Crime and Courts Bill [Lords]

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Maria Miller]

I understand the sentiment behind my hon. Friend’s question. I can reassure him that we have been working directly with representatives of the local press to ensure that the new system does not, as he suggests, burden them unnecessarily. Perhaps the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) will remark on that further; I will do so in my comments later.

Exemplary damages will be awarded only in the most serious cases, in line with both the Leveson report and the report of the 1997 Law Commission. The test for the award will be: where the defendant’s conduct has shown a deliberate or reckless disregard of an outrageous nature for the claimant’s rights; where conduct is such that the court should punish the defendant for it; and where other remedies would not be adequate to punish that conduct. The supplementary new clauses ensure that the new exemplary damages system works in practice.

New clause 22 sets out factors that the court must take into account in deciding whether an award of exemplary damages is appropriate, and whether membership of an improved regulator was available to the defendant at the time of the events giving rise to the claims. If so, what reasons the defendant had for not being a member are factors that can be considered. The court must also have regard, so far as it is relevant, to whether the defendant has internal compliance procedures of a satisfactory nature in place and how they are adhered to.

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

I wonder whether my right hon. Friend could provide me with some clarification. She says that the exemplary damages regime will apply as per the new clauses and so on. One of the exclusions from the definition of a “relevant publisher”, which she will find in new schedule 5, is:

“A person who publishes a title that relates to a particular pastime, hobby, trade, business, industry or profession”.

Maybe the “hobby” relates to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). What is the position of an irrelevant publisher, if I can describe him as that, who publishes a magazine or some other publication about a pastime, hobby or trade, but who none the less behaves within the terms of Rookes v. Barnard? Would the court still be able to award exemplary damages in that circumstance?

[Maria Miller]

My hon. and learned Friend raises an issue in which he is well versed. If I do not provide a complete answer, then I will get back to him with all the details. Clearly, if somebody is not a relevant publisher then they are not drawn into the self-regulatory scheme. They would not be subject to exemplary damages or be eligible for the scheme. Therefore, they would not be caught within this remit. We have so drawn the definition of “relevant publishers” to ensure that the scheme does not catch people we do not need to catch, and that is why we have been careful to set out the three tests in new clause 29—to ensure that we are clear about who is covered. Some individual organisations might well fall close to the line, but then it would be for the courts to decide.

New clause 23 sets out matters to which the court must have regard in deciding the amount of exemplary damages appropriate, and the key principles governing the court’s consideration are that the amount should be no more

“than the minimum needed to punish the defendant for the conduct complained of”

and that it should be “proportionate”. New clauses 24 and 25 ensure that those provisions will operate effectively in cases involving more than one claimant or defendant.

For completeness, I shall also mention new clause 26 and amendment 121A. New clause 26 implements recommendation 71 in Lord Justice Leveson’s report and confirms that, in cases under the new system, aggravated damages should be awarded only to compensate for mental distress and should have no punitive element. Amendment 121A provides that the provisions on exemplary damages come into force one year after the date on which the body is established by royal charter. That will be a powerful incentive to the press to establish the new regulator on a timely basis. For all their rarity, the availability of exemplary damages should send a powerful signal to publishers.

I turn to the provisions relating to costs in new clause 27A. The proposals are designed to give further real and powerful incentives and give effect to Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendation that the award of costs should be another tool to encourage publishers to join the regulator. The new clause would provide a clear presumption that where a claimant took a publisher inside the regulator to court, even if the claimant was successful, the normal rule that their costs would be met by a losing publisher would not apply. In other words, a defendant publisher that had joined the regulator should pay a claimant’s costs only in limited circumstances—if the issue could have been resolved at arbitration, had the defendant agreed to its being referred, or if it was just and equitable for the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs.

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[Ms Harman]

The royal charter requires the regulator to provide for an inexpensively run arbitration service which will impose no costs on complainants. As the hon. Gentleman will know, things can happen further along the chain after arbitration has been agreed to, but the essence of arbitration is that both sides embark on it agreeing that the arbitrator will settle the issue.

I think that this will be a great step forward, because it will deal with the problem of inaccessibility. Most people who are defamed, or whose privacy has been invaded in what is termed a media tort, would never dream of being able to go to court, although many lawyers are prepared to act on the basis of conditional fee arrangements. A free-to-use arbitration service is therefore an important component of the Leveson package contained in the royal charter. It is good news for claimants, but it also means that newspapers will be well and truly incentivised not to remain outside the regulatory body. If they are not in the regulatory body and arbitration is therefore not available to those who may complain about them, it is possible that when the case goes to court, costs will be awarded against them even if they win.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

rose—

[Ms Harman]

That is how we understand that the system will work. May I invite the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) to answer his question at the same time as asking it? I suspect that he thinks he knows the answer better than I do. He does not, but he probably thinks he does.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

What a charming way of allowing an intervention! I should have thought that a fellow member of the former Solicitor-Generals’ club would be a little more polite to me. I shall have to take our dispute to arbitration as soon as possible.

There is no doubt that the proposal presented by the Government, and agreed to by the Opposition, to encourage people to become members of the regulatory body and to make use of an arbitration scheme has its attractions, but I think that the right hon. and learned Lady and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State should be careful not to be seduced into thinking that arbitration equals no expense, no time, and simplicity. The sorts of cases that go to arbitration can be just as complicated as those which go to court and the expense involved in a fully tuned-up arbitration is no less than that of a piece of litigation. So this is a jolly good idea and let us all say how wonderful it is, but let us not seduce ourselves into thinking that arbitration is some magic answer, because there will be plenty of cases where the interlocutory procedures will be far too complicated for speedy mediation or arbitration under the regulatory scheme.

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[Sir Edward Garnier]

I thank the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Maria Miller), and the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) for introducing this section of the debate. It is clear that Members on both sides of the Chamber have worked extremely hard to bring the matter to a head. As I said in the debate opened earlier by the Prime Minister, everyone must be congratulated, but we must not oversell it or exaggerate the claims for the solution that may have been found.

I was interested in looking at some of the new clauses and new schedules to see that the statutory framework that seems to have been set down for the Crime and Courts Bill makes some changes to the law, but only up to a point. If one looks at new clause 21A, provision is made for the award of exemplary damages unless the defendant was a relevant publisher. But that is cancelled because the court can disregard subsection (2), and that is cancelled because under subsection (4) the court is not prevented from making an award of exemplary damages for other reasons. It rather disappears up its own grammar—I was about to use a rather unparliamentary term. We might need at some stage to reconsider the English used in the new clause if it is to be understood by the people we wish it to attract.

The other point we ought to think about—something my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) and I were discussing only a moment ago—is that we must be careful not to set up two regimes for exemplary damages. There already exists a common law regime for exemplary or punitive damages. Broadly, it is available where a state actor has behaved in an unconstitutional or high-handed fashion, for example when the police or the Prison Service grossly misbehaves in relation to someone in custody. That example is perfectly easy to describe: the court will award punitive and exemplary damages to mark society’s disapproval of the behaviour of that arm of the state.

[Guy Opperman]

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that there appears to be, in effect, almost a mirror image of the common law system of exemplary damages? Under the present system, which he rightly describes, for an unlawful arrest involving a police officer verballing an innocent defendant, for example, a judge would give exemplary damages. Surely that would be mirrored in exactly the same way in the provisions proposed in the new clause. All that might be good, but surely those provisions would apply on an ongoing basis in any event. Does he agree that the concern is that the provision on exemplary damages does not necessarily change the common law?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I think that I largely agree with my hon. Friend. The first limb relates to unconstitutional state behaviour, which he described and I mentioned, but the second limb relates to situations in which, under the common law, the defendant has calculated that the gain he could make from the civil wrong he commits will lead to greater profit for him than any potential damages he might have to pay as compensation to the wronged person. The court can recognise that by punishing the defendant, and deterring others from doing the same thing, through the separate and additional award of exemplary damages. Those two limbs of the exemplary damages regime are well described in the 1964 case of Rookes v. Barnard, but I will bore the House no further on that.

What we are creating is a regime that will be similar to the common law regime but not exactly the same and that will be limited to “relevant publishers”. We need to think carefully about whether we are setting up two systems that are close, but not quite parallel, for securing exemplary damages. While we are legislating to adjust exemplary damages for the perfectly sensible and understandable motive of encouraging newspaper publishers, or those who will become “relevant publishers”, to enter a scheme under a regulator, I wonder whether we ought to bring together everything relating to exemplary damages under one statutory umbrella. I say that not simply because I think that it would be neater, but also because of what is said in subsection (4) of new clause 30, which defines a relevant claim. It states:

‘“Relevant claim” means a civil claim made in respect of any of the following—

(a) libel;

(b) slander;

(c) breach of confidence;

(d) misuse of private information;

(e) malicious falsehood;

(f) harassment.’

Under the common law, libel, slander and malicious falsehood are already susceptible to punitive and exemplary damages, but as we know from Max Mosley’s case against Mirror Group Newspapers—I will not rehearse the facts of the case—the judge, when asked to award exemplary damages to the claimant in respect of the behaviour of the defendant newspaper, said, “Under the common law I do not think that I can extend the ambit of exemplary damages beyond the categories of libel and slander and so forth to a claim involving a breach of confidence or the misuse of private information.”

In the Bill we are extending by statute what that judge could not do, but we are extending it only to cases involving “relevant publishers”; we are not extending it to what I will crudely call “irrelevant publishers” or individual defendants who might misbehave in such a way that brings them within the regime of either of the two limbs of exemplary damages. I do not want there to be two separate types of exemplary damages. One statutory system should govern the consideration and awarding of exemplary damages, not one and a half or two systems. I urge the Government to consider this when they are thinking about how to take these matters forward. Perhaps having done so they will think that my concerns are of no importance or account, but I raise them nevertheless, admittedly in the light of having seen the document only during the course of this afternoon.

New clause 27A on the award of costs mirrors the arguments about exemplary damages. I entirely understand that the policy behind exemplary damages and the statutory costs regime as described in this set of manuscript amendments is intended to incentivise relevant publishers to come within the regulatory scheme. That is understood and perfectly sensible. However, we are in danger of misleading ourselves if we think that that is going to lead to easy and early resolution of media disputes. A moment ago I had a brief discussion with the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) on arbitration and so forth. New clause 27A(2) —I will read it, if I may, because it might be helpful—says:

“If the defendant was a member of an approved regulator at the time when the claim was commenced (or was unable to be a member at that time for reasons beyond the defendant’s control or it would have been unreasonable in the circumstances for the defendant to have been a member at that time), the court must not award costs against the defendant unless satisfied that…the issues raised by the claim could have been resolved by using an arbitration scheme of the approved regulator, or…it is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case to award costs against the defendant.”

That involves a bit of saying, “On the one hand but then on the other.” It is not quite clear which is the desired policy because there is a bifurcation.

On the question of whether

“the issues raised by the claim could have been resolved by using an arbitration scheme of the approved regulator”,

we would of course first have to see what that arbitration scheme looked like. Going back to the days of the now-no-longer-regretted Press Complaints Commission, that organisation, because of how it was set up and staffed and how the panels of adjudicators were composed, was wholly incapable of dealing with hugely complicated factual issues or with matters that required quite a nice calculation, or a nice discussion, of matters of law.

One might think that it would be very sensible that if a series of grossly defamatory allegations were made in a front-page article in a tabloid newspaper, or any other newspaper, that would lead to a dispute resolution process of the sort envisaged under this regime. Of course, it has a spurious attraction: “Let’s mediate, let’s settle, and let’s get it all dealt with quickly and cheaply and with the least possible intervention by lawyers.” As a matter of theory, that is a jolly good idea, but disputes come in different shapes and sizes. One can have the simplest possible dispute that does not require evidence or looking at complicated documents. I give the example of the meaning of words. If an article is defamatory on the face of it, a professor of English does not need to come and give a lecture about what this word means or that word means. The judge, if he is the arbiter, or the arbitration panel, can say, “This, in its natural and ordinary meaning, bears the following defamatory meaning”—end of story. Then the defendant, or the respondent to the arbitration, can say, “Okay, I accept what you say and I apologise—I didn’t mean that.” If meaning is the only question that has to be considered, some form of early, non-court dispute resolution, assuming that the panel is competent, would be a perfectly sensible way to do it.

Let us assume, however, that four contended meanings can be derived from the words under discussion. The defendant newspaper, be it a relevant publisher or otherwise, may say, “We don’t think that the words have those two highest meanings, but we do think that they have the two lower, less serious and less defamatory meanings. In so far as those meanings are to be derived from the words, we say they are true and we intend to justify them. We will also go further by saying that those meanings are not only true as a matter of fact, but that, in so far as they comprise or include comment, they are honest comment.” That will require the proposed system’s mediation procedure to go into all sorts of complicated questions with regard to the disclosure of relevant evidence, documents and so on.

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[Mr Speaker]

Order. The hon. Gentleman’s intervention is exceptionally lengthy. I know that he has a distinguished record at the bar. If he were being paid by the word he would be greatly enriched, but I trust that he has made his point to his satisfaction. If not, he can always have another go in a moment.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

What the PCC was good at was dealing with unfairness—the hideous intrusion on private grief, the doorstepper, the camera coming through the letter box, the knock on the door demanding a photograph of the dead child and so on. The PCC dealt with that extremely well, but what it could not deal with was the multi-issue disputes that I have outlined.

It is not just a question of assessing the truth or falsity of words or of whether they are defensible and honest comment. On honest comment and certain forms of qualified privileged defence, the judge or the arbiter has to consider the question of malice and the respondent newspaper’s motive when it published the words complained of. I do not think, even with the best will in the world, that the proposed arbitration system for relevant publishers, under a recognised regulator, good though it will be, will be sufficiently well breeched and resourced to substitute itself for a disinterested judge when dealing with the case.

When it comes to disciplinary measures or the incentivisation of costs to bring people into this scheme, either as claimants or defendants—this goes back to a point that I made in the earlier debate—it will not be possible to deal with many expensive cases cheaply and quickly. They will need to go to a more formal, court-like, if not court, system. They will require proper arbitration with qualified arbiters, the sifting and assessment of evidence, the judging of witnesses and the reading of lots of documents. Those are functions of any form of arbitration dispute and it will not be quick or cheap.

[Richard Drax]

Is my hon. and learned Friend saying that this proposed policy is a complete waste of time and that the system we have is perfectly workable, so long as it is more accessible to the many people who are not well off and cannot afford a listening?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I most certainly am not saying that it is a complete waste of time. I am saying that we should not seduce ourselves into thinking that it will do more than it can. It will be a far better system, all being well, than the PCC. It will have real teeth. It will have the ability to discipline respondent newspapers that are within the scheme by awarding costs and penalties of one sort or another.

The cases in which the new system will award a penalty of £1 million will be so rare as to be unthinkable. I imagine that it will deal with cases rather similar to those that are dealt with under the provisions of the Defamation Act 1996 on summary decisions, for which there is a limit of £10,000. I suspect that many of the cases that at the moment go to the High Court under those provisions will, if people are sensible, go into the new scheme. It will look at low-level damages, low-level punitive sanctions and cases that do not involve lots of complicated factual and legal issues.

Just because the new system will not look at many cases and just because the cases will not be hugely complicated does not mean that we should not do it; we should. We need access to some form of arbitration system for the people who have been bullied and disturbed by tabloid newspapers sticking their lenses through people’s letterboxes and so on. However, I urge the House not to think that we have suddenly waved a magic wand and that all future disputes will be resolved between victims or individual claimants and large media organisations through a cheap and speedy system; they will not. We ought to be a little cautious about that.

[Mark Reckless]

I have been enjoying my hon. and learned Friend’s speech for the past 20 minutes and I believe that the House benefits greatly from his exposition of these concepts. However, I am still unclear whether he supports or opposes what is proposed.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I do apologise if I did not make myself clear. I will try to do so again, but perhaps rather more speedily. I support what is in the measures. It is easy to understand that point, I suspect.

[Mark Reckless]

indicated assent.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

The second point is that, although I support the measures, I suspect that they will be of limited availability and limited use. However, that they will not solve every problem does not mean that we should not deploy them to solve some problems. As I said a moment ago, the sorts of problems that I think they will be used to solve are those that are currently dealt with summarily under the Defamation Act 1996 with a damages limit of £10,000. There is no suggestion of a damages limit here, but I think that it is in that area of dispute that the system will work. It will be broadly in disputes over meaning, unfairness or beastly behaviour by a newspaper that it will work.

The new system will also bring into the exemplary damages regime, to go back to my first set of arguments, causes of action for which punitive damages cannot currently be received under common law, such as breach of confidence and misuse of private information.

There is a lot to be said in favour of what is proposed. I just urge Members not to get excessively excited about what we are achieving. There will come a time when we have to look at the guts of the regulatory system, including at who is to be on the panels that decide the cases and so on. There is therefore a lot more work for the Minister for Government Policy and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to do, with co-operation, I hope, from the Opposition parties and our coalition partners.

I am probably going to the church by way of the moon, but I really do think that much of what has been said today is commendable, but that much of it is too overexcited. Yes, we should celebrate the consensus, but let us not be misled by it.

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[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

The Bill has undoubtedly been enhanced by the process of parliamentary scrutiny, so I would like to pay tribute to all right hon. and hon. Members who served on the Bill Committee and to those who spoke on Report, as well as to the Clerks and the Bill teams in my Department and the Ministry of Justice for their advice and support. In particular, I would like to commend the work in Committee of the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green), and the Minister of State, Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton Deane (Mr Browne), who is unable to be here this evening owing to the imminent—it might even have happened in the past few hours—arrival of the baby that his partner has been expecting.

The Bill already had many excellent features when it was first introduced in the other place last May, but it now returns to that House with a number of important new additions to which I shall refer. I welcome the broad measure of support for many—indeed, for most, I think it fair to say—of the provisions in the Bill. Over the two days on Report, the Government have, quite properly, been probed on a number of detailed aspects of the Bill, but the approach of the official Opposition, in Committee and again on Report, has been to seek to weigh down the Bill with a litany of requirements to produce impact assessments or to undertake reviews. Of course, we must properly assess the impact of these important measures, but the Government are determined to get on with the task of implementing these much-needed reforms to our justice system, not to procrastinate and delay by undertaking review after review.

I commend the efforts of all those who work with professionalism and dedication in our criminal and civil justice systems, but reforms are undoubtedly needed if we are to continue to see further reductions in crime, including serious and organised crime, and drive further improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of the police, prosecutors, the courts, and prisons and probation services. Our reforms must be judged, first and foremost, by whether they help us to cut crime and lead to a reduction in harm to our communities and to fewer victims of crime.

For too long, too many organised criminals have managed to stay one step ahead and beyond the reach of law enforcement. That will be the case no longer. The new National Crime Agency will have the capabilities, powers and authority to bring about a step change in our response. It will have a global reach and a local impact. It will lead the fight against the gangs that traffic drugs, people and guns; who abuse and exploit children; and who corrode and subvert our institutions and cost our economy billions of pounds a year. It will not do this alone, but in partnership with others. We are redrawing the policing landscape, with the NCA at the centre. The public will be better protected, as will our national security, for its establishment

The introduction of the new drug-driving offence will bear down on those who put other road users at risk of death and serious injury by taking illegal drugs and driving, and the enhanced protection for householders who honestly act in self-defence, and in the defence of their loved ones, when faced with an intruder in their home will ensure that the criminal justice system treats them as the victim, not as the perpetrator, of a crime. Furthermore, in helping the NCA and its law enforcement partners to tackle serious, organised and complex crime, the Bill provides for an innovative new tool—the deferred prosecution agreement—that will enable more organisations that commit economic and financial crimes to be brought to justice.

Among the important changes made to the Bill in this House is the provision to strengthen the civil recovery regime. As well as seeking to prosecute and convict those who commit crimes for financial gain, we must also ensure that we use all legitimate means to deprive such individuals of their ill-gotten gains wherever they may be. The Bill plugs a significant gap in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 that had opened up as a result of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Perry. It cannot be right that someone who commits crimes in this country should be able to escape the reach of our courts by siphoning off the profits of their criminal activity to buy property and other assets in another jurisdiction or to hide away cash in some foreign bank account. The Bill makes good the damage done to the civil recovery regime by the Perry judgment and ensures that, provided there is some connection with the United Kingdom, the reach of our courts continues, as before, to extend worldwide.

We have also made another important change to the 2002 Act. The system of restraint orders under that Act is designed to ensure that someone suspected of profiting from crime cannot squander or squirrel away their assets while the proper legal processes leading to the forfeiture of those assets is under way. However, it cannot be right that those with significant restrained assets can then qualify for publicly funded legal aid, free from any contribution. Those who can afford to pay towards their defence costs should do so, even if their assets are frozen. I am pleased that the House has today agreed to add provisions to the Bill to end this abuse. In implementing the scheme, we will want to be assured about the potential impact on the moneys paid as compensation to victims or to the police and prosecutors to fund further enforcement activity. Our aim should be to ensure that more is received from criminals, rather than simply to redistribute funds around the criminal justice system.

The Bill also includes some important reforms to the system of immigration appeals. There are two drivers for these reforms. The first is to ensure that the limited resources available in this tight financial climate are focused on those immigration decisions, such as a refusal of asylum, that have the more significant impact on the persons affected. The refusal of a family visit visa simply does not fall into that category of seriousness. No other category of visit visa attracts a right of appeal and the costs of the appeals process in such cases simply cannot be justified, particularly when the more timely and cost-effective option is to submit a fresh application.

The second driver underpinning the reforms to the immigration appeals system is to ensure that those who are a threat to our national security are removed from this country as quickly as possible. It simply makes no sense for those whose presence in this country the Home Secretary has personally deemed not to be conducive to the public good should then be able to return to the United Kingdom to challenge the cancellation of their leave, nor should someone who is being deported on national security grounds be able to delay their removal from this country by raising any and all objections on human rights grounds, which must then be determined before the deportation can be effected. Following an amendment in Committee, such a person will now be entitled to an in-country appeal only where they would face a real risk of serious, irreversible harm if their deportation were to go ahead before the appeal had been heard.

Finally on this issue, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) for his implacable resolve that the qualified right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the European convention on human rights cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the will of Parliament on the deportation of foreign nationals who commit serious offences. Last June the House gave its unanimous support to changes to the immigration rules for this purpose. I have already indicated that I now intend to bring forward primary legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows to establish the correct approach to article 8 in immigration cases. I am determined that the will of Parliament on this issue will prevail.

My hon. Friend has also been assiduous in seeking to strengthen the safeguards in our extradition arrangements. It is vital that we have effective extradition arrangements with our European partners and countries further afield. This country must not become a safe haven for those who commit offences abroad, nor should those who commit crimes here be able to escape justice by fleeing our shores. However, I will be the first to accept that our extradition arrangements must not only be fair, balanced and proportionate, but be seen to be such. That is why I have brought forward a significant change to the arrangements—namely, to introduce a new bar on extradition on grounds of forum, so that wherever possible decisions about where a trial should be held must be made in open court, where they can be challenged and explained. We will continue to examine whether we can make additional changes to the Extradition Act 2003, both to add further safeguards where they are needed and to improve its effective operation. I am determined to bring forward such changes as soon as parliamentary time allows.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I want to press the Home Secretary further on that point. When does she think parliamentary time will be allowed? Will it be before the end of this Session, or are we talking about later in the year or just some time in the future? [Laughter.]

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[Sir Edward Garnier]

I congratulate all those who have had rather more to do with this Bill than I have on getting to this point, and I hope that it will have fair passage in the other place next week. I am particularly pleased that, after a great deal of to-ing and fro-ing, the Bill still contains clause 32 on deferred prosecution agreements. I have a bit of a one-track mind on the subject, but I suspect that this piece of the Bill is going to earn, rather than cost, the Treasury some money—acting as a criminal justice weapon that will be to the advantage of the Chancellor. I hope that as he thinks about this Wednesday, he will remember clause 32 of this Bill.

I urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary—and the Justice Secretary, who is temporarily absent—to get on with the underlying secondary legislation, Crown court rules and so forth, which will allow the deferred prosecution agreements to be implemented. I hope that we can prosecute the first deferred prosecution agreement before the end of this year and, if not before Christmas, very shortly after it. It will be a valuable addition to our criminal justice armoury.

I heard what my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said about further consideration of extradition matters. It was, if I may say so, pretty dreadful that we did not have an opportunity to discuss any aspect of extradition this evening. This was an entirely self-inflicted wound, and I suspect that with a little more flexibility it could have been achieved—but there we are. I know that my right hon. Friend has said that something will be done about it later in the year. I am sure she will be as good as her word. I shall certainly be watching to see that she is.