European Union Bill

David Lidington Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

One can therefore see how the entire house of cards comes tumbling down as regards the freedom to indulge in a human negotiation. Let us face it, we are all human—we all know the constraints that can be placed on us if we know that everything that we say and do is, as in this place, taken down and recorded. If negotiations are to mean anything, there has to be an element of freedom within which our elected Governments who represent us on the European stage can conduct themselves. For all those reasons, I oppose what is otherwise a very well-intentioned new clause.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

This has been a genuinely interesting debate which—somewhat unusually for European debates, dare I say it—has developed in a way that I did not altogether anticipate. We started by discussing a new clause dealing with transparency and public and parliamentary access to information concerning European negotiations, but as the debate continued it developed along the broader theme of the adequacy or inadequacy of our current arrangements for the scrutiny of decisions taken by successive Governments of the United Kingdom on behalf of Parliament and people within the institutions of the European Union. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in the debate.

The key choice that has to be borne in mind in considering the proposition put forward in the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) concerns the most effective balance between, on one hand, appropriate access to information that provides the flexibility to allow citizens and other interested parties to see documents that contributed to policy making and, on the other hand, the need to preserve a space for candid, confidential discussion, deliberation and negotiation to ensure the best possible outcome in the interests of our country. I have sympathy for many of the arguments—certainly the motivations—of the hon. Members who tabled the new clause, but I do not think that it would deliver the right balance. I will make my arguments in more detail in due course, but I hope that at the end of the debate they will not press the motion to a Division.

I want to start by addressing some of the broader issues that have been raised. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston said that we needed to know when and how Ministers voted. Of course, one of the changes introduced by Lisbon is that we have new rules for the workings of the Council, including not only a public record but a public broadcast of the final deliberations at a Council session on legislative dossiers. At that point, it is apparent how each member state has voted, if indeed there is a formal division, and the arguments or the statement of position that the Minister or other representative of a member state chooses to put forward are also be made public. I have sat through a number of those public sessions over the past 10 months. I do not think that they will ever command a mass audience on a Saturday evening. I am not aware that they have ever been broadcast as part of the regular prime-time news bulletins in this country or any other member state.

The new clause and many of the contributions to the debate have tried to get at how Parliament, on behalf of the public, can hold Ministers to account more effectively, not just for that final, often rather formal, process of taking a decision on live TV, but for how the negotiating position of the United Kingdom is shaped in the numerous bilateral contacts and contacts with European institutions that are undertaken by Ministers and officials, sometimes over many months. A number of ideas have been suggested. My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) said that we need to look at the matter in the context not only of the EU, but of our participation in other international institutions and considering the use of royal prerogative powers more generally.

It is interesting that no hon. Member has mentioned the House of Lords, which has distinct and different scrutiny arrangements. There is a question for parliamentarians at both ends of this building as to what methods of scrutiny experience teaches us work best and most effectively. If Government and Parliament are to agree on new scrutiny arrangements, the position of both Houses will have to be taken into account.

[Mr Cash]

I am sure that the Minister would not want to misrepresent the differences between the two Scrutiny Committees. I know he is aware that the House of Lords has more generalised debates, whereas under our Standing Orders, our debates relate to particular legislative documents. To align the two might be a bit of a mistake.

[Mr Lidington]

That would be a matter for debate. I have heard dissatisfaction with the current scrutiny arrangements and a wish to explore the alternatives from several Members from all parts of the House this afternoon. At the moment, we have a model in the House of Commons and a model in the House of Lords. This business is done in various ways in other member states. Such a debate would take all those approaches into account.

The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) and my hon. Friends the Members for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) talked more generally about how we could improve our scrutiny arrangements. It seems to me that we need to keep the distinction between Parliament and Executive clearly in mind. Parliament’s role is to hold Ministers to account for their decisions, not to take on the role of the Minister. There is a strong case for saying to Parliament—perhaps I should be more cautious and say suggesting to Parliament—that rather than drowning parliamentarians in paperwork, about which the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk made a good point, Parliament and its Scrutiny Committees could seek to call Ministers before them, including in advance of Council decisions rather than necessarily waiting for the final version.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Will the Minister say how he thinks the House can overcome the problem of collective memory? In Whitehall, there is collective memory within the Administration, and if there is a change of Government, it is handed from one Administration to the next. Parliament has overcome the problem through successive Select Committees. However, if the knowledge is not in Parliament, once an Administration are gone it has no access.

[Mr Lidington]

When speaking on behalf of the Government, I must be careful not to presume to represent a collective Government position that does not yet exist, nor to pre-empt the views of parliamentarians from all parts of the House on the most appropriate method of scrutiny.

[Mr Cash]

The Minister is moving away from the proposals put forward by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) into a much deeper question, and I know that he is taking this opportunity to do so. As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, I ask him to consider also that because the decisions made by the Council of Ministers are of a legislative character and are binding on Parliament through section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, it is incumbent on him to consider the idea—in fact, to implement it—that Parliament may decide to vote against proposals that have been cultivated by the Government and to reject provisions that have been decided in the Council of Ministers. Perhaps the Minister can throw that point into the pool of his considerations.

[Mr Lidington]

That is clearly already possible under our system if a European measure comes forward that requires primary or secondary legislation to transpose it into the law of the United Kingdom. It is up to the Government of the day, of whichever party or parties it is composed, to retain the confidence of Parliament and to persuade a majority in Parliament to endorse their preferred approach.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston challenged me on the question of collective memory. The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk said that he regretted the switch from European Standing Committees with fixed memberships to European Committees with shifting memberships. I spent my first Parliament, among other things, doing duty on European Standing Committee A. There is no doubt that I learned a great deal by virtue of that continuity, not least through the example of the late and great Gwyneth Dunwoody on how to hold Ministers to account. She used to deliver a master class in reading the documents in advance and picking out the weaknesses in the Government’s argument.

[Michael Connarty]

I could share many happy memories of that lady turning up in Standing Committees of which she was not a member and holding Ministers to account because of her interest in the subject. Cross-border health care, for example, although not her speciality, was a cause célèbre for her.

I compliment the previous Government and the present Government for continuing to send draft Council conclusions to the European Scrutiny Committee. That is what a lot of Members, such as the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), have been talking about—actually seeing the proposals that are before the Council before they are discussed in the Council. The difficulty is that they are “limité” documents and are therefore semi-confidential. If there was a method that allowed a Committee or group of people in Parliament to have that responsibility—as is done in Denmark and Finland—and to interrogate the Minister on those documents, it would be a great step forward.

[Mr Lidington]

That is certainly an interesting suggestion. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his compliment. We intend to continue the practice of supplying “limité” documents whenever appropriate.

There is sometimes an issue about where the boundary of responsibility should lie between the European Scrutiny Committee and the various departmental Select Committees. If I have one reflection to offer from my experience in the 10 months that I have held my responsibilities, it is that parliamentary debate on this country’s engagement with the EU tends to take place in a metaphorical annexe. It is as though Parliament had constructed a separate, padded building, where the equivalent of the teenagers with their drum kits could get up to what they wanted. There is a serious question to be asked about whether our arrangements do justice to the fact that the European decision-making and legislative process should now be regarded as part of the mainstream of politics in the UK, rather than as something that can be relegated to an annexe.

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[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. Can we bring the debate back, please, to new clause 1?

[Mr Lidington]

I will try to bring this part of my speech to a conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, by saying that this has been an interesting discussion of the broader themes involved. We have heard allusions to various Scandinavian models of European scrutiny.

[Mr David]

Before the Minister finally moves on, I point out that I have been thinking long and hard about what to buy the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for Christmas, and now I am going to buy him a drum kit.

I welcome the tone and content of the Minister’s comments about having more scrutiny in the House. May I suggest to him that we really need to reinstate the twice-yearly debate about Europe before the Council meetings? Before he responds that that is an issue for the Backbench Business Committee, I once again implore him to ensure that Government time is provided for those debates.

[Mr Lidington]

I know that the hon. Gentleman has at least been consistent in pushing that line, but I have to remind him that his party, when it was in office, and all other parties, agreed unanimously to changes to our procedures and the organisation of parliamentary time that explicitly gave responsibility for those biannual debates on European matters to the Backbench Business Committee rather than the Government.

We have heard this afternoon about the importance of decisions in the EU to everybody in the country, and it would be a good expression of Parliament’s understanding of that point if Back Benchers of all parties put pressure on the Backbench Business Committee to make a debate on Europe a priority, instead of debates on the other matters that the Committee has chosen in response to Back Benchers’ demands. Back Benchers’ priorities should be debated in Back-Bench time, and I believe that most of us present this evening would like the Committee to feel that a debate on Europe was what Back Benchers wanted. I hope the hon. Gentleman will persuade his colleagues of that.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I am sure that we want to deal with new clause 1, and I am sure the Minister recognises that he is drifting away from the subject. He has been tempted all over the place, but I am sure he will want to deal with what is before us.

[Mr Lidington]

I simply remind all hon. Members who want to take forward these wider arguments that I said in my written ministerial statement on scrutiny on 20 January, which referred mostly to justice and home affairs, that the Government would

“review the arrangements for engagement on EU issues in consultation with Parliament.”—[Official Report, 20 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 52WS.]

I invite them to take advantage of that opportunity.

I turn to the detail of new clause 1, which causes me concern because it would result in the United Kingdom having a substantially different policy with regard to information on EU decision making from that on domestic policy making. It would also represent a substantial impediment to the UK’s ability to negotiate effectively in an intergovernmental conference, in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers. As a number of Members have said, it could have a negative impact on our relationship with other member states and the EU institutions, and more generally on the process of good policy making and legislation.

The negative effect on our ability to negotiate at the Council of Ministers concerns me most. First, action to comply with the statutory duty that the new clause would impose on Ministers could reveal sensitive information about the UK’s long-term negotiating approach in a number of areas. I do not believe it is sufficient protection to say that the negotiations would be complete or substantially complete by the time the documents were made available, because it is very rare that negotiating positions taken in respect of one piece of legislation do not have a read-across to positions on other matters that will probably still be live dossiers when that legislation has been agreed to.

Secondly, complying with the new clause would mean that our tactics in negotiations would have to take into account the duty to make negotiating positions on proposed amendments public at a later stage. For example, there are occasions on which we try to persuade other member states to propose, or take the lead on, particular amendments so that we can concentrate our time and energy on different amendments that perhaps have less widespread support. If a Minister knew that he might be criticised if it became public that he had not sponsored a particular amendment, that would constrain our negotiating tactics and weaken our negotiating strategies.

I quite understand that the proponents of the new clause might want to see how a decision is made at EU level and the details of what part the UK has played in that process, but I do not want any Ministers of any Government who are fighting for Britain’s interest in future discussions and negotiations to be doing so with one hand tied behind their back. It is absolutely essential to our national interest that Ministers can negotiate effectively on behalf of our country.

As a number of Members have said, including my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips), the new clause would also have implications for information that we have on record about the positions of other member states. There is even a risk that its requirements could put us in conflict with existing European legislation. As a member state of the EU, we are party to the terms of the access to documents regulation, article 5 of which requires that when any member state intends to disclose a document originating from one of the EU institutions, it must consult that institution before public disclosure. If, under the new clause, we had to release a text submitted at a Council working group that included proposed amendments from each member state, and the agreement of the Council as a whole had not been sought or obtained, we could potentially be at risk of infraction proceedings and ultimately a fine. As the new clause is drafted, it is quite possible that our obligations as an EU member state could be at odds with the statutory duty that the new clause would create.

[Mr Cash]

Has it not occurred to the Minister that if a serious question of accountability arises as a consequence of what he just said, as it does, there is a simple remedy if we are sovereign in this House: we simply override the EU and tell it to get lost?

[Mr Lidington]

The remedy that my hon. Friend seeks can be obtained by Committees and the House being energetic in holding Ministers to account for the positions that they take and for the way in which they agree to whatever compromise is eventually negotiated.

Importantly, the proposed new clause does not specify in any way to what “relevant documentation” refers. That came up earlier in the debate. It is not clear, for example, whether “relevant documentation” covers so-called non-papers submitted by member states, which are intended to be “without prejudice” contributions to discussions. Does it include Council working group documents that give the position in summary of each and every member state on a particular issue? There could easily be widely diverging views on what comprises “relevant documentation”.

That lack of clarity could also cause confusion in relation to UK documents. Reference was made during the debate to whether legal advice given to the Government would be required to be made available under the terms of the proposed new clause. If so, that would clearly undermine the principle of legal professional privilege, the significance of which the Information Commissioner has generally recognised in the context of the Freedom of Information Act. Governments need to receive free and frank legal advice without fearing that it must be drafted in a form that is suitable for later public consumption.

Hon. Members may argue that we should try to use the current renegotiation of the access to documents regulation to implement the provisions of proposed new clause 1, but that measure would take us a long way beyond what would be acceptable in terms of releasing documents that are used at EU level for deliberations and decision making. The positions of other member states in respect of the documents that they make available to their Parliaments and public vary dramatically. Domestic regulations in several states lay out specific criteria on which documents can and cannot be released. Such criteria often allow for a great deal of discretion for Ministers or their officials, or impose strict limitations on the type and origin of documents to be released.

In some member states, the approach is to accept the general principle that as much documentation as possible should be released, with the only limitations being the prevention of harm, with harm often being defined in terms of personal, legal or economic impact.

[Mr Cash]

My right hon. Friend is expertly demonstrating the complete, total lack of democracy in the EU. If ever a case needed to be framed and put in everybody’s loo, it is this one.

[Mr Lidington]

I look forward to visiting my hon. Friend and seeing the framed Hansard extract of my argument. I could return the compliment by wallpapering one of my rooms with the Hansard report of one of his speeches.

Hon. Members referred to a number of EU member states in the debate. Denmark was cited more than once as the prime example of an open country, but the documents that the Danish Government must provide to the European Affairs Committee of the Folketing do not include the positions of other member states or amendments that they have proposed, and nor are the Danish Government required to provide documents that have been prepared for their internal use, such as inter-ministerial correspondence. Even in Denmark, the right of access is subject to limitations when protection of, for example, public financial interests is essential.

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[Mr Cash]

I should like to endorse the general thrust of the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), although I must qualify that slightly by saying that I do not take the view that there is a difference between different types of statute. However, that does not make a material difference to the thrust of his argument, which is that we must at all costs preserve the right of this House ultimately to make the decisions. Indeed, in the 1870s—it might have been earlier—the statesman John Bright put forward the proposition that led to the Parliament Act 1911, some 30 years before it was implemented, precisely because he did not believe in privilege, in aristocracy or in the House of Lords as it was then constituted.

The reality is that we can achieve the objectives by adopting the new clause without necessarily accepting that the House of Lords could not become an elected body if that were the view of this House in due course. I do not accept the proposition put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) because so long as we have a second Chamber, the House of Lords will be the House of Lords—irrespective of whether it is elected.

The question of constitutional statutes has been introduced as a notion, but it is not intrinsic to the argument. What is essential is to ensure that we do not allow the Supreme Court to adjudicate over and above the decisions taken by our Parliament. That is the key issue. Some futile commentators—and, if I may say so, some Members of this House—mislead themselves from time to time by suggesting that sovereignty is not such an important issue. The reason for its importance is very simple: we Members are elected to make decisions, and all the other issues, such as dealing with burdens on business and so forth, stem from that. That explains my view of the European Union, which is that, where necessary, the sovereign Parliament should override through the “notwithstanding” formula to which my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset rightly referred and which I have employed on a number of occasions when I have been supported by Conservative Front-Bench Members—for example, when we were in opposition and with respect to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, and on other occasions.

What we need to insist on above all—it cropped up in the previous debate—is that this House on behalf of the electorate represents the democratic process whereby we are voted in to make decisions. We must insist on that at the expense of judicial supremacy. Even though I am the first to say that it is for the courts to interpret legislation, it is not for them to make it. That is the fundamental point. I thoroughly endorse both the sentiments and the wording of the new clause.

[Mr Lidington]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg),who I know takes a strong interest in these important constitutional issues—and he is right to do so. Our short debate has allowed him and other hon. Members to seek a means to entrench the Bill once it reaches the statute book, and to protect it from future attempts at repeal. At the same time, the new clause has been drafted in such a way as to permit my hon. Friend the opportunity to raise broader constitutional questions about the ultimate authority to take decisions and whether that should lie with Parliament or with the judiciary. My hon. Friend cited in particular the leading judgment of Lord Justice Laws, which has been quoted on many occasions during our proceedings on theBill.

I am afraid, however, that although I agree with much of the sentiment that underpins the new clause, I cannot support the new clause for reasons that I shall shortly provide. Let me first explain a little about the Government’s interpretation of the new clause and its effect. It would introduce a new category of Bill, which could not be passed under the procedure provided by section 2 of the Parliament Act 1911.

As all hon. Members will be aware, section 2 of the Parliament Act 1911 makes provision under which most public Bills can be enacted ultimately without the approval of the House of Lords. There are, however, two exceptions to the general rule. The first relates to money Bills, which have their own procedure under section 1 of the Parliament Act. The second exception is for what that Act terms

“a Bill containing any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years”.

Under the new clause, there would be a third exception: namely, any Bill that sought to amend or repeal what would be provided for in sections 1 to 7 of the European Union Act 2011, which this Bill will become if Parliament agrees to its passing. In practice, this would mean that the legislation could not be either repealed or amended in respect of those sections without the express consent of the House of Lords.

I hope it goes without saying that I fully support the political intention of the new clause to help to ensure that the Act remains on the statute book for a long time to come. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said on Second Reading, the Government believe that the Bill should become

“part of the accepted constitutional framework of this country”.—[Official Report, 7 December 2010; Vol. 520, c. 197.]

It is right to point out, however, that the Parliament Act 1911 has been amended only once, in 1949. Since then, Parliament has not considered it appropriate to single out any other pieces of legislation—for example, the Acts of Parliament passed to provide for Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolution, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 or, indeed, the European Communities Act 1972—for similar special status. Even enthusiastic supporters of the Bill would find it difficult to argue that this piece of legislation should be singled out in this particular way, which is denied to other items of legislation that might generally be accepted to have important constitutional significance.

[Mr Cash]

Even if my right hon. Friend were right in his general assertions about elements of the Bill, the implications of clause 18, as the European Scrutiny Committee report made clear, puts it into a very special category. Despite our attempts to amend that clause, which were sadly and tragically defeated, the fact remains that clause 18 makes a very significant change to this country’s constitutional arrangements. For that reason, the Bill should indeed be put into a different category.

[Mr Lidington]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for acknowledging the importance of clause 18. We had a full day’s debate on that clause at the start of our Committee proceedings, but I rather think that you would warn me, Mr Hoyle, against recapitulating that debate this evening. It is hard to imagine why a future Parliament would choose to repeal this Act, thereby abolishing the referendum lock and the enhanced control and scrutiny that the Bill provides for Parliament and the British people. It would incur a high political cost for any Government who brought forward such a measure and, indeed, for individual Members of Parliament who were prepared to walk through the Lobbies in its support.

It is an important part of this Government’s commitment to rebuilding trust with the British people to make clear what the future arrangements should be. Although it is always possible that a future Government will decide to act differently, I find it hard to imagine that any such future Government would be able to defend taking away from the British people the right to have their say about further changes to the European treaties.

I have further concerns about the impact of the new clause on the long-standing relationship between this House and the House of Lords. It would alter the relationship by expanding the relative powers of the House of Lords. It has never been part of the Government’s intentions for this Bill that it should be used to alter that relationship.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not only for giving way but for taking the new clause so seriously, but I must say to him that the Bill does not really extend the powers of the House of Lords and is not a new category of Act. Both it and the existing protection under the 1911 Act refer exclusively to the voting rights of the British people, which is why I think that they are exactly the same.

[Mr Lidington]

I hear my hon. Friend’s argument, but I could quite easily construct another argument. We have enacted other pieces of legislation in recent decades which are of great constitutional significance, which touch on the franchise—for example, the decision by, I believe, the Heath Government to lower the voting age from 21 to 18—and which could have been deemed to fall into a comparable category and to deserve equivalent protection.

This evening my hon. Friend is making a second attempt to persuade Parliament of the case for his proposal. A short while ago, he tabled an amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill that was very similar to this new clause. Indeed, it may have been identically worded. At the time the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), expressed a view to which the Government and I subscribe. The rules governing the relationship between this House and the other place, as laid down in section 2 of the 1911 Act, have been in place for some time, and we do not intend to start changing that relationship.

I suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that the political problem and the constitutional challenge that he has identified in the House of Lords judgment, namely the evolution within the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom courts of the idea of a distinct category of constitutional statutes which have a special status and which, in particular, cannot be impliedly repealed, should perhaps be addressed in the context of a more general proposal for constitutional reform. As my hon. Friend knows, my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister is considering the issue of possible reforms of the House of Lords. The best course may be for my hon. Friend to make representations to the Deputy Prime Minister as he considers what is the right way in which to proceed.

During one of the debates on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, my hon. Friend said:

“Our constitution should be safeguarded and preserved; it is not something that should be treated lightly or in an airy-fairy fashion”.—[Official Report, 18 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 708.]

I strongly agree with the sentiment that he expressed. That is why it is so important for the House to scrutinise thoroughly the issues raised by his proposal, and that is why I have considered it so carefully.

I welcome the scrutiny that the proposal has undergone, both this evening and during consideration of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. However, for the reasons I have given, I do not accept that the new clause is an appropriate way for us to achieve our shared intention. Following the debate on my hon. Friend’s similar amendment to the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, he withdrew the amendment. I sincerely hope that, having heard my arguments this evening, he will be prepared to withdraw his new clause.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Decisions subject to special referral procedure in TFEU

‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not permit the United Kingdom’s participation in the final adoption of a decision to which this subsection applies unless subsection (3) or (4) is complied with in relation to the draft decision.

(2) The decisions to which subsection (1) applies are—

(a) a decision under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU that permits the adoption of legislative acts in the field of social security;

(b) a decision under the provision of Article 82(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules in criminal procedure, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(c) a decision under the provision of Article 83(1) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(d) a decision under the provision of Article 83(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions.

(3) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House does not believe the United Kingdom should request the referral of a specified draft decision to the European Council under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU, Article 82(3) of TFEU or Article 83(3) of TFEU, as the case may be, providing for such a request, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.

(4) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the European Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House approves Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to support the referral of a specified draft decision back to the Council, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.’.—(Chris Heaton-Harris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Mr Cash]

That is a very interesting question. Conversely, there have been three referendums—one in Denmark, one in France and another in Ireland—that would have an impact on us and people voted against, but the process of European integration carried on notwithstanding those results. In fact, to use an analogy, we got the rough end because, although the referendums went the way that some of us wanted, they made no difference and integration carried on anyway.

We need to understand perhaps that these proposals are, in fact, extremely dangerous. I suspect that my right hon. Friend the Minister will argue that, although we are being denied a referendum, the proposal will require approval by the United Kingdom Parliament in due course. The essence of my case is that it will have such a profound impact on the United Kingdom, by creating a two-tier Europe, that a referendum would be required because it involves a fundamental change in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

I should like to say many other things about the proposal—perhaps I will have an opportunity to do so on Third Reading—but I have described its essence. This is a very dangerous move towards a German Europe, or a Franco-German Europe—it does not matter which way we look at it—and it is a fundamental strategic mistake. I see the Foreign Secretary, sitting on the Front Bench. He has bought this argument. I warned him before the general election that we should not enter this landscape. I am glad that he nods his head, because I was explicit about that at the time.

Finally, I recall the words of Thomas Mann who proposed what I still believe to be one of the great questions of our time, as yet unresolved, but probably resolved by these proposals of a two-tier Europe along the lines of Chancellor Kohl’s analogy of a convoy, and ask, “What will it be—a European Germany or a German Europe?”

[Mr Lidington]

We are confronted with a cornucopia of amendments and new clauses covering a number of important but disparate subjects. I shall try, in the time available to me, to do justice to them, but I apologise to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and to the House in advance should I not have time adequately to deal with each new clause and amendment.

My hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) tabled new clause 3, which is grouped with amendment 4. As he said, the new clause deals with the “emergency brake” procedures in the EU treaties. It is important to note that we cannot equate the emergency brake procedure with a treaty change or with the exercise of a ratchet clause, because those relate, rather, to controls on the exercise or use of existing competences to adopt European secondary legislation such as directives or regulations in the areas concerned. His new clause would enhance parliamentary control over the use of some existing EU competences. Subsections (3) and (4) would add a requirement for a motion to be passed by both Houses before the UK could decide not to invoke the emergency brakes that can be applied to proposals for measures under all four treaty provisions specified in the new clause, and also before Britain could put an end to the emergency brake procedure by agreeing in the European Council to refer the issue back to the Council to continue with negotiations under the ordinary legislative procedure.

As my hon. Friend said, it is our view that, even were the European Council to refer a matter back to the Council to continue negotiations, member states would still be free to pull the emergency brake again if they saw fit. As consensus is required on emergency brakes, and if parliamentary approval were not granted, the result would be that the UK was effectively able to block EU decision making in those areas, although in respect of certain measures, as he will understand, other member states could have recourse to use of the enhanced co-operation procedures without the UK’s participation where that was permitted under the treaties.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I followed the case made by the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) fairly carefully, and I understood it to mean that the new clause would give parliamentary backing of or control over Ministers when they go to the Council. Would that not strengthen the position of Parliament relative to the EU and put a bit of stiffening in Ministers when they go to negotiate?

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Gentleman has the right intentions, but the new clause would not achieve quite the purpose that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry intend. It would have some unintended and unwanted consequences as well. Let me explain why I consider that to be the case.

As I said at the outset, any proposals under the four treaty articles covered by the new clause would not constitute a transfer of power or competence from the UK to the EU, because the EU’s ability to act in those ways is already provided for by the treaties. Those decisions are not what the Government consider to be ratchet clauses, so we do not believe that such measures should, as a matter of policy, be subject to the controls provided for within the measure.

Furthermore, proposals for EU secondary legislation under articles 82(2) and 83 fall within the scope of our opt-in to title V under protocol 21 to the Lisbon treaty. We have already undertaken to review the procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of the use of the opt-in to ensure that Parliament has an increased say. I spelled that out, in outline, in my written ministerial statement of 20 January.

For the future, we have made it clear in clause 9 that the use of the ratchet clauses in some of those articles should ensure that any British participation in such measures by virtue of our opt-in should be preceded by the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and that our agreement to the final measures proposed should be preceded by parliamentary approval by Act of Parliament. We believe that that represents a significant step forward in enhancing the controls of the House on those justice and home affairs ratchet clauses while maintaining the same proportionate and sustainable approach that we have sought to take with all other parts of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I want to reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry.

Another example of the lack of flexibility in new clause 4 relates to the variation in payments from year to year. The December letter left some scope for real variation in payments over the next financial perspective, provided that payments over the whole period were frozen in real terms. The new clause would prevent any payments variations, but such variations are a natural consequence of how the financial framework works. For example, a commitment of €100 in 2005 might lead to a payment of €20 in 2006 and €80 in 2007. That is because commitments made in one year do not translate into uniform payments over subsequent years.

We want to cut wasteful EU spending, not just to reduce the overall size of the EU budget, but to free up some resources to improve the value for money that we and other member states get from European Union spending, and to support activities such as boosting economic growth and competitiveness. We would like to see work done on improving the way in which the EU budget supports economic growth and competitiveness via the Europe 2020 strategy, subject to judicious selection of the most appropriate policy instruments. We want the EU budget to enhance security, via an active role for the EU as a global player. This could mean increases in spending under those headings, but we would insist on those being counterbalanced by reductions under other headings, all within our overall objective of restricting any increase in the EU budget to inflation.

Paradoxically, the new clause might force a referendum on the next financial framework exactly because we had successfully achieved our reform agenda within the constraints of a very tight limit on the size of the budget overall.

New clause 4 and the associated amendment 7 would hamper our objectives of driving down the overall EU budget and improving the value for money that it provides. I therefore urge my hon. Friends to withdraw those amendments.

New clause 5 is about taxes. The measures proposed in the new clause address matters that already fall within European Union competence.

[Mr Cash]

Will the Minister attempt, even in the last 30 seconds, to say whether he accepts the principle that lies behind my amendment 1? So far he has not even touched on it.

[Mr Lidington]

We debated that issue at some length in Committee. My position and that of the Government remain that it is the sovereign right of member states to decide to agree treaties which affect them. What we are concerned about in the United Kingdom is defending the right of the British people to have a lock on anything that transfers powers away from this place to European Union institutions, and not to interfere with what other Governments decide independently that they wish to do.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I thank all Members who have taken part not merely in today’s debate, but during the seven days of debate that we have devoted to the European Union Bill. I also pay tribute to the team of officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. They have worked tirelessly for very long hours, frequently at weekends, to ensure that the Foreign Secretary and I have been briefed, and that our responses to the debates have taken account of the various and detailed points raised by individual Members from all parts of the House. Our officials have demonstrated a commitment to impartial public service in the best traditions of the British civil service.

As the Foreign Secretary said, we owe a debt of gratitude to all who have played their part in the comprehensive examination of the Bill. Why the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) ever dreamed that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) could be bought off, I cannot imagine. Having worked as a colleague of my hon. Friend for nearly 19 years, and having had dealings with him even before I entered the House, I am in no doubt whatsoever about his principle, tenacity and utter rectitude in refusing to be bought off by any Minister of any Government while he has served in this House.

The debates on the Bill have enabled us to identify, in large part through the assiduous work of my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris), areas where there were gaps in the Bill’s realisation of policy intent, and have allowed us to bring forward amendments. The debates have also provided an occasion for the House to reflect more broadly on issues of parliamentary scrutiny. My hon. Friend asked me a very direct question. The Government are in the initial stages of considering what sort of arrangements we wish to pursue. Although I have met my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and the Chairman of the Scrutiny Committee in the Lords, I have yet to meet the Chairs of the Select Committees on Justice and on Home Affairs, who clearly have an interest in the justice and home affairs measures that are coming forward under Title V.

I believe that it is for Parliament to determine how it collectively wishes to pursue the issue. It may be that other Select Committees, such as the Liaison Committee or the Backbench Business Committee, wish to take views or seek opportunities to debate the matter more broadly. I make no presumption as to what the outcome will be, and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone told me sternly that Parliament would not be told by the Government what scrutiny it should carry out, and that it would come forward with its own thoughts and opinions. I look forward to a vigorous and constructive debate about the shape of future scrutiny arrangements.

The Bill represents an important advance, not least because all parties represented in the House support the principle of it. None voted against it on Second Reading, and even the Labour party now accepts, in the words of its amendment to the Second Reading motion, that

“the principle of referendums on significant constitutional and monetary changes is appropriate”.

That is a real breakthrough, a belated recognition by the Opposition that for too long, major decisions on Europe’s future have been taken without the consent of the British people—the very mischief that the Bill addresses and seeks to put right.

As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said a short while ago, the Bill does not address, and is not intended to address, every problem and challenge to do with the UK’s relationship with the European Union. We take as our starting point the distribution of competences laid down by the treaties, an approach that does not go as far as a number of my hon. Friends would like. However, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) that we will indeed be vigilant in examining the proposals coming forward from the European Commission or other member states in respect of the competences that the EU already has.

The Bill embodies three fundamental principles: that the British people, and they alone, should have the final say on whether new competences or powers should be transferred from this place to the European Union; that Government should be more accountable to both Parliament and the British people for the decisions that we take in Europe on behalf of the UK; and that Parliament should have more say over treaty changes and the use of ratchet clauses.

There are plenty of things that are wrong with the EU and plenty of flaws in it, and we have heard a lot about them during the debates on the Bill, but I believe that there are also many things that we can and should do together with our partners in the EU to secure the greater prosperity and security of this country and the continent of which we form part. That is why the Government believe it is in the interests of the UK to be active and activist within Europe, and that we need to engage effectively and energetically with our European partners to secure common objectives.

If that is to succeed, however, we have to address the disconnection that exists between the British people and the way in which decisions are taken on their behalf in Europe. Contrary to what the hon. Member for Caerphilly suggested, I find sympathy from European counterparts to whom I talk privately, because they are aware that public disaffection is felt in many other member states, not just here. The Bill, which is intended to remedy that disconnection between the public and the EU, is an essential requirement of the EU’s democratic legitimacy in this country. By passing it, we can start to rebuild public trust by returning greater power to the British people, from whom it derives. That is what the Bill does, and that is why I commend it to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.