United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Richard Graham Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Straw]

I was implying no such criticism of the blue hats. The responsibility for what did not happen in Rwanda and Bosnia rested and rests with the Security Council and the international community, which failed to take action in the face of what amounted to genocide.

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) for twice mentioning that former Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his groundbreaking speech in Chicago in 1999, laid the foundation for what six years later became the agreement on the responsibility to protect.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the efforts and success of our diplomats in the UN Security Council in ensuring the correct wording of resolution 1973 should be well recommended?

[Mr Straw]

The hon. Gentleman anticipates what I was going to say, but I am happy to put that on the record, not least because as a former member of the Foreign Office diplomatic service, he served me and my predecessors and successors very well.

We all know what the consequences of doing nothing about Colonel Gaddafi would have been: industrial-scale slaughter. The medium and longer-term consequences of the military enforcement of Security Council resolution 1973 will be more benign, but we must recognise that the situation is fraught with uncertainties. The progress towards democracy in Libya and elsewhere in the middle east, which all hon. Members and the peoples of the region seek, will be inherently more difficult than eastern Europe’s progress towards democracy after the Berlin wall came down 20 years ago.

The middle east is a tough region, and its democrats will face two primary threats: the autocrats such as Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, or Presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali; and alternatively, those who wish to misuse and misinterpret the great and noble religion of Islam to establish backward-looking autocracies no less terrible than those of Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein.

Ultimately, the solution has to lie in the hands of the people of Libya and these other countries, but the international community—the United Kingdom included—can profoundly influence the final outcome by taking the right action or by inaction. I welcome what the Prime Minister said about the plans on which Her Majesty’s Government are already working. However, I hope that they will also draw together and publish a strategy setting out the UK’s vision for the region and the assistance they will provide, as part of an international programme, for an economic and political reconstruction of Libya carried out by the Libyans for the Libyans. I hope that that will include not just traditional overseas aid, but the work of an enhanced Westminster Foundation for Democracy, to nurture and sustain the growth of democratic institutions.

As we have heard, there are those who are reluctant or unwilling to support our action in Libya, and who seek a rationalisation for that inaction by making the relativist argument that we should not intervene in Libya unless or until we also intervene in, for example, Yemen, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. The immediate answer is that Libya is by far and away the most egregious case. I condemn the brutality elsewhere in the region as strongly as anybody else, but processes are under way in some parts—not all—of the region that might succeed, and in any event the democratic forces in those and other countries across the region will be greatly strengthened, not weakened, by the action we are taking in Libya. In my view, provided there is international pressure behind it, the revolution in attitudes sweeping the region will also increase the pressure on the Government of Israel properly to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians. No longer can the Government of Israel rely on complacent and compliant countries on their borders within the Arab world.

There is a parallel with Iraq, and I understand—why would I not?—its controversy. However, there is not the least doubt—not least from the mouth of Colonel Gaddafi himself—that but for the military action in Iraq, Gaddafi would never have given up his well-advanced nuclear weapons programme and a significant part of his chemical weapons programme. In the end, he had to give them up. Gaddafi without nuclear weapons is dangerous enough, as we have seen; Gaddafi with such weapons would have been far more dangerous—perhaps so dangerous that the international community would have been prevented from dealing with him today.

I salute our military personnel, as they are placed, yet again, in harm’s way on our behalf and that of the international community. I give my wholehearted support to the motion before the House, and I commend the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary for their indefatigable work in securing—against the odds—the resolution.