European Union Bill

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I should begin by apologising to the House for being so keen to table a number of new clauses and amendments at this late stage. It is not as if there is anything better going on in my life. It is not that Arsenal are playing Barcelona tonight, and I could have been watching that. Actually, as a referee I do not like Arsenal that much, but I could have been refereeing the football game between the Press Lobby against the Crown Prosecution Service—and I have a family, and there is a dinner that I could have gone too.

However, I did want to point out to the Minister that there are some fairly big gaps in the Bill, which came to my notice rather later than they should have. New clause 3 concerns the emergency brake, especially in the context of criminal justice matters. New clause 4 concerns the post-2013 financial framework. New clause 5 concerns own resources decisions and EU taxes. I have also tabled a range of complementary amendments.

New clause 3 deserves some explanation. Certain European laws proposed under the treaty on the functioning of the European Union are subject to the emergency brake procedure. Such proposals are adopted by qualified majority voting in the Council, and relate to social security and procedural and substantive criminal law. When an EU law on social security is proposed under article 48 of the TFEU, a member state can declare that the proposal

“would affect important aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system”,

and, having done so, can request that the proposal be referred to the European Council. The proposal is then so referred, and the Council suspends its consideration of the measure.

When an EU law on procedural or substantive criminal law is proposed under article 82(2) or article 83 and a member state considers that the proposal

“would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system”,

that member state may request that the proposal be referred to the European Council. The proposal is then so referred, and the Council suspends its consideration of the measure. A member state’s ability to stop the adoption of a proposal subject to qualified majority voting in that way is known as the emergency brake.

After the proposal has been referred to the European Council, the Council may refer the proposal back to the other Council, which then resumes consideration of the measure, taking decisions by qualified majority voting. However, there must be a consensus in the European Council for the proposal to be referred back. That means that any member state can block the proposal. Under United Kingdom law, the decision on whether to invoke the emergency brake lies solely with the Government. Parliament cannot insist that this happen, and the Bill, alas, will not change that. In contrast, the German Parliament can oblige the German Government to press the emergency brake on any of those matters. New clause 3 would cover all EU proposals subject to the emergency brake except for the proposals that would fall under clause 9(4) of the Bill. It would, however, require the final draft of the proposals to go before both Houses of Parliament, either of which could require that the emergency brake be pressed.

Back in January, in response to a letter that I had sent dealing with various aspects of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe wrote to me that there was nothing to prevent a member state from pressing the emergency brake repeatedly on a proposal. That means that, should Parliament remain dissatisfied with the proposal after it has been referred to the Council by the European Council following a use of the emergency brake, Parliament could insist that the brake be pressed again.

Subsection (4) of new clause 3 is intended to accommodate the possible scenario in which the European Council seeks to come to a consensus on a final draft of the proposal, which would be referred back to the Council for formal adoption straight away. It seems to make sense that the Government should be able to ask Parliament at that point whether the final proposal is acceptable, rather than the Government’s simply agreeing to refer it back to the Council and not insisting that the emergency brake be triggered.

I have been discussing new clause 4 with the Minister’s officials, and have been told that its provisions are probably covered in the Bill. A handful of proposals subject to the emergency brake would appear to be covered by clause 9(4). I would appreciate the Minister’s confirming that, at the end of a convoluted process—during which the British Government might know that a proposal under QMV is to be adopted so they do not vote for it or abstain, but vote against—we in this Parliament could still have our foot firmly on the emergency brake.

[Steve Baker]

I admire my hon. Friend’s tenacity, but I am only a simple engineer, so may I confirm that he has said that this House is unable to assert its sovereignty in relation to criminal justice?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I was not asserting that, although we have given away lots of justice and home affairs powers, and I do not think many Members or many of the British people fully appreciate how much we have potentially given away. This is an important point. Although the Bill has many problems, the referendum lock would ensure that we do not go down such a route in respect of the European public prosecutor and other matters to do with the criminal justice system. The measure I am talking about came in under the Lisbon treaty. No country has pressed the emergency brake yet. I would like to think that the Government would trust Parliament sufficiently for Parliament to have its foot on that brake, rather than for the Government alone to have their foot on it.

--- Later in debate ---

New clause 5 addresses a concern that many people share. In September, the President of the European Commission, President Barroso, started reigniting the flame on what is called in Europe own resources decisions, but which is essentially a European tax. I strongly believe that any tax imposed at the European level should be subject to a vote of the British people. That is not only a massive transfer of sovereignty, but it changes a fundamental relationship between us and the EU.

[Steve Baker]

(Wycombe) (Con): Does my hon. Friend not agree, however, that the fact of the situation in which we find ourselves is that the British people have no say about their EU budget contribution?