Guy Opperman
Main Page: Guy Opperman (Conservative - Hexham)Department Debates - View all Guy Opperman's debates with the Ministry of Justice
Crime and Courts Bill [Lords]
Guy Opperman Excerpts(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Maria Miller
My hon. and learned Friend raises an issue in which he is well versed. If I do not provide a complete answer, then I will get back to him with all the details. Clearly, if somebody is not a relevant publisher then they are not drawn into the self-regulatory scheme. They would not be subject to exemplary damages or be eligible for the scheme. Therefore, they would not be caught within this remit. We have so drawn the definition of “relevant publishers” to ensure that the scheme does not catch people we do not need to catch, and that is why we have been careful to set out the three tests in new clause 29—to ensure that we are clear about who is covered. Some individual organisations might well fall close to the line, but then it would be for the courts to decide.
New clause 23 sets out matters to which the court must have regard in deciding the amount of exemplary damages appropriate, and the key principles governing the court’s consideration are that the amount should be no more
“than the minimum needed to punish the defendant for the conduct complained of”
and that it should be “proportionate”. New clauses 24 and 25 ensure that those provisions will operate effectively in cases involving more than one claimant or defendant.
For completeness, I shall also mention new clause 26 and amendment 121A. New clause 26 implements recommendation 71 in Lord Justice Leveson’s report and confirms that, in cases under the new system, aggravated damages should be awarded only to compensate for mental distress and should have no punitive element. Amendment 121A provides that the provisions on exemplary damages come into force one year after the date on which the body is established by royal charter. That will be a powerful incentive to the press to establish the new regulator on a timely basis. For all their rarity, the availability of exemplary damages should send a powerful signal to publishers.
I turn to the provisions relating to costs in new clause 27A. The proposals are designed to give further real and powerful incentives and give effect to Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendation that the award of costs should be another tool to encourage publishers to join the regulator. The new clause would provide a clear presumption that where a claimant took a publisher inside the regulator to court, even if the claimant was successful, the normal rule that their costs would be met by a losing publisher would not apply. In other words, a defendant publisher that had joined the regulator should pay a claimant’s costs only in limited circumstances—if the issue could have been resolved at arbitration, had the defendant agreed to its being referred, or if it was just and equitable for the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs.
Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con)
The fundamental problem is not necessarily the costs paid at the end of the case, but the costs of a litigant’s bringing an action against a publisher. I and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) have represented many individuals who would have struggled to bring such actions without protections. Will the Secretary of State advise the House of what protections are in place, and may I highly recommend the protective costs order regime that provides protection to an impoverished, but justified, litigant as against a very wealthy publisher?
Maria Miller
My hon. Friend pre-empts something that I will cover in more detail later. I will not only deal with the cost regime, but explain that to comply with Leveson the new self-regulatory regime will include free arbitration, so giving those individuals the access to justice that he rightly says they should have.
New clause 27A establishes a second presumption—that a relevant publisher that chooses to stay outside the regulator would generally have costs awarded against it in proceedings for media tort, whether or not the claim is successful. In other words, a defendant publisher that does not join the regulator should always pay the claimant’s costs, unless the issue could not have been resolved at arbitration if the publisher had been a member of a regulator, or unless it were just and equitable for the defendant publisher not to pay those costs. These provisions deal with defendants and the costs they should or should not pay to claimants. The issue of claimants and the costs they might have to pay to defendants is also important and is addressed in subsection (5).
Lord Justice Leveson endorsed Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendation that qualified one-way cost shifting should be introduced for defamation and privacy cases. QOCS is a form of cost protection. The Government accepted that recommendation, and we have asked the Civil Justice Council, chaired by the Master of the Rolls, to make recommendations by the end of this month on appropriate cost protection measures to be introduced for defamation and privacy cases. The Government then expect to introduce a cost protection regime through the civil procedure rules.
Let us be clear: the new provisions on the awarding of costs, coupled with the provisions I have set out on exemplary damages, provide a powerful incentive to join the regulator and for disputes to be resolved through arbitration that meets the standards set out in the royal charter. Those defined as a “relevant publisher” for the purposes of the new legislation will, if they choose to sit outside the regulator, be exposed to the full force of the new exemplary damages and costs provisions. We want to ensure that the new provisions act as a powerful incentive—as I am sure you can hear me say, Mr Deputy Speaker—but we do not want to draw in too broad a range of publishers.
Maria Miller
I would say to my hon. Friend that when I have heard people talk about the approach they want the Government to take, they say that they want regulation of the press to be very much at arm’s length from politicians. What we are talking about is a self-regulatory body for the press, set up by the press. The royal charter is a verification panel that will ensure that the press is doing what it should do. It will not be under the eyes of Ministers; it will be independent. However, I urge him to look at the detail of the charter so that he does not take just my word for it, but sees it written down in black and white.
Maria Miller
There are lots of people who want to take part in the debate on these amendments, so if my hon. Friend lets me make a little progress, perhaps he can intervene on me a little later.
In new clause 29 we set out a definition of “relevant publisher” that captures national newspapers and their online editions, local and regional newspapers and their online editions, and online-only edited press-like content providers, as well as gossip and lifestyle magazines. Exemplary damages and costs are designed to catch larger news publishers—those at the centre of the circumstances giving rise to Leveson. As highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), who is no longer in his place, many of those are not necessarily the smaller publications.
Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)
I rise to support the Government new clauses in the group and the manuscript new clauses standing in the name of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. The manuscript new clauses arise out of the cross-party talks, into which I thank the Secretary of State for inviting us. That explains why hon. Members have not, I am afraid, had much time to look at them. We all want to be sure that hon. Members have the opportunity to scrutinise provisions in advance, but because we worked late into the night in attempting to agree them, they have been brought before the House with inadequate notice. I offer my apologies for that.
I hope to add to the points made by the Secretary of State, with which I greatly agree. Also, because hon. Members have not had much chance to look at the manuscript amendments and consider what they mean, I shall try to explain my understanding of how they sit with the new framework set out in the royal charter.
As the Secretary of State has said, the choice Leveson made was not to impose direct regulation on newspapers as a complaints system, but to invite them instead to set up their own regulation system and to encourage subscribers to it, not only because it is a good idea as the framework is fair and reasonable, but because incentives and disincentives have been provided. That, of course, leaves the choice to them—the point of incentives and disincentives is that they incentivise and disincentivise—but encourages them to go into the new regime.
It is also crucial—this is a major change—that a new arbitration system is being set up. Over the years, people have wrung their hands about how inaccessible the courts are to people who have been defamed, while newspapers have wrung their hands about being tied up for ages with the enormous costs that can arise if some oligarch takes a newspaper to court. Importantly, therefore, arising from the Leveson report is not just a new complaints system but a new arbitration system. Media torts, defamation and privacy claims that would otherwise have gone to court will instead go into the arbitration system. The manuscript new clauses on cost will incentivise not only newspapers but individual complainants to go into an arbitration system and not straight to court. There is an incentive for a complainant who wants to bring an action against a newspaper that is a member of a regulatory body to agree to arbitration, which will be available to members of the body and which will be run inexpensively. A complainant who does not want to go to arbitration, who says “I will take my chances in court” and who then wins the case will not win the costs, and costs may be awarded against that complainant. Arbitration will involve no cost to complainants, and they will benefit from a top-rate, legally kosher procedure without having to go to court.
Guy Opperman
I am delighted to observe that the Labour party studied the legislation in such detail before presenting it.
I should probably declare that I am a qualified mediator and arbitrator. Under the current system, people involved in arbitration can appeal against the process if they are not happy with it, and the litigation can begin anew. Would that arrangement continue, and how would an individual litigant defamed by a newspaper or any other publication bring an action, given that—contrary to what the right hon. and learned Lady has just said—the costs of arbitration are very high?
Ms Harman
The royal charter requires the regulator to provide for an inexpensively run arbitration service which will impose no costs on complainants. As the hon. Gentleman will know, things can happen further along the chain after arbitration has been agreed to, but the essence of arbitration is that both sides embark on it agreeing that the arbitrator will settle the issue.
I think that this will be a great step forward, because it will deal with the problem of inaccessibility. Most people who are defamed, or whose privacy has been invaded in what is termed a media tort, would never dream of being able to go to court, although many lawyers are prepared to act on the basis of conditional fee arrangements. A free-to-use arbitration service is therefore an important component of the Leveson package contained in the royal charter. It is good news for claimants, but it also means that newspapers will be well and truly incentivised not to remain outside the regulatory body. If they are not in the regulatory body and arbitration is therefore not available to those who may complain about them, it is possible that when the case goes to court, costs will be awarded against them even if they win.
Sir Edward Garnier
I thank the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Maria Miller), and the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) for introducing this section of the debate. It is clear that Members on both sides of the Chamber have worked extremely hard to bring the matter to a head. As I said in the debate opened earlier by the Prime Minister, everyone must be congratulated, but we must not oversell it or exaggerate the claims for the solution that may have been found.
I was interested in looking at some of the new clauses and new schedules to see that the statutory framework that seems to have been set down for the Crime and Courts Bill makes some changes to the law, but only up to a point. If one looks at new clause 21A, provision is made for the award of exemplary damages unless the defendant was a relevant publisher. But that is cancelled because the court can disregard subsection (2), and that is cancelled because under subsection (4) the court is not prevented from making an award of exemplary damages for other reasons. It rather disappears up its own grammar—I was about to use a rather unparliamentary term. We might need at some stage to reconsider the English used in the new clause if it is to be understood by the people we wish it to attract.
The other point we ought to think about—something my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) and I were discussing only a moment ago—is that we must be careful not to set up two regimes for exemplary damages. There already exists a common law regime for exemplary or punitive damages. Broadly, it is available where a state actor has behaved in an unconstitutional or high-handed fashion, for example when the police or the Prison Service grossly misbehaves in relation to someone in custody. That example is perfectly easy to describe: the court will award punitive and exemplary damages to mark society’s disapproval of the behaviour of that arm of the state.
Guy Opperman
Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that there appears to be, in effect, almost a mirror image of the common law system of exemplary damages? Under the present system, which he rightly describes, for an unlawful arrest involving a police officer verballing an innocent defendant, for example, a judge would give exemplary damages. Surely that would be mirrored in exactly the same way in the provisions proposed in the new clause. All that might be good, but surely those provisions would apply on an ongoing basis in any event. Does he agree that the concern is that the provision on exemplary damages does not necessarily change the common law?
Sir Edward Garnier
I think that I largely agree with my hon. Friend. The first limb relates to unconstitutional state behaviour, which he described and I mentioned, but the second limb relates to situations in which, under the common law, the defendant has calculated that the gain he could make from the civil wrong he commits will lead to greater profit for him than any potential damages he might have to pay as compensation to the wronged person. The court can recognise that by punishing the defendant, and deterring others from doing the same thing, through the separate and additional award of exemplary damages. Those two limbs of the exemplary damages regime are well described in the 1964 case of Rookes v. Barnard, but I will bore the House no further on that.
What we are creating is a regime that will be similar to the common law regime but not exactly the same and that will be limited to “relevant publishers”. We need to think carefully about whether we are setting up two systems that are close, but not quite parallel, for securing exemplary damages. While we are legislating to adjust exemplary damages for the perfectly sensible and understandable motive of encouraging newspaper publishers, or those who will become “relevant publishers”, to enter a scheme under a regulator, I wonder whether we ought to bring together everything relating to exemplary damages under one statutory umbrella. I say that not simply because I think that it would be neater, but also because of what is said in subsection (4) of new clause 30, which defines a relevant claim. It states:
‘“Relevant claim” means a civil claim made in respect of any of the following—
(a) libel;
(b) slander;
(c) breach of confidence;
(d) misuse of private information;
(e) malicious falsehood;
(f) harassment.’
Under the common law, libel, slander and malicious falsehood are already susceptible to punitive and exemplary damages, but as we know from Max Mosley’s case against Mirror Group Newspapers—I will not rehearse the facts of the case—the judge, when asked to award exemplary damages to the claimant in respect of the behaviour of the defendant newspaper, said, “Under the common law I do not think that I can extend the ambit of exemplary damages beyond the categories of libel and slander and so forth to a claim involving a breach of confidence or the misuse of private information.”
In the Bill we are extending by statute what that judge could not do, but we are extending it only to cases involving “relevant publishers”; we are not extending it to what I will crudely call “irrelevant publishers” or individual defendants who might misbehave in such a way that brings them within the regime of either of the two limbs of exemplary damages. I do not want there to be two separate types of exemplary damages. One statutory system should govern the consideration and awarding of exemplary damages, not one and a half or two systems. I urge the Government to consider this when they are thinking about how to take these matters forward. Perhaps having done so they will think that my concerns are of no importance or account, but I raise them nevertheless, admittedly in the light of having seen the document only during the course of this afternoon.
New clause 27A on the award of costs mirrors the arguments about exemplary damages. I entirely understand that the policy behind exemplary damages and the statutory costs regime as described in this set of manuscript amendments is intended to incentivise relevant publishers to come within the regulatory scheme. That is understood and perfectly sensible. However, we are in danger of misleading ourselves if we think that that is going to lead to easy and early resolution of media disputes. A moment ago I had a brief discussion with the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) on arbitration and so forth. New clause 27A(2) —I will read it, if I may, because it might be helpful—says:
“If the defendant was a member of an approved regulator at the time when the claim was commenced (or was unable to be a member at that time for reasons beyond the defendant’s control or it would have been unreasonable in the circumstances for the defendant to have been a member at that time), the court must not award costs against the defendant unless satisfied that…the issues raised by the claim could have been resolved by using an arbitration scheme of the approved regulator, or…it is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case to award costs against the defendant.”
That involves a bit of saying, “On the one hand but then on the other.” It is not quite clear which is the desired policy because there is a bifurcation.
On the question of whether
“the issues raised by the claim could have been resolved by using an arbitration scheme of the approved regulator”,
we would of course first have to see what that arbitration scheme looked like. Going back to the days of the now-no-longer-regretted Press Complaints Commission, that organisation, because of how it was set up and staffed and how the panels of adjudicators were composed, was wholly incapable of dealing with hugely complicated factual issues or with matters that required quite a nice calculation, or a nice discussion, of matters of law.
One might think that it would be very sensible that if a series of grossly defamatory allegations were made in a front-page article in a tabloid newspaper, or any other newspaper, that would lead to a dispute resolution process of the sort envisaged under this regime. Of course, it has a spurious attraction: “Let’s mediate, let’s settle, and let’s get it all dealt with quickly and cheaply and with the least possible intervention by lawyers.” As a matter of theory, that is a jolly good idea, but disputes come in different shapes and sizes. One can have the simplest possible dispute that does not require evidence or looking at complicated documents. I give the example of the meaning of words. If an article is defamatory on the face of it, a professor of English does not need to come and give a lecture about what this word means or that word means. The judge, if he is the arbiter, or the arbitration panel, can say, “This, in its natural and ordinary meaning, bears the following defamatory meaning”—end of story. Then the defendant, or the respondent to the arbitration, can say, “Okay, I accept what you say and I apologise—I didn’t mean that.” If meaning is the only question that has to be considered, some form of early, non-court dispute resolution, assuming that the panel is competent, would be a perfectly sensible way to do it.
Let us assume, however, that four contended meanings can be derived from the words under discussion. The defendant newspaper, be it a relevant publisher or otherwise, may say, “We don’t think that the words have those two highest meanings, but we do think that they have the two lower, less serious and less defamatory meanings. In so far as those meanings are to be derived from the words, we say they are true and we intend to justify them. We will also go further by saying that those meanings are not only true as a matter of fact, but that, in so far as they comprise or include comment, they are honest comment.” That will require the proposed system’s mediation procedure to go into all sorts of complicated questions with regard to the disclosure of relevant evidence, documents and so on.
Guy Opperman
My hon. and learned Friend is making a very good case. Does he agree that the PCC was notoriously fallible when resolving large newspaper disputes, but very effective at resolving disputes involving local media and newspapers, which genuinely respected and obeyed its procedures? The danger with the new system, which my hon. and learned Friend is outlining eloquently, is that the local paper will be stuck with the same regulatory process, which is clearly meant to be a sledgehammer, as large national newspapers such as The Sun and the Daily Mirror. I suspect that that will result in the process being more expensive for the smaller paper—
Mr Speaker
Order. The hon. Gentleman’s intervention is exceptionally lengthy. I know that he has a distinguished record at the bar. If he were being paid by the word he would be greatly enriched, but I trust that he has made his point to his satisfaction. If not, he can always have another go in a moment.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
There are other victims of this whole process, some of whom were revealed in the evidence to Leveson by the National Union of Journalists. They were the journalists who stood up and said, “I refuse to implement some of these strategies”—these tactics, manipulations or whatever we want to call them—and as a result lost their jobs, while others were victimised. The culture of bullying in some newsrooms was exposed in the NUJ’s evidence. That is why part of the union’s policy was to advocate a conscience clause.
I am grateful that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) said, there is a “brush past” in schedule 2 to the charter, with the reference to Leveson’s recommendation that:
“The industry generally and a regulatory body in particular should consider requiring its members to include in the employment or service contracts with journalists a clause to the effect that no disciplinary action would be taken against a journalist as a result of a refusal to act in a manner which is contrary to the code of practice.”
That would add to the architecture of protection and lift the standards of journalism in our country. That is why I welcome the important reference in schedule 2, which my right hon. and learned Friend shared with us. I regret the fact that it is a brush past, rather than something more specific, but I understand the negotiations that had to take place. We will need to return to this issue in the coming months. As the board of recognition panel is established, the regulator then applies for recognition. Consideration of whether the regulator has taken the recommendations into account is critical. One of this House’s roles will be to explore whether full consideration has been given to the conscience clause.
When the idea of a conscience clause was introduced into the debate by Leveson, there seemed to be cross-party support for it. Certainly the Deputy Prime Minister made a statement in support and the Prime Minister said he would consider the matter. Since then, the NUJ has been invited to go off and negotiate a conscience clause with individual employers. Unfortunately, that has not been taken seriously by a number of the employers. Negotiations have not proceeded and so far a conscience clause has not been inserted into a single contract. This is therefore an important factor to be taken into account by the recognition panel, and the regulator needs to put it firmly on the agenda for the future. A conscience clause would be an additional bulwark of support in establishing the point that we should not go through this cycle again and that there is a standard of journalism that we do not expect any journalist, editor or publisher to resile from. This will be beneficial in the long run. It will not impose onerous conditions on employers or publishers, and it should be welcomed as it will ensure a level playing field and a high standard of journalism right across the profession.
I am grateful for the reference in schedule 2 to Leveson’s recommendation 47, but I believe that the House needs to pay close attention to the roll-out of the process to ensure that it is considered by the regulator and that it forms part of the considerations of the recognition panel when the regulator is appointed.
Guy Opperman
Our constituents want a press that does not abuse the innocent, but that exposes the wrongdoer, the charlatan and the fraudster. I pay tribute to the work of Lord Justice Leveson, and to the people who have given evidence. Anyone who has ever given evidence or conducted legal proceedings will know that giving evidence is a traumatic and upsetting process, and to give evidence to the Leveson inquiry was a brave thing to do. Credit must be given to the Prime Minister for setting up the inquiry, and to all the parties for reaching some sort of agreement. However, it is a truism in legal circles and certainly in parliamentary circles that last-minute law is normally bad law. It is a matter of concern that the provisions have been produced overnight and that, even today, we are receiving manuscript amendments—only in Parliament are manuscript amendments typed—on important issues relating to exemplary damages, costs and the like.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
Is not the key to the matter the fact that this will be the law, and that it therefore constitutes statutory regulation of the press, with penalties and coercion if the press do not go along with it?
Guy Opperman
I hesitate at any stage in my parliamentary career to disagree on a matter either of parliamentary protocol or of statutory interpretation with the éminence grise that is my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). However, on this point I would disagree with him, because although the charter has to be brought to fruition through this House, it is clear that it is part of the common law. Its ongoing interpretation will be a common-law interpretation by a variety of High Court judges, who will spend a lot of time decoding, interpreting and attempting to fathom the provisions not only in the manuscript amendments but in the original proposals for the charter and the subsequent amendments that we received overnight. So, on this particular point, I disagree with my hon. Friend.
I suggest that this is a pragmatic resolution of a difficult parliamentary dispute. It is an all-party solution that accepts the fundamental principle that the Press Complaints Commission was patently not fit for purpose and was clearly letting people down. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) made clear in his well thought-out and eloquent speech, the PCC was unable to handle the large disputes of fact and law pertaining to the serious libels and slanders that take place in the media. It was extremely good at dealing with the local press and with low impact resolution-type cases such as those involving £10,000 payable for defamation, for example, but it struggled desperately to cope with the large media organisations and the particularly malign and difficult cases that, sadly, had to go to court.
That brings me, in the limited time I have, to the issue of costs. It fusses me tremendously that the position of an individual litigant in a case will not change that much. The royal charter might introduce a free process, in the sense that there is no claim form, unlike in normal litigation, but it will be free to those who are successful, because they will have some form of protection. The problem is that an individual litigant without means who lives in a suburban street in Hexham, for example, will still be unable to bring a course of action against a large media organisation. Contrary to the best efforts of those on both Front Benches, arbitration is still a complex, expensive and difficult process through which to navigate. It is also the case that while simple arbitration can and will be resolved on a relatively speedy basis, for the large cases that so concern us—everything from the Dowlers downwards—arbitration will take months at the very least, if not years, and will cost money.
That brings us back to the point of whether an individual who is so maligned by the press will be in a position to bring a course of action against a newspaper on the present basis of financial support. If that is lacking to such an individual, I struggle to see that happening. The individual would have to go to organisations such as the Free Representation unit or the Bar Pro Bono unit. I suppose I should make a declaration not only that I was involved with those organisations as a mediator, but that, statutorily speaking, I am still owed money by the Government for the work I did on behalf of the Government. That is, however, a side matter.
Finally, speedy laws done at the last minute—despite the massive efforts over many months by the Minister for Government Policy, my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr Letwin) and others—will always need improvement. The improvement ability of this royal charter is exceptionally difficult and, as was explained earlier, is part of the problem of having a royal charter. The difficulty is now passed to the House of Lords, which has a solitary day to consider all the provisions in the charter, the amendments and the manuscript amendments in circumstances in which, I suggest with respect, there cannot be reasoned debate or reasoned assessment. If we could address that particular problem, things would improve massively. The reality in the end will be that High Court judges will assess the royal charter on a common-law basis and interpret it as best they can—with all the ramifications that we would not wish to see on an ongoing basis.
Paul Flynn
I rise to challenge the hyperbole of the Government Front-Bench team on this particular measure, which will not be a great Act that will bring new liberty to the country. It describes itself as a royal charter presumably in the hope that it will gain the respect that other royal charters have. One effective example is the one under which the BBC operates. At one time in my life, I had duties as a member of the Broadcasting Council for Wales to decide on political balance in broadcasts. Everything was decided on the basis of ensuring that those broadcasters who had air time represented the views of the country—not easy when it came to deciding on Welsh language broadcasts where one party was predominantly represented by Welsh speakers. It had to be done, and we found a way of dealing with the press that was effective and balanced.
No attempt could really be made to impose a political balance on our national press, which was described by Aneurin Bevan as
“the most prostituted in the world”.
We see that that is still true if we look at today’s newspapers and examine the way in which the Daily Mail, for example, devoted six days of front-page headlines, including in The Mail on Sunday, to one subject—to attack the Liberal Democrats. Other things were happening in the world, but day after day we had this political tract seeking to affect the results of a by-election.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty) said, we should look at the proprietors as people who have immense power—power without responsibility—so that even elected Prime Ministers pay court to them. John Major, for example, was threatened with having a bin dumped on his desk by the editor of The Sun. Tony Blair flew to Australia to pay court to the empire of Murdoch. We know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) and the present Prime Minister were in close relationships, socially, with editors, and we have been given a very unhealthy revelation about cabals who are far too close to, and have too much interest in, the press, the police and politicians. That is a worrying situation.