Health Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I have sympathy with the principle behind amendment 58, in the name of the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. The hon. Member for North Shropshire is right to say that individuals with ME have not always received the best quality care. In many cases, ME is a debilitating and incredibly frustrating condition, and around 10% to 25% of sufferers have severe ME, meaning that they are housebound or bedbound. We know that some patients are sadly not believed by medical professionals.

In 2021, NICE said that most medical students have little or no training on the condition. The Government have previously committed to increasing the uptake of ME modules among NHS professionals. What progress has been made on that in the last couple of years? The Government also committed in the ME/CFS action plan to develop and run a public awareness initiative, with implementation expected by May this year. Has the Department developed that initiative yet? If not, what is responsible for the delay? It is not marked as complete on the Government website.

The amendment would put guidance for medical professionals into legislation, though, and my concerns about that are twofold. First, it may slow down improvements in the future. If individuals have to legally follow that guidance, how can they innovate and improve treatment without having to come back to Parliament for more primary legislation? That will take time and may mean that people with ME get worse rather than better care in the short term.

The requirement would also limit clinical judgment. A patient may have a particular set of symptoms or conditions or be on a particular set of medications that mean that the doctor or clinician looking after them needs to vary from the guidance. NICE intends the guidance to be just that, guidance, not law, but if guidance becomes law, the doctor or clinician will not be able to vary from it. My concern is that the amendment would be overly restrictive. Although it is well-intentioned, and it is a good idea to ensure that guidance is followed where possible, it would be too rigid. I therefore do not support the amendment, while continuing to support the aim of better treatment.

Clause 58 amends the Health and Social Care Act 2012 by inserting a new section 237(8A), which states:

“Provision made under subsection (8)(b) may include provision about the period within which a recommendation is to be complied with (including provision for the period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State).”

At the moment, NICE technology appraisals check the value of a product, whether a drug or a technology, then NICE makes a recommendation. It is then supposed to be the case that within 90 days or three months, ICBs ensure that those technologies are available, but we know that in the real world it can take longer—sometimes 12 to 24 months—for some things to become available. That could be because technology needs to be bought or training needs to take place.

I understand why there could be variation and why the Government may want to consider varying the period, but it is not clear why they need to do so in legislation, because it is possible now to vary the period on an individual basis. For example, the Government imposed a five-year limit rather than a 90-day limit for the introduction of hybrid closed loop systems for diabetes, because that is a technology that requires proper training and they were never going to be rolled out in such a short period. The other product that notably has a longer time is tirzepatide, which is more commonly known as Mounjaro. I suspect that that is down to cost, but I am not certain.

Why do the Government want to change the 90 days? The patient’s right to treatment with a NICE-approved product within 90 days will become a right to getting the product when the Secretary of State says so. That is not really a right at all, because it does not give patients any comfort and may mean that products are received later. The Government have put this power into the Bill, so they clearly intend to use it. Given that they have the power to vary on an individual basis, why do they need the power to vary on a blanket basis? Do they intend to extend the 90-day limit across the board? If so, by how much? There is no ceiling. The Committee received written evidence from Henry Burkitt from Oxygen Strategy, who made the point that there is no ceiling, no maximum time, no duty to consult and no necessity for the Secretary of State or NICE to give reasons why a delay has occurred.

The life sciences industry talks about how it wants products to be rolled out. When it is investing and doing research in this country, it wants to see new products rolled out as quickly as possible once they have been approved, and the clause is a sign that roll-out might be delayed. I understand that the Government might want to be able to vary on certain products, but they already can; why do they want to vary on a more general basis? It is presumably to slow down roll-outs, but by how much?

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am a parliamentary patron and champion of Action on ME. I feel I ought to put that on the record, as we have an amendment on ME.

[The Chair]

Thank you. That is a matter of record. Any other takers? No.

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[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman is right. When someone comes forward, they need to have trust in the system. If they think that coming forward will harm their job or career, or perhaps their colleagues’, they may be more reluctant to do so. There is a difference between a mistake and a reckless act. If people behave recklessly and badly, that needs to be dealt with for the sake of accountability, but if an individual is aware of a mistake, or aware of a loophole through which a mistake could have been made if only something else had not happened at that moment, they need to come forward and say so. It would be much more difficult for them to do so if there was a culture of fear.

Dr Benneyworth made it clear to the Committee that

“we are still working in a culture of fear”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 24, Q40.]

and that makes it difficult for people to come forward. People come forward now because they know that HSSIB is independent, but they will be less likely to come forward when HSSIB is an office in the CQC that is independent in name only. The Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), said that

“people cannot sit at desks near other people who are making decisions and at the same time be perceived as entirely independent. The perception of independence cannot be legislated for—the perception is everything”.—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 915.]

[Gregory Stafford]

As my hon. Friend said earlier, the problem comes when this new body within the CQC has to investigate the CQC. In the oral evidence session, I asked Dr Dash what would happen if the problem was CQC, and she gave what is probably the most extraordinary answer out of the many extraordinary answers she gave. It is worth repeating:

“Well, we then have to deal with that as a problem. That is the same as saying, ‘What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?’…What if the GMC is a problem? What if the Nursing and Midwifery Council is a problem?”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 8, Q9.]

She did not answer my question at all. In fact, she entirely sidestepped it. How can we have confidence in the Government’s proposal if the architect of the procedure cannot answer the most basic questions about the investigatory framework?

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That answer was quite shocking, really. The pause before it and the reaction was remarkable. The purpose of HSSIB is to investigate without fear or favour, and to enable people to come forward in a safe way, but if it was folded into the CQC, as the regulator, and the problem was the regulator, how would it investigate itself? How would it make recommendations to itself? What if it thinks the board that it works for is incompetent? Is it going to tell its boss that it is incompetent? How does that work? No one seemed to know the answer.

It also seems that Ministers have not thought about how the HSSIB unit will be vulnerable to political pressure. Under the Bill as drafted, the Government are planning to direct the “vast majority”—according to the impact assessment—of the investigations, and the quality board is going to have some influence over the recommendations, again under the direction of the Secretary of State.

The Liberal Democrats have tabled amendment 5, which would require the appointment of a committee. That idea is well intentioned, and we recognise the same problems and the same flaws in the Government’s approach, but I do not think it is enough to solve the problem. Even if the law says that the oversight of the investigative units will remain operationally independent, I just do not see how that is possible. I can see that the hon. Member for North Shropshire is trying to help by creating something better than what the Government have produced, but I do not think it is enough.

We have also tabled some amendments, including new clause 42, which would ensure that there is some operational independence in the choice of investigation by requiring the Secretary of State to adequately fund and resource patient safety investigations, including some of those initiated by this unit within the CQC.

Amendment 55 is a probing amendment. We noticed that much of the legislation has been lifted and shifted from the previous Act, but some things are missing, including national security grounds. We want to understand why that ground has not been included in the Bill. Very occasionally, health events have national security connotations—the Salisbury chemical weapons attack, for example. In such circumstances, restrictions on investigatory capabilities could be necessary. I do not know—I was just interested in why the Government have chosen deliberately to remove that particular clause.

Amendment 56 would allow

“the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.”

The HSSIB programme is world-leading. People look at it from across the globe, and some have asked for training or information on it, for which we have been able not just to recoup costs but actually charge. I do not understand why the Government have removed that provision, because it is an opportunity for them to get extra money without taking it off people in taxes. Do the Government want HSSIB to lose its international standing, or do they want British taxpayers to subsidise training for foreign health services? It is not clear. I would be grateful if the Minister explained that.

We need to come back to what the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said at the beginning: what is the purpose? The purpose is patient safety.

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[Helen Morgan]

I declare an interest as a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, which is opposed to the changes to HSSIB proposed in the Bill. Over the last couple of weeks, we have been reminded why we need an appropriate safety landscape when things go wrong. We have had the Donna Ockenden review into Nottingham maternity services. We have had Baroness Amos’s national review into the picture following a range of maternity scandals across the country. Yesterday evening, I attended the debate on the regulations to compensate victims of the infected blood scandal. Safety is at the top of all our minds at the moment, as it should always be.

Something that has come across very strongly from Members of all parties, on both sides of the House, is that culture is critical to ensuring that those types of issues—the huge scandals—never happen again. Indeed, smaller scandals must never happen again, because people need to be free. Staff in particular need to have the confidence that, if they report concerns about the way they operate, they will be safe to do so without jeopardising the rest of their career, and that those concerns will be acted on and the lessons learned. Everybody here wants to achieve that. I do not think anybody is arguing about the fundamental principle that, when there are concerns, they need to be raised in a safe place and that the lessons from those concerns need to be learned.

That is why I share the lack of understanding of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, about why rolling HSSIB into the CQC will change that culture, because the CQC is a regulatory body and HSSIB is an investigatory one. Their missions are fundamentally different. Putting them together compromises the independent investigation element in a way that is very difficult to overcome. We were told in the evidence to the Bill Committee by HSSIB’s chief executive that it is often told, “We tell you this; we wouldn’t tell a regulatory body.” It is clear that this perception of safety is critical to the way in which people interact with HSSIB.

We also heard in evidence to the Committee that the CQC warned that, as it stands, the Bill could leave it fighting against itself in the High Court. We could get a scenario where the regulatory arm of the CQC sought access to HSSIB’s confidential investigation reports, while HSSIB, the investigative branch, tried to keep them secret to protect its independence. That is not a situation anyone wants to end up in, and I am sure that is not the intention of this clause.

I think the shadow Minister has already made this point, so I will not labour it, but it is also important that the investigatory body must be able to examine the regulatory frameworks, commissioning decisions and oversight arrangements without institutional conflict. When I look back, for example, at the scandal that unfolded at Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS Trust over the maternity failings, I see that the CQC had given that trust a good rating during the course of all those terrible things going wrong. The CQC’s process clearly failed in that situation. It is difficult to imagine an arm of the CQC turning around in that scenario and saying that the CQC got its own assessment wrong. If it had tried to do that, it is difficult to imagine how that might have played out and that people might have had confidence in raising that problem.

I am also concerned about this because, as the Minister has alluded to, the CQC has faced significant criticism and publicly admitted that it has failed to carry out its functions to the best of its abilities over recent years. Although I welcome the Minister’s assurance that the transfer would happen only once the CQC was in a better place, the CQC might—again—be part of the problem in some instances, and HSSIB must be able to point to that where appropriate.

Lib Dem amendment 5 attempts to introduce the principle that, if this must happen, there needs to be a firewall in the CQC to keep HSSIB operationally independent. To achieve that, the amendment proposes to insert into the process a committee that is operationally independent of—with a majority of people who are not on—the CQC. Opposition new clause 42 seeks to do the same thing. I would be open to any suggestions that the Minister might make to reassure us that HSSIB will continue to be operationally independent, for all the good reasons that hon. Members have outlined.

[Gregory Stafford]

Before I address the clauses, I say for the record that 21 years ago this morning, 52 people were murdered and 784 injured by Islamist terrorists in London. I pay tribute to all the medical professionals who treated those people in such difficult circumstances.

I will speak to clauses 59 to 63 together because they all concern one of the most significant structural changes proposed in the Bill: the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body as an independent statutory organisation, and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission. At first glance, that may appear a relatively modest machinery-of-government change. The Minister argues that HSSIB’s functions will continue, its statutory safe-space protections will remain and operational independence will somehow be preserved. However, when one examines the evidence presented to the Committee, and that given to the Health and Social Care Committee, of which I am a member, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the problem that this merger is intended to solve. Instead, what emerges is a remarkable degree of consensus among those with the greatest expertise in patient safety that this proposal carries significant risks while offering little measurable benefit.

The question before us is therefore not whether HSSIB’s statutory functions can be transferred to another organisation, but whether Parliament should abolish an institution that it deliberately created to be independent. That distinction matters. Across public life, we recognise that effective scrutiny depends on institutional independence. Government expenditure is examined independently by the National Audit Office, citizens complain to independent ombudsmen rather than to the organisations about which they are complaining, air accidents are investigated independently by the Civil Aviation Authority, and rail accidents are investigated independently of the regulator. In each case, Parliament has recognised that organisations charged with investigating failures should not also be responsible for regulating, inspecting or enforcing against those they investigate. Healthcare should be no different.

Indeed, if anything, healthcare should demand an even greater degree of independence. Learning from failure depends on the confidence of patients, clinicians and families that they can speak openly and without fear that the information that they provide will later be used for regulatory or enforcement purposes. That is precisely why HSSIB was created. Its purpose was never to attribute blame but to understand why systems fail, identify the underlying causes of patient harm and ensure that lessons are learned before similar tragedies occur again. That philosophy represented a deliberate shift away from a culture of blame and towards one of learning. It was modelled consciously on the air accidents investigation branch, whose success over many decades has demonstrated that independent, no-blame investigations produce better safety outcomes than investigations driven primarily by enforcement.

It is therefore difficult to understand why the Government now seek to move away from the model that other safety-critical industries continue to regard as fundamental. Clause 59 would abolish that independent body and transfer its functions to the Care Quality Commission. In doing so, it would bring together two organisations with fundamentally different statutory purposes, different powers and, perhaps most importantly, different cultures. HSSIB investigates and the CQC regulates. One exists to ask why the system failed; the other exists to ask whether the organisation complied with required standards—those are not the same questions. Nor do HSSIB and CQC require the same relationship with those from whom evidence is obtained. An investigation depends on trust; a regulator depends on compliance. An investigator encourages candour; a regulator necessarily retains enforcement powers. The different roles are not a weakness of the system; they are precisely why Parliament chose to establish separate organisations.

I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could explain what assessment has been made of the impact on public confidence of the investigator and the regulator becoming part of the same statutory organisation. More specifically, what assessment has been made of the likely effect on clinicians’ willingness to speak openly if the organisation receiving confidential evidence also contains the regulator responsible for inspecting and enforcing standards? That concern has been expressed not only by the Opposition, but repeatedly by independent experts—and indeed, we just heard the hon. Member for Lewisham East asking similar questions.

Even the Care Quality Commission has expressed reservations. Evidence that it submitted to the Health and Social Care Committee earlier this year acknowledged that a lack of clarity remains regarding the respective roles of HSSIB and the CQC. Rather than resolving that uncertainty, the proposed merger risks deepening it. The CQC warned that preserving an effective separation between its investigatory and regulatory functions would be essential if confidence in HSSIB’s safe space were to be maintained, and it recognised the genuine risk of perceived conflicts of interest if those functions become blurred.

I think that should give the Committee pause for thought. When the organisation receiving the additional responsibilities is itself warning about the difficulty of maintaining the boundaries, we should listen very carefully. If the CQC believes that the risks exist before the merger has even taken place, what confidence can Ministers offer that those risks will somehow disappear afterwards? Similarly, the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, of which I am a member, has expressed concern that HSSIB should remain institutionally independent so that its evidence-based recommendations can continue to command confidence across the health system.

Such concerns, as I said, are not confined to Parliament, nor are they confined to one political party. They are shared by patient safety organisations, healthcare professionals and those directly involved in investigating serious incidents. During our oral evidence sessions, I put a straightforward question to Dr Penny Dash. I observed that I could find almost no one apart from her and the Department who believed that moving HSSIB into the CQC was the right course of action. That was not intended as some sort of rhetorical flourish; it reflected the evidence before us. Former Secretaries of State, patient safety experts, independent investigators and numerous professional organisations have all questioned the proposal.

Despite the breadth of concern, the Government have not produced compelling evidence that HSSIB, as presently constituted, is failing. Nor have they demonstrated that the separation between investigation and regulation is itself creating harm. Instead, Ministers have repeatedly assured us that HSSIB’s operational independence will remain, that safe space protections will remain and that independent investigations will remain. If that is indeed the Government’s position, an obvious question follows: if HSSIB will continue to operate independently, if its investigations will continue to be conducted independently and if its statutory protections will remain intact, why is it necessary to abolish the independent organisation at all?

That question goes to the heart of clauses 59 to 63, and throughout the evidence presented to the Committee, I have heard no convincing answer. The Government ask Parliament to believe that everything that makes HSSIB valuable will continue unchanged, but at the same time, they ask Parliament to dismantle the very institutional structure deliberately designed to protect those characteristics. That is not merely an administrative contradiction, but a constitutional one. If institutional independence genuinely matters, it should be preserved. If institutional independence does not matter, Ministers should explain why Parliament was wrong to establish it in the first place.

That question of necessity leads directly to the Government’s principal justifications for clauses 59 to 63, the Dash review. The Government have repeatedly relied on that review as the intellectual basis for abolishing HSSIB as the independent body, yet when one examines the report and the evidence given by its author to this Committee, the case becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

Without doubt, the review identifies a genuine problem: it concludes that the patient safety landscape has become crowded and in places confusing. Dr Dash told the Committee that she had identified more than 150 organisations operating across the wider patient safety landscape, and that clinicians were spending considerable time responding to different organisations, requesting information, completing forms and participating in overlapping reviews. She said that the system had become “busy and confusing”, and that that was distracting clinicians from improving the quality of care.

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[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a comprehensive speech and getting to the nub of all the relevant points. He talks about the system failing; to me, that is the absolute nub. The CQC is absolutely part of the system and of the establishment. If anyone is put off from making a complaint to the CQC when they think the CQC may be to blame, how on earth can the functions currently exercised by HSSIB continue in any effective way?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes several key points, and he is absolutely right: what problem are the Government trying to solve here? If we believe in independence, believe in an investigatory body and believe it is working well—and it demonstrably is working well—why on earth would we change it? That goes to a further point: these clauses not only potentially provide for a transfer of HSSIB into CQC but add risk and failure in that procedure.

My hon. Friend asks how we can be confident that the system is going to work if a patient or a clinician does not want to put their head above the parapet because they are frightened that there will be regulatory consequence. That is a fundamental problem with the Government’s proposal. As I have said several times in this speech, we have not had the answer to that and no answer seems to be forthcoming. I may touch on that in a bit more detail in a moment.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash was clear on this topic when he gave evidence to the Committee:

“My concern was that the NHS and actually health systems across the world are not very good at learning lessons when there are tragedies.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 29, Q52.]

That is the problem that HSSIB was created to address and why I struggle with the Government’s argument. If the problem is that the NHS does not learn lessons effectively, the answer should be to strengthen the organisation designed specifically to help it to learn, not to weaken the independence of that organisation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash identified the precise part of the system that remains broken. He said:

“the Bill does not do anything to address the bit that is not working well, and that bit is that the NHS is still very poor on acting on recommendations that are made”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q52.]

That is the crucial point. The Government’s justification for the merger appears to be based on a concern that there are too many recommendations, too many reviews and too much duplication, but the evidence of my right hon. Friend highlights a different problem. The issue is not that we do not know what needs to change but that we too often fail to act on what we already know. The answer to that problem is not fewer independent investigations but stronger accountability for implementing recommendations. Indeed, my right hon. Friend made that point powerfully in his evidence. He explained that

“What there needs to be is a formal system with a legal obligation on the Government.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q53.]

He warned that too often recommendations disappear into what he described as “agree in principle”, which allows organisations to acknowledge a problem without committing to a timetable for fixing it.

The Government are proposing structural change because recommendations are not always acted on, but the problem is not the existence of HSSIB; it is the absence of sufficient accountability when recommendations are made. The Government appear to be addressing the wrong failure. There is another important point from my right hon. Friend’s evidence. He explained that one of the long-term purposes of HSSIB was to reduce the need for expensive public inquiries. He told the Committee that

“Ideally, when something goes wrong, what you want is for there to be an investigation and for lessons to be learned, so that grieving families can say, ‘Well, at least we are confident that this wouldn’t happen again.’”

However, because families often lack confidence that lessons will actually be learned, they understandably seek public inquiries. My right hon. Friend explained:

“families still think the only way they can get real change is through a public inquiry”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 32, Q56.]

That is an important warning. If confidence in HSSIB is reduced, the unintended consequence may be more public inquiries, not fewer—more cost, more delay and, most importantly, more time before lessons are learned and acted on. That is the opposite of what the Government say they want to achieve.

The Government’s second argument is that safe space can be protected through legislation. I accept that Ministers intend to preserve those protections; however, the evidence we have heard demonstrates that the issue is not simply one of statutory wording but of culture and confidence. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash gave a particularly important example: he explained that the CQC plays a vital role because it rates healthcare organisations. Hospitals and GP practices care deeply about whether they are rated “outstanding”, “good”, “requires improvement” or “inadequate”. His concern was this:

“If a staff member is talking openly to HSSIB about a failure of governance in their organisation, and that is the same organisation that could decide whether they get stripped of their ‘outstanding’ rating and downgraded to ‘good’ or ‘requires improvement’, my concern is that some people may worry and say, ‘Maybe I shouldn’t be open, because this could affect my hospital’s rating.’”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 33-34, Q59.]

That is the practical problem: the Government’s argument relies on the assumption that staff will distinguish perfectly between different parts of the same organisation, but the concern is that a frontline clinician may not see those internal distinctions. They may simply see that the investigator and the regulator now sit under the same roof. When people are deciding whether to disclose something that may have consequences for themselves, their colleagues or their organisation, perception matters. As my right hon. Friend said,

“we have to be really careful that people still have confidence in the safe space function if this merger goes ahead.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 34, Q59.]

A similar point was made by Professor Carl Macrae from the University of Nottingham. While giving evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee, he said that it is difficult to conceive how legislation alone could overcome the fundamental conflict created by merging an independent safety investigation body with a regulator, given that the two organisations perform inherently different functions.

The Government’s case depends on trust surviving that merger, but the evidence tells us that trust is precisely what is at risk. Dr Benneyworth made a similar point from HSSIB’s perspective. She told this Committee:

“There needs to be much more clarity about governance and how that will work in the legislation to protect independence.”

She went further and suggested that if the Government proceed, there would need to be much stronger safeguards, including

“a legal duty on the CQC to protect the safe space.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 26, Q44.]

That evidence is significant because it is not a witness arguing that change is impossible; it is the organisation at the centre of this proposal telling this Committee that the legislation, as drafted, does not provide sufficient reassurance.

The Government’s response cannot simply be that they intend to be careful. The former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), said that the integration would be approached with “enormous care”, but we have to ask what that actually means in legal terms. Where are the enforceable safeguards? What prevents a gradual erosion of independence once HSSIB is part of the regulator? History tells us that institutional safeguards matter precisely because they protect against future changes in culture, leadership or priorities. A body can begin with the best of intentions, but still drift over time—that is why Parliament creates independent institutions in the first place. It is not because Ministers are untrustworthy; it is because good governance recognises that structures matter. In this case, the structure matters enormously.

Those concerns become even more significant when we consider the legal framework around protected information and the practical operation of safe space. The Government’s argument appears to rest on the belief that if the right protections are written into legislation, the independence of HSSIB can be preserved, but the evidence we have heard suggests that the challenge is much more fundamental. The question is not simply whether information is legally protected but whether staff, patients and families will continue to believe that it is protected. That distinction matters.

During our evidence session, Dr Benneyworth highlighted a very specific concern about the drafting of the legislation. She explained that, at present, the clauses related to connected individuals could create uncertainty about who in the CQC might have access to protected material. She said:

“The legislation needs to be much clearer around the protection of protected disclosure materials, to give the system confidence in our ability to hold and not share confidential information.”—[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 25, Q41.]

That is the crucial point: the success of HSSIB depends on confidence that information provided in confidence will remain within the investigation process. If there is uncertainty about whether information could move elsewhere in the organisation, the very existence of that uncertainty risks undermining safe space.

Dr Benneyworth went further. She explained:

“There needs to be a legal duty on the CQC to protect the safe space.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 25, Q41.]

That is a remarkable admission. The organisation whose functions are being transferred to the CQC is telling Parliament that the Bill, as drafted, does not provide that sufficient certainty. The Government’s response cannot simply be that everyone involved will act in good faith. Good governance requires more than good intentions; it requires a structure that protects independence, regardless of who happens to lead an organisation in future, who is Secretary of State or who is in government. That is why Parliament creates these independent bodies in the first place.

There is also a practical issue that cannot be dismissed. Dr Benneyworth explained that HSSIB is unique because it can investigate every part of the healthcare system, including national bodies. She told the Committee:

“At the moment, we have the ability, being an independent organisation, to investigate any part of the system where there is a concern.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 23, Q38.]

That includes looking at how national systems operate, how regulators function and how different parts of the health service interact. That independence is important, because sometimes the problem is not the provider delivering care; sometimes the problem is the system around it.

A regulator may look at whether an organisation has complied with standards; an independent investigator may ask a different question: why did the system make it possible for failure to happen? The questions are complementary, but not interchangeable. Dr Benneyworth made precisely that point when discussing national failures. She explained that some problems cannot be solved by regulating an individual organisation, because the underlying issue sits elsewhere in the system. She said that is not something that can be changed by a regulator—a fundamental distinction. Regulation can identify whether standards have been met and independent investigation can identify whether the system itself needs to change. Both functions are necessary, but combining them risks weakening both.

Those concerns sit within a wider challenge on candour in healthcare. The statutory duty of candour was introduced following the Francis inquiry into the failures of the Mid Staffordshire health trust. The duty’s purpose was straightforward: when something goes wrong, patients and families should receive an honest explanation. Despite that legal duty, however, evidence remains of a defensive culture within parts of healthcare. Legal advice can sometimes encourage organisations to think first about liability, rather than about learning. Administrators can understandably become concerned about litigation risk—and where fear dominates, openness suffers. That is precisely why the safe space matters.

HSSIB was created to provide an environment where the priority is not defending an organisation, but understanding what happened. If we weaken confidence in that environment, we risk making the wider culture of candour even harder to achieve. The irony, of course, is that the Government argue that the merger will strengthen patient safety, and yet the evidence suggests that it could weaken one of the most important ingredients of patient safety: openness.

I also want to express concerns shared with me directly by people working within HSSIB. During a meeting with some of my constituents who work in the organisation, individuals involved in patient safety investigations raised significant concerns about the proposed move. They believe that bringing HSSIB into the CQC represents a backward step for patient safety. They also expressed concern that the rationale for the merger has shifted. Initially, the argument appeared to focus on streamlining and reducing duplication; increasingly, however, it appears to be about reducing the number of safety recommendations being made. That misunderstands the problem.

As I have pointed out before, the challenge is not the existence of recommendations but ensuring that those recommendations lead to action. Indeed, I was informed that HSSIB has already been developing a recommendations monitoring system, specifically designed to improve implementation and oversight. In other words, the organisation is already working to address the very issue now being used as justification for restructuring it. That brings me back to the evidence given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash. He identified what I believe to be the central weakness in the Government’s argument:

“the Bill does not do anything to address the bit that is not working well, and that bit is that the NHS is still very poor on acting on recommendations that are made”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q52.]

That is the point that Ministers need to answer. If recommendations are not being implemented, strengthen implementation; if accountability is weak, strengthen accountability; and if learning is not embedded, create mechanisms to ensure that learning happens—but do not weaken the independence of a body responsible for identifying those lessons. The risk is that the Government solve the wrong problem. They will remove the independence of the investigator, while leaving untouched the failure to act on what investigators discover.

After considering the evidence presented to this Committee, the evidence that we heard in the Select Committee and my conversations with my constituents and others, I remain unable to support clauses 59 to 63. That is not because I oppose reform or believe that the patient safety landscape cannot improve—of course it can. The NHS must continue to learn, adapt and improve, but improvement requires honesty about what is working and what is not. The evidence suggests that HSSIB’s independent investigative model is one of the things that is working and that failure lies elsewhere. It lies in whether recommendations are being implemented, whether organisations learn quickly enough and whether staff feel safe enough to speak up. The answer to those problems is not to remove independence, but to strengthen it.

The creation of HSSIB represented a recognition by Parliament that healthcare needed the same principles of independent safety investigation that serve aviation, rail and other high-risk industry so well. Those principles exist for a reason: when something goes wrong, society needs an organisation that people trust to ask what happened, why it happened and what must change to prevent it from happening again. That organisation must be separate from those responsible for regulating the system. It must be able to investigate without fear or favour. It must command the confidence of patients, families and healthcare professionals.

The Government say that the protections will remain, but the evidence we have heard overwhelmingly demonstrates that confidence in those protections is precisely what is at risk. Once institutional independence is removed, it simply cannot be recreated through internal guidance or assurances. The structure matters, the culture matters and the trust matters.

For those reasons, I urge the Minister to reconsider clauses 59 to 63. If the Government believe that improvements can be made to co-ordination, accountability or implementation, discussions on that should absolutely continue and the Opposition would welcome them. However, the clauses go much further. They remove the independent status, which is so important. Given the enormous human and financial cost of avoidable harm in healthcare, Parliament should be extremely cautious before weakening one of the few mechanisms specifically designed to prevent it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. The issues relating to clause 59, principally the abolition of HSSIB, have been well articulated, not least by my colleagues on this side. I wish to add some of my own views too.

The debate has been framed as a transfer of the functions of HSSIB to the CQC, and indeed that is the title of the clause. The Minister has certainly articulated her arguments in that way. Effectively, it is the abolition of HSSIB. In fact, clause 59(1) plainly says:

“The Health Services Safety Investigations Body is abolished.”

Its functions may be transferred, but that is quite a significant change, and I do not want that to be lost within the context of this debate. At the heart of it is this idea around investigatory and regulatory functions. While the argument remains technical—and it is of course easier for the Government and indeed Dr Dash to make the arguments to abolish HSSIB in the abstract—when we talk about the real-life implications and how real people react to different circumstances, it is plainly very significant and negative.

That is particularly true when it comes to investigating where things went wrong and when the system is at least in question and could be at fault. When there are things that need airing that people are afraid to air, confidence in the new framework is essential. Regardless of the systems, processes or protocols that the Government may wish to put in place to ensure that the safe space concept continues to exist, who on earth, if they are worried about making disclosures, will be satisfied and confident that those in the CQC, who may themselves be at fault, will not learn about a disclosure to the arm of the CQC that is empowered and entrusted with investigating the problem? An independent organisation, which HSSIB currently is, provides not just technical confidence but genuine confidence that people can speak freely on matters that may well be extremely unhelpful to their employer or the CQC—the national regulator itself.

As the hon. Member for North Shropshire noted about the Shrewsbury and Telford situation, it developed while the CQC gave a good rating. It may be that the CQC was fair in doing that, but it does not look good in the eyes of the public, and it will be a consideration for individuals seeking to make disclosures to an investigation. What will the public think?

[Gregory Stafford]

As I said throughout my speech, I am against this proposal whatever the nature of the CQC. However, does it strike my hon. Friend, as it strikes me, that the problems of moving the functions of HSSIB into the CQC are compounded given that the CQC, as he alluded to, is not functioning well and does not have the confidence of patients and clinicians?

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend leads me to a point I was going to make later, but I will make it now. He is absolutely right: the CQC has not had a lot of good press and does not instil a high degree of confidence in professionals and the public. That is a very real issue. The Minister and, I think, Dr Dash have said that the transfer of powers from HSSIB to the CQC will not happen until it is in a better place, and that is all very well, but these changes are intended to last for a long time—indefinitely, presumably. To merely wait until an organisation is in a better place to transfer those powers, and to expect that organisation to remain in a better place in perpetuity, is wishful thinking.

The CQC has had leadership issues. We all hope and I am sure that the leadership will be in a better place in the near future, but if an organisation can be in such a bad place because of a failure of leadership, those circumstances can return in the future. Of course, it might be leadership failings within the regulator that HSSIB is asked to investigate. Again, if its functions are delivered by a regulatory organisation with leadership failings, there will be no confidence whatever that a truly independent and meaningful investigation can take place.

Let us not forget that the public are somewhat jaded by investigations, inquiries and reports—justifiably so. They clearly have a valuable function, but their function is far more valuable if there is confidence in them. If a powerful organisation such as the CQC—the regulator—can effectively mark its own homework, that does nothing to help the reputation of investigations and inquiries with the public. I suspect that the problem with them in the public’s mind is that it always looks a little bit like the establishment is looking at itself and coming up with an argument it can then justify. There is a perception that that does not lead to meaningful change. With this Bill, we will create an environment where that perception is even stronger.