Counter-terrorism and Security Bill

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

First, I should like to place on the record my thanks to the Minister for Security and Immigration, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), who is not in his place this evening, for his conduct of the debate on this Bill; he has been open, inclusive and generous. Very often, he has listened and genuinely responded to the points that all Members have made. I also wish to thank him for coming to a roundtable discussion that I organised two weeks ago. He made an excellent contribution among a group of academics, practitioners and people from think-tanks about how we can do some practical work around tackling extremism and radicalisation. I will let him have a report of that discussion this week, and I look forward to continuing the dialogue with Government about what we can do in practical terms to make this situation better than it is at the moment.

I wish to comment briefly on amendments 14 and 16, which relate to part 5 of the Bill and the Prevent programme. Like every other Member, I welcome amendment 14, which provides for parliamentary scrutiny of the guidance. I am delighted that the Government have now accepted that. It will be through the affirmative resolution procedure, and it will enable proper detailed scrutiny and debate of the matters that are in the guidance.

I have now had the opportunity to read the guidance. On Second Reading and in Committee, I kept saying to the Minister, “When will we see the guidance?” He implored me to be patient, saying that the issues I was raising would be addressed in that guidance. Well, I have been as patient as I can be, but I remain concerned about two issues that the guidance seeks to address. The first matter I raised in debate was that much of the Bill is couched in terms of dealing with individuals who are in danger of being radicalised and drawn into terrorism. There was very little, if anything, about the need to work on a broader basis with communities to build the resilience of communities to the extremist message and to galvanise communities into being actively engaged on this agenda. I am afraid that the guidance, as I have read it, is still completely focused on individuals.

This afternoon, I read the guidance in great detail, even to the point where I did a word search on it. It is 39 pages long and has 178 paragraphs and—I hesitate to say this to the House—the words “parent” and “family” do not appear once in that guidance. I would that thought that families and parents are absolutely on the front line of trying to prevent our young people from being drawn into extremism. I know that the Home Secretary will know that mothers, sisters and women in those communities can play a life-changing role in safeguarding the future of our young people, and yet nowhere in the guidance is there any mention of families and parents.

[Nicola Blackwood]

The right hon. Lady is making a very important argument about increasing community resilience. Does she agree that one of the most important ways that we can do that is by improving critical engagement with online content, which is one of the most pervasive forms of radicalisation?

[Hazel Blears]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady that online radicalisation has become increasingly important as technology has developed. Many young people are drawn into the most horrific websites and see the most horrendous content, which inevitably affects how they view these issues. I personally believe that the service providers have a great responsibility on this agenda and would like them to be much more active. Google, for example, has done some excellent work on gangs and I would like to see it replicate that work for the counter-terrorism agenda. We need a more inclusive conversation with the service providers on all these issues.

[Richard Fuller]

Does the right hon. Lady agree that we should not focus too much on the individual, as it is that individual who is at risk and who cannot put the circumstances into context in making decisions? Secondly, does she agree that communities are dispersing around the country and if we do not equip families to have those conversations, the strategy will not be as effective as it could possibly be, given those changes?

[Hazel Blears]

I agree, and I do not think that the two are mutually exclusive. We need to tackle individuals and we need action plans for individuals, but individuals live in families and in communities. We therefore need a much more holistic engagement programme.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Unfortunately, the right hon. Lady is stepping down as a Member of this House very soon and I only hope that her voice will not be stilled on such topics in other arenas. Does she agree that although there has been a welcome change in that Ministers from the Prime Minister downwards are now talking about the underlying perverted ideology at the root of radicalisation, we need to back up that new rhetoric with arrangements to counter that perverted ideology?

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman has a proud record of having pursued these issues with such determination and tenacity that he has, perhaps, had no small influence on the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister in talking about the long-term generational struggle and the need to deal with ideology.

I want to return to the point made by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood) about resilience, as that is the second issue that I am concerned about. I have read the guidance very carefully and the first mention of building community resilience is in paragraph 175 of 178, on page 39. It is about the police and it states:

“The success of Prevent work relies on communities supporting efforts to prevent people being drawn into terrorism and challenging the extremist ideas that are also part of terrorist ideology. The police have a critical role in helping communities do this. To comply with the duty, we would expect the police, working with others, to build community resilience”.

There is no objection to community resilience in principle in the guidance, yet it takes us 175 paragraphs before we talk about the need to do that. The Home Secretary is looking at me quizzically, but this is the guidance as we see it now and when it is revised, as I hope it will be, I hope that there will be a stronger emphasis on families, parents and communities. I have made those points consistently and I asked the Home Secretary to reflect carefully on that.

[Fiona Mactaggart (Slough) (Lab)]

Within those communities, there is a hunger to be engaged and a worry that at the moment the terms of engagement seem to be determined completely by the police and not sufficiently by families. I had a meeting with a group of Muslim mums in my constituency who asked for better education on how they could understand what was going on on the internet. We need a non-police-led element to this Prevent work as well.

[Hazel Blears]

My hon. Friend makes a point that is based on experience and it is all the more authentic and powerful for that.

These issues are not mutually exclusive. The police have a role to play and have an important security role, but other agencies and people in the community can equally make a big contribution.

The second point that I have raised consistently is about ideology. I am more reassured about ideology and paragraph 4 of the guidance, right at the front of the document, states that one of the objectives is to respond to the ideological challenge. Paragraph 17 talks about the need to train front-line staff so they are aware of the ideology and what they can do to push it back. I have asked again during the passage of the Bill how much resource will go into the area. We have £120 million to deal with the increased threat, but how much will go into the Prevent agenda? It is very important for people out there to know that. There is a hunger for training, support and capacity building among all the agencies that will have to carry out that duty. We need to offer some reassurance that that capacity and guidance will be in place.

My final point is about freedom of speech. I know that many Members have made their points on that already. The noble Lord Bates made a neat attempt to try to make the division between having due regard to and having particular regard to. I am not sure that I would envy him the prospect of litigating on that basis, because it seems to me to be a bit of a philosophical exam question. I know that the Home Secretary will look at that guidance again and make it as practical as possible, but reconciling those two formulations seems to me to be intrinsically difficult. I do not think for one moment that I am capable of reconciling that; that would require a greater philosophical brain than mine. Perhaps it will eventually come to judges. If the Home Secretary could say a little more about that, that would be very welcome.

Finally, will the Home Secretary publish all the responses to the consultation? That would help us all significantly in seeing the direction of travel. She has said that this is an ongoing generational struggle, as indeed has the Prime Minister. He said last week that the shadow will hang over our generation for many years to come. We are all engaged in trying to ensure that we tackle the problems we face. I will certainly seek to make whatever contribution I can to this agenda now and in future.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)]

On Second Reading, I and a number of other Members talked about the need for judicial or legal oversight of temporary exclusion orders and of the removal of passports and documents. I am pleased that some judicial or legal oversight has now been provided, but I am still a little disappointed about the number of days that a person’s passport can be held before that can effectively be challenged in the courts. I am also concerned that temporary exclusion orders are still closed proceedings, which means a person will not necessarily know what is being said against them. The ex parte nature of these proceedings is fundamentally wrong.

It has been said that any application for an exclusion order or to take someone’s documents will be intelligence-led and based on proper evidence. If that is the case, why is everybody frightened of proper judicial or legal oversight? That would not be by the method of judicial review, but in a proper, straightforward way, for example by going to the High Court to argue why a person should be excluded, or why they should not be on the managed programme, or why their documents should be taken. Proper legal aid should be provided for all those purposes as a matter of right, not as a matter of discretion.

On Prevent, I have to say that I disagree not only with the Home Secretary, but with my party and with what has happened previously. Prevent was brought in on a voluntary basis in 2007. I am afraid that some people think that they can introduce these kinds of things and then sit back and say, “Right, that’s going to deal with the whole issue of radicalisation.” That view is based on a fundamental flaw in the argument, which is that somehow this is all based on ideology. It is not based on ideology, or on a perverted ideology; there are other reasons why these things happen. It is completely wrong to think that simply by monitoring people in nurseries, schools, colleges, universities, hospitals and doctors’ surgeries we will be able to identify who might make the big leap from having a socially conservative view of something to going out to commit suicide and injure and maim other people.

I am very disappointed that that has not been looked at critically in this House. There seems to be universal acceptance here that Prevent is some kind of panacea; it is not. A number of organisations have said the same. A Demos report from 2010 recommended that the Government should dismantle the preventing violent extremism programme. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013 said that the Government’s counter-radicalisation programmes are not working.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 30, page 13, line 34, at end insert

“and must also develop capacity to combat and reject the messages of extremism”.

This amendment introduces a requirement to support work combating the ideology of extremism as part of preventing people being drawn into terrorism.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Mike Weir)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 21 stand part.

That Schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.

Clauses 22 and 23 stand part.

Amendment 19, in clause 24, page 15, line 6, leave out “may” and insert “must”

Changes it from optional to compulsory for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to accompany the statutory obligation provided for under Clause 21.

Amendment 31, page 15, line 7, at end insert—

‘(1A) Any such guidance should include a requirement to develop capacity to combat and reject the messages of extremism”

This amendment introduces a requirement to support work combating the ideology of extremism as part of preventing people being drawn into terrorism.

Amendment 20, page 15, line 21, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

‘(5) Before giving guidance under this section, or revising guidance already given, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—

(a) the proposed guidance or proposed revisions, and

(b) a draft of an order providing for the guidance, or revisions to the guidance, to come into force.

(6) The Secretary of State must make the order, and issue the guidance or (as the case may be) make the revisions to the guidance, if the draft of the order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(7) Guidance, or revisions to guidance, come into force in accordance with an order under this section.

(8) Such an order—

(a) is to be a statutory instrument, and

(b) may contain transitional, transitory or saving provision.”

This would ensure that statutory guidance produced under Clause 24 was subject to an affirmative resolution of each House.

Clauses 24 to 28 stand part.

Amendment 21, in clause 29, page 17, line 29, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

‘(7) To support panels exercising their functions under this section the Secretary of State must—

(a) provide guidance on the exercise of those functions;

(b) provide a list of approved providers for de-radicalisation programmes that may be referred to under subsection (4);

(c) ensure that the providers listed under paragraph (b) are subject to monitoring.”

This would give a greater role to the Secretary of State in supporting the role of local support panels. The Secretary would have to provide guidance (rather than it being optional) and she would also have to provide a list of approved providers for de-radicalisation programmes and ensure they would be subject to monitoring.

Amendment 22, page 17, line 41, at end insert—

“(c) the responsible local healthcare commissioning group; and

(d) local representative of the National Offender Management Service.”

This would include local health bodies and the probation service on the assessment and support panels.

Clauses 29 and 30 stand part.

That Schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.

Clauses 31 to 33 stand part.

New clause 12—Review of international best practice around deradicalisation—

‘(1) The Secretary of State Shall, within three months of this Act coming into force, lay before both Houses of Parliament a review into international best practice around deradicalisation.

(2) The review under subsection (1) shall include in particular—

(a) examination of best practice in—

(i) Germany;

(ii) Denmark;

(iii) Sweden;

(iv) other countries as determined by the Secretary of State.

(b) the role of community-based organisations in developing and delivering strategies to prevent radicalisation and to deradicalise individuals.

(c) evidence-based recommendations for the rapid implementation of a comprehensive deradicalisation programme in the UK.

[Hazel Blears]

Before embarking on my remarks on the amendments, I want to say a few words about the appalling events that have taken place in the past 24 hours that illustrate the importance of the work we are doing this week in Committee. I am sure the Committee will join me in sending our deepest sympathies and thoughts to the families of Katrina Dawson, the young barrister, and Tori Johnson, the café manager, who were killed during the 17-hour siege in the Lindt café in Sydney. Those were horrendous events and the whole community in Sydney is shocked. Our thoughts are with them and their families.

Also in the past 24 hours, we have seen a terrible attack on a school in Pakistan. I understand that at this moment the figures are hard to determine, but about 128 people have been killed, the vast majority children under the age of 16. As far as we know, six gunmen broke into the school compound, entered every single classroom and killed the children. Locals heard the screams of students and teachers. This has been described as a national tragedy and utter barbarism. I am sure the Committee endorses those sentiments. The work we are doing this week sometimes does not necessarily attract as many Members to the Chamber as other topics, but it is of the utmost importance to national security.

Amendments 30 and 31, tabled in my name and that of the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), seek to address what we consider to be a really important gap in the proposed legislation. We welcome part 5 of the Bill as a whole, and we had a good debate on it on Second Reading. The Government’s proposals to put the Prevent strategy and the Channel programme on a statutory footing are absolutely welcome.

[Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind)]

Will the right hon. Lady join me in saying how disappointed she is that part 5, which is a critical part of the Bill, does not extend to Northern Ireland? Young people in Northern Ireland are not immune to being radicalised and entreated to join terrorist organisations.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Lady has deep, if not unique, experience of the practicalities of these issues in her community in relation to Northern Ireland terrorism, which we have faced for many decades in this country and in Ireland as a whole. She makes a powerful point. I am sure that the provisions aimed at preventing young people in particular from being drawn into terrorism would have the same applicability in Ireland as they do in our country. In fact, I am sure there are many lessons we can learn from the dreadful experiences in Ireland that could inform our policy and practice in England, Scotland and Wales. I hope she will return to that in her remarks later on.

I welcome part 5 of the Bill and putting the Prevent and Channel programmes on a statutory footing. I hope that that will succeed in achieving more consistency, better practice and the sharing of projects. At the outset, I say to the Minister that I was very grateful for the recent briefing given to members of the Intelligence and Security Committee on the operation of some of these programmes. I think I saw a step change in intensity, breadth and depth in some of the programmes being implemented. I give the Government credit for doing that. As ever, I will say to him, “Good try and good effort, but there is much, much more we can do,” but I was pleased to have that information.

Amendments 30 and 31 are small, if not quite perfectly formed, but I hope that they will enable us to have a good debate on one of the most important things we ought to be doing to stop people being drawn into terrorism: challenging and combating the ideology that is the foundation of many of the problems we find here and across the world in the global jihad movement and in extreme political Islamism. I hope the amendments will be a catalyst for debate and I am very interested in what the Minister has to say.

Amendment 30 relates to clause 21(1), which puts a general duty on local authorities and other agencies to have regard to work done to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism when they are exercising their functions. The amendment specifically requires that when those duties are being carried out, they must also develop capacity to combat and reject the messages of extremism. Amendment 31 relates to clause 24, which provides that the Government should produce guidance on how those duties in clause 21 are to be carried out. I am very disappointed that the guidance has not yet been published. The Government’s explanatory notes to the Bill state that the guidance will be published in tandem with the Bill. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to have the fullest possible debate that I want us to have, without having some guidance in front of us. A key question for the Minister is when the guidance will be available. Will it be available before Report at the very least, so that we can have a full and proper debate when the Bill returns to the House? Amendment 31 states that the guidance should include provision on developing capacity to combat ideology.

The purpose of the amendments is to fill a gap in the Bill. My biggest concern is that part 5 of the Bill is couched in terms of addressing the vulnerability of individuals being drawn into terrorism. Clause 28 refers time and again to working with individuals who are already at risk of being drawn into terrorism. There are two things to say about that: it is a narrow interpretation that deals with individuals, but it also deals with individuals when they are already on the path to radicalisation. I believe there is a real gap in the Bill. As well as work with individuals, work ought to be undertaken on a broader basis with families and communities to build resilience so that people are able to withstand and reject the messages of extremism in the first place.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for all the amazingly important work she does on this issue. She is making a very powerful argument. Do we not also need to reassure families that the purpose of participation in those engagement activities is not punishment but rehabilitation? We have had far too many examples of families ringing up and reporting young people at the centre of this only for those young people then to be broken away from their families. It is important to keep the family unit close together when dealing with these issues.

[Hazel Blears]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. He is correct to say that much of this work needs to be done with families in a supportive environment. People who are already involved in terrorism are another matter. Unfortunate though this may be for some of the families affected, there will often be a case for prosecution when people cross the line and engage in criminal activity. Before that point, however, if we can find at the earliest possible stage people who are just beginning to be groomed—this is about grooming, which is relevant to other contexts as well—and who are about to take that path, and if we can support them and get good families and the rest of the community around them to give them resilience, we will have a much better chance of keeping them out of trouble than if we let them go down that path. It is much harder to bring people back than to stop them getting on that conveyor belt in the first place. That is why this work is so important.

[Mr Mike Hancock (Portsmouth South) (Ind)]

I agree entirely with the right hon. Lady that we have to start the process as early as possible, but the real problem in my city, which has been suffering quite badly from extremism—we have already lost four young men and there are others still out there—is how to give confidence to families in the community that, first, they will be taken seriously, and secondly, as the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) has said, that, somehow, their children will not be punished. How do we get to the families? I have yet to hear a decent argument that will give confidence to families.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. The work is difficult and complex. It is not easy. During my contribution I shall give a couple of examples that I hope will reassure him that we have made more progress over the past couple of years than in the past on exactly the area he mentioned.

I want to cover several aspects. Why is this work important? Who is best placed to do it? That is a key issue. I also want to address the importance of having an online presence these days, because so much is done through social media. I also want to address the role of religious leaders and scholars. That is a controversial area, but it is absolutely essential to work with them. I shall also give some practical examples.

Why is the work important? Young people are being drawn into situations and scenarios that are absolutely horrendous for them and their families.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady is a good friend of mine and one thing that has not been mentioned so far is friends. Does she agree that the peer group is probably as important—and sometimes more important—in influencing young people? I speak as the father of four teenagers.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman, whom I count as a friend in the House, makes an extremely important and valid point. Interesting research has been done lately on the contrast between exposure to radicalisation online and peer groups. It is very interesting that we concentrate on having a presence on online social media, but evidence is emerging that peer group influence is just as important—possibly more important—than online messaging.

This work is very important, particularly for young people who are even more vulnerable. Quite a lot of research has been done on people with mental health problems and how vulnerable they are at certain points in their lives. We had a good discussion about that on Second Reading. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) asked about the tipping point and what we really know about the issue. The work is also important because it counters the justification for terrorism and the powerful narrative about grievance and victimhood, which underpins all the work done by our Contest counter-terrorism strategy.

In the past such work was seen as something of an add-on to the Contest strategy: the important thing to do was to pursue the terrorists, disrupt plots, prosecute and convict. All that is absolutely essential, but because the Prevent strand of our work is about emotional vulnerability, mental health problems and families, friends and peer groups, it is much more difficult to have a direct and targeted strategy. It was therefore almost seen as a second-order issue. I am absolutely delighted that Prevent has now been put centre stage not only because the Bill puts it on a statutory footing, but because of the contributions of many Members. Of the 500 young people who have gone to Syria, 250 have come back, some of whom will be radicalised and pose a threat to this country. There is now an increased focus on that aspect, and I am absolutely delighted about that.

I ask the Minister whether that increased focus will be reflected in the money to be allocated to the Prevent programme. I would be very interested to know how much of the £130 million that the Prime Minister promised will actually be allocated to Prevent and Channel work.

[Lady Hermon]

I am sincerely grateful to the right hon. Lady for allowing me to intervene on her once more. Church leaders are another very important and influential group. I speak from the horrible experience in Northern Ireland. My late husband was the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary during the worst of the troubles—indeed, he was the longest-serving Chief Constable—and the late, wonderful Cardinal Cahal Daly, the leader of the Catholic Church, condemned, without hesitation, IRA violence and beseeched young people not to get involved with the IRA. The involvement and contribution of religious leaders is hugely important.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Lady makes another point illustrating the depth of her personal experience of the issues under discussion. The leaders of our faith groups play an essential role. Increasingly, Muslim leaders are condemning many of the atrocities, even so far as to issue fatwas and to say that they are un-Islamic activities. There is, however, further to go, because it is one thing to condemn something, but the big challenge is to build an alternative narrative that says it is not justified by religion or Islam, and that the way in which quotes from the Koran are twisted and perverted to justify violence is absolutely wrong. Government cannot play that role, and nor should they: it ought to be the role of respected scholars and religious leaders in the community. That work is essential, because the violence is justified by reference to a perverted view of a religion, which is a betrayal of mainstream, moderate Muslims.

[Mr David Ward (Bradford East) (LD)]

Is the right hon. Lady aware of the distrust and suspicion in some communities of what might happen? After the Bradford riots, many parents escorted their children to the police thinking they would get told off, but they ended up with long, extended prison sentences for actions that, at the beginning of the day, were simply not in the minds of those young people. There is a danger that people will be reluctant to come forward because of the way in which they will be dealt with by the police.

[Hazel Blears]

I am very much aware of the difficulties faced by people in such circumstances. It can be a dilemma for families and friends to take those steps, but what I will go on to say might reassure the hon. Gentleman to some extent.

Sara Khan is the director and co-founder of We Will Inspire, which might be an unfortunate name, given what has been said so far in the debate. The group works with Muslim women and empowers them. Sara Khan says:

“When I was growing up I was exposed to a moderate British Islam which talked about integration, active citizenship, love for one’s neighbours and it was this theological grounding that played a significant role in making many young Muslims that I knew resilient to the extremist narrative.”

She goes on to talk about a project she did:

“Earlier this year, Inspire completed a 6 week challenging extremism programme in Leeds to help educate women about the extremist threat and taught them key theological counter-narratives to extremist ideology. Many of the participants lived doors away from the homes of the 7/7 bombers and participants time and again stated ‘if I knew this information ten years ago when my children were teenagers, I would have taught them about the issues raised in this course. This is the first time I’ve been educated on such a crucial and important topic.’ These women expressed feelings of disappointment in religious and civic Muslim leaders in not providing their children with a contextualised understanding of Islam and their inability in directly challenging extremist ideas so easily available on the internet.”

When such work is done, therefore, and people feel confident in being able to rebut those arguments, it is absolutely possible to provide that kind of community assurance.

[Mr Mike Hancock]

I agree entirely with the right hon. Lady about the role of women in the community. I have talked to women in communities in Portsmouth, some of whom have lost their sons. They wished they had had more information and had been aware of what was going on. The trouble was that those young people had been radicalised outside the home and, in most cases, outside their working environment. Most of those young men were in further education and that was where they had been radicalised, which led them to go to Syria and, ultimately, to lose their lives.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman is right. He will see that in schedule 3 to the Bill there is a list of educational organisations that will be subject to the general duty in clause 21. I am pleased about that, and hope that the Minister will give us the assurance that, as well as formal education institutions, madrassahs will also be covered by this kind of work. Sometimes informal educational settings do not have standards that are as robust as we would all like.

Sara Khan has also given a good example of where community resilience building has worked really well, in Bristol. Five or six years ago, when local people were worried about young people being drawn into extremism, they set up an organisation called Naseehah, which trained 25 local people to recognise radicalised people, and then support and deradicalise them using Islamic theology. A potential suicide bomber who wanted to blow up Bristol town centre was sent to prison, where he was deradicalised. He then sent a message of endorsement to the community organisation, saying how important it was to challenge extremist ideologies.

That is one of the best illustrations I have seen of preventing extremism. It is about building resilience in communities, directly challenging the ideology, supporting vulnerable individuals and then referring them on to a channel project for an early intervention. If all the parts of the circle work together, we have a really powerful mechanism. At the moment, the Minister has a general duty on Prevent and his Channel provisions, which deal with individuals. I honestly think there is a gap on challenging ideology and building the resilience of communities so that they can take that work forward.

When I have raised that matter previously in the context of the Bill, people have said that that is implicit in clause 21—if there is a duty to prevent people being drawn into terrorism we will have to challenge the ideology. If it is implicit, what is wrong with making it explicit? The Prime Minister has said time and again—in his Munich speech, for example, and in his speech in Canberra—that this is a long-term generational struggle. It therefore ought to be explicit within the legislation. [Interruption.] The Minister talks about the Prevent review, but that was in 2011. I hope to persuade him today that it is a tiny step to say that work under clause 21 will include combating ideology.

I will move on now to online messaging. We have discussed previously some of the excellent work done by Erin Saltman of Quilliam, who has pointed out that, yes, it is important to take pernicious material off the internet so that people cannot access it, but that is not enough. People will find other ways to put that information back up, perhaps via another website, as there is still the technology. Therefore, what Quilliam has classed as counter-speech is very important. The hon. Member for New Forest East has talked a lot about that issue and has a lot of in-depth knowledge on it.

Quilliam has been good at saying what that counter-speech should look like. We need three things: a good message, credible messengers and a means of getting the message across. Quilliam has made the distinction that that should be done through a partnership between civil society, the Government and local government, and has pointed out that civil society organisations are often the best placed to deliver that message. It is not always the case that the Government have to do everything; they can facilitate, help, encourage and provide financial assistance, but the people out there in civil society organisations are crucial to efforts on this matter. Quilliam has made the point that many extremist groups are themselves peripheral civil society groups, so what better way to challenge them than robust civil society groups with really good values that want to do the right thing?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Security and Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

I will not pre-empt my speech by seeking to respond to all the points made so far, but I thank the right hon. Lady for the manner in which she is approaching the debate. Let me assure her that the fundamental aspect of challenging ideology is at the core of Prevent and the intent of putting this on a statutory basis is to endorse the work of Bradford and many other local authorities and organisations that are doing absolutely that.

[Hazel Blears]

I am grateful to the Minister for putting that on the record in such trenchant terms and I still want to encourage him to take the extra small step of putting it on the face of the Bill as well as putting it on the record in Hansard. Perhaps we will be able to do that together with our colleagues.

I have a few questions for the Minister. First, does he agree that tackling the ideology is important? He absolutely does. Does he agree that there is a gap in the legislation, in that it does not refer specifically to this work? Does he agree that this work should specifically be included in the guidance? I would be very interested in his response on that point. We might actually see the words “combat ideology” in the guidance, which would be very helpful. Perhaps we could return to the issue on Report to see how far we have moved.

My final questions are about resources. How much of the £130 million announced by the Prime Minister will be allocated to Prevent and Channel? We cannot do this work without the resources and the funds to do it. When does the Minister expect to be able to publish the counter-extremism strategy that I know he and the Home Secretary are working on? That would provide an important backdrop to the legislative work we are doing to make this happen.

I think there is a great deal of consensus across the House. I wish we were not having this debate and that we were not faced with the terrorist threat that we are, but as we are I am pleased that the Prevent part of the counter-terrorism strategy has become more central to what we are doing. There is recognition that if we stop people being drawn down this path, it not only would be good for them but would mean that we would not have to spend millions and millions of pounds on disrupting the plots that unfortunately threaten the essence of our nation. As with many other programmes, if we invest in prevention we do not have to pick up the pieces at the end of the day.

I am an optimist and although this work is difficult, I believe that if we work together—communities, central Government, local authorities, families, practitioners and academics—and ensure that we put every bit of our energy into preventing people from being drawn down this path, we can all learn together, although it will take time, and we can ensure that we live together as communities in peace and prosperity rather than being driven apart, as we are at the moment, by the hatred of this pernicious ideology, which is causing so much heartbreak and concern to communities across the world.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I rise to support the thrust of the argument made by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears). We have worked on these issues in tandem so many times that if they were put on to a DVD, we would be in danger of compiling a box set between us. However, by returning to the same subject again and again and often in the same terms in our campaign to get the Government to do more in this field, we are illustrating the principle that the Government ought to be applying when they do that—namely, if one is to win an argument about or involving ideology, it is not good enough to set out one’s stall a single time as though one were a university professor and to think that that is the end of the matter. One must keep the message coming over and over again until one gets one’s own way. We are saying that what is lacking in the machinery is the ability to consolidate and wage counter-propaganda warfare—I use that term in a non-pejorative sense—against this barbaric ideology, and we are talking about doing it in a way that will have an effect at a much earlier stage of the process than most of what is proposed in the Bill as it stands.

It is quite understandable, in the light of atrocities such as 9/11 at one end of the spectrum and what happened in that restaurant in Sydney in Australia at the other, that the Government’s first concern must be countering and impeding what in IRA terms used to be called the “men of violence”. I fully accept that as long as there is a totalitarian ideology at large in the world, in most societies, even democratic ones, there will always be a few people extreme enough, unbalanced enough, criminal enough or at a loss and vulnerable enough for indoctrination to subscribe to it. Even in this day and age, we can find supporters of Aryan theories of Nazism and supporters of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism, but the key point is that those supporters are absolutely isolated from the wider communities in which they live. We are not concerned about the ability to prevent, by persuasion or counter-indoctrination, every last person who is susceptible to becoming an extremist from becoming an extremist. We are talking about ensuring that that minority remains a minority and that their poison does not leach out into the wider community and, in particular, that the counter-measures taken by the state against what they are doing do not have the effect of radicalising the wider community.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I want to say a little about new clause 12, which I tabled. I believe that there is strong evidence from countries that are already investing in deradicalisation programmes that they are effective, and I think that we need to look more closely at those programmes—as well as counter-radicalisation programmes—and learn from them.

Let me make it clear at the outset that none of the programmes is a substitute for effective counter-terrorism legislation. They are, however, an important tool that we can and, I believe, should be using to better effect in tackling terrorism. They acknowledge that someone becomes radicalised for a reason, and suggest that therefore, in principle, that person can be deradicalised.

Members who were in the Chamber yesterday may have heard me read the words of Abubaker Deghayes, a Brighton man whose two sons were recently killed while fighting in Syria. He warned:

“The strategy you are using with our sons does not work. You are criminalising them just out of the fear they might become a threat to this country.

Do not push them to be radicalised, used by groups like Isis who are out for revenge and thirst for blood.”

He feels passionately about the need not simply to take urgent, effective action to curtail suspected terrorists, not simply to wash our hands of those who may have become radicalised, and not simply to generalise about who people of this kind are. He believes that we need to understand more about who they are, and why they have become radicalised.

I met Abubaker Deghayes, the father. I met his solicitor, Gareth Peirce, and I met campaigners from organisations such as Cage UK. All of them have a wealth of experience related to the impact of counter-terrorism legislation, and all of them paid tribute to the difference that deradicalisation programmes can make. I hope to host a parliamentary meeting early in the new year, before the House of Lords debates the Bill, in order to give colleagues an opportunity to hear from a range of experts, including police officers, who are engaged in such programmes in other European Union member states.

Before I say any more, it might be helpful if I defined my terms. In doing so, I shall refer to a very useful paper published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, which has conducted a comparative evaluation of counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. It describes deradicalisation programmes as those that are

“generally directed  against individuals who have  become radical with the aim of re­integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.”

That is notably distinct from programmes such as Prevent, which are concerned more with counter-radicalisation, which the Institute for Strategic Dialogue defines as

“a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.”

[Hazel Blears]

I, too, have read the paper from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Would it be fair to say that a lot of the evidence that has been gathered is about deradicalising people from far-right groups, because the work around political Islamism has not yet been developed to the point at which we would be able to get a lot of useful evidence? We need to do much more work in that area of threat facing us, because the far-right work is not necessarily completely comparable with the other threats we face at the moment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lady Hermon]

rose—

[Hazel Blears]

rose—

[Caroline Lucas]

I give way to the hon. Lady.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Lady for a well made contribution. She was perfectly right to make such a point, and it does not undermine the position that I am advancing. Indeed, I would love to learn more about the experience she describes. I suspect that the success of the scheme was not achieved by making people feel excluded or terrified about coming forward. I worry about the context in which we are having this discussion, which is the proposed legislation that the Government are setting out right now.

[Hazel Blears]

I echo the points made by the hon. Lady, but I just wonder what projects she has visited. Some of the work I have seen has been about not stigmatising individuals but putting on drama in schools to enable these issues to be brought to the surface and then challenged in quite provocative ways. There is training for teachers and some community-based projects. She is making the point that I made to the Minister, which is that I want to see more of that kind of work, because it is about enabling us to build community resilience rather than targeting individuals. There is some excellent practice in this country, as well as in Ireland.

[Caroline Lucas]

I completely agree with the right hon. Lady. I have seen and been part of some of those extraordinary community engagement processes. The drama in particular has a huge role to play. I come back now to the wider context. I am simply reporting to her what young people have said to me, which is that when they hear the Prevent programme being talked about and the kind of language and rhetoric that get used when we are talking in the abstract it feels to them as if this is something that is stigmatising and off-putting. They feel as if they are the problem. The programme does not seem to be the most conducive thing to engage them, even though when they get to it, they might find that it is something as constructive and as community based as she describes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Weir—the more Scottish National party Members we see in such positions, the better—and to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). She made several pertinent points, particularly on the need to look at experiences from across Europe, and I shall listen carefully to the Minister’s response. It struck me that there is an attempt to look at some of the measures that other countries are adopting to try to tackle this serious issue, but there are also different things being done across the United Kingdom. I wish to focus my remarks on what we are trying to achieve in Scotland.

We are absolutely committed to ensuring that law enforcement agencies and other bodies have all the tools they need to tackle terrorism effectively. We take that particularly seriously in Scotland. We believe that we have robust but different measures in place to tackle these issues. We have massive concerns about what is proposed in the Bill, particularly in part 5. We are concerned that it might cut across some of the initiatives in our Prevent strategy.

It is natural that in Scotland we look at things differently from the rest of the United Kingdom. We face a different range of issues, we have smaller ethnic minority communities, and we have not had the same sort of tensions within our communities, so obviously we look at things differently. I like to think that we therefore look at things a little more holistically, and certainly more holistically than a Conservative-led Government would, or even—if I may be so brave as to say it—than a new Labour Government would.

Our Scottish Prevent strategy shares the same objectives as Prevent across the rest of the United Kingdom, but it differs in some pretty serious and significant ways, particularly in how it is delivered. I think that it does all it can to reflect our Scottish context. Our approach uses Prevent though a safeguarding lens, with an emphasis on keeping people safe, on community cohesion, on participative democracy and on making sure that it is consistent with the needs of, and risks to, all our communities. The Scottish Government’s Prevent strategy for tackling violent extremism works with and through key sectors, including higher and further education, the NHS, the Scottish Prison Service and local authorities. Prevent delivery also benefits from Police Scotland’s model of community engagement and the strength of the relationship between our Muslim communities and the police service.

We sometimes ignore the cultural context, but it is important. One of the most impressive features of Scotland’s Asian community is its willingness and eagerness to adopt what is seen as Scottish identity. We have what is called the bhangra and bagpipe culture. Particularly in Glasgow, where we have a large Muslim community, it is striking how eager the community is to take on board some of the central, defining features of Scottish culture and to get involved. We saw that during the referendum campaign, as Mr Weir in particular knows. One of the fastest growing groups in the movement was Scottish Asians for independence, because there was a natural affinity with what we were trying to achieve as a nation, and there was something about what we were trying to do in order to transform society that proved attractive to many people who had come from countries such as India and Pakistan, which had in their own way secured their independence from the United Kingdom at some time in history.

This feature in Scotland differs significantly from the rest of the United Kingdom. Efforts have been made by the Scottish Government, Ministers and colleagues to try to ensure that the cultural context is taken into account when we approach issues such as radicalisation. I am sure the Minister has seen on his trips to Scotland how the Muslim community, particularly from south Asia, has been integrated in our society and our community. We should all be impressed by that, and perhaps the Minister can learn from our experience.

My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion made a powerful point about how we start to approach these matters and look at some of the community dimensions. We cannot be prescriptive. We cannot talk down to communities or expect them to respond to our stimuli, our suggestions and our objectives. I shall not dwell on what my hon. Friend said, but we have to work with communities. This process has to be organic, a conversation within communities and groups, to ensure that we come to the right conclusions.

The one thing that I want to add to what my hon. Friend said is that we must also look at the external environment. We have to try to understand what motivates people to get involved in what the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) rightly describes as barbaric activity. There is one thing that this Government have never done, and it surprises me how little work has been done on it. I encourage the Minister to look more closely at it: there is very little profiling of people who have gone out to the middle east to get involved in such activity. We do not have a sense of the pull factors, the reasons why people go there and get involved, because we do not ask them. We are too busy locking people up and all the other things that go with that.

We spend very little time trying to understand what it is that drags people to engage in such awful behaviour and activity, and I suspect that our reluctance to do that has much to do with the results that we are likely to find. When we see people being interviewed about their involvement in such activity, they are not people who would concern the Government on a day-to-day basis—people who have just emigrated from Pakistan or the middle east. They tend to be second or third generation who have been here for a long time. The ideology has not been brought here; it is an ideology that has emerged and grown within our communities.

When we listen to people being interviewed by broadcasters trying to understand what informs the way they behave, they all seem to be pretty respectable, cultured, almost middle class, standard citizens of the United Kingdom. They do not seem to conform to the traditional vision, if I may say that, of jihadists, and the caricatures that develop around that. We fail to get that right, to understand and to do the necessary work to profile—

[Hazel Blears]

I have some sympathy with the argument that the hon. Gentleman is developing on working with communities, which is the approach that I have always wanted to emphasise. Does he accept that one of the reasons that many of the people who are born and brought up in this country and have lived here for very many years then decide to go to Syria, or to create a terrorist plot here in Britain, is that they have been influenced by an ideology based on hatred and a complete rejection of other people unless they agree 100% with their very narrow world view? We have debated whether we use the word “combating” or “countering” in relation to this ideology, which has its roots in Salafi thinking. It is about a violent version of Islam that supposedly justifies this kind of terrorist activity. There is quite a lot of research on this, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of some of it.

[Pete Wishart]

Indeed. The right hon. Lady is partly correct. There is something that draws people in, but our failure to understand some of the motivations and pull factors is a fault that we have.

I do not want to labour my next point because I had an exchange about it with the hon. Member for New Forest East on Second Reading. It is that people feel such a sense of injustice and frustration about not being able to use the traditional, normal political process to exert some sort of change that they are driven to get involved in these activities. People are not born genetically programmed to become jihadists and terrorists: something fundamental and significant happens during their journey that influences them and makes them get involved. We fail to understand that.

We also fail to take responsibility for what we may have done in setting the external stimuli in this regard. For example, we fail to acknowledge the disaster that was the Iraq war and how that cause became a recruiting sergeant for a generation of young Muslims who, with their perverted sense of justice, saw no alternative but to get involved in these terrorist activities. We do not even need to debate this: we can see the line going all the way back to when it started. Yes, there were issues before Iraq and before some of the other difficulties in the middle east, particularly in relation to Palestine, but it is when we get to the invasion of Iraq that we can see the exponential growth in these activities.

We have to take responsibility for that. We have to acknowledge that the decisions we have made and the environment we have created perhaps give rise to some of the massive frustrations that people have. People are not born predisposed to be terrorists, to be jihadists, to be the most barbaric type of murderers. Something happens along the way and a frustration develops. Unless we address our responsibility for creating these conditions, we fail.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman and I have debated this on previous occasions. Does he think that ISIS is killing Yazidis and Christians because it has a grievance about British foreign policy?

[Pete Wishart]

No, of course not. If I may put it ever so gently to the right hon. Lady, that question is not worthy of her. There are conflicts right across the middle east that we fail to understand but only condemn, but in some way we are the major power in all this. We are the interveners in these types of activities, and we therefore have responsibilities in that regard. Of course this does not reflect UK foreign policy, other than perhaps at the margins.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

I can give a categorical no to the hon. Lady’s question. This is rather about the manner in which the Prevent strategy has been advanced and, indeed, the separate arrangements with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who has the lead responsibility in relation to a number of these matters.

I want to come back to the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles, who opened the debate, and her direct challenge in relation to where the focus should lie and the underpinning of terrorism. I draw her attention to objective one of the Prevent strategy, which is the ideological challenge. That is absolutely at the heart of the Prevent strategy—the work we do as central Government and the work undertaken at a local level in communities. It says in terms:

“All terrorist groups have an ideology. Promoting that ideology, frequently on the internet, facilitates radicalisation and recruitment”,

and

“Challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote it is a fundamental part of Prevent.”

I will come on to respond—

[Hazel Blears]

rose—

[James Brokenshire]

I will respond, if I am given a chance, to the amendment the right hon. Lady has tabled and to a number of points other Members have made.

It is worth underlining that we have made it clear that we will work with all sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation, including, as we have heard, those in education, health care providers and the wider criminal justice system. In legislating, our intention is to spread the many examples of good practice that have developed and to ensure that across the country specified authorities understand the risk from radicalisation in their area, and take proportionate steps to confront and deal with it. What that will mean in practice will be set out in statutory guidance, which I will go on to talk about.

One area that has attracted comment is the power in clause 25 for the Secretary of State to issue directions to a specified authority to enforce the performance of the Prevent duty. Directions may be given only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the specified authority has failed to discharge that duty. The Secretary of State must consult the Welsh or Scottish Ministers before giving a direction where the direction relates to the devolved functions of a Welsh or Scottish specified authority.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), speaking for the Opposition, asked what challenge process there would be. In essence, there is an escalation process. The guidance will set out certain responsibilities for each of the different agencies and institutions. If an agency or institution is then not meeting that, the Government will seek to work with that body to put in place appropriate guidance and steps that may be necessary. I chair a Prevent oversight board—Lord Carlile is a member of it—which seeks to assess our delivery. It would seek to assess that process and perhaps make a recommendation to the Secretary of State in those circumstances. The Secretary of State then has to give a direction, which is open to challenge by way of judicial review. For the Secretary of State to enforce it, she would have to get the specific order from the court and the court would need to enforce it. So there is a clear escalation process. Reaching the end of it would be highly unlikely, but it is absolutely right that we reserve that ability to give directions in that way and provide that escalation process.

That is an important point for the universities sector to understand, and it was certainly in the evidence I gave to the Joint Committee on Human Rights in highlighting some good practices. There is good guidance to be found among individual universities and in other sectors—indeed, I could cite the guidance of the National Union of Students. Many examples of good practice highlight where the duty needs to go, in ensuring that good practice is put in place and in sharing it. So a number of safeguards and limitations are built into these proposals to ensure that the powers are dealt with appropriately, with multiple layers of protection, including judicial oversight. It is important to restate that.

Let me deal with amendments 30 and 31 to chapter 1 of part 5, which stand in the names of the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles and my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I listen carefully to their recommendations and contributions, because I know the passion they hold for this subject matter, the knowledge they have and their intent to ensure that the Government and society as a whole are doing the right thing when seeking to prevent terrorism and in confronting the narrative, and the perverted and twisted justification that may lie behind it. She made some good points in drawing the Committee’s attention to the work of Sara Khan and We Will Inspire, and I am very aware of its work. It is a good example of a civil society group taking action, underlining the role British Muslim women play and empowering people. Other organisations such as Families Against Stress and Trauma are looking at the role of family and seeking to ensure that families feel able to come forward to seek assistance.

[Hazel Blears]

One issue that has been of deep concern to me for the past few years has been the lack of support for communities more generally to build their resilience to the extremist message. The Government seem now to be making a distinction between their work with individuals and Channel, and their work with families, but what I do not see is the broader work with communities more generally that can help to create a climate within which this ideology is not tolerated, the discourse is not acceptable and work is done on a broader framework. I am concerned about this and I would like to hear from the Minister that communities are not excluded from this programme of work.

[James Brokenshire]

They absolutely are not. Those communities are very much a core strand of the work. If we look at what Prevent has achieved over the period from 2011, we can see that approval has been granted to 180 projects, reaching out to 55,000 people. This year we are supporting more than 70 projects, and with the engagement of our co-ordinators we are actively building the capability of communities and civil society organisations and providing them with the skills to campaign against extremist material, including that which is available online. I recognise the point that the right hon. Lady makes, but it is absolutely our intent that Prevent will continue to do that work.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

It is intended to be one set of guidance covering all the relevant public bodies, but our intention is not simply to publish it; we also intend to hold a public consultation. It is not simply about the House being satisfied with the guidance; we intend to consult widely so that these issues can be examined carefully. The hon. Lady also mentioned clinical commissioning groups. Certainly, as part of the consultation, we will want to receive inputs regarding whether any other bodies should be brought within the ambit of the Bill.

[Hazel Blears]

When we were discussing the need to counter ideology, I asked whether that would be included in the guidance. I think it is absolutely essential that we have that guidance before we debate the Bill on Report, because so much hangs on its contents. It will be impossible for us to take that broader view without it.

[James Brokenshire]

I hear that message loud and clear. I hope that the right hon. Lady will receive further reassurance when she reads the guidance.

We shared the details of our proposals with the devolved Administrations at the earliest opportunity, subject to ongoing discussions within the Government. I have spoken and written to the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice and the Welsh First Minister about the Bill. The Home Secretary also had the opportunity to discuss these matters with the First Minister in the Joint Ministerial Committee on Monday, which was chaired by the Prime Minister. We continue to work closely with counterparts in the Scottish and Welsh Governments, at both ministerial and official level, but the Government’s intention is that the provisions will apply to Scotland. We are discussing that with the Scottish and Welsh Governments.

I heard the comments from the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), but this is a reserved matter and many of the specified authorities that will be subject to the duty in Wales and Scotland will exercise devolved functions, so it is important that they continue to work in that way. The clear point is that this is about national security. I think that we can learn in both directions. He said that lessons could be learned from practice in Scotland, and I am sure he would recognise that equally there might be very good lessons—we have heard some examples today—that could be learned from practice in England and Wales.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North mentioned amendment 20 and the requirement that it be considered. I hope she understands that it is still to be considered by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. We shall wait to hear what it says before making a change of the sort she contemplates. I recognise the need for appropriate examination of these matters and note the comments she has made. We will certainly reflect upon that point in the light of any further considerations and recommendations.

Amendment 21 would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to support panels in carrying out their functions. As I have explained, clause 28 already includes provision for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance to support a panel in respect of its functions. Guidance already exists for local partnerships. We will consult relevant bodies on how that should be updated and then issue new statutory guidance. The amendment also seeks to provide the panel with a list of approved providers of deradicalisation programmes and ensure that they are subject to monitoring. The list of approved providers is already made available to key members of the panel so that they can determine who might be best placed to deliver a theological or ideological intervention. It is the role of the chair to use the panel’s expertise to identify the most appropriate support package for an individual.

Amendment 22 would amend clause 29 to add the local health care commissioning group and a local representative of the National Offender Management Service as required members. These organisations are listed in schedule 4 as partners of local panels under the duty to co-operate. It is key to the success of the programme that panels have access to the right information and have the most appropriate attendance. I agree that it is essential that partners from health and NOMS co-operate under these provisions, and I believe they will. It is not necessary to express that in the terms of the amendment. It may not be appropriate for them to take part in all aspects of the meeting, but we need to keep the matter under review.

Clause 30 places a duty on partners of a panel to co-operate with the panel and the police in carrying out their functions and supporting people who might be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. This will include the giving of information.

Finally—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”] Thank you. Finally, on new clause 12, I say again to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) that we consult closely with our European partners and that is kept under close review. We take international best practice firmly to heart. Her new clause, which specifies certain European countries, is not needed because of that over-arching requirement.

On the basis of the assurances that I have provided, I ask right hon. and hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

[Hazel Blears]

I thank the Minister for his customary good manners, politeness and attention to detail on these issues. I have no doubt that he will consider in great depth the amendments that were tabled.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) for supporting the amendments today, and I thank members of my own Front-Bench team for their attention to detail, helping to raise the profile of Prevent and Channel and countering radicalisation, which is so important to all of us not just in this country, but across the world.

I do not want to ruin the Minister’s Christmas, but he has given me a solemn undertaking that he will continue to consider the substance of our amendments. If, indeed, countering the ideology is intrinsic to all the Prevent work, I still cannot understand why there is a reluctance to make that commitment explicit in the Bill. I accept that it might not be implicit. I accept now that it is intrinsic. I would like the Minister to move just that one step forward from intrinsic to explicit, and if he was able to do that, I would be extremely grateful.

The Minister has also given us an undertaking that the guidance under clause 24 will be available for consideration on Report in this House. That is essential. I am delighted to have that commitment on the record today. On that basis I am happy to withdraw the amendment, reserving my right to come back on Report.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 21 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 20, page 15, line 21, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

‘(5) Before giving guidance under this section, or revising guidance already given, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—

(a) the proposed guidance or proposed revisions, and

(b) a draft of an order providing for the guidance, or revisions to the guidance, to come into force.

(6) The Secretary of State must make the order, and issue the guidance or (as the case may be) make the revisions to the guidance, if the draft of the order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(7) Guidance, or revisions to guidance, come into force in accordance with an order under this section.

(8) Such an order—

(a) is to be a statutory instrument, and

(b) may contain transitional, transitory or saving provision.” .—(Diana Johnson.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

No. Under the temporary exclusion power in the Bill, when someone who has been involved in terrorist-related activities—that will be considered on a case-by-case basis—returns home to the UK, that will happen on what I would describe as our terms. In other words, that return will be managed so that appropriate action can be taken here in the United Kingdom.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary has just said that we need a counter-extremism strategy. May I ask her when that might be available? I remind her that the Department for Communities and Local Government was charged with producing just such a strategy three years ago, but it has not done so. My big concern about the Bill is that it appears to have a gaping hole at its centre. We have a lot about action on individuals who are radicalised, but it has little to say about countering the narrative and countering extremism in general.

[Mrs May]

As I have indicated, the Home Office is leading on the extremism strategy. We will be working on that, but the right hon. Lady should not expect to see anything published before the end of the year. On the wider issue, when we came into power, we made two changes to the way in which Prevent operated, and we did so for a good reason. First, we ensured that Prevent looked not only at violent extremism but at non-violent extremism. Secondly, we saw that in some communities, work being done on community integration under a Prevent heading was being rejected or arousing suspicion. People saw that the work was being done under a counter-terrorism heading and thought that it was about spying on individuals, when it was actually more about community integration. That is why we separated the integration work and gave it to the Department for Communities and Local Government, which has been undertaking that work.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. That is part of the process of trying to disrupt people from travelling to Syria and Iraq or from being active with terrorist groups. We want to get the message across to young people that if they want to help people in Syria there are better ways of doing it than crossing into the country. They can, for example, assist the humanitarian efforts in the UK to support refugees from Syria, which can be of genuine support to people in Syria. In recent weeks, I have met some very impressive women from Muslim communities around the United Kingdom. They have been working with young people and their families, developing a number of programmes, which relay the message, “Don’t go to Syria.” The #MakingAStand campaign and the work that is being done by the charity FAST are about helping families to ensure that young people get the message that they should not be going over to Syria.

Part 2 of the Bill relates to TPIMs. It gives effect to the recommendations of David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, in his most recent report on TPIMs. The changes to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 will provide the police and MI5 with valuable new capabilities. That includes allowing TPIM subjects to be relocated to different parts of the country. We will also be raising the legal test for imposing a TPIM—

[Hazel Blears]

rose—

[Mrs May]

May I make a little more progress and then give way to the right hon. Lady?

[Hazel Blears]

It is on that point.

[Mrs May]

Will the right hon. Lady at least allow me to get to the end of the paragraph before I give way?

The changes to the TPIM Act include allowing TPIM subjects to be relocated, but we will also be raising the legal test, as I said earlier in response to an intervention, and narrowing the definition of terrorism-related activity in relation to this power. David Anderson is clear that there is no need to turn the clock back to the previous Government’s control orders regime, and I agree with him.

[Hazel Blears]

I have a simple inquiry, as I genuinely do not understand why the clause as drafted states that if someone is going to be relocated 190 miles away that can be imposed by the Home Secretary, but if they are going to be relocated 205 miles away it has to be a matter for agreement. I do not understand the logic in that provision at all.

[Mrs May]

We looked carefully at the proposals made by David Anderson and I believe he suggested that there should be a geographical limit for the relocation.

Part 3 seeks to amend the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 to help us identify who in the real world is using an internet protocol, or IP, address at a given point in time. Changes in how service providers build their networks, made to enable them to cope with the increased demand for their services, mean that these identifiers are often shared between a great number of users. Companies generally have no business purpose for keeping a log of who used each address at a given point in time, which means that it is often not possible for law enforcement agencies to identify who sent or received a message. The provisions will allow us to require the key UK companies to retain the necessary information to enable them to identify the users of their services. That will provide vital additional capability to law enforcement in investigating a broad range of serious crime, including terrorism.

The Bill deals only with limited fields of data relating to a specific technical problem. Without the full package of data types included in the draft Communications Data Bill, published in 2012, there will still be gaps in law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ capabilities. For example, the child exploitation and online protection command in the NCA might still struggle to identify those who have been accessing servers hosting illegal images of child sex abuse. That is an issue to which Parliament will need to return after the general election, subject to the outcome of David Anderson’s statutory review of investigatory powers.

Part 4 contains measures on aviation, shipping and rail security. They will help us to stop terrorists and those involved or suspected of being involved in terrorism-related activity from travelling to and from the UK, and will mitigate the threat of an attack on those transport services. The proposals cover three main areas. First, they will require carriers to be able to receive instructions not to carry a specific passenger in a way that is compatible with our border systems. Secondly, they will establish a new framework for authority to carry schemes, commonly known as our no-fly arrangements, that will extend to new categories of British nationals and apply to outbound travel. Finally, they will enhance our ability to require carriers operating to the UK to undertake specified security measures, including the screening of passengers. Carriers that will not comply with security requirements will not be allowed to operate into the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is right to say that the huge stresses and strains in the region will have long-term consequences. That is why we need to do our bit with our humanitarian response and recognise the long-term security consequences both in the region and here in Britain.

Let me turn to the Bill’s measures and how they respond to the challenge we face. More needs to be done to prevent young people from being radicalised or drawn into extremism in the first place. The Home Secretary has said that she wants to strengthen the Prevent programme, which we welcome, and we hope that putting it on a statutory footing will help do that. She will know, however, that getting the Prevent programme right is not simply about legislation. The programme has been narrowed over the past few years, which has led to criticism from the Intelligence and Security Committee, which noted in its report last week

“the relatively low priority (and funding) given to Prevent in the CONTEST programme as a whole”.

The Committee concluded:

“The scale of the problem”—

by which it meant the number of people travelling—

“indicates that the Government’s counter-radicalisation programmes are not working.”

We know that Prevent support for local community programmes has dropped from £17 million to less than £3 million over the past few years. Although the Home Secretary talked about the promotion of a counter-narrative, the evidence suggests that far less work is being done now than a few years ago to promote counter-narratives within communities.

[Hazel Blears]

Does my right hon. Friend share my concern that, although many of the Bill’s provisions are very welcome, including those relating to the panels and putting things on a statutory footing, it is couched in terms of individuals? It mentions individual referrals and individual plans, yet, in essence, challenging the narrative is a collective responsibility for all of us, not simply individuals.

[Yvette Cooper]

My right hon. Friend is right. She has great expertise in looking at the work of the Prevent programme, particularly the community and local work that was being done. This is a concern. The Government originally cut the number of local authorities receiving funding through the Prevent programme from 90 to 23. They have subsequently reinstated some of them, but only four out of the 30 councils that were tasked with delivering Prevent submitted evaluations to the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism last year.

The Home Secretary has talked many times—we have pressed her on this—about the fact that she has passed some of the Prevent work to the Department for Communities and Local Government, but it is of considerable concern to us that there is no evidence that it is doing significant work on it. The community-led programme to counter radicalisation simply does not seem to be strong or effective enough. Much more could be done even without legislation to improve the Prevent programme, and if the Government do not do their bit, all the legislation in the world will not make the programme effective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell). The learned discussion between him and the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) is slightly reminiscent of the legal discussions that we have in the Intelligence and Security Committee, where we are blessed with three Scottish Queen’s Counsel members.

As a former counter-terrorism Minister, I am well aware of the difficulties of legislating in this area. Most of us wish that this legislation was not necessary. No politician in a democracy takes lightly action that will inevitably impact on the rights of individuals unless there is a compelling case to do so to protect our citizens as a whole.

The framework against which we set this legislation should be the test that we apply to our agencies and all the work that we do. I am talking about the fact that any action must be lawful, necessary and proportionate, and that should be our guide in our scrutiny of this Bill today. That is the language of universal human rights, and we should judge any proposals against that test, which is well established in our law.

Inevitably, this area will be contested territory; it always has been. I remember trying to take control orders through this House. It was one of our last all-night sittings. We sat throughout the night and had some amazing discussions at 4 am, some of which were intelligible and others of which were not, so I know how difficult it can be. It is contested territory, and that is as it should be in a strong democracy. I have no doubt that the debate over the next few weeks will be intense, passionate and occasionally noisy. It is up to us here in this House and in the other place to determine whether the proposals before us are necessary and proportionate to the threat that faces our country.

Lots of Members this evening have set out the nature of that threat. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) that if we look at the analysis, we can see that we have a problem in this country. We have at least 500 young men and women who have gone out to Syria, 250 of whom have probably come back. By comparison, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia have thousands of people who have gone out to be part of the conflict in Syria, so we should put the matter in perspective.

If 250 people have come back, perhaps one in nine or 10 of them will be radicalised to the extent that they may want to do us harm in this country. If that is the case, we are talking about 25 or 30 individuals who have come back trained, radicalised and experienced in conflict. That may sound like a small number, but in actual fact it is a significant and serious threat. The resources required to have 24-hour surveillance on 25 to 30 people in this country are absolutely immense, and I am concerned about the resources that are being made available, even with the extra £130 million that the Prime Minister announced the other day.

Professor Peter Neumann from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation has done some interesting work on segmenting the kind of people who go out to fight in Syria and the people who come back. He has grouped them into three categories.

First, we have the disturbed people who undoubtedly have mental health problems and who are particularly susceptible to the kind of narrative that is promulgated and that draws them into extremist activity.

The second category is dangerous. It includes those who are simply evil people and want to do us harm. They have records on social media of enticing other people to go out and take knives to people, chop their heads off or blow people up—they are dangerous people within our society. Interestingly, he describes the third category as the disillusioned. That includes all the people who have gone out to fight in Syria, perhaps in sympathy because they have seen on their televisions the terrible things that have happened to refugees and innocent families, but when they have got out there they have discovered that ISIS is a different proposition from what they thought. They never contemplated the viciousness, brutality, crucifixions and beheadings, and they often find themselves fighting and killing other Muslims because of the factional and sectarian nature of the forces in Syria. It is an interesting analysis.

I do not for one moment subscribe to the idea that there should be some kind of amnesty and that people should be allowed simply to come back into this country without facing any sanctions whatsoever. I absolutely believe that when people have committed criminal offences they should be prosecuted, convicted and put away for a long time.

[Keith Vaz]

My right hon. Friend has done a huge amount of work on community engagement, when in government and since then, as part of the taskforce. Drawing on all the work that she has done, what does she think is the tipping point? When does someone go from being a law-abiding citizen to deciding that they want to go? What pushes people over the edge? Are we any nearer to finding the cause?

[Hazel Blears]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that issue. We have more experience now of the different paths that people take towards extremism, but it is still very complex. It is different for different people, but one key issue is emotional vulnerability. The analysis suggests that there are key points in people’s lives when they feel lonely or isolated and are more vulnerable to a message.

The first year at university is often a difficult phase for people. They do not have a friendship group and can easily be drawn into activity that is glorified, that represents an adventure and that is full of passion and idealism. Some of us will no doubt have experienced similar circumstances in our own politics, and I was certainly fired up to go and do something about the injustice and inequality I found around the world. Luckily, I was not being groomed by extremists—at least, I do not think I was.

One of the other causes for the 7/7 bombers was the possibility of being drawn into forced marriage. Those young men wanted to fall in love and to do so on their own terms and in their own way, and they found the prospect of forced marriage very difficult. Many emotional issues and transition points are key in young people’s education, as well as the messages that are put out.

I am grateful to places such as the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s college, as well as other academic institutions, for the work they are doing on this issue. As the shadow Home Secretary said, we must follow the evidence where it takes us and not simply our own prejudices and views.

I welcome the provisions in the Bill as a whole. Many are common sense. I have no doubt that the judicial involvement in the issues to do with temporary exclusion orders will be contested. The measures on aviation and rail security are simply common-sense approaches to matters that we need to take seriously.

I want to focus on the issues to do with the Prevent strategy set out in part 5. I have a number of questions for the Government. Obviously, I welcome the fact that Prevent will be put on a statutory footing, as that is important in getting the appropriate resources in place and ensuring a consistent approach. A crucial part of this will be the evaluation of its effectiveness. When the Government did their review of Prevent three and a half years ago, they said that there were not sufficient measures of effectiveness, that there were no metrics, and that they were not able to measure the impact. What progress have the Government made in measuring the impact of the Prevent strategy, because I have seen no metrics, no valuation and no evidence on that score? If we are going to spend significant amounts of public money, as we have done and as I hope we will continue to, we must ensure that it is making a difference. Evaluation is therefore important.

The duty that will be placed on schools, prisons, probation providers and local authorities is very welcome. The explanatory notes stated that the guidance would be published in tandem with the legislation, but I think that the bicycle has got a little bit ahead of the guidance. I hope that the guidance will be published as soon as possible, because it will be a key part of the debate. We need to see how effective it will be, how it will operate in practice and what its parameters will be. I urge the Minister to make that a top priority.

My concerns about that agenda—I know that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) shares them—relate to counter-ideology. Where is the work, in the way chapter 5 is set out, on counter-ideology? Where is the work on tackling the narrative and ensuring that both online and offline there are positive messages that expose the poverty of this mediaeval ideology, which is about sharia law and establishing a caliphate, which is absolutely inimical to the right of women and girls, which does not believe in education, which is backward-looking, reactionary and does not provide a forward-looking view of what it means to be a Muslim in a modern, free and liberal democracy? It is all very well putting that duty on those organisations, but where is the work on counter-ideology? I want to hear from the Minister on that.

[Mr Khalid Mahmood]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that that is why we had to tackle the issue of the “Trojan horse” schools in Birmingham, which were deliberately separating pupils, putting young girls to the back of the class and not giving them the same opportunities as boys, further reinforcing that stereotype?

[Hazel Blears]

My hon. Friend is so right. I would like to place on the record my huge admiration for the courage he has shown in his community by standing up to some of the voices of reaction. That is never an easy place to be when taking a stand for something one believes in so strongly. He is second to none in the way he has enabled ordinary people in his community to speak out. They did not want that going on in their schools; they wanted their schools to educate their children for the future, not the past. He has done an amazing job.

My second question to the Minister is this: where is the collective work happening? Tackling the threat is an issue for us all—parents, all of us in this House and people in the community. When we see people starting to be led down the extremist path, we have a responsibility to act. Even before that point there is work to be done in increasing the resilience of communities to withstand the extremist message. Again, that is difficult to do. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East asked what the evidence is for a tipping point. The truth is that it is complicated and we do not have all the answers, but I am absolutely convinced that it is not enough just to deal with individuals who are already radicalised, to refer to the Channel group, to have a panel discussion and to come up with a bespoke programme for that individual. That is not enough. It is essential, but it has to be complemented by work that empowers people in the community, the decent vast majority of Muslims in our country who feel absolutely betrayed by this perversion of their faith. They have to be empowered to stand up, be counted, push that message back and gather the consensus around the majority of the community. I do not see that in this Bill, and I want to.

I want to put on the record my personal position on this, because there is a lot of confusion about it. As I think the Minister knows, I have always supported action against non-violent extremism as well as violent extremism. I did not always get 100% of my way—I am sure that the Home Secretary has experience of not always getting 100% of her way in Cabinet—but my personal position has always been that it is not enough to tackle violent extremism; we must also tackle the conditions in which it is allowed to become the accepted discourse and dialogue. That is where our strategy should be.

I have no problem with the Home Office leading on Channel and on the police and the agencies, but I agree with the hon. Member for New Forest East that we need a broader view on this agenda, because there are so many Government Departments involved. I do not think that the Department for Communities and Local Government should lead on this, but I believe that it has a role to play in bringing communities together. I am very disappointed by that Department’s lack of action and its failure to produce a counter-extremism strategy. We have had a statement, but we have seen no action to back it up over the past three years. I think that the issue is now incredibly pressing.

I will briefly say something on de-radicalisation. It is an even newer field and we have even less best practice on it. A very good European Union study by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue has given examples from other countries, but they are mainly based on bringing people out of far-right extremism. The Islamist threat has not yet been explored enough. We need to do more work on that. People in this country are doing great work, including Shiraz Maher from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, Fiyaz Mughal of Faith Matters, and those at the JAN Trust and the Active Change Foundation. We have some great, great people whom we need to support to make a difference.

I conclude with what the Prime Minister said—credit where it is due—in his Munich speech three and a half years ago:

“This terrorism is completely indiscriminate and has been thrust upon us. It cannot be ignored or contained; we have to confront it with confidence—confront the ideology that drives it by defeating the ideas that warp so many young minds at their root, and confront the issues of identity that sustain it by standing for a much broader and generous vision of citizenship in our countries.”

Our country is a great place for people to live and grow up—a country of freedom, tolerance and inclusivity. We have to stand for those values and stand against the wicked, pernicious, narrow, divisive extremist agenda that is unfortunately pervading so many of our young people.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for calling me to follow an excellent speech by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears).

At the end of the Home Secretary’s forthright speech, she said that we are “in the midst of a generational struggle”. That is true, but we are also in the midst of an ideological struggle. That is the message that the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles and I have been trying to deliver to the Government. Our message is that we are well served by our security and intelligence agencies in identifying and disrupting home-grown terrorists, but we lack comparable capacity to neutralise the ideology that infects them in the first place and to support mainstream moderate Muslims in challenging the extremists’ perverted distortion of Islam.

In reviewing our current strategy and policies to prevent people from being radicalised and drawn into extremist activity, we should, as I said in an intervention, follow the precedents of the wartime efforts to expose and denounce fascism and the cold war campaigns to counter communist totalitarianism. The extremist ideology of political Islam is a similarly totalitarian creed requiring an organised effort to undermine its appeal and to strengthen the long-term resilience of the communities that are most vulnerable to it.

In order to succeed, this work must be owned by the whole of Government on a cross-departmental basis, working closely with local government in engaging with civic and faith organisations on the ground. It requires the creation of a specialist counter-propaganda agency—I use the word “propaganda” in its non-pejorative sense—to develop a counter-narrative and to support communities in their efforts to challenge the extremists. This agency should operate under the supervision of a permanent ministerial committee on which the Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development are represented.

I assure you, Mr Speaker, that I did not give the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles any warning of what I am going to say next, but I am nevertheless going to say it, at the risk of embarrassing her. I feel—as, I am sure, will many others—that it is a great loss, given her specialist knowledge and flair for this subject, that she has decided to leave the House of Commons at the next election. Should such an agency be set up in future, I can think of no better person to run it than the right hon. Lady—whether she wants the job or not.

As we have heard, the Prime Minister has said, as far back as three years ago but also more recently, that it is not enough to tackle terrorism; it is also necessary to counter what he calls the “poisonous ideology” that underlies it. The Home Secretary now says that we need to tackle non-violent as well as violent extremism, so the message is clearly getting through, but there is still some way to go. Why is there such reluctance to recognise that what we ought to be calling un-Islamic extremism, and what we certainly should not be calling Islamic State, should be confronted at a similar level, on a similar scale, and in a similar way to our approach to fascist and communist ideologies in the past? The answer, I suspect, is the fear of the pseudo-religious basis of this incarnation of traditional totalitarian, extremist doctrine.

I want to draw the House’s attention to a particularly important article by Charles Moore in The Daily Telegraph on Saturday 29 November. It is headed, “We won’t defeat extremism until we understand their ideology”, with the sub-heading, “Stopping jihadists is one thing—but stopping them from wanting to kill is more important”. The article reflects very much the views that I have been putting forward in this speech, but neither I nor the right hon. Lady had any contact with Mr Moore before he wrote it. It is always very encouraging when somebody of that calibre independently arrives at similar conclusions to those that one has oneself reached.

[Hazel Blears]

I cannot anticipate what the hon. Gentleman is going to say next, but I did speak to Charles Moore last week, so I would not want him to mislead the House inadvertently.

[Dr Lewis]

That only goes to show that the right hon. Lady and I do not co-ordinate our efforts as seamlessly as perhaps we ought, because I should have known that. Anyway, the important thing about the article is that it looks at the consequences and conclusions of our recently published Intelligence and Security Committee report on the terrible events in Woolwich. The main question in Charles Moore’s mind about the killers is: what is it that made them so bloodthirsty and so bold in the first place? Why did they want to do such a terrible thing? He comes to the conclusion:

“Islamist extremism combines something very new—the power of internet technology—with something very old—the power of belief.”

He says that the report establishes that

“Lee Rigby’s murderers were ‘self-starting’”,

but that

“they were not lunatics or even ‘lone wolves’. They took large doses of the drug called ideology…It was supplied by pushers who might live in their neighbourhood, but might equally well live in Yemen or Aleppo.”

Charles Moore refers to the calls that have been made to start a counter-narrative, but he notes that MI5, for all its good work, does not have—some would say that it should not have this; it is not necessarily its responsibility to have it—an ideological unit. He says:

“It is rather as if we were trying to combat Communism without knowing the theories of Marxist-Leninism.”

He concludes:

“Time after time, it is non-violent subversion that has prepared the ground for serious trouble”,

and he warns against the danger of running around

“trying to catch the bad fruit, instead of taking an axe to the tree.”

This is a problem that we face at a scale that is not yet insupportable, but which could get very much worse.

Somebody once said that the problem with the world is that the ignorant are cocksure and the wise are full of doubt. The problem we have is that some people with a racist, radical, totalitarian, extremist, murderous ideology have found a way, in the name of their interpretation of their God and their Prophet, to do what extremists have always wanted to do, which is to enjoy untrammelled power over everyone else.

One cannot mobilise a society or a community to counter that successfully if one confines oneself simply to dealing with individuals whom one has already recognised as at risk of radicalisation, because they will already be on the conveyor belt to an extremist outcome and, very probably, to a violent extremist outcome. What one has to do is not to be shy about the virtues of democratic politics, institutions and ideas, or about denouncing the follies and iniquities of systems based on an ideology that stands in total opposition to everything that moderate and liberal-minded people believe.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

The hon. Gentleman reminds me of the last feature I wanted to include in the list of what we always see in these counter-terror Bills, which is the very thing he mentions; it is all about suspicion, and the powers of the Home Secretary and how she will be allowed to exercise them, never testing things in courts, because the evidence is not substantive enough. It is all to do with this idea that somehow we have got to make people safe in this country by proposing all sorts of control mechanisms on suspects. If the Government were serious about this—if they believed and had the courage of their convictions—they should take it to court and test it in the public court, and give people an opportunity to defend themselves. If someone is subject to one of these new TPIMs, they have no means to try to fight their defence; they have no access to having that tested in court. The Government talk about how extremism develops, about radicalisation and about the furthering of ideologies, but when they are doing things like this, it is no surprise that people might take a jaundiced view about some of the things that happen.

I enjoyed the contribution of the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). It was good and there was very little I could disagree with. Some of the things that are necessary to tackle extremism are the sorts of things he presented, and many of the things mentioned by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) are also absolutely necessary, but we have got to look at ourselves. We have got to look at the decisions we made. We have got to understand the things we have said, passed and done that may have inflamed the situation. If we cannot do that, we are not acting responsibly. We have got to make sure we account for our actions and see what they led to.

I was in the House when we had the debate on the Iraq war, as were other Members, and we said what would happen as a consequence of the Iraq war—an illegal war that inflamed opinion and passions not just in communities here, but communities around the world. We said that there would be a consequence and a reaction. That has come true. That has happened. The reason why we are now having to mop up with this type of legislation and these types of measures is because of some of the critical decisions we took, and some of the appalling and bad decisions we made and are still accounting for.

[Hazel Blears]

Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise that, in equal measure, the decision not to intervene in the events in Syria may also have inflamed the feelings of some of the people who saw the terrible events played out on their screens showing what was happening to vulnerable families in those circumstances?

[Pete Wishart]

What I accept is that there was a failure to recognise some of the international dynamics that influence communities in this country. The solution always seems to be that we have to intervene—that we have got to try to make the world better—and sometimes we are unaware of the unintended consequences that come from that. All I am saying to this House is that at some point we have got to acknowledge what we have done in terms of framing the conditions and setting the environment in which these things happen. By failing to do that, and by failing to acknowledge that type of issue, we will be hampered in our approach to these matters, and the very good things in Prevent and all the anti-radicalisation programmes will fall and fail, because we will have missed out a crucial part of the holistic view we need to take of these things.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

My hon. Friend says most of these are warranted powers: of course the lawful intercept section of the Bill is in relation to warranted powers, but communications data are not subject to warrants signed by a Secretary of State. [Interruption.] I am about to answer the question. I am not quite sure who said that. [Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart); I might have guessed.

Certainly, I would expect only warrants that would fall under current lawful intercept powers to come to me. On the issue of lawful intercept, it has been the contention of this Government—and, I believe, the previous Government when they passed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—that that had extraterritorial application. That has been legally questioned and we have continued to assert that that is the power that currently exists. The Bill puts that beyond doubt, by putting it clearly into primary legislation, so nobody can be in any doubt that the power that we have always said existed does in fact exist. That is the entire point, and I might add that I think a number of people may take comfort from the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) does not consider there to be an extension of powers in this Bill.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I raised this issue when the Home Secretary made her statement last week, but she is aware that some of the service providers do not accept the extraterritorial application of RIPA. She is now asserting that RIPA does have extraterritorial effect under this Bill. If some of those communication service providers maintain their current position—that it does not—what powers does she have to enforce the extraterritorial nature of the Bill and what sanctions will be available to ensure general compliance with its extraterritorial effect?

[Mrs May]

The point about putting this beyond doubt in the legislation is obviously that it strengthens the ability to enforce in this area. The enforcement capabilities remain as they were previously—taking out an injunction against the company concerned, with the sanctions that that might entail. The position is not changing; what is changing is simply being absolutely without doubt that the extraterritoriality is there, because it is now in the Bill, rather than it being asserted by Government as having been the intention of the previous legislation.

I will now attempt to make some progress. I have made the point that urgent action is needed—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

The European Union will consider the necessity of a further data retention directive in due course, but it will take some time to be put in place. As my right hon. Friend knows, the European Parliament has recently changed and the European Commission will be changing, so it will be some time before the issue is addressed. As anyone who has dealt with such matters at any stage knows, it can take some time for proposals to be considered and finally agreed.

Alongside the legislation, of which I have stressed the urgency and importance, it is right that we balance the use of sensitive powers against the public’s right to privacy. I have detailed the limits on access to communications data and interception that will be enshrined in the primary legislation. In addition, I announced last week a package of measures to strengthen safeguards and to reassure the public that their rights to security and privacy are equally protected. We will reduce the number of public authorities able to access communications data. We will establish a privacy and civil liberties oversight board. We will appoint a senior former diplomat to lead discussions with other Governments on how we share data for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. We will also publish an annual transparency report on the use of sensitive powers.

[Hazel Blears]

It is apparent to all in the House and has become increasingly evident over recent months that there is a problem with the low level of public awareness of the legislative measures, the safeguards and the framework. The interception of communications commissioner has produced an extremely good report on the use of these powers, in particular by GCHQ, rebutting many allegations about mass surveillance and considering targeting and warranting. However—I hesitate to say this—his report has probably been read by perhaps a handful of people in this country. What can the Home Secretary do to ensure that there is much more public awareness? Hopefully, the annual transparency reports and the new boards will help, but it is urgent and pressing that the public should understand exactly what the framework is, what the authorities and powers are and what the agencies are doing.

[Mrs May]

The right hon. Lady makes an extremely important point. She is right that Sir Anthony May produced a first-class report that set out the powers and how they are used and was clear about their rightful use. Sadly, perhaps because it was not a “shock horror” report, it did not receive an awful lot of publicity. I hope that the Government’s commitment to an annual transparency report will help in this regard. The Intelligence and Security Committee, on which the right hon. Lady sits, is carrying out its own review of privacy and security and I hope that it will get some publicity when it is completed. It therefore behoves all of us to try as far as possible to promote the message that effective oversight is in place.

Communications Data and Interception

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I absolutely can. In the Bill we are addressing the two issues of communications data and lawful intercept, and I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for recognising and drawing a distinction between them. It is important that people understand that distinction. Access to lawful intercept will continue in the way that it always has—under warrant. One of the roles of the Home Secretary and, in some areas, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, is to sign warrants and to consider their necessity and proportionality. A great strength of our system is that those ultimate decisions are made by people who are democratically accountable.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I welcome the Home Secretary’s proposals on data retention, which are absolutely essential to enable our security agencies to carry out their duty to protect our citizens, but I am concerned about the proposals to assert the extraterritoriality of our intercept powers, which, as she will know, is a matter of contention for some communications service providers. If some of them choose not to comply, what actions can she take to ensure uniformity of compliance with the legislation? That is a real challenge for her. I am also concerned about the mutual legal assistance treaty. It can provide a framework to enable us to get data from other jurisdictions, but it is so slow and cumbersome that it can take months. When we are in a fast-moving terrorist situation, we need to be able to get those data quickly. I think that reform of that treaty is a high priority.

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady. She raises two issues. First, she is absolutely right that there have been questions about the extraterritoriality of the current provisions in RIPA. We have asserted, as I believe the previous Government did, that the extraterritorial jurisdiction was there, but we have chosen to make it absolutely clear in the Bill that it is possible to exercise a warrant extraterritorially. That is part of the purpose of that part of the legislation. Secondly, we have already had discussions with the United States on the mutual legal assistance arrangements, and it is precisely that sort of issue that I think the senior former diplomat will be able to address in discussions with other Governments, particularly the American Government, because the right hon. Lady is absolutely right that currently the processes are very slow and do not address the issue as we need them to.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Tuesday 21st January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Gentleman, too, should want this information and these answers from the Home Secretary. Whatever his views about the legislation, he ought to want answers from the Home Secretary about whether CD still presents a risk. Our view is that it is right to have exceptional legislation, but that strong safeguards should also be in place. Sometimes there is a need for clear powers, but clear safeguards must also be in place. There should be provision to review TPIMs or control orders to make sure that they are used only where it is proportionate and justified. However, the Home Secretary should provide answers about whether she is needlessly putting people at risk as a result of the decisions she has taken.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

My right hon. Friend will be aware that the independent review of David Anderson recommended that consideration be given to an additional power at the end of a TPIM to provide something similar to licence conditions when people are released from prison. At the moment, there is no legislation to provide any degree of control once the TPIM is ended. Does my right hon. Friend think it a good idea to introduce such provisions into the TPIMs legislation so that if we do not have a TPIM, we at least have something akin to licence conditions on the release of prisoners?

[Yvette Cooper]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. As we understand it, no restrictions will be in place for these six men, regardless of the security risk. We do not know what the security assessment of these six men is; that is why the Home Secretary needs to tell us. She may now believe that they are no longer a risk and that no further restrictions are needed. If further restrictions are needed, however, we need to know what they are. We are happy to engage in a cross-party discussion about whether further legislation and changes are needed, but we need answers from the Home Secretary on the security assessment of these men.

Let us take the man known as AM, for example. The Government have argued that he was part of

“a viable plot to commit mass murder by bringing down transatlantic airlines by suicide bombing”.

Here is what the judge said just 18 months ago:

“But for the disruption of the transatlantic airlines plot, there is every reason to believe that AM would have killed himself and a large number of other people.”

Those are the judge’s words. He also said that

“convincing evidence of a change of heart was required before the Secretary of State could reasonably consider that the need to protect members of the public from a risk of terrorism had gone or been reduced to a level at which preventative measures were no longer required.”

The Home Secretary has now removed those preventive measures. Does she believe that there has been

“convincing evidence of a change of heart”?

Does she have evidence that

“the need to protect members of the public from a risk of terrorism”

has gone? I have cited what the court said 18 months ago, but what does the Home Secretary say about AM now? Once again, I give her the opportunity to intervene to answer the question whether she believes that AM is still a risk.

There are others, such as the man known as BF. Just seven months ago, the Home Secretary described him as a

“long term, committed and historically well connected extremist”

who

“maintains a desire to travel overseas and he would seek to travel after restrictions are removed and he would seek to engage in terrorist related activities.”

That was seven months ago; what has changed? Is he still a risk; yes or no? Then there is the man known as CE. The Home Secretary told the courts that he was trying to travel to Somalia to engage in terror-related activity and that he was linked to a UK-based network of Islamist extremists who are fundraising and supporting terrorism in Somalia. Is he still a risk; yes or no?

The courts confirmed nine months ago that CF had attempted to travel to Afghanistan to engage in suicide operations, while the Security Service said he was fundraising for al-Shabaab and recruiting fighters from the UK. Is he still a risk? The man known as BM is accused of fundraising for terrorist organisations in Pakistan and of trying to travel there to engage in terror-related activities. Is he still a risk?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

I have to say that that is an ingenious argument to make in support of the hon. Gentleman’s Front Benchers, but what it shows is that the courts were giving a very clear message about aspects of control orders. What we needed was a regime that was legally viable and would command the confidence of the police and security services, and TPIMs have been consistently endorsed by the courts, two successive independent reviewers of counter-terrorism legislation, the police and the Security Service. They provide some of the strongest restrictions available in the democratic world and some of the strongest possible protections that our courts will allow. We now have a strong and sustainable legal framework to handle terrorist suspects whom we can neither prosecute nor deport.

[Hazel Blears]

I am beginning to have a concern that, as a result of the outcry because people have absconded from the TPIMs regime, the Government will in future be reluctant to use the TPIMs powers. Will the Home Secretary confirm that if there are people who pose a serious security risk to this country, the Government will continue to use the TPIMs powers, although they are considerably weakened in my view, to try to protect the people of this country?

[Mrs May]

The TPIMs remain on the statute book. They remain there as an option; they are an option for the Security Service and the police to look at in relation to any individual and to bring forward to the Secretary of State for determination and then through the court process, which the right hon. Lady knows is in place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

What I have made clear is that the courts struck down forced relocation in a number of cases. That is a fact that the shadow Front-Bench team never put before this House.

The Opposition’s motion also raises a number of other issues, as the right hon. Lady did in her speech, so let me start by addressing the issue of the two-year time limit. Again, the Opposition do not tell us the whole story. If the police or Security Service observe any of those individuals engaging in new terrorism-related activity, they can apply to have a new TPIM placed on that subject. That is something that is entirely open to them. Besides, people coming off restrictions is nothing new. Convicted prisoners serve their sentences and are released every day. Opposition Members can say what they like, but that also includes people convicted under the Terrorism Acts.

[Hazel Blears]

It would help the House enormously if the Secretary of State could confirm now whether she is prepared to look at the recommendation from David Anderson that at the end of a TPIM there be some power similar to licensed conditions when people are released from prison, so that at least there is some mechanism for making these people engage with the authorities, whether it is the National Offender Management Service or the probation service. There needs to be some vestige of control over those people’s activities.

[Mrs May]

I will come on to those points about individuals in general and individuals who are coming off TPIMs. As I have said, if individuals have been conducting new terrorism-related activity, it is perfectly possible for a new TPIM to be established and for a request to be made for that TPIM to be applied to those individuals.

The Opposition can say what they like about the issue of the two-year time limit, but I suggest that the fact that people are released having been convicted under the Terrorism Acts suggests that there are people released on to our streets who have been involved in acts of terrorism.

Oral Answers to Questions

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Immigration (Mr Mark Harper)]

It is not possible to extend transitional controls due to the terms of the accession treaties signed by the Labour party when it was in government. Eight other European countries will remove those controls at the end of the year. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has, however, been working with our European colleagues to tighten the rules so that we see a reduction in the abuse of free movement.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I welcome that fact that now, under Clare’s law, victims of serial perpetrators of domestic violence will be able to get disclosures from right across the country. The Home Secretary knows that victims are probably at their most vulnerable at the point of disclosure, so will she ensure that organisations such as Women’s Aid and domestic violence advisers have sufficient resources to be able to protect those victims at that point?

[Mrs May]

I recognise the interest that the right hon. Lady has taken in the question of Clare’s law and the work that she did to promote the concept behind it, following the sad and tragic death of one of her constituents who did not have access to information about their partner. What we have seen among the police forces that have been piloting Clare’s law is a real understanding of the need to work closely with other organisations such as Women’s Aid to ensure that there is support for victims. I am pleased to say that the Government have ring-fenced £40 million for local support, including for independent domestic violence advocates, who often play a key role in such cases.

Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his remarks. As I indicated earlier, there will be a review of the operation of this case, as there was in relation to Ibrahim Magag, and any lessons that need to be learned will be.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

This year, 12 people previously convicted under terrorism legislation will be released and on our streets. Early next year, the orders of many of those still on TPIMs will come to an end. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, has said it is

“tempting, in the most serious cases, to wish for longer”

than the two years under TPIMs, and has described those whose orders will expire as at

“the highest end of seriousness”.

What steps is the Home Secretary taking to manage the undoubted increase in risk that will result from those on TPIMs who have completed their sentences under terrorism legislation being released and walking our streets?

[Mrs May]

The right hon. Lady started by referring to people being released, but these were people who had come to the end of their sentence. That is what happens—it happens in the normal course of events—but for individuals who pose a terrorist risk, or who are suspected of posing a terrorist risk, the law enforcement agencies take appropriate measures to ensure the security and safety of the public. As I said, national security is the Government’s first concern.

Intelligence and Security Services

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that it would be irresponsible to publish hundreds of thousands of documents without having a look at them. That is why I am so glad that that is what The Guardian has explicitly not done. It has taken a responsible approach and managed to prevent that. We can imagine what could have happened if there had been a WikiLeaks-style publication. The hon. Gentleman should be concerned about the fact that a contractor was able to get hold of all the information, and that is a serious failure from the NSA and a great disgrace. If it cannot protect information to that level of security, it should be very worried. There are, I think, 850,000 people who could have had access to that information. Was the NSA certain that none of them would pass it on to a foreign power? Frankly, passing it on to The Guardian is probably about the safest thing that could have happened to it.

One of the functions of Parliament is to pass legislation and scrutinise the work of the Government. However, if we do not know what is happening, how can there be any scrutiny? We see legislation such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 being used beyond the original intentions of the House, and that makes it impossible for Parliament to do its job. People say, “If you have done nothing wrong, you have nothing to fear.” I suggest that they say that to the green activists infiltrated by the police or to members of the Lawrence family. Human behaviour changes when people know that they are being watched. Is that the world in which we want to live?

There is also an economic issue. Our actions are hitting our own economic interests. The internet is a huge factor in business here—some £110 billion of GDP. It is a dynamic market, and it can move. If people are concerned about the privacy of their data here, whether their personal information or important company secrets, they will simply move where they store that information. Germany is already launching schemes to encourage businesses to go there instead, with e-mail systems that guarantee that no data will leave German boundaries while e-mails are being sent, so there is not the problem of information going overseas and coming back again to be looked at. That will hit us financially, regardless of anything else.

We must look at the balance between intelligence gathering and privacy. We need to have oversight. Although I am pleased that we are having the heads of the intelligence and security services coming to a public forum, it has been incredibly hard to get that to happen. Of course national security should not be taken lightly, but the public needs to understand what is being done in their name.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. It is essential that parliamentarians from every part of the House debate such issues, including, where possible, classified information. He has talked about balance, which is absolutely central to this debate. It is the balance between security, liberty and privacy and the need to keep our secrets safe and to enable our agencies to do their job. He is a scientist and believes in making decisions on the basis of evidence. There is a real danger here that we have this big debate about privacy almost in a vacuum. Does he accept that virtually every operation that has foiled a terrorist plot in this country has been dependent on communications data over the past decade or so, and that it is essential for our agencies to have those powers, but obviously within a robust legal framework?

[Dr Huppert]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her intervention. No one is saying that we should make illegal the collection of communications data; that would be a problem. She is also right to say that we need evidence; we cannot have a vacuum. That is exactly why it is helpful to know some of what is being said. We have heard people who say that we should never publish anything that would inform this debate. I want an informed debate, and I am pleased that we can have one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

Let me answer the hon. Gentleman very carefully; I hope that he will forgive me for being none too specific in my answer. Part of our responsibility, which did not just emerge after the revelations about Prism, is to look at what the agencies do, what their capacities are and how they use those capacities. It is a continuous process. We have in the head of GCHQ. We take evidence. We probe what it is doing and what it is capable of doing. Therefore, it is not that we did not have any concerns or any interest in what GCHQ was capable of. That is an ongoing process, but inevitably, when something new emerges, it is appropriate that, as a Committee, we look into it.

I have answered the hon. Gentleman’s question perhaps not as accurately as he would have liked, but—I am not being evasive when I say this—if I went any further, I would be going into detail that at this stage I do not think is relevant.

I was talking about the conclusions that the Committee reached in July. The second conclusion was this:

“We have reviewed the reports that GCHQ produced on the basis of intelligence sought from the US, and we are satisfied that they conformed with GCHQ’s statutory duties. The legal authority for this is contained in the Intelligence Services Act 1994.”

The third conclusion was that

“in each case where GCHQ sought information from the US”—

this is an important conclusion—

“a warrant for interception, signed by a Minister, was already in place, in accordance with the legal safeguards contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.”

Let us be absolutely clear as regards our own agency. We were able to look in detail at how it had used the information and we were able to conclude, with a high degree of conviction, that it was not breaking the law.

[Hazel Blears]

My right hon. Friend is making a very thoughtful and comprehensive speech and speaks, no doubt, for many of us on the Committee. It is an essential part of the debate that the agencies were operating within the existing legal framework of British law. Whether—my right hon. Friend might want to comment on this—the existing framework needs review was also a matter considered by the Committee, and that appears to be the heart of this debate. Yes, the agencies have conformed with the existing legal framework. It is legitimate debate to say, “Is that, in this modern age, still appropriate?” But the Committee clearly also went on to consider exactly that issue.

[Mr Howarth]

It is almost as though my right hon. Friend read my speech in advance. With remarkably good timing, she leads me on to my next point. In our report, as she well knows, under the heading “Next Steps”, we say:

“We are therefore examining”—

this is future work to be done—

“the complex interaction between the Intelligence Services Act, the Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and the policies and procedures that underpin them, further. We note that the Interception of Communications Commissioner is also considering this issue.”

In terms of who is doing their job and who is not doing their job, our Committee is doing our job; and, by the way, the commissioner is doing his job. There is, I think, a debate to be had—I cannot remember where this was raised—about the role of the commissioner.

One of the things that the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chair of our Committee, has brought about—it is partly to do with the legislation and, I think, partly to do with his own feelings about the way we need to act—is our becoming more outward facing as a Committee. As has been noted, we are to have the first open session, at which we will be interviewing in public the three heads of agencies, a week today.

It is important that we have made that change. It is important that when we can say what we know in public, we do so. In addition, although I would not necessarily go along with the formulation put forward, there might be a case for trying to persuade the interception commissioner to become slightly more outward facing. But that—

Abu Qatada (Deportation)

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

In relation to the interpretation of article 8, sadly we have seen cases where the interpretation by the judges has not been what the intent of Parliament was when we changed the immigration rules, which is why we are going to put those changes into primary legislation in the immigration Bill later this year. I can assure my hon. Friend that I and others will continue looking at human rights and what the right human rights laws are. As our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear on Sunday morning, the Conservative party will introduce our proposals at the next general election.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I, too, congratulate the Home Secretary and, in particular, the security Minister on the work that they have both done to get this good result. I was just thinking that it has taken 12 years to deport Abu Qatada—I think it took Andy Murray only seven years to win Wimbledon—so the whole country will be very pleased about this.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

And five minutes for you to get that in.

[Hazel Blears]

But it is a very serious matter, and this is a dangerous individual who was a threat to this country. I urge the Home Secretary to say to other countries with which we do not have memorandums of understanding that this is a clear message that the British Government can ensure that someone is deported, that they are not tortured and that they receive a fair trial. We should say to countries that may have been a little reluctant that now is the time to step up their act and get those memorandums agreed.

[Mrs May]

The right hon. Lady makes an important and valid point. Absolutely, we can send that message. One of the crucial aspects of this case is that the deportation with assurances memorandum of understanding was agreed by the courts as something that worked, so we can indeed build on that.