Northern Ireland Troubles Bill (Carry-over)

Gregory Campbell Excerpts

Carry-over motion
Monday 27th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alex Burghart]

I have read the Saville inquiry, and the hon. Member will have just heard me say that even after one of the longest, most expensive and detailed public inquiries in British legal history, it was impossible to get a conviction. Yet we are asking victims in Northern Ireland to believe that there will be some magical moment where suddenly it would be possible to get convictions in other cases. That, the House must understand, is for the birds; it will not happen. Victims will have their hopes raised and dashed in front of this legislation.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

Does the hon. Member agree that if ever there was a demonstration of the two-tier process in terms of legacy, we have it as a result of the Saville report? The same Saville report that was used to pursue Soldier F contained an assertion that Martin McGuinness probably had a submachine gun on the same day. He was never questioned, never mind pursued or taken to court—not once.

[Alex Burghart]

The hon. Gentleman raises a significant issue about the terrible events of Bloody Sunday, but I will not attempt to relitigate the whole of the Saville inquiry this evening—I understand the remarks that both the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood) have made.

Similarly, over the past few months, very senior veterans, senior generals and former members of the special forces have come out decisively against the Bill. On Armistice Day, in an unprecedented intervention, nine four-star generals wrote to warn that highly trained members of the special forces are already leaving the service. In January, seven SAS commanders wrote of the acute dangers of how

“a peacetime human rights framework”

now wields

“an effective veto over efforts to close the past.”

Last month, Generals Wall and Parker wrote that

“those who…did their duty in circumstances not of their making…are left exposed, without the shield of context or accountability that should rightfully belong to the state”.

This month, we read public reports that members of the special forces are quitting because they sense that the lawyers of the future will come after them.

I implore the House, on moral, practical and political grounds, not to support the Bill. I know that Labour Members will not wish to take it from me—and they do not have to—but they should take it from generals and special forces veterans who have dedicated so much of their lives to protecting their country and do not want to see their comrades-in-arms persecuted or their country weakened and put at risk. As politicians, I draw the attention of Labour Members to the fact that the Bill is not beloved by their constituents. They are being sent through the Lobbies tonight by people who may well change their position tomorrow.

The failings of the Bill, should it be passed, will be quickly seen but long felt. The House has the power to stop it tonight. If we do not, and the Government persist, the next Conservative Administration will repeal it and once again draw a line under the troubles.

Northern Ireland Troubles Bill

Gregory Campbell Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 19th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Robinson]

I disagree fundamentally with the Secretary of State. Let us put it like this: sexual violence was used to pursue the same aims by the same depraved people who were prepared to take life, and they did. Whenever we listen to Máiría Cahill, and her experience, we must remember that this was continual trauma inflicted by people who were exerting coercive control in her community, and who threatened her continually and repeatedly that she could not dishonour the virtuous— in their view—republican name. Yet she was repeatedly raped by the same people who were committing murder on our streets. On the notion that we can argue the toss and say, “Well she can go to the police”, is there no concept or understanding in this Committee that people like Máiría grew up in republican west Belfast or other places where going to the police is still an alien concept? This is being portrayed as the Human Rights Act and article 2-compliant mechanism that people can go to for truth and justice, but not if they happen to be a victim of one sort of crime—sexual crime—rather than the other sort of crime. That is shameful.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

Máiría Cahill has been a doughty campaigner on this issue for many years. At the weekend, she responded to a former Member of this House, Michelle Gildernew, who represented the constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone. Máiría Cahill indicated that she had reported that sexual violence to that former Member of this House —a Sinn Féin MP—who did absolutely nothing about it

[Gavin Robinson]

My hon. Friend is right. Máiría Cahill was defending me from outrageous suggestions directed towards me in a tweet by Michelle Gildernew, who had the temerity to do so knowing that Máiría Cahill had confided in her in the 1990s and she did nothing. I thank Máiría for her steadfastness and her courage over many years on the issues that she has raised.

New clause 21 is another attempt by the official Opposition, among many others on the amendment paper, to ensure that any process understands the context of operations, the environment in which people served, the rules of engagement, the pressure and the threats. How often do we hear people talk of Bloody Sunday and never mention the days that preceded it—I say that not as an excuse or a challenge for what happened—and the two police officers who were murdered? Those two police officers, patrolling that city on a cross-community basis, were murdered on the streets.

I often remember a gentleman who was in the end very senior in the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association for Northern Ireland saying to me, “Gavin, I remember one day being out the top of the Land Rover. I heard a clink, turned around and thought I was going to be shot because two of my friends had been killed the day before. I nearly shot until I realised it was an elderly lady putting out two milk bottles.” What he was trying to indicate to me was that as a young, 20-year-old man he was so perplexed, scared and petrified—knowing he had lost friends yesterday, wondering whether he would get home that afternoon and not knowing the answer—that when he heard that clink first thing in the morning, he thought he was next and he nearly shot an unarmed civilian. Thank God he did not, but he shared that story with me so that I could understand. So I support new clause 21 entirely when it talks about “contemporaneous Rules” and the environment in which people operated.

The Government have tried to meet us on equivalence in some ways in their new clause 31, which replicates amendment 56 tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and amendment 10 tabled in the name of the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim. New clause 9 has been proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart), who has put in efforts about “on the runs” and putting those beyond the pale. I understand that the Government have moved their position on that, but they could engage and support rather than always tabling their own new clauses.

New clause 5 deals with support for former members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. I make no apologies for saying that support for the Royal Ulster Constabulary should be before this House. We talk all the time about veterans, and rightly so. My grandfather served in the Royal Ulster Constabulary, although not during the troubles. He served his community. Some 302 officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary served their community and paid the ultimate sacrifice. It is was right that they were honoured with the George Cross, but it was wrong that they were so disgracefully dishonoured through the changes that were brought about in policing. Yet here we are, just weeks away from celebrating or acknowledging 25 years of renewed policing in Northern Ireland, with questions around support for the police.

I listened very carefully to the right hon. Member for Leeds South (Hilary Benn). I acknowledge that he has engaged with many victims, but while he was speaking I received a text message from a member of a victims’ group who had hoped for a visit from him when he was Secretary of State. He did not visit, although he sent a junior Minister. I remember visiting that same victim on the main street in Omagh. He served as a police officer on 15 August 1998. He showed me the shop where he was laying bodies that day—28 people lost their lives, as well as two unborn children. He then took me into the entry next door, where he had had to bring other bodies because there simply was not sufficient room in the front of the shop. He and his colleagues have been demonised for years, but this RUC man was weeping when he was sharing with me the pain he still had, although that was not his intention, and the pain he still harboured from those days. He has asked the Government to support him and his colleagues whenever they engage with the Omagh inquiry. He has lamented the fact that the Omagh inquiry is but a partial piece of the jigsaw.

The Omagh inquiry has only the terms of reference that allow it to answer the question, “What could the British state authorities have done to prevent Omagh?” What could we have done to prevent an act of terror? Omagh was blown up because dissident republicans from the Republic of Ireland sought vehicles in the Republic of Ireland, moved through the Republic of Ireland and came to Northern Ireland to destroy that market town. And so they did. But our inquiry will answer only what we could have done to prevent that. Time after time we have raised the issue about the legacy commission’s dates. Why are we, as a House of Commons, still prepared to pass legislation that says that the troubles ended in April 1998, when we know the Omagh attack occurred on 15 August 1998?

Whenever we raise these issues, it is, “Oh, you are just having a go at the Irish. The Irish have promised that they are going to give information,” but no, they have not. As the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) said earlier, this issue was raised at the Omagh inquiry last week in evidence given by John Ware, a “Panorama” journalist. He made reference to a call that was received by the Finner Irish army camp in Ballyshannon on 14 August 1998. Colleagues may remember me raising this last week, and the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim raised it as well. The reason John Ware made those comments was that he and core participants felt that the details he was about to outline in the inquiry were with them mistakenly, and that had he not read them out—and had the Irish Government realised they had let them slip—they would have been rescinded. That is why I got a call four weeks ago giving me the details on a similar basis, so that they could not be rescinded.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Reform)]

In the seven years that I have been a Member of this House, I do not think that I have been in a more respectful, positive and high-quality debate. There have been some absolutely outstanding contributions from across the House. I am not going to reach that standard, but I am proud to participate in the debate. I particularly acknowledge the contributions made by colleagues from Northern Ireland. Having visited a number of times recently, I can attest that they do politics pretty well there; there is a standard of speech-making that reflects the seriousness of politics there, and we have all benefited from that this evening.

My observation about the Bill and the amendments brought forward by the Government is that they essentially still fail on a core moral principle, which I will come to. The amendments that have been adduced as improving the Bill and addressing the concerns that have been raised do not, I am afraid, offer new protections. Many of them relate to measures that are already in force and could be applied, particularly those on the opportunities for anonymity and remote hearings.

The amendments and the new clauses are mostly simply important moral statements of what should be obvious. In particular, new clause 32 states that there is no equivalence between terrorist action and legal actions. It is extraordinary that it needs to be said that “a relevant person” in an inquest or proceedings

“must have regard to…the fact that force may lawfully be used to prevent unlawful violence”.

And what a thing to need to say that lawful action is not equivalent to terrorism! Why would that have to be stated in law, unless the Bill might be thought to suggest the opposite—that the law as it stands, and the Bill, could imply that equivalence?

At the heart of why the Bill remains inadequate is the essential imbalance in the legal procedures that the legacy of Northern Ireland applies. I pay tribute to a group of veterans I met recently—some special forces and some others—led by Dr Robert Parr, an academic at Oxford who was a Royal Marine and in special forces. He has written a very powerful paper that makes the simple point that the legal system—this is not addressed by the Bill; in fact, the Bill consolidates it—

“privileges the claims of former paramilitaries over those of the men and women who served the Crown”.

Of course, that is not intentional—the intention is to provide equity and parity—but the problem is structural.

The fact is that only a 10th of the deaths that happened during the troubles were caused by the security services, but it is men and women in uniform who must bear almost the whole institutional burden under the law as it stands, and that will not change under this Bill. The IRA and other paramilitary organisations got letters of comfort, early release and pardons. They had their weapons decommissioned without any forensic testing being done. Meanwhile, the British Army kept its records—indeed, it operated under the chain of command. It had accountability built into the work that it did; in fact, it had all the elements that made its decisions as safe as possible, as a military operating under the laws of a democracy. It is those elements that are now used against the Army, and that is the structural imbalance we face. That was apparent right at the beginning, when the Good Friday agreement was being implemented.

A letter has been released recently from John Reid, the Northern Ireland Secretary in 2001. He was writing to Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, and he made it clear that the proposed arrangement, in which an amnesty would be offered to terrorists but not to British veterans, was asymmetric and unjust, but that for reasons of political necessity, that is how it had to be. As Dr Parr has pointed out, the asymmetric exclusion of the security forces was therefore not the product of principled legal reasoning or an honest assessment of comparative culpability; it was the price of republican acquiescence in a political settlement. Just consider the insult that that represents to our soldiers.

I pay tribute to and honour the point that the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) made. Our soldiers beat the IRA to a standstill. They fought it to the negotiating table, and then they had to take the final indignity, which is that they, not the IRA, would face the threat of the law and of prosecution.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

The hon. Member pays tribute to the armed forces of the time. Does he agree that we enjoy peace today partly because of the work that many of our special forces did in penetrating paramilitaries, to the point that we found out only later about people such as Stakeknife? That was the reason why the paramilitaries were forced to the peace table; it was not that they voluntarily sought peace.

[Danny Kruger]

That is absolutely right.

There was a question from the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) earlier about who won. The answer is that, in so far as this was a military conflict, we know who won: it was the British Army, particularly with the help of special forces, but it had to suffer that indignity in consequence. It accepted as the price of peace the indignity and injustice of being exposed to the principle of liability and the threat of prosecution, while the IRA was indemnified. That was a bitter enough pill, but the actual practice of repeat prosecutions on the scale that we have seen—not the threat, but the reality—is unacceptable. That is not what was expected or accepted at the time, but back in those days, people reckoned without the European convention on human rights, the consequences of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the lawfare that the convention has brought into reality in our time, in this century. In particular, article 2 of the ECHR applies retrospectively to the investigations, based on the inadequacy of the investigations under standards that did not apply back in those days. That is the essential injustice of the law as it stands and of this Bill; there is a fundamental violation of the principle of legal certainty. Let me quote Dr Parr again. He says that

“the requirement that individuals be able to foresee the legal consequences of their actions at the time of those actions”

is itself

“a foundational element of the rule of law to which the ECHR is ostensibly committed.”

In passing, let me turn to one other indignity and injustice that, I am afraid, has been consolidated by this Bill. No accountability has ever been forthcoming from the Irish state, elements of which were arguably responsible for enabling, colluding with and covering up the actions of terrorists during the troubles, and none is expected in the future, despite the warm words of the Secretary of State. Thanks to this Bill, though, the Irish Government will play a crucial role in our own justice system. That is wrong.

What is happening is that the Government—and I honour them for doing this—are trying to reconcile common sense and decency, and the obvious appeal for justice on behalf of veterans, with the human rights framework that we have. I am afraid to say that that simply cannot be done, so I will end with a few thoughts about the future and the system that we need. We must start by reverting to the Good Friday/Belfast agreement, and to the principles that Tony Blair oversaw back then. He chose peace over justice, and he was right to do so. That was the right principle. Now, in our time, we need to choose truth over individual justice for people who can never realistically hope to attain individual justice. That is the way to heal a community; evidence from transitional justice programmes around the world, particularly in South Africa, demonstrates that that is the way to achieve healing in a community. The hon. Member for North Northumberland (David Smith) put it very well when he talked about the need for positive peace—national peace and reconciliation. Mrs Jones, the lady we have adverted to throughout this debate, is not going to get justice through the law, but if we genuinely open the archives—including the archives in Dublin—and encourage truthfulness, she could get the truth.

Going forward, we need to stop all future prosecutions of the sort that have persecuted our veterans, and we need a Bill that draws a line under the Northern Irish troubles, as well as the Haddon-Cave inquiry. We need a new process for war crimes under English law, and a new legal basis for military conduct without European law. I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis) and the private Member’s Bill he has introduced; I think that Bill goes in the right direction, but we can go even further. It particularly emphasises—this is the core point—that the chain of command is ultimately responsible for the actions of soldiers on the ground, and Ministers are ultimately responsible for the use of force, not the poor bloke who had to take a decision in a split-second, at risk of life.

I suggest that something more is needed even than what the right hon. Member for Goole and Pocklington suggests. We need to go further—we need to pull out of the ECHR altogether. There are many reasons for leaving it, and my party makes those points repeatedly. It protects terrorists and stops the deportation of illegal immigrants, but the most important reason is that it enables the prosecution of our soldiers. On those grounds, we must leave it.

Northern Ireland Troubles Bill

Gregory Campbell Excerpts

Committee of the whole House & 3rd reading
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a good point. By the time we finish considering the Bill today, I cannot see any legitimate reason why the Irish state would continue with its inter-state case at all. I have already made that point robustly to my counterparts in Dublin. I very much hope that they will look again and think again and decide that not only did we win the case in the Dillon judgment, but the legislation that we are advancing today is fully human rights-compliant, and that there is therefore no argument for them maintaining their inter-state case.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

The Secretary of State says that he very much hopes that the Dublin Government would move at the conclusion of today’s consideration. Has he had that conversation with them, and have they given him the assurance that that is what they intend to do?

[Chris Bryant]

Yes, to the first part. As I have just said, I have said this very robustly to Jim O’Callaghan and Helen McEntee on several occasions. They have kept their own counsel for the moment, but it seems to me inconceivable that, by the time the Bill gets to the House of Lords, there could be an argument for them maintaining the inter-state case, and I therefore hope that they will withdraw it. I am being as clear as I can with the hon. Gentleman. As he knows, he and I agree on many, many things, not least the fact that it is good to have power sharing in Northern Ireland and that I should not be running Northern Ireland.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Davis]

I am trying to do as much damage as possible. [Laughter.]

I stand to speak principally to amendment 51 and, to some extent, to amendment 49, which would stop existing paused inquests going forward. Amendment 51 would address directly the paused inquest relating to Loughgall. I picked that event out because it is the most controversial and central to what the IRA were trying to achieve. It is emblematic of many of the reasons why we should not pursue any of these inquests, but should put them in their proper place with the legacy commission, which could deal with them dispassionately.

Before I go any further, I draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and not just this year but in previous years. They relate to the fact that I was the trustee of the SAS Regimental Association for well over a decade—I cannot remember how many years.

All parties in the debate so far, yesterday and today, have quite properly focused on the need to get closure for victims and, at the same time, to deliver justice for our veterans. Nobody can argue with those two aims. I am focusing mostly on getting justice for veterans by preventing them being punished by the process, but, before I pursue that line in detail, I will address some of the words and definitions that we are using, particularly the definition of “victim” in the operation of inquests in Northern Ireland.

We all have in our minds a fairly clear idea of what a victim is, but unfortunately it is a little different in Northern Ireland. The difference arises from a deliberate decision taken by the Blair Government in article 3 of the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, which changed the definition of “victim” and ruled that anyone affected by the troubles through loss, trauma or injury would be classed as a victim. That means that proven murderers killed in an attempt to carry out another murder count as victims. I know of nowhere else in the world where the law treats killers as victims.

This issue is still relevant. In September last year, the Democratic Unionist party used a motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly to try to restore some moral clarity by adding the word “innocent” before “victims”. Most of us would think of that as a tautology, but the motion was defeated by Sinn Féin, supported by Alliance. That is incredibly central to this matter, because the word “innocent” exposes the truth and draws a line between terrorists and their victims.

In response to the point made earlier by the hon. Member for Sunderland Central, “veterans” and “victims” are not mutually exclusive terms, but “terrorists” and “victims” are. That is the significance of the amendments I am talking about. In the IRA active service unit killed at Loughgall, there were any number of people to whom that applied. The clearest example was Jim Lynagh, who was guilty of at least 20 murders and probably more than 30. His nickname was “the executioner”. He was not an innocent victim by any rational judgment of the word.

Why Loughgall? It was the greatest single defeat of the IRA—the one that they are most sore about and still feel the scars of. Why is that? Because it involved the defeat of what they considered their most successful unit, the East Tyrone brigade. What was the measure of that success? That so-called brigade killed 250 innocent people. The defeat at Loughgall was seen as a humiliation for the IRA, and that means that they are now desperate to rewrite history and cast their murderers as heroes and British soldiers as amoral killers. That is why they want a coroner’s inquest, rather than a legacy commission.

I am afraid that in Northern Ireland a coroner’s inquest is in many ways public theatre; it is just different. The shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), made this point, but I will reiterate it. In the rest of the United Kingdom, an inquest is not allowed to pursue a case if it becomes at all apparent that it may lead to a criminal prosecution, such as the finding of an unlawful killing, but in Northern Ireland the reverse is true.

Even Northern Irish judges recognise the ludicrous nature of that situation. We saw that in the Coagh case with Soldier B, where there was judicial review attempt after judicial review attempt, which led to the judge talking about the

“ludicrous nature of this challenge, funded as it is by legal aid.”

The judge in that sequence talked about having to make views or judgments in slow motion or freeze frame on decisions. Those were life-and-death decisions, for the individuals concerned, and they were made in fractions of a second. That is the central reason for my objection.

Why are operations such as Loughgall, Clonoe, Coagh or any of the others challenged by supporters of the IRA and others? The peculiar circumstances of Northern Ireland made this sort of operation necessary. How is that? The IRA knew how to frustrate justice. They would murder or intimidate not just anybody who thought that they might be a witness, but their families. If I were in that circumstance in Northern Ireland, I would baulk at giving evidence if I felt that my family might be murdered as a result of doing so, and I would baulk at serving on a jury for the same reason. That is why we ended up with Diplock trials, which had judges without juries, because that was simply not viable. When Diplock recommended those trials, he gave the example of a man who was executed in front of his young son the day before he was due to give evidence in a terrorist trial. That is the background and the circumstances.

However, the IRA did not stop there. They understood that, as well as witnesses, the other thing that matters in court cases is forensics. That is why they wore a strange uniform of boiler suits, rubber gloves, shoe coverings or wellingtons and balaclavas, because they knew that they had to deny the evidence, but that was not all. When they had carried out their crime, the cars used were frequently abandoned and burned to destroy the evidence. There are plenty of examples—I think Clonoe was one of them—where a crowd prevented the authorities from getting close to a car until it had burned out, for the very simple reason that it destroyed the evidence. Even in the case of the murder of a previous Speaker at Stormont, Norman Stronge, and his son, the IRA set fire to the house, with the same aim.

[Mr Campbell]

On the right hon. Gentleman’s point about the IRA’s determination to deal with forensics, does he know that they also blew up the forensics laboratory in south Belfast, where the forensic information had been gathered?

[David Davis]

The hon. Gentleman is exactly right. That serves to focus our minds on the fact that this was a very deliberate strategy. This did not happen by accident, and the IRA did not just take to wearing boiler suits as uniforms; this was a deliberate strategy.

The IRA’s strategy faced the state with a conundrum. Doing nothing and sitting back does not work—if the jury processes and other judicial processes do not work, that is not an option. Why do I say that? Let me go back and take the East Tyrone brigade as an example. It killed 250 people before Loughgall. During the late ’80s, it was killing people at a rate of 10 or 15 a year. Doing nothing meant that 10 or 15 innocent people would die every year because the state was not fulfilling its duty, so the only way to stop it was to catch the East Tyrone brigade in flagrante—in the act of carrying out a crime—and try to arrest them. Of course, the first aim of the state is always to act with minimum force if possible, but the circumstances did not always allow that. This was an armed set of terrorists, probably in the process of trying to kill somebody, who might then turn to kill you, and you had to stand up and say, “Excuse me, you’re under arrest.” We saw from many of these events how dangerous that was. At Coagh—the case that went through all those judicial reviews—an SAS soldier effectively had to dress up as a UDR man to be the target, and they had to wait until he had been shot at before they moved.

At Clonoe, which my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar mentioned, there was another problem: the intelligence was wrong, which made it even more difficult. There they were facing a double-barrelled dushka machine gun, .50 calibre and capable of bringing down light armour or aircraft. A three-second burst of fire from that and the whole patrol would have been dead. That was the sort of thing we were asking our soldiers to do. I will come back to the Loughgall example, which is even worse in many ways. That was the sort of thing that we said to our soldiers, “You must do this to attempt to achieve an arrest, or at least a stop if you have to.” This is not theoretical; in the specific context of the special forces, which is what these three cases relate to, hundreds of soldiers died in Northern Ireland. If Members want to look into this, I recommend that they look up the example of Lance Corporal David Jones, who was shot at the moment of challenge, or that of Captain Westmacott. There are others, but those cases give the Committee clear examples of the sorts of risks that had to be taken—and were taken—by our brave, honourable, decent and law-abiding soldiers.