European Union Bill

Chris Heaton-Harris Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Heaton-Harris (Daventry) (Con)]

I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from, and equally, I understand the new clause. The reality is that after any Council meeting, 26 other countries run to their national press to say exactly what the British negotiating position was and what we might have given away. Within about 24 hours, anybody out there can see most of the negotiations that have taken place. I am sure the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) will understand this point. If we are going for transparency—if the detail of the negotiations is going to be out there anyway—surely it would be easier for the British Government to come back, lay their cards on the table and say how they played their hand.

[Neil Carmichael]

The role of Ministers in interpreting each other’s decisions and talking to the press later is different from formally disclosing key positions. I do not spend a huge amount of time reading the newspapers, certainly not those produced by Mr Murdoch. I would much prefer the House to test Ministers on the outcomes and make sure that the integrity of the decisions was protected and that the capacity of our Ministers to act independently in the interests of this nation state was upheld. That is why the clause is not helpful.

I understand the motives, as I said at the beginning of my remarks. I can see why people want to have more information about the European Parliament and more transparency in relation to the Commission. It is not a clear structure at the best of times. I can see why more transparency should be required of the Council of Ministers, but the clause is not the right mechanism. The critical issue, as we discussed last time, is to make sure that this House can test Ministers thoroughly and properly at each and every opportunity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr MacShane]

Yes, and I well remember the right hon. Gentleman in the even longer debates—going through the night—on the treaty of Amsterdam saying that signing it would mean the abolition of Britain. When there is a new Bill, we have debates, and we have had many debates and some good discussions on this one.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr MacShane]

Can I make just a wee bit of progress? [Interruption.] Well, I will give way to one of my favourite ex-MEPs. How can I resist?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I am not sure whether I should take that as a compliment. Has the right hon. Gentleman had a chance to read the written ministerial statement about this subject that was issued during our previous five days of debate? It included what, in coalition terms, would probably be deemed a full and comprehensive offer to the House about how we might scrutinise justice and home affairs matters. We should examine that offer in much closer detail today, and perhaps we will later on.

[Mr MacShane]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, because he brings to the House considerable knowledge of how the European Parliament does its business. That is exactly the way in which the European Parliament carries out its scrutiny. Perhaps we should learn from him; perhaps he and I should set up a small committee to go to Strasbourg —for him to return there—to see what we might learn.

In essence, the hon. Member for Stroud is quite right: this is the WikiLeaks amendment. It would abolish the need for WikiLeaks, because the process of Government decision-making would be published. I would love to see that for something infinitely more important to my constituents—the thinking, advice and documents that have led to the promulgation of the NHS Bill or, in two or three weeks’ time, that lead to the Budget. I expect, however, that I would find very little support on the Government side of the House and absolutely none from the Opposition Front Bencher waiting for his turn to speak for the idea that we do government better if we allow Mr Julian Assange to publish every document and every communication that goes into a Minister’s box.

I can confirm exactly the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) made about how negotiations can and do take place. I recall once trying to protect the steelworkers of Britain from a proposal, which the then Labour Government supported, to allow the import of steel—a derogation of the then EU trade rules—from a dodgy supplier in Egypt which I knew to be linked to the army and was, in my view, a wholly corrupt organisation. I could not quite work out why we were so keen to allow the deal to go through, which would have damaged steelworkers’ jobs and production in this country and, if the steel were re-exported, those in the rest of Europe, too.

I could not, however, convince any civil servants. At one stage, I had 27 of them, including two knights of the realm, grouped around me, telling me, “Minister, you have to give way.” I put down my little foot and said, “No, I am elected. That is what I am paid to do.” Then, they went out and got the Secretary of State for Business and Industry to phone me, and at that stage either I resigned on the spot or accepted a superior order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Decisions subject to special referral procedure in TFEU

‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not permit the United Kingdom’s participation in the final adoption of a decision to which this subsection applies unless subsection (3) or (4) is complied with in relation to the draft decision.

(2) The decisions to which subsection (1) applies are—

(a) a decision under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU that permits the adoption of legislative acts in the field of social security;

(b) a decision under the provision of Article 82(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules in criminal procedure, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(c) a decision under the provision of Article 83(1) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, unless the decision falls under section 9(4);

(d) a decision under the provision of Article 83(2) of TFEU that permits the adoption of directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions.

(3) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House does not believe the United Kingdom should request the referral of a specified draft decision to the European Council under the provision of Article 48 of TFEU, Article 82(3) of TFEU or Article 83(3) of TFEU, as the case may be, providing for such a request, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.

(4) This subsection is complied with if—

(a) a draft decision is before the European Council,

(b) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House approves Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to support the referral of a specified draft decision back to the Council, and

(c) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.’.—(Chris Heaton-Harris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 4—Certain decisions under Article 312 of TFEU requiring approval by Act and by referendum—

‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not vote in favour of or otherwise support a decision to which this subsection applies unless—

(a) the draft decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and

(b) the referendum condition is met.

(2) The referendum condition is that set out in section 3(2), with references to a decision being read for the purposes of subsection (1) as references to a draft decision.

(3) Subject to subsection (6), subsection (1) applies to a decision under Article 312(2) of TFEU to adopt a regulation laying down the first multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period following 2013, where that multiannual financial framework would include—

(a) an initial annual ceiling on total EU payment appropriations that was higher than the ceiling on total EU payment appropriations for 2013 in the multiannual financial framework covering 2013, taking account of an adjustment of the 2013 ceiling for inflation,

(b) subsequent annual ceilings on total EU payment appropriations, some or all of which increased from the previous year, or could increase from the previous year without revision of the multiannual financial framework through the procedure laid down in Article 312(2) of TFEU, by more than an adjustment for inflation,

(c) an initial annual ceiling on total EU commitment appropriations that was not lower than the ceiling on total EU commitment appropriations for 2013 in the multiannual financial framework covering 2013, taking account of an adjustment of the 2013 ceiling for inflation, or

(d) subsequent annual ceilings on total EU commitment appropriations, some or all of which were at least as high as the previous year’s ceiling adjusted for inflation, or could be at least as high as the previous year’s ceiling adjusted for inflation without revision of the multiannual financial framework through the procedure laid down in Article 312(2) of TFEU.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the only relevant adjustments for inflation are those used by the EU for the figures involved.

(5) Subject to subsection (6), subsection (1) also applies to a decision under Article 312(2) of TFEU to adopt a regulation revising the first multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period following 2013, where that regulation would cause the multiannual financial framework to include provision identified in subsection (3) when the framework had not done so before.

(6) Inclusion of provision to enable EU payment or commitment appropriations to be reallocated between the annual ceilings of the same type of appropriation in a multiannual financial framework does not of itself cause a regulation laying down or revising a multiannual financial framework to fall under subsection (1).’.

New clause 5—Certain decisions under Article 311 of TFEU—

‘(1) A Minister of the Crown may not confirm the approval by the United Kingdom of a decision to which this subsection applies unless—

(a) the decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and

(b) the referendum condition or the exemption condition is met.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to a decision under the third paragraph of Article 311 of TFEU to adopt a decision laying down provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union, where the decision adopted contains provision for payment to the EU as own resources, without the need for a further decision under the third paragraph of Article 311 of TFEU, of some or all of the revenues from a tax or other levy on natural or non-State legal persons that is established or which may be established by EU law (including by that decision).

(3) The referendum condition is that set out in section 3(2).

(4) Subject to subsection (5), the exemption condition is that the Act providing for the approval of the decision states that—

(a) under the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union in force at that time, revenues from the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2), or from a tax or other levy that is very similar and which is established or may be established by EU law, are already paid in whole or part to the EU as own resources or may be paid in whole or part to the EU as own resources without a further decision under the third paragraph of Article 311 of TFEU, and

(b) the adopted decision to which the decision relates does not contain provision that is likely to require or allow a significant increase in the amount or proportion of revenue obtained in the United Kingdom in any one year from the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2) that is or may be paid to the EU as own resources, compared to that required or allowed by the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union in force at that time.

(5) Where a statement as per subsection 4(a) is made that revenues from a very similar tax or other levy to the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2) are or may already be paid in whole or part to the EU as own resources, the statement for the purposes of subsection 4(b) may state that the adopted decision to which the decision relates does not contain provision that is likely to require or allow to be paid to the EU as own resources an amount or proportion of revenue obtained in the United Kingdom in any one year from the tax or other levy referred to in subsection (2) that is significantly greater than the amount or proportion of revenue obtained in the United Kingdom in any one year from the very similar tax or other levy required or allowed to be paid to the EU as own resources by the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the European Union in force at that time.’.

Amendment 1, page 4, line 8, clause 4, at end insert

‘except where any such provision substantially affects all or any of the political, economic, fiscal, social or constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and other Member States of the European Union.’.

Amendment 6, page 4, line 43, clause 6, at end insert—

‘(2A) A Minister of the Crown may not confirm the approval by the United Kingdom of a decision under the provision of Article 218(8) of TFEU for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in accordance with Article 6(2) of TEU unless—

(a) the decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and

(b) the referendum condition is met.’.

Amendment 8, page 6, line 21, clause 7, after ‘Union’, insert

‘, unless the decision falls under section (Certain decisions under Article 311 of TFEU)’.

Amendment 7, page 6, line 39, at end add—

‘(da) a decision under Article 312(2) of TFEU to adopt a regulation laying down or revising the multiannual financial framework of the European Union, unless the decision falls under section (Certain decisions under Article 312 of TFEU requiring approval by Act and by referendum).’.

Amendment 4, page 8, line 22, clause 9, at end insert—

‘(4A) For decisions under a provision falling within either paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (2) that are subject to qualified majority voting, otherwise supporting a decision includes, for the purposes of subsection (4), permitting the United Kingdom’s participation in the final adoption of a decision.’.

Government amendment 3.

Amendment 5, page 9, line 3, clause 10, leave out subsection (2).

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I should begin by apologising to the House for being so keen to table a number of new clauses and amendments at this late stage. It is not as if there is anything better going on in my life. It is not that Arsenal are playing Barcelona tonight, and I could have been watching that. Actually, as a referee I do not like Arsenal that much, but I could have been refereeing the football game between the Press Lobby against the Crown Prosecution Service—and I have a family, and there is a dinner that I could have gone too.

However, I did want to point out to the Minister that there are some fairly big gaps in the Bill, which came to my notice rather later than they should have. New clause 3 concerns the emergency brake, especially in the context of criminal justice matters. New clause 4 concerns the post-2013 financial framework. New clause 5 concerns own resources decisions and EU taxes. I have also tabled a range of complementary amendments.

New clause 3 deserves some explanation. Certain European laws proposed under the treaty on the functioning of the European Union are subject to the emergency brake procedure. Such proposals are adopted by qualified majority voting in the Council, and relate to social security and procedural and substantive criminal law. When an EU law on social security is proposed under article 48 of the TFEU, a member state can declare that the proposal

“would affect important aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system”,

and, having done so, can request that the proposal be referred to the European Council. The proposal is then so referred, and the Council suspends its consideration of the measure.

When an EU law on procedural or substantive criminal law is proposed under article 82(2) or article 83 and a member state considers that the proposal

“would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system”,

that member state may request that the proposal be referred to the European Council. The proposal is then so referred, and the Council suspends its consideration of the measure. A member state’s ability to stop the adoption of a proposal subject to qualified majority voting in that way is known as the emergency brake.

After the proposal has been referred to the European Council, the Council may refer the proposal back to the other Council, which then resumes consideration of the measure, taking decisions by qualified majority voting. However, there must be a consensus in the European Council for the proposal to be referred back. That means that any member state can block the proposal. Under United Kingdom law, the decision on whether to invoke the emergency brake lies solely with the Government. Parliament cannot insist that this happen, and the Bill, alas, will not change that. In contrast, the German Parliament can oblige the German Government to press the emergency brake on any of those matters. New clause 3 would cover all EU proposals subject to the emergency brake except for the proposals that would fall under clause 9(4) of the Bill. It would, however, require the final draft of the proposals to go before both Houses of Parliament, either of which could require that the emergency brake be pressed.

Back in January, in response to a letter that I had sent dealing with various aspects of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe wrote to me that there was nothing to prevent a member state from pressing the emergency brake repeatedly on a proposal. That means that, should Parliament remain dissatisfied with the proposal after it has been referred to the Council by the European Council following a use of the emergency brake, Parliament could insist that the brake be pressed again.

Subsection (4) of new clause 3 is intended to accommodate the possible scenario in which the European Council seeks to come to a consensus on a final draft of the proposal, which would be referred back to the Council for formal adoption straight away. It seems to make sense that the Government should be able to ask Parliament at that point whether the final proposal is acceptable, rather than the Government’s simply agreeing to refer it back to the Council and not insisting that the emergency brake be triggered.

I have been discussing new clause 4 with the Minister’s officials, and have been told that its provisions are probably covered in the Bill. A handful of proposals subject to the emergency brake would appear to be covered by clause 9(4). I would appreciate the Minister’s confirming that, at the end of a convoluted process—during which the British Government might know that a proposal under QMV is to be adopted so they do not vote for it or abstain, but vote against—we in this Parliament could still have our foot firmly on the emergency brake.

[Steve Baker]

I admire my hon. Friend’s tenacity, but I am only a simple engineer, so may I confirm that he has said that this House is unable to assert its sovereignty in relation to criminal justice?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I was not asserting that, although we have given away lots of justice and home affairs powers, and I do not think many Members or many of the British people fully appreciate how much we have potentially given away. This is an important point. Although the Bill has many problems, the referendum lock would ensure that we do not go down such a route in respect of the European public prosecutor and other matters to do with the criminal justice system. The measure I am talking about came in under the Lisbon treaty. No country has pressed the emergency brake yet. I would like to think that the Government would trust Parliament sufficiently for Parliament to have its foot on that brake, rather than for the Government alone to have their foot on it.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I find the hon. Gentleman’s arguments very persuasive. At least we, as well as Germany, could stand up and be counted. If it is good enough for the Germans, it should be good enough for us. I would like such a provision very much indeed, but is not the worry for our Government in particular that our Parliament is especially likely to exercise that power over Ministers going to the European Council? Is not their concern that we might actually exercise our right to put our foot on the brake?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Quite possibly, but that is the essence of democracy, and one of the reasons we were put here in the first place is to keep check if not on what our own Government are doing, at least on what institutions to which we are giving powers might be doing with them. I would like the Minister to reiterate the comments I have heard from his officials about the emergency brake and new clause 4 possibly not being needed.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Why has my hon. Friend chosen to put a veto in the hands of the other place? I can understand why the matter might be subject to a vote of this House, but why also to a vote in the other place?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Well, that sounded better to me when I was writing it down. It seemed perfectly logical for this to be a matter for both Houses, and the other place does scrutinise European matters, as we have discussed. It has a depth of expertise on European matters, although it might be completely wrong in its conclusions.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The House of Lords has an absolute veto on statutory instruments and many other things. It is only legislation introduced in the House of Commons on which the Lords does not have a veto. It would therefore have been illogical to have excluded it.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I could not have put it better myself.

Moving swiftly on, new clause 4 addresses the post-2013 financial framework. We are about to enter into very important negotiations about how much money we give to the European institutions over the next financial framework—that for 2014 to 2020. We have had many assurances from the Government that they will seek a very tough settlement, and I thought it would be wise to encapsulate in a new clause this Parliament’s view of a tough settlement. I thought it might be a good idea to spell out the situation if we do not get a freeze on the amount of money we are spending per year in that financial framework at EU level—or indeed a cut, which I hope we might be angling for. I wanted to make it clear that if we failed miserably in our negotiations and had to accept—perhaps for reasons of diplomacy, as I am unsure whether we would have to accept this as we have a veto on these matters—a rise in the amount of money that could be spent in that financial framework, that would also become part of the Bill. In fact, I would like that to be put to a referendum so that people can vote on whether we should give a lot more money to institutions that we do not completely trust. That is the main purpose of new clause 4. I hope its being moved will give the Minister another chance to state on the record exactly what our position will be going into negotiations on the financial framework post-2013.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Well, they do have a say through the Government they elect, and the Government do negotiate these things in the multi-annual packages. As I said in a debate on a previous new clause, this is one way of making sure that if the Government decided it was practical for us to have a rise in the amount of money being spent in the European institutions, the people would have a say on how much it would be. I accept that own resources is covered in some ways in the Bill, but I thought I would phrase the new clause in such a way that it would give the Minister a chance to tell the House exactly what the British Government’s views are on matters of taxation coming in at the European level. My new clause would at least introduce the principle of referendums on own resources decisions bringing about substantial changes in EU taxation, and require future Governments to go through a more exacting process to agree to such changes, which would expend significant political capital if they were proposing something clearly out of line with what the British people want.

The new clauses address the crux of the debate, which is the scrutiny of European matters. We in this place do not do scrutiny half as well as we should. On Third Reading, I hope to speak about how we might improve scrutiny and what the Government should do.

[Michael Connarty]

I want to speak briefly in support of new clauses 3, 4 and 5. They get to the meat of the discussion we should have been having with the Government before they introduced this silly Bill. It is silly because it is never likely to be used, as there are so many ways that a Government Minister of any political complexion who wishes to continue with the European project can get measures through Parliament, such as by saying that they are insignificant or that it is not necessary to have an Act of Parliament. Therefore, I do not think that the Bill’s measures will be used a great deal. It is based on the premise that the Government want to put in place the measures they introduce, and presumably a Government of any complexion will know that they need a majority in the House in order to introduce any measure that they might decide is significant enough to be dealt with by a referendum or an Act of Parliament.

In reality, therefore, the Bill is a bit of a public relations exercise. But the new clauses are not. They would address the things that are wrong at the moment with the process of dealing with the emergency brake. It should be in place and it should be used properly in a way that gives a Government a chance to speak on behalf of their Parliament and their people in the Council in a fundamental way. New clauses 3 and 4 are very attractive, because would give teeth and meat—a bit of beef—to a Bill that lacks that completely. The Bill is a list of things which might be on the mind of the body politic and perhaps the anti-European press, but it does not have any substance. The new clauses have substance, as they lay out clearly how the brake should be used.

There is absolutely no doubt that new clause 5 is necessary. It deals with a tax and we should have had a similar clause, somewhere along the line, on the giving away of our social security rights. It is clear that people who come to this country to work see social security as an extra payment that does not come out of the pocket of their employer. When someone leaves their family back in Poland, where they still have their house, to come to this country to work, they get all the benefits required under our social security legislation—tax credits, child tax credits and so on—which they often send back home. They also often end up with a council house, because they then bring their family to this country and live in overcrowded conditions, and they leave their house back there being paid for by the British taxpayer. All those things might have been examined seriously if we had had a provision such as new clause 5 to deal with how social security would transfer.

Clearly the own resources arrangement is a tax and will be about creating a European tax as a substitute for VAT. I have been at conferences and seminars called by the Commission in other countries to press that point heavily, and thank goodness Treasury officials were there to argue hard against such an arrangement. We might say that it was one of the three red lines, because we said that tax was a red line that would not be crossed. However, the own resources debate will clearly be pressed again and again by the Commission, which will try to convince us that the proposed arrangement is not a breach of one of those red lines. New clause 5 would put up a nice barrier that we would have to cross purposefully and decisively if we wanted to move away from that red line. I commend the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) for his tenacity, even at this late stage, in tabling well thought-out new clauses. I do not think that they come from a Eurosceptic, anti-European view; they would just be common sense and make good legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

We debated that issue at some length in Committee. My position and that of the Government remain that it is the sovereign right of member states to decide to agree treaties which affect them. What we are concerned about in the United Kingdom is defending the right of the British people to have a lock on anything that transfers powers away from this place to European Union institutions, and not to interfere with what other Governments decide independently that they wish to do.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I, too, thank the Minister for Europe for being so precise in many of his answers to the questions that we have raised. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for asking more awkward questions than I would ever dare, and the Labour Front Benchers for adding to the debate, although they did so only partially because they just sat there really. However, I did welcome the contribution made by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds). It was probably the most coherent of the lot, so I congratulate her.

The shadow Foreign Secretary’s remarks about the Government taking their eye off the ball when it should have been concentrating on these important matters were slightly unfair, especially as they came from someone who, when in a slightly more junior job on the Government Benches, was known in European circles for going missing, not all the time, but on one particular occasion. He was being called to speak in the European Parliament by President Borrell when he unfortunately stepped out to take a very important phone call and left just an empty chair next to a startled UK official. President Borrell did not know who the then Minister for Europe was or what he looked like—he had been told he was a young precocious man who was raring to go—and so, thinking that the UK official was the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), he called him to speak. In the end, a cross and flustered Minister rushed into the Strasbourg plenary session to catcalls, boos, whistles and derogatory laughter—and that was after he gave his speech. It is the way his Government handled these European issues that makes this European Union Bill all the more important.

Just about everyone who has spoken has taken on board and asked the Minister for more clarification about one surprisingly consensual part of this Bill. That is the general dissatisfaction with the way we scrutinise EU legislation in this place. We talk about this quite a lot, but a written ministerial statement made a number of vague proposals. I know it was an invitation for this House to do more, but will the Minister say what he would expect this House to do to take him up on this offer? Does it involve the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee writing a letter to him, forming a team with ministerial officials and taking this matter forward? Everybody in this place wants to do the job of scrutinising European legislation better and we would like to know exactly what the slightly vague couple of sentences in the written ministerial statement actually mean.

The Bill now goes down the Corridor and the strange noises we hear in the background are those of tombs opening and biographies being dusted down by the great and the good of the former diplomatic service, who intend to remind everybody of how everything was so much better when they were left to operate behind closed doors with few checks or balances and how those bloomin’ elected people, of all political persuasions, down the other end of the Corridor are wrong because they always try to react to public opinion. I would like to think that one of the strongest arguments for this Bill is the fact that we are dragging all this out into the open and binding the hands of Ministers when they go into negotiations in Europe, although not as much as I would like. The noise that is coming in opposition to the Bill only strengthens the Minister’s hands in getting this through.