Health Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Helen Morgan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Electronic devices switched off, please, and no teas or coffee in the Committee Room. Members may remove their jackets if they wish to do so and, exceptionally, if any Members wish to remove ties, because of the weather I am prepared to permit that as well.

Clause 58

NICE recommendations: decisions about time for compliance

[Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 78, in clause 58, page 43, line 40, at end insert—

“1. (8B) Regulations under subsection (8A) must include provision about the period within which NICE guideline NG206 on myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) must be complied with.

2. (8D) The Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NICE guideline NG206, including the extent to which integrated care boards and relevant NHS bodies have implemented recommendations relating to ME specialist services and severe or very severe ME.”

The amendment would require that a period must be set within which the NICE guideline NG206 on ME must be complied with by ICBs and other health bodies. Furthermore, the Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NICE guideline NG206 across the NHS in England.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Helen Morgan]

The amendment was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt) on behalf of the approximately 1.2 million people in England who live with myalgic encephalomyelitis, because five years after the introduction of National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guideline NG206, little has changed. Service provision according to NG206 remains patchy and poor, with many patients having traumatic experiences. The amendment would require a period to be set in which integrated care boards and other health bodies must comply with the guideline, and the Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NG206 across the NHS in England.

The introduction of the guideline after sustained campaigning represented a major reform after years in which ME was treated as a psychiatric condition and patients were pushed to follow graduated exercise therapy. Often, GET had disastrous consequences, precipitating serious deteriorations that patients never recovered from. Credit is due to the hon. Member for Washington and Gateshead South (Mrs Hodgson), the current Minister for Public Health and Prevention, for her determination when in opposition to bring about the change.

In a written answer published last week, the Minister for Public Health and Prevention confirmed that all ICBs have a statutory obligation to ensure sufficient care provision for their population, but the experience of those with ME is that that obligation is far from being fulfilled. In some ICBs, no services for ME are commissioned; in others, the provider has a history of providing services that reflect not NG206, but the old and condemned approach of GET. Some services are provided out of psychiatry departments, which is a huge red flag for those with ME, and information on the quality of services is patchy. Results from a big survey of more than 5,000 people with ME or long covid in late 2025 painted a bleak picture: more than half said that they had been disbelieved by an NHS healthcare official, one in three had been made to feel that their ME was their own fault, and almost two in five had had an encounter with a clinician that was traumatic or traumatising.

Five years after its introduction, NG206 is far from being complied with, and so members of the ME community—approximately 1.2 million people, as I said—are desperately asking that something be done to address the situation. The amendment represents a route that offers hope for many long-neglected and mistreated people. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us about improving the consistency of provision for people with ME.

Moving to the clause generally, we broadly support the intention, but think that more safeguards need to be built into the principle, given the powers that are being handed to the Secretary of State. The clause makes provision for the period for compliance with a NICE recommendation, but gives no detail of how that will work in practice or how often the Secretary of State will change the standard three-month rule that NICE requires. No ceiling is put on the compliance period, no criteria govern when the period may be extended, and there is no duty to consult or set out reasoning.

What will the process be when the Secretary of State intervenes in the period of time for compliance with a NICE recommendation? We thought that there would be some mix of evidence requirements, consultation, statement of reasons, impact assessment and some kind of parliamentary scrutiny. The Secretary of State should at least have to set out their reasoning why the new power has been used. The value of the current requirement is almost entirely due to the compliance period being short and fixed. The three-month rule gives a positive NICE recommendation practical force. A power to lengthen or vary that period without constraint weakens the requirement in substance while leaving it formally intact. The right is not removed but its timing is made discretionary. For a patient awaiting treatment, that does not amount to the same thing.

A variation power is not new. Since the introduction of the budget impact test in 2017, NHS England has been able to apply to NICE to extend the funding period for medicines with a budget impact above a defined threshold, but, importantly, that period is criteria-based, triggered by a defined financial threshold, subject to a defined process and time-limited in effect. We are not overtly opposed to the power in principle, but more safeguards should be built into the criteria for its application. I would be grateful for some guidance from the Minister on that.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I have sympathy with the principle behind amendment 58, in the name of the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. The hon. Member for North Shropshire is right to say that individuals with ME have not always received the best quality care. In many cases, ME is a debilitating and incredibly frustrating condition, and around 10% to 25% of sufferers have severe ME, meaning that they are housebound or bedbound. We know that some patients are sadly not believed by medical professionals.

In 2021, NICE said that most medical students have little or no training on the condition. The Government have previously committed to increasing the uptake of ME modules among NHS professionals. What progress has been made on that in the last couple of years? The Government also committed in the ME/CFS action plan to develop and run a public awareness initiative, with implementation expected by May this year. Has the Department developed that initiative yet? If not, what is responsible for the delay? It is not marked as complete on the Government website.

The amendment would put guidance for medical professionals into legislation, though, and my concerns about that are twofold. First, it may slow down improvements in the future. If individuals have to legally follow that guidance, how can they innovate and improve treatment without having to come back to Parliament for more primary legislation? That will take time and may mean that people with ME get worse rather than better care in the short term.

The requirement would also limit clinical judgment. A patient may have a particular set of symptoms or conditions or be on a particular set of medications that mean that the doctor or clinician looking after them needs to vary from the guidance. NICE intends the guidance to be just that, guidance, not law, but if guidance becomes law, the doctor or clinician will not be able to vary from it. My concern is that the amendment would be overly restrictive. Although it is well-intentioned, and it is a good idea to ensure that guidance is followed where possible, it would be too rigid. I therefore do not support the amendment, while continuing to support the aim of better treatment.

Clause 58 amends the Health and Social Care Act 2012 by inserting a new section 237(8A), which states:

“Provision made under subsection (8)(b) may include provision about the period within which a recommendation is to be complied with (including provision for the period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State).”

At the moment, NICE technology appraisals check the value of a product, whether a drug or a technology, then NICE makes a recommendation. It is then supposed to be the case that within 90 days or three months, ICBs ensure that those technologies are available, but we know that in the real world it can take longer—sometimes 12 to 24 months—for some things to become available. That could be because technology needs to be bought or training needs to take place.

I understand why there could be variation and why the Government may want to consider varying the period, but it is not clear why they need to do so in legislation, because it is possible now to vary the period on an individual basis. For example, the Government imposed a five-year limit rather than a 90-day limit for the introduction of hybrid closed loop systems for diabetes, because that is a technology that requires proper training and they were never going to be rolled out in such a short period. The other product that notably has a longer time is tirzepatide, which is more commonly known as Mounjaro. I suspect that that is down to cost, but I am not certain.

Why do the Government want to change the 90 days? The patient’s right to treatment with a NICE-approved product within 90 days will become a right to getting the product when the Secretary of State says so. That is not really a right at all, because it does not give patients any comfort and may mean that products are received later. The Government have put this power into the Bill, so they clearly intend to use it. Given that they have the power to vary on an individual basis, why do they need the power to vary on a blanket basis? Do they intend to extend the 90-day limit across the board? If so, by how much? There is no ceiling. The Committee received written evidence from Henry Burkitt from Oxygen Strategy, who made the point that there is no ceiling, no maximum time, no duty to consult and no necessity for the Secretary of State or NICE to give reasons why a delay has occurred.

The life sciences industry talks about how it wants products to be rolled out. When it is investing and doing research in this country, it wants to see new products rolled out as quickly as possible once they have been approved, and the clause is a sign that roll-out might be delayed. I understand that the Government might want to be able to vary on certain products, but they already can; why do they want to vary on a more general basis? It is presumably to slow down roll-outs, but by how much?

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[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Clause 58 is about the time period for compliance with NICE recommendations on health and social care provision. As we have heard, it will enable that period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State.

NICE’s technology appraisals and highly specialised technology guidance play a vital role in ensuring that patients in England can access treatments that are clinically effective and a good use of NHS resources. When NICE recommends a new treatment, the NHS is usually required to make funding available within three months. That means that patients can consistently benefit from innovative treatment.

That said, there are cases where the three-month timeframe is just not realistic. That might be because of affordability pressures or practical challenges such as a stretched workforce. In those situations, a longer implementation period is needed to ensure that complex new treatments can be introduced in a safe way that does not disrupt services for other patients. For example, the period for NICE’s guidance on the drug Paxlovid for the treatment of covid was extended to 12 months to allow time for the NHS to put the necessary routine testing systems in place and train healthcare professionals.

I do not think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raised this issue, but the opposite is sometimes true, and the NHS issues guidance that provides swifter access to medicines and medical treatments. For example, cancer medicines can be funded from the point of a positive draft recommendation. At present, NHS England decides whether a NICE treatment is funded more quickly or in a shorter timeframe, while NICE determines whether the funding period should be extended, typically following a proposal from NHS England. The abolition of NHS England means that those roles and responsibilities will need to be reconsidered. The clause provides flexibility for the final decision on funding timelines to sit with either NICE or the Secretary of State, but it will not mandate which.

To the point raised by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, the Government intend to set out further details of these arrangements in regulations using the enabling power granted by this Bill. Importantly, the clause will not reduce NICE’s independent role in assessing the clinical and cost effectiveness of new treatments, nor will it weaken the NHS’s obligation to provide timely treatment. Instead, it will ensure that decisions on funding timelines remain flexible and sustainable, and that the system is equipped to respond effectively to future pressures.

I will now speak to amendment 78, which was moved by the hon. Member for North Shropshire. I recognise the vital role that NICE guidelines play in improving quality and consistency of care across the NHS. NICE’s guidance is developed by experts on the basis of rigorous assessment of the available evidence and provides an important benchmark for best practice, including for patients with myalgic encephalomyelitis. I know that the hon. Member intends to withdraw the amendment, but if she were to press it, the Government would not accept it.

To be clear—again, partly to the point of the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham—it is a long-standing and deliberate position that NICE guidance is not mandatory, which reflects the role it plays in supporting patient care. Crucially, guidelines do not override the professional judgment of clinicians, and it is essential that clinicians retain the flexibility to determine the most appropriate course of treatment for individual patients based on their specific circumstances. It is also important to recognise that NICE guidelines are often complex frameworks for care that must be adapted to local service configurations and patient need. Requiring full compliance with the NICE guideline would remove the ability of local service providers to ensure that ME services are appropriate to the needs of their local populations.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire made some important points about treatment of ME over the years, and many of us have encountered constituents with similar stories. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon for his work supporting constituents with the condition. To be clear, the Department fully recognises the need for more consistent implementation of the NICE guidelines on ME. That is why we are already taking forward practical measures. In particular, the Department and NHS England are developing a service template specification, aligned to NICE’s guidelines, to support commissioners and providers in delivering appropriate services for people with ME. We will continue to work with stakeholders, the industry and the NHS in doing that.

Those steps will help to drive improvement in care without undermining clinical judgment or imposing inflexible statutory requirements. With that, I commend clause 58 to the Committee.

[Helen Morgan]

I thank the Minister for her words, particularly on amendment 78. As I said, I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will continue to bear in mind that provision for people with ME is extremely patchy and that a number of our constituents are suffering in the long term. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Transfer of HSSIB’s functions to CQC

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 55, in schedule 8, page 110, line 23, at end insert—

“(10) If the Secretary of State certifies that it is in the interests of national security that the powers conferred by subsection (1)—

(a) should not be exercisable in relation to certain premises in which there is a Crown interest, or

(b) should not be exercisable in relation to certain specified premises for other purposes,

those powers are not exercisable in relation to those specified premises.

(7) In this section, ‘Crown interest’ means—

(a) an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department;

(b) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Crown;

(c) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster;

(d) an interest belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall.”

This amendment makes provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers under subsection 51J(1) to the Health and Social Care Act 2008, inserted by Schedule 8 of this Bill.

Amendment 56, in schedule 8, page 116, line 8, leave out subsection (9).

This amendment would allow the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.

Amendment 5, in schedule 8, page 120, line 16, at end insert—

“(2A) After paragraph 6(8) insert—

‘(9) A committee of the Commission is to be appointed in accordance with regulations.

(10) The purpose of the committee is to oversee the health services safety investigation functions formerly conducted by HSSIB, transferred to the Care Quality Commission under the Health Act 2026.

(11) The committee is to be operationally independent from the Care Quality Commission.

(12) The committee is to consist of a chair appointed by the Secretary of State, and not less than six and not more than twelve other members appointed by the chair.

(13) A majority of the members of the committee must not be members of the Care Quality Commission.

(14) So far as is reasonably practicable, the persons appointed to the committee must include persons with knowledge or experience relevant to the discharge of functions under this paragraph.’”

This amendment would ensure that oversight of HSSIB’s functions would remain operationally independent of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) following the transfer of its functions to the CQC.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 60 and 61 stand part.

New clause 42—Funding for Care Quality Commission (CQC) investigations—

“The Secretary of State has a duty to make provision for adequate funding and resources for patient safety investigations conducted by the CQC, including some initiated by the CQC themselves.”

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Decluttering a landscape does not make patients any safer. Rolling HSSIB into the CQC does not make anything safer. In fact, one of the fundamental things I do not understand about this is that the Government say, “Don’t worry, it’s okay—we’re basically recreating HSSIB within the CQC,” in which case they have not decluttered the landscape; they have just hidden it and sort of pushed it out of the way within the CQC. They have not removed it. Either they have decluttered the landscape and removed it, or they have not. It does not seem clear which the Government think they have done. I would be grateful if, when the Minister wraps up her comments, she could explain why she thinks this move will improve patient safety for us all across the NHS.

[Helen Morgan]

I declare an interest as a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, which is opposed to the changes to HSSIB proposed in the Bill. Over the last couple of weeks, we have been reminded why we need an appropriate safety landscape when things go wrong. We have had the Donna Ockenden review into Nottingham maternity services. We have had Baroness Amos’s national review into the picture following a range of maternity scandals across the country. Yesterday evening, I attended the debate on the regulations to compensate victims of the infected blood scandal. Safety is at the top of all our minds at the moment, as it should always be.

Something that has come across very strongly from Members of all parties, on both sides of the House, is that culture is critical to ensuring that those types of issues—the huge scandals—never happen again. Indeed, smaller scandals must never happen again, because people need to be free. Staff in particular need to have the confidence that, if they report concerns about the way they operate, they will be safe to do so without jeopardising the rest of their career, and that those concerns will be acted on and the lessons learned. Everybody here wants to achieve that. I do not think anybody is arguing about the fundamental principle that, when there are concerns, they need to be raised in a safe place and that the lessons from those concerns need to be learned.

That is why I share the lack of understanding of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, about why rolling HSSIB into the CQC will change that culture, because the CQC is a regulatory body and HSSIB is an investigatory one. Their missions are fundamentally different. Putting them together compromises the independent investigation element in a way that is very difficult to overcome. We were told in the evidence to the Bill Committee by HSSIB’s chief executive that it is often told, “We tell you this; we wouldn’t tell a regulatory body.” It is clear that this perception of safety is critical to the way in which people interact with HSSIB.

We also heard in evidence to the Committee that the CQC warned that, as it stands, the Bill could leave it fighting against itself in the High Court. We could get a scenario where the regulatory arm of the CQC sought access to HSSIB’s confidential investigation reports, while HSSIB, the investigative branch, tried to keep them secret to protect its independence. That is not a situation anyone wants to end up in, and I am sure that is not the intention of this clause.

I think the shadow Minister has already made this point, so I will not labour it, but it is also important that the investigatory body must be able to examine the regulatory frameworks, commissioning decisions and oversight arrangements without institutional conflict. When I look back, for example, at the scandal that unfolded at Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS Trust over the maternity failings, I see that the CQC had given that trust a good rating during the course of all those terrible things going wrong. The CQC’s process clearly failed in that situation. It is difficult to imagine an arm of the CQC turning around in that scenario and saying that the CQC got its own assessment wrong. If it had tried to do that, it is difficult to imagine how that might have played out and that people might have had confidence in raising that problem.

I am also concerned about this because, as the Minister has alluded to, the CQC has faced significant criticism and publicly admitted that it has failed to carry out its functions to the best of its abilities over recent years. Although I welcome the Minister’s assurance that the transfer would happen only once the CQC was in a better place, the CQC might—again—be part of the problem in some instances, and HSSIB must be able to point to that where appropriate.

Lib Dem amendment 5 attempts to introduce the principle that, if this must happen, there needs to be a firewall in the CQC to keep HSSIB operationally independent. To achieve that, the amendment proposes to insert into the process a committee that is operationally independent of—with a majority of people who are not on—the CQC. Opposition new clause 42 seeks to do the same thing. I would be open to any suggestions that the Minister might make to reassure us that HSSIB will continue to be operationally independent, for all the good reasons that hon. Members have outlined.

[Gregory Stafford]

Before I address the clauses, I say for the record that 21 years ago this morning, 52 people were murdered and 784 injured by Islamist terrorists in London. I pay tribute to all the medical professionals who treated those people in such difficult circumstances.

I will speak to clauses 59 to 63 together because they all concern one of the most significant structural changes proposed in the Bill: the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body as an independent statutory organisation, and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission. At first glance, that may appear a relatively modest machinery-of-government change. The Minister argues that HSSIB’s functions will continue, its statutory safe-space protections will remain and operational independence will somehow be preserved. However, when one examines the evidence presented to the Committee, and that given to the Health and Social Care Committee, of which I am a member, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the problem that this merger is intended to solve. Instead, what emerges is a remarkable degree of consensus among those with the greatest expertise in patient safety that this proposal carries significant risks while offering little measurable benefit.

The question before us is therefore not whether HSSIB’s statutory functions can be transferred to another organisation, but whether Parliament should abolish an institution that it deliberately created to be independent. That distinction matters. Across public life, we recognise that effective scrutiny depends on institutional independence. Government expenditure is examined independently by the National Audit Office, citizens complain to independent ombudsmen rather than to the organisations about which they are complaining, air accidents are investigated independently by the Civil Aviation Authority, and rail accidents are investigated independently of the regulator. In each case, Parliament has recognised that organisations charged with investigating failures should not also be responsible for regulating, inspecting or enforcing against those they investigate. Healthcare should be no different.

Indeed, if anything, healthcare should demand an even greater degree of independence. Learning from failure depends on the confidence of patients, clinicians and families that they can speak openly and without fear that the information that they provide will later be used for regulatory or enforcement purposes. That is precisely why HSSIB was created. Its purpose was never to attribute blame but to understand why systems fail, identify the underlying causes of patient harm and ensure that lessons are learned before similar tragedies occur again. That philosophy represented a deliberate shift away from a culture of blame and towards one of learning. It was modelled consciously on the air accidents investigation branch, whose success over many decades has demonstrated that independent, no-blame investigations produce better safety outcomes than investigations driven primarily by enforcement.

It is therefore difficult to understand why the Government now seek to move away from the model that other safety-critical industries continue to regard as fundamental. Clause 59 would abolish that independent body and transfer its functions to the Care Quality Commission. In doing so, it would bring together two organisations with fundamentally different statutory purposes, different powers and, perhaps most importantly, different cultures. HSSIB investigates and the CQC regulates. One exists to ask why the system failed; the other exists to ask whether the organisation complied with required standards—those are not the same questions. Nor do HSSIB and CQC require the same relationship with those from whom evidence is obtained. An investigation depends on trust; a regulator depends on compliance. An investigator encourages candour; a regulator necessarily retains enforcement powers. The different roles are not a weakness of the system; they are precisely why Parliament chose to establish separate organisations.

I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could explain what assessment has been made of the impact on public confidence of the investigator and the regulator becoming part of the same statutory organisation. More specifically, what assessment has been made of the likely effect on clinicians’ willingness to speak openly if the organisation receiving confidential evidence also contains the regulator responsible for inspecting and enforcing standards? That concern has been expressed not only by the Opposition, but repeatedly by independent experts—and indeed, we just heard the hon. Member for Lewisham East asking similar questions.

Even the Care Quality Commission has expressed reservations. Evidence that it submitted to the Health and Social Care Committee earlier this year acknowledged that a lack of clarity remains regarding the respective roles of HSSIB and the CQC. Rather than resolving that uncertainty, the proposed merger risks deepening it. The CQC warned that preserving an effective separation between its investigatory and regulatory functions would be essential if confidence in HSSIB’s safe space were to be maintained, and it recognised the genuine risk of perceived conflicts of interest if those functions become blurred.

I think that should give the Committee pause for thought. When the organisation receiving the additional responsibilities is itself warning about the difficulty of maintaining the boundaries, we should listen very carefully. If the CQC believes that the risks exist before the merger has even taken place, what confidence can Ministers offer that those risks will somehow disappear afterwards? Similarly, the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, of which I am a member, has expressed concern that HSSIB should remain institutionally independent so that its evidence-based recommendations can continue to command confidence across the health system.

Such concerns, as I said, are not confined to Parliament, nor are they confined to one political party. They are shared by patient safety organisations, healthcare professionals and those directly involved in investigating serious incidents. During our oral evidence sessions, I put a straightforward question to Dr Penny Dash. I observed that I could find almost no one apart from her and the Department who believed that moving HSSIB into the CQC was the right course of action. That was not intended as some sort of rhetorical flourish; it reflected the evidence before us. Former Secretaries of State, patient safety experts, independent investigators and numerous professional organisations have all questioned the proposal.

Despite the breadth of concern, the Government have not produced compelling evidence that HSSIB, as presently constituted, is failing. Nor have they demonstrated that the separation between investigation and regulation is itself creating harm. Instead, Ministers have repeatedly assured us that HSSIB’s operational independence will remain, that safe space protections will remain and that independent investigations will remain. If that is indeed the Government’s position, an obvious question follows: if HSSIB will continue to operate independently, if its investigations will continue to be conducted independently and if its statutory protections will remain intact, why is it necessary to abolish the independent organisation at all?

That question goes to the heart of clauses 59 to 63, and throughout the evidence presented to the Committee, I have heard no convincing answer. The Government ask Parliament to believe that everything that makes HSSIB valuable will continue unchanged, but at the same time, they ask Parliament to dismantle the very institutional structure deliberately designed to protect those characteristics. That is not merely an administrative contradiction, but a constitutional one. If institutional independence genuinely matters, it should be preserved. If institutional independence does not matter, Ministers should explain why Parliament was wrong to establish it in the first place.

That question of necessity leads directly to the Government’s principal justifications for clauses 59 to 63, the Dash review. The Government have repeatedly relied on that review as the intellectual basis for abolishing HSSIB as the independent body, yet when one examines the report and the evidence given by its author to this Committee, the case becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

Without doubt, the review identifies a genuine problem: it concludes that the patient safety landscape has become crowded and in places confusing. Dr Dash told the Committee that she had identified more than 150 organisations operating across the wider patient safety landscape, and that clinicians were spending considerable time responding to different organisations, requesting information, completing forms and participating in overlapping reviews. She said that the system had become “busy and confusing”, and that that was distracting clinicians from improving the quality of care.

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[Edward Argar]

I do think that the scope of the review, who determined the six organisations and how that was looked at is important, and I am sure that the Minister will be able to clarify that when she makes her concluding remarks. However, there are a couple of other issues that concern me in terms of some of what was in the review, which seems to be the basis on which this is being done. Finding 6 suggests that HSSIB has expanded its

“scope of work beyond the original remit.”

It goes on to say:

“HSSIB was originally established, along the lines of safety investigatory bodies in other industries, to look at specific cases or incidents of severe harm, but it has since broadened its work into making more systemic recommendations.”

I have to say, as the Minister who took the Health and Care Act 2022 through, that is simply not the case. That Act does not limit HSSIB investigations to individual incidents. If I recall correctly, in some of the debates on the HSSIB clauses in the Bill, we alluded as a Committee to the need for it to be able to look beyond individual incidents and try to draw out common themes. What has been said simply does not accord with my recollection of the purposes of the legislation.

Again, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon highlighted this. Recommendation 3 states:

“Most investigations into safety incidents should continue to be managed within provider organisations”.

That is the real challenge here. HSSIB’s independence is what allows it to range across the piece—to have issues raised with it and look at individual organisations. The challenge so often is that the provider organisations are marking their own homework and are simply not getting to the truth, or being as candid with those who have made the complaint as they have a right to expect.

[Helen Morgan]

I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has had the experience that I have had as a constituency MP of very senior clinicians who work in the NHS attending my surgery and explaining that if they have raised concerns within their organisation, they have been encouraged either to leave or to retire. They feel frightened to raise concerns about safety that they have experienced in carrying out their duties, so it is really important that this safe space exists. Does he agree with that?

[Edward Argar]

The hon. Lady makes her point extremely clearly, and I do agree with exactly the point she makes, because in any organisation it is a big step for an individual employed by or working in the organisation to make a complaint about their organisation or to whistleblow on something that has gone on or that they feel has not been got right. Key to getting people to do that is that they feel safe and empowered to do it in the public interest, and that is exactly what is at the heart of the air accidents investigation branch and the rail accident investigation branch model, so that the information is brought forward and learnings can be driven by it to improve safety for everyone. As the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said, that safety is patient safety and that has to remain the golden thread that runs through everything we are debating. Whatever difference of perspective we have on this set of clauses, that must remain at the heart of what we are looking for.