Phone Hacking

Jack Straw Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

To be fair to my right hon. Friend, the issue of the Information Commissioner’s reports—particularly the two reports he mentions—really is a rebuke not just to the previous Government but to the then Opposition. We too should have made more of those reports, which included some very important detail about what was going wrong in data handling, data theft and the rest of it. We must ensure that the inquiry asks the question, “Why were they ignored, and what are we going to do about it now?”

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

May I commend the Prime Minister on the appointment of Lord Justice Leveson, who, as I am sure the Justice Secretary will confirm, is a man of the highest intelligence and integrity, and extremely well equipped to take on the job? On the future regulation of the press, I urge the Prime Minister not to fall into the trap that some in the press are setting, by asserting that any degree of statutory regulation is bound to lead to an end of self-regulation. Given that Express Newspapers has withdrawn from the Press Complaints Commission, as it did in January, will he acknowledge that some measures may have to be imposed by statute so that there is a stronger system of self-regulation?

[The Prime Minister]

The right hon. Gentleman speaks some very wise words. There are ways of setting up a regulatory system that is effectively independent, that is non-statutory, that does not have the Government’s fingertips all over it, as it were, and that can do a good and trusted job, as we see in the case of advertising standards. In any case, this matter will not now be for us, but for the inquiry, and it is important that the inquiry should look into it carefully.

Counter-terrorism

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. and learned Friend is entirely right. Clearly, this was a painstaking operation—if you like, a painstaking piece of detective work—that went on for many, many months. I can tell from speaking to President Obama that this was not some chance opportunity that came up but a piece of very careful work put in place over months and an operation clearly carried out with great professionalism and skill.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

The Prime Minister rightly talks about three strands of a strategy to deal with the continuing problem of al-Qaeda. May I suggest that there is an additional strand, to pick up his point about the pernicious ideology of al-Qaeda, which in many ways remains the most enduring threat posed by al-Qaeda, notwithstanding the demise of its leader? Although there is no silver bullet, so far as here at home is concerned we need to continue programmes to deal with underachievement by some—not all—Asian heritage groups in schools and underemployment of them at work in order to reduce the opportunities for their minds to be taken over by this ideology.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Two weeks ago, I re-watched “Hotel Rwanda”, the chilling film portrayal of the massacres of the defenceless civilians who were hacked to pieces by the so-called forces of law and order because they had the misfortune to belong to the wrong ethnic group. In July 2005, when the UK had the EU presidency, I went to Srebrenica in Bosnia for the 10th anniversary commemoration of the day in 1995 when 10,000 unarmed civilians were brutally murdered by the forces of law and order because, in that case, they had had the misfortune to belong to the wrong religious group.

In Rwanda and Bosnia, the UN solemnly considered what it should do. In both theatres, there were already blue-hatted UN troops on the ground, but they stood by as the massacres took place in front of them. Those troops were there as peacekeepers, but there was no peace to keep—rather, peace urgently needed to be made.

Doing nothing in the face of evil is as much a decision with consequences as doing something. This resolution is historically significant not just on its own terms, but because, as we heard from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, this is first occasion on which the Security Council has acted decisively upon the words relating to the responsibility to protect, which were agreed in the UN General Assembly in 2005, and in Security Council resolution 1674 2006.

[Martin Horwood]

I worked for Oxfam at the time of the Rwanda crisis and I strongly remember the awful situation in which UN forces found themselves. I hope the right hon. Gentleman was not implying fault on the part of the blue hats themselves, because their rules of engagement constrained them. The progress that the international community has made leading to the responsibility to protect is of course very positive.

[Mr Straw]

I was implying no such criticism of the blue hats. The responsibility for what did not happen in Rwanda and Bosnia rested and rests with the Security Council and the international community, which failed to take action in the face of what amounted to genocide.

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) for twice mentioning that former Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his groundbreaking speech in Chicago in 1999, laid the foundation for what six years later became the agreement on the responsibility to protect.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the efforts and success of our diplomats in the UN Security Council in ensuring the correct wording of resolution 1973 should be well recommended?

[Mr Straw]

The hon. Gentleman anticipates what I was going to say, but I am happy to put that on the record, not least because as a former member of the Foreign Office diplomatic service, he served me and my predecessors and successors very well.

We all know what the consequences of doing nothing about Colonel Gaddafi would have been: industrial-scale slaughter. The medium and longer-term consequences of the military enforcement of Security Council resolution 1973 will be more benign, but we must recognise that the situation is fraught with uncertainties. The progress towards democracy in Libya and elsewhere in the middle east, which all hon. Members and the peoples of the region seek, will be inherently more difficult than eastern Europe’s progress towards democracy after the Berlin wall came down 20 years ago.

The middle east is a tough region, and its democrats will face two primary threats: the autocrats such as Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, or Presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali; and alternatively, those who wish to misuse and misinterpret the great and noble religion of Islam to establish backward-looking autocracies no less terrible than those of Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein.

Ultimately, the solution has to lie in the hands of the people of Libya and these other countries, but the international community—the United Kingdom included—can profoundly influence the final outcome by taking the right action or by inaction. I welcome what the Prime Minister said about the plans on which Her Majesty’s Government are already working. However, I hope that they will also draw together and publish a strategy setting out the UK’s vision for the region and the assistance they will provide, as part of an international programme, for an economic and political reconstruction of Libya carried out by the Libyans for the Libyans. I hope that that will include not just traditional overseas aid, but the work of an enhanced Westminster Foundation for Democracy, to nurture and sustain the growth of democratic institutions.

As we have heard, there are those who are reluctant or unwilling to support our action in Libya, and who seek a rationalisation for that inaction by making the relativist argument that we should not intervene in Libya unless or until we also intervene in, for example, Yemen, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. The immediate answer is that Libya is by far and away the most egregious case. I condemn the brutality elsewhere in the region as strongly as anybody else, but processes are under way in some parts—not all—of the region that might succeed, and in any event the democratic forces in those and other countries across the region will be greatly strengthened, not weakened, by the action we are taking in Libya. In my view, provided there is international pressure behind it, the revolution in attitudes sweeping the region will also increase the pressure on the Government of Israel properly to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians. No longer can the Government of Israel rely on complacent and compliant countries on their borders within the Arab world.

There is a parallel with Iraq, and I understand—why would I not?—its controversy. However, there is not the least doubt—not least from the mouth of Colonel Gaddafi himself—that but for the military action in Iraq, Gaddafi would never have given up his well-advanced nuclear weapons programme and a significant part of his chemical weapons programme. In the end, he had to give them up. Gaddafi without nuclear weapons is dangerous enough, as we have seen; Gaddafi with such weapons would have been far more dangerous—perhaps so dangerous that the international community would have been prevented from dealing with him today.

I salute our military personnel, as they are placed, yet again, in harm’s way on our behalf and that of the international community. I give my wholehearted support to the motion before the House, and I commend the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary for their indefatigable work in securing—against the odds—the resolution.

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[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), who is Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee. I hope to return to one of his observations later in my speech.

On Friday, I described the Prime Minister’s drive towards achieving the resolution as showing “courage and leadership”, but today let me first pay tribute to the courage and leadership shown by our armed forces. As John Nichol found when he was enforcing the no-fly zone in Iraq, those who fly into hostile territory take extreme personal risks. As ever, we make decisions that they then carry out, and we owe them as much as they are prepared to sacrifice on our behalf, which is everything. In that context, it was an extreme honour to be in the Chamber to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Kris Hopkins). It was one of the most powerful and moving speeches that I have heard in the House, and I hope that others listen to it as well.

However, political actions, too, show moral courage or the lack of it. The safe thing to do would have been to leave the leadership to the United States or to countries nearer to Libya, probably in Africa. There was a large chance—and I have to say that it was my own expectation—that the resolution would fail. Demanding publicly something quite so controversial shows not only real clarity about what is right and wrong, but a willingness to risk rebuff and potential humiliation in order to do right. I am proud that we have a Prime Minister and a Foreign Secretary who are willing to take such risks.

All the arguments against the resolution were considered by the United Nations in exhaustive detail and, in the end, rejected. Britain’s United Nations ambassador, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, is clearly a persuasive and respected man and is very, very good at what he does. We could have said that it was a matter for the Libyans; we could have left it to them, whatever the cost to civilians. But when the League of Arab States takes a different view, that suggests strongly that we ourselves should consider whether we should be so laissez-faire: our doing so would have had consequences elsewhere. Just as Arab countries were showing themselves ready to throw off tyranny, we would have been sending the message that the correct response for a tyrant is, in Gaddafi’s words, to show no pity and no mercy, and that message would have been heeded throughout the world. I therefore entirely support the motion.

However, this is only the beginning. There are some serious questions that need answering, and they will trouble those who support the motion just as much as they will trouble those who do not. First, what is the end state that we want to achieve? Obviously we would like to see the back of Gaddafi, but that is not part of the United Nations resolution; so with what will we be satisfied? Secondly, in general terms, what is our strategy for reaching whatever end state we wish to be satisfied with, and how will we decide when we have done so?

[Mr Straw]

The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, correct to say that “getting rid of Gaddafi” is not part of resolution 1973, but the resolution that preceded it—resolution 1970, which provides for the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to investigate crimes against humanity in Libya—could easily bring about the arrest and incarceration of Colonel Gaddafi under international law. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we need to factor that into our strategy?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I entirely agree. On Friday I asked whether the aims of resolution 1973 were impossible to reach unless Gaddafi were gone. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, however, said that the resolution was about giving protection to the civilians, with which I entirely agree. He went on to say that it was about giving the Libyan people the chance to determine their own future. I do not see anything in the resolution that says that, but I think we need to be clear about it.

Thirdly, will further resolutions from the United Nations be needed or sought as a result of some of the questions that will arise during this debate?

The fourth question is about exactly how far the advice of the Attorney-General takes us. We must be absolutely clear about what is sanctioned by the resolution and what is not. The summary of the Attorney-General’s advice is clear, because enforcing the no-fly zone is clearly allowed by the UN resolution. However, we need to know not only that what we are doing is legal but how far, legally, we are entitled to go. We must not leave a chink that will let people say, “The resolution allowed some things, true, but not this.”

Fifthly, will the Treasury be generous? Will my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer allow the Ministry of Defence to concentrate, at least for the next few months, on these operations rather than on its desperate scrabble to find the extra £1 billion, for this year alone, to which it was committed in the strategic defence and security review but which it still has not identified?

Sixthly, does my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary agree that ruling out the use of occupation forces does not rule out the use of ground forces? I am talking not just about search and rescue helicopters, which my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Dan Byles) mentioned during the Prime Minister’s speech, but about identifying targets that are free of civilians.

Seventhly, there is the difficult question of whether the ceasefire applies to the rebels. If the rebels try, in response to breaches of the ceasefire by Gaddafi, to retake areas that he has taken, should we use military force to stop them? That would seem a bit strange, but does the UN resolution permit the facilitation of arms supplies to the alternative Government, and if so should the United Kingdom be helping to provide that?

These are things that we do not know, as a result of the UN resolution, and we might need a further resolution to clarify things. Many more issues will arise, but I support this action. The House will not give a blank cheque to this action, so I welcome the Prime Minister’s willingness to return to the House to keep us updated on something that is moving very fast.

Japan and the Middle East

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 14th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. and learned Friend made a strong and persuasive argument in his newspaper article this morning. I make three points. First, on the issue of mercenaries, what is happening is unacceptable. We should be sending the clearest possible message to those in Mali, Chad and elsewhere who are thinking of volunteering as mercenaries, and we should put into the next UN resolution the strongest possible language about mercenaries. Secondly, the same should apply to policing the arms embargo against the Gaddafi regime, because there are signs that he is seeking additional armaments right now. Thirdly, I hear clearly the argument —it is an ingenious argument that only a lawyer of my right hon. and learned Friend’s brilliance could make—about the specific way the arms embargo was termed towards the country that Gaddafi effectively renamed, but I am not sure it is an opinion that is shared by all other lawyers.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I was going to ask the Prime Minister about the nature of the duties on the Security Council. Five years ago, a high level working group established by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recommended that the responsibilities—the duties—of the Security Council should be broadened from protecting international peace and security to a “responsibility to protect” populations from internal humanitarian disaster, even where that did not directly pose a threat across the borders of those countries. Does the Prime Minister agree that as well as the commendable action that the British Government are taking to push the international community to deal with the immediate problem of Libya, we need to use this terrible example to press our partners internationally to broaden the remit of the Security Council so that we never get another Bosnia or Rwanda or, maybe tragically, another Libya?

[The Prime Minister]

The right hon. Gentleman has considerable expertise on this issue. The responsibility to protect has been pushed forward and debated, and I remember asking questions in opposition, at the time of problems in Burma and elsewhere, on whether it should be invoked. What the lawyers will advise, quite rightly, is that things have moved on and changed since Bosnia. It seems to me that one of the things we are trying to do here is learn the lessons of Iraq and the lessons of Bosnia, where the international community was neither fast enough, nor indeed decisive enough in responding.

Libya and the Middle East

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I do think that there are lessons to learn from the deal in the desert. The previous Government were correct to encourage the giving up of weapons of mass destruction, but more parameters should have been put on the relationship, particularly— I have made the point before—regarding the release of al-Megrahi. It should not have been the British Government’s position to try to facilitate that. Lessons need to be learned more broadly about that, and I am sure that there will be an opportunity to do so.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I echo the commendations of our forces and diplomatic and other staff who have worked hard to provide an adequate service for British citizens and others stranded in Libya. I commend the other actions that the Government are now taking, but may I ask the Prime Minister to expand on the point he made in his statement about what he described as greater redundancy for responding to future crises, by which I assume he meant greater resilience and greater resources. Does he accept that cutting Foreign Office staff by 450 to save £30 million at a time when its budgets are flat cannot do other than significantly undermine its ability to respond adequately and promptly when the next crisis occurs?

[The Prime Minister]

I obviously listen to the right hon. Gentleman, given his experience. The cuts to the Foreign Office are much less severe than cuts to other Departments, so I do not think that that has had a material impact. As for the issue of redundancy, clearly in the case of Egypt, the combination of scheduled flights and adding in charter flights meant that we led the pack in getting people out. In Libya, the situation was different and more difficult, and we need to learn the lessons about what extra capacity we need to put in place. As I have said, it is not as simple as some people think, because if capacity is added too quickly, scheduled flights collapse—bmi and BA both fly to Libya—and you land yourself with a bigger problem. The lessons should be learned. The only point that I would make now is that, as we stand today, Britain is doing a huge amount to help other countries out of Libya, and is helping more than 32 nationalities.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Jack Straw Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I apologise that I was not here at the commencement of these proceedings—I got caught short in the gymnasium.

I put it to my hon. Friend that it scarcely lies in the mouths of the Conservatives to challenge the authority of the other place when they were happy to see that authority used to the greatest extent on these provisions just before the election when they vetoed their inclusion from the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

[Chris Bryant]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. In addition, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives so respect the House of Lords that they have decided to pack it with pliant Members so that they can start getting better results in votes. I praise those Members of the House of Lords, including Baroness Trumpington, who has never voted against the Conservative Whip, and who is notwithstanding a very splendid woman, who today decided to vote for the amendment in the name of Lord Rooker.

I support the alternative vote, but to me it is an even more important principle that the views of the British people, completely and definitively established, are enacted. That is why Lord Rooker’s threshold is appropriate.

Finally, the Minister’s amendment in lieu has absolutely no value. It would mean merely that the process that is already adopted by the Electoral Commission would be implemented. He knows that it is a chimera—the smile without the Cheshire cat.

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[Kevin Brennan]

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), I support AV and will vote yes in the referendum.

Hon. Members might wonder about the Minister’s desperate desire to sit down without explaining the amendment that he is asking us to send back to the House of Lords. He knows that in the other place Members rightly think that this House has not properly considered the matter, not least because he hogged all the time yesterday when he gave us an hour for debate. Now we have a mere hour to do the same, and many hon. Members want the opportunity to speak. We still have not considered the matter fully and had a full and proper debate in the House.

[Mr Straw]

Picking up the point made by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), does my hon. Friend accept that the coalition agreement, or the needs of the Liberal Democrats, has undermined the traditional relationship between this place and the other place? In every previous example that I can think of when we were in government, there would have been a compromise in such a situation. That was the case scores of times, but Ministers lack any authority to grant a compromise.

[Kevin Brennan]

My right hon. Friend is right. I shall come to that point.

The Minister is still trying to obfuscate over the threshold and suggest that in some way it would negate the proposals in the Bill. What is unusual about the proposed referendum is that the Government are making it binding. Normally under our constitution, referendums have been advisory to Parliament, not binding in their outcome, and that includes the devolution referendums that were mentioned. The difference in threshold in the Scotland and Wales Bill back in 1979 was that it required 40% of those voting to vote in a certain way.

All the amendment does is say that if 40% of people fail to vote in total in the referendum, Parliament should reconsider the matter. That is an entirely different and reasonable position and in keeping with the traditions of our constitution that referendums are advisory and not binding, particularly when turnout is so low.

The amendment that we are sending down to the House of Lords is an insult to the other place. The Minister’s puerile explanation of it and the cursory way he dealt with the amendment that he is now asking us to vote for was a complete insult to our intelligence and that of the public.

I am afraid that when one lifts a stone in this place, procedurally what one sees underneath is sometimes quite unpleasant. Constitutionally, the Minister had to table an amendment, but instead of putting down a serious amendment that attempted to meet the House of Lords somewhere along the line of compromise, he tabled the parliamentary equivalent of a colouring-in book; he had to fill it in with something and so produced this puerile and meaningless amendment. It is an insult to the other place and to our intelligence. They sit there on the Front Bench, hairy man and smooth man, abusing our constitution. The Government should try to meet the other place somewhere on the spectrum of compromise. That would have been the reasonable thing to do and in line with our constitution.

As someone who will vote yes to AV in the forthcoming referendum and encourage as many people as possible to vote, I think that the idea that this House should not even have the constitutional right to look at the outcome of the referendum if only a very small number of people vote is an insult to democracy.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 15th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman is right. One of the most convincing arguments was heard in our previous debates in this House, which is that a turnout threshold effectively makes every abstention a no vote. People abstain from voting in referendums for any number of reasons, but treating all those who abstain as effectively expressing a preference is not the right thing to do. A turnout threshold would give those in favour of a no vote a positive incentive to stay at home. As I said in our earlier debate, we should, as democrats, encourage people to go out there and vote yes or no. The important thing is that people take part, and a turnout threshold would encourage some of them to stay at home.

Such a barrier would also create some very strange mathematical scenarios. For example, if 39% of the electorate turned out, the result would not be binding, even if 75% of those votes were in favour of change. So, even if the public had expressed a clear preference, it would not count. On the other hand, a result in which 41% of the public had turned out, even if it were a narrow 51%:49% result, would count. There is no logic to that proposal; it makes no sense.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

This whole argument is against a motion that was not passed in the other place. It is against one that was defeated where there was a threshold that amounted to a veto on the result if the turnout were below that threshold. Does the Minister not accept that this Lords amendment is completely different in character? All it does—although it is a very important “all”—is to ensure that if there is a turnout of less than 40% in total, the matter will come back to this House. To pick up the Minister’s example, if, say, there were a 39% turnout and 75% of that 39% had voted in favour of a change in the voting system, I cannot conceive that this House would fail to endorse it. On the other hand, if there were a 25% turnout and if it were approved by only—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

In fairness, many Members want to contribute to the debate. Can we please come to the end of the question?

[Mr Straw]

In those other circumstances, the House would surely think again. Is that not a very sensible way of proceeding?

[Mr Harper]

No, I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman. The Government are simply trying to ensure that the public get the choice. If we insert a threshold—even the one put forward by the noble Lord Rooker, which was supported in the other place by a majority of only one—it effectively means that we are saying to the public that even where there was a clear decision, it would not be binding and the matter would come back to this House. If we were to agree with it, there would be no point; if we were to overturn it, it would be outrageous. Thresholds are not part of the traditions and practice in this country. We have discussed the one example of where it was used, and we found that it was not a very good precedent.

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[Stephen Williams]

I am about to stop to allow others to get in. Bristol’s turnout is traditionally higher than that of most of the other great urban areas of this country, yet we do not say that the people elected to run our great cities in England are not fairly elected and cannot make those decisions. We do not have thresholds for those elections, so we should not have a threshold in this circumstance either.

[Mr Straw]

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), I am a supporter of the alternative vote system, as I have made clear, not least in a tract that few people read, to which I contributed with my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr Hain) in 1986. I also spelt it out in this House on 9 February 2010 in a very big debate on AV. On the issue of consistency, the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) may recall that he voted against the whole idea of having a referendum on AV then, so there is always a place in heaven for sinners to repent. On the threshold, I say to him that the excuse of technical defects in an amendment is the last refuge of a Minister who has nothing to say. If the only problems with Lord Rooker’s amendment are technical defects, he should ask the parliamentary counsel to draft amendments and they will go through like a dose of salts.

On the principle, the Minister was arguing against an all-or-nothing threshold, saying that if we did not reach the threshold—this is a very different one from that for the Scottish Assembly in 1979—the whole referendum result would be nugatory. That is not the case here, because this is a skilfully put together threshold. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda says, it does not render nugatory a result on a 39% or 35% turnout; it brings the matter back to this House. However, were the turnout derisory, we would of course need to think again. For those reasons, I strongly urge hon. Members from all parts of the House, regardless of their view on the merits or otherwise of AV, to vote for this Lords amendment.

[Mr Cash]

Last night, Lord Rooker, to whom I pay great tribute, said that his amendment required tweaking, which is what my amendment (a) does. In a nutshell, it says that if the threshold of 40% is not reached, the Minister would have an obligation to introduce legislation to repeal the alternative vote provisions. Why do I say that?

EU Council and North Africa

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 7th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

As ever, my right hon. and learned Friend brings a mixture of experience and precision to this issue. We were told by the previous Government what they did not want, which was the death of al-Megrahi in a Scottish prison, but we were not told by the previous Government what they did want, which was the facilitation of his release. That comes over, time and again. The most powerful point that my right hon. and learned Friend makes is this: in the end, that man was convicted of the largest mass murder in British history, which should have been the thought coursing through ministerial veins and brains when Ministers wrote those memos and made those speeches.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I fully understand the Prime Minister’s concern and that of colleagues on both sides of the House about the timing and circumstances of the release of Mr Megrahi. However, having read the Cabinet Secretary’s report in full, which I have here, may I say that it was wrong of the Prime Minister to elide quotations from the Cabinet Secretary’s conclusions with his own gloss, implying that those were indeed the conclusions? As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has spelt out, and contrary to the implication that the Prime Minister has given to the House, the Cabinet Secretary concluded that nothing in the material that he reviewed contradicts anything that my right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary told this House on 12 October in a detailed statement or anything that my right hon. Friend the former Prime Minister has said at any time on this issue. The conclusions back up the continued assertion made by the former Prime Minister, the former Foreign Secretary and me, as the Prime Minister has finally admitted through gritted teeth, that there was no pressure from BP on the Scottish Government, that we acted properly at all times and, moreover, that at no stage did we ever suggest to the Scottish Government what decision they should take.

On so-called facilitation, let me read to the House the very next sentence. It

“amounted to: proceeding with ratification of the PTA”,

which was in hand anyway,

“explaining to Libya in factual terms the process for application for transfer under a PTA…and informing the Scottish Government that there was no legal barrier to transfer under the PTA”.

That was all known before and does not contradict what my right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary said at the time.

[The Prime Minister]

Let me make two points gently to the right hon. Gentleman. First, although the Cabinet Secretary rightly, in my view, finds that nothing in this report contradicts what the then Foreign Secretary did say, my point is purely this: this is about what was not in that statement. That is because when we look at what is in the report, we find that it is very clear that there were all sorts of things—facilitations and game plans—that we were not made aware of.

I do not want, in any way, to misquote what Gus O’Donnell has done in a very good report. The conclusions in paragraph 34 state:

“Policy was therefore progressively developed that HMG should do all it could, whilst respecting devolved competences, to facilitate an appeal by the Libyans to the Scottish Government for Mr Megrahi’s transfer under the PTA or release on compassionate grounds… as the best outcome for managing the risks faced by the UK.”

All right hon. and hon. Members will be able to make up their mind whether what we were told by the previous Government was a full and complete picture. Everyone can make up their mind and I am pretty sure what a reasonable person will come to.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Jack Straw Excerpts

Wednesday 24th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Laing]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is correct. I recognise that that is why he put his name to the amendment. It is a pity that we have not had an opportunity in some other way to go into these matters. However, I reiterate that the Committee has an opportunity now to consider matters relating to exclusive cognisance and the Standing Orders. I hope the Committee will take that opportunity, but I have every confidence that the Minister will also take the opportunity to reassure us. Amendment 33 is merely an alternative that I put before the Committee for consideration.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Since my elevation to the Back Benches six weeks ago, I have put a number of supplementary questions by way of interventions. This is the first time that I have spoken from the Back Benches in 23 years.

It is a delight to follow the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), who represents my home area, Loughton in Essex, where from a very early age I used to be sent out delivering leaflets and canvassing against the local Conservative party, never to any effect. My mother continued to represent the area in which we lived, first on the district council and later on the town council, until she was in her 80s. Thankfully, she is still alive.

I have witnessed many occasions when a Member has moved an amendment that they do not understand. Indeed, I can think of one occasion 30 years ago on the Finance Bill when I moved an amendment that I did not understand—an embarrassment made worse by the fact that it was I who had drafted it. For the life of me, I could not work out what it meant, although I am pleased to say that officials in the Treasury, as it turned out—the Minister later showed me his briefing—had gone through all sorts of intellectual contortions to guess at that piece of total gibberish. Never before have I heard an hon. Member from either side of the House move an amendment with which they profoundly disagreed, but I admire the way in which the hon. Lady very loyally made the case for the group’s lead amendment while ensuring that her own reservations about it were put on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

My right hon. Friend is being slightly disingenuous. Is not the most obvious reason why the Bill is here, before us, that the coalition partners are worried that the other one will welsh out?

[Mr Straw]

Of course. I was going to come on to that, but I am grateful to my hon. Friend for leading me down that path. There is no reason to rush through legislation for a fixed-term Parliament, because, even if we do not have the Bill, there is no prospect of a general election being called, in almost any circumstances, within the next three years.

The Liberal Democrat and Labour parties were committed by their manifestos to the principle of a fixed-term Parliament, but the Conservatives’ proposal ran directly counter to that, because it stated that a general election should be called within six months of any change of Prime Minister, meaning that, if the Prime Minister had suddenly passed away or something else had happened to him and he was no longer in office, we could have had a general election within a twelvemonth.

We know, however, that the structure of the Bill and the rush derive not from the pursuit of a sensible idea for which there is all-party support, but from narrow, partisan reasons related to the internal chemistry that both parties feared and, I think, still fear could be explosive in difficult circumstances.

[Mrs Laing]

indicated assent.

[Mr Straw]

I am glad to have the hon. Lady’s endorsement.

As we know, that was precisely the reason why, miraculously, of all the numbers that the coalition partners could have chosen, they originally alighted on the trigger level of 55%, because it would have given neither partner the ability to force an early general election against the wishes of the other.

[Mr MacNeil]

The right hon. Gentleman says that there is no prospect of a general election for a number of years, but may I mischievously suggest that he shows greater faith in the coalition partners than they show in themselves and each other?

[Mr Straw]

I would like to have such faith. My faith in the Conservative party’s ability to pursue its own interests and survival and to consume other, minor parties—mainly ones beginning with ‘L’—is always high. My faith in the Liberal Democrat party’s ability to secure its own survival was never particularly strong and has completely plummeted following the coalition deal. Shortly after the election, a Conservative peer told me—literally licking his lips at the prospect—of how he would happily predict that the parliamentary Liberal Democrat party would go the same way as previous Liberal parties, once they had been embraced by the suffocating hug of the Conservative party, and disappear for a number of decades into oblivion. I am glad to see that the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) is, if not quite licking his lips, smiling in approbation at the prospect.

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman neglects to mention the Lib-Lab pact in the late ’70s, which I am sure he will remember, and that the Liberals got through unscathed.

[Mr Straw]

But the pact was not with the Conservative party. Sadly, in some ways, the Labour party is far less ruthless than the Conservative party when it comes to worrying about its own survival. I am happy to discuss the details and the highways and byways of the Lib-Lab pact, because I worked as a special adviser, as they were pompously called and, I think, still are, to the great Peter Shore at the time—and necessary it was, too. In those days, at least the Liberals had some sense of which side they were on, but they have abandoned even that idea since.

I shall speak specifically to amendment 4 in the name of the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) and many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, which would delete clause 2(1)(c), the measure providing the two-thirds trigger for a Dissolution. The hon. Lady made a slip of the tongue that, as often with such slips, held a revealing truth. She talked of a motion of “no consequences”, rather than a motion of no confidence, and, apart from the fact that I object to the idea of special majorities in the House, it seems to me that the trigger is wholly redundant, unnecessary and, indeed, offends the role of the House in holding the Executive to account. Now that the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives have had to abandon the completely naked idea of a 55% trigger, which would have enabled the most extraordinary circumstances to arise, they should abandon the provision before us, including the two-thirds trigger, altogether.

The provision was included in the Bill as a copy-out from sections 3 and 46 of the Scotland Act 1998. The Deputy Prime Minister first tried to make up the arguments for the measure on the hoof, and somebody pointed out to him that such a trigger existed in the 1998 Act. He suggested that it was a completely rigid trigger, and that the only way in which an election for the Scottish Parliament could be called was by a two-thirds majority of every MSP. Closer examination of sections 3 and 46 of the 1998 Act shows that that is simply not the case, however.

Section 3 does, indeed, provide for an early election if

“two-thirds of the total number”

of MSPs vote for one or, as subsection (1)(b) goes on to state, if

“any period during which the Parliament is required…to nominate one of its members…as First Minister ends without such a nomination being made.”

Under section 46, the First Minister’s nomination is by a simple majority. If it transpires that nobody in the Scottish Parliament can command a simple majority—in other words that no confidence in either party is declared and the Government in Scotland cannot continue—there is by virtue of that fact an election, and that is entirely right.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I am listening carefully to the right hon. Gentleman, and I want to push him on the points that he is making. The possibility of a no-confidence vote still exists in the Bill, and if a Government could not be formed in 14 days we would go to a general election. Would he prefer the power to call a general election to remain solely in the gift of the Prime Minister or in the gift of this House?

[Mr Straw]

I am in favour of a fixed-term Parliament, although I would have wished it to be four years. So, too, did the Liberal Democrats wish it to be four years. Indeed, they spelled that out in a document dated 10 May 2010 headed “Recovery and Renewal”, which contained their proposals in the coalition talks for what became the coalition agreement. I am indebted not to the department of open government in the Liberal Democrat headquarters for providing wider sight of this, because whatever they think about the Freedom of Information Act 2000, they certainly do not apply it to themselves, but to the New Statesman and its website. For greater accuracy, however, I have a copy here. It says:

“Immediate legislation to…set the date of the next election for June 2014, and establish”—

[Tristram Hunt (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab)]

Ah!

[Mr Straw]

I will repeat that because I know that my hon. Friend must have misheard it:

“Immediate legislation to…set the date of the next election for June 2014, and establish the principle of four-year fixed term Parliaments in future.”

[Interruption.] The Deputy Leader of the House is mumbling from a sedentary position. If he thinks that I have misread that, I am extremely happy to be corrected. However, it ill behoves the Liberal Democrats—I am sorry, I almost said the Conservatives: that was a Freudian slip—and, particularly, the Deputy Prime Minister to suggest that a five-year term is a matter of principle, as opposed to a four-year term, when they proposed a four-year term and agreed to a five-year term only as a result of some rather scrubby back-stairs deal.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Office of the Leader of the House of Commons (Mr David Heath)]

Let me try to help the right hon. Gentleman, because I do not believe that he was here on the first day of Committee when we debated this matter, which is in clause 1. As we are now on clause 2, I do not want him to find himself out of order.

[Mr Straw]

I am sure that that is a matter for the Chair, but I was simply trying to provide a comprehensive answer to the hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke).

If we have a fixed-term Parliament, then of course the power of the Prime Minister to call an election is very significantly modified. I am concerned about the rights of this House. This House works by passing legislation, and all other matters, on the basis of votes by a simple majority. If we had a written constitution, which I am not against, we could have a separate debate about whether there should be some means or other of entrenching certain basic provisions. We are doing that in practice for some, but not others, by way of referendum, and for some, but not others, by way of convention and cross-party consensus. Meanwhile, however, regarding how this place works and good governance, we operate on the basis of a simple majority.

What we should be doing in the Bill is laying down a fixed term—I would prefer it to be four years, but it is going to be five—and then accepting the reality that circumstances could arise in which a Government of the day lost the confidence of the House. There is no alternative to that. No new Prime Minister could suddenly pop up and regain the confidence of the House. That being the case, there has to be an election, as happened after four and a half years of the ’74 to ’79 Government. It seems to me that those should be the only circumstances that should trigger an early election. I do not want there to be provision whereby, by some method or another, whether it is by a majority of a half, 55% or 67.5%, a package of Members can be got together in order to hold a general election. Nor do I think that those provisions would ever be used, because they are so complicated. There is no point in our passing legislation that has no significant purpose.

[Mr MacNeil]

I am genuinely listening with an open mind to what the right hon. Gentleman is saying about a simple majority in Parliament. However, how can we control a Prime Minister who has a majority in the House and whips his party to vote for his will? How can we maintain the power of the Parliament when the Prime Minister controls parliamentarians through the Whips?

[Mr Straw]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point as to whether a Prime Minister anxious for a general election could engineer a vote of no confidence. Even if these provisions stand as they are in the Bill, that would still be a technical possibility.

[Mr MacNeil]

It would be less likely.

[Mr Straw]

No, it would not. There is nothing in paragraph (c) that would, in law, prevent a Prime Minister from being party to an arrangement to secure his own demise and go for a general election. If these provisions go through, there will be nothing, in law, that can be done about that theoretical possibility.

Professor Robert Hazell, in evidence to the Lords Constitution Committee, made a very pertinent comment on this point when he said that political incentives should prove a force for stability. Whatever may have been appropriate in Germany in one very unusual case where the Chancellor did indeed arrange to move a motion of no confidence in his own Government, the prospect of a Prime Minister of this country coming to the House to move a motion of no confidence in his own Administration without suffering immediate popular and parliamentary derision, and a significant loss of votes at the poll that would then follow, is fanciful.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I might have expected that the right hon. Gentleman would hit the nail on the head. He is really talking about the great damage that lies within these provisions—namely, that they are in defiance of the democratic mandate. This is about Whips and patronage; it has nothing to do with the people outside. My only suggestion—it is not a criticism—would be that he may want to qualify his reference to the impact on this House by talking about the impact on our electoral and democratic system and thereby the damage done to the people of this country.

[Mr Straw]

I accept what the hon. Gentleman says and thank him for the compliment.

I have a number of rules that I try to follow in politics, one of which is that fancy tactics never work. This is a fancy tactic. I am sorry to say—it is not that I have anything personal against them—that one can see the Liberal Democrats, who were, as described by one of their members, a perpetual Opposition think-tank until they suddenly and unexpectedly found themselves in government, thinking up this wheeze on the basis that because it had happened in Scotland and, no doubt, in Latvia or Leichtenstein, it would work here. However, we have a more direct system of democracy; we may criticise, and I hope that we do. [Interruption.] I hear someone referring to Scotland. I happen to think, on reflection, that the relevant section in the Scotland Act is redundant, but different considerations applied at the time. One consideration—I mean this in no disobliging way to Scottish colleagues of all parties—is that the Scottish Parliament is a creature of this House, legally, whereas we have to be responsible for our own rules.

[Mr MacNeil]

Thanks for the SNP Government, then.

[Mr Straw]

It is the first time that I have ever been thanked for anything by a member of the Scottish National party. I hope that next April and May it says on every leaflet how deeply grateful the SNP is for the possibility and opportunity to serve in a Scottish Government and to enjoy all the rewards that have come its way from the money that the British people, of all parties, have provided.

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means]

Order. The right hon. Gentleman said that he had some rules. Could he have another rule, which is to speak to the amendments in the group?

[Mr Straw]

I am sorry that I digressed, Mr Evans.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)]

This is not a fancy tactic—I would not know one if I saw one, although if I did I am sure I would have learned it from the right hon. Gentleman. It is very straightforward. We decided that if there were a general view in the House that there should be an early election, the House should have the power to cause one.

The right hon. Gentleman gave the example of Germany. The reason why the Government there engineered a vote of confidence was because there was no other mechanism for an early election. If we were to remove our provision, then if there were a general view in the political classes and in the country that there should be an early election, the only way of having one would be for the Government to engineer a vote of no confidence. That would not be very sensible or very honest.

[Mr Straw]

We need to speak about possibilities in the real world. The only example in recent times that I can think of when a Prime Minister has wanted to call an election of choice, without any necessity due to his parliamentary majority, is that of Edward Heath in January 1974. There was no way he would have got a two-thirds majority in favour of a Dissolution. In my view, the country as a whole and the Conservative party would have been saved a great deal if there had not been an early Dissolution at that point. I simply say that if we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, which is a good idea but will have consequences, we must ensure that a Government can get booted out only if a motion of no confidence is passed.

[Chris Bryant]

Is there not one other very significant difference between the drafting of the Scotland Act 1998 and of this Bill? In Scotland, the process involves considerable consultation with wider civic society and all the political parties, because it was concluded that the electoral system should virtually guarantee that one political party would never enjoy a majority. That is very different from the situation here.

[Mr Straw]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point.

[Mr Cash]

Following the Minister’s intervention, may I take the liberty of correcting a point that was made regarding the German situation? Under the German constitution—a written constitution, of course—a two-thirds majority must be in each house, whereas the Bill’s provision applies only to the House of Commons. In addition, and more importantly, it must be two thirds of all those who vote in the Division in question, not two thirds of all seats. That is a very important difference.

[Mr Straw]

I accept that, and the history of the German constitution is very different from the history of ours, even though to a large extent we wrote it.

I will finish where I began, by referring to the explanation by the hon. Lady of the amendment that she moved, with which she does not agree. She pointed out that that was a consequence of her Committee having to rush through pre-legislative scrutiny. I sat on the Front Bench for part of the debates on the Bill, and I have yet to hear any convincing explanation from the Minister as to why they had to rush the Bill through.

[Mr MacNeil]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the higher the percentage of parliamentarians required to trigger an election, the less likely it is that any Prime Minister will call an election of choice, because it will be more difficult for them?

[Mr Straw]

If a Prime Minister really wanted to call an election of choice, they would not worry about the two-thirds majority requirement, because they would be very unlikely to get it. They would instead go for a motion of no confidence.

By legislating for a fixed-term Parliament, we will establish a clear political norm that Parliaments last for five years. Leaving aside the argument about whether the term should be four or five years, I happen to support that principle, and I believe that is where the British people are. However, if the confidence of the House is lost, or the Government of the day simply give up and vote for a motion of no confidence, there must be an election. In the absence of that, there should not.

I have arranged to go and sit in Westminster Hall at 4.30 pm to listen to a debate on a matter of interest to all Members from east Lancashire. If this debate is not concluded by then, I hope I may be excused.

[Mr Cash]

The Chamber is very empty, considering the significance of what is being done by clause 2. In a way, that reflects the decline of this Parliament, which some of us believe strongly needs to be rejuvenated, not on the basis of protestations of power being returned to the House, as we read in our manifesto, but in the reality of how legislation is introduced.

The clause is the turn of the screw by the coalition into our democratic system of government, which, at its essence, is about the individuality and votes of conscience of MPs, irrespective of the Whips and the patronage system. It creates a permanent constitutional change through a passive, silent revolution—the most silent revolution since our Parliament began. It is being done without a mandate of any kind for any party, in any manifesto, in any part of the political system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

I am more than delighted to reply to the hon. Gentleman. Sparring with him always causes me great amusement. As for what he says, there is a substantial difference. The threshold amendment that I moved on the other Bill was to do with the threshold of a number of people who would participate in the election, and not what was going on in this House. It was not even related to the question of the threshold of those who voted yes, as in the Scotland Act 1998 and the amendment of George Cunningham, the then Member for Finsbury and Islington, so there is a significant difference. I am talking about the trust that is given to us in this House and the manner in which we discharge it.

The coalition originally proposed 55%, but that was so manifestly absurd that the coalition agreement was then torn up and the figure was replaced with two thirds. If not 55%, why two thirds? The Scottish Parliament—I am using this analogy because it has already been raised, but I think that it is completely irrelevant—does not form Her Majesty’s Government. Decisions in time of war, a Finance Bill or any of the other great levers of power are determined, and will continue to be determined, by the United Kingdom Parliament. One such great exercise of power at a most important time was the confidence motion of 10 May 1940, which was passed, as it happened, by the Government, and it led to the demise of Neville Chamberlain’s Government, because everyone knew he had to go. I do not regard the Scottish parliamentary experience as relevant. If not two thirds, why not 75%, 60% or any other number that Harry Potter’s wand might conjure out of thin air?

[Mr Straw]

Will the hon. Gentleman speculate on what he thinks would have happened if the two-thirds rule had applied in May 1940?

[Mr Cash]

Absolutely. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. Furthermore, there was the motion of no confidence in the Callaghan Government in 1979, in which the numbers of votes were 310 against 311. The result of that vote may have been a matter of satisfaction for the Conservative party, but I am sure that it would not have been to others. However, if the two-thirds rule had been in operation, there would not have been a change in Government and that would have been a disaster for the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

My hon. Friend with his customary originality brings into play a contemporary example. Imagine a two-thirds rule being applied in respect of Mr Cowen at this moment. Be in no doubt, there would be riots in the streets of Dublin. This is an essential question about the irresponsible manner in which this power could be used to induce results that are fundamentally undemocratic.

[Mr Straw]

I understand the Minister’s point that these provisions relate not to a motion of no confidence but to other motions for an early Dissolution. Given, too, the poor definitions of a motion of no confidence, we could anticipate a situation in which a Government who wish to cling to power, even though they lack a simple majority, could dodge and weave—because they determine the business of the House—for quite a period and ensure that the motion that went before the House was tabled under clause 2(1)(c) requiring a two-thirds majority in the hope of buying themselves a little time. If this provision were not in the Bill, the choice between going to the end of the period and having an early election would be much more stark.

[Mr Cash]

The right hon. Gentleman demonstrates why many people thought that he was one of the foremost leaders of the House of Commons. He understands the mechanics that lie behind such questions. Precisely what he has just said could easily happen. Indeed, many other things are likely to be conjured out of thin air by the wave of a magic wand of the kind that only Harry Potter seems able to use.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

The Opposition’s thinking is not a matter for me. I happen to believe that our present constitutional arrangement should be sustained. It gives me no pleasure to know that the Opposition will vote with me on amendment 4. Their reasoning does not matter; what matters is the constitutional principle that I am advancing.

[Mr Straw]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. May I illustrate the point that he and I have made in answer to the Minister’s perfectly reasonable point? At first blush, it appears that the provisions of clause 2(1)(c) strengthen the role of the House against the Prime Minister. However, I remember what happened in 1979. I was a candidate at the 1979 election, so I was no longer working for the Government, but I was in very close touch with people for whom I had worked for three and a half years and knew a lot about what was happening. There was a crisis over the outcome of the Scottish Assembly referendum, and the Commons needed an occasion on which it could give vent to that feeling, because the various smaller parties had to have their positions put on the record. Had there been a provision in legislation for an early Dissolution by two-thirds majority, the Government of the day—

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. Interventions must be shorter. I understand that the point has to be made, but I would be grateful if we could get to it quickly.

[Mr Straw]

In that situation, the Government of the day would have worked with the smaller parties and said, “You can have your shout on the two-thirds majority, and in return, we’ll give a bit of extra cash to Northern Ireland,” and so on. That would have happened. Therefore, the motion of no confidence would probably never have been tabled, and even if it had been, it probably would have been lost.

[Mr Cash]

I understand that point, and the right hon. Gentleman describes a sort of invitation to pork barrel politics.

Prisoners’ Right to Vote

Jack Straw Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

My hon. Friend will know that 60 years ago Britain signed up to the European convention. [Interruption.] The shadow Justice Secretary is yelling again; he clearly needs telling again, so I will tell him again. Because Britain signed up to the European convention 60 years ago, it binds us legally. The Government must act in accordance with the law, as the previous Government accepted. The danger is that compensation payments will be awarded against us to prisoners. As I said earlier, the only thing worse than giving prisoners the vote would be giving them the vote and then having to give them compensation on top of that.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Before the Minister gets away with this nonsense that we did nothing—in fact, we held not one but two consultations on the issue—will he tell us on what occasion during those five years either he or any other member of his Front Bench, or Conservative Opposition Back Bencher, did anything other than call for us not to make any decisions about prisoner voting rights?

[Mr Harper]

The right hon. Gentleman has proved the point that I made: he says that the Government consulted on doing something but failed to do anything. Five years passed after the judgment, and the right hon. Gentleman and the Government of whom he was a senior member did nothing in terms of implementing the judgment.