The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset said, all EU member states have committed to a common foreign and security policy for the European Union. As part of that, the common security and defence policy aims to strengthen the EU’s external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management. Every year, the High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy sends a report on CFSP to the European Parliament. At 300 pages, the report from July 2015 covers all CFSP and CSDP activity for the year 2014 and provides an overview of countries’ activities. It also includes such information as when the High Representative appeared before the European Parliament and lists the statements and declarations she made during the previous year.
The report highlights the need to forge a long-term strategy for the EU’s external action. Europe’s security matters to the UK. The threats that we face do not stop at our borders. It is important and in our national interest to work together with our European partners and other allies—primarily NATO on defence, but also the EU when it makes sense in security matters—to better tackle our evolving security challenges. The EU, like NATO and the UN Security Council, is an international organisation that this country can use its membership of to get things done in the world to the advantage of the people whom we represent. Successful, effective EU action can help to protect our country and can play a complementary role to NATO in providing security.
However, it is not about competing with NATO. NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of the UK’s defence and security, but the EU can support UK foreign policy through a comprehensive deployment of military, civilian, diplomatic and development policies—the so-called comprehensive approach. The approach offers the UK a toolkit from which to project stability in both Europe’s immediate neighbourhood and globally. In today’s uncertain world, strong alliances and partnerships are more important than ever before. In almost every aspect of our national security and prosperity, we must work with others, not because we cannot work alone if we must, but because the threats and opportunities are global and our own action will be more effective when working in partnership with likeminded countries.
To give some examples, we worked effectively alongside other EU partners to secure the historic Iran nuclear deal. We leveraged significant EU funding to tackle the threat of Ebola in west Africa. The successful EU missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Horn of Africa, in both of which the UK played a leading role, have directly contributed to this country’s national policy objectives. EU sanctions on Russia have been an important element of our response to the illegal annexation of Crimea. Our EU partners and EU institutions also share our aims of countering the threat from Daesh and pushing back on radicalisation, trafficking and proliferation in the middle east and Africa.
European nations should work together when it makes sense to develop the critical capabilities needed to tackle current and future security threats. We want the EU to complement NATO’s existing efforts in this area. We also want to help build a more competitive and innovative defence manufacturing and service sector across the EU and to open up European defence markets to British exporters. By improving the workings of the defence market, reducing bureaucracy, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, and stimulating research, development and collaboration, we will deliver better value for money, cutting edge capabilities, high-end skills, and jobs and growth for the UK economy. We will continue to search constantly for ways to improve CSDP’s effectiveness. Our focus is on the real-world impact of policy initiatives, not institutional navel-gazing and rearranging the structures of European external work.
As I said, the Government have been clear that NATO remains the bedrock of our national defence. It is the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world, and we are committed to working with NATO allies to strengthen collective defence. In September 2014, the UK hosted the NATO summit in Wales. We set in motion new initiatives to take this forward and secured an unprecedented commitment from 28 EU Heads of State and Government and all NATO allies to halt the decline in defence expenditure. The UK has made clear our commitment to achieving NATO’s 2% target, ensuring that we remain NATO’s strongest military power in Europe. We will strongly encourage other allies to meet that commitment.
NATO-EU co-operation remains a high priority for the UK. Some good work has been done, but we need to work harder to drive the agenda forward. In a number of areas—in particular on cyber, countering hybrid warfare and developing security capacity in other states—greater co-operation between NATO and the EU will help us to deal with modern security threats. NATO and the EU already work together in places such as Afghanistan, tackling piracy in the Horn of Africa, and building stability in the western Balkans. We continue to send our armed forces and specialist civilian expertise to EU missions, where it makes sense for our own foreign policy goals and national interest.
We recognise that the world has moved on since 2003 and that a revised EU global strategy is needed. We think that this should form a basis for greater institutional coherence within the EU, particularly between the Commission and the EEAS, where there remains significant room for improvement. On timing, we currently expect the publication by the High Representative some time towards the end of the Dutch presidency, but at the moment that is still very much an exercise by the High Representative. It is not a question of the member state Governments sitting round and hammering out a text; we await her conclusions.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review states:
“A secure and prosperous Europe is essential for a secure and prosperous UK.”
Playing such a central and active a role on the world stage as we do, the UK is in a strong position to influence EU common action. The European External Action Service is already working on many of the priorities set out in the SDSR and can complement UK bilateral work. As the SDSR describes, the EU has a range of capabilities including sanctions, military and civilian missions, and security and development support programmes worldwide. Recent examples include sanctions imposed on Russia and the work that EU partners are co-operating on to counter the terrorist threat posed by Daesh in Syria, Iraq and indeed, through returning foreign fighters, in our own European member states.
The EU “Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Daesh threat” was finalised in March 2015. The strategy is supported by a €1 billion fund. It is an important EU strategy that reinforces the UK’s bilateral approach in the region. Linked to that is the significant contribution by the EU to the London Syria conference this week, where the EU is likely to pledge financial assistance over two years to help refugees in the surrounding area.
The EU has been supporting a range of counter-terrorism efforts in Tunisia focusing in particular on the need to enhance protective security and crisis response, and to strengthen borders, aviation security and strategic communications. It is at EU level too that we will contribute to delivering an EU-Turkey facility of more than €l billion in support of Turkey’s work to support refugees in need and to manage the very large flows of people from Syria.
I must acknowledge that the way in which the report was handled, for security reasons, was not perfect, and I put on record again my apologies to the Committee for that oversight. We have taken steps, including additional scrutiny training within my Department, to make sure that everybody, even when they are new to a job, is alive to their responsibilities. Because the report was published on 14 July last year, even had it been deposited as early as it should have been, perhaps on 16 July, it would not have been possible for the newly reconstituted Committee to meet to consider it before the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 July.
I turn now to the defence action plan, about which my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset asked. The plan is due to be completed and published by December 2016, but we have some indications that the timing might slip and we might be looking at a date in 2017 for the final version. We expect a first draft sometime this summer—I cannot be more specific at the moment.
I remain happy to talk to the European Scrutiny Committee about ways in which we can improve the handling of CSFP documents in the light of its report of a couple of years ago, but I have always said that that discussion must also explore ways of streamlining a certain amount of less important EU documentary business so that my Department is able to provide, without completely breaking its back, the additional documents for which my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset and his colleagues on the Committee have been calling.
The Chair
We now have until 5.34 pm for questions to the Minister. May I remind members of the Committee that questions should be brief? It is open to a member, subject to my discretion, to ask related supplementary questions.
Pat Glass
The question is: is it right that the document is about being proactive, about building capacity across the member states? The European Scrutiny Committee believes that the Government do not have sufficient scrutiny arrangements in place, and the Minister has said that the arrangements have been less than perfect, so it would be helpful if he could set out what the future scrutiny arrangements would be.
Mr Lidington
I will try to reply to those points. The purpose of the common foreign and security policy is set out primarily in article 21 of the treaty on the European Union. I will not recite it in full—it is lengthy—but it is basically about developing external action in a way that promotes European values and the fundamental interests of security, independence and integrity, and consolidates and supports democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law in external action. The article goes on to list other criteria too.
NATO is to some extent reactive, in that it is the ultimate guarantor of collective security for allies. I do not want to get drawn too far into this question, but I think it is fair to say that at the Wales summit and again at the Warsaw summit later this year, we are trying to ensure that NATO is less reactive and is, for example, focusing very much on questions of resilience and how to have effective deterrents and response plans in place against hybrid attack, not just conventional military attack.
EU external action has particular value added in two ways. First, of course, not every EU member state is a member of NATO, so countries such as Sweden and Finland are able to contribute to EU missions, including military missions, when they would not be able to do so as part of a NATO mission. For example, the Austrians have deployed forces as part of an EU mission in the western Balkans, whereas they could not participate in a NATO mission. Secondly, EU work can provide civilian expertise in things such as training of military personnel; training of police and security forces; border work, including the training of border forces; and missions to try to improve the governance of neighbouring or more distant countries.
The roles should be complementary. One could argue, for example, that the cyber threat to military communications and military capability should be dealt with at NATO level, but we know there is a cyber threat to key IT systems for energy distribution and even for retail distribution in a modern economy. It is much more difficult to say that those fall naturally into NATO’s remit, but effective co-operation and complementarity between NATO and the EU, if done well, can add up to a very effective security response.
On the question of scrutiny, with every CFSP document we check whether the document in question falls within the terms of the scrutiny reserve resolution. If it does, it goes to the Committee anyway for scrutiny. The challenge from the Committee—it is one I understand—is that some quite significant policy documents on EU foreign policy, including some described as action plans in the past, do not fall within the current terms of reference of the scrutiny reserve resolution. The volume of such documents is so large that I would be reluctant to agree to submit all of them for scrutiny, so it comes down to a matter of my judgment as to which I send to the Committee.
I remain open to trying to agree with the Committee a set of criteria that would enable it to have oversight of the documents that it particularly wishes to see and that are genuinely important. I would, in return, want to have a serious discussion about the fact that some documents—not necessarily CFSP documents—go to the Committee at the moment that frankly need not go through the formal scrutiny process and could be dealt with in a more streamlined fashion.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I have three groups of questions. The first is on the scrutiny issue. I draw the Minister’s attention to page 331 of the documents. The criticism on scrutiny in this case is perhaps as much of the European Union as of the Minister: it took six and a half months to prepare the report on 2014, which made proper scrutiny by this House extremely difficult. It seems improper of the European Union to be so slow in producing documents that they cannot be scrutinised properly by national Parliaments, leading to a scrutiny waiver. What can the Minister do to improve that?
In response to the Minister’s suggestion of some negotiation between the Committee and his office as to what is sent for scrutiny, may I say that if the Government were a little more up to date with the debates that had been requested, including one now outstanding for more than two years, there might be more good will between those who wish to scrutinise and those who are scrutineered?
Mr Lidington
On the point about the slowness with which the EU sometimes produces documents, I am sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s comments. As he will know, I have exchanged correspondence with both the present and previous High Representatives about that, reminding them of the importance of our parliamentary scrutiny processes and the need for documents to be produced in good time wherever possible. In this particular case, it is fair to say that there was quite a complex negotiation at the level of ambassadorial representatives in Brussels, so it would be wrong of me to say this was all down to the External Action Service of Mrs Mogherini.
However, my hon. Friend’s general point is well made, although I would add that there are ways in which the House of Commons could improve its own scrutiny arrangements. It was probably unavoidable that for more than three months there was no House of Commons scrutiny arrangement in place, because from the moment of Dissolution, the scrutiny structure here fell away and did not operate again until almost the end of July 2015. That is not the fault of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset and his fellow Committee members—it is a side effect of our constitutional arrangements, but the EU machine continued to turn out documents during that time. It will not surprise my hon. Friend to learn that my personal view is that scrutiny Committees ought to have some arrangement for monitoring documents and sifting them during recesses, because that would help the process.
My hon. Friend referred to the backlog from the previous Parliament. As he will know, we are making efforts to try to clear that as rapidly as possible. There is always a difficult balance to be struck in the allocation of time, both in Committee and on the Floor of the House, but the usual channels are well aware of the concerns of my hon. Friend and his colleagues and are endeavouring to clear the backlog as soon as possible.
Mr Rees-Mogg
As a supplementary, I cannot let the Minister get away with the suggestion that the delay in reconstituting the European Scrutiny Committee was the fault of anybody other than Her Majesty’s Government. The Whips Office determines when these things happen, so I am surprised that he uses that as a defence. I remind him that these areas are subject to unanimity and if documents are produced late, the Government are in a strong position to refuse them and to say that they must wait for scrutiny by the House. It is not a matter covered by qualified majority voting. Moving on to page 337 of the Council’s conclusions, my first very simple question requires a yes or no answer. Am I right in thinking that these conclusions are conclusions accepted by Her Majesty’s Government?
Mr Lidington
Let me deal with the first point. My hon. Friend is clearly right that to some extent the timing of the setting up of any Committee is in the Government’s hands, although I think that what happened in this case was that once Parliament had met, elected a Speaker and heard the Queen’s Speech, it moved on to make provision for the election of Select Committees. Quite a few Members in all parts of the House wished to stand for membership of departmental Select Committees. Because the European Scrutiny Committee is not elected in the same way, it was felt fair to wait until the outcome of those elections to Select Committees were known before we moved on to selecting members of the ESC.
It is true that because CFSP decisions require unanimity, we can block things. We have to decide, when making a decision to block something, especially if the question is one where we actually support the policy, whether blocking on scrutiny grounds is going to cause a harm to our national diplomatic interest that outweighs the offence of not awaiting the correct scrutiny procedures. However, more than once in my time as Minister, I have simply refused to agree to something, which has meant a delay in implementing a number of quite significant EU measures. In this case, we were talking about the latest annual report in a series of annual reports. This has no policy impact—it simply reports what had happened during 2014. I will be straight with my hon. Friend: in those circumstances, and knowing that the Committee only had its first meeting on 21 July, the day after the Foreign Affairs Council, and that it was not likely to meet again until after the summer recess, I decided that it would not be in the United Kingdom’s interests to block the publication of an annual report, when, as we have shown, it would be perfectly possible to have a debate at a future time. No policy has been authorised as a consequence of that decision, because the report was purely retrospective.
I confess that in response to my hon. Friend’s second question, I am slightly at a loss because the copy of the report that I have does not go up to page 337, but only goes up to page 301. There were no conclusions to the report.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I was moving on to page 337 of the package, which relates to the Council’s conclusions on the common security and defence policy, following the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May. I just wanted to check that those conclusions were agreed by Her Majesty’s Government.
Mr Lidington
I will check the reference, and, if I may, I will try to respond to that in my winding-up remarks at the end of the debate.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am grateful. Perhaps the Minister may be able to find inspiration while I am asking the next question. If the Government did agree to those conclusions, I would bring to his attention paragraph 1 of the conclusions of the Council. As I understand it, Council conclusions are normally agreed by all members of the Council, so it would be odd, unless there was a specific reservation, if the Government had not agreed paragraph 1. It states:
“This calls for a stronger Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy”.
I thought that it was the policy of Her Majesty’s Government to repatriate powers from the European Union, whereas the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 May 2015, in the opening paragraph of its conclusion, calls for more powers for the European Union. If the Government agreed to that, can the Minister explain why they did so?
Mr Lidington
The straight answer is that yes, we did agree to any conclusions that require unanimity and, if I may say so, I think that the slip that my hon. Friend is making is to equate support for
“a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy”
with support for a stronger role for EU institutions in constraining and directing the activities of member states. What we are talking about here are security and defence policies agreed in common, unanimously, by the free decision of 28 national Governments working together, because we have seen in cases such as the Iran nuclear programme, or action in the western Balkans, that we are able to achieve more if we are working together than if even one or two of the big member states try to act on their own.
I would argue that we should be confident and ambitious about the influence that the United Kingdom can and does have on the shaping and framing of those policies. We are one of a handful of EU member states that have a history of global engagement and a worldwide diplomatic network, which is delivering the 0.7% UN target on international development. In terms of the trust fund of Turkey, for example, that enables us to put our money and our commitment on the table, and lead the actions of others at European level.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am grateful for the further opportunity to discuss this. The Minister thinks that I have misconstrued the conclusions, but paragraph 2 of the Council conclusions goes on to say that the EU and member states
“are assuming increased responsibilities to act as a security provider”.
When it refers to the EU, that must refer to the institutions of the European Union and must refer back to the second sentence of paragraph 1. It is giving more power to the European Union institutions; it says it in the document.
Mr Lidington
But in this context, that is the European Union institutions acting on the basis of a unanimously agreed decision by the Governments of the member states meeting in the Council. If there is not unanimity, there is no EU foreign policy position and, therefore, no EU action.
Mr Rees-Mogg
The Minister wishes to use words in a way that does not bear the normal meaning of them. Perhaps he will be able to help me in the usage of some words by the writers of the document, where the words do not have any normal meaning. Could he explain paragraph 4 of the document and tell us what the following means?
“The aim is to increase synergies in the EU response to priority horizontal issues”.
What are priority horizontal issues?
Mr Lidington
I have some sympathy with my hon. Friend’s dislike of what I sometimes refer to as diplo-babble. I have to confess that one finds this in national policy documents, I dread to say, as well as in European ones from time to time. I think he is being slightly unfair because he is quoting that phrase out of the context in which it is set. The context is the Council committing itself
“to further strengthen the links between external and internal security.”
The next sentence goes on to define priority horizontal issues
“such as terrorism, organised crime, foreign fighters, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, irregular migration, hybrid threats, border management, energy security and cyber security”.
The meaning behind that convoluted bit of jargon is that EU countries working together need to do more to co-ordinate. To take one example, that means co-ordinating the work that we do to strengthen our domestic arrangements to tackle terrorism with the external work that we do through diplomatic and other means.
I believe it is right, for example, that European countries, working through EU justice and home affairs provisions, should provide a system whereby we all have access to records of passenger names of people travelling within the EU or from EU airports to other flights. There is a natural synergy between that and working with countries, such as Turkey, that are used as transit routes by terrorists and organised criminals; just as there is a synergy with EU work to improve governance, public order and the rule of law in the countries of the western Balkans, which are very much prey to organised crime in all its forms, and which need and value external support from elsewhere in Europe to buttress their attempts to build the rule of law in their countries.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am grateful to the Minister for his translation of diplo-babble, but there are more examples, such as
“hybrid strategies and operations by state and non-state actors”.
I wonder who is doing the acting.
Paragraph 8 reports:
“Therefore, defence issues should also be considered in coherence”—
for the benefit of Hansard, I make clear that that is two words, “in” and “coherence”, rather than “incoherence”, although one might think the alternative is better—
“with other relevant EU policies and sectors, and vice versa”.
This is an extraordinarily unclear document, except when it is clear and the Government say that it is not.
In the context of my first question on the document, I will bring the Minister to paragraph 16. Could he explain what is meant by the following?
“The establishment of a EU facility linking closer peace, security and development in the framework of one or more existing EU instruments; and a dedicated instrument to this effect, in view of the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020”.
Does that mean more powers to EU institutions?
Mr Lidington
No, it does not, is the straight answer. Because I do not have direct ministerial responsibility for Africa, I offer to write to my hon. Friend with further details once I have talked to the Minister for Africa. However, my reading of this section of paragraph 16 is that it is saying that an EU facility should be established to try to drive forward internal peace, security and development in African countries. It seems that those three objectives fit naturally together. An African country that is more secure is likely to be able to offer greater economic opportunities to its people, more economic growth and more employment, which in turn will reduce the attractiveness of crime, terrorism and so on.
The following line, which refers to the
“mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework”,
is saying that this new facility could be set up within the context of the mid-term review, meaning that funds that are currently spent in one particular way could be reallocated through the creation of the new programme. I can give my hon. Friend and the Committee a firm assurance that the unanimity lock remains on the ceilings that were negotiated by the Prime Minister in 2013. The mid-term review may come up with interesting ideas about how to reorganise expenditure programmes, but unless the Government changed their mind, which they have no intention of doing, those seven-year MFF ceilings remain in place.
Mr Rees-Mogg
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that answer. If he does write to me, might he look at the opening part of paragraph 16? In that context, does
“the Joint Communication on ‘Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’”
refer to the development of EU competence, of which I would always urge him to be cautious?
Paragraph 17j states that the Council
“Welcomes the clarification and understanding achieved regarding the possible use of Article 44 TEU”.
Will he explain what that possible use is? Although the document welcomes the clarification, it does not explain it.
Mr Lidington
It is part of the Lisbon treaty and permits the Council to entrust the conduct of a CSDP mission to a willing group of member states smaller than the entire EU membership, allowing those without an interest in the mission to give it their political blessing without actually having to participate. Under article 44, a coalition of the willing could therefore take on a mission under the EU banner with the support of EU infrastructure and spending programmes. Italy and a number of southern member states are particularly keen on that at the moment because they are talking about a further CSDP mission in the Mediterranean.
The article has the potential to be useful because it would provide a way to reflect the reality that it is inevitable in a diverse EU membership that member states have different levels of interest in particular crises. It will be no shock to the Committee if I say that Malta is concerned about what is happening in Libya and that Lithuania is concerned about the situation vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Article 44 will add value only if it has some different rules that allow for greater flexibility of action. By definition, the article is likely to be used when not all member states want to be fully engaged in a mission and therefore use of the article should not come with an automatic expectation of common funding from member states that have chosen not to participate. Those who want to take part should pay for it.
We can delegate a mission to a particular group of member states, but we are very reluctant to support the idea of delegating responsibility for that mission’s conduct, even if it is being conducted by only a minority of willing member states. In any use of article 44, we would want to insist that standards of planning, organisation, governance and spending oversight in the conduct of a mission remained just as high if it took place under article 44 as it would for any other EU mission.
Jesse Norman (Hereford and South Herefordshire) (Con)
The Minister’s responses have raised a question in my mind about what the Government’s policy actually is; I hope he does not mind if I ask him about that in the context of this motion. Is the Government’s policy with regard to the EU to withdraw powers wherever possible in line with the doctrine of subsidiarity? Is it never to remit any further powers to the European Union? Is it to contemplate remitting powers to institutions of the EU where policy, and in particular, British policy goals are served by such a remission of power? Or is it to remit such powers if—and only if—such remission is purely temporary? I would be very grateful if the Minister clarified the policy.
Mr Lidington
To a large extent, one would need to look at the detail of the subject area being addressed. On my hon. Friend’s first question, it is certainly the Government’s position that in all areas of EU activity, the cardinal principle ought to be “Europe where necessary, national where possible”, and that action should be taken at a European level where we believe that will give genuine value added. We therefore want to see subsidiarity applied rigorously in areas of activity that fall within EU competence under the treaties.
When it comes to new powers, as my hon. Friend will know, we set out very significant checks in the European Union Act 2011 in the form of requirements for parliamentary agreement, primary legislation and in many cases, a referendum in this country before this or any future British Government could agree to the transfer of additional competences to the EU by way of treaty amendment or a new treaty.
I think there is certainly deep scepticism on the Government’s part towards the idea that EU competences need to be expanded. The Lisbon treaty already gives very significant competences to the EU. It is dangerous in politics ever to say “never”, and we do not know what the world will look like in five, 10 or 25 years’ time, but I think it is good that we have those checks in place on the statute book to ensure that if any future Government were tempted to agree to an expansion of EU competences, they could do so only with the full support of Parliament, and in most cases, of the British public in a referendum.
When it comes to the additional exercise of powers within an existing competence—for example, with the proposal for a new justice and home affairs measure—we will, in that particular case, make a judgment, based on our assessment of the national interest, as to whether it is in our interest to participate or not participate in that measure. Where the matter falls within the EU’s treaty competence already and where we do not have the opt-out—for example, single-market matters—part of our negotiating approach would be to press for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to be observed fully.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Committee takes note of European Union Document No. 11083/15, Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (part II, point E, paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013)—2014: Draft Annual Report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament; and welcomes the constructive coordination between EU Member States and Institutions to achieve a range of positive foreign policy outcomes.— (Mr Lidington.)
Mr Lidington
I am grateful to both the hon. Member for North West Durham and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset for their contributions. The hon. Lady was right that the document we are debating contains no new policy. It is purely a retrospective report on what happened or what was done during 2014. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that I do not claim—and never have claimed—that everything about the EU is perfect, certainly not the way it does external policy. I probably know that better than any other member of the Committee after the last five and three quarter years. However, as I said earlier, I believe that in today’s world the reality is that, in order to protect our own citizens and advance the interests of our country, we need to work with others.
I remember my noble Friend Lord Hague saying to me after one extremely long Foreign Affairs Council when he was Foreign Secretary that, while it was utterly frustrating and infuriating to try to get 28 different countries all to sign up to a common package of sanctions against a third country, the effort was worth while, because, when that could be achieved, it was more effective than Britain acting on its own or even than Britain, France and Germany acting together. It closed down so many actual or potential loopholes for sanctions busting, and there was a greater political and economic effect on the country being targeted than if only a small group of the willing had taken action.
The safeguards that we have with regard to the exercise of the EU’s foreign and security policy responsibilities are, first, that it is laid down in the treaties that, for a foreign policy position to be adopted, all member states have to be in agreement. Every country, including the United Kingdom, has a veto. Not only that, but the European Court cannot second-guess policy positions. It has a limited right to look at the implementation of unanimously agreed decisions, for example on sanctions. An individual who is subject to EU sanctions can go to the European Court and argue that the sanction was imposed improperly or on the basis of false evidence, or for whatever other reason. However, the Court cannot intervene in the making of a foreign policy position.
In addition, the European Union Act 2011 provides explicitly for a referendum to be held in this country were any future British Government to be tempted to agree to move from unanimity towards majority voting for common foreign and security policy or common security and defence policy.
I also say to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that yes, we do need to be vigilant about attempts to stretch the envelope over competence. For example, since 2010 I have instructed my officials to be very active in resisting what we believe to be unwarranted attempts by the Commission to supplant the role of member states or the rotating presidency in representing the EU position in international organisations. That is a battle that I am sure will continue.
Also, when considering vetoing a particular measure, or at least delaying agreement to it—what my hon. Friend asks me to do more frequently—I consider what the impact of such a veto or delay would be. Sometimes, when the final unclassified version of a document has regrettably, for whatever reason, been produced late in the process by Brussels, I am faced with the decision of whether to override scrutiny in order to allow agreement, or to do as he asks and block agreement pending scrutiny. Sometimes that might mean deciding whether to put at risk the continuation of an EU peacekeeping or training mission in a country where the operation of that mission is important to the United Kingdom’s interests.
Mr Rees-Mogg
Of course I accept that there are urgent occasions, particularly in relation to sanctions, when it is right to override scrutiny, because giving us time to scrutinise sanctions would also give the person who is supposed to be caught by them time to change his affairs. This document, however, was a report on what happened in 2014, so it was in no sense urgent that it be agreed in July; it could easily have waited until proper scrutiny had taken place. It seems to me, therefore, that the urgency argument really does not apply in this case.
Mr Lidington
In this case, as I described earlier, had we blocked agreement on 20 July, it would have been in the knowledge that we could not return to it until scrutiny processes had been completed, which would have taken us well into the autumn, given that Parliament sat for only two weeks in September, and I think the Committee met only once in those two weeks. A debate could probably not have taken place until the second half of October at the earliest.
We had, as we always have, many political objectives at stake during a Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The Foreign Secretary and I took the view that to hold up agreement on this would simply be an unwelcome use of negotiating capital that we wanted to keep for substantive foreign policy issues where getting others to agree to the British position was challenging but important for our diplomatic interests. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset is perfectly entitled to say that we misjudged that and that we should have been more rigorous in defending parliamentary scrutiny, but that was the way in which my right hon. Friend and I approached it.
In conclusion, it remains the case, in my view, that we can achieve important objectives of this country by working co-operatively with our nearest neighbours and partners. Furthermore, the diplomatic weight that the United Kingdom brings to the European table is significant. We can and do have a major influence on shaping what later become common European policies. In that sense, we can use the European arrangements to amplify our own diplomatic reach and punching power. Indeed, people from the United States often tell British officials and Ministers that they want us to get involved in bringing other Europeans to the table. In fact, the Prime Minister was very active in ensuring that the United States and European Union positions on Russia sanctions have been very closely aligned throughout the Ukraine crisis.
Although these institutional arrangements are not perfect—I am not going to claim that we will win every single battle—I believe that we can use our power and influence effectively to shape European policy positions in a way that brings tangible benefits to the security and prosperity of the people of the United Kingdom. On that basis, I commend the Government’s motion to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.