Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateGavin Robinson
Main Page: Gavin Robinson (Democratic Unionist Party - Belfast East)Department Debates - View all Gavin Robinson's debates with the Northern Ireland Office
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt has been a great pleasure to listen to the speeches so far, in particular the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith). His remarks about the future, innovation and the opportunities for Northern Ireland struck a chord with me. They took me back a decade to when I visited Northern Ireland as the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform. I remember very clearly meeting youngsters at a local school and talking predominantly about the future. I was keen to understand how young people viewed the future. When we talk about Northern Ireland we spend a long time, for understandable reasons, talking about the past. I went away from that meeting incredibly optimistic, because they were very keen to focus on what united them and on the opportunities for the future. Those young people who were then in the sixth form will now be in their late 20s. They will be in careers, building businesses and building families. I was very optimistic about that and I echo what my right hon. Friend, a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said about the opportunities for Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.
I add my congratulations to the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson) on his successful election as the leader of the Democratic Unionist party at what, I suspect, will be a challenging time in Northern Ireland politics. I wish him all success in that role, and in the role he will play in ensuring the devolved institutions remain in being and are able to be successful in helping to govern what is a beautiful part of the United Kingdom.
On the Bill, a lot of the press comment over the past week about the future of the institutions has been rather feverish. It is worth reflecting on something the Chairman of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) said about the timetable. We are considering this proposed legislation in the normal way and I think that is a good thing. It is clear from the programme motion that the Bill will be considered in a Public Bill Committee until July. It will then come back on to the Floor of the House and make its way to the other place to be debated there. Looking at the commencement details, there is a further two-month period before it comes into force. It is therefore worth all the parties in Northern Ireland reflecting over the coming days and weeks that if anything were to happen to the institutions at the moment, the rules governing events are the current rules, which obviously have some very challenging timescales attached to them. It is worth all the parties reflecting that, as we debate the Bill, the rules in force at the moment will be those in force for a considerable period of time.
I support the measures in the Bill, but the Chairman of the Select Committee made a good point—I think it was also touched on by others, including the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson)—about time periods. Although I accept that the current time periods are very tight, there is a danger in extending them too far, whereby we lose the focus we get from the results of democratic elections. The danger is that we allow the results of elections not to be put into place, we do not concentrate people’s minds appropriately and we get drift and indecision; although it may be uncomfortable, we sometimes need deadlines and uncomfortable consequences to enable people to make what are often difficult decisions, to ensure that there are functioning institutions. Although I support what is in the Bill, it is worth our reflecting on whether we are perhaps going too far; it is worth bearing in mind that there is a balance to be struck.
I will briefly touch on what is not in the legislation—I trust I will not tempt you to intervene, Madam Deputy Speaker, as I think we are allowed to touch on this briefly on Second Reading. I wish to reflect on the exchanges I had with the Secretary of State and the exchange involving the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood) and the right hon. Member for East Antrim on the forthcoming legislation on legacy prosecutions. To make it absolutely clear to the hon. Member for Foyle, I certainly do not advocate an amnesty, and I do not believe those in my party who advocate for a better settlement and fairer treatment of veterans have ever argued for one. One important factor in the reputation of the British Army around the world is that our armed forces are bound by the rule of law and if they transgress it, they deserve to suffer the consequences. What we are talking about here is a situation where a due process has been undertaken and vexatious attempts are then made to prosecute people where there has been a proper investigation. This is about how we get that balance right—not through having an amnesty but reflecting that there have been some injustices. That is what we are trying to achieve, and I think the right hon. Member for East Antrim put that point well when he intervened. I will leave that there for now, because it is not covered in this Bill—it will come in separate legislation and I know the Government are considering carefully the right content, to reflect the points made by Members on both sides of the House.
The Secretary of State touched on the final couple of points that I want to make when he talked about where it was right for this House to legislate—the right hon. Member for East Antrim and the former Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon also mentioned this—and where matters are properly devolved and the Assembly would be able to deal with them. I have had slight differences with the Government on this point in the past. For example, although I very much support same-sex marriage and voted for it in England, my view was that that was a devolved matter that the Northern Ireland institutions should have resolved. I know the former Secretary of State took great pleasure in putting it into force, but I did not agree that it was right for him or the Government to do so—it should have been for the devolved institutions to do so. I raise that because of the debate we had on the cultural aspects of the New Decade, New Approach agreement, which the former Secretary of State touched on. I have been following the debate that has been taking place in Northern Ireland. The understanding that has been set out in the media—which of course is not necessarily completely representative of the facts—is that under the deal that appears to have precipitated the end of the former leader of the Democrat Unionist party, Mr Poots, there had been an agreement that if the cultural aspects of the deal were not dealt with in the Assembly, they would be legislated for here. My right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon has said that his view is that they should be done locally. He is prepared, in extremis, to countenance their being done here. When the Minister of State winds up the debate, could he set out a little of the Government’s thinking about when the devolved aspects should be dealt with by the devolved institutions, and about what the Government’s tests are for when they should be legislated for here?
I would perhaps put it a little less loudly than the right hon. Member for East Antrim, but I broadly support his sentiments that if we have devolved matters, they should be ones for the devolved institutions. As in other parts of the United Kingdom where there are devolved governance mechanisms, we do not have to agree with the decisions of the devolved Administrations in order to accept that they are the right people to be making them. The test for me is not whether I agree with what the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government or the Northern Ireland Executive do; if a matter is devolved, the decision is for them, and it does not matter whether I, the Government or this House like it. The decision is for the institutions to take, and for them to justify to the people who elect them. That is the essence of democratic accountability.
There is an important point here: if those who were elected in Northern Ireland to govern Northern Ireland do not make those decisions and are not held accountable, we damage the entire drive to enable properly functioning democratic institutions. It will not be sustainable if every time something very difficult challenges the ability of those institutions to make decisions, somebody else sorts it out for them, for whatever reason. Whether it is for good motives or not, that will not be helpful in the long term. A little thinking about how the Government approach these matters would be helpful.
The final point, which the right hon. Member for East Antrim and my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon touched on, is about the powers of Northern Ireland Ministers in the extended periods when they are able to remain in post but there is no functioning combination of a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. I think that the Bill is still an improvement on where we are today because, as I understand it, when we were in the long period of having no functioning Government, officials were in the very difficult position of having to manage Departments. For rather obvious reasons, they are incredibly constrained in the decisions that they can take; they are not accountable to anybody, and regardless of their actual powers, they are very constrained in what they are able to do.
I am not clear from having read the Bill and the explanatory notes quite what the legislation envisages, for example about the extent of the powers in the 48-week period with Ministers taking decisions. However, I still think that even if they are having to take quite important or big decisions, they have the benefit of being accountable. They are able to appear before the Assembly and have questions asked of them; that provides better accountability, which is an improvement on having those decisions made by officials.
This point has now been raised on three occasions. It is probably worth reflecting for the benefit of the House—perhaps the Minister will pick up on it later—that during the negotiations that led to this provision, it was recognised and remains the case that no Minister can act on a significant cross-cutting issue without recourse to the Executive. That also applies if the issue is controversial. In those circumstances, the Executive will not be sitting, because there will not be a First Minister or a Deputy First Minister, so the Minister will have full competence in their range of departmental responsibilities—but should any issue be significant, cross-cutting or controversial and require recourse to the Executive, it should not proceed.
The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. I had in mind what happened during the extensive period in which officials were having to manage these things, when really important issues built up in the national health service in Northern Ireland and there were important decisions to be made about pay, conditions and funding. My understanding, having looked into it, is that there were serious deteriorations in the quality of care provided. I do not think that that raises issues of the sort that the hon. Gentleman raises, but it is obviously helpful if Ministers can take decisions. Even if Ministers are taking decisions that may not have been envisaged when the legislation was set out, at least they have the benefit of being accountable, having to set out both in the Assembly and publicly what they have done and why they have done it and, at some point, being accountable at the ballot box. I think that is an improvement. If the Minister can, in winding up, say anything about the extent of those powers or decision taking that is not currently set out in either of the documents before us, that would be helpful to the House.
I hope that the Bill progresses to Committee after we have concluded our remarks.
It is a pleasure to follow the excellent contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart). I guess I also need to reflect on the points made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). He made two points, and I substantially agree with the first, which was about the range of voices from Northern Ireland in this debate and the positive aspect that that brings to our deliberations in this House. I say that acutely knowing that I am following a colleague of mine and that people will be thinking, “For goodness’ sake, we’ve just had six minutes of that, and now we’re going to get another 15 or 20 from the big lad.” I promise I will try to give an alternative reflection.
The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland is right, and I too believe that the 2017 to 2019 Parliament was greatly inhibited by the curtailed voices. There was no range of voices from Northern Ireland save for that of Sylvia Hermon, the former hon. Member for North Down. That is not to say that I agree with everything that is said or with other contributions, but I think this House benefits from a range of reflections. I also make the point, since there are now a range of voices from Northern Ireland in Parliament, that it is still important that the other parties engage with us. It would be a shame for anyone to think that they now have a buddy or a mate in Parliament, so there is no need to broaden their own horizons; that would similarly be a foolhardy mistake. I look forward to continued engagement with the right hon. Gentleman.
The fact that there is widespread critical agreement on the progress of the Bill through Second Reading highlights the point that it is probably not that significant an advancement. Its provisions take us so far and make some changes, but they are not significant in and of themselves. It is appropriate, however, that there are advancements to New Decade, New Approach, and in a legislative sense it is appropriate that those aspects are before us today.
It is right that we reflect that this is non-emergency legislation. That is nice for me as a Member of Parliament who has been here for six years and seen hugely significant issues that affect the people of Northern Ireland rushed through this Chamber in a three or four-hour process of Second Reading, Committee and Third Reading. None of that is appropriate. It is important to recognise how this is progressing and is intended to progress over the months to come.
We benefited not only from the contribution that the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) made earlier, but from his time as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. I remember the engagement that we had at Stormont House on the discussions about New Decade, New Approach, and the personal determination that he had at the time to make sure that politics worked; I sometimes feel that that is lacking now. I hear time and again from community voices, sectoral support, business and public servants in Northern Ireland, all of which still have good contact with the right hon. Member and still hugely value the contribution that he made to our society in Northern Ireland. That energy and drive was predicated on Northern Ireland people working for Northern Ireland people on supporting devolution in Northern Ireland, on making it work no matter how difficult or intractable the problems appeared, on highlighting, recognising and dealing with the continual difficulties in our society, and on supporting us collectively across the political spectrum to deal with those issues in Northern Ireland.
That is why I think that the commitment made last week was so retrograde. We know that there are challenges—they have been reflected in this debate—but do not turn around and give the impression that “If you just can’t do it, we’ll do it for you.” I said to the Minister of State two weeks ago, “Do not make the commitment that you will legislate on any aspect of NDNA without political consent, because the political party that you are going to do it for still needs to work with other political parties in Northern Ireland.”
The only way that devolution will be successful in our Province—the only way that we will continue on the pathway from troubles to peace—is if we work with one another, trust one another and build a relationship based on shared values and a shared outlook on how we grow as a society. If the British Government, the Irish Government or the American Government step in at every turn and say, “Come on, now, I’ll hold your hand and take you down this certain path, because that’s where you want to go,” it will not work.
The short-term gain of what was agreed last week is futile and fundamentally injurious to devolution in Northern Ireland. I say at this stage—it is not part of the Bill, but it is intrinsic to all that has gone before—that the Government need to recognise that continuing along the path that they have outlined would be hugely detrimental to progress in Northern Ireland. I say that with no joy—none whatever.
The protocol was mentioned. It is a hugely symbolic and genuinely difficult issue affecting all strands and strata of our society. We hear voices at one side saying, “It’s all a disaster and it’s all been imposed upon us,” and we hear others saying, “Well, you brought it upon yourselves.” None of that actually matters at the end of the day for the ordinary consumer, the ordinary businessman or the ordinary member of our community who is striving for the best but sees the barriers ahead of them.
I heard the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood)—I am glad that he is back in the Chamber as he gets a mention—say that he was surprised that the protocol featured in the statements made today; “Why not the priority of the health service?” We first need to recognise the difficulties. We need to highlight the problems and work to resolve them. But make no mistake about it: there was a suggestion that a focus on veterinary agreement would be significant in relation to the protocol; it is but one aspect.
We recognise the challenges in the health service. How do we deal with the challenges in the health service if we do not deal with the grace period on medicines that is going to expire? Was it not the European Union, three months ago, that sought to trigger article 16 to prevent the export of vaccines to Northern Ireland? It was. We saw cancer drugs get approval by our UK medical agency in the last month, but the European medical agency had not yet quite made the approval, so those cancer drugs were not being made available in Northern Ireland, a part of this country—a constitutionally integral part of this country, enshrined under the Good Friday agreement that we all seek to protect.
Let us not suggest that veterinary issues alone will solve the protocol. They will deal with the significant impediment of barriers for food and animal products, but they will not deal with the totality of it.
I appreciate what the hon. Member says about medicines. It is important that we have a resolution in that regard, and I believe that some very good work is being done by both the European Commission and, let me say, the UK Government in that regard. But on the veterinary agreement, although I appreciate that it is only one part of the equation, would his party join all other parties in Northern Ireland in making a common call to the Government in that very particular respect? I appreciate that it does not address all the issues, but surely, if all five parties were to make a common pitch on that one topic, it would make a huge difference, and I would expect the Government to listen to that.
I understand why the hon. Member puts forward that proposition, but he is falling into the same trap. That alone will not solve it. If we go collectively as five parties and say, “Sort out veterinary,” the Government will, but does that solve all the problems impacting Northern Ireland on the protocol? No, it does not. Does it solve the medicines issue? No, it does not.
There was a clamour months ago about steel, and a resolution was found for the importation of steel into Northern Ireland, with a Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs fix. Did it do anything for aluminium? No, it did not. Does that impact aerospace, the largest private employer in my constituency and a huge employer in the hon. Member’s constituency—something we recognise that, despite the problems last year with coronavirus, had £1.4 billion-worth of economic benefit to Northern Ireland and still employs 6,500 people? Is that on the table for resolution? I can tell you, Mr Deputy Speaker, of my disappointment and anger when I got a message back from the Northern Ireland Office indicating, “Well, actually, the letter was sent to Mr Šefčovič, and it’s not going to be added to the agenda.” There has been little change since.
That is before we touch on the constitutional aspects and before we touch on the democratic deficit associated with the protocol. I am not saying that we should not collaborate on veterinary checks, but let us not go down the rabbit hole of focusing solely on one singular issue when the issues are many, deep and broad and they need to be resolved.
I shall conclude on this, Mr Deputy Speaker. There are challenges in society in Northern Ireland. There have been concerns around the stability of our institutions in Northern Ireland and the opportunity for progress. Although I recognise them all, I will not lose my passion for progress in Northern Ireland—for all of us, irrespective of our differences, working together in Northern Ireland. It costs me nothing to say I believe and agree that commitments that were entered into shall and will be honoured, but we cannot ignore the huge and damaging impact that the protocol has brought to society in Northern Ireland and the unease that abounds throughout my community and many others, and we have to buckle down and deliver, and solve it.
Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateGavin Robinson
Main Page: Gavin Robinson (Democratic Unionist Party - Belfast East)Department Debates - View all Gavin Robinson's debates with the Northern Ireland Office
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Daniel Holder: Certainly. We have done a number of papers on this, which we have fed into the negotiations that led to the re-establishment of it. In summary, we think that what is in the Belfast agreement as the petition of concern was set up as a safeguard to ensure that all sections of the community are protected and can participate in the institutions. That was linked expressly to conformity with equality requirements, specifically, as I have said a number of times, the ECHR and the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. The provision for cross-community voting was also linked to that.
The Good Friday agreement provides for a special procedure committee, which would be a committee with full powers. It would be established to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal was in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR and the Bill of Rights. That committee must be convened when a petition of concern is tabled, unless there is a cross-community vote to the contrary.
In our view, it is very clear that that was the original intention of the Belfast agreement. I do not think that the custom and practice of it not operating properly through this time is sufficient to suggest that that should be viewed differently. Essentially, the original intention of the agreement has been departed from. It is now, but was not supposed to be, essentially, a subjective political veto; it was supposed to be tied to more objective criteria.
We always go back to the fact that—plus sometimes the difference of views—you cannot just make up human rights, ECHR rights or the rights in the Bill of Rights. They would largely reflect the existing human rights commitments of the UK, albeit not in an enforceable format without the Bill of Rights. Therefore, you bring in a level of objectivity, with the same function that the Joint Committee on Human Rights would have, in that the special procedure committee may seek advice from the Human Rights and the Equality Commissions that were established under the Belfast agreement as to whether a measure or particular piece of legislation offends those standards.
Of course, there is a weakness, that a party or parties could just ignore the expert advice and the determination as to whether a particular measure breaches those equality standards and vote to the contrary anyway. However, the original intention was very much to make that linkage. It is expressly on the face of the agreement.
Q
Daniel Holder: If you read paragraph 13 of strand 1 of the Good Friday agreement it says that, when a petition of concern is tabled,
“the Assembly shall vote to determine whether a measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. If this fails to achieve support on a cross-community basis...the special procedure shall be followed.”
The agreement expressly says that the special procedure committee must be established each time a petition of concern is tabled, unless there is a cross-community vote to the contrary.
Q
“The Assembly may appoint a special Committee”.
Is that correct?
Daniel Holder: I am fortunate to have the relevant paragraphs in front of me; yes, but—
You can take my word for it, Mr Holder. I will move on.
Daniel Holder: No, I do have the relevant paragraph in front of me but, Mr Robinson, that is referring to other occasions when the Assembly may establish this particular committee. For example, the special committee on equality requirements can be established for another reason. There is one example of its ever being established, for the Welfare Reform Bill. That was on the basis of a petition of concern, from a referral from the Bill Committee dealing with welfare reform. The Assembly can establish this Committee for other reasons, and you are right to point to that being permissive. However, it is not permissive when a petition of concern is tabled; it is mandatory, unless there is a cross-community vote to the contrary.
I have two Members indicating that they wish to ask questions, and there are nine minutes left, so I will move on.
Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateGavin Robinson
Main Page: Gavin Robinson (Democratic Unionist Party - Belfast East)Department Debates - View all Gavin Robinson's debates with the Northern Ireland Office
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Sir Jonathan Stephens: In a sense, I agree with you, Mr Farry. I was indicating earlier that there had been significant change in Northern Ireland. At the time of the Good Friday agreement, the assumption was that there was a Unionist majority community, a substantial nationalist minority community and a relatively small but steady component who did not identify with the others. Since then, the situation has changed. It is more like two substantial minorities with a much larger, more significant and growing number of people who choose not to identify with either.
Over time, I think that will mean that a number of the arrangements need to be looked at again and examined. I am just conscious, having participated in a number of those discussions over the years, that that is not an easy task. It takes up a huge amount of political energy. Yes, there is a lot to be said for anticipating, rather than reacting to, crises, but Governments across the world, not least in Northern Ireland, have a number of crises right now to respond to. I simply suggest that right now does not seem to me to be a good time to undertake that significant and mammoth task, but I would be surprised if at some point in the next 10 years it is not on the agenda.
Q
I do not know whether you had the opportunity to hear the evidence session this morning. Some questions were raised about the lack of detail in the Bill as to what safeguards are in place if Ministers are in position and there is a difficulty in forming an Executive. You will know that the discussions during the negotiations focused on safeguards for issues that are significant, cross-cutting and controversial, which would ordinarily therefore go to the Executive, but with no Executive sitting, those decisions could not be made. It appears in one sense that there needs to be further detail in the Bill on what the pitfalls might be. One aspect that did not come out in the evidence this morning was the fact that Ministers normally operate after having gone through a process of reaching consensus on a programme for government. Any Minister without an Executive could therefore continue to bring forward decisions on that basis, and perhaps juxtapose that with an inability for Ministers to act and the difficulty that the Northern Ireland civil service found itself in during that three-year hiatus.
Sir Jonathan Stephens: The fundamental position is that the Bill essentially provides for a form of caretaker Administration in the absence of the formation of a full Executive. Without an Executive Committee or an Executive meeting—there cannot be an Executive without a First and Deputy First Minister—as you say, Mr Robinson, decisions cannot be taken on issues that are cross-cutting, significant or controversial. That in itself will be a significant constraint. During the absence of Ministers, cases were brought before the courts arguing that decisions had been reached without the required authority, and the courts policed that quite robustly. No doubt they will police these provisions equally robustly.
Although there might not be an Executive Committee meeting in place, there is likely to be agreement on a programme for government, even if it was of the previous Administration. That will provide an overview, as it were, of the direction of the Government under which a caretaker Administration would be able to continue to operate. I think there are protections in place, but I continue to come back to the point that no system is perfect, and there should be no doubt that the absence of a properly functioning Executive for the periods of time that could be possible under the Bill would itself have serious consequences, but at least we would not be in a situation where there was no direction and no decision making at all.
Q
Sir Jonathan Stephens: I think that is where the provisions in the Bill for the Secretary of State to call an election in the event that he judges that there is no longer broad cross-community support are critical. That underpins the whole basis of government in the Good Friday agreement, which is that Government should have broad cross-community support. If one ended up in a situation in which there were Ministers of only one party, that would be very unlikely indeed to command broad cross-community support, and you would expect the Secretary of State to step in. I think there are protections against that.
I have also identified the fact that if there is no Executive Committee meeting, because there is no First or Deputy First Minister, the ability of Ministers to take significant, controversial or cross-cutting decisions is heavily constrained. They cannot take such decisions, and the courts have already demonstrated their readiness to step in if they think that that boundary has been crossed. So this sets up a mechanism in which this is a caretaker Administration keeping the business of government and public services going, but unable to take it in new, strategic directions. So I think there are protections in place.
Colleagues, we have scheduled 45 minutes for this session. Who would like to ask the first question?
Q
You know the Bill before us. Would you mind giving us your reflection on its provisions, the rationale for them as you see them, and whether you feel there are elements that have not been achieved or are worthy of consideration by the Committee?
Emma Little-Pengelly: My experience of the existing provisions comes from a more practical point of view, as well as the theoretical and legal aspects of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. I had come in initially as a shadow special adviser to help prepare for the restoration of institutions back in 2007. That included working very closely with the drafters office and with machinery of Government elements within the Executive and the Departments in order to look at things such as the ministerial code, how the Executive should operate, and the guidance for Ministers and Departments in relation to what matters needed to come to the Executive. Also, it included issues such as the nomination of Ministers and the First and Deputy First Minister.
Over that period of time, from 2007, obviously we have had a number of significant issues and challenges. Very often they led to periods of negotiation. Much of those negotiations took place within the context of trying to talk about the technical details of the process in which we try to operate in Northern Ireland. It is a very challenging and difficult system to operate. It is a system where, at the very heart, arising from the Belfast/ Good Friday agreement, the key principle is consensus and inclusion. That is a very slow and difficult process for trying to come to decisions.
The key element to remember is that in Northern Ireland we do not have—and have never had for some considerable time since the Belfast agreement—a majoritarian system of government. Therefore, that principle is very much cooked into every part of the process, from the nomination of First and Deputy First Minister and what they can do, singly or acting jointly, to the way the Ministers operate in relation to the Executive. All of that is based on a process of consensus and a process of agreement. That of course means that at times we cannot get agreement, and that has been very, very difficult. Nevertheless, that is the system that we have had. It is the system that we have operated right up until very recently.
In more recent years, there has been a drive to change some of the elements of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement —in particular, around the concept of cross-community voting and consensus, and particularly around the safeguard mechanism of the petition of concern. When you look at the petition of concern, it is important to take a look, carefully, at the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. I listened to the evidence very carefully today. I strongly disagree with what was put across, for example, this morning by Daniel from the Committee on the Administration of Justice, in relation to the original intent of the petition of concern mechanism. I think that the proposal that this was supposed to be a very narrow issue, as opposed to it applying to all key issues, simply does not hold up to scrutiny.
I would ask everybody to take a look back at the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. The petition of concern is set out in the section referred to as Safeguards, and the Safeguards section that refers to the cross-community voting is entirely separate from the safeguard that sets out the ECHR and the equality protections. The cross-community component of that is set out in 5(d), under strand 1, and yet the ECHR and the equality severable obligations are set out in 5(c) of strand 1 of the Belfast agreement. Those are not conditional on each other; they are entirely separate. It was clear from the Belfast agreement and then the Northern Ireland Act 1998 that the cross-community consensus was to apply to all key decisions.
This is not just in terms of the basic reading of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement or the Northern Ireland Act. I think it is important also to look back at the Hansard for the passage of the Northern Ireland Bill in 1998 and the comments that were made about that Bill from all parties. I think the key thing here is that those commenting on that in the House of Commons were those who negotiated it. It was the Ulster Unionist party—David Trimble and others—along with the Social Democratic and Labour party representatives. It is very clear from reading the Hansard that no issues of concern were raised about the scope of the petition of concern and cross-community vote protections and safeguards as set down in the Safeguards section of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.
Q
Emma Little-Pengelly: When you look back to the operation of the petition of concern—again, I referenced, in terms of the passage of the Northern Ireland Bill, as it then was, in 1998, the fact that no concerns were raised about the scope of those particular provisions. But likewise, when the Northern Ireland Assembly was established under the First Minister and Deputy First Minister leadership of the Ulster Unionist party and the SDLP, no concerns were raised at that time about the petition of concern. It was still difficult. When you look back at the history of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the various crises that we have faced, of course it is difficult, because the ultimate aim of those provisions, and the provisions across the Northern Ireland Act, arising from the agreement, is that they are all based on consensus building.
We have heard some reference about the petition of concern being used as a veto, but in reality it is used in a way that reflects the fact that there is not yet, or no, consensus on particular issues, and those are key issues, so where a petition of concern is used, it is an indication that an issue has been pushed forward without consensus. That is why, when you look at the new provisions proposed in this Bill—the idea, for example, of a 14-day cooling-off period for a petition of concern is, I think, very welcome. Gavin will know as well as I do that—look, the sustainability procedures and processes as part of the New Decade, New Approach negotiations were something that the Democratic Unionist party pushed very, very hard. We pushed because we could see that it does not benefit the people of Northern Ireland to be in a situation of perpetual crisis, particularly if those crises are manufactured by, for example, the tactical resignation of a First or Deputy First Minister. Ultimately, we do need stability, and stability within a very difficult process to operate. I think the 14-day period, now within this proposed Bill, will allow a period for people to get together to try to find a consensus way forward. That may be through amendment if it is legislation, or it may be by some further or different agreement. But at the very heart of this is the idea that because the institutions were set up to be very inclusive, from the very beginning there was a concern that significant minorities should not be forced to be part of either an Executive or Government in Northern Ireland where they were subject to continual majority decision making.
That applied right up until the point at which Unionism was no longer the majority. We have since seen concerted moves to try to remove that safeguard for significant minorities. The concern there is that yes, it is a difficult and frustrating system, but in Northern Ireland ultimately this will only work if you have that maximum consensus. As I understand from those who negotiated the Belfast agreement, and right through to those who negotiated the St Andrews agreement that modified and built on some of those protections, that at the heart of that is the idea that significant minorities should not be excluded, and that consensus decision making is the priority over a quick and simple majority system, which would exclude those people.
Q
Emma Little-Pengelly: I think that Northern Ireland have found themselves in this position on previous occasions, and in fairness, on those occasions all Ministers have respected that an Executive is not in place, and largely abided by and operated under the decisions previously agreed by it. I agree completely with what Sir Jonathan Stephens said on the safeguard of the courts, but as we know, the court process is long; it requires somebody to take a challenge and often ends up in Ministers taking legal challenges against Ministers.
I would have thought, though, that there is an additional safeguard in that Ministers in Northern Ireland are required to operate lawfully—they cannot step outside of that. If a Minister wanted to take a decision that was significant or controversial or cross-cutting, it is very clear from both the jurisprudence and the legal cases on this, and in terms of what was said at the time of the passing of the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, that a Minister has no power—there is no vires for a Minister to take a decision that ought to have come to the Executive under the terms of the St Andrews Act amendments. Therefore, a Minister could not take a decision on a significant, controversial or cross-cutting matter, unless that had already been agreed by the Executive.
In the situation that you have outlined, Gavin, there would be no way to form an Executive. Without the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, you cannot have an Executive meeting and therefore those decisions cannot be decided on because an individual Minister does not have the power or the vires to do that. Therefore, he would be operating ultra vires. I presume that the permanent secretary or the accounting officer of that Department would advise the Minister of that, and that the Minister could not proceed because that would be unlawful under those circumstances.
Q
Secondly, you and I will disagree about the purpose of the petition of concern and when it should be used and so on. You have said, now that Unionism is no longer a majority, there are moves to take away safeguards like the petition of concern. What did you think, then, when Arlene Foster suggested removing it as a mechanism altogether during the negotiations?
Emma Little-Pengelly: First, to be fair to the Democratic Unionist party, I should make it clear that I am not here as a spokesperson for the DUP, so I cannot comment on the particular issues of the current situation. What I can say is that the DUP, along with many others, has, over the years since the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, pushed for a better form of government, as you will be aware, very much around trying to put better democracy in that and a better system that is not so slow or difficult to try to get agreement through.
There is a real issue around protections and safeguards. It is notable that the petition of concern is in the safeguard section. It does apply to all key decisions. That is the system that was set up—purposely difficult, I suppose, one might say—to ensure that there was maximum buy-in. What we are rapidly seeing is that people now have a particular policy proposal, they get the majority for it and they want to push that forward, against the will of significant sections of the other community.
People need to get back better to fundamental consensus policy making. Potentially we have lost that over the years. As I said, it is slow but there is a benefit to that. When you look back to the original point about intent, it is important to point out that equality and human rights are very well protected, cooked in right across the system.
If you look back to the narrative around the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, including the discussions and the debates in the House of Commons on those matters, you will see that the key safeguards lay with the establishment, under the agreement, of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Human Rights Act, which at any time can give advice or perhaps even take a legal challenge against a Department or the Northern Ireland Assembly—certainly give advice on that.
Importantly, the Northern Ireland Assembly is set up but it does not have competence to deal with matters that would be in contravention of the European convention on human rights or equality legislation. I understand that your evidence will go on next to the Speaker. The Speaker will have a legal team, so it is not even a case of a discretion. The Northern Ireland Assembly, certainly even set down in the agreement and the Northern Ireland Act, emphasised and safeguarded even further in the Human Rights Act 1998, has no power to legislate in a way that is in violation of that. A piece of legislation should never be introduced where there is a decision by the Speaker’s legal panel that is in contravention of that.
What we have seen subsequently is that people will have a range of views about whether something is a breach of human rights, which is very different from whether it is legally a breach of human rights. Of course, that is an evolving issue. There are safeguards there already, but I would also point out that the party of which Mr Eastwood is a member did not raise any concerns about the scope of the petition of concern at the time of the passing of the Northern Ireland Act, nor in the first decade of the Northern Ireland Assembly’s operation, and the operation of the petition of concern. This is an issue that has emerged over the past number of years, on the briefing from the likes of CAJ and others. There was no indication on the record—Hansard or elsewhere—that there was a concern about this.
To go back to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, the obligations under strand 1 5(d) are completely separate from the obligations under strand 1 5(c). They are severable. Of course, they can be linked through the special process, which has already been outlined to you, but they are separate. It is very clear from both the spirit and the detail of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement that cross-community consensus was to apply to all key decisions.
Q
Mark Durkan: In terms of the agreement, the Bill is meant to uphold and follow through on understandings that were reached by five parties and the two Governments in the NDNA, and that was the price of getting devolution restored. I look at the Bill not as something that is going to directly damage the Good Friday agreement. I would say it is something that does not go far enough to restore and repair the Good Friday agreement, to correct its standing. What is missing is the true correction correcting the original architectural flaw in the original 1998 legislation around the petition of concern. What is in the Bill about qualifying the use of the petition of concern is helpful and good, but it does not go far enough to correct the basic architectural flaw about the absence of the special procedure and the focus on equality and human rights, so that is something that could be improved.
Likewise, in terms of the appointment of First Ministers, I would prefer legislation that restored the factory setting of the Good Friday agreement and allowed for the joint election by the Assembly of joint First Ministers. That is going to be particularly important coming up to the next Assembly election when there will be all sorts of speculation about the possible permutations of numerical strengths of different parties. The terms that were fixed at St Andrews say that the biggest party in the biggest designation gets one nomination, and the next nomination goes to the biggest party in the next biggest designation, but they also provide for the fact that if the biggest party is not in the biggest designation, it will get to appoint the First Minister, and then the Deputy First Minister will go to the biggest party in the biggest designation. So, you can see areas where parties will speculate that they might score very highly in the election in terms of seats but end up, because of St Andrews, being disqualified from the exclusive nominating rights that are fixed. It would be much better if the whole Assembly, as elected at the next Assembly election, had the responsibility of jointly electing First and Deputy First Ministers, and if all parties had responsibilities for making the Government work, rather than being able to say, “It’s the problem of those two parties,” which are preassigned those two nominating positions by the random results of the election. Nobody else can be nominated to anything without the First and Deputy First Ministers being nominated.
The repair work that could be done and the prevention of some pretty serious anomalies or absurdities that could potentially arise after the next election have not been achieved by the Bill. I do not think that we should be precluded from thinking that through further, in order to avoid an impasse after the next election.
Q
Mark Durkan: I do not fully accept that. The whole point about the petition of concern at the time was to ensure that we had—I used this phrase earlier—joined-up scrutiny and that we would make sure that there could be a connection between the quality of Assembly consideration and the advice or evidence that might come from the Equality Commission, the Human Rights Commission or indeed others.
Remember that the whole promise of the Bill of Rights in the agreement was very much a promise to citizens. That is one of the reasons I lament the absence of a Bill of Rights. When we were negotiating the agreement, our thinking was that the reliance on things like the petition of concern would reduce in circumstances where you had a live Bill of Rights and the good custom and practice of people being able to exercise their own challenges. Parties would not then have to rely on some of these other designation-related devices. It was there for a reason. Yes, the agreement and the legislation are clear about the obligations around rights, including the European convention on human rights. But the logic and strength of that has been watered down by much of the legislation that has happened since Brexit, because the European convention on human rights does not have the same strength of standing in Northern Ireland after some of those bits of legislation as it did.
We are in a bizarre situation whereby a public authority can say to a Northern Ireland Minister, “You cannot ask us to breach the European convention on human rights,” and they are within their rights to do so and to challenge any request, demand or pressure by a Minister or Department to so do. But they will not be in a position to so challenge a demand or instruction from a Minister of the Crown under, for instance, the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. Those instructions can apply directly to Departments in Northern Ireland or to other public bodies. What was envisaged in the Good Friday agreement, which Mo Mowlam in particular put so much work into the wording and strength of, is now diminished. I would like to see it restored.
Q
Mark Durkan: Yes, and the courts in Northern Ireland are given under the agreement the power to strike down legislation of the Northern Ireland Assembly on the grounds of incompatibility. They do not have the power to strike down legislation from Westminster, for instance. They do not have the power to strike down decisions that might be taken by a Minister of the Crown under something like the United Kingdom Internal Market Act. The decisions of a Minister of the Crown cannot be challenged in the courts. The UK Internal Market Act specifically provided for there being no challenge in the courts of Northern Ireland, or indeed in any other courts, on that basis.
That knocks a pretty big hole in the intended effect of the commitments on the European convention on human rights, which was provided for as part of the Human Rights Act. When negotiating the agreement, one of the reasons we were able to agree that the work on the Bill of Rights was something that would be for the future—for the next few years—was that a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. The promise of the European convention being available and accessible in the domestic courts in Northern Ireland, on the basis of the Human Rights Act, meant there was a starting point—there was already a starter for 10—as far as rights protections, alongside the institutions, was concerned. But the intent and the expectation was that there would also be some additional rights that would go alongside the European convention and that, together, those rights and the European convention would constitute a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.
It would have been good to achieve that. I think it would also relieve the temptation that parties sometimes feel to use devices like the petition of concern and other structural blocks in the name of saying they are reserving or protecting rights, when they are actually preventing decisions. The more robust and articulate a Bill of Rights that can be taken to the courts, the better for the decision-making processes.
Q
Mark Durkan: The word in the agreement is not “unique” but “particular”. From my memory, that was because one negotiator in particular and one party would have voice-activated apoplexy any time anybody said Northern Ireland was a “unique situation” or “unique”. George Mitchell, Ministers of both Governments and all sorts of people found themselves seized with this fierce reaction to the suggestion that we were unique. “Particular” was, apparently, allowed, so that is what is there.
In the wording of the agreement, we did not specify—we did not give lists of examples of the particularities—and that was simply because we did not want to turn that section of the agreement into a sort of sin sheet, whereby we would each record or voice sensibilities about rights breaches or perceived rights breaches that had been endured, either through governmental or non-governmental and other actions.
Obviously, Northern Ireland does have very particular circumstances. At the time we were negotiating the agreement, there was a lot of talk around group rights. For instance, people were talking about that in relation to the parades issues, from two different sides and two different senses of rights. They were partly being talked about there, but we were not writing that specifically into the agreement.
Obviously, there is a statement in the agreement that makes a commitment—a kind of “from here on in”, future-looking commitment—around certain rights in Northern Ireland. Some of those touch on some of the issues that maybe are not dealt with in this Bill but are dealt with in other aspects of NDNA.
Q
Mark Durkan: I think you can have both—it does not have to be an either/or. The forum having its own standing is good—it can take on work, particularly long-term work that may need careful framing of options and choices, and scoping out some of the issues and potential problems. We saw the forum as something that could do that, but we do not think it is the only form of civic engagement or input that there should be.
Let us not forget part of the success of a different aspect of the agreement in terms of policing—the Patten plan. We think the role of the independent members of the Policing Board was part of the strength of making that new beginning for policing happen and succeed during some very challenging times in the early days of the Policing Board and some challenging issues, in terms of the Omagh bombing report and the issues around, “I’m retiring; no, I’m not retiring”, by the then Chief Constable. The independents had a key role alongside the elected representatives. That is something that we can replicate in other ways. When it comes to prelegislative scrutiny in the Assembly, for instance, there is no reason why members of the public with particular policy insider expertise and credibility in given policy communities should not be there alongside MLAs.
There are different models and options, but there is certainly a big appetite among the public for it to be not just politicians alone who decide those things—or, more often than not, fail to decide them—and then recriminate those who are to blame.
Q
Again, I suppose this is relatively moot in your term, Alex, because the POC has not been deployed while you have been in post, but what is your understanding of the requirement for those Committees to be established under the current framework?
Alex Maskey: You know that as part of the Good Friday agreement, that framework was agreed, but it was never, if you like, replicated in the Assembly. Speaking as someone involved in the Good Friday agreement, that was one of key areas people were focusing on to make sure we built the new instructions on a proper framework. However, it is a statement of fact that they are not there, not used and not in place at the moment. I spend every other week in the Chamber, busily telling people, “I have no role over that,” in terms of the code of conduct, for example.
On what you are requesting, Claire, I would have liked the provisions in the Good Friday agreement to have been faithfully implemented across the board, and that would have applied to these provisions as well. The fact they are not means that I have to deal with what is in place within the framework, the Northern Ireland Act, and our own Standing Orders, and I will faithfully deliver on those.
Q
Alex Maskey: On one level, it could possibly help, because it would remove the issue. If you were to remove it, then you do not need to deal with any consequences. Gareth said earlier that we have identified a number of issues that could be impacted, such as the LCMs, but there are others we may not have detected yet. I suppose it could go some way towards solving it.
Q
Lesley Hogg: We have really highlighted the problems; these are political solutions that are you are trying to identify. Many of these have been ongoing for a number of years. We have highlighted that there is an issue. There is no easy solution, but we are happy to continue to work with officials to see if we can come up with anything.
Dr McGrath: Mr Robinson, I would just add that former Speaker Hay wrote in 2009 that the tabling of a petition of concern is a serious and important procedural step that has the effect of raising the bar. From an Assembly perspective, you hope to avoid the law of unintended consequences with all of these. For example, you could imagine that making it easier for Members to withdraw a petition of concern could potentially increase the number tabled. Given that 116 petitions of concern were tabled in the 2011 to 2016 mandate, one in the 2016 to 2021 mandate and none in the last 18 months, the Committee will want to consider the law of unintended consequences.
Q
Alex Maskey: First of all, as you know, the Speaker has the role of verifying or confirming whether a Bill is competent in the first instance, before it is introduced. Once it is introduced, I would refer that to the Human Rights Commission. The Assembly also has the right, which was exercised recently, to vote to make sure we do refer something; it is a bit of an additional belt-and-braces provision. The Assembly can vote to refer a Bill or a measure to the Human Rights Commission at the outset, so it would always be referred in the first instance to the legal team, who would look at it from a perspective of rights, as well as considering all other matters of competence. Of course, additionally, we then refer it to the Human Rights Commission. The provisions are there, and they are acted on in each and every case.
Q
Alex Maskey: I certainly hope that anything that we do would lead to that outcome. As I said at our meeting, Minister, with the political will, we can resolve most of the matters, if not all of them. Unfortunately, occasionally we have not been able to resolve matters, including, as I said, when it came to an Opposition Bill passed a number of years ago; it was put forward by John McCallister. There was no cross-community agreement to enact a Standing Order to apply that. That might seem odd or unusual, and it probably is, but the fact of the matter is that we did not get an agreement.
At our meeting and in correspondence, we addressed the fact that the first item of business of an Assembly is electing the Speakers. With the six-week ruling, and the six-week period of delay envisaged in the Bill, theoretically, the Assembly could meet after six weeks, and if it could not be formed at that time or could not fill the offices, then it could close down for the next six weeks, but if we do not get a Speaker in place—if we do not have that agreement—we cannot even move to that point. With political agreement and common sense, you would imagine we could resolve these matters. We have only drawn attention to these matters on a cautionary basis because of our experiences; in the past, we have not even been able to pass a number of important matters on the basis of cross-community support.
Since taking up my post, I have routinely been on record reminding Members that we have a very important job to do, as guardians of the legislature, in holding the Executive to account. However, it is also by way of being our business to secure and try to maintain public confidence in the institutions. If we can do anything to maintain the sustainability of the institutions on the basis of the integrity of NDNA and previous agreements reached, I think we will be doing a good job. Anything that helps us to perform our duties in a way that maintains and builds public confidence, we need to embrace.
Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateGavin Robinson
Main Page: Gavin Robinson (Democratic Unionist Party - Belfast East)Department Debates - View all Gavin Robinson's debates with the Northern Ireland Office
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThank you very much, Mr Stringer. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I take no offence at the mis-association of me with the hon. Member for Foyle—I have been called far worse, so I will take it on the chin.
I will speak briefly to amendment 6, which appears in my name. It relates to the ministerial code and the insertion into law of what is known in Northern Ireland as the three-meeting rule, which was agreed by the Northern Ireland political parties as recently as the Fresh Start agreement in 2015. At the moment, my understanding is that it is in essence guidance and not part of law, and we see partial implementation of the rule in the Executive. Sometimes papers can be blocked for considerable periods, causing considerable frustration for Ministers. In recent weeks, for example, the Northern Ireland Health Minister has had a Bill on organ donation blocked. My party colleague, the Justice Minister, has had a Bill blocked for a considerable time.
There has been a lot of talk about the petition of concern and vetoes in discussion of the Assembly, but a lot less attention has been paid to what happens inside the Executive where, in essence, there are two vetoes. The first is in the way in which the First Minister and Deputy First Minister have almost full control over the Executive agenda. It takes almost a double sign-off from both for a matter even to get on to the agenda for debate. Secondly, a cross-community veto can be deployed by three Ministers to block a decision. My amendment addresses the former issue of the agenda, so that there is at least scope for a discussion and a vote to take place on any Executive paper. No Minister puts a paper to the Executive that is without merit, and they all deserve discussion.
The purpose of amendment 6, in essence, is to put into the ministerial code something that has already been agreed by the Northern Ireland political parties in the Fresh Start agreement of 2015.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.
I promised myself this morning that I would not get into the mould of opposing every amendment that has been proposed by my colleagues from Northern Ireland, but I have a couple of points to make about SDLP amendments 17, 18 and 19, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Belfast South. The danger is that we seek to legislate too much on such issues. I understand entirely the thrust of her argument and, indeed, the way in which the amendments have been structured is to talk of best endeavours and the relationships that we want to see in our political situation. In truth, however, they bring with them no legislative consequence should we not see best endeavours. How I would frame it is that if we need to rely on such provisions being in legislation, the system is not working as it should in any event. Without a consequence, and given the positive but loose nature of the amendments, I do not think that the proposals would add significantly to the Bill or to the agreement reached in New Decade, New Approach.
I also understand why the hon. Member for North Down has advanced amendment 6. He served in the Executive when I was a special adviser in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. He will understand not only that the nature of that joint office brings political challenges with it, but that there is still an importance of that office’s chairing and maintaining the efficiency of the business brought before the Executive. He and I will both remember times when things were much more terse around that table, but to reflect on his time as a Minister, whenever he brought forward papers for the Department for Employment and Learning, we engaged in discussions prior to any difficulty emerging around an agenda. His special adviser and I used to spend a lot of time problem solving before issues were brought formally to the agenda.
I apologise, Mr Stringer. I will focus exclusively on amendment 7. My party has been very keen to see the petition of concern amended. Our views and, indeed, those of many others on this issue are very clear. In some senses, it would be almost logical for us to try to make the signing of a petition of concern as difficult as possible. However, I was very struck by evidence that we received orally last week and also in writing from the Speaker of the Assembly. Concern was expressed that if the proposal for Deputy Speakers not to be able to sign a petition of concern were put into law, that might well deter people from coming forward to become a Deputy Speaker in the Northern Ireland Assembly. It is worth referencing the fact that the way Deputy Speakers operate there is somewhat different from the practice at Westminster, in that they continue to have a political role.
I should say that my party does not have at present a Member of the Assembly who is a Deputy Speaker, and nor do we intend to seek any of those offices in the future, so I may be speaking from a position of a certain objectivity in this regard. I do think it is worth the Committee’s considering whether what was a sincere commitment made in New Decade, New Approach—I accept that it is in black and white in that document—may have, in the cold light of day, some unintended consequence and therefore that there may be some scope for reconsideration. I would be happy to hear the views of other Members in that regard.
I just want to give my reflections on the evidence that we heard from the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I do not agree that there is a chilling effect associated with the agreement reached––New Decade, New Approach–that would have a material impact on parties’ willingness to provide a Deputy Speaker for the Assembly. I would go further and say that our Deputy Speakers are not the same as Deputy Speakers here. Neither is our Speaker. Our Speaker in Northern Ireland does not resign from their political party. When they seek re-election, they do so as a member of a political party.
The element that I do not think the Speaker reflected on appropriately in his evidence last week is that, as each of the four parties provides a Speaker and three Deputy Speakers—one from each of the four parties—the consequence of assuming that office and so being unable to sign a petition of concern applies to the four largest parties. Each is supplying somebody and each takes the consequence. In that sense, what was agreed in New Decade, New Approach is fairer than one party losing a signatory from a petition of concern because they assume the position of Speaker, so I take quite a different view from that of the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly and I do not believe that the fears that he outlined are merited.
The New Decade, New Approach deal was explicit that the Speaker and three Deputy Speakers shall not sign a petition. I therefore question why we would seek to amend the deal, which delivers on a key concern of the party of the hon. Member for North Down during the negotiations: that a petition of concern should be used only in rare situations.
I acknowledge the concerns that were raised by the Speaker, but as we have just heard, there are different views on their strength and there is the fact that four out of the five major parties in the Assembly are represented in the speakership or deputy speakership. There is a balance in its impact in that regard. I have offered a follow-up conversation between officials at the Northern Ireland Office and the Speaker’s officials to look into the matter further, but I cannot at this moment support an amendment because we are not aware of how real a risk this poses. We have heard divergent views on that. The Government are willing to return to the issue after further engagement with the Speaker, but for the time being I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
While we welcome minor amendments to the petition of concern to make it a little more difficult to table one, that does not improve how the POC works or restore it to its intended purposes. Amendments 11 and 12 seek to do that by restoring some of the Belfast agreement’s factory settings, as it were, and reinserting the special procedure described in paragraphs 11 to 13 of strand one, whereby a special committee should examine the rationale and viability of a petition of concern so that it is used as a mechanism to protect minority rights and not, as has been practised during the previous mandate, to thwart them. Amendment 11 would restore that original intent, which has not been adequately used. Amendment 12 enables that by specifying how such a committee could be established at the request of either the Assembly Executive Committee, a Minister or a relevant Committee.
I am not doing very well on my commitment at the start. I want to push back politely on the notion of factory reset, and that we are getting back to the original intent of the provision. That is not agreed. Going through last week’s evidence, it is fair to say that there are those who were involved in the process in 1998 who are now trying to retrofit and read into the 1998 agreement what they hoped to attain or achieve at that stage, and did not.
I think this is a constructive proposal. We have to be mindful of the concern that was raised last week in evidence: that Assembly authorities might be slow to consent or assent to such a restriction on the 14-day timescale should it not be elucidated very clearly—not just here, but on Report and so on. If we cannot find a form of words that is acceptable on Report, the exchange that has just been had needs to be expanded on and very clearly delivered on Report in Hansard. There should be no doubt or equivocation among the Assembly authorities that, should petitioners decide that the 14 days are no longer required, or that the issue is of such urgency or significance that it needs to be resolved within that timeframe, that flexibility is permissible.
I absolutely take note of the hon. Gentleman’s comments, and agree with his intent. I am happy to come back to that issue on Report, as appropriate.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendment made: 2, in clause 5, page 7, line 17, leave out from beginning to first “the” on line 18 and insert “the presentation of the petition and the time when”.—(Robin Walker.)
This amendment means that the standing orders may specify a minimum period of notice of less than a day for a petition of concern.
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 5, page 7, line 31, at end insert—
“(e) make provision to allow petitioners to withdraw a petition of concern at any stage in the process.”
The amendment relates to the wider package of comments I made earlier. I will not press it to a vote today. I just flag it up as part of that wider discussion and hope that the Government reflect on it and, indeed, as the hon. Member for Belfast East said, speak further to this general issue on Report.
When you see the physiology of that amendment, it is clean; it does exactly what we have described. We may have to consider whether it is appropriate for us to do this through the Bill or whether it can be reflected through the Standing Orders of the Assembly, but it is exactly what the intent behind amendment 8 was; amendment 9 does it very cleanly. I am positive about the spirit and the text of the amendment, but it may not be pressed to a vote this morning.
There are no surprises in this Bill to the parties of Northern Ireland. There is no period of time that is required to get ready, implement or reflect the changes brought forward in the Bill. The shadow Secretary of State has clearly outlined that the agreement was reached 18 months ago. But for coronavirus—whether we accept it as an excuse or not—the provisions in the Bill would be in place and we would be able to fall back on them if they were required.
I am not sure what the rationale is for two additional months beyond Royal Assent. A strong argument has already been put forward by the hon. Member for North Down and the shadow Secretary of State. Subject to a compelling reason why an additional two months are required, there is merit in curtailing that timescale.
Committee members will know that it is usual practice and parliamentary procedure to allow two months before provisions come into effect following Royal Assent. The type of preparatory measures we might be referring to in this case could be the very changes to Assembly Standing Orders that we have debated. Nevertheless, I recognise the strength of feeling among Committee members.
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley talked about recent events in Northern Ireland. The Bill was not brought forward as a response to recent events. It was brought forward as a response to NDNA and what was agreed between the parties. In terms of the time that has elapsed, she will know that Parliament has been extremely occupied with covid legislation, thanks to the pandemic, but we made a point of introducing this Bill early in this Session. We have also given the time for the Bill not to be rushed through as emergency legislation, but to be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny, which has been welcomed by all sides. That is good news and is all too rare an occurrence for a Northern Ireland Bill.
We are not minded to accept the amendment, but should the political context in Northern Ireland and an early commencement be beneficial for Executive stability, we are content for it to be considered in the other place. I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment for the time being and allow the process of parliamentary scrutiny to continue. Should the progress that we have seen today be repeated in the other place, and the level of cross-party support that we are seeing at this stage, I see no reason why they could not allow for an amendment of this nature to proceed.
Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateGavin Robinson
Main Page: Gavin Robinson (Democratic Unionist Party - Belfast East)Department Debates - View all Gavin Robinson's debates with the Northern Ireland Office
(3 years ago)
Commons ChamberAt the outset, I take the opportunity to pay tribute to Sir David Amess and pass on my condolences to his family. I also reference his personal connection to the Bill, in that he was one of the Chairs in Committee. True to his character, he handled proceedings professionally, efficiently and with huge impartiality. May I also say, for those MPs who are still new to this place and are still swotting up on procedure, that he was very generous and understanding in that regard? I also thank the House of Commons staff, and the Bill Clerks in particular, for the rapid turnaround of amendments in the past week.
The amendments in my name fall into four broad categories: the election or nomination of First Minister and Deputy First Minister; reforms to petitions of concern; the operation of the Executive; and the commencement date. On the nomination and election of the First Ministers, frankly the current system does not work. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are identical in terms of status, powers, responsibilities and duties. That one small distinction in wording takes on disproportionate importance—indeed it is only symbolic—and turns our elections into the politics of fear. That risks crowding out consideration of important economic, social and environmental issues during election campaigns. They are often about keeping the other side out, and yet, in the past, the so-called victorious party has gone on to share power in the same joint office with the largest party from the other designation.
There is speculation that Sinn Féin could emerge as the largest party after the next Assembly election and we have two Unionist parties unwilling to make clear whether in such circumstances they would serve as Deputy First Minister. That is hugely destabilising and a selective application of the rules of democracy as they stand. That could lead us into a difficult situation after the next election. People should clearly adhere to the rules, but that does not preclude us from seeking support for reforms to make the system work more effectively.
It is important to note that there will be issues on which we can find agreement. There will also be issues and amendments before us today on which we cannot find agreement. However, importantly for these proceedings, does the hon. Member agree that, as we discussed in Committee, the Bill fairly reflects what was agreed in New Decade, New Approach and that, unless and until we get joint agreement on a range of issues through another forum, we should not be tinkering around with too many amendments?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his comments. I agree partially. The Bill does accurately reflect the New Decade, New Approach agreement, but it is worth referencing that that was made back in January 2020. I pay tribute to the former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith), for his endeavours in that regard. However, we have had many political developments since then. One of my great frustrations as a Member of this place and previously as a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly is that we often respond to the last crisis and fix the rules to address what has already happened rather than trying to look ahead, anticipate where crises are likely to happen and put measures in place that will make the world operate more easily.
That brings me to new clause 1, in my name, which seeks to address anomalies in the current system. At present, the largest party regardless of designation is entitled to the position of First Minister. However, the Deputy First Minister must come from the largest party from the largest remaining designation. I do not want to get too far ahead of myself as a member of the Alliance party, but it is conceivable that, one day—perhaps after the next election or at some time in the future—a party that is not Unionist or nationalist may be the second-largest party in Northern Ireland and yet it would not be automatically entitled to that position. That would create a certain crisis of legitimacy in terms of the institutions and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister team. With that small measure, we could address that problem.
Secondly, I turn to new clause 4 in in the names of the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood) and the hon. Member for Belfast South (Claire Hanna) of the Social Democratic and Labour party, which would essentially return to the Good Friday agreement model and the first iteration in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 by providing for an election of a joint team of FM and DFM. That would have two advantages: Assembly endorsement of the team; and reinforcement of the point of collective responsibility from being part of a joint office, not two individuals pursuing separate agendas.
My one reservation is that that relies on the current cross-community voting system, which is fundamentally linked to the designation system. As hon. Members will know, MLAs are required to sign in as Unionist, nationalist or other. I used to be an “other”, which is a wonderful way to describe one’s identity. The system perpetuates the two communities model in Northern Ireland rather than reflecting the diversity that existed in 1998 and that which exists today. There are people with open, mixed and multiple identities, and there are people from different backgrounds who have come to live in Northern Ireland and are not properly reflected in how we frame the operation of the Assembly. That needs reform.
Thirdly, new clause 2, in my name, would return to the Good Friday agreement model but with the distinction that we end up with a purely weighted majority vote—set at two thirds—without reference to any designations whatsoever. That is the fairest and most ideal way to address the issue. It would avoid some anomalous outcomes and inflexibility. Both new clauses on the second and third options would take the opportunity to acknowledge in law and change terminology to confirm and reinforce that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister are identical in status, powers, responsibilities and duties.
New clause 3—my final amendment in the group—would reinforce that point about the equality of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in all those respects but outside the context of the nomination or election process. We may not be able to find consensus on that during the Bill’s remaining stages. However, we should take the opportunity outwith that to reflect in law that the FM and DFM are entirely equal, to try to take the heat out of the fairly stupid, meaningless contrast that is made and creates huge tension in our election campaigns. Unfortunately, we would need to make one exception and say that that would not apply to the First Minister and Deputy First Minister election process, because, until we change the system, someone must be put in place first, and someone else second.
I turn to petitions of concern, which have been a source of huge controversy in the past 20 years in Northern Ireland. Petitions of concern have been used and abused well beyond their original intention. They have brought huge discredit, and indeed tension, to the Assembly. It is worth noting that virtually no human rights or equality legislation has been passed by the Assembly. Instead, it has been done either through various periods of direct rule or through the direct intervention of Westminster, notably through the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 in recent times. I welcome the reforms in New Decade, New Approach, but the Alliance party is sceptical about whether they go far enough. People may say that there have not been any petitions of concern since the Assembly’s restoration. That is true, but we have also not had much legislation or any equality or human rights pieces before the Assembly. We must therefore remain vigilant.
I want to test two points with the Government. The first lies in the 14-day timeframe for a petition of concern to be considered, which may turn out to be a straitjacket. There may well be situations in which a matter must be considered urgently, such as a legal responsibility or some other deadline that must be met in response to a legislative consent motion. I therefore think it is worth clarifying that the Assembly has the ability within its Standing Orders to vary that 14-day timeframe if the circumstances warrant it. In a similar light, a petitioner or set of petitioners could withdraw their support for a petition if they feel that the issues they were concerned about have been addressed otherwise, rather than having the clock continue. In Committee, the Minister of State’s predecessor did give such reassurances, and I hope that the incumbent will be happy to do the same today.
I turn briefly to the operation of the Executive. Amendment 2 would move the “three meetings rule” from guidance to statute. At present, we have much concern in relation to the petitions of concern issue in the Assembly, but it is not as commonly understood that there are mutual vetoes in the context of the Executive. They must also be addressed. One such veto relates to the formation of the agenda. At times, Ministers have sought to put papers on the agenda but been blocked persistently. The three meetings rule is therefore of particular importance.
I appreciate that others are waiting to speak so, finally, I want to talk about the commencement timeframe. Comments about such timeframes may be unusual on Report, but this is an important point in this particular context. It is unusual to have a Northern Ireland Bill moving through Parliament at the normal pace of a Bill—most tend to be matters of urgency.
The ethos of the New Decade, New Approach agreement was to ensure that the institutions worked together, that we have sustainability and that we try to avoid crises, whether that is collapse of the Assembly or difficulty in forming a new Executive after an Assembly election. It is two years since New Decade, New Approach was agreed, but we are only now putting this into legislation, and we meet in the midst of a potential crisis of non-delivery of other aspects of New Decade, New Approach, with tensions emerging around the protocol and the unrealistic demands made in that regard—the Democratic Unionist party of colleagues sitting in front of me has made threats that it may withdraw its Ministers from the Executive in the near future—as well as speculation about what might happen after the next Assembly election. It would therefore be seen as absurd if we had a crisis when the measures in the Bill could to some extent have been helpful in managing that crisis. However, the Bill might still be in the process of going through Parliament or, even worse, it might have received Royal Assent but, because of the two-month commencement period, we would not be in a position to deploy the measures that might have helped the situation.