Police Conduct and David Carrick

Harriet Harman Excerpts

Tuesday 17th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Mother of the House.

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

I thank the Home Secretary for her statement. I completely agree with the very strong questioning put by the shadow Home Secretary, and I also agree with what was said by the former Home Secretary and the current Chair of the Select Committee.

I have two questions. The first is about timing. As hon. Members have said, successive Metropolitan Police Commissioners have complained that the regulations this House has put in place in statutory instruments prevent them from sacking officers who they know are unfit to be in the Metropolitan police, so that puts a responsibility on us to change those regulations. Can I suggest that the Home Secretary, in consultation with the Metropolitan police, brings forward draft regulations, and let us consult not in the overall generality of a review, but on those specific draft regulations? We will be 100% behind her when she brings to the House changed regulations, so that the Metropolitan police are able to manage the force in the way we all want to see them manage it.

The second point about Sir Mark Rowley and the response to the Carrick situation is that this is not just about change in the future, but about dealing with the individuals who are currently in senior and management positions in the Met who seemed to think it was all right for Carrick to be given extra responsibilities and to be promoted. The management suitability of those officers really ought to be examined by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, and we need a bit of transparency about that. Will the Home Secretary urge the commissioner, whom we all support in his determination to change the culture, to publish transparently what tracking he has gone through of when Carrick was looked at and nothing was done, because all of those senior officers have colluded? Will she also look through all of the officers, at horizontal level, who were part of the banter and the immediate culture of this officer, and who did nothing to report him and therefore were colluding in the perpetration of these atrocious crimes?

[Suella Braverman]

I want to do what works, which is why I have taken very seriously what the Met commissioner has said about the process relating to police misconduct hearings and disciplinary processes. I have been clear that where there is a role for Government, we will act, but it is important that we look carefully at the issue. That is why the review I have just announced will cover issues such as the legally qualified chairs, to ensure that they are striking the right balance and making the right decisions. It is important that we ensure that the trends in the use of misconduct sanctions and the consistency of decision making in cases of sexual misconduct, other violence against women and girls and such offences are appropriate. Those are the kinds of things we need to look at very carefully.

When it comes to the Metropolitan police, as I have said, the Met commissioner has instituted a new anti-corruption and abuse command specifically to look at any other risk factors and any other issues relating to this kind of incident. An extra 100 officers were drafted in to use covert tactics to identify officers who act in a corrupt or predatory manner, including those who abuse their positions in the police. I am encouraged by those early commitments by the Met commissioner, and I think we need to get behind him so that we can radically improve the system.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Harriet Harman Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

Not only was the Minister not able to, but he did not want to.

This year alone, 26,000 have entered and, unless the legal loopholes are effectively stopped, they will continue to come in a tsunami of numbers next year. The Government have provided a remedy partially in this Bill but not yet regarding the full legal framework of the Human Rights Act, the European convention on human rights, EU retained law and the refugee convention of 1951, as amended with universal application in 1967 by a protocol. On EU retained law alone, I have found on the Government’s website in the National Archives that this amounts to as many as 123 directives and regulations, spelling out masses of laws relating to asylum and immigration that originated in EU law and are now on our statute book, although a few have been revoked.

The official Home Office policy guidance for asylum screening is still essentially based on the same law, and it makes for dismal reading. It is essential that that is changed. At present, an asylum claim must be registered where an individual fears persecution or serious harm of persecution for any given reason on return to their country. How to evaluate a fear varies with every individual and can in many cases be deliberately exaggerated.

To be recognised as a refugee under the UN refugee convention, the claimant can assert that they have a well-founded fear of persecution and be not only unable, but unwilling, to go back to their country of origin or habitual residence. That can be invoked on grounds which include mere political opinions. Furthermore, they can claim that they are within the judicial sphere of “the humanitarian protection policy”, and the discretion as to whether an asylum claim should be accepted is heavily weighted in favour of asylum, even if the claimants do not even use the term “asylum” when they arrive on our shores.

A paper by the highly distinguished former professor of law at Oxford, John Finnis, and Simon Murray explains in graphic terms the law and case law in more than 100 pages of detailed analysis. They conclude that the European Court of Human Rights has wrongly circumvented fundamental principles originated in the European convention on human rights and the 1951 refugee convention. They also argue that, properly interpreted, the UK and other signatory states have no obligation to let in refugees arriving at our borders en masse, have no legal or treaty obligation to accept refuges at all, and have no obligation to provide asylum for dangerous refugees, such as criminals and terrorists.

The European Court, by radical and unwarranted interpretation, has used the article 3 provisions on torture and inhuman treatment and the article 8 provisions on the right to private and family life to extend the ambit of claimants to encourage them to engage in unlawful immigration. That has been done through the formula of so-called living instruments and recent UK judicial rulings that have continuously expanded claimants’ rights within the judicial system. Claimants are granted repetitive appeals that bring the immigration system under intense pressure at monumental expense to the taxpayer, with grave political consequences on the doorstep.

We need to pull the rug from under the traffickers’ feet, save the lives of those who are exploited by them, and protect our own manifesto promises. Despite the Government’s good intentions in aspects of the Bill, we must solve the fundamental problems presented by the human rights legislation and the legal framework of the provisions that I have mentioned. We cannot continue, with unwarranted interpretation and judgments by the judiciary, to allow illegal immigration.

I seek robust assurances today from the Government to resolve the matter by legislation, and I will press my amendment unless I get them. We cannot go on kicking the can down the yellow brick road. The journey has begun, but the question is where it ends. The yellow brick road is not only in disrepair, as it was in “The Wizard of Oz”, but littered with political precipices.

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to amendments 96 to 100 and 102, which stand in my name and those of other hon. Members. They arise from the legislative scrutiny of the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

I remind hon. Members that the Joint Committee is a cross-party Committee with half its members from the House of Commons and half from the House of Lords. We undertake legislative scrutiny of all Bills for their human rights implications. We have taken evidence on the Bill from many people—including the Minister, for whose evidence we are grateful—and we are advised by our own legal experts.

In our report, which we published on 1 December, we concluded that the proposed new measures to criminalise those who enter the UK without a visa or without leave will breach human rights law and the refugee convention; our amendment 102 would deal with that. We also concluded that there should be no immunity from prosecution if criminal offences are committed by border officials, particularly where they lead to loss of life; our amendment 100 would deal with that. I hope that the Government will accept both amendments.

Our amendments 96 to 99 would deal with the major issues relating to pushbacks. The Bill provides greater powers for Border Force to “board, divert and detain” vessels. The Government acknowledge that crossings are perilous; this debate takes place in the shadow of the 27 people who drowned in the channel. The Minister was clear in his evidence to the Joint Committee that he does not want Government action to be the cause of yet more lives lost. Of course not.

Our amendment 97 would circumscribe the new powers to ensure that they could not be used against unseaworthy vessels such as dinghies. Our amendment 98 would ensure that they could not

“be used in a manner…that could endanger life at sea.”

Our amendment 96 would ensure that they could be used only in a way that complies with international maritime law, which the Government say they want to comply with. The Minister said in evidence to us that that is the Government’s intention and that they would make that intention clear in operational directions—but if the power is in the Bill, so should the protections be.

Given the Government’s intention, what reason could they possibly have to oppose the amendments? The Government have a big majority and can whip to vote them down, but the amendments have been tabled by a cross-party Committee of both Houses, they have been expertly drafted by our legal counsel, and they represent what the Government say is their intention.

The Minister is new and enthusiastic in his role. He was very forthcoming in his evidence to our Committee, and he and I have spoken about the subject privately, for which I am grateful. I offer him a bit of advice: not to be the Minister who votes our amendments down just because he can, not to be the Minister who makes his Back Benchers vote against ensuring that lives are not endangered—that is not the right thing for him to do—and not to be the Minister who gives new powers to Border Force that cost lives at sea.

Our amendments allow for the new powers, but make them compliant with international law and make them safe. The Government have no reason to oppose the amendments, so I hope that the Minister will say to his colleagues and his civil servants that he wants to reflect on them because he does not want to stand in the way of putting the Government’s intentions on the face of the Bill. If the Government do oppose the amendments, we will seek to press amendment 98 to a Division, but I hope that that will not be necessary.

Violence Against Women and Girls: Police Response

Harriet Harman Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on what action she will be taking in response to the report by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary on the police response to violence against women and girls.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rachel Maclean)]

Crimes of violence against women and girls are utterly despicable. They inflict profound and lasting harm on the victims and have a damaging impact on our society as a whole. That is why the Government are taking concerted action to crack down on these appalling crimes.

I am extremely grateful to the right hon. and learned Lady for providing me with an opportunity, as the newly appointed Safeguarding Minister, to outline our work in this area, and I very much hope to work collegially across the House. I know that every parliamentarian shares our concern about these serious issues.

The Home Secretary commissioned this report from the police inspectorate to help police forces strengthen their response. We are carefully considering the inspectorate’s findings, and we expect the police and others to take any necessary action. The Home Secretary has committed to considering the report’s full recommendations and will update Parliament when she has done so.

We supported the inspectorate’s recommendation in its interim report in July to introduce a full-time national police lead for violence against women and girls. I am pleased to say that Deputy Chief Constable Maggie Blyth has been appointed to the role, and we look forward to working with her.

While the report shows that there is more to do, we must not lose sight of the fact that we have made progress. The report acknowledges improvements in the police response to these crimes, including better identification of repeat victims, improved techniques to collect evidence, and improved safeguarding measures.

Since 2010, the Government have taken significant action in this space, including introducing new laws to tackle stalking, forced marriage, female genital mutilation and so-called revenge porn. Importantly, we have brought forward the landmark Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and I pay tribute to my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), who is sitting beside me on the Front Bench, and to the Prime Minister for playing a vital role. We have more than doubled the safer streets fund, while our unprecedented police recruitment drive is putting more officers in our communities to protect the public and drive down crime.

We are determined to go further, which is why we published our new tackling violence against women and girls strategy in July, and we will publish a complementary domestic abuse strategy this year. Our new strategy will drive our effort to prevent these crimes, ensure that victims get the support they need, and bring perpetrators to justice. It details a number of steps, including immediate investment in measures to make our streets safer, more funding for specialist support services, and a multimillion-pound public behaviour campaign to challenge unacceptable behaviour.

Public protection is our No. 1 priority. Violence against women and girls has absolutely no place in our society, and we are committed to working with the police and other key partners to confront these crimes wherever they appear.

[Mr Speaker]

We come to the Mother of the House, Harriet Harman.

[Ms Harman]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I am really grateful to you for granting this urgent question.

I thank the Minister for her response and welcome her to her new role and wish her well in it. I will support her in her work, but we need a greater sense of urgency. In just the last few days, there have been more horrific killings of women. In Sheffield, 35-year-old Terri Harris was killed together with three children, John Paul Bennett, Lacey Bennet and Connie Gent. In Greenwich, primary school teacher Sabina Nessa was only 28 years old.

Her Majesty’s inspectorate of police, Zoë Billingham, rightly describes this as an “epidemic” of male violence against women, and the extent of the impunity of men for this violence is shown by the killer of Sophie Moss saying that it was just “rough sex gone wrong” and literally getting away without a murder charge.

All credit to the Government for commissioning this report. Will they now implement its recommendations in full? We have a woman Homey Secretary, and I believe that women in leading positions have a special duty to deliver for other women. Although she will meet the inevitable institutional objections and traditional resistance to change, she will, if she does this, have 100% support from this side of the House and, indeed, 100% support from her own side. It is not often we can say this, but this is something that the whole House wants.

[Rachel Maclean]

I thank the right hon. and learned Lady for her questions, and I pay tribute to her for her long-standing record of action in this area. I am sure that she will continue to hold me to account at this Dispatch Box and in other forums.

Speaking on behalf of the Government and myself, our heart goes out to all those affected by these horrific crimes. Our thoughts are with the families and the victims. The right hon. and learned Lady will be aware, however, that we cannot comment on ongoing cases.

Addressing murder is a key priority for the police. They are, of course, operationally independent from the Government, and rightly so. Driving down the murder rate in this country is a key priority. The right hon. and learned Lady mentions the report’s findings. We are working carefully and very closely on them and are considering them in detail. That is why we have appointed the policing lead Maggie Blyth; we look forward to working with her and taking forward those recommendations and actions.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Court Bill

Harriet Harman Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab) [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

(Deputy) Speaker: With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 2—Kerb-crawling—

‘(1) It is an offence for a person, from a motor vehicle while it is in a street or public place, or in a street or public place while in the immediate vicinity of a motor vehicle that they have just got out of, to engage in conduct which amounts to harassment in such manner or in such circumstances as to be likely to cause annoyance, alarm, distress, or nuisance to any other person.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to revocation of their driving licence, or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or both.

(3) In this section “motor vehicle ” has the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Act 1972.

(4) In this section “street” has the meaning given by section 1(4) of the Street Offences Act 1959.’

New clause 23—Child criminal exploitation

‘At end of section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (meaning of exploitation), insert—

“Child criminal exploitation

(7) Another person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls the person to undertake activity which constitutes a criminal offence and the person is under the age of 18.’

This new clause introduces a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation.

New clause 24—Registered sex offenders: change of name or identity—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of how registered sex offenders are able to change their name or other aspects of their identity without the knowledge of the police with the intention of subverting the purpose of their registration.

(2) The review must consult persons with expertise in this issue, including—

(a) representatives of police officers responsible for sex offender management,

(b) Her Majesty’s Passport Office, and

(c) the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.

(3) The scope of the review must include consideration of resources necessary for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.

(4) The review must make recommendations for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.

(5) The Secretary of State must report the findings of this review to Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.’

This new clause would ensure that the Secretary of State must publish a review into how registered sex offenders are changing their names or other aspects of their identity and propose solutions for how the Government aims to tackle this issue.

New clause 26—Reporting of sexual offences: public awareness—

‘Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must draw up and implement a campaign to improve public awareness of the desirability of reporting sexual offences, with particular reference to offences which may not be reported because they are not considered sufficiently serious.’

New clause 27—Code of practice on dealing with sexual offending—

‘(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice on dealing with sexual offending.

(2) The code must be issued to—

(a) all police forces in England and Wales,

(b) all local authorities in England and Wales,

(c) the National Probation Service,

(d) the Victims Commissioner and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and

(e) anyone else the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(3) The code must contain provision designed to—

(a) improve public awareness of the desirability of reporting sexual offences, with particular reference to non-contact sexual offences, and

(b) achieve any other purpose the Secretary of State considers appropriate to deal with sexual offending.

(4) Before issuing a code under this section the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish proposals,

(b) consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate, and

(c) lay a copy of the code before Parliament.’

New clause 28—Domestic homicide reviews—

(1) Section 9 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (2) substitute—

“(2) The Secretary of State must in all cases which meet the circumstances set out in subsection (1) direct a specified person or body within subsection (4) to establish, or to participate in, a domestic homicide review.”

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

“(3ZA) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out—

(a) the type of data relating to domestic homicide reviews which must be recorded, including—

(i) the number of domestic homicide reviews taking place across England and Wales annually; and

(ii) the time taken to complete each individual domestic homicide review;

(b) that the data must be recorded centrally in a Home Office database; and

(c) that the data must be published annually.”’

This new clause seeks to modify the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to force the Secretary of State to automatically direct a domestic homicide review in circumstances as outlined in Section 9 of the Act. The new clause also aims to improve data collection methodologies around domestic homicide reviews.

New clause 29—The right to protest—

‘(1) The Public Order Act 1986 Part II (Processions and Assemblies) is amended as follows.

(2) Before section 11 insert—

“10A The right to protest

(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.

(2) Public authorities have a duty to—

(a) respect the right to protest;

(b) protect the right to protest; and

(c) facilitate the right to protest.

(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect national security or public safety, prevent disorder or crime, protect public health or the rights and freedoms of others.

(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.”’

This new clause would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities whilst recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.

New clause 31—Offence of assaulting etc. retail worker—

‘(1) It is an offence for a person to assault, threaten or abuse another person—

(a) who is a retail worker, and

(b) who is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(2) No offence is committed under subsection (1) unless the person who assaults, threatens or abuses knows or ought to know that the other person—

(a) who is a retail worker, and

(b) is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, a fine, or both.

(4) Evidence from a single source is sufficient to establish, for the purposes of this section—

(a) whether a person is a retail worker, and

(b) whether the person is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(5) The offence under subsection (1) of threatening or abusing a retail worker is committed by a person only if the person—

(a) behaves in a threatening or abusive manner towards the worker, and

(b) intends by the behaviour to cause the worker or any other person fear or alarm or is reckless as to whether the behaviour would cause such fear or alarm.

(6) Subsection (5) applies to—

(a) behaviour of any kind including, in particular, things said or otherwise communicated as well as things done,

(b) behaviour consisting of—

(i) a single act, or

(ii) a course of conduct.

(7) Subsections (8) to (10) apply where, in proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is—

(a) specified in the complaint that the offence is aggravated by reason of the retail worker’s enforcing a statutory age restriction, and,

(b) proved that the offence is so aggravated.

(8) The offence is so aggravated if the behaviour constituting the offence occurred because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.

(9) Evidence from a single source is sufficient to prove that the offence is so aggravated.

(10) Where this section applies, the court must—

(a) state on conviction that the offence is so aggravated,

(b) record the conviction in a way that shows that the offence is so aggravated,

(c) take the aggravation into account in determining the appropriate sentence, and

(d) state—

(i) where the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is different from that which the court would have imposed if the offence were not so aggravated, the extent of and

the reasons for that difference, or

(ii) otherwise, the reasons for there being no such difference.

(11) In this section—

“enforcement”, in relation to a statutory age restriction, includes—

(a) seeking information as to a person’s age,

(b) considering information as to a person’s age,

(c) refusing to sell or supply goods or services,

for the purposes of complying with the restriction (and “enforcing” is to be construed accordingly),

“statutory age restriction” means a provision in an enactment making it an offence to sell or supply goods or services to a person under an age specified in that or another enactment.

(12) In this section, “retail worker”—

(a) means a person—

(i) whose usual place of work is retail premises, or

(ii) whose usual place of work is not retail premises but who does retail work,

(b) includes, in relation to a business that owns or occupies any premises in which the person works, a person who—

(i) is an employee of the business,

(ii) is an owner of the business, or

(iii) works in the premises under arrangements made between the business and another person for the provision of staff,

(c) also includes a person who delivers goods from retail premises.

(13) For the purposes of subsection (12), it is irrelevant whether or not the person receives payment for the work.

(14) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to prove that the person charged with the offence knew or ought to have known any matter falling within subsection (12)(b) in relation to the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed.

(15) In this section, “retail premises” means premises that are used wholly or mainly for the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public.

(16) In this section, “retail work” means—

(a) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is retail premises, any work in those retail premises,

(b) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is not retail premises, work in connection with—

(i) the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public, or

(ii) the sale or supply of services (including facilities for gambling) in respect of which a statutory age restriction applies,

(c) subject to subsection (17), in the case of a person who delivers goods from retail premises, work in connection with the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public.

(17) A person who delivers goods from retail premises is doing retail work only during the period beginning when the person arrives at a place where delivery of goods is to be effected and ending when the person leaves that place (whether or not goods have been delivered).

(18) In this section, references to working in premises includes working on any land forming part of the premises.’

New clause 32—Assault due to enforcement of statutory age restriction—

‘(1) This section applies to an offence of common assault that is committed against a worker acting in the exercise of enforcing a statutory age restriction.

(2) This section applies where it is—

(a) specified in the complaint that the offence occurred because of the worker’s enforcing a statutory age restriction, and

(b) proved that the offence so occurred because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.

(3) A person guilty of an offence to which this section applies is liable on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.

(4) In consequence of subsections (1) to (3), in section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (which provides for common assault to be summary offences punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months)—

(a) insert—

“(3) Subsection (1) is subject to section [Assault due to enforcement of statutory age restriction] of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (which makes provision for increased sentencing powers for offences of common assault committed against a worker acting in the exercise of enforcing statutory age restrictions).”

(5) In this section—

“enforcement”, in relation to a statutory age restriction, includes—

(a) seeking information as to a person’s age,

(b) considering information as to a person’s age,

(c) refusing to sell or supply goods or services,

for the purposes of complying with the restriction (and “enforcing” is to be construed accordingly),

“statutory age restriction” means a provision in an enactment making it an offence to sell or supply goods or services to a person under an age specified in that or another enactment.

(6) This section applies only in relation to offences committed on or after the day it comes into force.’

New clause 42—Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services—

‘(1) A person who is within a buffer zone and who interferes with any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services in that buffer zone is guilty of an offence

(2) A “buffer zone” means an area with a boundary which is 150 metres from any part of an abortion clinic or any access point to any building that contains an abortion clinic.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), “interferes with” means—

(a) seeks to influence; or

(b) persistently, continuously or repeatedly occupies; or

(c) impedes or threatens; or

(d) intimidates or harasses; or

(e) advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion; or

(f) informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means; or

(g) sketches, photographs, records, stores, broadcasts, or transmits images, audio, likenesses or personal data of any person without express consent.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) in the first instance—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or

(ii) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or

(iii) to both; and

(b) on further instances—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both; or

(ii) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.

(5) Nothing in this section applies to—

(a) anything done in the course of providing, or facilitating the provision of, abortion services in an abortion clinic,

(b) the operation of a camera if its coverage of persons accessing or attempting to access an abortion clinic is incidental and the camera or footage is not used for any of the purposes listed in subsection (3), and

(c) a police officer acting properly in the course of their duties.’

This new clause would introduce areas around abortion clinics and hospitals (buffer zones) where interference with, and intimidation or harassment of, women accessing or people providing abortion services would be an offence.

New clause 43—Implementation of the Law Commission review of hate crime—

‘(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations implement any recommendations of the Law Commission which relate to hatred based on sex and gender characteristics following the conclusion of its review of hate crime legislation.

(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) includes—

(a) power to amend primary legislation; and

(b) power to amend or revoke subordinate legislation.

(3) A document containing a draft of regulations under subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament not later than six months after the publication of the Law Commission’s recommendations, and that draft must be in a form which would implement all those recommendations which relate to hatred based on sex and gender characteristics.

(4) Draft regulations under subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament not earlier than 90 days, but not later than 180 days, after the document referred to in subsection (3) was laid before Parliament.

(5) The draft regulations laid before Parliament under subsection (4) must be in the form in which they appeared in the document laid before Parliament under subsection (3), except that they may contain any changes which have been recommended by any committee of either House of Parliament which has reported on that document.

(6) A Minister must make a motion in each House of Parliament approving the draft regulations laid before Parliament under subsection (4) within 14 days of the date on which they were laid.

(7) Subject to subsection (8), if the draft regulations are approved by both Houses of Parliament, the Secretary of State must make them in the form of the draft which has been approved.

(8) If any amendments to the draft regulations are agreed to by both Houses of Parliament, the Secretary of State must make the regulations in the form of the draft as so amended.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to implement any recommendations made by the Law Commission’s review of hate crime which relate to hatred based on sex and gender characteristics. Draft regulations implementing the Commission’s recommendations would be subject to the super-affirmative scrutiny process (by subsections (3) to (5)), and would be amendable (under subsection (8)).

New clause 44—Commercial sexual exploitation—

‘(1) A person (A) who gives, offers, or promises payment to any person to engage in sexual activity with a person (B) is guilty of an offence.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a “payment” includes money, a benefit, or any other consideration.

(b) an activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—

(i) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or

(ii) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.

(c) no offence is committed by a person (A) unless the sexual activity with the other person (B) involves—

(i) the person (A) being in the other person (B)’s presence, and

(ii) the person (A) touching the other person (B), or

(iii) the person (B) touching themselves for the sexual gratification of the other person (A).

(d) it is immaterial whether the payment is given, offered, or promised by a person engaging in the sexual activity, or a third party.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’

This new clause criminalises buying sex and decriminalises anyone offering sexual services.

New clause 45—Commercial sexual exploitation by a third party—

‘(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person (C) assists, facilitates, controls, or incites, by any means, another person (B) to engage in sexual activity with another person (A) in exchange for payment, anywhere in the world; and

(b) the circumstances are that—

(i) the person (C) knows or ought to know that the other person (B) is engaging in sexual activity for payment; and

(ii) the person (C) assists, facilitates, controls, or incites the other person (B) to engage in sexual activity with another person (A) with the intention of receiving payment.

(c) Subsection (1) of this section is to be construed in accordance with section [Commercial sexual exploitation].

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’

This new clause criminalises pimping.

New clause 46—Advertising—

‘(1) A person commits an offence if the person causes or allows to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of activity prohibited by sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] and [Commercial sexual exploitation by a third party] of this Act.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’

This new clause criminalises those who benefit from the advertising of sexual services. This includes ‘pimping websites’.

New clause 47—Extra-territoriality—

‘(1) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act regardless of where the offence takes place.

(2) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence—

(a) under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act if any part of the offence takes place in the UK, and

(b) under section [Advertising] of this Act if any person in the UK pays money to any other person as a result or through the advertisement published or displayed.’

This new clause allows criminal prosecutions for acts contravening the relevant sections whether they occur within or outside the United Kingdom.

New clause 48—Immunity of victims—

‘(1) A person (B), by reason of their involvement as a victim of an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act by another person (A) does not commit an offence by doing anything which (apart from this paragraph) would amount to—

(a) aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the commission of an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act by the other person (A);

(b) conspiring with the other person (A) to commit an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act; or

(c) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting offences) in relation to the commission of an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising]of this Act by the other person (A); or

(d) an offence under section [Advertising] of this Act.

(2) In this section it is immaterial whether the other person has been convicted of an offence.’

This new clause ensures that those subject to commercial sexual exploitation do not find themselves criminalised by having ‘assisted’ the person buying sexual services.

New clause 49—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions—

‘Section 92 of the Protection from Freedoms Act 2012 is replaced as follows.

“92 Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions

(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under—

(a) section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (buggery),

(b) section 13 of that Act (gross indecency between men), or

(c) section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 or section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (corresponding earlier offences), may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.

(2) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959, may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.

(3) A conviction or caution becomes a disregarded conviction or caution when conditions A and B are met.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), condition A is that the Secretary of State decides that it appears that—

(a) the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over, and

(b) any such conduct now would not be an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory).

(5) For the purposes of subsection (2), condition A is that the Secretary of State decides that it appears that any such conduct now would not be an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] and [Commercial sexual exploitation by a third party] of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021.

(6) Condition B is that—

(a) the Secretary of State has given notice of the decision to the applicant under section 94(4)(b), and

(b) the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice was given has ended.

(7) Sections 95 to 98 explain the effect of a conviction or caution becoming a disregarded conviction or caution.”’

This new clause permits those who as a result of exploitation have convictions for soliciting, to have their conviction disregarded.

New clause 50—Repeals—

‘The enactments specified in the following Table are repealed to the extent specified in column 2 of the Table.

TABLE

[Ms Harman]

Let me say at the outset that I completely agree with everything that the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) has just said. We have not got enough time to properly debate the Bill and the many issues it engages.

I have four key issues, which are the subject of cross-party amendments and new clauses. One is to do with the crucial right to protest, which the Bill curtails. As Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I have tabled amendments on that. I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) will get an opportunity to speak about protecting and enhancing the right to protest. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) has also tabled a new clause on that, which has a great deal of support. Many other hon. Members will speak about the subject.

There are also concerns about the rights of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community. Again, as Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I have tabled amendments on that and so have other Members, including the hon. Member for Stockton South (Matt Vickers). My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones) will speak about both issues from our Front Bench. I will therefore not speak specifically about the right to protest and Gypsy, Roma and Traveller rights, but I strongly support those from all parts of the House who will speak on those matters.

I will confine my comments to new clauses 1 and 2, which have support from across the House. They deal with the safety of women and girls on the street. Hon. Members will remember that, after the horrific killing of Sarah Everard, there was an outflowing on social media from young women and girls, even young schoolgirls, saying, “We are not safe walking on our streets at night. If we have to walk home in the dark after school, we will often find a man in a van kerb-crawling us with the window wound down, calling for us to get in the van, asking why we are not getting into the van, and following us home.” Often, they will take a longer route home, even though it takes more time, to go down busier streets, rather than the quickest route, where they feel less safe. Often, they will take a cab when they would really like to walk home, but just do not feel safe.

What has been shown is that this is not just a problem for some young girls and women; it is a problem for all. It is a universal, everyday experience. Sexually predatory men feel that they can harass and intimidate young girls and young women when they are on the street, especially after dark and if they are on their own. We simply have to decide whether we are going to protect and support the rights of men to do that, or whether we are going to say, “No, we support the rights of women and girls to be able to walk down our streets at night on their own, after dark in the winter, coming home from school, without being subjected to this sort of intimidation, menace and harassment.” I do not think we hear anybody arguing that in this day and age, women and girls should accept that. I remember that, back in the day when I, like everybody else, was subjected to it, if someone complained, people said, “But you should be flattered—you should be flattered that people find you attractive.” It is not flattering. It is menacing, it is unwarranted and it is unwanted, and we should not accept it.

I have tabled two new clauses. One is about kerb-crawling. Currently, it is a criminal offence to kerb-crawl a woman if someone is doing so to solicit her because they want to pay for sex. That was introduced many years ago to protect a neighbourhood from becoming a red light district and having endemic kerb-crawling, so we already have the basis in the law. What I am suggesting, with a lot of cross-party support, is that this should be a criminal offence without it being because the man is doing it to try to pay for sex; it is enough if he is kerb-crawling. He should not be able to do that. The punishment ought to be taking away his licence. If a man is going to lose his licence for his van or car, he will pretty soon alter his behaviour, which is exactly what he should be doing.

I also have a new clause on harassment in the street. At the moment, if a man harasses a woman and there is a course of conduct because he is generally stalking her, that is a criminal offence, but if he does it to a schoolgirl going home who he does not know and it is not a course of conduct but one-off conduct, she has no right of redress. I suggest expanding the stalking offence to include even a one-off, so we have two bespoke offences.

If we have two new crimes, women and girls will know that they do not have to put up with this and that they can complain, men will know that they are going to be called to account and end up in court if they do it, the police will know that they have to investigate it and prosecute it, and the courts will know how to deal with it. Then, we can end the shameful situation that women and girls find themselves in on the street.

The Government have said in Committee that they are in listening mode. That is welcome, but it does not go far enough. Women and girls want the Government not just to listen, but to act. It is about time that the concerns of women and girls were heard and acted on. If we do not support the new clauses and the Government do not accept them, they will be guilty of letting women and girls down. I hope that will not be the case. I press the Minister, who has been very generous with her time in meeting me, to say that this is the moment that we are going to change the law and make a new start.

[Mr Speaker]

I remind hon. Members that, if we do put a speaking limit on, it will be on the countdown clock, which will be visible on the screen. I am now going to appeal to everybody, without the time limit on, to please not force it. Let us be kind to each other—short and brief. Everybody, I believe, has a genuine contribution to make, so I really want to hear them.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Harriet Harman Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 5th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Victoria Atkins]

I have one more minute.

We are trying to tackle harmful behaviour, and Opposition Members need to ask themselves just how much damage, disruption and distress is acceptable for their constituents to bear.

I will quickly deal with the extraction of information. This is an important part of the Bill, because we want to ensure that strong privacy safeguards are in place when dealing with people’s sensitive personal information. This Bill, coupled with the rape review, is an absolutely critical part of that effort.

Mindful that the House will want to vote on these matters, I will conclude. We promised our constituents that we would take measures to make our society safer and to crack down on crime. As my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire Dales (Miss Dines) set out, that is the promise we all made to our constituents. We are delivering on promises made to the electorate and standing up for the decent members of society who do not commit the sorts of crimes that we in this Chamber have sadly had to hear about. I therefore have no hesitation in commending the Bill to the House.

[Ms Harman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We come to group two. After I have called the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) to move new clause 3, there will be a four-minute limit on Back-Bench contributions.

New Clause 3

Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant's sexual history

‘(1) Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

(a) starting in paragraph (b) omit “in cross examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial,”;

(b) at end insert “with anyone other than the defendant”.

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) for “an accused” substitute “a party to the trial”;

(b) in paragraph (a) omit “or (5)”.

(4) For subsection (3) substitute—

“(3) This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case and that issue is not an issue of consent.”

(5) For subsection (5) substitute—

“(a) For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence may be adduced or question asked unless the judge determines in accordance with the procedures in this subsection that the question or evidence has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

(b) In determining that question the judge shall take into account—

(i) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;

(ii) the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process by removing from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;

(iii) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;

(iv) the potential threat to the complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy;

(v) the complainant’s right to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law;

(vi) the provisions of the Victims Code;

and any other factor that the judge considers relevant.”

(6) In subsection (6), for “subsections (3) and (5)” substitute “subsection (3)”.’

This new clause excludes the admission in evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant with a third party, whether by the prosecution or the defence, to show consent, whilst leaving it admissible if it is relevant to any other issue in the case. It sets out the additional requirement that to be admitted the material must be more probative than prejudicial and sets out the considerations the judge must have in regard to considering that extra requirement.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ms Harman [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 4—Definition of “issue of consent”—

‘(1) Section 42 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) For paragraph (b) substitute—

“(b) “issue of consent” means any issue where the complainant in fact consented to the conduct constituting the offence with which the defendant is charged and any issue where the accused reasonably believed that the complainant so consented;”’

This new clause re-defines “issue of consent” for the purposes of section 41, including in the definition the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent, and thus removing it as a reason for the inclusion of a complainant’s sexual history or behaviour.

New clause 5—Admission of evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history—

‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 43 insert—

“43A In any trial or contested hearing to which section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies, if no pre-trial application in accordance with Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules has been made, or if such application has been made and refused in whole or in part, no further application may be made during the course of the trial or before its commencement to call such evidence or ask such question, and no judge may allow such application or admit any such questions or evidence.”’

This new clause would have the effect that no section 41 evidence or questions could be admitted by a judge at trial unless there had been an application before trial in accordance with the practice directions; and the amendment would ban applications from being made immediately before or during the trial.

New clause 6—Complainant’s right of representation and appeal on an application to adduce evidence or questions on sexual conduct—

‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 43 insert—

“43A In any trial to which section 41 applies, where notice is given that there will be an application under Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules for leave to ask questions or to adduce evidence as to any sexual behaviour of the complainant—

(1) The complainant may not be compelled to give evidence at any hearing on the application.

(2) The complainant will be entitled to be served with the application and to be legally represented (with the assistance of legal aid if financially eligible) as “a party” within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Rules in responding in writing to the application and in presenting their case at any hearing on the application.

(3) If the application succeeds in whole or in part, the complainant will have a right to appeal for a rehearing of the application to the Court of Appeal on notice within 7 days of the judgement being delivered.

(4) On any such appeal, the Court of Appeal will rehear the application in full and may grant or refuse it in whole or in part.

(5) The Secretary of State may, by regulation, set out rules of procedure relating to any hearing or appeal under this section.”’

This new clause would give the complainant a right of representation, with legal aid if they are financially eligible, to oppose any application to admit section 41 material about them. This new clause would also give complainants a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal if the application is allowed in whole or in part. The new clause also provides that the complainant is not compellable as witness at the application.

New clause 7—Collection of and reporting to Parliament on data and information relating to proceedings involving rape and sexual assault—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall collect and report to Parliament annually the following data and information—

(a) The time taken in every case of rape or sexual assault for the case to progress from complaint to charge, from charge to pre-trial plea and management hearing; and from then until trial.

(b) The number of applications to ask questions or adduce evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) made in the Magistrates and Crown Courts of England and Wales, irrespective of whether a trial was subsequently held.

(c) The number of cases which involved questions on or evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant in all rape, sexual abuse and other trials or contested hearings in the Magistrates and Crown courts in England and Wales, irrespective of whether an application was made to admit such questions or evidence in advance of the trial or hearing.

(d) In cases to which section 41 of the 1999 Act applies—

(i) whether Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules was followed in each application and if it was not, how it was not;

(ii) the questions proposed to be asked;

(iii) the evidence proposed to be called;

(iv) whether the prosecution opposed the application and if so the content of their representations;

(v) whether evidence was called to support or oppose the application;

(vi) whether the application was allowed in whole or in part and a copy of the judgement made on the application;

and

(vii) any other material which might assist in an assessment of the frequency, basis and nature of applications for the use of such questions or evidence and the likely impact on any parties to any trial and the trial outcome.

(2) The data and information to be collected under subsection (1) shall include—

(a) all the material from any pre-trial application;

(b) the questions in fact asked and the evidence in fact called about any sexual behaviour of the complainant in the trial;

(c) any application at the start or during the course of the trial to vary or alter any judgement given in any earlier application or any further application to admit such questions or evidence;

(d) whether any material not previously authorised was used in the trial;

(e) whether the prosecution objected; and

(f) any ruling made or action taken by the judge on the further conduct of the trial as a consequence of the admission of questions or evidence under section 41 of the 1999 Act.

(3) The data and information to be collected under this section shall be collected from the date of Royal Assent to this Bill.’

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to collect and report to Parliament data and information on trial delay and section 41 matters.

New clause 8—Training for relevant public officials in relation to the conduct of cases of serious sexual offences—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall, on this Act coming into force, publish and implement a strategy to provide training on the investigation of rape and alleged rape complainants, and the admissibility and cross-examination of complainants on their sexual history to—

(a) the Crown Prosecution Service;

(b) Police Forces;

(c) the Judiciary; and

(d) such other public bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(2) The Secretary of State shall ensure that any judge who is asked to hear a trial where the accused is charged with rape or any other serious sexual offence has attended and completed a training programme for such trials which has been accredited by the Judicial College.’

This new clause ensures that all criminal justice agencies shall be trained and that no judge can hear a sexual offence trial of any kind unless they have attended the Judicial College serious sexual offence course.

New clause 9—Requirement for a pre-sentence report when sentencing a primary carer—

‘(1) Section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3) insert—

“(3A)A court must make inquiries to establish whether the offender is a primary carer for a child.

(3B) If the court establishes that the offender is a primary carer for a child, unless there are exceptional circumstances before sentencing the offender the court must obtain a pre-sentence report containing information to enable the court to make an assessment of the impact of a custodial sentence on the child.”

(3) After subsection (4) insert—

“(5) In this section—

(e) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and

(f) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause amends section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make clear the requirement for a sentencing judge to have a copy of a pre-sentence report, considering the impact of a custodial sentence on the dependent child, when sentencing a primary carer of a child.

New clause 10—Duty of the court to state how it has considered the consequences for the child when sentencing—

‘(1) Section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

“Offenders who are primary carers

(10) A court sentencing a primary carer for a child must state how the best interests of the child were considered in determining the sentence (including, if appropriate, consideration of the views of the child).

(11) A court sentencing a pregnant woman must state how the best interests of the baby were considered in determining the sentence.

(12) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care

responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause amends section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to require a sentencing judge to state how the best interests of a child were considered when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 11—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when sentencing a primary carer—

‘(1) After section 227 of the Sentencing Act 2020, insert—

“227A Restrictions on imposing imprisonment on a primary carer

(1) This section applies where a court is considering imposing a custodial sentence on—

(a) a primary carer for a child, or

(b) a pregnant woman.

(2) The sentencing court must—

(a) consider the impact of a custodial sentence on the child or unborn child, and

(b) presume (subject to victim impact and any other sentencing considerations) that a non-custodial sentence is in the best interests of the child or unborn child.

(3) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause would create a requirement for a sentencing judge to consider the impact of a custodial sentence on a child when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 12—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when determining bail for a primary carer—

‘(1) Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (9) insert—

“(10) Where a court determines whether to grant bail in criminal proceedings to a person to whom this section applies who is a primary carer for a child or pregnant, the court must—

(a) consider the impact of not granting bail on the child or unborn child; and

(b) presume (subject to victim impact or other relevant considerations) that it is in the best interests of the child or unborn child for bail to be granted.

(11) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’

This new clause would impose a requirement for the judge to consider the impact of not granting bail on a child when determining, in criminal proceedings, whether to grant bail to a primary carer of a dependent child.

New clause 13—Data collection in relation to prisoners who are primary carers—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish annual data identifying—

(a) how many prisoners are the primary carers of a child,

(b) how many children have a primary carer in custody, and

(c) the ages of those children.

(2) In this section—

(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and

(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial

care responsibilities for a child.’

This new clause would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the number of prisoners who are the primary carers of a child and the number of children who have a primary carer in custody.

New clause 17—Maximum sentences for causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death—

‘(1) Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (7), for “a term not exceeding 14 years” substitute “life”, and

(b) in subsection (8), for “10” substitute “14”.

(2) Schedule 19 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended by the insertion of the following after paragraph 20—

“Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004

20A An offence to which section 5(7) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies.”’

This new clause seeks to increase sentencing levels under section 5 of the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death) by raising the death offence to life imprisonment, and the “serious injury” offence to 14 years.

New clause 18—Custody for own protection or own welfare—

‘(1) The Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.

(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.

(3) In Part 1A of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences to which Part 1 does not apply) omit paragraph 5.

(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of non-imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.’

This new clause would repeal the power of the criminal courts to remand a defendant into custody for their own protection (or in the case of a child, for their own welfare) pending trial or sentence.

New clause 19—Justice impact assessment for Wales—

‘(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or regulations made under this Act, which impacts on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.

(2) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the date on which they are made, issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue an assessment of the impact of the Bill on devolved policy and services in Wales within six months of it passing, and to issue such an assessment of any further changes to regulations under the Bill within one month of making them.

New clause 20—Failing to stop or report accidents involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury—

‘(1) After subsection 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, insert—

“(4A) A person who fails to comply with subsections 170(2) or 170(3) when he knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, is guilty of an offence.”

(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts), after the entry relating to an offence under RTA subsection 170(4), insert the following—

[Ms Harman]

New clause 3 would deal with a problem that the Government have acknowledged: that on the question of rape, the justice system lets women down and lets men off the hook. There are many problems that contribute to that, but one that the Government have rightly identified is that the process focuses on the complainant rather than on the defendant. The investigation becomes an investigation of the complainant—her mobile phone, what she was doing, her attitudes—and not of the suspect. The trial becomes the trial of the complainant, not of the defendant, in one very material way: the use by the defendant of the complainant’s previous sexual history by bringing it into evidence.

It has been acknowledged since as long ago as 1999 that the complainant’s previous sexual history is not the issue, and it is wrong for the defendant to try to use it to deter her from supporting a prosecution for fear that all her dirty washing will be washed in public, in open court, or that it will undermine her standing and credibility in the eyes of the jury. That was supposed to be outlawed in 1999, but it has become clear that a loophole was left when we changed the law.

In a third of all rape cases now, one way or another, the defendant brings into court the complainant’s previous sexual history. When the Victims’ Commissioner was a police and crime commissioner, she conducted research that showed that in one third of rape trials observed, the previous sexual history of the complainant was brought into evidence. That research is backed up by work done by the Criminal Bar Association.

The Victims’ Commissioner gives the example of a complainant who had her parents in court to support her. They did not know that she had had an abortion, but the defendant brought that into evidence in order to undermine her and throw off her ability to give her evidence—there were her parents, sitting in court, and they did not even know that she had had an abortion. Another report was of a case in which the jury were told, “This is a woman who has had adulterous affairs,” thereby trying to undermine her. Of course, that is not relevant to the issue of whether or not a rape has been committed, so we need to tighten up the law.

I have drafted a perfectly good, watertight clause to tighten up the law so that where the question of previous sexual history is relevant, especially if it is with the same partner in respect of whom the rape is alleged, it is allowed in evidence with the permission of the judge, but where it is not relevant, it is not. However, our Front Bench and the Government in their rape review have said that they are minded to send it to the Law Commission to look at. I would have preferred the Government to legislate in the Bill, which is after all the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, but they have decided not to do that; they say that they will refer to the Law Commission the whole question of the focus on the complainant, so I make two requests in that respect.

First, I think that the Law Commission should sit with an independent reference group. I have a great deal of respect for the Law Commission, but quite frankly we cannot leave it to get on with it on its own. We need an expert, independent reference group that is steeped in understanding of the issue and that can help the Law Commission. I suggest that Rape Crisis England & Wales should be on that group, and so should the Victims’ Commissioner.

My second request is that there should be a time limit on the Law Commission’s work. The Law Commission goes into things very deeply, but we do not want this to go on and on for years—it has been a problem for years, so we do not want it to go into the long grass with a never-ending Law Commission investigation. We want the findings to be ready for when the Government are thinking of bringing forward their victims Bill, which they will consult on shortly and which arises out of the violence against women and girls consultation. If we are not going to accept this today, and the Government are not, let us have the Law Commission looking at it, with an independent reference group and with a time limit. Then, the Government will have done more than just apologise to rape victims for justice not being done; they will make sure that in future justice is done.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We now go to the Chair of the Justice Committee, Sir Robert Neill, and the four-minute time limit comes into force for Back Benchers at this point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Buckland]

The hon. Lady would be interested to see the note that I have here—it says, “Remember the families.” I am grateful to her for reminding me of that, and, of course, I will undertake to put a suitably phrased letter in the Library of the House. I hope that assures hon. Members that I am taking the necessary steps. I absolutely recognise the importance of those concerns.

I listened with care to the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), who charted her own deeply distressing recent experience of when a photograph was entirely inappropriately taken of her without her consent and in circumstances that all of us would deeply deprecate and deplore. We all want to do something about this, which is why, some time ago, we asked the Law Commission to review the law around the taking, making and sharing of intimate images without consent to identify whether there are gaps in the scope of protection that is already offered to victims.

Importantly, we and the Law Commission are looking at whether recording and sharing images of events such as breastfeeding should be captured as intimate imagery for the purposes of any reformed criminal law. It has completed a public consultation and is developing final recommendations for the Government. It is certainly my intention to act. I want to make sure that the law is resilient and comprehensive and that, when it is drafted, we do not inadvertently create loopholes that people could take advantage of. I gently remind the hon. Lady that the public nuisance reforms are precisely those of the Law Commission, and it is in that tradition of careful consideration that we have already undertaken and started this work.

I am grateful to all hon. Members for their continued dedication to improving the way in which the system handles sexual offences cases, and that dedication is clearly behind the amendments concerning the use of evidence, including section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. However, we have to remind ourselves that section 41 already provides a very comprehensive prohibition on the defence adducing any evidence or any questions relating to previous sexual behaviour. The hon. Lady is right to refer to our undertaking in the rape review action plan to ask the Law Commission to examine the law, guidance and practice relating to the use of evidence in prosecutions. The Law Commission will be very happy to meet the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) about her concerns to take on board the proper observations she makes. Let us not forget that the wider issue about rape myths will also be part of its work.

On the issue of penalties for those who disclose the identity of anonymous complainants, I think we can go one better. There are a number of other offences—modern-day slavery and female genital mutilation come to mind—where anonymity is a legal requirement. When we redraft the legislation, it is essential that we cover all offences where anonymity is a requirement and also assess the interplay between the criminal offence and contempt of court. As a Law Officer, I police that particular divide regularly. Clearly, the Law Officers already have the power to pursue wrongdoers for contempt of court where serious wrongdoing has been evidenced. I am grateful that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General has invited the Law Commission to undertake a thorough review of the law in this area with a view to strengthening it so as to meet the ambitions of all of us in this House.

I am grateful, as ever, to the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) for her steadfast and consistent work in the support of victims. We already, through the victims code, have a number of entitlements relating to parole. A root-and-branch review of the Parole Board is ongoing. The observations and concerns that she has outlined are being fully embraced by that, and further work will be done on victims law.

On pet theft, it is vital that the underlying seriousness of this type of criminality is fully reflected by the law. That is why, since its launch on 8 May, the pet theft taskforce has been working to look at the wider issues. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his work on this. As a pet owner myself, I understand the depth of feeling that exists. I am able to say in the strongest terms that we will act to drive out this pernicious crime. His new clauses address some of the issues at the heart of where we will take action. I give him, and others, the assurance that it is our intention to make any necessary changes to this Bill in the Lords before it returns to the Commons once we have finalised the detail of exactly what is needed, using a range of powers, including primary legislation. The effect of these changes will, I believe, help to achieve what he and other hon. and right hon. Members are seeking to achieve today.

On road traffic, I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for North Cornwall (Scott Mann) and for Truro and Falmouth (Cherilyn Mackrory), who are working hard to raise awareness about these important issues. I can assure them, and the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), that my ministerial colleagues at the Department for Transport are working to explore options with my officials about how these offences will work in the wider context. I take on board the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) about the particular context in which people seek to evade the law and evade responsibility. While we have the common law offence of perverting the course of justice available, more work needs to be done to identify that class of driver who manipulates the system and evades responsibility in a way that clearly outrages the community and offends the wider public.

On the matters raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), we both share a passion for the issue, and I have been proud to spearhead reforms on child cruelty in the past. I will work with him and, as he knows, we are looking at the issue more widely. Indeed, we hope to bring concrete reform forward as soon as possible.

As time reaches the witching hour, I simply say that tonight is an opportunity for hon. Members to unite in common cause to strengthen the fight against crime and to make our communities safer. The opportunity is there. The gauntlet is laid down to Labour Members. I ask them to take it up.

[Ms Harman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Policing and Prevention of Violence against Women

Harriet Harman Excerpts

Monday 15th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. I will continue to engage with all colleagues on this. It is a really important point, and I know how hard it has been for many colleagues in the House. Of course, the regulations, with their implications and the restrictions they have brought in, will be subject to debate in the House going forward.

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

I would like to pay my deepest sympathy and respects to the family of Sarah Everard and her many dismayed and grieving friends. I welcome the reopening of the violence against women and girls consultation. It is evident that the Home Secretary recognises the genuine and justified strength of feeling about women’s safety that lay behind the vigil on Clapham common, so surely it was just wrong of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to refuse to reach agreement with the organisers and find a way so that the vigil could go ahead safely.

Does the Home Secretary agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the law on protest during the covid pandemic needs to be clarified so that protests can go ahead, but do so safely? The Joint Committee has drafted regulations that will be published with our report later this week. Will she undertake to consider them seriously with a view to laying them before the House?

[Priti Patel]

I thank the right hon. and learned Lady for her comments. I think everyone across the House has expressed shock, grief and, obviously, concern about the images from Saturday evening. There is no dispute there whatsoever. I will, of course, look at the report when it is published and I will be more than happy to have discussions with colleagues about it. We are in a pandemic, and this has been a very difficult period. It has been difficult for the police as well—I am the first to acknowledge that. We have asked the police to do unprecedented things, and they have had unprecedented powers throughout the pandemic based on the need to protect public health. With the incredible work of the vaccine roll-out, and as we ensure that that carries on smoothly and we move through the Prime Minister’s road map and plan of easements, one would now hope that we can work together collectively, yes, to live with coronavirus but do things differently.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Harriet Harman Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading - Day 1
Monday 15th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

I very much agree with what the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) said. The terrible outcome of the police ban on the Clapham common vigil in the wake of the tragic killing of Sarah Everard shows how wrong the Government are to try in this Bill to curb the right to demonstrate, so I hope they will think again about that. The anger of the vigil was about women demanding to be able to walk the streets without fear, and we must listen to those demands and act on them now in the Bill. This demand is not new. Along with women up and down the country, I joined the “Reclaim the Night” protests in the 1970s, but then women’s demands were not listened to by the men in the corridors of power. Now there are women in government, in the Home Office and in the Cabinet. There are women in all parties in Parliament. We are in the corridors of power, so we must use our power to deliver for women.

We all argued it would make a difference if we were here as women in Parliament. Now we had better prove it. We can in this Bill make it a crime to do what men do to women on the street every day and which makes their lives a misery. Kerb crawling is terrifying for a woman or a girl on her own, especially after dark. A man has no right to do it, so let us make it an offence punishable by taking away his driving licence. Following a woman on the street, filming her, trying to get her number and not taking no for an answer are harassment. Why should women and girls have to put up with it? Let us make that a criminal offence. I have tabled two new clauses, which have the backing of Members from all parties, and not just women, but men, too. I hope that the Government will accept them.

Too often when a woman is the victim of a sexual offence, all her previous sexual history is dragged up in court and it ends up as though she is in the dock, not the man. That is not supposed to happen, but it does, so we need to stop it. I have new clauses with cross-party backing to do that, too, which I hope the Government will back. Women do not want us to sympathise; they want action, and that is what we should do.