Victims and Prisoners Bill (Second sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We have until 3 pm for these questions.

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

Q Part 3 of the Bill had no pre-legislative scrutiny; do you think it would have benefited from that? How much engagement has the Parole Board had with the Government on that part of the Bill?

Martin Jones: I certainly think there would have been a benefit. I always think there is benefit in pre-legislative scrutiny. I have taken legislation through in the past as an official and there would certainly be benefit in Parliament understanding what the impact would be.

On consultation with the Parole Board, it would be fair to say that it was very limited ahead of the provisions being introduced to Parliament. The root-and-branch review was published in the spring of last year, setting out what the proposals would be. Ahead of the Bill’s publication, the details of what it contained were shared with us, but I would not say that we were asked for our views on what was contained in the legislation.

[Ellie Reeves]

Q The proposed new release test introduces a public protection threshold. How does the Parole Board currently approach risk? Is the new test likely to result in a change in how the Parole Board makes decisions?

Martin Jones: The current release test is set by Parliament. It is a very clear, simple test as to whether the prisoner’s continued detention remains necessary for the protection of the public. That means that public protection is always paramount in our decision making. Of course, when we make those decisions, we have to have regard to all the different factors involved in a prisoner’s case: the progress they have made in custody, the nature of their index offences, whether they have been well behaved in custody, whether they might have taken drugs in custody, and whether they might have done positive work, such as education and training. We take account of all those factors when we reach a Parole Board decision.

I would say that what is on the face of the Bill, in reality, gives effect to what the Parole Board already says in its guidance that we should take into account. We think that the legislation should make no significant changes to our practice.

[Ellie Reeves]

Q In the Bill, there is a checklist of things that it is proposed the Parole Board should take into account when making those decisions. I heard what you said about it not making a difference to how the Parole Board operates now, but something that is missing from the checklist but that I understand the Parole Board currently takes into account is unproven allegations against the prisoner. What do you think the implications of that being left off the list are?

Martin Jones: The slight danger is that the Parole Board practitioners start to view the matters that are on the face of the Bill as more important than other factors. The Bill is clear that it is not an exhaustive list, and the Parole Board can, of course, take account of whatever factors it believes to be relevant in the individual case, but the fact that Parliament puts a certain set of factors on the face of the Bill means that you will always have to have regard to that.

Allegations is a particularly important area when you are assessing the risk of a prisoner. It most commonly comes to the Parole Board when, for example, you are talking about an allegation of domestic violence. It often comes up, and particularly with somebody being recalled to custody. It may not be a proven allegation, but what the Parole Board may see is a pattern of behaviour with a person being arrested on a number of different occasions, alleging perhaps an assault against a partner. Those charges may not end up being brought to court and may not be proven, but when we are deciding whether someone is to be released, we want to ensure that we understand the pattern of behaviour. It was certainly something that was important to us as part of the DSD case—that is the Worboys case—in relation to how we take account and what weight we add in making those decisions. So previous allegations is a really important point for us.

[Ellie Reeves]

Q The Bill gives the Secretary of State powers to veto the Parole Board’s decisions in certain cases. Do you think the reforms could impact on the Parole Board’s decision making and/or independence?

Martin Jones: It is important to be clear that the Parole Board has always taken the view that it is important that you are able to challenge a Parole Board decision if either the victim, the Secretary of State or a prisoner thinks we have got our decision wrong. Ultimately, our decisions are judicial decisions made independent of Government and based on evidence and the law.

In 2019, the Government introduced a reconsideration mechanism that enables parties to come to the Parole Board and say, “We think you’ve got it wrong.” It is very closely based on the grounds for judicial review, and that provides a way for us to then review that case, normally via a judicial member of the Parole Board looking at all the evidence that the panel took account of and deciding, via a decision that is now published and available for the public to see, whether that decision was rational and fair. We have no problem with people challenging that.

The problem with a block on the decision and the veto amounts to two issues, one of which is: will it subsequently stand up to legal scrutiny? Parliament and the courts have been very clear that the final decision on whether somebody is safe to be released or not has to rest with a court. Until this Bill came along, that court has always been the Parole Board, subject only to judicial review. If you have the Justice Secretary intervening and blocking that release, it will have to go up, according to the Bill, to the upper tribunal to decide whether that decision should stand, and they will apply very similar principles of judicial review to look at the rationality of our decision.

In almost all cases, in my experience, when the Parole Board makes a decision, the reason we release somebody is because the professionals—the offender manager, the prison officers, the probation officer and the psychologists —say that the person is safe to be released. It is really important that we do not make decisions out of the air: they are based on the evidence presented to the panel. In my experience it would be highly unusual for us to go against that. But, of course, we are a court and we have to look at the evidence independently.

It is very difficult to see how, if the decision gets blocked and it goes up to the tribunal, and you look at all the evidence and the evidence is pointing towards release, and it gets blocked, that will withstand a subsequent challenge. The Parole Board has suggested that an alternative way would be to have a substantive appeal—which could indeed be wider than judicial review, if that was what Parliament decided—and that would provide an effective mechanism to stop and have a review of Parole Board decisions if you genuinely think we have got it wrong. That would add additional balance into the system.

My concern would be building up unrealistic hopes in the eyes of victims. I meet loads of victims: they are getting terribly upset and you can understand it. If you have been the victim of a serious crime—20 or 30 years ago you have lost a member of your family—and that person is up for parole, that is always going to be a difficult experience. But I am not sure that simply delaying release by two to three months is good for victims if a significant number of the decisions do not subsequently stand up to scrutiny by the courts.

[Ellie Reeves]

Q Thanks for that. On a related point, parole hearings feature a great deal of information about the offender. There can be lots of reports and an in-depth hearing before a decision is made. In your view, will the Secretary of State be able to consider all the evidence before making a decision?

Martin Jones: You are absolutely right: generally speaking, particularly in what we describe as the tier 1 cases—cases of murder, rape, terrorism, or causing or allowing the death of a child—the average size of the dossier of information provided to the Parole Board will be somewhere between 500 and 1,000 pages. Our members will in most cases ordinarily consist of a judge—a retired judge, sometimes a retired High Court judge; an independent member, who might be a retired police officer, a retired probation officer or prison officer; and maybe a psychologist or a psychiatrist if somebody has a mental health condition. They will consider that in detail and spend anywhere between half a day to a day hearing evidence from all the people at the hearing to determine whether that person is safe to be released or not.

If the Secretary of State then usurps that, how will he get sight of the evidence that the panel has carefully weighed in the balance to make the final decision? Decision letters are normally 15 to 20 pages long, explaining the legal basis of why we think that person is safe to be released or not. You certainly need an equivalent process if that is going to withstand a challenge subsequently in the tribunal.

[Ellie Reeves]

Q Thanks for that. The upper tribunal will have the power to confirm a decision or direct the release of a prisoner, but as they do not have experience of assessing risk in the way the Parole Board does, how will they be able to make those sorts of assessments?

Martin Jones: That would be an additional challenge. At the moment, I guess the closest approximation you have is the mental health review tribunal, which makes decisions about the release of people from hospital or prison. If you have mental health conditions, that goes up to the tribunal. But this would be new work for the tribunal.

It certainly seems to me that the tribunal would need training in relation to risk assessment. The lifeblood of the Parole Board is understanding the progress that somebody has made and ensuring the processes work. Clearly, if you are going to have, under one part almost, a reconsideration of the case as a whole, that will be quite a complex decision if you are potentially dealing with a significant volume of cases being challenged.

Victims and Prisoners Bill (Fifth sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Anna McMorrin]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. The Government have repeatedly ignored advice on this, so I am here again to be a voice for the voiceless, who will remain voiceless if the Bill passes unamended.

Rachel Almeida, assistant director for knowledge and insight at Victim Support, told us last week that a huge number of victims are impacted by persistent antisocial behaviour. She said:

“We agree that there needs to be a threshold for it to be persistent ASB, but we believe that their not having any rights means they are unable to access the support that they really need.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 71, Q148.]

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

As constituency MPs, we all receive reports of antisocial behaviour. A constituent came to me because her neighbour regularly throws human waste out of the window. Can it really be right that she would not be considered a victim under the Bill?

[Anna McMorrin]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I do not think there is a Member here who does not have discussions with constituents, has not received casework about it, and has not seen antisocial behaviour when they are and about. This is a major issue that needs to be addressed, and the amendment would address it.

Antisocial behaviour can make victims’ lives a living nightmare, causing stress, misery and despair. It can often be the precursor to very serious crimes, including knife crime and gang activity, so it is important that it is taken seriously by the agencies that respond to it.

For example, if I had ordered a new outfit online and it was delivered to my house and left in the doorway, and someone pinched it, that would be a crime. It would be an unfortunate or upsetting incident, but it would have minimal impact on my wellbeing, because I could request a new outfit or get a refund. As a victim of that crime, I would be eligible for support services to help me cope and recover, regardless of whether I thought that was necessary. I would be eligible for all the rights under the victims code, including having my complaint recorded.

If I were a victim of antisocial behaviour, the situation would be entirely different. I might have people parked outside my home drinking, being disruptive, throwing cans into my garden, kicking a ball against my wall, and coming back night after night, swearing, spitting and being aggressive. I would feel persecuted in my own home and so targeted that I might become afraid of leaving the house. The longer it persisted, the more traumatised I would become. But as a victim of antisocial behaviour, I would have no access to victims’ rights and no guarantee of support. That disparity must end.

Dame Vera Baird KC, the former Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, told us last week that a key problem with the Bill is that it does not deal with people who suffer from serious antisocial behaviour.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna McMorrin]

The Minister should not be surprised that we are debating child criminal exploitation once more; my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham tabled a similar amendment to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 just two years ago. Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the Government voted against that amendment, so two years on we still do not have a definition of child criminal exploitation in statute. Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society define child criminal exploitation as when

“another person or persons manipulate, deceive, coerce or control the person to undertake activity which constitutes a criminal offence where the person is under the age of 18.”

That is the definition that we would like to see on statute.

Child criminal exploitation takes a variety of forms, but ultimately it is the grooming and exploitation of children into criminal activity. The current reality is that, across each form that child criminal exploitation takes, children who are coerced into criminal activity are often treated as perpetrators by statutory agencies, rather than as victims of exploitation. That is partly because safeguarding partners work to different understandings of what constitutes criminal exploitation.

Recently, child criminal exploitation has become strongly associated with one specific model—county lines—but it can also include children being forced to work in cannabis factories, being coerced into moving drugs and money across the country, or being forced to commit financial fraud, to shoplift or to pickpocket. The lack of shared understanding of what child criminal exploitation is and the guises it can take means that the questions are not consistently asked when children are identified as being associated with criminal activity, either at the time of arrest or during court cases in which the possible coercion of a child has taken place.

[Ellie Reeves]

Throughout the country, children are being used by criminal gangs to do their bidding, and they are often subjected to the most sophisticated coercion, intimidation, duress, abuse and, sometimes, sexual abuse, so does my hon. Friend agree that it is indefensible not to have them listed as victims in the Bill?

[Anna McMorrin]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. It is completely indefensible not to have the definition of child criminal exploitation in the Bill to make sure that, as she says, such children are seen as victims, not perpetrators.

The lack of shared understanding that I mentioned also means that children are often arrested for crimes that they are forced to commit, whereas the adults who exploit them are often not investigated or brought to justice, leaving them free to exploit other children, which happens. All this is because of the absence of a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation, the true scale of which is completely unknown. We know that it is happening all over the place—it is off the scale, essentially—but many children who are exploited or groomed fall through the cracks of statutory support so are not identified in official statistics.

In England in 2021-22, there were more than 16,000 instances of local authorities identifying child sexual exploitation as a factor at the end of an assessment by social workers; 11,600 instances of gangs being a factor; and 10,140 instances of child criminal exploitation being a factor. It has been estimated that in England alone there could be as many as 200,000 children aged 11 to 17 who are vulnerable to serious violence because of the levels of crime or income deprivation in their community.

Research carried out by Dame Rachel de Souza, the Children’s Commissioner for England, found that 27,000 children who were at high risk of gang exploitation had not been identified by services and as a result were missing out on vital support to keep them safe. The research also found an even higher number of children who were experiencing broader risk factors linked to exploitation, with one in 15 teenagers—or 120,00 young people—falling through the gaps in education and social care. These are children who are being excluded from school, who are persistently absent or who go missing from care, and many face a combination of factors that leave them vulnerable to exploitation.

In the evidence sessions last week, Dame Rachel de Souza spoke about the importance of including a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation in the Bill. When asked whether it should be in the Bill, she said “absolutely”, and that she had wanted to bring it up herself. She said:

“When I go around the country and talk to children, wherever they are—whether that is being held in police cells or children who are involved in drugs or whatever—I realise just how complex the situations are. You realise that these children are as much victim as perpetrator. Children tell me all the time that their experiences with the police make them feel like they are not victims but criminals. That is what we need to sort out.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 24, Q50.]

Victims and Prisoners Bill (Sixth sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, at end insert—

“(e) where the death by suicide of a close family member of the person was the result of domestic abuse which constitutes criminal conduct.”

We have all had a long time while the Bill has been going through to campaign, successfully, on various things through various means, including, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood mentioned, around the pre-legislative scrutiny. Those of us who have been fighting for child victims born of rape were pleased to see that concession. Another area that many of us have campaigned on is recognition of people who are victims of homicide but not direct victims. If someone’s daughter is murdered, they are a victim of that crime. Both those concessions have come about, and not dissimilarly to my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham I wish to push the envelope a little further, and talk about those who die by suicide as a direct result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

I met a mother at a memorial service for violence against women and girls. Just yesterday, she emailed me. Her daughter died in 2018. She wrote:

“If my daughter hadn’t met him, she would still be alive, her children still have a mother, me my precious only daughter…Why is the associated link between ‘domestic abuse’ and ‘suicide’ ignored? Overlooked are the ‘compensating’ mechanisms—substance abuse, alcohol, ‘mental health issues’ then used by so called ‘professionals’ as the reason ‘why’ they have taken their lives...the link is the perpetrator and the victim, NOT the substances. They are often used by the victim to ‘escape’ from the relentless mental, physical abuse and torture. They don’t want to die, merely ‘escape’ from the traumatic situations. They are in Hell.”

Families who have lost loved ones to suicide following domestic abuse should be recognised as victims, in the same way as those who lose family members to murder are supported.

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. I want to mention the family of Gemma Robinson. Gemma was the victim of a horrific assault by a former boyfriend. She took her own life in 2020 due to the fear of facing her attacker in court. Gemma’s sister, Kirsty, has spoken about the devastating impact of Gemma’s death on the whole family. The family were then left to face the sentencing of the perpetrator, Gemma’s inquest and the domestic homicide review all on their own, without support. Does my hon. Friend agree that Gemma’s case highlights why it is so important that relatives in these types of cases are recognised as victims?

[Jess Phillips]

I thank my hon. Friend. Our hearts go out to Gemma’s family. That is exactly the reason why I tabled the amendment and why the Labour party seeks to have these people recognised. That recognition would allow such relatives to access the support and care they need, and begin to shine a light on a shamefully under-scrutinised and ignored sphere of criminality and wrongdoing.

We do not need to look much further than the facts of the cases and the experiences of the families to realise that those relatives should be recognised and have the support and guidance that that would, or should, bring. The criminality and wrongdoing in those cases, the interaction with court processes and the justice system, and the trauma experienced, make the argument for inclusion clear. Although in many cases, they may not ever get a criminal sanction against the perpetrator, there are inquests and domestic homicide reviews, as my hon. Friend said. Honestly, to be a victim in this country, whether that is one recognised by this Bill or not, is hard work. Imagine doing that work when your daughter or your sister has died.

There are other concerns about why this recognition is important, which are to do with unchecked criminality and wrongdoing. In these heartbreaking cases, where the deceased took her own life—I use the pronoun “she” due to the gendered nature of domestic abuse—there is clear evidence that she was driven to suicide by the abuse she suffered at the hands of a domestic abuse perpetrator.

The feelings of injustice for bereaved families when the abuser escapes all responsibility for the death must be unbearable. Families find themselves in an agonising position of having watched their loved one experience horrendous criminality—violence, abuse, coercive control—and the unrelenting horror day after day, hour after hour, until their loved one was driven by desperation to take their life. Currently, in those cases, criminality is going completely unchecked, un-investigated and unchallenged. Perpetrators remain free to harm again and again. Bereaved families are left feeling failed by the justice system, and the opportunities to address issues and learn lessons are being missed.

There has been one successful prosecution of that type of case. In 2017 R v. Allen, the perpetrator pleaded guilty to manslaughter—if we are relying on cases where men plead guilty, we are on a hiding to nothing—in respect of the death of his former partner, Justene Reece, who had taken her own life after experiencing years of coercive control, stalking and harassment. Justene had left a suicide note explaining that she could not endure her stalker’s behaviour any longer. That case is a clear precedent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna McMorrin]

In his opening speech on Second Reading, the Justice Secretary stated that

“in order to deliver justice, victims must be treated not as mere spectators of the criminal justice system, but as core participants in it. That is the mission of this Government and of this Bill. It will boost victims’ entitlements”

and

“make victims’ voices heard”.—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 583.]

On paper, it sounds like the Government are dedicated to putting victims first, yet they stumble at the first hurdle. Clause 2(3) states only that agencies should comply with the four overarching principles of the victims code, making those principles weak and open to interpretation.

[Ellie Reeves]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if the Bill is really going to serve victims, it is important that it sets out what must be done rather than what should be done? We all know that when the word “should” is used, it often simply does not happen, and that is not good enough.

[Anna McMorrin]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. That is at the core of why I would like the Government to agree to the amendment. The principles are at the core of the Bill and agencies must comply with them. If they do not, that will call into question the essence of this entire piece of legislation.

I understand from the Government’s response to the Justice Committee’s pre-legislative scrutiny report that they believe the wording cannot be “must”—I am probably predicting what the Minister will say—because agencies require flexibility. However, having spoken to various stakeholders, I have seen no example where such flexibility would be required or reason why we could not reflect it in the code, rather than by watering down victims’ rights in the Bill.

As the Government’s reasoning remains unclear, I hope the Minister might clear that up for us today. If the intention is to prevent civil litigation from victims, the Bill already achieves that. Victims deserve some form of accountability from criminal justice agencies, and weakening victims’ rights by using the word “should” will result only in a Bill that fails to make a difference on the ground.

The victims code has been in place since 2006. Compliance with the code has always been low; even though the Government have reformed it four or five times, that has not driven better compliance. The Bill is an opportunity to improve that, but by stating that agencies only “should” comply, it absolutely fails to do so. I will repeat what London Victims’ Commissioner Claire Waxman said during the evidence session. She said that

“delivering the code is a minimum level of service to victims. Even if agencies are complying and delivering it, it is still a minimum level.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 29, Q67.]

As shadow victims Minister, I speak to survivors every day. Their harrowing truths and inspiring bravery helps shape what we do in this place, and I thank every single one of them for sharing their truth with me. I want to pay tribute to one of them, Sophie, who spoke to me. She was raped when she was just 19 years old. After Sophie reported the rape to the police, she was brought in to be interviewed, after which months went by with little contact or communication about her case and what was going to happen. She was not told of her entitlement to an independent sexual violence adviser for eight months after speaking to the police and had to wait two years for her day in court after it was pushed back several times. Sophie was told by the detective on her case that it would help her to give evidence in person in court, which she did, even though she was absolutely petrified and the thought of it retraumatised her. She desperately did not want to.

Her Crown Prosecution Service barrister looked at Sophie’s case for only 30 minutes before the trial. He had no communication with her before that—not even a conversation before the trial began. Sophie told me that she felt like a tick-box exercise for the CPS to just get its stats up and get the case into court.

During the trial, Sophie was put behind a screen to protect her from seeing the perpetrator—a little screen that goes up, knowing that the perpetrator is there—but the defence barrister persisted and used a horrific scare tactic to throw Sophie off. He asked her to open a booklet that was in front of her. She opened it to page 1 and in front of her was the image of the man who was the perpetrator. Her own barrister did absolutely nothing to stop that. That not only had a very real mental health impact there and then—she suffered a panic attack and anxiety and had to leave the courtroom—but she could not gather herself afterwards because it had retraumatised her. She said to me that she thought she was going to vomit there and then in the court, and nobody did anything to stop her. The witness assistant, who was of course trying her best, said, “Pull yourself together, Sophie. You need to go back in there and do this.”

Sophie told me that because of the technique used she was unable to remember any of the important details of the incident, and we know what trauma does: people cannot recall really important incidents and detail. The intense stress and anxiety she was experiencing meant that she just could not remember. She believes that that led to the not guilty verdict.

After waiting a torturous two years for justice, Sophie was retraumatised and her attacker walked free. Although I agree with the four overarching principles, I do not agree that they are a step in the right direction for victims. We must make sure that the Bill is fit for purpose and that agencies have a duty on them. That is why the amendments and changing “should” to “must” are essential.

Victims and Prisoners Bill (Seventh sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making a really powerful speech. Does she agree that many of us have seen cases in our surgeries where mothers who have escaped domestic abuse tell us that they have been re-traumatised by the family courts, that abusive ex-partners often use the process in the family courts as a further form of abuse and control, and that the children are weaponised?

[Anna McMorrin]

I absolutely agree, and that gets to the core of the point I am making. Domestic abuse is the central issue in private law children’s proceedings in family courts, and evidence shows that allegations of domestic abuse are present in at least half of all such proceedings. A study by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service published in 2021 found domestic abuse allegations in 62% of cases and that special measures in those cases were not being upheld.

Earlier this week, I met Dr Charlotte Proudman, a barrister who specialises in family law at Goldsmith Chambers. She has worked with many survivors and victims of domestic abuse, taking their cases to appeal and being successful when she does so, which shows that there is a problem. Her dedication to those mothers has brought hope to many women and survivors of domestic abuse, but it should not take going to appeal or having a barrister take a case to appeal, or overturning those cases, to expose the problems in the family courts.

The rights of victims of domestic abuse under section 63 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 are not implemented consistently or, even worse, they are not informed of those rights at any point in the process. Many of the survivors report suffering, revictimisation and retraumatisation caused by the family justice system. It is clear that the special measures introduced in the 2021 Act have made no difference whatsoever to victims’ experiences on the ground. There is an opportunity in this Bill to change that and to strengthen the victims code to place a duty on agencies to inform domestic abuse survivors of their rights under section 63, “Special measures in family proceedings: victims of domestic abuse” of the 2021 Act. I hope the Minister agrees that we should put this in the code to overturn what is happening now.

Victims and Prisoners Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Given his personal experience and connection, this will not have been easy for him, and I am grateful for not only his words, but his service on the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Public protection decisions: life prisoners

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 96, in clause 32, page 24, line 25, at end insert—

“(fa) the nature and seriousness of any conduct by the prisoner which—

(i) is alleged,

(ii) is as yet unproven,

(iii) has not resulted in a conviction,

which may have implications for the risk posed by the prisoner.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 118.

[Ellie Reeves]

This victims Bill is long-awaited. Although it is good to finally be on my feet, I should say that part 3 is a distraction to debating the real and serious issue of victims. Many of us share the view that it should never have made its way into the Bill.

Amendment 96 seeks to broaden the list of things that the Parole Board must take into account when making a release decision. I want to set the context by saying a few words about the new release test. No one wants to see dangerous criminals released from prison, and the release of John Worboys, Colin Pitchfork and Tracey Connelly rightly led to public outrage. Setting the test out in legislation and introducing a new threshold may help to give greater transparency and consistency. However, it is not clear whether it will make a difference to how the Parole Board already operates. In evidence to this Committee, the Parole Board chief executive stated that it currently assesses risk

“as to whether the prisoner’s continued detention remains necessary for the protection of the public. That means that public protection is always paramount in our decision making.”

He went on to say that

“what is on the face of the Bill, in reality, gives effect to what the Parole Board already says in its guidance that we should take into account. We think that the legislation should make no significant changes to our practice.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 51, Q100.]

My concern is that setting out in legislation the list of factors that the Parole Board has to take into account could lead to the process becoming a tick-box exercise. Clauses 32 and 33 set out matters—such as the nature and seriousness of the offence and the risk of the prisoner failing to comply with their licence conditions on release or committing further offences—that the Parole Board rightly takes into account when making a public protection decision. Although the list is non-exhaustive, there is a risk that factors that are not on the list but that may be important in a particular case do not get the consideration that they deserve. That could lead to poorer decision making, leaving the public less safe, and that leads me to my amendment.

I am deeply concerned that the draft list of criteria does not include alleged but unproven offences. Let us take Worboys, for example. His release on parole in 2018 rightly caused outrage. He was originally charged with attacking 14 women and faced 23 charges, including rape, sexual assault and administering a substance with intent. He was convicted of 19 offences in 2009. In December 2019, he was handed two additional life sentences for attacks on four more women, as it was revealed that he had confessed to targeting 90 victims. The failings of the police in this case are widely acknowledged, but on his release in 2018, the dossier from the Ministry of Justice did not emphasise the other allegations against him. Therefore the panel did not consider the alleged offences that he had not been charged with but, on the balance of probabilities, he had committed. In 2019, the Parole Board guidance was changed so that alleged but unproven allegations could be taken into account.

Litigation on this point followed, in the case of Pearce. Mr Pearce was sentenced after three offences of sexual assault. After serving his minimum sentence, the Parole Board refused to direct his release and instead directed his transfer to open conditions. In accordance with the new guidance on allegations, the board, when assessing his risk, took into account multiple unproven allegations about other alleged sexual assaults carried out by Mr Pearce against women and girls. Although the Court of Appeal found that the decision in respect of Mr Pearce was lawful, it held that parts of the board’s guidance were unlawful, as in its view only proven allegations could fairly be taken into account in the risk assessment.

The Parole Board appealed to the Supreme Court, which concluded in April this year that the Parole Board’s guidance on the unproven allegations against a prisoner is lawful. Therefore, alleged but unproven offences may be taken into account in release decisions where the Parole Board decides that they are relevant to the question of a prisoner’s risk to the public.

Although that is a step forward for victims and public safety, the Government’s failure to include alleged but unproven allegations on the statutory list is a huge step backwards. That was the key lesson from the Worboys case, so the omission is startling. It risks not only diluting the list’s importance, but the exclusion by panels of such allegations from their decision making. If that happens, decision making will be of a worse quality, and that will put the public at greater risk. That is why these amendments are so important, and I urge the Government to support them.

[Edward Argar]

I welcome the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge not only to her seat but to her feet, to take on part 3 of the Bill. In answer to her opening comments, the reason that part 3 is included is that when we talk to victims, there are two key points at which they raise concerns and anxieties. The first is the initial stage, from the arrest to the charge, the court process and—hopefully—the conviction and sentencing of the perpetrator. The second, which has been raised with me, the Lord Chancellor and others, is when a perpetrator is coming up for release or parole. That is the thread that links part 1 and part 3 of the Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her amendment, which would explicitly add unproven allegations to the list of matters that the Parole Board must take into account when deciding whether it is safe for a prisoner to be released. I appreciate the point that she made about specific cases; I am a Leicestershire MP, and the impact and trauma of Colin Pitchfork’s deeds are still very much there among communities, not just in the immediate area where it took place but across my constituency, because people remember them with horror. In this context, “unproven allegations” refers to allegations that the prisoner has committed offences in addition to those of which they were convicted. Those could be, for example, complaints recorded by the police or misconduct in prison.

I agree with the hon. Lady that unproven allegations are an important factor in risk assessment. I reassure her that they are already given the consideration they require by parole panels and that the Parole Board has specific guidance for its members on the matter. Members of the Committee may be aware that the Supreme Court recently handed down its judgment in the case of Pearce, to which the hon. Lady referred. The case considered the board’s guidance on unproven allegations, and the Court held that the Parole Board can have regard, where appropriate, to any unproven allegations regarding a prisoner and is free to give them due consideration as part of that release decision even where that material has not been established as a fact. The Parole Board has since updated its guidance in the light of the judgment and continues to consider unproven allegations in its decisions.

Given the potential importance of unproven allegations, we considered adding them to the list of mandatory criteria. However, this is a technical area of law and we fear that the amendment would potentially go further than the Pearce judgment, which would risk including baseless allegations that lack credibility and going beyond the parameters set by the Supreme Court judgment. In our view, the position agreed by the Supreme Court is clear and has been carefully considered. We are content that the developed jurisprudence gives sufficient clarity for the board to fairly consider allegations of this kind as it makes decisions.

Clauses 32 and 33 both contain a list of factors that the Parole Board must take into account when making a public protection decision about a prisoner. The list is explicitly not exhaustive. The list includes the conduct of the prisoner while serving their sentence as well as the risk that the prisoner would commit a further offence if no longer confined. In our view, unproven allegations already fall within the scope of these mandatory considerations. Members of the Parole Board are experts in the field and will consider all relevant and available information in line with the guidance regardless. On the basis that unproven allegations already fall within the wording and scope of both these mandatory considerations, that unproven allegations are therefore already an important part of the decision-making process, and that clear guidelines have been handed down by the Supreme Court, we consider the amendment unnecessary.

[Ellie Reeves]

I thank the Minister for those comments. I note his point about the drafting of the amendment perhaps going further than the judgment in Pearce. Given the importance of getting this right, might we look at a way that alleged but unproven allegations could be incorporated into the list between now and Report?

[Edward Argar]

In the nicest way, I would not wish to leave the hon. Lady out of the multiple conversations that I am likely to have over the summer with her right hon. and hon. Friends about different aspects of the Bill. I hope that it has come across in Committee that I am always happy to work constructively with the Opposition on this. We may not always reach the same conclusion or end up in the same place, but I am always happy to have those conversations with the hon. Lady.

[Ellie Reeves]

I am grateful for those assurances about working together on this. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 33 stand part.

That the schedule be the schedule to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for the point she makes, and I understand that she is getting at how widely one draws out what is relevant and useful information pertinent to decision making. I appreciate the point she makes about some factors not currently being explicitly taken into consideration under the provision. On that specific point of law, I hope she will allow me either to write to her or revert to her before the Committee concludes.

With subsection (5)(c), the requirement is then to consider the prisoner’s behaviour, even in prison or on licence, while serving the sentence. The decision maker must review the available evidence—for example, from probation officers—as to whether the prisoner has complied with all the demands made of them. There is a link to subsection (5)(f), which considers the impact of any rehabilitative interventions, such as therapeutic treatment or engagement in education, and their effectiveness in reducing the prisoner’s risk to the public.

I have already mentioned subsection (5)(d). Subsection (5)(e) covers the assessment the decision maker must make in respect of what licence conditions might be imposed if the prisoner is suitable for release, and what the likelihood of the prisoner complying with them is. Subsection (5)(g) requires the decision maker to take account of any submission made on behalf of the prisoner as to their suitability for release. An account must also be taken of any submission from the Secretary of State, which may include their view on the risks posed by the prisoner.

As we have discussed at length, it is vital that we put victims at the heart of the criminal justice system. For that crucial reason, subsection (6) says that when assessing the level of risk that the prisoner may pose to the public in general

“the decision-maker must in particular have regard to the protection of any victim of the prisoner.”

In that context, my interpretation of the requirement on the board to take all relevant evidence into account—as I said, I will write to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley if I have misinterpreted this—is that if relevant material is held by another authority, it can still be obtained on behalf of the Secretary of State and considered. I hope that she will allow me to confirm that to her in writing.

The criteria set out in subsections (5) and (6) are comprehensive and undoubtedly assist the decision maker in assessing risk; however, it is not an exhaustive list of criteria. That is confirmed by subsection (9), which clarifies that the decision maker is not limited in the matters to be taken into account when assessing a prisoner’s risk. The Government consider it necessary to be transparent and clear when it comes to making very important public protection decisions that have significant consequences for the public, victims and prisoners. The high threshold for release and the criteria by which risk is assessed must therefore be there for everyone to see and understand. We are satisfied that the clause codifies the release test used by the Parole Board, and the board advises that it could be a welcome clarification for it of the factors that its members already take into consideration.

[Ellie Reeves]

I thank the Minister for setting out the clauses comprehensively. They are broadly welcome, in that they introduce a new public threshold in legislation. Although putting the release test in legislation and introducing the new threshold may help to give greater transparency and consistency, there remains a question mark about whether it is necessary. The Chair of the Justice Committee observed on Second Reading that

“there is an element in this part of the Bill of trying to solve a problem that does not exist and therefore a risk of over-engineering the system, which we might not need…There is nothing wrong with changing it, and perhaps nothing wrong with expanding it, but are we sure that we are getting this right?”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 602-603.]

Although it was helpful to hear from the Minister today some of the thinking behind the clauses, I notes that the Justice Committee wrote to the Lord Chancellor stating that the changes could have a positive effect on consistency and transparency of Parole Board decision making, but also outlined that the changes are not strictly necessary. Again, there is a question mark about whether parliamentary time could be better spent focusing on victims rather than some of these changes.

Let me return to the concerns I raised previously about the non-exhaustive list of factors for the Parole Board to take into account. There is a risk that the Parole Board may end up giving more weight to those things that are on the list rather than to other factors that may be relevant. I have already spoken about alleged but unproven allegations. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley gave the example of findings that might be made in the family court, particularly in relation to rape and domestic abuse. My worry is that an unintended consequence of specifying a list of things that have to be taken into account might be a failure to take into account issues that are also extremely relevant to risk. Although we broadly we support the clauses, we think those points need a little further reflection.

[Edward Argar]

I am always conscious that the hon. Lady is an extremely able lawyer, so I listen carefully to everything she says and will reflect carefully on her points. I am also conscious that both Lewisham East and Lewisham West are represented on this Committee; Lewisham is well represented. With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule agreed to.

Clause 34

Amendment of power to change test for release on licence of certain prisoners

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

The clause is an amendment to an existing power in section 128 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The power allows the Secretary of State to be responsive to the risk posed by certain cohorts of offenders by allowing changes to the release test applied by the Parole Board by secondary legislation. For example, if the release test was found to no longer be suitable for assessing the risk posed by a particular cohort, the power would allow the Secretary of State to swiftly rectify that by amending the release test to safeguard protection.

The clause simply amends the pre-existing power to ensure it remains operable with the introduction of the Bill. First, it brings the new release test in clauses 32 and 33, which we have just discussed, into this power, so that the Secretary of State can amend it if necessary. Secondly, it ensures that the power also works with the new ministerial second check introduced in the Bill, which we will debate in due course. In the event that the Secretary of State decides to call in a case to remake a decision, he or she will apply the same release test as the Parole Board. Likewise, if a prisoner decides to appeal a decision made by the Secretary of State to the upper tribunal, they will also apply the same release test.

The power is used to change the release test applied by the Parole Board. The release tests applied subsequently by the Secretary of State and the upper tribunal must also be changed, which this clause facilitates. The clause is not new policy, but simply ensures that the pre-existing legislation continues to operate consistently and effectively. I commend it to the Committee.

[Ellie Reeves]

We welcome clause 34, which will allow future changes in the release test to be made by affirmative statutory instrument. The Worboys case demonstrated inadequacies with Parole Board processes, and changes were needed that until then had not been anticipated. It strikes me that in future we may find that changes are needed in ways that we cannot foresee today, but there must be scrutiny of any changes, so I am pleased that the Government have recognised this is a matter for which an affirmative as opposed to a negative statutory instrument is required. We welcome this measured approach.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her support and for her words. I hope clause 34 can stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Fay Jones.)

Victims and Prisoners Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of this Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to [e-mail] or passed their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. It is very hot, so people are welcome to remove their jackets if they so wish.

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 35, page 32, line 9, at end insert—

“(aa) manslaughter;”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 92, in clause 35, page 32, line 22, at end insert—

“(fa) an offence under section 6 of that Act (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);

(fb) an offence under section 8 of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);

(fc) an offence under section 47 of that Act (paying for sexual services of a child) against a person aged under 16;”

Amendment 91, in clause 35, page 32, line 25, at end insert—

“(ha) an offence under section 19 of that Act (sexual assault on a young child by penetration);

(hb) an offence under section 20 of that Act (sexual assault on a young child);

(hc) an offence under section 21 of that Act (causing a young child to participate in a sexual activity);”

Amendment 94, in clause 35, page 32, line 29, at end insert—

“(ja) an offence under Article 13 of that Order (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);

(jb) an offence under Article 15 of that Order (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);”

Amendment 95, in clause 36, page 34, line 40, at end insert—

“(aa) manslaughter;”

Amendment 97, in clause 36, page 35, line 10, at end insert—

“(ea) an offence under sections 6 to 51 of that Act;”

Amendment 119, in clause 36, page 35, line 12, at end insert—

“(ga) an offence under sections 2 to 11 of that Act against a mentally disordered person, as defined by section 17 of that Act;

(gb) an offence under Part 4 or Part 5 of that Act;”

Amendment 98, in clause 36, page 35, line 17, at end insert—

“(ia) an offence under Part 3 or Part 4 of that Order;”

New clause 22—Referral of release decisions to the Court of Appeal: life prisoners—

‘After section 32ZA of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 insert—

“Referral of release decisions to Court of Appeal

327ZAA Referral of release decisions to Court of Appeal

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a prisoner is serving a life sentence imposed in respect of an offence specified or described in section 32ZAB (the “relevant sentence”),

(b) the Parole Board is required to make a public protection decision about the prisoner under section 28(6)(b) or 32(5A), and

(c) the public protection decision relates to the relevant sentence.

(2) Where the Parole Board has made a decision in a case to which this section applies—

(a) the Secretary of State may refer the decision to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, or

(b) a victim may apply to the Secretary of State to request that the prisoner’s case be referred to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal.

(3) Within [30 days] of an application being made under paragraph (2)(b), the Secretary of State must—

(a) exercise the power under subsection (2)(a) and refer the prisoner’s case to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, or

(b) provide to the victim a written statement explaining why they have decided not to exercise that power.

(4) This section applies in relation to a prisoner whose sentence was imposed before, as well as after, this section comes into force.

(5) But nothing in this section affects the duty of the Secretary of State to release a prisoner whose release has been directed by the Parole Board before this section comes into force.

(6) In this section, “public protection decision” has the meaning given by section 28ZA(2).

327ZAB Offences for purposes of Court of Appeal referral

(1) The offences specified or described in this section (for the purposes of section 32ZAA) are—

(a) murder;

(b) manslaughter;

(c) an offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime 10 and Victims Act 2004, where a child has died as a result of the prisoner’s unlawful act;

(d) an offence specified in any of paragraphs 41 to 43 of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code (specified terrorism offences other than inchoate offences);

(e) an offence that is not an inchoate offence and was determined to have a terrorist connection, within the meaning given by section 247A(7A) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;

(f) an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape);

(g) an offence under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13);

(h) an offence under section 6 of that Act (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);

(i) an offence under section 8 of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);

(j) an offence under section 47 of that Act (paying for sexual services of a child) against a person aged under 16;

(k) an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 9) (rape);

(l) an offence under section 18 of that Act (rape of a young child);

(m) an offence under section 19 of that Act (sexual assault on a young child by penetration);

(n) an offence under section 20 of that Act (sexual assault on a young child);

(o) an offence under section 21 of that Act (causing a young child to participate in a sexual activity);

(p) an offence under Article 5 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)) (rape);

(q) an offence under Article 12 of that Order (rape of a child under 13);

(r) an offence under Article 13 of that Order (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);

(s) an offence under Article 15 of that Order (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);

(t) an offence that—

(i) is abolished, and

(ii) would have constituted an offence referred to in paragraphs (a) to (s) if committed on or after the date on which it was abolished.

(2) A sentence in respect of a service offence is to be treated for the 35 purposes of section 32ZAA as if it were a sentence in respect of the corresponding offence.

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) “service offence” means an offence under—

(i) section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006,

(ii) section 70 of the Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955, or

(iii) section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957;

(b) “corresponding offence” means—

(i) in relation to an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales within the meaning of that section;

(ii) in relation to an offence under section 70 of the Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955, the corresponding civil offence within the meaning of that Act;

(iii) in relation to an offence under section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the civil offence within the meaning of that section.

327ZAC Powers of the Court of Appeal

(1) On a referral of a prisoner’s case under section 32ZAA, the Court of Appeal may—

(a) direct the Secretary of State to release the prisoner on licence as soon as is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances including, in particular, the need to make arrangements in connection with any conditions that are to be included in the licence, or

(b) decide that the prisoner should remain confined and direct the Secretary of State accordingly.

(2) In making a decision under subsection (1), the Court of Appeal must have regard to whether there is no more than a minimal risk that, were the prisoner no longer confined, the prisoner would commit a further offence the commission of which would cause serious harm.

(2A) In making a decision under subsection (1), the Court of Appeal must consider—

(a) any statement made by the Parole Board as to the reasons for its decision,

(b) the evidence considered by the Parole Board in reaching its decision,

(c) any representations made to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State, by a victim, or on behalf of the prisoner,

(d) any transcript made of a Parole Board hearing in respect of the case.

(3) No judge shall sit as a member of the Court of Appeal on the hearing of a reference under this section in respect of a sentence they passed.”’

New clause 23—Referral of release decisions to the Court of Appeal: fixed-term prisoners—

‘(1) After section 256AZB of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 insert—

“Referral of release decisions to the Court of Appeal

256AZBA Referral of release decisions to the Court of Appeal

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a prisoner is serving a fixed-term sentence imposed in respect of an offence specified or described in section 256AZBB (the “relevant sentence”),

(b) the Board is required to make a public protection decision about the prisoner under a relevant provision of this Chapter, and

(c) the public protection decision relates to the relevant sentence.

(2) Where the Parole Board has made a decision in a case to which this section applies—

(a) the Secretary of State may refer the decision to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, or

(b) a victim may apply to the Secretary of State to request that the prisoner’s case be referred to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal.

(3) Within [30 days] of an application being made under paragraph (2)(b), the Secretary of State must—

(a) exercise the power under subsection (2)(a) and refer the prisoner’s case to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, or

(b) provide to the victim a written statement explaining why they have decided not to exercise that power.

(4) This section applies in relation to a prisoner whose sentence was imposed before, as well as after, this section comes into force.

(5) But nothing in this section affects the duty of the Secretary of State to release a prisoner whose release has been directed by the Parole Board before this section comes into force.

(6) In this section—

“corresponding power of direction” , in relation to a relevant provision, is the power of the Board to direct the Secretary of State to release the prisoner, for the purposes of which the public protection decision is made (see section 237B);

“public protection decision” has the meaning given by section 237A(2);

“relevant provision” has the meaning given by section 237B.

256AZBB Offences for the purpose of Court of Appeal referral

(1) The offences specified or described in this section (for the purposes of section 256AZBA) are—

(a) manslaughter;

(b) an offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, where a child has died as a result of the prisoner’s unlawful act;

(c) an offence specified in any of paragraphs 41 to 43 of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code (specified terrorism offences other than inchoate offences);

(d) an offence that is not an inchoate offence and was determined to have a terrorist connection, within the meaning given by section 247A(7A);

(e) an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape);

(f) an offence under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13);

(g) an offence under sections 6 to 51 of that Act;

(h) an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 9) (rape);

(i) an offence under section 18 of that Act (rape of a young child);

(j) an offence under sections 2 to 11 of that Act against a mentally disordered person, as defined by section 17 of that Act;

(k) an offence under Part 4 or Part 5 of that Act;

(l) an offence under Article 5 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1769 (N.I. 2)) (rape);

(m) an offence under Article 12 of that Order (rape of a child under 13);

(n) an offence under Part 3 or Part 4 of that Order;

(p) an offence that—

(i) is abolished, and

(ii) would have constituted an offence referred to in paragraphs (a) to (o) if committed on or after the date on which it was abolished.

(2) A sentence in respect of a service offence is to be treated for the purposes of section 256AZBA as if it were a sentence in respect of the corresponding offence.

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) “service offence” means an offence under—

(i) section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006,

(ii) section 70 of the Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955, or

(iii) section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957;

(b) “corresponding offence” means—

(i) in relation to an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales within the meaning of that section;

(ii) in relation to an offence under section 70 of the Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955, the corresponding civil offence within the meaning of that Act;

(iii) in relation to an offence under section 42 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957, the civil offence within the meaning of that section.

256AZBC Powers of the Court of Appeal

(1) On a referral of a prisoner’s case under section 256AZBA, the Court of Appeal may—

(a) direct the Secretary of State to release the prisoner on licence as soon as is reasonably practicable in all the circumstances including, in particular, the need to make arrangements in connection with any conditions that are to be included in the licence, or

(b) decide that the prisoner should remain confined and direct the Secretary of State accordingly.

(2) In making a decision under subsection (1), the Court of Appeal must have regard to whether there is no more than a minimal risk that, were the prisoner no longer confined, the prisoner would commit a further offence the commission of which would cause serious harm.

(3) In making a decision under subsection (1), the Court of Appeal must consider—

(a) any statement made by the Parole Board as to the reasons for its decision,

(b) the evidence considered by the Parole Board in reaching its decision,

(c) any representations made to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State, by a victim, or on behalf of the prisoner,

(d) any transcript made of a Parole Board hearing in respect of the case.

(4) No judge shall sit as a member of the Court of Appeal on the hearing of a reference under this section in respect of a sentence they passed.”’

[Ellie Reeves]

I want to say from the outset that part 3 of the Bill had no pre-legislative scrutiny and there was a lack of consultation with the Parole Board. What that really shows, as I understand it, is that this policy was driven by the previous Justice Secretary. The current Justice Secretary is very reasonable; I hope that, along with his colleagues, he will look at these measures again and be open to our proposals.

The decisions to release John Worboys, Colin Pitchfork and Tracey Connelly rightly caused public outrage and undermined confidence in the Parole Board, but the proposals in clauses 35 and 36 are not the right approach. I will set out why new clauses 22 and 23 are so important. They both seek to give victims more of a voice and provide a mechanism for a check on Parole Board decisions, but they do so in a way that would give victims confidence. They would not undermine the separation of powers or the independence of the Parole Board, nor would they lead to the politicisation of Parole Board decisions.

Clauses 35 and 36 effectively give the Secretary of State a veto over a release decision on top tier prisoners. Our new clauses would give the Secretary of State a power to appeal a Parole Board decision to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal; give victims the power to refer their case to the Secretary of State to make an application on their behalf to the Court of Appeal; and expand the top tier cases in scope so that more victims could benefit. Likewise, the amendments would also expand the top tier.

The new clauses are far preferable to the current measures in the Bill, for the following reasons. First, the Parole Board acts as a quasi-judicial, independent and impartial body. Giving the Secretary of State the veto on its decisions would undermine that, and fundamentally change the application of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the Executive.

Nobody wants dangerous criminals to be released, but allowing a politician power over a release decision will leave them vulnerable to public or party opinion, which can run counter to the actual risk of reoffending. That could lead to decisions being made because they are politically or publicly expedient, not because they are properly considered or based on a fair assessment of risk. As the former Conservative Prime Minister Sir John Major recently stated in his lecture to the Prison Reform Trust,

“I do not see how (or why) the Justice Secretary would be able to reach a more just decision than the Parole Board. Any single Government Minister—however able or well-meaning—would be far more vulnerable to public campaigns and, under pressure, to make a harsher decision to appease them. This is a very slippery slope. I do not think that any politician should have that power, and I hope the new Justice Secretary will reconsider or—if he does not—that Parliament will deny it.”

He is absolutely right. That is why new clauses 22 and 23 seek to give power not to the Justice Secretary, but to the Court of Appeal, which will not bow to political pressure. That would maintain the separation of powers.

Clauses 35 and 36 are also likely to be incredibly costly. The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment assumes that 20% of top tier Parole Board decisions to release will be vetoed, suggesting that about 150 people a year will not be released. The central estimate outlines that that will require an additional 640 prison places to be built, at a cost of £238.3 million and an annual running cost of £28.7 million. In total, the central estimate puts that policy at just shy of £0.5 billion. It is disappointing that in a Bill that is supposed to be about victims, the only money that can be found is for prisoners.

Furthermore, as the Justice Committee outlined in its letter to the Justice Secretary after its evidence session, the only way it could see the Justice Secretary being able to make release decisions to the same standard as the Parole Board would be, in effect, to create a shadow Parole Board in the Ministry of Justice. How much resource and focus would that take?

New clauses 22 and 23 are likely to be far more cost-effective. They would not need the creation of a shadow Parole Board to ensure that the Secretary of State could make decisions effectively; the Court of Appeal is already expert in such work. Allowing an appeal mechanism to the criminal division is likely to be much less expensive than creating a complex veto process, which is full of legal risk for the Government.

In addition, clauses 35 and 36 do not give a mechanism for a victim to challenge release decisions; they only give the right to the prisoner and the Secretary of State. New clauses 22 and 23 would give victims, who are supposed to be at the heart of the Bill, more rights by allowing them to ask the Secretary of State to put in an appeal against Parole Board decisions. In effect, that would mirror the unduly lenient sentence scheme and, if a referral were not possible, those victims would be given reasons why. Their rights would also be increased by the new clauses through the expansion of the top tier of cases. The other amendments in this group would do the same.

Under the Government proposals, only murder, rape, causing the death of a child, and serious terror offences are in the top tier for which a referral can be made. New clauses 22 and 23 and our amendments would expand the top tier to include sexual offences against children that fall short of rape. Most people would agree that all sexual offences against children should be treated with the utmost seriousness, and their exclusion from the list of top tier cases risks diminishing that. Under our new clauses and amendments, the top tier would also include manslaughter. That is particularly important, because many men who kill their partners or ex-partners are convicted of manslaughter and not of murder.

I turn to the impact of clauses 35 and 36 on victims. The independent Victims’ Commissioner for London, Claire Waxman, outlined in her written evidence to this Committee that she believed the clauses would compound victims’ trauma and suffering. In oral evidence, she said of victims:

“Putting these measures in gives them a false sense of hope. We are telling them that there is a chance that the Justice Secretary can veto the Parole Board decision and that the prisoners will not be released.

What will actually happen in reality is that, yes, the Justice Secretary might veto, but that prisoner will then have legal aid to appeal the decision. They will appeal every decision, pulling the bereaved families into even more distress and trauma.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 30, Q68.]

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, as well as giving false hope, the measures would extend the length of time it takes to get the decisions made, therefore extending the agony that people feel while not knowing what a decision will end up being?

[Ellie Reeves]

That is absolutely right. Not only do the measures give a false hope, but they will cause a huge amount of delay in the system before those primary decisions are ever arrived at. That is incredibly detrimental to victims.

The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment supports the view of the London Victims’ Commissioner. Its estimates suggest that 75 cases a year will, after a lengthy process, result in the Secretary of State’s decision being overturned and the prisoner released. That does not suggest that clauses 35 and 36 will give victims more confidence in the justice system. In fact, the opposite is likely. As the solicitor Andrew Sperling outlined in his evidence to the Justice Committee, that is because the reforms would create a three-tier system of Parole Board, Secretary of State and upper tribunal. He said:

“What you have here is a system being set up that says that there needs to be a three-tier system, and that the Parole Board should not be capable of making decisions in the most serious cases.”

As the Law Society outlined in its written evidence, delays could have the result that

“fewer prisoners serving fixed sentences will be released on licence, instead being released automatically when their sentences end”.

That would create a public safety concern, as prisoners would return to the community without probation supervision, which would be concerning for victims and at odds with what the Bill is supposed to be about, as well as putting the public at risk. New clauses 22 and 23 would prevent those issues from arising, as they would create a more truncated route to a final release decision. Under our proposals, the Court of Appeal would make the final decision, rather than the Secretary of State, with the prisoner then having the right to appeal.

It is worth noting that in 2019 a reconsideration mechanism was introduced that allows parties to a Parole Board case to challenge a release decision. As Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, outlined in an evidence session of the Justice Committee on the Bill, since the mechanism was introduced the Secretary of State has made 50 applications of reconsideration. Mr Jones said that

“in the last four years, the Secretary of State has been concerned about 50 of our decisions, of which, following reconsideration by a judge of the Parole Board, 12 have subsequently been set aside and then reheard.”

He went on to tell the Select Committee that, under the new proposals,

“20% of top-tier decisions may subsequently be set aside by the Secretary of State. That is in stark contrast to the fact that over the last four years, they have sought reconsideration for only 50 decisions. I am not sure how you jump from doing 12 a year to seeking to set aside hundreds of our decisions each year.”

I am aware that the Justice Secretary recently used the mechanism to request a reconsideration of the decision to release Colin Pitchfork, which I welcome, but new clauses 35 and 36 will seemingly make the mechanism irrelevant. New clauses 22 and 23 would complement the mechanism and provide another important check on Parole Board decisions by the Court of Appeal.

Finally, the Prison Reform Trust and a number of other stakeholders outlined in their written evidence that clauses 35 and 36 could lead to poorer, less transparent decision-making. We do not know what criteria the Justice Secretary will follow in exercising the new power. We do not know whether it will be exercised directly by the Secretary of State or under authority delegated to an official. If a prisoner released without the Secretary of State exercising their veto goes on to commit a serious further offence, we do not know whether the Secretary of State or their officials will be subject to the serious further offence review process or held accountable for any errors.

That brings us back to the point made by nearly every stakeholder providing evidence on part 3: why is the Secretary of State better placed to make a release decision than the Parole Board, which has heard the evidence and whose job it is to do this professionally? The reforms will risk poorer decision-making. At the moment the buck stops with the Parole Board, but, if it knew that the final decision rested with the Secretary of State, that could drive down parole decisions, conversely leaving the public less safe. As Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, stated when she gave evidence to the Justice Committee, the clauses

“could have an unintended consequence of making it more difficult for us to recruit judicial members,”

as the role could be seen as downgraded. That could risk the board losing such valuable expertise. Our new clauses would ameliorate those issues.

For all those reasons, I strongly urge the Government to look at their proposals again. They have attracted widespread concern and will undermine the separation of powers, risk the politicisation of police decisions and cost vast sums to implement. They could cause victims more harm and leave the public less safe. New clauses 22 and 23 would give the Secretary of State the power to appeal against a Parole Board decision in cases where they think that the decision is wrong, ensuring that another check is in place. Victims would also be empowered to ask the Secretary of State to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The amendments and new clauses would expand the top tier of cases, increasing victims’ rights and ensuring that some of the worst crimes are treated with the seriousness that they deserve. I hope that the Government will consider that carefully, and look again at their proposals.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Edward Argar)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on a Bill Committee once again, Mrs Murray. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments, which would add sexual offences against a child, sexual offences against those with mental disorders and manslaughter to the list of offences to which the ministerial decision-making power would apply.

To remind the Committee, the ministerial decision power in clauses 35 and 36 imposes a new safeguard—a check and balance—on the release of the most serious offenders in the top tier. It will allow the Secretary of State to intervene on behalf of the public and take a second look at the release decision. I recognise, as I am sure Members on both sides do, that all crimes are serious, especially to their victims, and the top tier in the Bill is not an exhaustive list of serious crimes. Sexual offences committed against children and those with mental disorders cause long-lasting harm to their victims. Those who commit manslaughter have caused immeasurable grief to their victims’ families. The impact of these offences cannot be understated, and the entire parole system needs to be robust in protecting the public from those who commit such grave offences.

The Parole Board does its difficult job well and has a very good track record of assessing risk. Over 99% of offenders directed for release do not go on to commit a serious further offence. It is clear that in the overwhelming majority of cases the Parole Board gets it right. However, the root and branch review of the parole system, published in March 2022, found that a small number of cases have demonstrated the need for an additional safeguard. Some offenders present a heightened risk to the public due to the nature of their crimes, and their release should be approached with even greater caution. They are murderers, rapists, the most serious terrorists and those who have caused or allowed the death of a child.

The top tier cohort has been carefully chosen to capture these offences, and we do not think it is proportionate to widen the cohort of offenders to which the power applies beyond these four offence types. These are the cases that the root and branch review deemed to carry the greatest risk to the public, and they are the cases that most greatly affect public confidence in the justice system.

New clauses 22 and 23 would seek to replace the ministerial decision-making power with a new power to allow the Secretary of State to instead refer a case directly to the Court of Appeal for review, which would determine whether the prisoner was safe to release. The new clause introduces a statutory right for victims in the referral process, expands the offences included in the top tier, and removes the power for the Parole Board to be able to refer cases directly without making a decision. I will come on to these changes in turn, but let me first say that the principle behind the new powers in the Bill is that the most serious offenders should be subject to additional scrutiny before they are released, in order to reinforce our focus on public protection and bolster public confidence. While I recognise our differences in approach, I believe there is a degree of agreement across both sides on that underlying principle.

I turn to the principal difference in the new clause. Let me begin by explaining the different approaches. Clauses 35 and 36 would allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case to retake a release decision, with an onward route of appeal to the upper tribunal. We will come on to this route of appeal and its destination in later clauses. The new clause would instead provide a new power for the Secretary of State to refer a top tier case directly to the Court of Appeal, instead of making a decision themselves.

On the principle of whether it is right that Ministers themselves should directly take decisions, I believe that the public rightly expect a role for Ministers when it comes to the release of the most serious offenders. Keeping the public safe is the Government’s first duty, and it is not unreasonable for Ministers to act as an additional safeguard—as a check and balance in the system. That is why the approach in the Bill is for Ministers to apply the additional safeguard themselves, with an onward route of appeal.

The new clause would introduce a new statutory role for victims in the referral process, by creating a power for them to apply to the Secretary of State to request that the prisoner’s case is referred to the Court of Appeal. Within 30 days, the Secretary of State would be required to either refer the case to the Court of Appeal or provide a written statement explaining to the victim why they have decided not to exercise that power. I understand the concern that victims often feel about the potential release of an offender, and as we implement the reforms in the Bill we will ensure that they are able to make their voices heard as part of the process.

Let me give an example of how we already do this in our existing processes. Under the pre-existing reconsideration mechanism, victims are able to submit a request to the Secretary of State asking them to apply to the Parole Board for a decision to be reconsidered. HM Prison and Probation Service will respond on behalf of the Secretary of State to each victim to confirm whether an application for reconsideration has or has not been made, with an explanation of why. This is an operational process, rather than one set out in primary legislation. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for highlighting the need to ensure that we build the right processes and support for victims into whatever new ministerial or other decision-making model is in place, but I do not consider it necessary to set that out in primary legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but I do not think anyone is suggesting what she suggested in her final sentence. She is right to highlight the tariff difference, which is reflective of something that Parliament decided it wished to do, recognising that it would create a disparity in the tariffs, in the light of the Kinsella murder. Parliament was cognisant of that. Whether that should be looked at is a perfectly reasonable point. In that context, I pay tribute—as I know the hon. Lady would—to the Goulds and Deveys for the campaign they are undertaking on the issue, and to the Killed Women campaign more broadly. Wherever this lands, they are provoking an important public debate on this very important issue and the disparity between whether a knife is taken to the scene of a crime in a public place or is already there.

I will be cautious on the hon. Lady’s specific question about the statistics, because I do not know whether that level of granularity is available, but I will take that away and look. If the data is recorded in a way that answers her question and is publicly available, I will be happy to share it with her.

Finally, the new clause would remove the discretionary referral power, which would allow the Parole Board to send a case directly to the Secretary of State without taking a first-instance decision or, in this instance, directly to the Court of Appeal. The intention behind this route of referral is to allow the Parole Board to refer a case where, for whatever reason, it is unable adequately to make an assessment of risk and so cannot make a robust decision. I recognise that the Justice Committee, as referred to by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge, has also raised concerns about this route of referral, and we are carefully considering the issues raised and the broader point of the Justice Committee in its very swift—for which we are grateful, and I know the Lord Chancellor is grateful—one-off inquiry into part 3 of the Bill.

In subsequent debates, I will outline what we believe is the most appropriate route of referral and why we do not believe that the Court of Appeal is the right route. We believe that that remains the upper tribunal, but that is addressed specifically in subsequent amendments and clauses. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her amendments and new clauses, but I am afraid that at this stage we must resist them.

[Ellie Reeves]

I am particularly disappointed that the Minister does not seem amenable to expanding the top tier, particularly to include those serving sentences for manslaughter. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley set out very clearly why that is so important. As I said in my speech, so many men who kill their partners or ex-partners are in prison for manslaughter rather than murder, and it sends completely the wrong signal.

I am disappointed that the Government are not minded to accept our amendments. I will not push them or the new clauses to a vote, but I hope that the Minister and the Justice Secretary will reflect on the points we have made as the Bill progresses. I beg to ask leave the withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 36 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

The shadow Minister says “what we have always done before”, but the powers and the approach—the so-called separation of powers—are relatively new, and I believe came in under the last Labour Government. If I recall correctly, the Home Secretary under previous Conservative Governments in the ’80s and ’90s had a number of the relevant powers. I take her point, but it is not how this has always been done; it is a relatively new innovation—that is not to say it is a bad one, but I would exercise a degree of caution about whether it is from time immemorial. We have the principle of a separation of powers, of course, but in this space, historically, there has always been a lack of clear delineation—for want of a better expression—in such matters.

Clauses 35 and 36 also allow the Secretary of State to call in a top tier case if the Parole Board has directed release. Around 1,900 top tier cases come before the Parole Board each year and, on average, the board directs release for about 650 of those offenders. In any top tier cases in which release has been directed, the Secretary of State may decide to call in the case and, by doing so, quash the decision of the Parole Board. The Secretary of State will then retake the decision as to whether that offender should be released. If a case is not called in, the decision of the Parole Board stands and the Secretary of State is required to give effect to that release decision as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

For either of the two routes, the Secretary of State will make a decision about whether the offender is safe to be released by applying the full release test, as set out in clauses 32 and 33, based on all the evidence and advice before them. If the Secretary of State decides that the offender should remain in prison, they must notify the prisoner of the reasoning behind their decision and of the prisoner’s right to appeal. We will turn to that right of appeal in the debates on later clauses.

The new power provides an additional safeguard to the release of the most serious offenders, an issue that particularly affects public confidence in the parole process. Victims are often anxious about whether a prisoner who caused them harm is released, out of concern not only for themselves and their families but for the wider public. Allowing the Secretary of State to apply an additional check and balance to such decisions will help to ensure that those who present the highest risk to the public remain in prison.

The board will continue to risk assess offenders in the same way that it does now, independently of the Government, and will continue to make the final decision about release for most parole-eligible offenders. The board does that difficult job well in the vast majority of cases. However, in the few cases where it is necessary, clauses 35 and 36 will allow the Secretary of State to intervene to provide additional scrutiny to release decisions and to further bolster public confidence in the system.

[Ellie Reeves]

When discussing new clauses 22 and 23, I spoke at length about why I do not think that clauses 35 and 36 are the right approach. I will not repeat those concerns; they are on the record already. I will simply add to them by quoting from the speech of the former Conservative Prime Minister Sir John Major to the Prison Reform Trust:

“In the thousands of decisions to be made each year, there is no way that Ministers could possibly match the experience and knowledge of the 350 Parole Board members.”

I listened to what the Minister had to say but I am not reassured. He talked about the Secretary of State providing a check. Under our proposals for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, there would be referrals, so there would still be a role for the Secretary of State, but the referral would be to the Court of Appeal, which we think is a far more sensible and proportionate response. I hope that the Minister has listened to the concerns expressed right across the political spectrum and that he will reflect on them as the Bill makes progress.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful, as ever, to the shadow Minister for her tone and approach. I do not want her to feel left out as we have already debated parts 1 and 2—I am always happy to work with her, too, over the course of the summer. She is very welcome, along with the hon. Member for Rotherham, the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and other shadow Ministers, to meet me over the summer, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), who is the policy Minister for this part of the Bill. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Procedure on referral of release decisions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

Before I start, I should make a correction: I think I just inadvertently took away membership of the Privy Council from the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood. I restore it swiftly, with an apology.

Clause 37 will insert a new section into the Criminal Justice Act 2003, setting out what the Secretary of State must consider as part of their decision making on referral of a case from the Parole Board to them, and allowing the Secretary of State to take any evidence necessary for decision making.

Section 239 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 sets out the requirements of the board in considering an offender’s case, including that it must consider all documents put before it by the Secretary of State, as well as any other evidence obtained, and that, if it deems it necessary to make the decision, it can interview the prisoner. Clause 37 would ensure that the same procedural requirements are replicated for the Secretary of State, including that he or she must consider all the evidence that was before the Parole Board in reaching a decision. The Secretary of State may also make their own findings of fact as appropriate.

The clause also provides for the Secretary of State to make rules on the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State when making release decisions, akin to the Parole Board rules, which are made in secondary legislation and govern the proceedings of the Parole Board. That means that, post the commencement of the legislation, there will be a robust and clear legislative procedure in place for the exercise of the Secretary of State’s power to provide an additional check on the release decisions of the most serious offenders.

[Ellie Reeves]

Clause 37 will allow the Secretary of State to make their own findings of fact, without being bound by previous findings of the Parole Board. The clause also sets out what evidence the Secretary of State must consider in reaching their decision. I have already set out at some length, when speaking on proposed new clauses 22 and 23, why I consider the Secretary of State to be the wrong person to make parole decisions. I will not repeat those concerns, as they are already on the record.

It is clear that under clause 37 the Justice Secretary, unlike the Parole Board, will not have had the benefit of interviewing the prisoner before making a decision about their parole. They could authorise someone to conduct an interview on their behalf, but are not compelled to do so. It is difficult to see how, when the Parole Board has interviewed the prisoner, often for many hours, the Secretary of State, who has not interviewed them, would be in a better position to make an assessment of risk, as the Chair of the Justice Committee made clear on Second Reading:

“I do not think the Secretary of State would normally feel happy acting on hearsay in such circumstances, because at the end of the day it is second-hand evidence and he would have to substitute his judgment for that of those who had heard first-hand evidence.”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 603.]

That further brings into question whether the Secretary of State is the right person to make parole decisions. I hope the Minister will reflect on that as the Bill progresses.

[Edward Argar]

I always reflect very carefully on all points made to me by the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Appeal to Upper Tribunal of decisions on referral: life prisoners

[Ellie Reeves]

I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 38, page 37, line 18, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 100, in clause 38, page 37, line 31, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 101, in clause 38, page 37, line 36, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 102, in clause 38, page 37, line 37, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 103, in clause 38, page 38, line 4, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 104, in clause 38, page 38, line 8, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 105, in clause 38, page 38, line 14, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 106, in clause 39, page 38, line 26, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 107, in clause 39, page 38, line 39, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 108, in clause 39, page 39, line 4, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 109, in clause 39, page 39, line 5, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 110, in clause 39, page 39, line 10, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 111, in clause 39, page 39, line 14, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 112, in clause 39, page 39, line 20, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 113, in clause 40, page 39, line 36, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 114, in clause 40, page 39, line 39, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 115, in clause 41, page 40, line 8, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 116, in clause 41, page 40, line 9, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

Amendment 117, in clause 41, page 40, line 12, leave out “Upper Tribunal” and insert “criminal division of the Court of Appeal”.

[Ellie Reeves]

I have already explained at length why clauses 35 and 36 do not set out the right approach. The Government may be determined to push forward with them, but I am concerned that the upper tribunal may not be the correct forum to hear an appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deny parole. The amendments seek to change the approach, so that any appeal would be to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal.

Unlike criminal courts or the Parole Board, the upper tribunal has no experience of assessing the risk of harm to the public. It is not a fact-finding body; rather, it is there to deal with points of law. Therefore it is unclear why the Government believe that the upper tribunal would be best placed to make such assessments. A more appropriate mechanism for dealing with appeals against decisions by the Secretary of State would be via the Court of Appeal. That view is shared by many.

In evidence to the Justice Committee, his honour Peter Rook KC, a former Old Bailey judge and current vice chair of the Parole Board, outlined that, given the likely need for the calling of evidence from witnesses, any appeal should go to the Court of Appeal criminal division. That is because, unlike the upper tribunal, the Court of Appeal criminal division has experience of such matters.

The Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), made a powerful contribution on Second Reading. He made the point that an appeal can be made on judicial review grounds, which requires a permission stage, or on the merits, which does not require permission. As a result, it is likely that any prisoner who appeals the Secretary of State’s decision will do so on the merits. That will then effectively require a rehearing, which the upper tribunal would be ill equipped to deal with.

A letter from the Justice Committee to the Lord Chancellor stated:

“While there is no doubt that it is right that the final decision on release should lie with an independent court or tribunal, the proposed appeal mechanism in the Bill is flawed. We can see that there could be a case for a merits-based appeal mechanism from the Parole Board, but in our view that should be to the Court of Appeal criminal division rather than to the Upper Tribunal.”

The letter goes on:

“It was pointed out to us that the appeal, particularly on merits, will logically have to be by way of a re-hearing and may frequently involve taking oral evidence. The Upper Tribunal has no experience in or procedures for dealing with this, whereas the Court of Appeal criminal division does.”

I hope that the Government will reflect on that, and reconsider whether the upper tribunal is the appropriate forum for any appeal, or whether the criminal division of the Court of Appeal would be better suited.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her amendment, which would change the appellate chamber for appeals of any Secretary of State decision to refuse release to the Court of Appeal, rather than the upper tribunal. I know that the Justice Committee has also heard evidence that suggests that the Court of Appeal might be the appropriate venue for referral appeals. The hon. Lady and I may disagree on the underlying point about the role of the Secretary of State, but in looking specifically at which is the most appropriate appellate route, the Government feel, for specific procedural and legal reasons, that the Court of Appeal is the wrong route. It may help the Committee if I set out the Government’s position on that point.

The appeals in question will be where the Secretary of State has called in a Parole Board decision to release a top tier offender, or the board has referred a case to the Secretary of State for an initial release decision. I appreciate that other amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge propose the direct referral of a decision by the Parole Board, but the principle is the same in either case: a judicial body with the correct powers and expertise, whether that is the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal, would ultimately be required to assess the decision. Top tier offenders, as we have already debated, are those who have committed the most serious crimes, such as murder and rape, so it is only right that there is a second check on any decision to release them.

The Government’s view is that the public will be further reassured if that check is made by the Secretary of State or another Minister acting on their behalf. Although I say “check”, it will, of course, be much a more thorough review than that term might imply. The procedure set out in part 3 for verifying whether an offender is suitable for release will require the Secretary of State to apply the public protection test in full and to reach a decision as to whether the offender, if released, would pose

“no more than a minimal risk”

of committing an offence that would cause “serious harm.” That test is the very same release test that will be applied by the Parole Board, which is set out in clauses 32 and 33, which we considered on Thursday.

Even though the Secretary of State and the Parole Board will have applied the same test, there may be occasions when the Secretary of State reaches a different conclusion from the Parole Board and judges, such that a top tier offender has not satisfied the threshold for release and should therefore remain in prison. In such cases, part 3 enables the offender to appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision not to release them. It is right that an appeal should be possible. The ability to challenge a decision is a crucial mechanism and safeguard in our justice system, and it provides a route for ensuring that decisions have been taken correctly and fairly.

The grounds on which an appeal may be brought forward are laid out in clauses 38 and 39. They are straightforward and comprehensive. An appeal may be made either on the grounds that the Secretary of State’s decision is flawed in some way—for example, it is irrational or there has been an error of fact—or it may be made on a merits ground, that is, on the grounds that the prisoner believes they meet the minimal risk threshold for release. The

“no more than a minimal risk”

ground will require the appellate court, whether that be the upper tribunal or the Court of Appeal, to apply the public protection test to determine whether the prisoner is safe to release. That may involve a fresh hearing of the case, if the upper tribunal considers it necessary, and may require the taking of oral evidence.

The amendments require us to consider which appellate court is best placed to fulfil these functions and hear appeals. The Court of Appeal is a statutory body that has its powers set out in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It primarily considers appeals from the Crown court against conviction or sentence. Section 2 of the 1968 Act explains that the court may allow an appeal against conviction if it thinks the conviction is unsafe; otherwise it has to dismiss the appeal. It also has powers under section 3 of the 1968 Act to substitute a conviction for another offence.

In determining these issues, and other matters under the 1968 Act, the Court of Appeal does not need to give any consideration to whether a prisoner is safe to release, nor does it conduct re-hearings on the facts. If the Court of Appeal were to be the venue to hear appeals from a decision of the Secretary of State not to release, substantive amendments would have to be made to the 1968 Act and training would have to be given to the Lords Justices of Appeal. Taking on this additional work could have a detrimental effect on the timescale in which the court can hear appeals from those who consider that they have been wrongly convicted and who are serving prison sentences as a result.

On the other hand, the upper tribunal has wide-ranging powers already extant under section 25 of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, facilitated by the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, which gives it the same powers as the High Court in terms of attendance, examination of witnesses, production and inspection of documents, and broad scope to conduct and administer hearings. The tribunal has experience in hearing oral evidence and in making decisions in the light of such evidence. For example, it takes oral evidence in appeals against decisions of the Disclosure and Barring Service, and occasionally may also do so to remake a decision after setting aside a decision of the first tier tribunal.

We therefore conclude that, on balance, the upper tribunal is best placed, in terms of the existing legislative powers, to hear appeals against the new ministerial decision-making power, and the Court of Appeal does not appear to be as suitable a venue in this context. I appreciate that the shadow Minister may form a different view, but I think this is a balanced judgment and I would urge her not to press her amendments.

[Ellie Reeves]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out why he considers the upper tribunal to be the correct forum. Although I have heard what he has said, we do still have concerns about the appropriateness of the upper tribunal to hear these cases, particularly because most of the appeals are likely to be on substantive grounds. However, we do not propose to press the amendments to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

We have already discussed clauses 35 and 36, which create a new power for the Secretary of State to intervene in release decisions for the most serious offenders. It is only right that if the Secretary of State refuses release, there is recourse to an independent review. Clauses 38 and 39 therefore set out that a prisoner whose release is refused by the Secretary of State under the new provisions can appeal the decision to the upper tribunal. Clause 38 covers life prisoners and clause 39 is for fixed-term prisoners.

There are two routes of appeal available. First, appeals can be made on the grounds that the decision was flawed because it was illegal, irrational, procedurally improper or the Secretary of State made an error of fact that was fundamental to the decision they reached. Subsection (4) clarifies that a decision should not be found to be irrational by the upper tribunal unless it deems that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made that decision. In such cases, permission must be sought from the upper tribunal for the appeal to proceed. If the appeal is upheld, the matter is referred back to the Secretary of State for another decision, in line with other public law decision-making processes; otherwise, the Secretary of State’s decision is upheld and the prisoner remains confined.

Secondly, an appeal is also available on full-merits grounds—that is, whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner remain confined. That would allow the tribunal to examine the evidence and re-take the release decision from first principles by applying the same release test, without referring the case back to the Secretary of State. There is no permission stage for this route of appeal. Ongoing post-tariff detention requires determination of lawfulness by a court, in accordance with article 5(4) of the European convention on human rights. The appeal process will ensure that the referral process is robust and there is a proper check and balance on the use of the Secretary of State’s power.

I urge that clauses 38 and 39 stand part of the Bill.

[Ellie Reeves]

I have set out at length why I do not think that the Secretary of State’s veto is the right approach, but if the Government press ahead with this aspect of the Bill, it is of course absolutely right that there is an appeal mechanism. It is also right that it should be possible to appeal on judicial review grounds or on the substantive merits. As I have said, I anticipate that most appeals will be on the merits, as that will not require a permission stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ellie Reeves]

I have already set out why we do not think that the Secretary of State referral is the right approach. These clauses kick in if the Secretary of State orders a release following a referral, or if the upper tribunal orders a release following a refusal by the Secretary of State. I am concerned as to the appropriateness of either the Secretary of State or the upper tribunal setting licence conditions, given the lack of experience that either one has in doing so. Setting licence conditions is a key part of the Parole Board’s responsibilities; licence conditions are crucial to public safety and confidence. It is a matter that, aided by recommendations from the probation service, the board devotes a great deal of time and thought to. It is difficult to see how the Secretary of State will be able to give individual cases the same level of scrutiny as experienced Parole Board panels. Equally, the upper tribunal has no experience of undertaking this kind of work, nor is it clear whether it has the resources to do so effectively.

That also raises the question of how the Secretary of State will be resourced to perform this role, as making informed decisions about what licence conditions are needed is a complex and highly important task. For example, some licence conditions are standard, but others are made at the discretion of the Parole Board. These discretionary conditions will often be closely related to the board’s assessment of the prisoner’s relationship with his probation officer. In practice, they set requirements for the probation officer as well as the prisoner. The risk is that this process will make it impossible for the Secretary of State to give individual cases the same scrutiny as the Parole Board panel. In reality, therefore, they will be heavily dependent on the probation service’s advice on licence conditions. The danger is that an overstretched probation officer may wish to avoid requirements that are too onerous in themselves or, where they have a good relationship with the prisoner, may recommend licence conditions that are insufficiently cautious.

My concern with these clauses is that important licence terms could be missed, which could lead to the public’s being made less safe. I am also concerned by the written evidence from the Prison Reform Trust about the Bill, in which it outlines that, currently,

“victims can make representations to the Parole Board on the content of licence conditions which the board must have regard to.”

There appears to be no mechanism for that to happen under these clauses, which is a regressive step for a Bill that is meant to be about victims.

I hope that as the Bill progresses the Minister will look at these concerns and outline how the Secretary of State will be resourced to do a task that is normally a matter for experienced Parole Board members, how they will ensure that this does not weaken victims’ current rights, and how the public will be kept safe.

[Edward Argar]

I am happy to reassure the shadow Minister that as the Bill continues its passage we will continue to review how each of those duties would work in practice, and if any of the points that she raises give us further cause for reflection, we will of course consider them carefully.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998: life prisoners

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Edward Argar]

Clauses 42 to 44 will disapply section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 from prisoner release legislation. Specifically, clause 42 disapplies section 3 from chapter 2 of part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which governs life sentences; clause 43 disapplies it from chapter 6 of part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which covers fixed-term sentences; and clause 44 disapplies it from section 128 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which contains a power to amend release for certain cohorts of offenders by secondary legislation.

Let me begin by saying that I and the Government acknowledge that these clauses may have caused some concern and a degree of debate. I entirely understand that and will listen carefully to any points raised by right hon. and hon. Members in our debate and will subsequently, with the Lord Chancellor, reflect on them very carefully. It may, however, be helpful if I first explain the purpose of section 3 of the Human Rights Act and its potential impact on prisoner release legislation.

Section 3 requires primary and subordinate legislation to be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the European convention on human rights, in so far as it is possible to do so. When a court considers section 3, it is required to go further than usual when interpreting legislation that is otherwise incompatible with the convention rights. At times, this has required courts to depart from the unambiguous meaning of legislation. It has required courts to adopt interpretations of legislation that depart from the intention of Parliament when it passed that legislation.

The requirement in section 3 is not only for courts; anyone, including public authorities, applying legislation has a duty under section 3 to interpret it in a compatible way. It is therefore possible that, at some future point, a court interprets release legislation in a way that is contrary to that which Parliament intended. To prevent any such unintended consequences, we are removing the duty in respect of prisoner release legislation. That will ensure that, should the courts find the provisions incompatible, they will apply the section as it was intended to be applied, and not through the prism of section 3 to alter the interpretation. That is part of our approach to ensure that public protection is always at the core of the system. In such cases, declarations of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act will be available.

Clause 45 sets out the approach a court should take if a challenge has been raised on human rights grounds regarding the release of a prisoner. That situation could arise, for example, due to a judicial review, and in that situation the court is required to consider the convention rights of a person in relation to a release decision. The relevant release legislation is the same as for clauses 42 and 43, in chapter 2 of part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 or chapter 6 of part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and subordinate legislation made under both of those chapters.

Clause 45 sets out that, when considering a challenge of that kind, the court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public from the offender. That requirement does not apply to the non-derogable rights set out in article 2, on the right to life; article 3, on the prohibition of torture; article 4(1), on the prohibition of slavery; and article 7, on no punishment without law.

Of course, courts already consider risk to the public. However, the Bill ensures it is given greatest possible weight in the circumstances under consideration, further reinforcing the focus on public protection. I reiterate what I said at the outset, which is that the Secretary of State and I will continue to carefully reflect on points made in Committee and will more broadly review the impact that this section, and others, will have in the context of the legislative framework.

[Ellie Reeves]

It is worth mentioning that the Government’s Bill of Rights, which sought to rip up our Human Rights Act, has thankfully been dropped. A vast amount of parliamentary time and, I am sure, Government bandwidth was taken wrestling with that Bill, until the decision to scrap it was rightly made. My concern is that the clauses may be another way for the former Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), to dilute our human rights framework through the backdoor.

Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with rights under the European convention on human rights as far as is possible. The clauses would disapply section 3 to prisoners as a group when it comes to legislation about their release. A number of groups have rightly raised concerns about that. The Prison Reform Trust said:

“The introduction of specific carve-outs from human rights for people given custodial sentences contradicts one of the fundamental principles underlying human rights—their universality and application to each and every person on the simple basis of their being human. Moreover, it is precisely in custodial institutions like prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state.”

In its written evidence to the Committee, the Bar Council stated:

“There is no evidence of any systemic impairment due to the HRA of the Parole Board’s ability to make high-quality, safe, decisions about prisoners—no statistical analysis of recidivism/public safety concerns from prisoners released due to interpretation of legislation in line with Convention principles.”

In his speech on Second Reading, the Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) said:

“Whatever one’s view of the Human Rights Act, there is no evidence that this is a problem in such cases. In fact, the evidence we heard from practitioners, from both sides, is that it can be helpful to have to have regard to section 3 in these hearings. These clauses seem to be trying to solve a problem that does not exist, and I wonder whether we really need them. It is perfectly possible to have a robust system that still complies with section 3. This is a needless distraction that sends the wrong signal about a certain desire to pick unnecessary fights, which I know is not the current Secretary of State’s approach.”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 604.]

I think that sums it up really well.

Clause 45 directs courts to give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public when a question arises as to whether a person’s rights under the ECHR have been breached in relation to a release decision. The Law Society’s written evidence states:

“It is not clear what the ‘greatest possible weight’ will mean in practice and will require interpretation by judges. We are concerned that this will lead to an increase in litigation challenging this new standard.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

The clause is the first of two covering the Parole Board, and it will enable two changes to be made to the Parole Board rules, which are in secondary legislation. Let me begin with subsection (2), which is concerned with amending the power in section 239(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The power allows the Secretary of State to make rules via secondary legislation about the Parole Board’s proceedings. At the moment, the provision permits rules to be made about how many members deal with particular cases, or that specified cases be dealt with at specified times. The Government want to specify that the rules may also cover which types of Parole Board member must sit on cases.

In “Root and Branch Review of the Parole System”, the Government committed themselves to increasing the number of Parole Board members from a law enforcement background. We will shortly consider clause 47, which will enable that to happen. The review also committed the Government to ensuring that every parole panel considering a case involving a top tier offender would have a law enforcement member.

The Government recognise that each and every type of Parole Board member brings different experience and skills. That range and diversity contribute to generally effective risk assessments and sound decision making. However, members with law enforcement experience, such as former police officers, have particular first-hand knowledge of the impact and seriousness of offending. In addition, they have the ability to interpret and analyse broad ranges of evidence, and many have direct experience of the probation system, including, for example, licence conditions and the likelihood of an offender’s compliance with such conditions.

Law enforcement members are, therefore, uniquely well-placed to inform and enrich the Parole Board’s assessment of risk in top tier cases. To fulfil the commitment made in the root and branch review to have law enforcement members on the parole panels for top tier prisoners, subsection (2) will enable the Secretary of State to make the secondary legislation needed to achieve that goal.

Let me turn to subsection (3), which will enable the Secretary of State to make rules relating to the new power in clauses 35 and 36 that will allow the Parole Board to refer top tier parole cases to the Secretary of State to determine, instead of taking the decision itself.

As I set out when we considered clauses 35 and 36, we anticipate that the Parole Board will refer cases to the Secretary of State only on very rare occasions. However, the power to make referrals is unfettered, so subsection (3) addresses that by giving the Secretary of State the power to make rules in secondary legislation that set out the parameters for the board making a referral. That could include, for example, a requirement that a certain stage in the proceedings must have been reached before a referral could be made. Setting that out in secondary legislation, rather than in primary legislation, allows for greater flexibility should the need arise at some future point to amend, remove or add to the steps needing to be taken before referring a case. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Ellie Reeves]

It is important to note from the outset that police officers already serve on the Parole Board, alongside other members with expertise, including judges, psychologists, psychiatrists and others. They are an incredibly important part of the board’s membership. I would be interested to know from the Minister what evidence there is for this change and what he hopes to achieve by mandating that at least one member with law enforcement experience sits on top tier cases.

In the Justice Committee’s evidence session on part 3 of the Bill, solicitor Andrew Sperling said:

“I am not sure what the evidence of need is here. Is it being suggested that there is a deficiency in Parole Board decision making that will be corrected by importing more police officers?”

The mandating seems to be a backward step. The Ministry of Justice’s 2019 review of the Parole Board rules states:

“Restrictions on which panel members can hear particular types of case have gradually been lifted over…to allow greater flexibility and timeliness in listing the right cases for the right panel members and we do not wish to undo the improvements this has achieved.”

That point was echoed by Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, in this Committee’s oral evidence sessions, when he said that

“the Parole Board is a court in law. In reality, it is best for the court to decide who are the appropriate people on cases, depending on the complexity”.––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 54, Q106.]

The risk of undoing current practice was also outlined by Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, at the Justice Committee’s evidence session. She said that

“we deal with 2,000 top-tier cases a year. If we had to put a person with a law enforcement background on every single case, I think that could build delays into the system.”

The Prison Reform Trust also said it shared that view in its written evidence to this Committee.

In addition to delays, the other issue is experience. I know that the Minister agrees that complex parole cases demand particular care, and require the skills and experience of individual board members. If this clause is used to appoint new members with law enforcement backgrounds, we could have a situation where top tier cases are heard by newer members who, by definition, are inexperienced in making parole decisions. Ms Corby made that point in her evidence:

“It is not the way we currently do things—to put our newest members on our most serious cases. People tend to work their way into the cases”.

With all that in mind, I hope the Minister recognises the risk. I am interested to hear his response and how those unintended consequences will be mitigated.

[Edward Argar]

The hon. Lady alluded to the fact that people with law enforcement experience already sit as Parole Board members, so, on her last point, there is already a pool, which can be augmented and built up over time. That will allow those who are already experienced in Parole Board decision making to sit on some of the most serious cases. That therefore mitigates her concerns.

We are seeking to ensure that the views of those experienced in law enforcement are considered, and we will strengthen that further. That is not a factor that will determine the outcome, but we want to ensure that those voices are heard more consistently and that the process is more formalised than at present. We believe the clause strikes the appropriate balance in ensuring that the board has that perspective at its disposal in any particular case, as well as other relevant perspectives, to aid it in reaching the decision it chooses to reach.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Parole Board membership

--- Later in debate ---

[Janet Daby]

I thank my hon. Friend for everything she just said, and I absolutely agree. Those are absolutely the points that I am making as well. I fear that the power is too subjective and, with respect to the Secretary of State, may be misapplied if not handled carefully. In evidence to this Committee, the chief executive officer of the Parole Board himself said that this risked the Parole Board’s independence, and the measure fails to note that the chair may need to be removed on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity.

Although I do not intend to take amendment 120 to a vote, I hope that it will encourage the Minister to rethink how this clause is drafted, tighten up the removal mechanism, give greater consideration to protecting the Parole Board’s independence and privilege misconduct or incapacity as reasons for removing the chair.

[Ellie Reeves]

I welcome the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East. First, it is right that if someone is not up to the job as chair of the Parole Board, there should be a way of removing them—the public would not expect any less—but clause 47 goes a great deal further than that. Amendment 120 seeks to address that. In his evidence to the Committee, Martin Jones, the Parole Board chief executive, stated:

“There is already a protocol in place that would allow a Secretary of State to follow a process in a fair way to remove the chair of the Parole Board if they believe they are not fulfilling their functions.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 55, Q107.]

Caroline Corby, the chair of the Parole Board, stated at the Justice Committee’s evidence session:

“My concern is that if it is used simply because the Parole Board has made a controversial decision, that potentially impacts on the independence of the Parole Board.”

That is because parole decisions, by their very nature, are sensitive and controversial. Removing the chair because a decision in an individual case is unpopular would likely influence the panel’s decision making, thereby undermining the independence of the board in its judicial decisions. Given that, Ms Corby argued that

“the chair of the Parole Board needs more protection than pretty much any other chair of any arm’s length body.”

For those reasons, the Justice Committee concluded in its letter to the Justice Secretary that there should not be a statutory power to enable the Secretary of State to dismiss the chair of the board in the manner and terms proposed. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about these points and what reassurances he can give me and my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his intervention and, as ever, his knowledge. I am grateful that he offers it in his capacity as a Member of this House, rather than being on the clock as a very senior King’s counsel.

The clause also inserts proposed new sub-paragraphs (2B) to (2E) into schedule 19 to the Criminal Justice Act. Those provisions concern the chair and vice chair of the Parole Board. Proposed new sub-paragraph (2B) puts in statute for the first time the period of appointment for the leadership roles, and it aligns the period so that both appointments are for five years, with the possibility of reappointment for a further five years. Currently, the practice is that the chair’s appointment is for three years, and may be extended for the same period, whereas the vice chair’s appointment is for five years, with a five-year extension. The longer period for the vice chair reflects their additional role as an active panel chair and aligns with the usual tenure of appointment for other board members.

We want to align the chair’s period of appointment with that of other members, thereby offering additional protection to the post holder as well as reducing any risk to the smooth running of the board that might arise if its leader were to change relatively frequently. That said, there might be a rare occasion when requiring a change of chair before the end of their appointment period is the best or only option. For that reason, proposed new sub-paragraph (2C) gives the Secretary of State a power to remove the chair from office if it becomes necessary to do so for reasons of public confidence.

A mechanism already exists for the Secretary of State to ask an independent panel to consider dismissing the chair if there are concerns about the post holder’s performance or their ability to do the job effectively. That route remains our preferred approach in the unlikely event that a dismissal is required. This measure in the clause, which enables the Secretary of State to act independently and without referral to a panel, is a last-resort measure to be applied only in the event of a need for Government to act swiftly and decisively. It is not a power that any Secretary of State would ever use lightly, and ideally there will never be cause to use it at all.

Proposed new sub-paragraphs (2D) and (2E) of schedule 19 to the 2003 Act confirm that the chair and vice chair may not return to those posts once their period of appointment has ended except when they are re-appointed immediately after their initial tenure has ended. However, either postholder may be appointed to another role in the Parole Board.

Finally, I turn to clause 47(7), which sets out the functions of the Parole Board’s chair in statute for the first time. The overall intention is both to define the chair’s role as a strategic leadership role and to make it clear that the postholder does not play any part in the board’s decision making when it comes to considering individual parole cases. Proposed new sub-paragraphs (2A)(1)(a) to (g) of schedule 19 provide a non-exhaustive list of functions to be carried out by the chair. Proposed new sub-paragraphs (2A)(2) and (3) prevent the chair from involvement in individual cases. Although it is for the board to decide who will take on any functions currently carried out by the chair that are related to individual cases, we anticipate they will pass to the vice chair or another member of the board.

[Ellie Reeves]

I associate myself with the Minister’s comments about Caroline Corby and her dedicated leadership of the Parole Board, and I thank her and all the other members of the Parole Board for their important work.

Most of what the Minister has set out is broadly sensible. I have already set out my concerns when speaking to amendment 120, but I want to briefly add that clause 47 also prohibits the chair of the Parole Board from being involved in individual parole cases. That seems to unnecessarily hinder the chair in their role. In evidence to the Justice Committee, Professor Shute said:

“it is…hard to lead the board unless you have experience of sitting on panels…I think it is helpful, if you are going to lead the board, to have first-hand experience of sitting on panels, but this provision is going to prohibit a chair from doing so.”

It its letter to the Justice Secretary, the Justice Committee concluded that

“prohibiting the Chair from sitting on cases would potentially undermine their leadership of the Board, and make the role less attractive to suitable candidates in the future.”Clause 47 seems broadly sensible, but I urge the Minister to consider and reflect on those points.

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, to whom I listened carefully. I will always reflect.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Whole life prisoners prohibited from forming a marriage

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ellie Reeves]

I rise to support clauses 48, 49 and 50. At present, 66 prisoners are serving whole-life sentences in England and Wales. Those sentences reflect some of the most despicable crimes imaginable—ones so serious that the prisoner will never be released from prison. For families trying to rebuild their lives after the devastation of a crime caused by that group of offenders, hearing news that they have been able to conduct a relationship in prison is unimaginable.

There is also often a safeguarding issue. Given the history of the prisoner, it is right that their motivation in pursuing a marriage is examined, as we know that such people often have great capacity for coercion and exploitation. I note the recent case of serial killer Levi Bellfield, who is serving a whole-life sentence for the murders of Marsha McDonnell, Amelie Delagrange and Millie Dowler, as well as the attempted murder of Kate Sheedy. He also had a long history of domestic violence and remains a suspect in other crimes. News that he has met someone, and has been able to marry her behind bars, has rightly been met with public outrage.

I can only imagine how the news has impacted Bellfield’s victims and their families, and it is concerning that he was introduced to his now wife by a fellow serial killer and was able to propose marriage in the prison visitors’ centre. Under current legislation there are no sufficient powers to prevent that from happening. I therefore welcome these clauses, which will put appropriate legislation in place to ensure that something like it does not happen again.

[Sarah Champion]

It is a pleasure to serve under your wise counsel, Mrs Murray. I am standing against clauses 48, 49 and 50, and against my Front-Bench team in doing so. I do not think that they should be in the Bill, and I would like to explain why.

First, fundamentally, everything I have done in this place is to support victims and survivors and their rights. At my very core, human rights and equality is what motivates me and gets me out of bed every day. It is because of that that I am challenged by these three clauses. Sometimes, we see legislation coming through that is, to quote the Minister, “common-sense legislation”, but it is brought forward for an emotional—or indeed a headline—reason. That does not make it good legislation, and I am concerned that that could be happening in this case.

I also seek to understand how the Government maintain that these measures are compliant with their obligations under the European convention on human rights. For me, the Secretary of State is coming over as God-like, to put it simply. I do not think that we have the right to take away someone’s right to get married or to have a civil partnership, and I question what the benefits of that will be.

I want to believe that there is a restorative purpose for people going to prison. I want to know that by maintaining one relationship, they are able to change and improve. The fact that someone may be seeking marriage gives me hope that there is potential within some of the most wicked and deplorable people whom I have ever had the misfortune to come across. There is hope that they might be able to maintain a meaningful relationship.

Victims and Prisoners Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Ellie Reeves Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th July 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Champion]

I am content at this point with the movement that the Minister has offered. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14

Independent legal advice for victims of rape

“The Secretary of State must develop proposals for a scheme to give victims of rape access to free, independent legal advice.”—(Ellie Reeves.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)]

New clause 14 seeks to introduce independent legal advocates for rape victims. Although it is always awful to be a victim of any crime, seeking justice after a rape is particularly traumatic, not just because of the desperately low chance of the offender being charged—it is currently just 1.6%—or because rape cases take the longest of all crimes to get to court, but because rape and other sexual offences are the only criminal offences in which the victim’s credibility can become the focal point of the police investigation and the trial.

In no other crime would the complainant’s lifestyle, online presence or sexual history be considered relevant to a jury. Coupled with the fact that victims have no right to their own legal support, that can mean that they find themselves trying to navigate a complex and opaque system on their own. That is why one of the things that survivors tell me time and again is that they feel the criminal justice system is working against them, compounding the trauma they have already suffered.

Given the pressures, it is no wonder that nearly 70% of survivors who report a rape drop out of the justice system. I recognise that the Minister has outlined the fact that he is looking at independent legal advice for rape victims, specifically in relation to disclosure. Although I welcome that, the remit needs to be much wider. Too often, the interests of rape victims are not properly protected in the criminal justice process. When that happens, rape survivors need somewhere to turn to get expert legal help, and that is where legal advocates come in.

The alleged offender has a defence lawyer acting and advocating in their interests, but the rape victim has no such support, and that causes many survivors to drop their cases. An independent scheme of legal advocates would help to tackle that. This proposal would not give victim survivors party status in legal proceedings, and would not conflict with fair trial rights and the duty of the Crown to act in the public interest.

It is important to note that independent legal advice schemes for victims already exist in many other jurisdictions, including many European countries, Australia, Japan, California and Ireland. The UK is an outlier in that respect. As it stands, the only specialist independent legal advice for rape survivors in the UK comes from the groups Centre for Women’s Justice and Rights of Women. They do brilliant work, but can assist only a very limited number of survivors. They cannot deliver the full service that survivors often require, so there is a significant level of unmet need.

A pilot scheme of legal advocates was trialled in Northumbria between 2018 and 2020. The survivors who took part gave positive feedback, as did most of the police and prosecutors directly involved with the lawyers in the scheme. One survivor, Susan, said that

“100% in all of this the saving grace has been”

the lawyer,

“without a doubt, without a doubt my saving grace”.

Police and prosecutors were also clear that the accused’s right to a fair trial was not affected. Overall, the pilot found that the legal advocates substantially improved best practice in the police and CPS, and led to an improved victim experience.

Academic research by Dr Olivia Smith of Loughborough University shows that expanding the roll-out of the pilot to every police force in England and Wales would cost just over £4 million a year. The Home Office estimates that the emotional and wellbeing consequences alone of sexual offences, and the inadequate responses to those crimes, cost £9.8 billion. Given that, and the bulk of research showing that legal advocacy improves criminal justice satisfaction, health and employment outcomes, the cost of an independent legal advocate scheme is far from prohibitive, and would likely make huge savings elsewhere across the economy.

I turn to the remit of legal advocates. It is important to outline that, given the complexity and range of the legal issues that survivors encounter, legal advocates need to be trained lawyers, as opposed to independent sexual violence advocates. They need to be able to properly advise survivors on the issues they encounter, as well as conduct legal casework, such as reading police and CPS documents and preparing written representations. They have to be in an organisation entirely separate from any criminal justice bodies, to uphold their independence and, if necessary, liaise directly with the police and the CPS on the survivors’ behalf. However, we are not proposing that legal advocates assist victims at trial or represent them before the court. We are also not proposing that they play a role in the day-to-day communications between police and survivors. Rather, they would support the victim on specific issues that arise where legal expertise is required, from the moment they report their case to the police right through to trial. Importantly, they would be available free of charge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

In the latest progress update, we also recognised that there is more to do. I want to be very clear on the record that I am not unsupportive of what the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge seeks to achieve with her amendment. Indeed, to better understand whether independent legal advice and representation is required, and how it could work in practice alongside our wider reforms and in broader interactions with the system, we have asked the Law Commission to explore the merits of independent legal advice and representation, and how that would work in practice, recognising among other things the specific challenges in cases of rape and serious sexual offences, in terms of third-party material and similar. We also hope that the Law Commission will consider in the round why one particular set of cases should attract it while others would not, and whether that would be an equitable approach. There are very specific reasons in the case of RASSO cases, but we have asked the Law Commission to look at it carefully.

The Law Commission’s consultation on the use of evidence in sexual prosecutions was published on 23 May and will run until the end of September. I suspect that it will cover this matter and a wide range of other matters that we have discussed. I look forward to closely reviewing the Law Commission’s findings and, through gathering that additional evidence, arriving at a well-informed position on this important issue, and how it might be practical to deliver on such a commitment, subject to what the Law Commission says, and to decisions by the Lord Chancellor. To continue our improvements to third-party material requests through the Bill, we are also introducing duties on policing, which we debated when considering new clause 4. In addition, the victims code will introduce an entitlement for adult victims of rape and serious sexual offences to be offered a meeting with the prosecution team once they have been notified that the case is proceeding to trial. That will give victims the opportunity to discuss what happens next and to ask any questions that they have about the process.

On supporting victims to access the right to review process, the CPS notifies victims by letter of decisions not to charge or to stop a case, and offers eligible victims the right to request a review and gives details on how to do that. I will suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General that she and the Director of Public Prosecutions undertake an exercise akin to the one that the hon. Member for Rotherham and I did to look at how—often standard—letters are worded and framed, to ensure that they are sensitive and communicate clearly. That would be a matter for the Attorney General’s office.

In our view, it is slightly premature at this stage to propose a specific approach to free legal advice without taking into account the findings, and the expert advice, of the Law Commission’s important work on these issues. In the light of that work, we will probably return to these questions when it reports.

[Ellie Reeves]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I take some comfort from him saying that he is unable to support the new clause “at this stage” and that it is premature rather than something that is not being looked at. It is an incredibly important issue. I note that the Law Commission is looking at it. I would not want to see the issue kicked into the long grass.

[Edward Argar]

May I offer to meet the hon. Lady to discuss this in advance of the Law Commission work, so that the two of us can discuss it further, as Minister and shadow Minister?

[Ellie Reeves]

I would very much welcome that, and I am grateful for the offer. I will not press the new clause to a vote in the light of what the Minister has said. He acknowledges on the rape review that came out yesterday that there is more to do. I gently suggest that this is one of the key things that could be done so that we start to see some real progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 20

Data-sharing for immigration purposes: exemption for victims

“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements to ensure that personal data of a victim, as defined by section 1 of this Act, that is processed for the purpose of that person requesting or receiving support or assistance under the Victims Code is not used for the maintenance of immigration control.

(2) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 shall not apply to the personal data to which subsection (1) applies.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the Secretary of State must issue guidance to—

(a) persons providing relevant victim support services, as defined by section 12 of this Act;

(b) persons exercising any function of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality; and

(c) persons exercising any function conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer.

(4) In this section “immigration control” means United Kingdom immigration control and includes any United Kingdom immigration control operated in a prescribed control zone outside the United Kingdom.”—(Sarah Champion.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Sarah Champion]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I wonder if it will help to start by saying that the Deputy Speaker has said that the debate in the Chamber will go all the way to 5 pm—I will preface my quite long speech with that, but I will keep it moving.

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[Sarah Champion]

The situation that we are in pains me, and it pains me that the Minister is unable to move forward on this. It is not enough to inform those vulnerable victims; I need to see the police being informed of what they ought, and ought not, to be doing. I will withdraw the new clause, but I assure the Minister that it will come back. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 21

Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

“(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—

‘2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person (“A”) is convicted of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of another person (“B”); and

(b) A and B had parental responsibility for the same child (“C”) at the time at which the offence was committed.

(2) Subject to the exceptions in subsection (3), A ceases to have parental responsibility for C while A is serving a custodial sentence in a prison or other place of detention in respect of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of B.

(3) The exceptions are where a conviction for manslaughter was made—

(a) as a result of the partial defences provided for in section 54 (partial defence to murder: loss of control) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, or

(b) on the grounds of diminished responsibility

in circumstances in which, on the balance of probability, A was a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour by B at the time of the killing or at a time reasonably proximate to it.’

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision that is consequential on this section.

(3) The power to make regulations under subsection (2) may (among other things) be exercised by modifying any provision made by or under an enactment.

(4) Regulations under this section—

(a) may make transitional and saving provision;

(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Ellie Reeves.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ellie Reeves]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Under the law, if a father is found guilty of killing his children’s mother, he retains parental responsibility over the children. That means that after ending their mother’s life and destroying the children’s lives, such killers still have power over their children—power to be involved in decisions affecting their lives and power to continue controlling and abusive behaviour over the family of their victim. The new clause would end that dreadful situation.

The new clause would reverse the situation in which the onus is on the victim’s family to prove, often through protracted legal proceedings, why the perpetrator’s parental responsibility should be revoked. Instead, the killer’s parental responsibility would be automatically removed for the period they were in prison, and the onus placed on them to go through the legal hoops to prove that they deserve that responsibility. That would apply to all those found guilty of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the other parent.

The loss of a parent to violence creates deep trauma. We have no official figures for how many children lose their mothers in that way, but we know that two women are killed by their partner or former partner each week. One trauma specialist I spoke with, who has worked with hundreds of children whose mothers were killed by their fathers, estimates that about 50 mothers are killed by the father per year. In those cases, the children are dealing not just with grief, but with the loss of their parent—the mother is almost always the victim in such cases—and with the feelings of anger, shame and confusion that accompany having a father who has committed such an abhorrent act.

Retaining parental responsibility, however, allows those men to continue to exercise control over the children and surviving family from their prison cells. That results in an indefensible situation—his permission must be sought for things such as schooling or medical treatment, or before the children can be taken abroad. That forces the children’s carers, who are often the only stability the children have left, to engage with the killer and his wishes. That can be hugely distressing and, in turn, can potentially destabilise the children’s recovery.

Some abusive fathers even try to block maternal family members from gaining custody of the children they love, leaving the children to grow up in the care system instead. That has left some families unable to see their loved nieces, nephews or grandchildren—for months on end, as legal battles go through the courts—at the exact time when they are needed most to support the children.

The fact that a convicted killer’s parental responsibility cannot be suspended without protracted legal battles is a huge injustice. What greater dereliction of duty towards a child can there be than to rob them of their mother and burden them with a lifetime of trauma? Many are raised knowing that the perpetrator retains intimate knowledge of and access to their lives, which undermines their recovery. For some, that results in fear—they might themselves be in danger—and for others, in decisions made not in their best interest but rather to deprive them of opportunities out of sheer spite.

Children Heard and Seen, a charity that supports children impacted by parental imprisonment, reports that the retention of the father’s rights is a significant traumatising factor in those children’s lives. Children need stability, and their guardians having to fight in the family courts runs counter to that. As I have outlined, our new clause would end that.

I now turn to the case that helped shape the new clause: that of Jade Ward. Jade was 27. She had recently left her former partner when she was murdered by him in her home. Her four young sons were all in the house at the time. Jade’s killer was given a life sentence last year, with the judge calling the attack “merciless”. However, Jade’s family were horrified to find that their daughter’s killer retained rights over the children.

Jade’s parents said that her killer started to cause ripples not long after being sentenced, asking to see the boys’ school reports and attendance notes. They were then informed by social workers that, if they wanted to take the children on holiday, he would have to be consulted, and that he still had the power to take decisions on medical treatment. Jade’s mother said:

“He had lost control of Jade so he did what he did, and now he has still got control because he is controlling the boys and controlling us and it is horrific…He is in prison, but his presence is still looming. Any rights should have been taken away from him the moment he took away their mother…You cannot put into words the added worry and the stress because of him. It means we still can’t move on.”

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[Jess Phillips]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if we were to walk up to anybody in the street and ask them whether a murderous father could decide whether his children could go on holiday, they would think we were mad? Yet that is so clearly the case.

[Ellie Reeves]

I have spoken to countless people about this situation and frankly, when I say that a dad can retain from his prison cell parental responsibility when he has killed the kids’ mum, they look aghast. They cannot make sense of it; it does not make sense. That is why this new clause is so important.

[Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)]

I understand the general point that the hon. Lady is making. Surely there are powers in social services and in the courts to completely remove the parental responsibility in question here. Is that not something that should be exercised? Can the hon. Lady not imagine also that there could be a case where a mother who had been brutalised over a period lost control or perhaps just defended herself so vigorously that it became a manslaughter? In circumstances such as those, we could imagine that the mother’s parents might be looking after the child and she might want to see school reports.

[Ellie Reeves]

In relation to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s first point, yes, families can go through the family court to get a special guardianship order. I will say a bit more about that later. However, it puts the onus on the victims’ families to go through protracted, costly and often opaque family law processes for that to happen. That can take years.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Or social services.

[Ellie Reeves]

But parental responsibility remains, so while that goes on, the dad still has a say.

[Sir Oliver Heald]

Well, it is an urgent case.

[Ellie Reeves]

But they are not heard urgently; it takes years, as in the case of Jade Ward and other survivors and families I have spoken to.

In relation to the second point, I will go on to speak about how those people are specifically protected. Under the new clause, those convicted of manslaughter with a defence of loss of control or diminished responsibility and who at the time of the offence were subjected to coercive or controlling behaviour by the person they killed would not be caught, as there is specific carve-out. I will talk a little more about that as I go on, but I want to end what I was saying about Jade Ward by paying tribute to her family in highlighting the situation and trying to stop other families from facing the suffering they have faced.

I now want to talk about Mumtahina Jannat, known as Ruma, as her case also outlines the injustice that is occurring. Ruma was murdered by her violent ex-husband. On hearing the news, Ruma’s niece, the renowned children’s author Onjali Raúf, went straight to the house to find the children, but they had already been taken straight from school into foster care. She was not allowed to know where the children were or to make contact with them, while from his jail cell the killer was given the phone number of the foster parent and allowed to make contact with them, sending them letters. That is despite the fact that Ruma turned to Onjali and her mother for help when she fled with her children to a refuge five years earlier. Onjali said:

“We saw those kids every other day…Our home was a refuge for them. We would watch films with them and take them on holiday. They were part of our family…We didn’t see the children for over a year. After we were finally reunited with them, they asked us questions that gave us hints about the lies they were being told in those letters. Lies that tried to justify his murder of their mother…That youthful confidence was sucked out of them. And of course they had trouble trusting us again—why would they?”

Commenting on the current situation, Onjali said:

“Until it happens to you, you don’t know how broken the system is…You don’t know it’s geared towards this violent person, who has all the protections and all the rights…There’s no justice. ‘Justice’ isn’t the right name for this system.”

For Onjali’s family, new clause 21, which would change the law on parental responsibility, would be a step towards justice.

There is a school of thought that says that children always benefit from contact with their parent, but that is contrary to the available evidence. I met with Diane Clarke, whose mother was killed in 1978 when Diane was just 10 years old. Her father was charged with murder, which he denied, although he admitted manslaughter. He was sentenced at Birmingham Crown court to just three years in prison.

When her father was released, Diane was sent to live with him. She told me that at the time she felt that that was what she wanted, yearning for a normal family set-up, but as a child she did not recognise the domestic abuse she had witnessed for what it was or that she had been groomed by her dad to disrespect her mum. Only now, as an adult, does she realise the further harm inflicted on her by this living arrangement. She says that she realised she lived in fear that she would anger him and he would kill her too. Let us be clear: this was not an irrational fear, given that he had already killed someone he claimed to love.

New clause 21 would deliver protections for cases such as Diane’s, as it contains provisions for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter to have their parental responsibility suspended. That is necessary, as so many cases of domestic homicide result in a manslaughter rather than a murder conviction. This is often despite long histories of domestic abuse featuring in these cases.

Take, for example, the case of Joanna Simpson. She was killed by her estranged husband, Robert Brown, in 2010. The attack began when Brown was returning their two children, aged nine and 10, after a half term visit. Brown used a hammer he had packed in the children’s bag and bludgeoned Joanna repeatedly. He then put her body in the car with the children in it and took her to the site of a pre-dug grave, where he buried her. Joanna’s friends and family all describe the killing as taking place in the context of long-term abuse, but Brown was convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. It is vital that killers such as Robert Brown are prevented from causing more harm to their children, regardless of what the conviction for killing ends up being. New clause 21 would ensure that.

All the cases I have referred to involve men who have killed women. However, it is right to acknowledge that there are some women in prison for manslaughter having killed their partner after suffering years of domestic abuse—a point made by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire. We recognise the very specific nature of those crimes and that, in such circumstances, the risk to the children presented by the killer is not the same. Therefore, in new clause 21 we have included an exemption where a manslaughter conviction is made on the grounds of loss of control or diminished responsibility and the prisoner had, on the balance of probabilities, been a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour by the person killed at or near the time of the killing. In these rare cases, I do not consider that the mother should automatically lose their parental responsibility. That is why new clause 21 contains the exemption.

I turn to the current system. I appreciate that new guardians can already seek a special guardianship order over the children, meaning that their parental responsibility would trump the perpetrator’s, although they would still need to consult him on some things and would not be able to do certain important things without his consent. However, that still places an extra burden on the family in terms of legal proceedings. Given the abysmal court delays, that is another hurdle for a family that has already been through legal proceedings in the criminal court.

I also understand that the family can seek an adoption order, but that can feel uncomfortable for families as it legally alters the relationship between the children if they are with the family. For example, if they are adopted by their grandmother, she legally becomes their mother and their birth mother legally becomes their deceased sister. But that is beside the point. As Onjali says,

“Why do we even think murderers should have parental responsibility? They forfeited that ‘responsibility’ when they killed their children’s mother. It’s beyond logic.”

New clause 21 would remove the burden of lengthy, stressful proceedings in the family court and give children the security they so desperately need: that their new guardians have responsibility for them and that they are safe.

To conclude, the research is clear that adverse childhood experiences have a huge impact on how children grow and develop. New clause 21 is about doing what is best for the children left behind: safeguarding their rights, protecting them from abusers and trying to give them the best possible means to thrive. It is about valuing the rights of children over those of abusers.

One year on from the petition for Jade’s law, it is indefensible that men who kill their partners, often after long periods of abuse, are still able to exercise control over the surviving children and their guardians from their prison cell. I note the Justice Minister’s comments today outlining his support after months of campaigning from Labour. I also note his comment that he is looking to find a quicker way to cut off parental rights for killers. Today is that opportunity with new clause 21. By voting for it, we can end an indefensible situation and truly make this a Bill for victims. Failing to do so is a vote for more delay, leaving vulnerable children unprotected and victims’ families having to fight through the backlogged courts. I hope that Government Members will vote to support Jade’s law today.

[Edward Argar]

I thank the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge for her new clause, which seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in the tragic circumstances where one parent of a child has been convicted of murdering or committing voluntary manslaughter of the other for the term of their imprisonment for such an offence. I do of course have the deepest sympathy for families dealing with such a tragic event—including the family of Jade Ward, who have campaigned bravely and tenaciously for the change to be made.

The hon. Lady and I debated the issue in November last year in Westminster Hall, following which the right hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside introduced me to Jade’s parents, who were there to listen to that debate. I suspect that this view will be shared by the shadow Minister: I think everyone in that room was struck by their quiet dignity in the face of everything they have had to put up with and endure while campaigning.

Strengthening measures to ensure the safety of children and vulnerable parents continues to be a top priority for the Government and something we remain deeply committed to. I agree that in such tragic circumstances family members who are stepping in to care for the child or children should be better supported, and that, fundamentally, an abusive parent who has committed such a terrible offence should not be able to use family court proceedings as a further way of exerting control or tormenting a tragically bereaved family. As the Lord Chancellor stated in The Sun today,

“It should be presumed that when one parent murders another, denying their child of a loving parent, they should not have the right to make decisions on that child’s life.”

I agree with the Lord Chancellor. He was clearly setting out the view of His Majesty’s Government. It is now a matter of how that intent is achieved.

As the Lord Chancellor has stated, there will of course be exceptions, as the hon. Lady’s amendment recognises, such as victims of domestic violence and domestic abuse who lash out after years of abuse, for whom automatic restriction would not be appropriate. But restricting the right should be the norm. It is right that time is taken to properly look at the options, however, to ensure that exceptions are captured—I will come on to the legal reasons in the light of a recent case in a minute—and we are looking for the quickest way and most appropriate vehicle. The shadow Minister would say we have one in front of us as we sit in this room today, and that might prove to be the case. However, we do not believe this new clause is the right route to remedy this situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister, but I will go on to explain why I believe the drafting is not necessarily appropriate. I assure her that there are no plans to prorogue or dissolve Parliament in the immediate future that I am aware of.

I would also like to make clear that the courts do have the power to seriously restrict the exercise of parental responsibility when it is in the child’s best interests. I heard the points made by the shadow Minister in respect of that process. I draw hon. Members’ attention to the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Re A, regarding parental responsibility. In that judgment, the President of the Family Division confirmed that Parliament has already given the court the power to empty a father’s parental responsibility of all content and prevent them from making any future applications to the court, regardless of the marital status of the parent or how parental responsibility was acquired. Courts can and do make use of that power when it is appropriate to do so, but crucially, they are able to do so considering all the unique circumstances of the individual case, with the child’s best interests at the heart of their decision. The new clause potentially would remove that ability. However, I take the shadow Minister’s underlying point about how retraumatising and traumatic going through the family court in that context can be.

As I said earlier, I have huge sympathy for the aims of the amendment, particularly in respect of the processes and procedures that bereaved families have to go through in order to achieve the result they desire. We are committed to taking action to address this issue, as the Lord Chancellor has unequivocally set out. In response to the Ward family’s calls for reform, we have asked the Family Procedure Rule Committee in the interim to make the court process less time-consuming and more straightforward for families applying for special guardianship orders and other orders to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in these or similar circumstances. The committee is actively considering what changes can be made to deliver that. Also, as of 1 May, the Government have extended the scope of legal aid for making special guardianship orders. That means that in private family proceedings where an individual wishes to become a special guardian, they can receive legally aided advice and representation to help them do that, subject to a means test.

I agree that there is more that can and should be done. That is why we are actively working on what changes could be made to the law on parental to rectify the position that the Ward family have highlighted through their campaign, while avoiding unintended or perverse consequences from those changes. We need to fully consider the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Re A case as part of that.

I am very concerned about the risk that an automatic suspension of parental responsibility could be deemed to breach the child’s rights under articles 6 and 8 of the European convention on human rights, potentially leading to legal action or undermining what we are all trying to resolve here with minimal legal challenge. It is better that we take the intervening months to carefully consider what is the right approach in the light of that judgment, and return—hopefully swiftly—with a fully drafted and carefully considered proposal that guarantees the core principle of the Children Act that the family court should always have the best interests of the child at heart, but that also seeks to address the underlying point, the underlying intention, of the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge.

This new clause has, as I hope everyone can agree, an entirely noble and uncontroversial aim. We all have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them. I am happy to work with the hon. Lady on this if she so wishes. I will repeat the words of the Lord Chancellor, which set out the Government’s position:

“It should be presumed that when one parent murders another, denying their child…a loving parent, they should not have the right to make decisions on that child’s life.”

I have to say in response to the final point made by the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge, with whom I tend to agree—not all the time, but a lot of the time—that on this, I disagree with her. Voting against the new clause is not a vote for doing nothing or a vote to reject a solution that works. It will be a vote for taking the time to get it right.

[Ellie Reeves]

I have listened to what the Minister has had to say, but the Government have had ample time to bring forward proposals on this matter. A new clause could have been presented by the Government in relation to this Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the issue has been being raised since as far back as 2016. We had the debate last November. Therefore the Government have had more than enough time to bring forward proposals. There is a proposal on the table today to end this situation once and for all. That is why I will press new clause 21 to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Janet Daby]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In discussing new clause 25, I will focus on the Government’s own equality statement on the Bill. Hon. Members will recognise the problem of disproportionalities in criminal justice. Too often, minority groups face unfairness in how they are treated in the justice system. More action is required to identify those inequalities, and where they are identified, they must be tackled.

The new clause requires the Government to lay before Parliament an annual report covering how the Secretary of State has exercised his powers regarding release decisions for top-tier offenders. The report would include how a case is referred, the decision from that referral, and information about the appeal mechanism after referral. All the information will be broken down by protected characteristics.

I wish to make three brief points. First, black and Asian prisoners and those aged 18 to 20 fall into the top-tier category at a higher rate than other parole-eligible prisoners; they are over-represented. That is why the new clause is required: to record such concerns. For some protected characteristics, such as marital status or pregnancy, it would be difficult to identify the impact of clauses 35 to 39, and the equality statement recognises that. However, the new clause requires reporting on all protected characteristics to catch disproportionalities that are not currently identified, but may arise in future. It is also a tool to address wider concerns of disproportionality. Between Committee and Report stages, I hope the Minister will include that point in his consideration of whether to revise the clauses.

Secondly, following recommendations made in the Lammy review, the Ministry of Justice committed to publishing

“more and better data on ethnicity where possible”.

Let us please follow that principle. If a new power is given, information on how the power will affect ethnic minority groups should be published. In response to the Secretary of State’s new referral powers, therefore, I hope he will publish that kind of data. Unfortunately, new powers are often introduced before Ministers are required to publish regular information on the impact of the powers. I hope the Minister will not make this another such example. It is in the Minister’s interest to produce an annual report and to allow parliamentarians to scrutinise the issue, so that he and his colleagues in the Ministry of Justice have more information and can be proactive in tackling inequalities.

That brings me to my third and final point, on victims and public protection. The equality statement highlights the Government’s belief that confidence in the system must be balanced against the case for rehabilitation—I refer Members to page 30 of the equality statement. Unfortunately, I am not yet convinced by that analysis. Building confidence in the parole process is inherently linked to the rehabilitation of offenders. If it is not—as the Government’s equality statement seems to indicate—it will fail to reassure victims and it will undermine the Government’s aim of prioritising public protection.

The impact assessment for the Bill shows that, in recent years, about a third of those who would be classified as top-tier offenders have been released. Even after the Bill gains Royal Assent, top-tier offenders are expected to be released at a similar rate. That is why rehabilitation is essential for victims and for public protection. We must make best use of: rehabilitation opportunities; key work; the use of open conditions where appropriate; and release on licence to facilitate reintegration back into the community. I accept that that will not always be possible, but I expect that the Minister in his reply will agree that a range of options should be available when making a release decision. Perhaps he could reflect on how creating a top tier of offences might better interact with rehabilitation opportunities. That will reassure victims and protect the wider public.

I hope that the new clause encourages the Minister to acknowledge the issues highlighted in the equality assessment, and to consider how we can resolve them as the Bill passes through Parliament.

[Ellie Reeves]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East for moving new clause 25. As I outlined earlier, there is concern across the political spectrum about the impact of clauses 35 and 36. I also share my hon. Friend’s concerns about racial disproportionality in our criminal justice system. The equality impact assessment for the Bill finds that the provision it makes for the creation of a top tier of prisoners will disproportionately impact black and Asian prisoners and young adults. As the Prison Reform Trust’s evidence points out, the Government have made

“no provision to mitigate or prevent that discriminatory impact.”

It therefore seems sensible that the Secretary of State should report annually on the use of the powers on release decisions. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.