the United Kingdom Government’s position. When there is a unanimously agreed CFSP position, normally that will be represented by the European Union’s representative, but member states do speak—particularly if the occasion is sufficiently important—in support of the EU representative’s view, giving extra weight to the views expressed on behalf of all 27 members. It is best left to judge on a case-by-case basis exactly what tactic will be the most effective in delivering the outcome we want, but I take to heart the hon. Gentleman’s point about wanting to hear the vigorous expression of British policy objectives, whether on our own or in support of a unanimously agreed EU position.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way in a second debate this afternoon.

If there is not a unanimously agreed position, can the EU representative speak at all, or do they have to remain silent?

[Mr Lidington]

If there is no unanimously agreed position, there is no locus for the EU representative to speak at all; they have a right to express a view only when there is an agreed European Union position. As hon. Members on both sides will probably recall, there have been occasions when, regrettably, European Union member states have split two or three different ways on a particular issue before the Human Rights Council.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Does that apply to the noble Baroness Ashton as well? Can she speak on foreign policy matters only with the consent of the British Government?

[Mr Lidington]

Baroness Ashton is an office holder, in accordance with the treaties, as both vice-president of the Commission and High Representative of the European Union. She can speak out on foreign policy issues in that capacity; what she cannot legitimately do is express a view purporting to be the commonly agreed policy of the European Union, and therefore on behalf of all 27 member states, unless the decision to adopt a common position has been taken by those member states.

In practice, what happens is that a common foreign and security policy position is adopted. An incident may then occur—another outrage in Syria, for example. Nobody quarrels with the idea that Baroness Ashton would comment on that, just as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary would; the test is whether the statements are in line with the foreign policy position that has been unanimously agreed. In my experience, Baroness Ashton has observed very well the requirements of the treaty and the importance of unanimity for a commonly agreed position.

Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Wednesday 29th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I will not give way again, because I have limited time and there are a lot of points to which I wish to respond.

I will not dwell on what happened in December because I want to get on to what hon. Members asked me this afternoon. However, I draw the House’s attention to the fact that my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have now sent detailed accounts of the approach to the December European Council meeting and the events that took place shortly afterwards to my hon. Friends the Members for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) and for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) in their capacities as Chairs respectively of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Treasury Committee. Those letters have been copied to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and are already available on the websites of the Foreign Affairs and Treasury Committees. I am making arrangements for them to be placed in the Library today.

The Prime Minister’s decision in December ensured that the treaty, to which 25 countries subscribed, was “outside” the European Union. As my right hon. Friend told the House in January,

“we are not part of it and it places no obligations on the UK. It does not have the force of EU law for us, nor does it for the EU institutions or for the countries that have signed it”.—[Official Report, 31 January 2012; Vol. 539, c. 678.]

I want to deal with some of the points that my hon. Friends the Members for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) and for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) made. The treaty does not govern how the European Union shall act. It imposes certain obligations on the contracting states, which are linked to the EU. However, in so far as it refers to EU treaties, it makes it clear that they and their rules have primacy and apply in any circumstance where there might be overlap or apparent contradiction.

My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset asked about the prospect of non-eurozone members being fined under the fiscal compact. If a non-eurozone member state has ratified the treaty, until it joins the euro, it can decide which parts of titles III and IV of the compact apply to it. Once that country joins the euro, the whole fiscal compact applies to it. The fiscal compact rule in article 3(2) and the jurisdiction of the Court under article 8 fall within title III, so pending membership of the euro, the non-euro countries can choose whether they wish to be bound by those aspects of the compact. A member state, whether in the euro or not, can be fined only once it has ratified the fiscal compact through its national means.

My hon. Friend also asked about the risk of the treaty somehow being imposed on us in the next five years by underhand means.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I want to clarify the point that I was trying to make. The treaty might possibly come in through enhanced co-operation, so although it would not formally be imposed on us, it would reach the status of an EU treaty if the current treaty that we are in the process of ratifying is ratified.

[Mr Lidington]

I do not know whether we will have time to explore that this afternoon. I may write to my hon. Friend setting out the answer in greater detail, but I do not believe that his fears are justified. Treaty change can take place only under the procedures for treaty change in the treaty on European union and the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. It cannot take place under enhanced co-operation, which can, in any case, bind only those countries that choose to participate in it. That is clear in the treaties.

The role given to the European Court in the compact in relation to the balanced budget rule—and, indeed, the imposition of that rule—could not be introduced under enhanced co-operation. Although the compact declares that it has the objective of being incorporated in the EU treaties in five years, that is only an aspiration, not a given. Any changes to the EU treaties would have to be agreed by all 27 member states, using the procedures under the EU treaties themselves for treaty amendment. Change cannot be made through the EFSM treaty, which is to be signed intergovernmentally by the eurozone members only.

European Union Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for acknowledging the importance of clause 18. We had a full day’s debate on that clause at the start of our Committee proceedings, but I rather think that you would warn me, Mr Hoyle, against recapitulating that debate this evening. It is hard to imagine why a future Parliament would choose to repeal this Act, thereby abolishing the referendum lock and the enhanced control and scrutiny that the Bill provides for Parliament and the British people. It would incur a high political cost for any Government who brought forward such a measure and, indeed, for individual Members of Parliament who were prepared to walk through the Lobbies in its support.

It is an important part of this Government’s commitment to rebuilding trust with the British people to make clear what the future arrangements should be. Although it is always possible that a future Government will decide to act differently, I find it hard to imagine that any such future Government would be able to defend taking away from the British people the right to have their say about further changes to the European treaties.

I have further concerns about the impact of the new clause on the long-standing relationship between this House and the House of Lords. It would alter the relationship by expanding the relative powers of the House of Lords. It has never been part of the Government’s intentions for this Bill that it should be used to alter that relationship.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not only for giving way but for taking the new clause so seriously, but I must say to him that the Bill does not really extend the powers of the House of Lords and is not a new category of Act. Both it and the existing protection under the 1911 Act refer exclusively to the voting rights of the British people, which is why I think that they are exactly the same.

[Mr Lidington]

I hear my hon. Friend’s argument, but I could quite easily construct another argument. We have enacted other pieces of legislation in recent decades which are of great constitutional significance, which touch on the franchise—for example, the decision by, I believe, the Heath Government to lower the voting age from 21 to 18—and which could have been deemed to fall into a comparable category and to deserve equivalent protection.

This evening my hon. Friend is making a second attempt to persuade Parliament of the case for his proposal. A short while ago, he tabled an amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill that was very similar to this new clause. Indeed, it may have been identically worded. At the time the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), expressed a view to which the Government and I subscribe. The rules governing the relationship between this House and the other place, as laid down in section 2 of the 1911 Act, have been in place for some time, and we do not intend to start changing that relationship.

I suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that the political problem and the constitutional challenge that he has identified in the House of Lords judgment, namely the evolution within the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom courts of the idea of a distinct category of constitutional statutes which have a special status and which, in particular, cannot be impliedly repealed, should perhaps be addressed in the context of a more general proposal for constitutional reform. As my hon. Friend knows, my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister is considering the issue of possible reforms of the House of Lords. The best course may be for my hon. Friend to make representations to the Deputy Prime Minister as he considers what is the right way in which to proceed.

During one of the debates on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, my hon. Friend said:

“Our constitution should be safeguarded and preserved; it is not something that should be treated lightly or in an airy-fairy fashion”.—[Official Report, 18 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 708.]

I strongly agree with the sentiment that he expressed. That is why it is so important for the House to scrutinise thoroughly the issues raised by his proposal, and that is why I have considered it so carefully.

I welcome the scrutiny that the proposal has undergone, both this evening and during consideration of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. However, for the reasons I have given, I do not accept that the new clause is an appropriate way for us to achieve our shared intention. Following the debate on my hon. Friend’s similar amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, he withdrew the amendment. I sincerely hope that, having heard my arguments this evening, he will be prepared to withdraw his new clause.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Decisions subject to special referral procedure in TFEU

‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not permit the United Kingdom’s participation in the final adoption of a decision to which this subsection applies unless subsection (3) or (4) is complied with in relation to the draft decision.

(2) The decisions to which subsection (1) applies are—

(a) a decision under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU that permits the adoption of legislative acts in the field of social security;

(b) a decision under the provision of Article 82(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules in criminal procedure, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(c) a decision under the provision of Article 83(1) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(d) a decision under the provision of Article 83(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions.

(3) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House does not believe the United Kingdom should request the referral of a specified draft decision to the European Council under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU, Article 82(3) of TFEU or Article 83(3) of TFEU, as the case may be, providing for such a request, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.

(4) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the European Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House approves Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to support the referral of a specified draft decision back to the Council, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.’.—(Chris Heaton-Harris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

European Union Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 1st February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend, as always, reminds us of practicalities and of the real world. As I said to our hon. Friend the Member for St Albans, the legislation for democratic representation must make provision for all conceivable eventualities, even if they seem highly improbable to us.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

If the Bill were simply to say that Anthea McIntyre were elected, it might be in danger of becoming hybrid legislation.

[Mr Lidington]

I bow to my hon. Friend’s constitutional knowledge. I suspect that having the Bill declared hybrid is the last thing that any of us want.

If we reached circumstances in which none of the candidates from 2009 was available or willing to be returned, a by-election would be held. The returning officer would confirm to the Secretary of State that the seat could not be filled, and the Secretary of State would lay an order by statutory instrument to specify the date of a by-election. I stress that the by-election is very much a last-resort option, and that, given the short time between the 2009 elections and now, the Government are confident that the process outlined in schedule 2 is likely to identify a candidate to fill the additional seat.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 19

Financial provisions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

European Union Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I agree. Quite apart from any constitutional or legal significance, it would be politically and diplomatically counter-productive to go down the route that my hon. Friend has rightly warned against. Whether the UK as state party should continue to have the relationship with the European convention on human rights that we currently have is a matter of intense in the debate in the House, and Members on both sides of the Committee have their views on that.

The point for the purposes of this afternoon’s considerations is that the accession of the EU to the ECHR would make no practical difference to the UK’s position. The Government see some advantages in EU accession, because the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg could act as a direct check on how EU institutions exercise their powers, in exactly the same way it acts as a check on the actions of all other signatories to the convention. I know that some of my hon. Friends will say that they believe that the European Court of Human Rights should not have that type of authority over this country, but I say to them that it is my belief that the EU and its institutions should be held to the same standards on human rights as we expect of member states.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way and for his patient responses to so many questions. I wonder whether it is necessary for the EU to sign up to the ECHR, because we have already debated the question of how EU law comes into effect in this country, which is by Act of Parliament. Therefore, any decision made by the EU can come into effect here only under our own laws, which are of course already justiciable under the European Court of Human Rights. This is not so much an added safeguard as a symbolic step towards creating the European Union as a state.

[Mr Lidington]

We certainly need to guard against that. The Government have accepted, as did the Conservative party before the general election, that the ratification of the Lisbon treaty is a political and legal reality and that we will work within that context. The treaty states that the EU shall accede to the ECHR, and it also provides that the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights should be considered, once accession has taken place, as general principles of EU law. In those circumstances, one would expect that those in the Commission who are responsible for drafting European directives and other legislative initiatives would have regard to the judgments of the Court and would frame draft European legislation in order to meet the standards of that jurisprudence.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Will the Minister clarify Her Majesty’s Government’s view of the Lisbon treaty, because it seems to me that they are in quite a strong position to say that things that have not already been done, which are subject to unanimity before they can be implemented, need not be implemented by the Government?

[Mr Lidington]

There is a clear statement on the face of the treaty that the EU shall accede to the European convention on human rights, and the Government’s position is that we accepted that statement and that commitment as part of the Lisbon treaty. As I hope to explain shortly, the law and our procedures in this House provide a number of safeguards that, I believe, will enable the House of Commons and the other place to scrutinise in detail any proposal for accession when it comes forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Lady says that the Labour Government never sought to compromise. That might explain their result at the last general election.

The answer to the hon. Member for Caerphilly is that there is a collective discussion, and it is a matter of public record that every decision about European policy is routed through the European Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. The membership of that Cabinet Committee is published: it comprises two thirds Conservative Ministers and one third Liberal Democrat Ministers. That is the balance of all the Cabinet Committees. There are discussions and exchanges of points of view, and there is an outcome to which everyone collectively is willing to sign up and support. That seems to be a sensible, constructive way in which to do the business of government.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I thank the Minister for giving way once more. Would he be kind enough to clarify this point about the coalition? Can we take it that the Conservatives do not wish to opt in wherever an opt-in is available, so that whenever we do so, it is because we have been bullied into it by the Lib Dems?

[Mr Lidington]

No, I do not think that my hon. Friend should jump to that conclusion. In yesterday’s debate, I cited some counter-terrorist measures such as the European initiatives on passenger name records or on the tracking of terrorist finance, and it is very much in the interests of the United Kingdom for us to take part in them. The US Government, who have a strong interest in these areas of policy, very much want a transatlantic agreement on such counter-measures and look to us to try to persuade other European Union member states to support a vigorous counter-terrorist policy and effective measures that will satisfy Washington as well as London.

European Union Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and David Lidington

Tuesday 7th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

May I make it clear that I nodded to indicate that I would respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) in my concluding remarks?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I would not wish to anticipate the excitement that we all hold for the Minister’s speech on that crucial point.

The Bill is important and broadly good. Let us be absolutely clear that there are many of us on the Government Benches, and on the Opposition Benches, who want powers to be brought back from the European Union. The European Union is a state in decay. It is rotten at its very core. It is corrupt. It is dishonest. It is bullying. It has a currency that is failing as I speak, a currency that is bankrupting several of its nations and putting ruinous conditions on Ireland, Portugal and Greece—and the Spanish and the Italians will follow.

The European Union has not been in British interests. It is not the common market that people expected it to be and we need root-and-branch reform. I know that we are in a coalition and that we have made concessions to our coalition partners, as they have made concessions to us. They have not yet realised how dreadful the European Union is, but as one hon. Member said to me earlier, “The more they get to know about it the worse they will know that it is.”

Let us look in detail at this Bill and at why it is welcome as far as it goes. The element on the referendum is very important and I was delighted that Vernon Bogdanor, the extremely distinguished constitutional historian, quoted John Locke in his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee. My delight is all the greater because John Locke grew up in Belluton, which, as right hon. and hon. Members know, is a village in North East Somerset. John Locke said in his “Second Treatise of Government”:

“The Legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated power from the People, they who have it cannot pass it to others”.

That is the essence of our constitution.

People talk learnedly about the sovereignty of Parliament, but what do they really mean and where does it come from? I think this was all settled in the 17th century. There were two choices: one was that sovereignty came from God and was given to the King, and the other was that it came from the people and moved upwards and that it was borrowed by Parliament for a period. The sovereignty of Parliament is a great thing. We should bear in mind that the Supreme Court is established by Parliament, as are the very monarchy and the laws of succession. That precious sovereignty is ours not because we are the great and good of the land, or because we sit on green Benches in a fine Palace, but because the British people have given it to us for a period, and we may not bind it or give it away. We may not give it to Europe or the United Nations; only the British people can do that, and they must have a referendum lock on it.

We heard a characteristically well-phrased speech from the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). He was concerned that the Bill would not provide a lock because it could be repealed by subsequent Parliaments. That is true, of course, but a lock can be unlocked if one has the right key, and the key will be the considerable political capital that would be expended by any Government who wished to remove, dilute or give away the power of the sovereign British people. So, the lock is worth while. There has been an interesting development in law about constitutional Acts having a higher standing than ordinary Acts, and the European Communities Act 1972 is considered to be such an Act, as Lord Laws mentioned in the Thoburn case. If that is right, I hope we will get some guidance from Her Majesty’s Government on whether the Bill would be a constitutional Act that could not be subject simply to implied repeal but would have to be repealed directly. The referendum lock is important and beneficial even though it is not enough in terms of our relationship with the EU.

Clause 18 affirms the sovereignty of Parliament and provides that we allow European law to take effect only because of the 1972 European Communities Act. I welcome the clause, but it was a matter of great dispute among much more learned people than me during the European Scrutiny Committee’s deliberations. I welcome it because of the nature of our constitution, which evolves without things necessarily being written down. We discussed this issue during Committee deliberations on the Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill. There are things that the sovereign could do by royal prerogative that are so unlikely and improbable, because they have not been done for so long, that they have fallen into disuse and effective decay. My worry is that without this clause, the 1972 Act might be viewed as one that cannot be amended or repealed and that we might get to a stage, perhaps in 50 years’ time, when the courts hold that it is so important that it is of a different order of magnitude than any other statute.

Clause 18 turns the clock back, which is rather gratifying because we are told that the Tories never turn the clock back. Evelyn Waugh said that he voted Tory all his life expecting them to turn the clock back but that they did not put it back 10 minutes. On this occasion, we are putting it back by 38 years; we are resetting the constitutional position to where everyone would have known it was in 1972. I think that is important, even though I thoroughly accept the point made by many right hon. and hon. Members that it is not a complete statement of the whole theory of the sovereignty of Parliament. I hope that would be unnecessary because the sovereignty of Parliament comes from the British people and cannot be taken away, however much one says so.