European Union Bill

David Lidington Excerpts

Tuesday 1st February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

The first set of clauses under consideration in Committee this afternoon relate to the transitional protocol on Members of the European Parliament, which is covered in clauses 15, 16 and 17, and schedule 2. In sum, the provisions allow for a technical change that permits a temporary increase in the number of MEPs, including one additional Member from the UK.

It might be helpful to give some background to the protocol before turning to the detail on the clauses, so that colleagues on both sides of the Committee understand the context of our proposals. The European Union treaties, as amended by the treaty of Lisbon, provide for the allocation of 18 additional MEPs to 12 member states, including one additional MEP for the UK. The treaties also provide that the number of MEPs from Germany should be reduced by three. However, the treaty of the European Union, as amended by Lisbon, states that the European Parliament shall not exceed 750 members in number, plus the President, which makes a total of 751, and that no single member state will be allocated more than 96 seats. Before the Lisbon treaty, Germany had 99 MEPs. Its allocation has therefore been reduced to 96 seats to fit within the maximum number permitted by the treaties.

The TEU also states that the European Council shall adopt a decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament. Article 2 of protocol 36 to the treaties—on transitional provisions—reaffirms that and states that the decision

“shall be adopted in good time before the 2009 European Parliament elections”.

However, as the Committee will be aware, given the Irish rejection of the Lisbon treaty in its first referendum on the matter and the additional guarantees sought by Ireland in 2009 in the wake of that, there was a delay in the ratification of the Lisbon treaty by all member states—personally, I wish it had been more than a delay—and therefore a delay to the treaty entering into force.

As a result, and contrary to the relevant provision in the TEU, the 2009 European elections actually took place before any European Council decision was adopted. Those elections were therefore held in accordance with the provisions of the Nice treaty, under which the European Parliament comprises 736 MEPs.

The European Council had already agreed what to do in that situation. Back in December 2008, it agreed that, should the Lisbon treaty come into force after the 2009 European parliamentary elections, a transitional protocol would be agreed to permit those member states that gained MEPs as a result of the Lisbon treaty to elect their additional MEPs during the current European parliamentary term. This would mean that they would not have to wait until the next round of European parliamentary elections in 2014, when those changes would come into force automatically, in accordance with the treaty of Lisbon.

The arrival of 18 additional MEPs during the 2009-14 parliamentary term increases the number from 736 to 754—three more than the maximum permitted by the EU treaties, and transitional arrangements are therefore needed to enable the number of MEPs to exceed temporarily the limit of 751 laid down in article 14(2) of the treaty on European Union.

[Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way on the statistics about the number of MEPs. Does he have any figures showing how much these additional MEPs are costing us while we wait for the correct number to be arrived at?

[Mr Lidington]

I am glad to be able to tell my hon. Friend that the cost of these additional MEPs will be provided for out of the European Parliament’s budget; no additional contribution is required from the United Kingdom or any other member state. That is perfectly right, and the European Parliament will already have made provision in its budget for these additional costs.

The European Council also agreed that the transitional protocol should provide that the three German MEPs who would no longer have a seat in the European Parliament would not have to stand down in the middle of their term of office, because it is not possible under the treaties to curtail an MEP’s mandate during a parliamentary term. In order to make the required transitional changes, the member states of the EU agreed to a transitional protocol at a limited intergovernmental conference on 23 June 2010, under the ordinary revision procedure. Although the ORP was used, the European Parliament had previously agreed not to convene a convention of representatives of the EU institutions, member state Governments and national Parliaments, because the European Parliament recognised the very limited scope of the proposed treaty change.

The IGC was convened in the margin of the Conference of Permanent Representatives—known as COREPER—with the agreement of Ministers of each member state. IGCs are occasionally convened in COREPER meetings for single-issue matters, such as the approval of appointments of judges to the Court of Justice, and one was used on this occasion because the treaty change in question concerned a single, time-bound issue already agreed by the Heads of Government and Heads of State at the European Council, rather than a more substantial renegotiation or re-opening of the EU’s treaties. I then announced to the House via a written ministerial statement on 6 July last year, at column 7WS, that the transitional protocol had been agreed.

As with any treaty change, the protocol now requires that all member states ratify it before it can enter into force. As I have already made clear in our earlier debates in Committee, it is for each member state, when it comes to any treaty amendment, to determine whether and how it carries out its own national procedures for approval and ratification. In the United Kingdom at present, any amendment to the EU treaties conducted under the ordinary revision procedure—as was the case here—can be ratified by the UK only if it is approved by Act of Parliament. This is set out in section 5 of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008.

Parliamentary approval of the transitional protocol is therefore required by Act before the protocol can be ratified in the UK. Clause 15 of the Bill therefore provides for this parliamentary approval. Subject to Parliament’s approval, the legislation will of course require that any treaty change conducted under either the ORP or the simplified revision procedure would in future need parliamentary approval by Act. Since what we are debating is a technical change to the treaty that relates merely to the number of MEPs, and does not transfer any power or competence from the UK to the EU, it does not meet the requirements to hold a referendum. However, as the provisions in the 2008 Act require approval by Act of Parliament, we have decided to use them to seek the approval of Parliament. Section 5 of the 2008 Act would subsequently be repealed, as a consequence of clause 14, and replaced by the provisions in clauses 2 and 3 in any future decisions.

It is important to note that the additional MEPs are entitled to take their seats following the next European parliamentary elections in 2014 in any case, regardless of what the Committee determines this afternoon. The transitional protocol simply means that those people will be able to do that earlier than 2014, because the treaties would have provided for their election in 2009 had the Lisbon treaty been in force then, as was anticipated by the then Heads of Government and Heads of State. At the 2014 European parliamentary elections the additional MEPs, along with every other MEP, will be elected in the usual way, according to each member state’s practice. As none of the additional MEPs could take up their places until every member state had ratified the transitional protocol, the Government have continued with our predecessor’s approach, and we now seek Parliament’s approval to ratify this treaty change.

The protocol states that it will enter into force on 1 December 2010, provided that all the instruments of ratification have been deposited. Failing that, the protocol would enter into force on the first day of the month after the last member state ratifying the protocol had done so. Clearly we have passed that somewhat ambitious deadline already, and it is for each member state to decide whether, how and when to approve ratification. However, it is our intention to ratify as soon as possible, subject to Parliament’s approval. As I have made clear, we are discussing a short-term transitional measure, until the next European parliamentary elections, which are due to take place in June 2014. It does not transfer power or competence, and so does not require the people’s consent in a referendum, but it is a treaty change. As such, it requires the approval of this Parliament through primary legislation. I hope that members of the Committee will be able to approve this temporary measure.

[Emma Reynolds (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)]

Let me say at the outset what a pleasure it is again to be debating the Bill with the Minister and the select group of Members currently in the Chamber. We welcome the provisions that the Government have set out to give parliamentary approval to the allocation of the UK’s extra seat in the European Parliament. Having worked in the European Parliament for some time, I know the important role that it plays, but I would like to ask the Minister some questions of clarification.

Can the Minister clarify why the so-called Sainte-Laguë process was chosen to allocate the UK’s extra seat in the European Parliament to the west midlands region? I understand that the method was set out in the Electoral Commission report in October last year. What consultation took place between the Government and the Electoral Commission on choosing that method? Was a joint decision made, or was it the decision of the commission or the Government? Did the Government consider any other method to allocate the extra seat, and if so, which? Which methods are being used by other member states to allocate extra seats?

The explanatory note says that the west midlands had the lowest number of electors per MP according to the current electoral register, and on that basis the decision was made to allocate the extra seat. It is perhaps ironic that, although the west midlands will be given one extra MEP, owing to the Government’s plans it is set to lose several MPs. Which electoral register did the Government consider when making their decision: the one from December last year or the year before? Can the Minister tell the Committee what progress other member states are making on ratifying the protocol to increase the number of MEPs, and when he expects the UK to take up its extra seat in the European Parliament?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr MacShane]

Might my hon. Friend possibly accept that on this occasion I really must bow to the Chair and sit down?

[Mr Lidington]

A number of the questions posed by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) invited me to move from clause 15 to clauses 16 and 17. If you are willing to allow me to stray on to that territory, Mr Hoyle, I shall be able to reply to her questions now and perhaps speak more formally later when we deal with those clauses; otherwise I shall have to delay my responses to her.

The right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) made his points very forcefully. I agree with him that there is a disconnection between decisions made by national legislatures in just about every member state and decisions made in the European Parliament—or in Europe more generally—on behalf of those countries, and I think it important for us to consider how to remedy that democratic deficit. However, I do not want to be drawn into a detailed discussion about the treaty changes which would need to be debated and negotiated to produce the outcome that the right hon. Gentleman seeks, and which would have to command unanimous agreement among all member states and, indeed, the European Parliament itself.

Let me say two things about the European Parliament. First, it does an important job. Whatever view I, or any other Member present, may take on whether or not it should have particular powers, my contacts with MEPs of all parties have given me the impression that, for the most part, they take their duties of scrutinising and seeking to amend European legislation very seriously. As a Government and as a Parliament, we need to have regard to and engage consistently with MEPs if we are to pursue successfully the national objectives of the United Kingdom through the European Union.

Secondly, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is an unhealthy democratic gap between the way in which the European Parliament operates and the— in my opinion—correct belief held by most national legislatures that they are more directly accountable to the voters in their respective countries than are MEPs. That is, perhaps, particularly true in the United Kingdom, where there is a significant difference in the method of election: while MEPs are elected through a regional party list system, we in the House of Commons are elected to single-Member constituencies. The right hon. Gentleman has sketched what has the makings of a fruitful debate in the months and years to come.

Let me now deal with the various detailed points made by, in particular, the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East. While I am tempted to deal at length on differences between the Sainte-Laguë and d’Hondt methods, that would probably reduce the number of Members attending the debate even further. I am happy to offer a seminar. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) indicates that he does not wish to be drawn into a debate about the respective merits of Sainte-Laguë and d’Hondt.

[Mr MacShane]

Let us leave Sainte-Laguë and d’Hondt. Is the Minister in favour of the alternative vote? That is what the Committee and the nation want to know.

[Mr Lidington]

No.

The answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East is that the Electoral Commission decided to use the Sainte-Laguë method following various consultations that it had carried out. There is a debate about whether we should move to that method when it comes to deciding how to elect Members of the European Parliament, but that is a matter for a future occasion.

[Emma Reynolds]

Will the Minister clarify whether the d’Hondt system was considered by the Electoral Commission in allocating the extra seat?

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Lady knows that the Electoral Commission is completely independent of the Government, so that question should properly be addressed to the chairman and the chief executive of the commission.

The history of this process is that on 22 September 2010 the Minister with responsibility for political and constitutional reform, the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), wrote on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister to the chair of the commission formally requesting a recommendation under section 3 of the European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003 as to which of the 12 UK electoral regions, for the purposes of European parliamentary elections, should receive the UK’s additional MEP seat. UK MEPs are, of course, elected on a regional basis from 12 electoral regions—Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and nine regions in England. In making the recommendation for the distribution of any Member of the European Parliament, the Electoral Commission is obliged to ensure that each electoral region is allocated at least three MEPs and that the ratio of registered electors to MEPs is, as far as possible, the same in each electoral region. The Electoral Commission process is independent of Government and, importantly, the Government are bound to accept its recommendation.

In allocating the seat, the Electoral Commission applied the Sainte-Laguë method, as the hon. Lady has said, following previous consultation exercises it had undertaken on the method to be used. It has indicated that the system has the advantage of enabling it to adhere to its statutory requirement that the ratio of registered electors to MEPs is as nearly as possible the same in each electoral region. On 26 October 2010, the Electoral Commission recommended that the west midlands should be allocated the additional MEP provided for in the transitional protocol, and published a report to that effect, a copy of which was placed in the Library. My hon. Friend the Minister with responsibility for political and constitutional reform confirmed the commission’s decision to the House via a written ministerial statement on 26 October 2010—column 7WS in Hansard. Let me place on the record now, as my hon. Friend did at the time, the Government’s thanks to the commission for its work in producing that recommendation.

The hon. Lady is right that population trends and electoral numbers change over time. The answer to her direct question is that the December 2009 electoral register was used in making the calculation and the recommendation that the west midlands should receive the additional seat, but I want to make it clear to the Committee today, as the Government have stated publicly on previous occasions, that if it became likely while the Bill remained under consideration by either House that any changes to electoral registration data would result in a different UK electoral region gaining the seat, we would seek a revised recommendation from the Electoral Commission. We have acted on the basis of the December 2009 register, but if the evidence of new registers suggests that a region other than the west midlands should get the seat, we would revert to the commission for a further recommendation.

[Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

We are, of course, in a rather unusual situation with European Parliament elections, in that Gibraltar is included, and Gibraltar shares Members of the European Parliament with the south-west of England. What methods for determining the electors in Gibraltar have been used in the calculations?

[Mr Lidington]

I think that is a matter for the Electoral Commission. It advises that it has used the Sainte-Laguë method throughout, and in comparing electorates for each region it would have taken the Gibraltar electorate into account when making its calculation for the south-west. I undertake to double-check what I have just told the hon. Gentleman; if I have inadvertently led him up the garden path, I will of course correct that on the record, but I have confidence that the Electoral Commission has done its job properly.

[Mrs Main]

I am listening with profound interest to my hon. Friend’s remarks. Does he share my concern that, to the public outside, seemingly topping up the gravy train rather than culling it—perhaps expanding the size of the electorate for existing MEPs rather than increasing the number of MEPs—might not, in today’s environment of cuts, be met with a degree of approval?

[Mr Lidington]

The changes to the distribution of MEPs between member states arose from new calculations about the populations of the different member states. Just as we have boundary reviews from time to time in the United Kingdom to reflect the growth of electorates in some places and the reduction in others, it is right that such a process should take place at the European level.

My hon. Friend makes a more fundamental point in her intervention, in implicitly arguing that there should be a significant overall reduction in the number of European legislators. I understand that argument, and I am certainly very much in the camp of those who argue that the European Parliament, like every other European Union institution, should be looking to reduce its expenditure rather than expect it automatically to increase. I would say just one word of caution to my hon. Friend, though. One consequence of reducing the number of MEPs overall would be either that the representation of the smallest member states would disappear completely or, if they were allowed a guaranteed minimum number of MEPs, that they would be disproportionately over-represented compared with the larger member states. The larger member states, such as ourselves, would suffer the greatest cuts in our representation if the smallest were protected, and potentially see a reduction in our influence over the European Parliament.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

It has just struck me that my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) suggested a two-house European Parliament. I am not an enthusiast for that, but in those circumstances could you not have an arrangement similar to that for—

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We have already ruled on that question.

[Mr Lidington]

I think the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) is demonstrating that he has political ambitions as yet unfulfilled.

I can now assure the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) that expert advice has reached me confirming that my trust in the Electoral Commission was well placed and that the electorate of Gibraltar were indeed considered in the context of the south-west region and assessed in accordance with the Sainte-Laguë system.

The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East asked me about the different options for selecting the additional MEPs. The protocol allows member states to choose between three options. First, member states could use the 2009 European parliamentary election results and elect the additional MEPs as if the additional seats had existed at the time of those 2009 elections. That is the method that we have chosen.

The second option would be to hold a by-election. In this case, that would mean holding a by-election in the west midlands region for a single MEP at an estimated cost of perhaps £10 million. The third option would be for member states to appoint temporarily one of their national parliamentarians to become the new MEP for the remainder of the current European parliamentary term. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East indicates that the hon. Member for Luton North or perhaps the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) might be candidates in such circumstances.

The previous Government decided in February 2010 that the UK’s additional MEP would be elected by reference to the results of the most recent European parliamentary elections, as though the additional seat had existed at that time. The present Government have continued our predecessor’s chosen approach, and the clauses are framed in that way. That is also the method used by the great majority of other member states that are gaining MEPs. In fact, some member states elected additional MEPs during the 2009 elections on the basis that they could take up their seats only once the transitional protocol had come into force.

Our chosen method avoids the delay and the cost associated with a by-election and would allow us to return the additional MEP as soon as possible after the approval of the relevant provision in the Bill. It also has the merit of being exactly the same method that we use in any case to fill a vacant British seat in the European Parliament after the death or resignation of an elected MEP. Again, these clauses and schedule 2 would apply only until the additional seat had been filled and until the next European parliamentary election, which is scheduled for 2014.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Election of additional MEP

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr David]

May I briefly ask the Minister an additional question on the extra MEP, simply to gain some broader context? He mentions correctly that other member states have additional MEPs. Of course, as he points out, all member states must agree to adopt the necessary legislative procedures to bring about such MEPs, but what is the time scale? We are dealing with the situation now. I wonder whether other EU member states have had an opportunity to alter their legislation to bring out such MEPs. Are we waiting for them to do so? What is the time scale? That obviously has a bearing on when the MEP from the west midlands can take her seat.

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I apologise for having overlooked that question when it came from the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds). The most sensible thing for me to do would be to write to the hon. Gentleman with a full list and to deposit a copy of that letter in the Library for the information of all Members. However, the latest information available to me is that in respect of the other member states that are gaining MEPs—or, indeed, other member states generally, because the protocol must be ratified by all 27 of them, whether they gain or lose MEPs, or whether there is no difference in the number of MEPs from a country—something like two thirds to three quarters of member states have reached the stage of notifying their accession to the proposal, but others have not done so. Germany, for example, has debated the measure in the Bundestag, but my understanding is that Germany has not yet ratified it. We are awaiting news on where France is going. Some of the others, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Malta, have gone a considerable distance towards ratification already, but we are not right at the back of the pack, by any means. My expectation is that this measure will probably be ratified by all 27 member states later this year, but it could slip into 2012, because each member state can decide how high a priority it gives to this measure. I hope that that gives the hon. Gentleman an adequate holding answer for now, but I undertake to write to him with chapter and verse as soon as possible.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Election of additional MEP

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Mr Lidington]

It might be helpful if I set out in a little more detail the provisions in schedule 2, because it also deals with the procedures to be followed in the admittedly unlikely event that we were unable to fill the vacancy for the additional MEP by looking at the party lists as they were constituted in 2009.

As I have explained, clause 17 provides for the method of electing and returning the UK’s additional MEP. Schedule 2 provides a series of detailed provisions to be used when undertaking the process to return that additional MEP. As a first step, the regional returning officer for the designated region—in this case, the west midlands—would be required to identify which registered party would have won the additional seat in accordance with the results of the European parliamentary elections of 4 June 2009, as though that seat had already been allocated to the west midlands at that time. Since there were no independent candidates in the west midlands at the 2009 elections, the schedule provides only for allocation to a registered party.

The regional returning officer would then be required to identify from the registered party’s list of candidates at the 2009 elections the candidate whose name appeared highest on the list. In doing so, the returning officer has to disregard those people who have already been returned as MEPs, or who have since died. For example, if the registered party had proposed six candidates in an electoral region and the first three candidates on that party’s list had been returned as MEPs, the returning officer would identify the fourth candidate on that party’s list as the next person to be returned as an MEP. That person is referred to as the first choice.

Schedule 2 provides that the returning officer then has a duty to contact the first choice to ask whether he or she will provide written confirmation of their willingness and their ability to be returned as the MEP. The returning officer would also ask the first choice to deliver a certificate signed by, or on behalf of, the nominating officer of the registered party, confirming that he or she may be elected.

Schedule 2 further sets out the process to take place if the returning officer is unable to contact the first choice candidate or if that person confirms that, for whatever reason, they are unwilling or unable to stand, or if they do not provide the certificate required by law. In order to maximise the independence of the process, and to make it clear that there is no Government gerrymandering involved, it shall be at the discretion of the regional returning officer to determine the length of the “reasonable period” involved.

If there has been no success with the first choice candidate, the returning officer should identify the next name on the registered party’s list of candidates. This candidate is referred to in the schedule as the subsequent choice, and the returning officer shall repeat the same process with that candidate. This process will continue until either the seat is filled or there are no more names on the registered party’s list of candidates.

Schedule 2 then sets out what would happen if the first choice candidate provided the required documentation after the regional returning officer had determined that it was appropriate to move on to the next individual. In that case, schedule 2 provides that the so-called prior choice would have forfeited their opportunity because they had previously been given adequate opportunity by the returning officer to provide the relevant documentation within a reasonable time. They would have to wait to see whether the process could be completed successfully with the current candidate being approached by the regional returning officer. If the returning officer had no success with that subsequent candidate, the earlier candidate could be allowed at that stage to provide documentation and stake a claim.

The schedule then sets out the process to take place when a candidate has returned the required documentation to the satisfaction of the regional returning officer. The returning officer has to declare publicly in writing that that person should be returned as an MEP, prepare a public statement containing relevant information concerning the process, and send copies of both documents to the Secretary of State.

[Mrs Main]

The scenarios that my right hon. Friend has outlined are obviously hypothetical, but in a hypothetical scenario of, say, six candidates when three or four have been elected and the other two are, say, dead, what happens then?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. It is right that in drafting legislation, particularly on a matter as important as democratic representation, we make provision even for unlikely eventualities. If my hon. Friend will bear with me for a few seconds, I shall come to precisely the point that she identified.

When the returning officer has sent copies of the documents to the Secretary of State, the candidate will be confirmed and will be free to take up their seat as soon as the transitional protocol has entered into force. That depends on ratification having taken place in every member state.

Here I come to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans (Mrs Main). Schedule 2 also provides that, in the event that none of the candidates on the relevant 2009 list was available or willing to be returned as an MEP, as a last resort a by-election would be held to fill the seat.

[Nick Boles (Grantham and Stamford) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend tell us whether these provisions are to apply only once, in one particular case at one particular time? Is it not the case that we know perfectly well who would be most likely to benefit from the provisions? Is it not also the case that we know that she is alive and wants to be a Member of the European Parliament? Would it not be quicker just to elect Anthea McIntyre as a Member of the European Parliament for the west midlands and move on to the next clause?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend, as always, reminds us of practicalities and of the real world. As I said to our hon. Friend the Member for St Albans, the legislation for democratic representation must make provision for all conceivable eventualities, even if they seem highly improbable to us.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

If the Bill were simply to say that Anthea McIntyre were elected, it might be in danger of becoming hybrid legislation.

[Mr Lidington]

I bow to my hon. Friend’s constitutional knowledge. I suspect that having the Bill declared hybrid is the last thing that any of us want.

If we reached circumstances in which none of the candidates from 2009 was available or willing to be returned, a by-election would be held. The returning officer would confirm to the Secretary of State that the seat could not be filled, and the Secretary of State would lay an order by statutory instrument to specify the date of a by-election. I stress that the by-election is very much a last-resort option, and that, given the short time between the 2009 elections and now, the Government are confident that the process outlined in schedule 2 is likely to identify a candidate to fill the additional seat.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 19

Financial provisions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Lidington]

Clause 19 provides for the financial provisions associated with some of the provisions of the Bill, mainly those in part 2 required for the implementation of the transitional protocol on MEPs. Any costs incurred as a result of our implementation of the protocol will be met from the Consolidated Fund.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

How much will that new MEP cost?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to make a little progress, I will explain where potential costs might conceivably arise. Any costs would consist of the minimal costs arising from the administrative expenditure of the returning officer of the west midlands electoral region. The costs involved there will depend on what those administrative costs are, but they are costs that would have to be budgeted for in the normal way. The returning officer does not have a blank cheque that he can draw on. If the seat could not be filled in accordance with schedule 2 and a by-election had to be held, there would be costs associated with that by-election, for which clause 19 makes provision. On our best current estimate, a by-election would cost about £10 million to run.

[Mr David]

If there were a by-election, would it be held under the first-past-the-post or the alternative vote system?

[Mr Lidington]

If a by-election were to be held, my understanding is that it would be held on the basis of the first-past-the-post system, if only one candidate could be elected. Again, if I am mistaken, I will correct the record.

[Mr David]

May I press the Minister a little further on that? I am sure that what he is saying is correct, but would it not be strange if all the other MEPs from Britain—in fact, I would guess all the other MEPs from every other European country—were elected under a form of proportional representation, yet this one individual was the only one elected under first past the post?

[Mr Lidington]

The fact that this is a transitional arrangement means that it is sui generis. As the hon. Gentleman will know, normally the European Parliament has a rule that a legislator cannot have a dual mandate and be a member of both a national legislature and the European Parliament. Here we have insisted that people had to leave active membership of the House of Lords in order to take a part in the European Parliament, and Members here have had to make a choice in the past when they have held a dual mandate in the House of Commons and the European Parliament about which they wished to pursue after a particular election. Special arrangements are being made because this matter is transitional.

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

Perhaps I may help the Minister: essentially, a by-election in such circumstances would be under the list system. The list would just be a list of one.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend has helped by indicating that we would be making a somewhat academic distinction in these circumstances. It might be important theologically, but not in terms of practical politics.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

To carry on with the theological argument, is it not the case that PR systems reduce to first past the post when there is one vacancy in effect, with the exception of a dead heat? That is the real point on the ballot paper where there is a cross put against the name, which is a traditional first past the post, or whether it is one, two, three or four, depending on the number of candidates. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify.

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Gentleman invites me to speculate on what the procedure would be were there to be a tie in the event of a very unlikely by-election covering the whole of the west midlands region. I will seek advice in order to be certain of my position and write to him or respond to him later in the debate.

[Chris Bryant]

I am grateful to the Minister for being so generous in giving way, as he always is. He has suggested that Members of this House or the House of Lords are barred from being Members of the European Parliament, but I do not think that that is the law. I would be grateful if he could advance the Act of Parliament in which that is stated. I thought that the Rev. Dr Ian Paisley was simultaneously a Member of this House and the European Parliament for a considerable time.

[Mr Lidington]

That was possible for a long time, but the rules were changed and the right hon. and noble Lord Bannside, as he now is, decided to leave the European Parliament at the appropriate election because he wished to remain a Member of the House of Commons.

The other costs covered by clause 19 arise by virtue of clause 13, which provides that the Electoral Commission shall

“take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness… and… may take steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the subject-matter”

in connection with any referendums held, pursuant to part 1 of the Bill. Clause 19 provides for any additional costs incurred as a result of that activity.

It is also worth underlining the fact that since 14 July 2009 the salaries of Members of the European Parliament are paid from the European Parliament’s budget. The United Kingdom will make no direct payments as a result of the implementation of the transitional protocol on MEPs, so clause 19 makes no provision for any such payments.

[Mr David]

I would like to refer to one point relating to financial provisions. The Minister has referred to clause 13, which we debated last week, although in insufficient detail in my view. What possible costs could be incurred by provisions of the Bill relating to possible referendums, because the Electoral Commission is given tremendous scope? For example, clause 13(b) states that the Electoral Commission “may”—I stress that word—

“take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the subject-matter of the referendum.”

We have also discussed the fact that there could be referendums on extremely complex and almost esoteric issues, and the Government of the day would have to make an enormous effort to ensure that there was a reasonable debate among the public on the issue under consideration, rather than some other issue. Will the Minister spell out what sort of cap there could be on the Electoral Commission’s expenditure? We have also touched on the possibility that public money would be given to the campaign in favour of a change that a Government want and to the campaign against it. What sort of cap will be included for two opposing campaigns that could be initiated as a result of this legislation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

Before responding to those points, I should clarify the method of election we would use for a by-election. My hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) was absolutely correct: although in theory the list system would be used, in practice it would be a list of one, so for all intents and purposes it would be a first-past-the-post election.

The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) asked about public money being available to umbrella campaign organisations arguing for either a yes or a no vote. We have always taken the view that any referendums conducted by authority of the Bill should be run along lines equivalent to those provided in other statutes, especially the AV referendum that we hope will be held this May, subject to Parliament’s approval.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Main]

Will a set amount be put aside in the Budget every year as a contingency fund for the possible multiple referendums to which my right hon. Friend refers?

[Mr Lidington]

No. The matter will be decided at the time. We will not operate on a hypothetical basis—that there might or might not be a referendum in any particular year. We would make provision for it as and when required.

[Chris Bryant]

I am not sure whether the Minister therefore means that the Foreign Office would make provision, whether the Ministry of Justice would do so under the referendums provision or whether it would come out of the contingency, but my anxiety is that one might end up with the same situation as we have in Wales for the next referendum on 3 March. Nobody has been identified as the official no side of the argument, so there will be no public money for either no or yes, because if there is not an official no campaign there cannot be an official yes campaign.

[Mr Lidington]

The regulations for the referendum will be those set out in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. I suggest not that any changes are planned, but that, in accordance with any amendments made to that legislation between now and the date of any future referendum on a European issue under the Bill, the rules for its conduct would change. Today, we propose, however, that, as long as the 2000 Act remains in force in its current form, the rules that apply to it should apply to any referendum held under the auspices of the Bill.

[Emma Reynolds]

On the Minister’s previous point, may I gently suggest that the difference between the alternative vote system and first past the post is that the candidate should receive more than 50% of the vote? So, there is a difference, even if only one candidate is listed. On clause 19, what does he estimate the cost to be of a referendum on any of the Bill’s measures that would trigger a referendum? Given the Government’s slightly confusing messages—they promise not to transfer power to the European Union, as set out in the coalition document, yet they demonstrate their eagerness through the Bill to commit to a referendum when a trigger is in place—will he estimate how many referendums we will have in this Parliament and, therefore, how much of a drain they will be on the Consolidated Fund?

[Mr Lidington]

I really do not know how many times I have to keep repeating this before the Opposition understand: there is a clear pledge in the coalition agreement that the current Government will not, during the lifetime of this Parliament until 2015, agree to a treaty amendment—under either the ordinary or simplified revision procedures—that would transfer competences or powers, as defined in this legislation, from the United Kingdom to the European Union. Therefore, the question does not arise: as the United Kingdom will have the right of veto over any such measure, we are making it clear that we are not going to agree to it. By bringing this legislation into effect, however, we are enacting provisions, to apply during this Parliament, for enhanced parliamentary controls over treaty changes. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made it clear that the proposal on the table for a narrow treaty change under the simplified revision procedure to establish a permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the eurozone countries would, under the 2008 legislation, require simply a resolution in both Houses for it to be ratified by the United Kingdom, but, once this Bill comes into force, primary legislation will be required for that ratification. So as a consequence of this Bill, irrespective of the fact that we do not anticipate agreeing to anything that would require a referendum, there will be enhanced parliamentary control over any promised or hypothetical further treaty change or invocation of one of the passerelle clauses expressly provided for in the Bill.

[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

Of course, the situation is exactly as the Minister says while this coalition Government are in power. However, we are in a fixed-term Parliament and there is no guarantee that this coalition Government will still be the Government, so the additional clauses are there to protect us.

[Mr Lidington]

It is very important that we legislate on the basis that we want to give people the assurance that they have this protection against any future Government choosing to railroad through the transfer of new competences to the European Union institutions without the people being given the right to have their say. Any future Government of any political colour will be taking a pretty massive political risk if they try to rob people of the right to have the final say about the transfer of competences and powers from this country to Brussels. That will be a very powerful deterrent against any future Government being tempted down such a course.

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister said that this Government have no intention of having a referendum because they do not intend to trigger one under their own Bill, thereby proving that the whole Bill, like Z, is an unnecessary letter. Will he now get on to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) about how much a referendum is going to cost?

[Mr Lidington]

On current prices, a referendum, if held on its own, could cost between £80 million and £100 million. If it were combined with other elections on the same day, the figure might well be considerably less. However, these things would have to be calculated in detail at the time. It depends on factors such as whether another election is being held on the same day, so all the apparatus of paying for staff to set up polling stations and to count ballot papers is already being provided for, or it is being done as a one-off solely as a referendum on a European subject.

[Mr David]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

I was trying to respond to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), but I will give way.

[Mr David]

These are very important issues. At a time of austerity, as the Government say, it is of great concern that there is such a lax approach to quite considerable sums. Does the figure that the Minister mentioned include merely funding for the conduct of a referendum, or does it also include the grants to organisations to enable them to put the respective arguments in a referendum?

[Mr Lidington]

I will come back to the hon. Gentleman having taken advice on that point. I would say gently to him, however, that giving the people their say, in the way they would expect, about the transfer of significant powers to act and make policy from this Parliament and this country to Brussels ought to be a high priority for Government expenditure. The reputation, not just of his party but of British politics in general, would have been a lot higher had the previous Government given a higher priority to spending money on the referendum that they had promised on the Lisbon treaty, rather than making a saving on that while spending billions of pounds on other objectives, many of which were of significantly less importance to the people whom we represent.

[Emma Reynolds]

I say gently to the Minister that if he goes back and reads our manifesto commitment, he will find that we promised a referendum on the constitutional treaty. If he asks his officials, with whom I was working at the time—

[The Chairman]

Order. We are getting carried away and are drifting. I am sure that the Minister wants to get back to the point.

[Mr Lidington]

I will leave it to the hon. Lady to try to explain that distinction on the doorstep.

The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) asked about expenditure authorised by clause 13. We have to understand the distinction between an authority to spend, which is what we are debating, and what the level of any expenditure should be. If we did not have the authorising power, as set out in clause 19, the Electoral Commission would simply not be able, without going ultra vires, to promote public awareness of a referendum or the subject matter of a referendum. The Electoral Commission, like any other Department or organisation funded by the taxpayer, has a budget that is set through negotiation with the relevant Departments and the Treasury, and it will have to make provision from within that budget. If it really feels that it needs more, it will have to come back to the Government to seek agreement for a supplementary authorisation for additional spending, in the way that such things are usually provided for. We are debating a power under the clause for the Electoral Commission lawfully to spend money on a particular set of objectives, and nothing more.

[Chris Bryant]

Rather unfortunately, the Minister unpicked my support for the clause in the speech that he just made. He is right that this is the only point at which Members will decide how much should be spent on referendums, should they come into play. As he said, the rules on elections and referendums are set out in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act. The Government may wish to change some of those elements in the future, but Members will never consider this element of funding again. The moment that the Government want to have a referendum, they will have one and we will not have an opportunity to decide the cost of it.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that a major reason for holding a referendum on the same day as the local elections in England, the Assembly elections in Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Scottish Parliament election is the saving of some £30 million. I am not quite sure how that matches with the figures that the Minister gave for the cost of a stand-alone referendum. I wonder whether the Foreign Office is operating on slightly different figures from those of the Cabinet Office, which are being advanced by the Deputy Prime Minister.

I say to the Minister that to propose a Bill that provides no assurance that the financial sense of holding a referendum will be considered, and that provides only for the ideological sense of having a referendum to be considered, is a failing. As an example, I will give a failing of the previous Labour Government. There will be a referendum on new powers for the Welsh Assembly on 3 March. I have knocked on a lot of doors in the Rhondda recently, and I have been hard-pressed to find a single person who knows that the referendum is taking place. I suspect that very few people will take part in it. I know what machinations led to the provision in the Government of Wales Act 2006 that has put us in that situation, but I am unsure whether it is a good use of public money constantly to go to voters in referendums. I would have thought that a Government who wanted to get the best value for money, especially in a time of austerity, would want to have a value-for-money test as part of the decision about whether there should be a referendum. My anxiety is that there will be referendums on piddling matters, because lawyers will force them to happen. That will cause significant cost to the Government and no actual benefit to voters, who will effectively vote by not voting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend has essentially made my point for me again. As you are looking quizzical, Mr Hoyle, there is no need for me to detain the House longer. [Interruption.] No, it is quizzical, honestly. Well, it certainly is now, even if it was not a few seconds ago. I look forward to hearing the Minister explain why there is no provision in the Bill for a value-for-money test before there is a referendum.

[Mr Lidington]

First, to make the record absolutely clear, I say to the hon. Members for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) and for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) that the former was right to correct me about the way in which votes would be counted in the somewhat unlikely event of a by-election. In effect, it would be an alternative vote election but with just one candidate from each party. The candidates would be numbered, so the question of a tie, to which the hon. Gentleman drew my attention, would not arise. I am grateful to both hon. Members for their interventions, which have made it certain that we have got the correct facts on the record. I am sure that in the hypothetical case of a by-election being called, they will find the Hansard record of these exchanges very helpful.

To respond to the point that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) made about finance, the detailed financial provision for any referendum would be made in the Bill authorising that referendum. When we debated earlier clauses, I explained that there would need to be primary legislation for that purpose—I think it would almost certainly be part of the Act of Parliament to ratify a treaty change.

I believe that there is simply disagreement between the hon. Gentleman and me about that matter. I take the view that we should have a referendum when the question to be determined is significant enough in principle to require it. We have laid out in detail in the Bill the changes to European treaties, and the transfers of decisions from unanimity to qualified majority voting, that we think are of such constitutional or political importance that a referendum of the British people should be required before any Government could decide to accept them not just for their own term of office but permanently and, in the eyes of many in the EU, irrevocably.

The problem with introducing a measure such as a value-for-money test is that it opens up a wide area of discretion for the Government of the day, who could say, “Well, this decision might be of legal and constitutional importance, but frankly, the costs involved do not justify all the trouble of asking people to come out and vote and they aren’t really interested anyway.” That way of thinking is part of what got Europe into the democratic deficit in which it is now trapped. There is a gulf of mistrust between voters and the political elites who govern them in far too many European countries, each of which has proud democratic traditions. We see that in this country in how Parliament is regarded—it is not just down to the EU; it is down to all sorts of other things as well. Such a measure would be another element in that deficit.

Allowing people to have the final say over decisions that are important to the future of their country is one way to remedy that deficit. I think it better to define the circumstances in which that will happen in legislation, as we have done with the Bill, than to leave it to the discretion and judgment of Ministers, who might decide on the ground of public interest or of value for money. For that reason, I prefer our approach.

[Chris Bryant]

The fact that the Minister and I disagree on this matter or on the Bill is no great revelation. Even his private office might have worked that out. He gave the game away a bit when he said that the matter of principle is that one must give the people the right to decide when the transfer of power is sufficiently significant, but significance is not an absolute but a comparator. That is my problem.

The Bill provides for the addition of a new MEP. Will he assure the House that there is no need to provide for a situation in which that MEP, having been appointed, decides to leave or unfortunately dies? Will that seat simply be gathered up in the normal process of by-elections?

[Mr Lidington]

The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. The normal processes for filling a vacancy in the European Parliament would apply in those circumstances too.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Lidington]

The clause provides that the Bill extends to the whole United Kingdom. The subject matter of the Bill is reserved to the Westminster Parliament and it contains no provisions that fall within the terms of the Sewel convention, or that would require any legislative consent motions in respect of the devolved legislatures. In any case, I can confirm to the Committee that the devolved Administrations were consulted on the Bill prior to its introduction, and are content with its provisions.

Part 2 of the Bill, which provides for the implementation of the transitional protocol on MEPs, also extends to Gibraltar, because the people of Gibraltar, as has already been mentioned, participate in UK elections to the European Parliament. Where clauses 20, 21 and 22 touch on part 2, they also extend to Gibraltar.

As I made clear early in Committee, and as you would certainly expect of me, Mr Hoyle, I have discussed the approach taken in the Bill with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar. He has made it clear that he approves of our approach, in terms of both the application of part 2 to Gibraltar, and the provisions in part 1 that ensure that the people of Gibraltar can participate in any referendum that is held when a treaty change affects them by virtue of our membership of the EU and the UK’s Act of Accession.

[Mr David]

I am pleased that the Minister has gone out of his way to emphasise that there has been consultation and agreement with Gibraltar—I am sure that you, Mr Hoyle, will be especially pleased about that. However, will the Minister clarify further what consultation there has been with the devolved Administrations? I am thinking of the Scottish Parliament and Executive in particular, because I noted in evidence submitted to the European Scrutiny Committee that concern was expressed that elements of the Bill might impinge upon devolved areas. Certainly, when the evidence was submitted, those concerned were not entirely satisfied that the Government had taken that fully into account. Will he give a cast-iron commitment—if I can use that phrase—that there has been consultation, and that all parties are happy?

[Mr Lidington]

Yes, we consulted the devolved Administrations in 2010, at the same time as final policy approval was sought from Departments. The text of the Bill was circulated to the devolved Administrations as soon as it had been drafted and was available for circulation in Whitehall. We have tried to keep them as much in the picture as possible and as soon as was practical. As the hon. Gentleman will understand, the Government took office in May last year, and arranging policy clearance and then the drafting of the Bill has been an intensive piece of work. However, I do not think that the devolved Administrations have been treated in any way unfairly. I have assured them that the Government remain completely committed to what the Prime Minister has termed the “respect agenda”, and that we are committed to honouring in full the various memorandums of understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom and the devolved Administrations. I am happy to make clear that commitment once again.

[Chris Bryant]

I am afraid that it was the words “the respect agenda” that turned my stomach and made me get to my feet suddenly. My experience of the Government thus far, in relation to other constitutional developments, has been that the respect agenda has been more honoured in its breach. To be fair, however, the Foreign Office has discussed the matter openly and fairly with the Governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to ensure that the legislation might suit their needs. However, there might be some areas—particularly in relation to the different legal system in Scotland—where, although it might not feel like the UK Government have surrendered a power in negotiations in Brussels, it might feel more like they have in Scotland. At those moments, the people of Scotland might say, “We want a referendum, because we do not like what you are doing”, while the Government and Parliament might not think that there is any need to do so.

I want to make a second point about Gibraltar. We have all referred, Mr Hoyle, to your personal interest in Gibraltar, and I bow at that altar as well. The Minister used a particular phrase that seemed like it had been crafted very carefully through the decades by Foreign Office mandarins. Having used such phrases before myself, I wonder whether it might not help were the Minister to unpack it. I think he said that the people of Gibraltar would be allowed to vote in a referendum where they are affected by a measure. I do not know how one would determine whether Gibraltar has been affected. I am not sure whether the Minister is being too clever by half, or whether I am being too foolish by half, but I am sure that he will enlighten us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

Let me deal with Gibraltar first. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will recall from when he had responsibility for such matters, Gibraltar is part of the European Union, but it is not subject to all of the acquis. Therefore, the referendum will extend to Gibraltar where the treaty amendment, passerelle clause or article 48(6) decision concerned affects an area of European Union competence that covers it. If the proposed treaty change dealt with an area of competence from which Gibraltar was completely excluded, it would not take part in the referendum.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

I can feel a peroration coming on, so I just want to check something to do with Gibraltar. Notwithstanding the remarks that the Minister has made, clause 11(1)(c) refers to who gets to vote

“if the referendum is also held in Gibraltar,”

but who decides whether the referendum is held there? Would that have to be laid out in the Bill that was implementing the individual referendum in question?

[Mr Lidington]

No, it would be a matter of treaty and law. I refer the hon. Gentleman to clauses 2(2)(a) and 3(2)(a). They provide for the circumstances relating to whether a referendum on whether a treaty should be ratified should be held throughout the UK—“or”, and this is the important provision,

“where the treaty affects Gibraltar, throughout the United Kingdom and Gibraltar”.

The referendum will extend to Gibraltar where the treaty matter that is subject to the referendum is a matter that includes Gibraltar. If it is a treaty matter from which Gibraltar is excepted, the referendum will not include the people of Gibraltar.

[Chris Bryant]

So why does clause 20 not say that the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom and Gibraltar?

[Mr Lidington]

Because the provisions for Gibraltar are laid out in clauses 2 and 3, as I have explained.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Commencement

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 15, page 12, line 12, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

‘(3) The day appointed under subsection (2) shall be within one month of the day on which this Act is passed.’.

Under clause 21, certain provisions will come into force quickly, while others will do so at a later date. Clause 15 will come in straight away, as will part 3, which includes clause 18, the sovereignty clause. The amendment would bring in the whole Bill all at once within one month of its passing through all relevant stages. I know that my right hon. Friend the Minister has said elsewhere that it is the Government’s intention for the entire Bill to come into force within two months of Royal Assent. I am giving my right hon. Friend an opportunity to say a few more words about the clause, and I am sure that he will be able to deal with it as comprehensively as he has just dealt with the many points put to him by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). All those points were put to bed and I am sure that he will put this point to bed in the same way.

[Mr Lidington]

The Bill radically changes how the UK approaches the consideration of future key decisions on the European Union. It is therefore right that the provisions of this legislation should be applied as soon as possible after Royal Assent. It is also right that any treaty change currently being considered should be examined through the prism of this legislation. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and I have all made it clear that the Government’s firm intention is that the provisions will apply to the eurozone treaty change, which is expected to be agreed at EU level at the spring European Council.

Under the usual arrangements, the provisions of Acts of Parliament enter into force, unless otherwise stated, two months after Royal Assent. This Bill, however, has a slightly different set of provisions when it comes to commencement. Clause 21 makes provision for the Bill’s entry into force; subsection (1) provides for clause 15 and part 3 to come into force on the day of Royal Assent.

Clause 15 allows our country to be able to ratify the transitional protocol on MEPs as soon as possible, and two months earlier than we would otherwise have been able to. Article 2 of the MEP protocol stated that it should be in place, if possible, on 1 December 2010. At the moment, it looks unlikely that we will be the last member state to ratify that transitional protocol, but I would want us to be in a position where, if it turned out that we were bringing up the rear, there would be no delay and we would be able to bring our ratification into effect and allow the provisions of the protocol to take effect immediately after Royal Assent. We thus consider early commencement of that part of the Bill to be appropriate in order to reduce the delay and ensure that early commencement of the provision would not have any undue or adverse effects.

Clause 21(2) enables the Bill’s other provisions to be brought into force by one or more commencement orders made by the Secretary of State, and subsection 3 allows different days to be appointed for different purposes. The subsections were intended to give the Government the flexibility to bring the remaining provisions into force earlier—I emphasise the word “earlier”—than might otherwise have been the case, but we did not fix back in November, when we introduced the Bill, the date on which the provisions would enter into force. We allowed for flexibility so that individual parts could be brought into force at times that would maximise the Bill’s effectiveness.

Amendment 15 aims to ensure that all parts of the Bill are in force within one month of Royal Assent. I entirely understand the wish of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) to ensure that the Bill is in force as soon as possible, and I share his enthusiasm, but I hope I can persuade him that his amendment is not necessary. As we have already made clear, the Government have a firm commitment to use the Bill’s provisions for any future treaty change, not least the forthcoming eurozone treaty change. Because of the timing of that change, Parliament will have two bites at the cherry. Under the 2008 Act introduced by our predecessors, it will have a vote before the March European Council; it will then have to consider a Bill under the provisions in this Bill. We introduced Government amendment 56 precisely to ensure that this Bill could apply to the eurozone treaty change.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend is giving a very helpful explanation, but can he tell me which parts of the Bill will cover the proposed eurozone treaty change, whether or not the Bill is in force? As he has said, it does not matter whether it is in force or not, because the Government will abide by its terms regardless of whether it has been commenced.

[Mr Lidington]

All relevant parts of the Bill would apply to the treaty change. The Minister responsible would have to make a formal statement setting out whether the change transferred competences or powers—as defined in the legislation—to the European Union and therefore triggered a referendum, or whether it fell into one of the exempt categories.

As my hon. Friend knows, the Government believe that the treaty amendment that is now being considered applies only to the eurozone. It does not transfer any competences or powers from the United Kingdom to Brussels, and therefore, although primary legislation would be required for its ratification, a referendum would not be required. However, under this Bill we will require the Minister to set out his argument in the detail that we would expect to be demanded in relation to any other treaty change proposal.

There would then need to be primary legislation for the United Kingdom to ratify the treaty change. Although it does not affect the United Kingdom directly, it must be ratified by all 27 member states in order to take effect. It is therefore important for Parliament to have the right to examine the implications of the change in detail. We consider that primary legislation represents a better, more democratic approach than the simple debate on a resolution which is all that is provided for the ratification of such a change under the 2008 Act.

Clause 21 allows for flexibility to introduce provisions in the Bill at different times if required. I can assure my hon. Friend, on behalf of the Government, that we will lay an order to ensure the commencement of all the provisions that are not already in force by then one month after Royal Assent. We want to ensure that Parliament and the public are able to exercise the new rights that the Bill gives over EU decision-making as soon as possible. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the assurances that he seeks, and that I can therefore persuade him to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David]

I should like to say a few words about the clause. The whole issue of when the Bill comes into effect causes us some concern, because it has been our contention from the start of our deliberations that the Bill is essentially window dressing. It is not an attempt to introduce genuine participation and accountability, but is instead, as a Minister has said, a rather crude attempt to tie future Governments.

Certainly, in terms of parliamentary scrutiny, I welcome what the Minister has said today and previously. Logically, many of things that the Government have announced in the Bill and in recent written statements are to be welcomed. We are firmly in favour of as much parliamentary accountability and involvement as practicable. Indeed, that was the whole tenor of the Opposition’s amendment at the start of our Committee deliberations. However, it worries me that we still have the important issue of the justice and home affairs opt-ins, particularly the European Court of Justice provisions, which will have to be considered during this Parliament. The Minister has been absolutely firm in his determination to ensure that although we will have additional scrutiny considerations regarding whatever a Government may decide to do, there will not be a referendum on this extremely important issue. These matters worry us greatly, because we contend that there is a certain amount of illogicality in the Bill. It is contradictory, it does not hold together and there is not a great deal of intellectual sense behind it. That is clearly illustrated by the whole issue of the ECJ opt-in provisions.

If the Government were true to their rhetoric, they would insist that the legislation would be introduced and that a referendum would be held during this Parliament if they decided to opt into those provisions, as some suggest they would like. That is why the whole issue of when different parts of the Bill commence and have legal effect is of tremendous importance. I want to register and reinforce the Opposition’s concern that the Government are approaching this matter in what we consider to be a totally ham-fisted way.

[Mr Lidington]

I shall be brief. I think the hon. Gentleman has a bit of a nerve. It was actually the Government whom he supported and served who agreed to the treaty that collapsed the third pillar, which communitised justice and home affairs, bringing those areas of policy under European Court of Justice jurisdiction when previously they had been intergovernmental. As we debated last week, we have as a Government announced that we shall be discussing with the scrutiny Committees and others the ways in which we can strengthen parliamentary scrutiny over justice and home affairs and give greater accountability of the Government to Parliament for those decisions.

We have said publicly, on the record, that the decision that must be made by 2014 on whether to opt out of or remain party to the pre-Lisbon corpus of justice and home affairs measures will be subject to a debate and to a vote in each House of Parliament. The previous Government made no provision for such an arrangement. They were content for the 2014 decision, which the hon. Gentleman now describes as of great magnitude, to be subject simply to the normal scrutiny provisions and for the Committee to determine whether to call it in for debate. I note that, despite all the hon. Gentleman’s strictures about there being no need for this Bill, he did not suggest that a hypothetical future Labour Government would seek to repeal the legislation. He knows the penalty that would accrue to any political party that tried to deny the people the democratic rights that they are being given under the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Priti Patel]

I thank the hon. Lady for her contribution. I entirely agree. The air needs to be cleared, and the British public naturally feel upset and uneasy about that. The issue is a sensitive one, hence the need for greater openness and transparency.

I ask the Minister to consider the points that I have made—fundamentally, the issue of openness and transparency. We have handed away far too many powers. The Bill is about the future, and I would welcome the Minister’s views.

[Mr Lidington]

The new clause moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel) raises important issues, and it is right that we should devote some time and attention to her arguments today. I share a large number of the concerns that she expressed, and I welcome her wish to see much more transparency and clarity in the way in which the European Union operates. Having said that, I shall argue that the method proposed by my hon. Friend in her probing amendment is not necessarily the best one to secure those objectives. I shall deal with the main components of the new clause in turn and explain why, although I share many of her concerns, I do not think that the proposal as drafted is the best vehicle to deliver those goals.

Let us look first at how to police the boundaries of European competence. I share the anxiety expressed by my hon. Friend, and I believe that this is the mischief that subsection (2)(b) of new clause 7 is intended to address. That subsection requires that a list of any powers or competences transferred from the UK to the EU under the terms of the treaties in the previous 12 months, which have or have not received specific authorisation under any provisions of part 1 of the Bill, be included in the annual report.

The treaty position is clear. A competence should be transferred from the UK to the EU only if there is a treaty or treaty amendment unanimously agreed by all member states using the ordinary revision procedure, whereby we have a continuing power of veto. Power, as defined in the Bill, is changing the treaty to give an EU institution or body the power to impose a requirement or obligation on the UK, to impose sanctions on the UK, or to abolish what are defined in the Bill as significant vetoes.

Given that those changes to competence or power are covered by the referendum lock as set out in the Bill, there ought to be no possibility of the need for any entries at all in the report under subsection (2)(b) because competence cannot lawfully be transferred by any other means. What lies behind my hon. Friend’s argument, I think, is a concern that competence may be extended in ways other than formal treaty change.

It is important to try to distinguish the issues. There are cases where the EU has competence—we may argue about whether it ought to have such competence, but that competence has been granted by one or other of the previous treaties—but where the UK has particular views about how the European Union should legislate on the basis of that competence. We may believe that a particular measure is unjustified on grounds of subsidiarity, or that the costs of a particular measure are disproportionate to the benefits being claimed.

I offer the Committee an example. We do not dispute that the EU has competence to legislate on the terms and conditions for pregnant workers, but we have very strong views about the content of the particular proposal that is on the table, and we successfully built firm opposition in the Council to the European Parliament’s approach, which has effectively brought those negotiations to a standstill. At heart, that is not a matter of competence; it is a matter of policy. Those matters are debated carefully in the discussions about negotiating strategies that take place in the European Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, and they are also covered in the explanatory memorandums that we as a Government submit to Parliament.

There are other areas where there are concerns about whether a Commission proposal for new EU legislation or action oversteps the boundaries of existing EU competence. Again, the Government rigorously assess every proposal coming out of Brussels to ensure that it falls within the scope of competence and that the treaty base put forward by the Commission is justified. To give another example, we have been rigorous in asserting our position with regard to matters to do with the EU’s external competence.

Let us look at the External Action Service and consular work. We have firmly restated the treaty position that the EAS has no formal role in consular work, and should support it only by facilitating co-operation and the co-ordination of member states’ actions. The competence for consular functions remains with member states. We have made it clear to Baroness Ashton and to the Commission that we would oppose Commission proposals for the EAS to have a direct role in providing consular assistance or in any other way seek to expand the institutions’ role beyond the competences set out in the treaty.

As a further example, at the Cancun UN conference on climate change, we insisted on prior agreement on when the presidency and the Commission would be authorised to represent the position of the member states, and the forms of words that they would use when doing so. We did that in order to safeguard the position that competence remained with the member states and had not been given exclusively to the institutions of the European Union. In the last resort, if we considered that a proposal went beyond the competence of the EU, we would challenge it during the legislative process and, if necessary, at the European Court of Justice.

One of the reasons I hesitate to endorse an annual report is that I think what the Government should be doing is to make clear their views on competence as they affect particular measures whenever those measures are brought forward. If we adopted the proposed annual report, there would be a risk of Whitehall saying, “Let’s wait for the 12 months to elapse for the annual report.” My hon. Friend will probably have received some parliamentary answers; when I was a free spirit, I used to get parliamentary answers saying that the information would not be made available now, but if I wanted to hang on for six months, it would be made available in that Department’s annual report, or when a promised review was published. I would not like us to get into that situation with regard to these matters.

I have asked that every explanatory memorandum sent to Parliament should not simply state what legal base the Commission has given to it, but give some assessment of the suitability of that legal base.

We need to be much more forward-looking and smarter. Right across Whitehall, we must pay more attention to the Commission’s forward work programme, so that we can identify up front any potential issues of concern over competence creep at an early stage, preferably even before the publication of a proposed directive or other measure. That is the way forward for continuing work in government to scrutinise every proposal on competence grounds, and much more openness and activity in Parliament as well.

[Emma Reynolds]

In the interests of transparency and openness, which the hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) spoke so eloquently about, why do the Government not consider reintroducing the pre-European Council debates that used to take place in the House?

[Mr Lidington]

Because those debates were explicitly transferred from the Government to the Backbench Business Committee when it was established, along with responsibility for a number of other debates which had previously been held in Government time. The report that recommended that transfer was adopted unanimously in the House, with the support of the Labour party as well as that of Conservative Members.

[Mr Bone]

The Minister is exactly right on that point. I have the privilege of sitting on the Backbench Business Committee, and we always look forward to representations on the European issue. The Committee can bring a motion to the House, rather than just a general debate, and force the Government to do something.

[Mr Lidington]

Indeed. My hon. Friend is not exactly averse to opportunities to debate the EU. For hon. Members on both sides of the House who feel that there needs to be a debate on the Commission’s work programme or any aspect of that, the way forward is to ask the Backbench Business Committee to use the time allotted to them for consideration of those matters.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

The Minister mentioned competence about a hundred times in his remarks, quite rightly, but subsection (3)(b) of the new clause mentions a cost-benefit analysis of the impact of any decisions made. Will the Minister address that point? Will Her Majesty’s Government at any point undertake a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of our membership of the EU?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend pre-empts me, because I am about to come on to the question of cost-benefit analysis. I very much agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Witham that the EU has to provide much better value for money. The Government are clear that the EU needs to change and can do things a lot better than it does at present. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has argued in the House and elsewhere that the EU cannot be immune to the budgetary realities that every member state Government in the EU and every family in the EU has to face. That is why it was the Prime Minister and this country that led the process to ensure that the 2011 EU budget did not grow in line with the unacceptable demands of the Commission and the European Parliament, and why at the end of last year the Prime Minister secured the important principle that over the next financial perspective the EU budget should reflect the consolidation efforts being made by Governments right across the EU.

[James Wharton (Stockton South) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that this is not just about value for money within the EU as a body and the way it functions, but about the impact on value for money across all that Government do and across our society as a whole of the measures implemented by the EU? We talk about what appears to be mission creep from the EU, which we often see when competences are used in an elastic manner to drive forward new centralised European policies. Will the Minister please make a statement on ensuring that we look for value for money in how they are implemented as well?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. The Government seek to ensure that there is much better value for money and a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis of measures at the EU level, and to apply those same principles to the transposition of European legislation into our own domestic arrangements. I suspect that hon. Members on both sides of the House will have been familiar in the past with European legislation that has all sorts of gold-plated extras that add to the cost and complexity that businesses or voluntary organisations face when the legislation reaches its final form here, usually by way of statutory instrument.

My hon. Friend the Member for Witham rightly says that we must ensure that the EU too addresses this challenge, and we are going about that in a number of ways. First, we are working with like-minded European partners to encourage smarter regulation by applying more rigorous use of evidence in the EU. We welcome the Commission’s smart regulation communication, published in October 2010, which set out a four-year strategy to reduce the regulatory burden of EU legislation on business. That communication reflected a number of this country’s priorities, including further strengthening of the impact assessment process and post-evaluation adjustment of laws.

We need to see much more progress on impact assessment. The Commission has a commitment to produce impact assessments for all its proposals, but, to be honest, the quality is variable and we continue to press for improvements. The Parliament and the Council do not have a routine commitment even to produce impact assessments as a matter of course, and we believe that those two institutions should be doing that as well. It is now a fact of life that most areas of European law-making involve the European Parliament as a more or less equal partner with the Council of Ministers. That means that on a number of important measures, for example on employment matters and other pieces of social regulation, the Council might agree a position and then the Parliament can choose to vote through measures that introduce greater costs that industry has to bear.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does not the Minister understand that we do not want better impact assessments, but less regulation? How will the Government deliver their very good one-in, one-out policy on regulation if they cannot stop the torrent of regulation that is still pouring out of Brussels now that it is occupying the whole of the financial services field, for example?

[Mr Lidington]

We have to do both. The two are not alternatives. Impact assessments are valuable, and they focus the minds of other European Governments, and of the groups representing industry in those member states, to become more active in pressing home their interests than is sometimes the case at the moment. The more transparency that we get in the European legislative process, the more likely it is that we will move towards the objective that both my right hon. Friend and I seek.

I would share with my right hon. Friend a wish to see the EU legislate less. There is too often a culture in the Commission that identifies a problem and then seeks a remedy in the form of new law. Non-legislative measures can often be more effective, and certainly less burdensome and complex, than legislative measures. That is something that my colleagues across Government are pursuing with colleagues from other countries who share our views on this matter, and we seek to encourage other countries to work with us to look for non-legislative ways of addressing problems and challenges, rather than looking for a new directive as the first resort every time.

[Mrs Main]

An impact assessment may work on EU law, but what about the gold-plating that goes on when the law is already passed; we seem to add to it in reams in this country?

[Mr Lidington]

That has certainly been a genuine problem, and it is a priority for the Reducing Regulation Committee, chaired by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, to address. The Government now have an established policy not to gold-plate. When we implement European legislation, we will be certain to do no more than is required of us by the words of the legislation. Ministers are now under an agreed political obligation to resist any attempt from within their Departments to add extra bells and whistles to what is required of us by a directive. We should do what our competitors and partners in Europe are doing and no more.

[Mr Shepherd]

I applaud the Minister’s aspirational words, but those of us who have been here as long as he has have heard them said so many times. It is an old song, and yet nothing is ever resolved on the issue. Why is he confident that action will now follow those same old words?

[Mr Lidington]

I am confident because of what I see and hear when dealing with Ministers from other European Governments who have woken up to the scale of the competitive challenge that Europe faces from other regions of the world. When one talks with Ministers from Germany, Scandinavia, much of central and eastern Europe and even France, which has historically had a different approach to business and trade than we have had, one realises that there is a real fear that we are facing not only a difficult economic downturn and an ongoing economic crisis, with high unemployment across our continent, but a profound, long-term challenge to the competitiveness, and therefore prosperity, of our societies. I find Ministers from other countries alive to that challenge and so have greater hope that we can make progress than does my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd).

[Mr Douglas Carswell (Clacton) (Con)]

Will the Minister not find that that is precisely the sort of lip service that was paid to reform at the time of the Lisbon agenda more than a decade ago, when Ministers throughout Europe said that they would achieve reform and precisely nothing happened? Have we not been here before and heard that song sung too often?

[Mr Lidington]

The Lisbon agenda was certainly a grievous disappointment, and our chief concern about the Europe 2020 programme is that it will go the same way by being much too concerned with targets and inputs and not looking at competitiveness. However, if we look at the history of this country’s relationship with the EU, we can see how the UK has at key moments helped lead a movement that has changed Europe for the better.

I was teased earlier by Opposition Front Benchers about the impact of the Single European Act, but the creation of the European single market gave opportunities to business and individual workers in this country and in every other member state, and that has helped us to become more competitive and prosperous now than we would have been had Margaret Thatcher and Lord Cockfield not had the vigour and commitment to see it through.

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[Emma Reynolds]

I agree with much of what the Minister has just said, including his comments on the Single European Act and the benefits of the single market, so there is an agreement between the two Front Benches on that. Does he agree with the argument that when European legislation is drafted properly and replaces 27 sets of legislation, for those businesses trading across borders it can actually be a deregulatory measure?

[Mr Lidington]

It is possible for that to happen, but it depends crucially on the content and complexity of the measure. Regulation is not desirable simply because it takes place at a European level and replaced national regulations. It is especially undesirable from the UK’s point of view if a familiar system of regulation that reflects the way we do business is replaced by something modelled on completely different practices from a different member state.

[Mr Carswell]

The Minister sings the virtues of the single market, so will he explain to the Committee why we have had a trade deficit with Europe every year since we joined the single market, whereas before we had a trade surplus? Will he also explain why non-EU states such as China seem to have no difficulty in gaining market access without having signed up to many of the regulations he supports?

[Mr Lidington]

I am sorry that my hon. Friend seems to regard Margaret Thatcher as having sold out to Europe when she agreed to the single market. I ask him to talk to UK businesses, as he will find that they regard the single European market as a great boon. It was the combination of the UK being in the single European market and at the same time offering the best deal, with regard to regulation and low taxes, that led the UK, under the Conservative Government that he and I supported, to attract the lion’s share of foreign direct inward investment into the entire EU.

[Mr Hollobone]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

I will give way, but I am conscious that we have another important new clause to debate and do not want to get drawn too far away from this new clauses’s content.

[Mr Hollobone]

We will have plenty of time to enjoy ourselves with that this evening. The Minister is stressing the benefits, as he sees them, of our membership of the EU, so I will return to the point I made some moment ago: why will Her Majesty’s Government not undertake a comprehensive audit of the costs and benefits of our EU membership?

[Mr Lidington]

There are some elements of EU membership that could be put into such a calculus, but we cannot measure, in the way my hon. Friend wishes, things such as the diplomatic leverage that we obtain by being able to work in partnership with other European countries. [Hon. Members: “No!”] Some will differ from me in that analysis, but the fact that we were active members of the European Union helped us to achieve a package of sanctions against the Iranian nuclear programme last year that was tougher and more effective than either the United States or the Government of Iran believed possible. We were there at the table, so we were able to exert a powerful influence, in partnership with others, in the defence and enhancement of our national interest in securing sanctions against that programme, and we were able to overcome opposition from a number of other member states that weighed in the balance some very big commercial interests in Iran. That sort of advantage does not lend itself easily to the calculation that my hon. Friend invites me to make.

There are all sorts of things wrong with the EU as well, and we can find other occasions to debate its flaws, but the Government’s position is that membership of the European Union is one of the key ways in which we seek to advance the United Kingdom’s influence in the world.

[Mr David]

The right hon. Gentleman makes some very important points, but would it not be far better if he spent time talking, as he has, about the benefits of the European Union, rather than about this stupid, nonsensical Bill?

[Mr Lidington]

I do not regard as insignificant or risible giving the people of the United Kingdom a final say over treaty changes that transfer new powers and competences from this Parliament to Brussels. We would have much more public confidence in politics, and a much better chance of positively putting the case for British membership of the European Union, if the public did not feel so betrayed by the absence of any endorsement, by means of a referendum, of past treaty changes.

On new clause 7, which my hon. Friend the Member for Witham moved, my response to our hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) indicates why some of what it seeks is not suitable. Subsection (2)(a), for example, would require a report on

“any statements in the previous 12 months under section 5”—

both the statement about whether such a treaty or decision transfers power or competence, and the statement on whether any transfer under Clause 4(1)(i) or (j) is significant.

It would not be onerous to include that requirement in an annual report, but there are unlikely to be so many treaties or decisions in any one year, so there would not be any real value in that information being collected and set out in an annual report. Under the Bill, there will be a minimum requirement for a written ministerial statement and an Act of Parliament before any such measures can be agreed, and that seems to represent sufficient transparency.

On repatriation, I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Witham, who put her argument very powerfully and cogently. She knows that, under the coalition agreement, the Government are committed to examining the existing balance of competences and what they mean for Britain, and we continue to look at that issue.

The new clause raises some very important issues, and I welcome my hon. Friend’s aims of seeking much better value for money, more transparency and vigilance against competence creep within the European Union. Those matters are not for the Bill, however, which deals with treaty changes and ratchet clauses transferring powers or competences to the EU. We need to focus immediately on the individual issues to which she refers, measure by measure, as they arise in the Commission or as individual items of legislation, rather than taking up time preparing retrospective reports that I fear would be of largely historical interest.

What is relevant and important to the work of Ministers throughout Whitehall is for the Government to pursue with Parliament ways in which we can improve the scrutiny of EU issues and the opportunities for Parliament to hold Ministers to account for their stewardship of the United Kingdom’s interests in European discussions. I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw her new clause.

[Priti Patel]

I thank the Minister for his response to my new clause. I shall say a few words, because a number of issues arose in his reply.

There is a range of issues that clearly must be aired and discussed—that was the purpose of my new clause—in relation to competence creep and the ever-increasing powers that have been sucked away to Europe over the years. The Minister has a valid point about the proposed report being more retrospective, and if nothing else his assurances about the role of this House and Parliament in the scrutiny not just of legislation but items as they arise, and about the forward-look in terms of the Commission’s work programme, are absolutely vital. As we heard in the earlier debate, a number of assiduous Members will continue to bring those issues to the Floor of the House, to pursue them and to persist with them.

I intend to withdraw my new clause, but my final point to the Minister is about cost-benefit analysis, which is fundamental. The Government could still do a lot more to assure the British public that their hard-earned money was being spent more effectively when it comes to EU matters. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 11

Provision for further referendum

‘In order to meet the referendum condition referred to in section 2, section 3 and section 6 of this Act, the Act providing for the approval of—

(a) a treaty under the terms of section 2; or

(b) a decision under the terms of section 3; or

(c) a decision or draft decision under section 6

shall also provide for a further binding referendum to be held on continuing United Kingdom membership of the European Union, if the majority of those voting in a referendum held under the terms of the relevant section are opposed to the ratification of the treaty, decision or draft decision, as the case may be.’.—(Mr Bone.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

That is a problem for the governing parties. They must decide whether to support new clause 11. I obviously hope that they will not support it, because I believe that the strength of our country and our democracy is that such decisions are made here in the House of Commons—things are not decided by offshore proprietors, pornographers or others with very large cheque books.

[Mr Lidington]

This has been a passionate debate. Although I am unable to accept new clause 11 on behalf of the Government, I admire the integrity, commitment and, as others have said, the parliamentary ingenuity, of my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone). As befits somebody who is assiduous in his attendance and fierce in his affection for, and loyalty to, the House of Commons as an institution, he has gone through the rule book and explored parliamentary procedure to ensure that an issue about which he cares so strongly has ample time for debate on the Floor of the Committee.

I want to do my hon. Friend justice by responding in detail on his proposal on its merits. The difficulty is not simply that new clause 11 seeks to do something that is not within the scope of the Bill as the Government have framed it, but that it raises a number of important political questions.

[Mr Bone]

On a point of order, Ms Primarolo. Could you correct me if I am wrong? If new clause 11 was not within the scope of the Bill, we would not have been allowed to debate it today.

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dawn Primarolo)]

You are correct, Mr Bone, that for a new clause to be selected, it must be in order. The Minister probably did not quite mean what he said.

[Mr Lidington]

I qualified my statement, Ms Primarolo, by saying, “as the Government have framed the Bill”. The intended purpose of the Bill is to provide both additional parliamentary scrutiny and the ultimate sanction of a public referendum on decisions that would transfer powers and competences from this country to the EU. The Government’s purpose was not to provide for the sort of additional referendum that my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough seeks. It is indeed a tribute to his parliamentary skill that he has found a way, within order, to seek to address that issue.

[The Second Deputy Chairman]

Good say, Minister. The proposed new clause is in order. Whether the Government actually like it or think that it should be in the Bill is the purpose of this debate. I think we have clarified that now.

[Mr Lidington]

I am perfectly happy to abide by your ruling on that, Ms Primarolo.

[Mr David]

I do not wish to intrude upon private grief among Conservative Members, but I agree with you absolutely, Ms Primarolo, and you are absolutely correct that there is no question of the proposal being out of order.

The Minister gave a very interesting summation of the Bill, but he did not mention one crucial aspect of it. He did not say that referendums will not apply in this Parliament.

[Mr Lidington]

Assuming that the Bill gains parliamentary approval and Royal Assent in the normal way, it will apply during this Parliament from the time when it comes into effect. As I said earlier today, one illustration of that is that the treaty change proposed by Germany and being taken through EU institutions at the moment will have to be ratified by primary legislation rather than simply by a resolution of both Houses, as would be the case under the current legislation, which was introduced by the previous Government in 2008. What distinguishes this Parliament is that the Government have said, as part of their coalition agreement, that we do not intend to agree at European level to any proposal to amend the treaties or invoke passarelle clauses that would require a referendum under the terms of the legislation that we have been debating for a numbers of days now.

The referendums authorised under the Bill are intended to be final decisions. They will give people the opportunity to judge whether a particular proposal to give new powers to the European Union is in the national interest. One of the things that is troubling about the new clause is that it implicitly assumes that those who vote no to a particular proposition also want to challenge the UK’s membership of the EU, but I do not think that that can be taken for granted. As other hon. Members have said, there is a risk that some people could be influenced in how they vote on the substance of a proposal by a calculation of whether it would be likely to produce the end result of an in/out referendum. Such electors might take into account his or her views on the in/out proposal and not just the pros and cons of the measure on which they are being invited to cast a vote.

I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough overlooks the problem of a possible succession of referendums on Britain’s membership of the EU. It is possible to imagine that under a future Government—not this one—referendums on moving to qualified majority voting for common foreign and security policy and on joining the euro might be scheduled for two successive years. The new clause would leave open the possibility of an in/out referendum after one—or, indeed, both—of those referendums, because under his new clause a rejection of the first proposition would trigger an in/out referendum, which might result in the public deciding to stay in the EU. A second referendum on a treaty change might come forward 12 months later and also be rejected, and then, in the course of less than a year, we would find ourselves with two successive referendums on the UK’s membership of the EU. That is not a sensible way in which to conduct our relationship with the countries of the EU.

Nor does the new clause address what would happen if there were two questions on a ballot paper in one day, which we debated earlier. Why should a positive vote for one treaty change proposition and a negative vote for a second trigger a referendum? One cannot read into how people cast their votes on treaty change proposals what their view would be of the desirability of a referendum on membership. More fundamentally, however, the new clause does not capture the range of opinions held by the British people. The hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey), whom I completely respect on these matters, said that she wanted people to be able to express a view on the direction that the EU was taking. However, that is not what people are being offered through the new clause, of course. They are being offered the opportunity not to express their view on the direction of the EU, but to say whether the UK should remain a member.

[Kate Hoey]

The Minister must know that it is precisely because of the direction of the European Union that people want the opportunity to say that they do not like that direction by withdrawing from the European Union.

[Mr Lidington]

Withdrawing from the European Union is not the only choice for people who are dissatisfied with the current arrangements. There are plenty of people around who want Britain to remain a member of the European Union, but to have certain powers currently exercised in Brussels repatriated to this country. After all, that was the combination of views expressed at the last general election in the Conservative party manifesto, which sought the repatriation of certain powers, but said:

“A Conservative government will play an active and energetic role in the European Union”.