United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Jack Straw Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Two weeks ago, I re-watched “Hotel Rwanda”, the chilling film portrayal of the massacres of the defenceless civilians who were hacked to pieces by the so-called forces of law and order because they had the misfortune to belong to the wrong ethnic group. In July 2005, when the UK had the EU presidency, I went to Srebrenica in Bosnia for the 10th anniversary commemoration of the day in 1995 when 10,000 unarmed civilians were brutally murdered by the forces of law and order because, in that case, they had had the misfortune to belong to the wrong religious group.

In Rwanda and Bosnia, the UN solemnly considered what it should do. In both theatres, there were already blue-hatted UN troops on the ground, but they stood by as the massacres took place in front of them. Those troops were there as peacekeepers, but there was no peace to keep—rather, peace urgently needed to be made.

Doing nothing in the face of evil is as much a decision with consequences as doing something. This resolution is historically significant not just on its own terms, but because, as we heard from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, this is first occasion on which the Security Council has acted decisively upon the words relating to the responsibility to protect, which were agreed in the UN General Assembly in 2005, and in Security Council resolution 1674 2006.

[Martin Horwood]

I worked for Oxfam at the time of the Rwanda crisis and I strongly remember the awful situation in which UN forces found themselves. I hope the right hon. Gentleman was not implying fault on the part of the blue hats themselves, because their rules of engagement constrained them. The progress that the international community has made leading to the responsibility to protect is of course very positive.

[Mr Straw]

I was implying no such criticism of the blue hats. The responsibility for what did not happen in Rwanda and Bosnia rested and rests with the Security Council and the international community, which failed to take action in the face of what amounted to genocide.

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) for twice mentioning that former Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his groundbreaking speech in Chicago in 1999, laid the foundation for what six years later became the agreement on the responsibility to protect.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the efforts and success of our diplomats in the UN Security Council in ensuring the correct wording of resolution 1973 should be well recommended?

[Mr Straw]

The hon. Gentleman anticipates what I was going to say, but I am happy to put that on the record, not least because as a former member of the Foreign Office diplomatic service, he served me and my predecessors and successors very well.

We all know what the consequences of doing nothing about Colonel Gaddafi would have been: industrial-scale slaughter. The medium and longer-term consequences of the military enforcement of Security Council resolution 1973 will be more benign, but we must recognise that the situation is fraught with uncertainties. The progress towards democracy in Libya and elsewhere in the middle east, which all hon. Members and the peoples of the region seek, will be inherently more difficult than eastern Europe’s progress towards democracy after the Berlin wall came down 20 years ago.

The middle east is a tough region, and its democrats will face two primary threats: the autocrats such as Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, or Presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali; and alternatively, those who wish to misuse and misinterpret the great and noble religion of Islam to establish backward-looking autocracies no less terrible than those of Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein.

Ultimately, the solution has to lie in the hands of the people of Libya and these other countries, but the international community—the United Kingdom included—can profoundly influence the final outcome by taking the right action or by inaction. I welcome what the Prime Minister said about the plans on which Her Majesty’s Government are already working. However, I hope that they will also draw together and publish a strategy setting out the UK’s vision for the region and the assistance they will provide, as part of an international programme, for an economic and political reconstruction of Libya carried out by the Libyans for the Libyans. I hope that that will include not just traditional overseas aid, but the work of an enhanced Westminster Foundation for Democracy, to nurture and sustain the growth of democratic institutions.

As we have heard, there are those who are reluctant or unwilling to support our action in Libya, and who seek a rationalisation for that inaction by making the relativist argument that we should not intervene in Libya unless or until we also intervene in, for example, Yemen, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. The immediate answer is that Libya is by far and away the most egregious case. I condemn the brutality elsewhere in the region as strongly as anybody else, but processes are under way in some parts—not all—of the region that might succeed, and in any event the democratic forces in those and other countries across the region will be greatly strengthened, not weakened, by the action we are taking in Libya. In my view, provided there is international pressure behind it, the revolution in attitudes sweeping the region will also increase the pressure on the Government of Israel properly to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians. No longer can the Government of Israel rely on complacent and compliant countries on their borders within the Arab world.

There is a parallel with Iraq, and I understand—why would I not?—its controversy. However, there is not the least doubt—not least from the mouth of Colonel Gaddafi himself—that but for the military action in Iraq, Gaddafi would never have given up his well-advanced nuclear weapons programme and a significant part of his chemical weapons programme. In the end, he had to give them up. Gaddafi without nuclear weapons is dangerous enough, as we have seen; Gaddafi with such weapons would have been far more dangerous—perhaps so dangerous that the international community would have been prevented from dealing with him today.

I salute our military personnel, as they are placed, yet again, in harm’s way on our behalf and that of the international community. I give my wholehearted support to the motion before the House, and I commend the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary for their indefatigable work in securing—against the odds—the resolution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), who is Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee. I hope to return to one of his observations later in my speech.

On Friday, I described the Prime Minister’s drive towards achieving the resolution as showing “courage and leadership”, but today let me first pay tribute to the courage and leadership shown by our armed forces. As John Nichol found when he was enforcing the no-fly zone in Iraq, those who fly into hostile territory take extreme personal risks. As ever, we make decisions that they then carry out, and we owe them as much as they are prepared to sacrifice on our behalf, which is everything. In that context, it was an extreme honour to be in the Chamber to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Kris Hopkins). It was one of the most powerful and moving speeches that I have heard in the House, and I hope that others listen to it as well.

However, political actions, too, show moral courage or the lack of it. The safe thing to do would have been to leave the leadership to the United States or to countries nearer to Libya, probably in Africa. There was a large chance—and I have to say that it was my own expectation—that the resolution would fail. Demanding publicly something quite so controversial shows not only real clarity about what is right and wrong, but a willingness to risk rebuff and potential humiliation in order to do right. I am proud that we have a Prime Minister and a Foreign Secretary who are willing to take such risks.

All the arguments against the resolution were considered by the United Nations in exhaustive detail and, in the end, rejected. Britain’s United Nations ambassador, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, is clearly a persuasive and respected man and is very, very good at what he does. We could have said that it was a matter for the Libyans; we could have left it to them, whatever the cost to civilians. But when the League of Arab States takes a different view, that suggests strongly that we ourselves should consider whether we should be so laissez-faire: our doing so would have had consequences elsewhere. Just as Arab countries were showing themselves ready to throw off tyranny, we would have been sending the message that the correct response for a tyrant is, in Gaddafi’s words, to show no pity and no mercy, and that message would have been heeded throughout the world. I therefore entirely support the motion.

However, this is only the beginning. There are some serious questions that need answering, and they will trouble those who support the motion just as much as they will trouble those who do not. First, what is the end state that we want to achieve? Obviously we would like to see the back of Gaddafi, but that is not part of the United Nations resolution; so with what will we be satisfied? Secondly, in general terms, what is our strategy for reaching whatever end state we wish to be satisfied with, and how will we decide when we have done so?

[Mr Straw]

The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, correct to say that “getting rid of Gaddafi” is not part of resolution 1973, but the resolution that preceded it—resolution 1970, which provides for the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to investigate crimes against humanity in Libya—could easily bring about the arrest and incarceration of Colonel Gaddafi under international law. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we need to factor that into our strategy?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I entirely agree. On Friday I asked whether the aims of resolution 1973 were impossible to reach unless Gaddafi were gone. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, however, said that the resolution was about giving protection to the civilians, with which I entirely agree. He went on to say that it was about giving the Libyan people the chance to determine their own future. I do not see anything in the resolution that says that, but I think we need to be clear about it.

Thirdly, will further resolutions from the United Nations be needed or sought as a result of some of the questions that will arise during this debate?

The fourth question is about exactly how far the advice of the Attorney-General takes us. We must be absolutely clear about what is sanctioned by the resolution and what is not. The summary of the Attorney-General’s advice is clear, because enforcing the no-fly zone is clearly allowed by the UN resolution. However, we need to know not only that what we are doing is legal but how far, legally, we are entitled to go. We must not leave a chink that will let people say, “The resolution allowed some things, true, but not this.”

Fifthly, will the Treasury be generous? Will my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer allow the Ministry of Defence to concentrate, at least for the next few months, on these operations rather than on its desperate scrabble to find the extra £1 billion, for this year alone, to which it was committed in the strategic defence and security review but which it still has not identified?

Sixthly, does my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary agree that ruling out the use of occupation forces does not rule out the use of ground forces? I am talking not just about search and rescue helicopters, which my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Dan Byles) mentioned during the Prime Minister’s speech, but about identifying targets that are free of civilians.

Seventhly, there is the difficult question of whether the ceasefire applies to the rebels. If the rebels try, in response to breaches of the ceasefire by Gaddafi, to retake areas that he has taken, should we use military force to stop them? That would seem a bit strange, but does the UN resolution permit the facilitation of arms supplies to the alternative Government, and if so should the United Kingdom be helping to provide that?

These are things that we do not know, as a result of the UN resolution, and we might need a further resolution to clarify things. Many more issues will arise, but I support this action. The House will not give a blank cheque to this action, so I welcome the Prime Minister’s willingness to return to the House to keep us updated on something that is moving very fast.